Abstract. Pro-Kremlin Youth Movements in Russia and the Idea of Conservative Modernisation (*) Laura Petrone N. 46 APRIL 2011

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1 Laura Petrone N. 46 APRIL 2011 Pro-Kremlin Youth Movements in Russia and the Idea of Conservative Modernisation (*) Over the past decade youth movements have been a primary concern for the Russian leadership, to the extent that both Putin and Medvedev have shown a strong commitment in promoting the participation of young people in structures directly or indirectly linked to the Kremlin. Indeed the supervision of the spaces of civic engagement, at the level of formal and informal youth groups, and the ability to orchestrate them to some degree, have proven to be of strategic importance for the Russian leadership. Clearly, the social space constitutes a privileged sphere of intervention for containing the main sources of pluralism. In the era of globalisation and democratic legitimacy the incumbents recognise that civil society actors such as NGOs, trade unions and social movements, are necessary for the modernisation of the country and that their potential should be exploited. Yet, in their view these structures represent a precious resource provided that they do not threat the established order which defines the boundaries within which social activism is deemed legitimate. This is not to deny the existence of a kind of a genuine youth activism, not orchestrated from above, in contemporary Russia. On the contrary, numerous empirical studies demonstrate the flourishing of organisations and other social actors which openly oppose the regime: those politically engaged operate both as youth sections of opposition parties, such as Molodëzhnoe Yabloko and the National Bolshevik Party, and as non party organisations, such as the Moscow Helsinki Group and the Garry Kasparov s United Civil Front, which count many young people among their members. Although extremely different in political orientation and frequently divided, over the last five years these movements have succeeded in arrange an umbrella coalition cited as Drugaya Rossiya (Other Russia). Significantly, this front is strongly opposed by the government and it has recently been denied registration as political party by the Russian Justice Ministry. This issue is not covered in our discussion, however. Abstract This analysis seeks to outline the role of pro-government youth organisations in Russia in supporting the Kremlin s policy agenda in relation to the modernization process. Particularly, it shows the shift in the movements main role from bulwark against coloured revolutions to championing the incumbents plan of conservative modernisation : this expression was coined by Dmitrii Trenin to indicate the leaders priority of reforming the country without losing traditional values and political stability. The overall programmes and activities of three principal youth pro-kremlin organisations are analysed with the aim of ascertaining and ability to vehicle the official discourse. In the final section, Russia s political context is also considered in the light of the recent upheavals in the Arab world and of the strategies used by the leadership to preserve the established order. Are the social demands that brought the Arab protestors to topple their regimes hared by Russians? Or are they only confined to the North Caucasus region where widespread discontentproduces different kind of popular mobilitation, including terrorism? Laura Petrone holds a doctorate of Political Science from the University of Bologna. (*) The opinions expressed herein are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of ISPI.

2 2 ISPI - Analysis From counterweighing the coloured revolutions to supporting the modernisation project The need to supervise mobilisation initiatives among the younger generations was found to be particularly urgent after that the coloured revolutions, under the slogan for greater democracy and transparency, have dethroned the post-soviet regimes in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005). In those events it was precisely the role of youth organisations, with the support of international foundations, to be crucial in dismissing an entire ruling class. Since then, vaccinating the country against the orange threat has become a priority. Efforts have been made to set up a political activism that satisfied all the requirements of a Western civil society but that was somewhat managed from above, as a counterweight to potential opposition groups driven from outside: movements like Nashi and Molodaya Gvardiya, which have their precursors in Idushchie Vmeste and Molodëzhnoe Edinstvo respectively, were originally conceived with this specific task 1. However, even after the immediate menace coming from an orange revolution withered away, the pro-government organisations have continued to function as a major source of support to the Kremlin policy agenda, contributing to vehicle the official view on issues of interest among the new generations. Particularly, this support has inevitably encompassed the leadership s peculiar view on how to carry out the great project of modernisation, one of the most urgent and debated question in contemporary Russia. As Dmitrii Trenin 2 puts it, the idea of a conservative modernisation, to be accomplished in an evolutionary manner without eroding or weakening the state structures, has emerged as an hallmark of Medvedev s Presidency. This is best expressed in the President Medvedev s famous article Rossiya vpered! (Go Russia!): when talking about the modernisation path that should be followed in both the economic and political realms, he explicitly condemns the supporters of a permanent revolution to overcome the country s backwardness: «Hasty and illconsidered political reforms have led to tragic consequences more than once in our history. They have pushed Russia to the brink of collapse. We cannot risk our social stability and endanger the safety of our citizens for the sake of abstract theories. We are not entitled to sacrifice stable life, even for the highest goals» 3. Alongside the gradualist approach, this idea is centered on Russia s core values, at least at a rhetorical level, such as sovereignty and territorial integrity, patriotism and traditional family, which in domestic politics are embodied in the concept of suverennaya demokratsiya. Broadly used in public speeches, it combines the discourse on Russia as an independent and sovereign power, with the practical need to compact the ruling elite around the line dictated from the Kremlin, ensuring an effective glue and a powerful source of legitimacy. Vladislav Surkov, the first deputy head of the Presidential Administration and the main ideologist of sovereign democracy, in his policy document called The Nationalisation of the Future 4 refers to Russia as a «puissant energy power» that will rise «out of a struggle for possession of high technology and not out of an overgrowth of the energy sector». In this vein, the task of reforming Russia is perceived as a sort of national mission to be accomplished through a specific, domestic model of development. This is true notwithstanding the recent initiatives aimed at fostering the alliance with Western countries in the EU-Russia modernisation partnership: the latter case shows more a Moscow concern in attracting Western capital following the economic crash of the late 2008 rather than the willingness to fully adopt Western standards of development. 1 Nashi s manifesto is quite explicit in stating this anti-orange intent. See Molodëzhnoe demokraticheskoe dvizhenie Nashi, Manifest, last accessed 16 December D. TRENIN, Russia s Conservative Modernisation A Mission Impossible?, «SAIS Review», Vol. 30, No. 1, Winter-Spring 2010, pp D. MEDVEDEV, Rossiya vperëd. Stat ya Prezidenta Dmitriya Medvedeva, 10 September 2009, kremlin.ru/news/ V. SURKOV, Natsionalizatsiya budushego, «Ekspert», 20 June 2006.

3 ISPI - Analysis 3 Russian young people are given a central role in supporting the official discourse, and President Medvedev in many occasions has publicly invited the new generation to take active part in it. On July 2010 in Seliger was held the International Youth Forum, a camp organised by the Russian government to promote youth activism and entrepreneurship skills; in that event the President, addressing to thousands of young people, stated: «the future of our country depends on you, people who have the most advanced minds, boundless energy, a huge working capacity and do not hesitate to express their own emotions» 5. Nashi, Molodaya Gvardiya, Mestnye and the official idea of modernisation The Russian post-imperial nationalism and its fundamental claims are thoroughly reflected in the programmes and main activities of the pro-government youth movements as have been set up in the last years. Our analysis will focus on three main movements all dating back to 2005, Nashi, Molodaia Gvardiya and Mestnye, in order to ascertain their adherence and potential contribution to the aforementioned concept of conservative modernisation. The programmes: To begin with, Nashi s guiding principles reproduce with striking fidelity some concepts which return in the leaders official speeches. Indeed, since its birth the movement has laid out a consistent mega-project, based on a coherent analysis of the historical and political role of Russia in the contemporary world. In its manifesto the Russian youth is asked to accept a great challenge, to make the country the world leader in the twenty-first century. As core of the Eurasian geopolitical axis, it is stated, Russia has the important responsibility towards history in defending its own territorial integrity from those forces who want to downsize its leading role within the international political scenario: «today the United States on the one hand and international terrorism on the other aspire to control the Eurasia and the entire world. Their ambitions aim at Russia. The task of the younger generation is to defend the sovereignty of our country today, as our grandparents did sixty years ago». Here the reference to Russia as a great power engaged in a never-ending rivalry with the West promptly evokes the still immense emotional echo of the WWII experience, one of the central discourses of Russian patriotism. It is not surprising that among the Nashi founders appears Vladislav Surkov himself, who at that time planned to make it a new structure to support the ruling party United Russia (UR), providing it with a strong ideological platform to attract votes especially among young people. Thanks to the personal support of the former President and current Prime Minister Putin, the movement rapidly gained wide popularity, particularly over the 2007/2008 election cycle, reaching of members. The idea of engaging the rising generations in the modernisation project is explicitly espoused by the movement Molodaya Gvardiya (Young Guard). Unlike Nashi, this group has been formally affiliated with the majority political party Edinaya Rossiya (United Russia) since its birth in 2005: in the 2007 parliamentary elections substantial numbers of its members were elected on United Russia s party list and it is likely that some molodogvardeitsy will appear in UR lists in the next parliamentary elections of December The doctrinal section of its general manifesto 6 says: «We believe that Russia must be strong and independent from the opinion of the Western democracies friends». The so called modernisation of the cadres and of the economy in which the Russian youth is called upon to participate is cited as one of the engines of development for Russia. In this respect, the organisation offers rather easy opportunities to earn money by offering 5 E. ROMANOV, Medvedev pobeshchal tok-shou. Glava gosudarstva vpervye posetil molodëzhnyi Forum na Seliger, «Vzglyad. Delovaya Gazeta», 8 July Manifest, Molodoi Gvardii Edinoi Rossii Prinyat tret em s ezdom organizatsii, ru/convention/manifest.

4 4 ISPI - Analysis political support to the Presidential administration and even to enter into politics. Not surprisingly, Molodaya Gvardiya activists share with the Nashi colleagues the perception of the movement as an effective career development path and a venue of self-realization 7. Similarly, the Dvizhenie molodykh politicheskikh ekologov Mestnye (Union of the young political ecologists The Locals ) defines itself as «an union of not indifferent [sic] young people, [who] have come together to create and implement their ideas to develop themselves and participate in the development and modernisation of the country» 8. As in the case of Nashi and Molodaya Gvardiya the Mestnye appears to assume a clear conservative stance: among the core values of the movement there are the protection of, and the compliance to, the traditions of the native land, patriotism, the respect for elders and the aspiration to establish a full-fledged family with at least 3 children. The environmental element, i.e. the protection of the richness and beauty of our country from an unsustainable exploitation and pollution receives less attention in the manifesto, though the ecological motive is supposed to be the movement s distinctiveness. Nevertheless, it is deftly linked to the Russia s fate through the slogan of ekologicheskaya modernizatsiya (ecological modernisation), i.e. a sustainable path of development to be pursued through a qualitative transformation of the major factors which impact on the environment 9. The Actions: Since its founding, Nashi has undertaken a number of high-profile mass events, mostly in support of the Kremlin and always patriotic in orientation. Its inaugural mass rally took place on May 15, 2005, few days after the Den Pobedy (the Day of Victory): an estimated 60,000 youths from all over the Russian Federation marched in Moscow to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the Soviet victory over the Nazis and to recall the independence of their country. In addition, Nashi members on several occasions have been reported to intimidate opposition groups and personalities who publicly criticise the government: in 2006 members of Nashi conducted a campaign against the British ambassador in Moscow, Tony Brenton, as he attended an opposition conference called Another Russia on July In April and May 2007, Nashi members held daily protests in front of the Estonian embassy in Moscow against the moving of the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn to a military cemetery 11. Once the immediate threat of an orange revolution faded away, the movement Nashi has undergone a deep reorganisation to align the movement with Russia s post-election strategic interests. This took place in the aftermath of the 2007 State Duma and 2008 presidential elections, confirming that its role was primarily political, to shore up support for Putin s course among youth. As Nashi s leader, Nikita Borovikov, explained, «like any civic organisation, [Nashi] coordinates its activity in line with the needs of the state. The state is now in great need of political and economic innovation. We will occupy this niche and do everything that is required of us» 12. This statement sounds like an explicit commitment to comply with the incumbents strategy addressing the modernisation challenges. Allegedly this renewal, culminated in the closure of most of the 50 regional offices replaced by nationwide projects, takes on a specific social orientation. Most of the projects have either a strongly didactic focus, as in campaigns against public alcohol consumption and gambling, or are designed to give assistance to vulnerable populations, especially war veterans. In 7 See interviews to the movements representatives in E. LEVINTOVA, J. BUTTERFIELD, History Education and Historical Remembrance in Contemporary Russia: Sources of Political Attitudes of pro-kremlin Youth, «Communist and Post-communist Studies», Vol. 43, No. 2, 2010, pp (159). 8 Dvizhenie molodykh politicheskikh ekologov «Mestnye», O dvizhenii, 9 My i ekologicheskaya modernizatsiya, 10 Russian youths 'hound UK envoy', BBC News, 8 December I. TRAYNOR, EU protests over Russian attacks on ambassadors, «The Guardian», 3 May «Nezavisimaya Gazeta», 5 August 2008.

5 ISPI - Analysis 5 this perspective youth movements like Nashi are to be considered not only in terms of their political role but also as actively engaged in providing social welfare policies. As such, they offer forms of social service to the needy, working in concert (sometimes explicitly in partnership ) with state social welfare institutions 13. As regards Molodaya Gvardiya s main activity, it operates from local offices which are not formally supervised by one overarching federal headquarters. Instead, United Russia s regional bases provide an umbrella leadership; by and large the movement is less protest-oriented then Nashi and not as much engaged in street initiatives. The more institutional profile makes it an organisation primarily committed to recruiting from among young participants of United Russia events. It sponsors the advancement of Molodaya Gvardiya candidates in Russian politics, via proposing every six months the participation of its members to the party primary elections at both federal and regional level: to date nine candidates from the movement are expected to compete for the next Duma elections of December Besides the movement s active involvement in the modernisation of cadres, the role of Molodaya Gvardiya in supplying a sort of ideological blueprint for the young generations should be stressed. Among the most visible initiatives is the project Rossiiskaya natsiya-rukovodstvo k deistviyu (Russian nation-guide to action) carried out by the movement coordinators in a clear, lucid attempt to ascertain the main problems facing Russian youth, like the factors hindering the education of young citizens to national values 15. The main argument focuses on the lacking of a common, unifying idea to be shared by the public at large, as strong as it was the building up of a classless society in Soviet times. Particularly, the question of identity ( problema identichnosti-kto my? ) embraces the very sense of belonging to a community which is synthesised in the awareness to represent something opposed to the others ; such an identity becomes extremely relevant in ensuring the stable development of the country: «The worst thing that could happen to people who inherited the ruins of the once-great Soviet Empire is to lose the national unity, and with it the universal national identity». As a matter of fact, as showed by some extensive researches, when it comes to depict the Russian youth in terms of future perspectives and expectations what emerges is a picture full of contrasts. On the one hand there has been an improvement of its economic status in the past few years, on the other hand a certain degree of frustration and disillusion becomes apparent: young Russians are aware that they can only count on themselves to solve their problems and to be successful; they do not expect much from the authorities or from society as a whole and, more significantly, when it comes to assess the future of the country they are more pessimistic then they are about their own future 16. As sociologists point out, society can only bear change if its population can apply a meaningful interpretation to social reality. If this is not possible, social change leads to crisis-laden insecurity and instability in short, to anomie. This is a great risk for a ruling class which is perfectly aware of the necessity of reforming the country and of the precious support from the young people to achieve that. In this perspective, the idea of nation is considered capable to provide not only a common ground for discussing the future of Russia but also the motivations and hopes needed to attract the rising generations to the modernisation plan. Therefore, it is not striking that among the measures envisaged to contain such a negative tendency the project Rossiiskaya natsiyarukovodstvo k deistviyu suggests «a system of international, patriotic education in kindergartens, 13 J. HEMMENT, Soviet-Style Neoliberalism? Nashi, Youth Voluntarism, and the Restructuring of Social Welfare in Russia, «Problems of Post-Communism», Vol. 56, No. 6, 2009, pp D. DAFFLON, Youth in Russia. A Portrait of a Generation in Transition, Swiss Academy for Development, 2009.

6 6 ISPI - Analysis schools and universities, where once the October, Pioneer and Komsomol organisations were active». Finally, as Nashi and unlike Molodaya Gvardiya, the movement Mestnye works mostly as a mobilisation machine among young people and has been reported to conduct highly visible actions of protest. Some of the initiatives have an ecological orientation, as the expeditions all over the country to carry out independent monitoring of industrial enterprises and their impact on the environment of particular settlements 17. Some others show a clear social dimension, as the campaign Obshchestvennyi kontrol (Social control) 18 in which the Mestnye check stores to enforce the law banning the sale of alcoholic and tobacco products to persons under the age of 18. Others are characterised by a rather xenophobic tone that has nothing to do with the movement s stated goals, as the distribution of leaflets urging Muscovites to boycott non-russian cab drivers or helping the police to find illegal migrants working in the markets of Moscow periphery 19. Conclusive remarks In times of crisis and great uncertainty in the country s future development, youth activism has the potential to act as the bearer of social innovation. This is something the Russian leaders are perfectly aware of and seek to seize the opportunity as best they can. In their view youth activism can be used to vehicle conservative ideas throughout society while publicly asserting the need of modernising Russia. Accordingly, the efforts of generating a patriotic and politically active cadre of youth is to be evaluated not as a mere propaganda tool but as part of a consistent project of social and economic development that has been planned for the country since the last decade. This short analysis was intended to show that movements like Nashi, Molodaya Gvardiya and Mestnye adhere to a quite common ideology and share a particular set of attitudes, inspired by traditional and patriotic values, largely used in the Kremlin s official rhetoric. Most significantly, the analysis of the movements manifestos and main activities reveals an explicit support for to the leadership s view in addressing the challenges of what Trenin has defined a conservative modernisation, namely the plan to reform Russia s economy and society without political upheaval. But to what extent is this rhetoric sustainable for the Russian leadership? The recent unrest in the North Africa and the Middle East has shown autocratic leaders coping with the societal demands of renewal in different attempts to preserve the status quo. Undoubtedly, Russia s peculiar political arrangement should be stressed with respect to these contexts: unlike the latter cases it is a country where elections have become a ritual in the 20 years of post-communist independence, laying the groundwork for the establishment of a party system with specific features. In addition, it is a country that from the years of perestroika has seen the proliferation of many social movements and organisations claiming to represent multiple interests in political decision-making. Russia is also now fully integrated into the channels of economic globalisation and has recently seen the formation of a stable middle class. Notwithstanding this, it is a country that in the last ten years has experienced a stiffening within the spaces of political contestation: in practice, in a framework of democratic rules Russia has succeeded in organising the limitation and control of social space in order to ensure political stability and the reproduction of power Mestnye diktuyut zakony rynkam. Podmoskovnaya molodyezh ustroila oblavu na migrantov, «Kommersant», No. 221/P (3552), 27 November 2006.

7 La ricerca ISPI analizza le dinamiche politiche, strategiche ed economiche del sistema internazionale con il duplice obiettivo di informare e di orientare le scelte di policy. ISPI - Analysis 7 Interestingly, during the meeting of the anti-terrorist committee in Vladikavkaz on February 22, President Medvedev has maintained that «in the Middle East and Arab world a grave situation is taking shape. [...] these are very complex states and it is quite probable that hard times are ahead, including the arrival at power of fanatics. This will mean fires for decades and the spread of extremism. They have prepared such a scenario for us before, and now more than ever they will try to realize it. In any case, this scenario won't succeed» 20. Not surprisingly, the President s speech has soon gained strong resonance among the pro-kremlin movements. On the same day Nashi s website posted an essay from Boris Yakemenko that draw on the same concepts with more aggressive tones: «Libyan leader Col. M. Qaddafi has shown the whole world how to treat provocateurs who aim for revolution, destabilisation, and civil war. He started to destroy them. He used rockets and everything he has. This is the most accurate path to end American 'revolutionary' techniques» 21. It is worth noting that Mr. Yakemenko is one of Nashi s top officials and member of the Public Chamber of Russian Federation, an institution which is supposed to represent the principal actors of Russian civil society. In fact, aside from some more aggressive stance, the official speeches from Russian leaders in these days sound more as a condemnation of democracy promotion initiatives driven from outside than an apology for suppressing oppositions 22. Based on these considerations, with respect to the upheaval in the Arab world the Kremlin s reaction so far has been quite reminiscent of the attitude previously shown against the orange threat : the us vs. them approach in reading international events and the claim of a Western plot to change regime in Russia from one hand, and the role assigned to youth movements to spread these messages on the other hand. I risultati della ricerca vengono divulgati attraverso pubblicazioni ed eventi, focalizzati su tematiche di particolare interesse per l Italia e le sue relazioni internazionali e articolati in: Programma Africa Programma Caucaso e Asia Centrale Programma Europa Programma Mediterraneo e Medio Oriente Programma Russia e Vicini Orientali Programma Sicurezza e Studi Strategici Progetto Argentina Progetto Asia Meridionale Progetto Cina e Asia Orientale Progetto Diritti Umani Progetto Disarmo Progetto Internazionalizzazione della Pubblica Amministrazione Le pubblicazioni online dell ISPI sono realizzate anche grazie al sostegno della Fondazione Cariplo. ISPI Palazzo Clerici Via Clerici, 5 I Milano ISPI S. MININ, I snova oni Uroki, kotorye my ne izvlekaem, «Nezavisimaya gazeta», 25 February 2011, See also Putin s stance on these same events:

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