vision of a world without nuclear US officials insist that reductions their strategic arsenal.

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1 Brad Glosserman and Eleni Ekmektsioglou Strategic Stability in US-China relations (*) No MAY 2011 Abstract The search for mutual vulnerability At the height of the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union had nuclear arsenals of 31,255 and 45,000 stockpiled weapons, respectively 1. In the two decades since the end of the superpower standoff, both countries have made significant cuts into those stockpiles: Russia now has 2,430 nuclear warheads while the US has 1, Additional cuts are on the horizon 3 as both countries work toward President Barack Obama s 1 For the size of the US arsenal see: Transparency FINAL_w_Date.pdf; for estimatess of the Soviet arsenal see crs/ htm. 2 The number refers only to strategic weapons. For the US, see H.M. KRISTENSEN - R.S. Norris, US Nuclear Forces, 2011, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 67, 2, p. 66, retrieved from com/content/67/2/66.full.pdf+html; for Russia see H.M. KRISTENSEN - R.S. Norris, Russian Nuclear Forces 2011, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 67, 3, p. 68, at bos.sagepub.com/content/67/3/67.f ull.pdf. 3 According to the New START treaty, the numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads will fall to 1,550 by vision of a world without nuclear weapons 4. US officials insist that reductions in the strategic arsenal do not imperil its security, nor that of its allies. The US retains (and continues to develop) capabilities to both deter and defeat enemies and adversaries across a range of contingencies. Nevertheless, US cuts shift the strategic balance with other countries, China in particular: the ratio of US to Chinese weapons has gone from 40:1 (in 1997) to 10:1 (in 2010), and should close further still. US reductions are occurring as the Chinese modernize and increase their strategic arsenal. While the actual number of Chinese strategic warheads has remained relatively flat, the addition of road-mobile ICBMs and the reinforcement of its sea-based capabilities mean that the number of weapons that can strike the 5 US has increased. 4 Some dismiss that vision as naïve; the authors are divided on the question. Nonetheless, the US has declared that it will reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons in its national security strategy and future cuts are part of that project. 5 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes discuss the sea leg of China s deterrent in China s New For most of the postwar era, the world s most important strategic relationship was that between the United States and the Soviet Union. The two superpowers threatened each other and the rest of the planet with the prospect of mutually assured destruction, as their bloated nuclear arsenals held out the possibility of destroying each other several times over. Even though Russia and the US still possess the world s largest strategic arsenals and the overwhelming majority of nuclear weapons, the collapse of the Soviet Union has transformed that relationship and forced analysts to shift their attention elsewhere. We have entered a second nuclear age (Bracken 2000, pp ), one of whose defining features is the US-China strategic relationship. Unfortunately, that relationship is in flux, and most worrying, the two countries appear to view it from fundamentally different perspectives. Finding a mutually acceptable definition of strategic stability and then creating that relationship is one of the key challenges of this new nuclear era. Brad Glosserman is executive director of Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulubased foreign policy research institute Eleni Ekmektsioglou is a WSD-Handa fellow at Pacific Forum, working on Chinese military policy and strategy. (*) The opinions expressed herein are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of ISPI.

2 2 ISPI - Policy Brief Some US analysts and Asian allies worry that additional US cuts to say, a strategic arsenal of 1,000 weapons could prompt China to sprint to parity in an attempt to create a balance in the two countries strategic relationship 6. Official Chinese statements deny any such temptation, arguing that their strategic programs are driven by carefully defined strategic needs, not windows of opportunity 7. While China may not seek strategic parity, it does want a relationship with the US that protects its national interests. The key question is how to define and operationalize that relationship. A few years ago, Chinese participants at bilateral track-two discussions insisted that they wanted a relationship of mutual vulnerability with the US. Chinese strategists look at the mutual assured destruction of the Cold War era and see mutual recognition of each adversary s legitimate national interests as well as recognition 8 of the other as an equal. Undersea Nuclear Deterrent: Strategy, Doctrine, and Capabilities, in «Joint Forces Quarterly», no. 50 (3rd Q, 2008), pp For missile force modernization see Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People s Republic of China 2010, p L. Saalman, China and the US Nuclear Posture Review, The Carnegie Papers, February 2011, p China possesses a small number of nuclear weapons entirely for self-defense in China s National Defense White Paper, 2000 available at engdocs/wpnd2000.htm. 8 Ironically, Chinese typically dismiss any attempt to use Cold War analogies that substitute China for They want the same treatment. The American response has been direct: explicit acknowledgement of mutual vulnerability is impossible. No US politician could accept such a situation in those terms. Dig a little deeper, however, and it is clear that there is more there than meets the eye. China has sufficient numbers of nuclear weapons and other strategic assets to ensure that it has a survivable secondstrike capability. It can retaliate against the US with strategic weapons if it is prepared to suffer the consequences. In other words, mutual vulnerability exists. In recent bilateral discussions, we no longer hear demands for mutual vulnerability. Instead, Chinese analysts have seized on the language of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) as evidence that the US is prepared to acknowledge their concerns. In the NPR, the US says that it seeks to promote strategic stability with China (and Russia) and will pursue high-level dialogue with each country to foster more stable, resilient and transparent strategic relationships. 9 The NPR assuages Chinese status concerns by referring to the Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, which explained that «maintaining stability in the US-China relationship is as important to this Administration as maintaining strategic the Soviet Union as outdated and inherently hostile. 9 Nuclear Posture Review Report, p. 29. stability with other major powers» 10. Great power or rising power? As the world s second largest economy with increasingly global economic interests, a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, and one of the five legally recognized nuclear weapon states, China is certainly a major power. But China is also a rising power and, historically, rising powers have been revisionist states. Conscious of the suspicions created by its rapid development, Chinese officials and strategists insist at every opportunity that they have learned the lessons of history, that they benefit from the existing regional and global order, and that they do not seek to change it. China pursues a foreign policy based on the five principles of Peaceful Coexistence that in its most recent incarnation seeks a harmonious Asia 11. At the same time, there is a widespread belief among Chinese that their country is vulnerable, that other nations are threatened by China s rise, and that those other nations actively seek to undermine China. For all its successes, China remains (for 10 Ibidem, pp The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, noninterference in each other s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence. For President Hu s keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the April 2011 Boao Forum see gov.cn/english/ /15/ content_ htm.

3 ISPI - Policy Brief 3 most Chinese) a developing country surrounded by potential adversaries that are motivated by ideological hostility or irridentist claims 12. While Beijing has settled most of its land borders, there are ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea, with Japan in the East Sea, and with North and South Korea in the East China Sea. The rejuvenation of US military alliances in Japan, South Korea, and Australia, along with newly forged partnerships with Vietnam and India, (two of Beijing s historical rivals) fuel fears that the US is preparing to contain China and prevent it from reassuming its rightful central place in the Asian order. Exhibit A in the Chinese bill of particulars is the continued 13 existence of Taiwan, a renegade province whose status is perpetuated by the United States with continuing arms sales. China has demanded a halt to those sales, arguing that they contravene the terms of US-China normalization, in particular, the third Shanghai communiqué in which the US pledged to gradually reduce its arms sales to Taiwan, and that the importance of China to the US outweighs that of Taiwan. The US counters that it has a moral and legal commitment 12 See Shen Dingli, A Chinese Assessment of China's External Security Environment, China Brief, vol. 11, no Official US policy is that Washington does not support unilateral changes in the status quo by either side. In other words, Taiwan should not declare independence and the mainland should not use force against the island. Mutually agreed upon steps are fine, however. to Taiwan. In addition, Taiwan is a signal of the credibility of the US commitment to its allies in Asia. Any indication that the US was abandoning Taiwan would undermine US standing throughout the region and around the world. Containment? You must be kidding More fundamentally, however, the Chinese claim that the US does not accept China s rise is paranoia, not fact. The US would not have invested billions of dollars in China, bought hundreds of billions of dollars of goods from China, or educated thousands of China s best minds if it sought to contain the country. Engagement, not containment, is longstanding US policy and it is made plain in the NPR: «The United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater global role in supporting international rules, norms, and institutions» 14. Just as many nations question Chinese assurances that its rise will be peaceful, the Chinese challenge the US claim that it is ready to deal with China as an equal partner. Thus, despite the fact that the two countries have overlapping interests and concerns, their relationship is dominated by mistrust, suspicion, and ample opportunities to turn that tension into conflict. The realization of one of China s core interests, the reincorporation of Taiwan, is actively blocked by the United States. Several of China s maritime 14 Nuclear Posture Review Report, p. 5. disputes are with nations allied with the US. Beijing has protested vigorously (and courted considerable risks in doing so) continuing US attempts to conduct surveillance missions in its territorial waters and airspace. Chinese defense planners must reckon with the possibility of armed conflict in the US and hence the prospect of nuclear escalation either as a result of conscious decisions or by miscalculation or misperception. Given this potential for conflict, strategic stability is not just an abstract notion. Defining strategic stability Unfortunately, the meaning of strategic stability isn t clear. It could mean several things. The first is parity (or rough equality in numbers) of strategic forces but, as noted earlier, that isn t China s stated intention (nor is there any indication that the US would permit that to occur). Alternatively, it could mean an enduring balance of forces either among strategic weapons or in terms of comprehensive national power such that both sides are satisfied with their status relative to the other and do not seek to change that relationship 15. Such a state would imply that neither side believes it would be subject to nuclear coercion in the event of a crisis and retains sufficient capability to protect its national interests. A third alternative is that strategic stability is a relationship 15 This could be a circular definition: it is stable if neither side considers changes by the other sufficient to force it to respond. In other words, it is stable when it is stable.

4 4 ISPI - Policy Brief defined by a transparent force structure and doctrine, so that each side understands and believes the other s intentions and capabilities and can predict the other s actions as a result. This view suggests that stability is more a process than a state, and that sufficient understanding of the other side s thinking and forces will reduce the possibility of miscalculation or misperception in a crisis and hence the inclination to resort to nuclear weapons in such situations. It isn t clear which definition is preferred by the two sides. The Chinese seem to gravitate to the second 16. And while the US uses the term 16 The argument is supported by the Chinese effort to gain recognition of their second-strike capability. The Chinese want to establish a relationship predicated on their capacity to retaliate in case of a US attack. Achieving a balanced relationship at the strategic level is thus part of the more general concept of comprehensive power. While the term strategic balance refers to material capabilities, comprehensive power comprises both material and non-material elements. It refers more to the status a state possesses and the political leverage it exerts. Defining a strategic relationship with the US under these premises accords with China s grand strategic objectives, at least according to Li Bin and Nie Hongyi, in An Investigation of China-US Strategic Stability, in «World Economics & Politics», no. 2, 2008, p (translated version available at ents/nwgs/li-and-nie-translationfinal pdf For the term comprehensive power and the Chinese use of it, see A. Tellis in G.J Schmitt (ed.), The Rise of China; Essays on Future Competition, Encounter Books, New York, 2009, p several times in the NPR, readers will search in vain for a definition in the document itself. The closest it comes is when, discussing relations with China, the NPR explains that «the purpose of a dialogue on strategic stability is to provide a venue and mechanism for each side to communicate its views about the other s strategies, policies, and programs on nuclear weapons and other strategic capabilities. The goal of such a dialogue is to enhance confidence, improve transparency, and reduce mistrust» 17. Given the depth of the divisions among the two sides and the filters that shape (and distort) perceptions of the other, it is going to take more than dialogue to create strategic stability, however. Where do we go from here? The US-China Strategic Dialogue: Plainly, the two countries need to institutionalize strategic discussions in their bilateral relationship. A step has been taken with the establishment of the U.S.-China Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD) under the Strategic Track of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), the inaugural round of which occurred during the S&ED that was held in Washington on May 10, While this is a good start, it should be matched by an institutionalized military-to-military dialogue that is insulated from political upheavals in the relationship 18. If either track is to 17 Ibidem, p Historically, mil-mil relations are first to be cut when China is unbe meaningful, however, it must be a substantive discussion that addresses key topics and goes beyond the usual talking points. Genuine strategic stability depends on each side understanding the other s thinking, how it assesses and interprets situations, and the factors shaping its response. It is unclear if the US and China even share a vocabulary when discussing strategic concerns; while they may use the same words, their definitions often vary significantly 19. US-Allies Strategic Dialogue. US-China discussions do not occur in a vacuum. Paradoxically, strategic stability in the US-relationship can create instability elsewhere as US allies worry about the credibility of the US commitment to their defense. This can result from two sets of fears: either the US will not be willing to trade Los Angeles for Tokyo (to put it crudely) or that rapprochement between Beijing and Washington would encourage the US to subordinate its allies concerns to those of its new partner. If those allies question the US commitment to their defense, they could be prompted to develop nuclear capabilities of their own. It is imperative then that the US hold strategic happy with US behavior, for example, arms sales to Taiwan. 19 The English-Chinese, Chinese- English Nuclear Security Glossary is a valuable contribution to the clarification of nuclear terms. The project illustrates the need for both parties to speak the same language. Pacific Forum CSIS holds track two and track 1.5 dialogues with Chinese counterparts that focus on terms and attempt to close the gaps in language.

5 ISPI - Policy Brief 5 discussions with Japan and South Korea to ensure that that they do not feel abandoned and that they are assured of the US commitment to their defense. This process is underway but the evolving security environment in Northeast Asia demands that the US make it a priority and ensure that it too is institutionalized 20. Multilateral arms reduction talks. The last round of US- Russia strategic arms talks has made it clear that we are approaching the end of the road for such strategic negotiations. The US and Russia have made deep cuts in their arsenals, and have indicated a willingness to go further, but they have also indicated that it is time for other nations to join the process. Both Moscow and Washington worry that new force levels are qualitatively different from previous levels and future reductions could transform strategic relations on the global level; for both nations, the principal concern is China. This promises to be a difficult process. China has long insisted that it will join the arms control process when the time is right, but that time has not yet arrived. Chinese strategists continue to argue that the US and Russia still have a long way to go before they have made sufficient reductions to justify Chinese inclusion in such talks 21. When 20 The topic has been repeatedly discussed during Pacific Forum hosted US-Japan Strategic Dialogues. 21 President Hu Jintao in his speech on nuclear disarmament before the UNSC called on the US and Russia to keep making subthat time comes, multilateral talks will be difficult. The US and Russia (or the Soviet Union) have decades of experience with arms control and difficult as talks continue to be, we often forget how much harder the first years of negotiations were. But China won t be the only problem. Farsighted strategists agree that at a minimum, such talks will include the P5 nations the US, Russia, China, Britain and France. But China will demand Indian involvement, and India will demand Pakistan join as well. Both are likely to insist that Israel take a seat and North Korea will seek inclusion to validate its own claim to nuclear weapons state status. At that point, strategic stability will take on a new meaning and a new urgency. stantial cuts in their nuclear arsenals. However, Hu made no reference to Chinese participation in nuclear disarmament negotiations. For the speech see mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/hyyfy/t htm and Dingli Shen, China s Nuclear Perspective: Deterrence Reduction, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, in «Strategic Analysis», vol. 32, no. 4, p For Chinese arms control analysts views, see J-D Yuan, Chinese Perceptions of the Utility of Nuclear Weapons; Prospects and Potential Problems in Disarmament, Proliferation Papers, IFRI, Spring La ricerca ISPI analizza le dinamiche politiche, strategiche ed economiche del sistema internazionale con il duplice obiettivo di informare e di o- rientare le scelte di policy. I risultati della ricerca vengono divulgati attraverso pubblicazioni ed eventi, focalizzati su tematiche di particolare interesse per l Italia e le sue relazioni internazionali e articolati in: Programma Africa Programma Caucaso e Asia Centrale Programma Europa Programma Mediterraneo e Medio Oriente Programma Russia e Vicini Orientali Programma Sicurezza e Studi Strategici Progetto Argentina Progetto Asia Meridionale Progetto Cina e Asia Orientale Progetto Diritti Umani Progetto Disarmo Progetto Emergenze e Affari Umanitari Progetto Internazionalizzazione della Pubblica Amministrazione Le pubblicazioni online dell ISPI sono realizzate anche grazie al sostegno della Fondazione Cariplo. ISPI Palazzo Clerici Via Clerici, 5 I Milano Per informazioni: ispi.policybrief@ispionline.it ispi.policybrief1@ispionline.it ISPI 2011