Robustness, inequalities, governance

Transcription

1 EUROPEAN CITIES/METROPOLIS Robustness, inequalities, governance Patrick Le Galès Professor of Sociology and Politics Directeur de recherche CNRS at CEVIPOF Sciences Po Paris 1

2 I) European cities obsolete or rising? II) Inequalities, the case of upper middle classes III) How to govern fragmented cities/metropolis Patrick Le Galès 2

3 I) ROBUST DYNAMIC EUROPEAN CITIES / METROPOLIS Patrick Le Galès 3

4 Good reasons not to be interested in European cities Decades of «end of cities» views Everything is now urban? Sprawls, fragmentation, chaos, Los Angeles view of the world Mega/large/global/posmodern cities European cities are obsolete Mobility : Can we be anything anywhere? Patrick Le Galès 4

5 Convergence towards megacities Megacities : size World cities : hierarchies, networks New Global cities : Sassen, advanced services and polarization New Megacities : Castells, nodes of networks Global city regions : innovation, social formations, political actors Post metropolis, post cities Liquid society view, nomades Patrick Le Galès 5

6 Future of European cities after 50 years of single market? Of cities like Amsterdam, Antwerp, Barcelona, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Lisbon, Liverpool, Lyons, Manchester, Marseilles, Munich, Naples, Newcastle, Nuremberg, Stockholm, Stuttgart, Turin and Vienna, half must either grow or decline: expanding to become one of the six or seven European urban giants, or declining into provincial insignificance The carnage will likely be most pronounced among the mid-sized cities of Germany and the United Kingdom. Patrick Le Galès 6

7 Political mechanisms of urban decline : role of middle classes As Europe overall becomes less urban but its few largest cities grow, the cultural divide between city and suburb will likely grow, and political support for the needs of cities generally may well decline as has clearly occurred since the 1960 s in the US (Rogowski 1998: 23). Less public investments and redistribution in cities Patrick Le Galès 7

8 Thinking beyond convergence : European cities are part of European societies Role of the state, welfare state Territorialisation Institutions Patrick Le Galès 8

9 Europeans are born to stay not born to run Only 1,5 to 2% of Europeans move to another country, stable over time (3% at the global level, ILO) 7,2% change house (over 16% in the US), half of them stay in the same area Transnational movers, only 30% of skilled workers Patrick Le Galès 9

10 European cities The relative long-term stability of the European urban system Its original structure with a concentration of medium-sized cities and the remains of its physical form. Cities as distinctive characteristics of European societies Cities versus metropolitan regions : dynamics Patrick Le Galès 10

11 Patrick Le Galès 11

12 Patrick Le Galès 12

13 European cities A mix of public services and private firms, including a robust body of middle class and lower-middle class public-sector employees and professionals, who constitute a firm pillar of the social structure. Patrick Le Galès 13

14 European cities, are still structured and organized within European states: in particular, welfare states. The state and Europe, in part, protect the city including in terms of resources. Patrick Le Galès 14

15 Public expenditure GERMANY 45,6 43,8 46,3 42,9 FRANCE 51,9 49,5 53,5 51,4 ITALY 49,8 52,4 51,1 44,4 NETHERL 51,9 49,4 47,7 41,5 SWEDEN 60,4 55,9 62,1 52,7 UK 41,9 44,4 39,2 UE 48,3 46,7 48,7 44,2 USA 33,8 33,6 32,9 29,4 Patrick Le Galès 15 Source : OECD Economic Outlooks, june P.278

16 Political dimension The continuing representation of the city as a whole and the increased legitimacy of political elites in sustaining and re-inventing this presentation. Political leaders, organised interests Planning, strategic project Patrick Le Galès 16

17 Robust European cities Accumulation of resources Despite increasing social tensions, inequalities, even riots at times, European cites have resources, identities, and political legitimacy, and it is not appropriate to describe them as dual cities. 60 % of public investments (not in the UK) is controlled by local or urban government in the EU Patrick Le Galès 17

18 European cities are becoming more European The institutionalization of the EU is creating rules, norms, procedures, repertoires, and public policies that have an impact on cities. The EU also is a powerful agent of legitimization. By designing urban public policies and agree a Europe of cities, supporting transnational networks Patrick Le Galès 18

19 Two scenarios Rise of megacities in Europe and the carnage of medium sized cities, Continuous growth of globalising medium sized European cities Evidence sofar : in most countries, economic and demographic development of cities/metropolitan area/urban region (not in the UK) Patrick Le Galès 19

20 II Inequalities versus integration/integration/cohesion No ideal view of European cities, no ideal coherence within an integrated urban society Competition Sprawls, environment issues Immigration Economic inequalities Social differentiation Patrick Le Galès 20

21 In What sort of European Urban societies do we live in? Denationalisation of societies Europeanisation? Globalisation? A liquid society? Disembededness (Giddens) Fragmentation, Decline of national organisation, institutions, the state Take one issue here as a threat to the integration process within cities : the rich, upper middle classes Patrick Le Galès 21

22 Are the upper middle classes exiting from national society and the urban fabric? Dual cities in the making? Gated communities Ghettoes of rich Secession Suburbanisation Potentially a major threat to cities, privatisation, individualisation, fears, end of public space Patrick Le Galès 22

23 Patrick Le Galès 23

24 Where do cadres supérieurs live? (Préteceille s study) : more in Paris, more in suburbs Category Cadres supérieurs and professions intellectuelles : in Paris in 1962, now 66% of the category in Ile de France now live in outside Paris, mainly in the western suburbs of Paris, classic residential location of the French bourgeoisie (52% in 1962) Patrick Le Galès 24

25 No radical gentrification or suburbanisation No massive gentrification process : gradual No white flight : continuous embourgeoisement No dualisation of the global city Public sector/cultural cadres supérieurs more in Paris, private sector managers in both spaces, ingineers more in western suburb : new middle class suburbs in the East Patrick Le Galès 25

26 Moyennisation of Paris/ile de France space Because of decline of working class and more middle class groups everywhere, more ethnic minorities also Two exceptions - The making of ethnic/urban poor neighborhoods in Seine St Denis - Slow but regular increase of social segregation of private managers and ingeers, firms executives from the private sectors in the most exclusive western suburbs (similar to the income argument) Patrick Le Galès 26

27 Income : top 10% increase their share of national income in the past 10 years Piketty : long term stability of share of the highest decile of wages in proportion of the overall wage structure in France over the 20th century (between 25 and 28%) ie 2.5 the average wage Middle classes wages rose in parallel to average wage in France over the century However, increase of that share over the past decade : not as much as the UK but evolution Patrick Le Galès 27

28 French context : the differentiation between les cadres and les cadres supérieurs Middle class public versus private sectors, the particular category of «les cadres», rise in the 1960 s, consumption society After the 1980 s from 1,8 million in 1982 to 3,2 million in 2003 : massive growth and differentiation 13% of the French social structure More women but only a third of firms managers One third in the Paris region, over 55% for cadres supérieurs Paris as a social escalator region and a pump Patrick Le Galès 28

29 Are UMC Exiting? Two dimensions Transnational dimension Urban dimension Patrick Le Galès 29

30 Social differentiation : globalisation effect Differentiation and overlapping of various scales of interactions for individuals, beyond the national frontiers, open room of manoeuvres for individuals in terms of choice of residence, of social practices, of identity claiming, of invesment of different resources In principle, mobility and individualisation increase the dynamics of choice for invididuals and households... a major influence to blur national logics of stratification, disctinction, national income or prestige hierarchies. Patrick Le Galès 30

31 A European/transatlantic new bourgeoisie in the making? Economic processes are leading the globalisation dynamics (which is contradictory, not linear, conflicts) Groups which are related to these dynamics take advantage of the processes : status, prestige, income New resources (mobility) can be mobilised by groups in order to challenge existing hierarchies, to push for different modernisation projects, to articulate an interest of their own and to sustain their ambitions. Patrick Le Galès 31

32 UMC partial exit The rise of various types of mobility allows some individuals, particularly upper middle classes to partially exit from the national society to which they belong. They can choose to exit but that remains pretty rare. Mostly, they can choose to partially exit : their culture, consumption, friends, jobs, housing, children, financial investment, may be organised at the transnational level or in relation to this level. They have a different set of opportunities which allow them to play at different level : the transational scale, the national or the local/urban. Patrick Le Galès 32

33 UMC : locals and cosmpolitans most upper middle classes are mobile.at the same time, they live in local/urban area, hey send their children to schools, they use services, they are consumers. for upper middle classes groups, their status often results from both their occupation (may be narrowly defined by a type of employment or a professional community) and a residential choice, or trajectory, cities. (Savage) They partly define who they are by the place neighbourhood, city, urban region- they live in Patrick Le Galès 33

34 To renegociate their integration This opportunity for partial exit allows them to negociate their own position within the national social structure, for instance to actively campaign against high level of taxes, to escape taxation or to send their children to international schools and universities. They have some capacity to mobilise and invest resources at the national level but also at the international level, that gives them extra resources to put pressure on national structures and on cities Patrick Le Galès 34

35 Renegociating their integration within the national societies Pressure on school, or against high level of taxes, to escape taxation or to send their children to international schools and universities, social segregation Evidence : decrease of 15% of the income tax in Europe over the last twenty years Capital is mobile, decrease of company taxes, high income can partially avoid taxation Patrick Le Galès 35

36 EXIT : transnational and urban dimension Transnational exit Urban exit/secession Nomades Immobile Retreat from the city - Mobile and locally rooted Immobile and locally rooted Patrick Le Galès 36

37 Paris Case Pressure on schools Groups isolating themselves from the urban fabric Not the dominant process Similar results for London (Butler) No dual cities.sofar Ongoing research in Milan, Madrid, Lyon, London, Paris, what about gated condominium in Madrid? Patrick Le Galès 37

38 III Urban Governance Government and governance of metropolitan areas : how to govern The Democratic question State and UE : defining the parameters of urban governance Patrick Le Galès 38

39 Agregation of groups, interests Cities as political beasts Cities may be more or less structured in their economic and cultural exchanges and the different actors may be related to each other in the same local context with long-term strategies, investing their resources in a co-ordinated way and adding to the social capital riches. In this case the urban society appears as well structured and visible, and one can detect forms of (relative) integration. If not, the city reveals itself as less structured and as such no longer a significant subject for study: Patrick Le Galès 39

40 This analysis suggests to look at the interplay and conflicts of social groups, interests, and institutions, which regulations have been put in place through conflicts and the logics of integration. Cities do not develop solely according to interactions and contingencies: groups, actors and organizations oppose one another, enter into conflict, co-ordinate, produce representations in order to institutionalize collective forms of action, implement policies, structure inequalities, and defend their interests. Patrick Le Galès 40

41 Government Rules, constitutions Organisations Processes : agregation of interests and steering Outputs, public policies Patrick Le Galès 41

42 Gouvernance enchangée ou gouvernance en chantier? Good governance to solve problems beyond the failures of government : functionalist Governance : triumph of private interests in the growth coalitions The enchanted land of governance Modes of governance as the articulation of regulation Patrick Le Galès 42

43 Modes of governance in the making Coalition, Institutions political orientations and goals, Outputs : resolution of conflicts, allocation of resources Patrick Le Galès 43

44 Governance, Collective actor Common good Sense of unity innovation integration mechanisms representation Patrick Le Galès 44

45 back to the usual suspects European cities : urban governance, competition, flagship projects, construction, utility network, Agencies, Coordination : contracts, chartes, strategies, partnership Urban oligarchies? Favourable context for corruption, urban growth coalitions/urban regime Patrick Le Galès 45

46 Restructured Metropolitan governance Restructured goverments Services and policies Less clientelism and day to day management More strategic authorities More bureaucracy (flexible governance arrangement) versus more democracy Patrick Le Galès 46

47 Patrick Le Galès 47

48 New policy instruments Public policy instruments as : a particular type of institution, a technical device with the generic purpose of carrying a concrete concept of the politics / society relationship and sustained by a concept of regulation Patrick Le Galès 48

49 Definition and typology of policy instruments (2) Type of instrument Legislative and regulatory Type of political relations Social guardian state Type of legitimacy Imposition of general interest by mandated elected representatives Economic and fiscal Redistributive state Socio-economic efficiency Agreement- and incentive-based Information- and communicationbased Mobilizing state Audience democracy Seek direct involvement Explain decisions / accountability Brief outline Old policy instruments as routinized legal forms constituting the archetype of state interventionism Ex. : Norms, Taxes, Permits New policy instruments as less interventionist forms of public regulation. Ex.: Voluntary agreements, Codes of conduct, Labels De facto and de Competitive Mixed : scientific / jure standards / mechanisms technical and / or Best practices pressure of market Patrick Le Galès mechanisms 49

50 Parameters of Urban governance A new cycle of the nation state The EU Patrick Le Galès 50

51 New forms of state control Regulatory state Control and surveillance Competitive state Mobilising state Patrick Le Galès 51

52 EU : decline of territorial cohesion priority ESDP : marginal Regional funds Urban programme EU competition dynamics versus territorial cohesion Horizontal europeanisation : work in progress Patrick Le Galès 52

53 Conclusion Metropolitan growth does not mean global cities or nothing Spread and growth of urban regions does not mean the end of cities Globalisation does not mean urban convergence Spatial segregation is also a question of middle classes Patrick Le Galès 53

54 Individual choices of those groups are also influence by collective choices on public investment Political processes are central : how to govern cities which are more diverse, with more immigration and to keep some collective dynamism (fears, extreme right) EU : a bad cycle, what comes next? Patrick Le Galès 54