PISA, a mere metric of quality, or an instrument of transnational governance in education?

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1 PISA, a mere metric of quality, or an instrument of transnational governance in education? Endrit Shabani (2013 endrit.shabani@politics.ox.ac.uk Introduction In this paper, I focus on transnational governance in education by examining the case of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and its famous study, Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). I draw upon theories and literature on soft power and global governance to discuss the role OECD has established in educational policy-making through PISA. Moreover, I argue that PISA rather than a mere metric of quality, as OECD considers it, is an instrument of transnational governance in education. I begin with a brief explanation of recent changes in educational policymaking and then explain the role of PISA and the OECD in educational policymaking. Afterwards, by employing the concepts of soft power and explaining processes of governance, I try to describe how OECD is acting as a transnational governor in education. Clarifications and limitations Before I continue further, I want to note that the term transnational instead of supranational, is used deliberately, because a Governing Board composed of member states representatives governs PISA, and therefore it may represent a collective endeavour of countries that govern it. That said, I am aware that PISA bureaucracy may have a certain level of independence and is therefore not exclusively in the service of member states (Verger, Novelli, & Kosar, 2012). Moreover, global governor might not be the best word to describe the OECD, because not every country of the world participates in this study (only 65 out of 192 countries). Additionally, I want to clarify that this paper focuses solely on analysing the OECD s behaviour as a global governor, and therefore a thorough analysis of PISA s outcomes falls beyond its scope. However, I am aware that many aspects of PISA are criticized as having an undesired in education systems around the globe. Starting from the

2 increase in disparity and inequality between countries, through the weakening of national identity, to the shifting of decision-making from the public sphere (teachers, parents and children) to the international policy elites. Changes in educational policies For a long time, Education policy have been at the discretion of the government, mainly because this domain was considered to serve as space where national identity is constructed (Arnott & Ozga, 2010). In recent years, however, interdependence (both economical and political) between countries has increased, and challenges that countries face have changed, some of which go beyond the capacities of the nation state to deal with. Therefore, collective endeavours between countries are encouraged, and educational systems converge more on their ultimate goal to succeed in the knowledge economy (Ball, 1998). Accordingly, educational policymaking is shifting toward an international arena, institutions are redesigned, a common policy space is established, and comparative data, standardisation and quality benchmarks, now underpin new forms of governance (Ozga, 2009). Consequently, various international organisations (IO) are employing practices to set directions and organise aspects of social life (Grek, 2012), whereas national governments are shifting from the role of an enabler of provision to a driver for integration within an international model (Ozga, 2011). OECD and PISA One of these IOs is the OECD, which unlike the World Bank that believes in developing the knowledge economy through the market and individualism, promotes a liberal approach of institutions in knowledge production (Verger, Novelli & Kosar, 2012). The OECD first administered PISA in 2000 with the goal to help in further improvement of education worldwide (OECD, 2001). However, some authors argue that its purpose was (and still is) serving to the global market by generating qualified human resources (Moutsios, 2010; Ball, 1998). 2

3 PISA is an international test that assesses the extent to which 15-year-old students have acquired key knowledge and skills that are essential for full participation in modern societies (OECD, 2012,p3). The test focuses on reading, mathematics, scientific and problem-solving, by ascertaining how students can apply what they have learned within and outside of school (ibid). The test is conducted triennially and has grown too fast. In PISA 2012 were tested 510,000 students representing a population of 28 million students from 65 countries and economies all over the world, and even more, countries are anticipated to join in PISA 2015(ibid). What remains interesting is the fact that although OECD does not have any legal instrument, or financial incentive to encourage member states to follow its recommendations, it has managed to influence educational policy-making and generate a need for reforms all over the world (Grek, 2009; Morgan, 2009; Dobbins & Martens, 2012). Moreover, OECD is overtaking international actors like UNESCO in its power to govern (Mundy, 2010), and PISA now represents the new governing system of education, which through comparison and competition pushes education systems all over the world toward the same direction (Grek, 2012; Moutsios, 2010). Soft power and transnational government Before I start building my argument in support of my claim that PISA is a transnational governance instrument, I want to provide a brief description of soft power and the processes of governance. Soft power or co-optive power is defined as the capacity of one country, or an IO, to get other countries to want what it wants by exerting the power of attractive ideas, and by shaping other countries preferences through political discourse (Nye, 1990). Soft power can be facilitated by transnational networks, which encourage the exchange of ideas between experts and policymakers, and therefore construct knowledge at an international level (Morgan, 2009; Ozga, 2009). Additionally, financial incentives may also be used to encourage certain policy compliance between countries. Thereafter, in the absence of a world government, many IOs take the role of a transnational governor, in crafting policies through a coordinated action. Policymaking, however, is not limited to making and enforcing rules, but involves many other activities and processes. Drawing from the work of many established scholars, we can construct a four-step model to explain the governing process: 1. Identifying (or creating) issues and agenda setting; 2. Making 3

4 rules; 3. Rule implementation and enforcement; 4. Monitoring and assessing performance through benchmarks and indicators. Following these four stages of governance, I will try to unpack how OECD is using PISA as an instrument of transnational governance in education. 1.Agenda setting - Identifying (or creating) issues The first stage is identifying problems to be tackled and setting the political agenda. Although the OECD claims that PISA helps policy-makers around the world to determine their domestic policy targets (OECD, 2012), it would have been quite unlikely for them to have policy targets that contradict what PISA promotes. In fact, rather than national governments, it is likely that the OECD, through PISA programme, is setting educational policy targets and agendas of many countries around the world. First, by using PISA results to identify (diagnose) problems of national education, albeit they may not have been considered as problems previously from a national perspective (Arnott & Ozga, 2010; Avant et al., 2010). Then, national governments are persuaded to tackle these problems through certain reforms, conducted in a certain way (Verger, Novelli, & Kosar, 2012). In other words, PISA is shaping the general perception of education by telling countries what purpose national education should be serving, or where they [the countries] should be heading (Moutsios, 2010, p132). The capacity of PISA to elevate certain reforms to the top of the national agenda can be seen in countries where it has urged educational reforms (See Arnott & Ozga, 2010; Bieber & Martens, 2011; Dobbins & Martens, 2012; Martens & Niemann, 2013; Sellar & Lingard, 2013). In particular, remains interesting the case of Germany. A country whose education system for many years has been a model of success for other European countries that have referred to it. However, it underwent substantial reforms once the first PISA results became public and the public opinion was scandalised (Grek, 2009). As for how OECD has managed to promote its educational policy agenda worldwide, there might be various answers. First, OECD has exercised its influence by promoting attractive ideas through transnational networks discourse. Countries participating in PISA are represented in international conferences and other decision-making, 4

5 technical and political committees where information and ideas are shared and perceptions and beliefs are influenced in a way that facilitates political convergence between countries (Bieber & Martens, 2011). Hence, even a state that is indifferent toward PISA results may be persuaded to change its views (Avant et al., 2010). For instance, as Dobbins and Martens (2012) have found in their study, results of PISA 2000 were perceived with a layer of suspicion in France, but some years later, the country was persuaded to go through substantial reforms in education, using PISA recommendations as a guideline. Secondly, the expertise-based authority OECD has established in years (Avant et al., 2010) and the data approach (providing measurable results and statistical data) PISA has embraced, make its assessment to be perceived as a scientific fact that is politically neutral. Moreover, since PISA is so much advertised globally, it is wellknown to the public and therefore government may feel pressured by its constituents (Grek, 2012). Consequently, PISA has the capacity to dictate what is taken seriously by the government, and also to frame policy solutions. Finally, through replicating the policy in various countries, these ideas gain legitimacy and influence policy-making, in the light of evidence-based policy, where the fact that these policies are successful in some countries is used as evidence (or promise) of success (Moutsios, 2010; Verger, Novelli, & Kosar, 2012). Therefore, as I argue below, governments feel both convinced and pressured to follow OECD s education agenda in domestic policymaking. 2.Making the rules The second stage involves making the rules, which aim to show national governments the way toward the target. As described above, although PISA does not promote explicit rules, there are many implicit ones conveyed through models of success, as well as through recommendations given to national governments. Firstly, it is a practice for OECD to provide a comprehensive description of the PISA Champions, countries that have scored high on the test. The reason given for this promotion is to help countries learn from each other by sharing successful experiences (OECD, 2012). In fact, these reports define the very model of success every country should 5

6 follow, if there is any interest to perform high on PISA. For instance in their study, Dobbins & Martens (2012) found that Finnish Reform Recipe 1 not only was offered to every PISA participatory country, but also every aspect of Finnish primary education was taken as the very model of an ideal system. Additionally, by establishing an implicit causality relationship between some features of the Finnish education system and the high performance of the country in PISA, OECD has simultaneously constructed the rules for success. Therefore, it is the OECD that decides what counts as important in an education system, and what counts as success. Additionally, some concrete recommendations are delivered to national governments by the OECD, showing them precisely what they should do to improve their domestic education system. As I explain below, although these recommendations are not binding for member states, still they will serve as rules for success if we consider the strong aspiration of governments to perform better in this international competition (Bieber & Martens, 2011). In summary, while claiming to help countries improving their education system, OECD is driving them to follow its political agenda, which is also considered as rules for success. 3.Implementation and enforcement Since the rules have no importance if not followed, the third stage of governance is ensuring their implementation and enforcement. Again, OECD does not have any legal power over national governments to enforce its recommendations, but it is also a fact that PISA recommendations have urged important reforms all over the world. Hence, it may be assumed that these recommendations have an enforcing power, which derives from various sources. First, the competitiveness between countries that PISA has induced generates pressure over national governments. As Grek (2009) explains, PISA is highly promoted by the media, and consequently it is very well-known by politicians, experts, media and the public. Thus, how a country performs in PISA tests, and especially how it is ranked in 1 Finland was ranked very high in the first PISA tests and for many years it was considered as the PISA Champion. 6

7 comparison to other competitors, matters to national policy-makers, who are going to be glorified or blamed for these results. As Foucault (1978) explains, governing means employing multiform tactics rather than imposing laws to reach the desired end. Hence, glorifying and blaming may well be a governing tactic to coerce national governments to follow PISA s rules for success. In this way, when 15-year-olds perform lower than PISA s average, countries are shamed, and governments are blamed. Consequently, governments are pressed either to undertake reforms and adapt to the international model of PISA or otherwise to legitimate their domestic model and draw out of this ranking (Morgan, 2009; Bieber & Martens, 2011). Accordingly, PISA is not merely a comparison of countries based in data, but rather a political tool to influence policy-making in education (Grek, 2012; Ozga, 2009) Furthermore, PISA data are also in use by the European Commission and they underpin evidence-based policies of the EU in education. This fact may certainly increase the importance of PISA, by adding another layer of assurance that PISA recommendations have to be followed, especially by every state that has a substantial interest in the EU (e.g. countries that aspire to join the EU). However, not all the OECD efforts have the same effect everywhere, and the pace of implementation varies from country to country. For instance, PISA results and recommendations in the USA have had a limited influence over the last decade, whereas in other countries it has urged substantial educational reforms (Bieber & Martens, 2011). Thus, it is clear that national governments remain as gatekeeper to these reforms. In some cases they facilitate the implementation of PISA recommendations either because they believe in their success, or because they want to legitimise educational reforms, which would otherwise be contested (Grek, 2009). Switzerland (Bieber & Martens, 2011) and France (Dobbins & Martens, 2012) are just some few of many examples to illustrate. Similarly, there are other cases when policy makers may upload various reforms to PISA policies and then download those back at their national context, by following a sort of boomerang trajectory of influence (Morgan, 2009; Verger, Novelli, & Kosar, 2012). 7

8 4.Monitoring and assessing performance The last stage of governance is monitoring the progress of rules implementation and assessing outcomes of the policy (Avant et al., 2010). Likewise, every three years (and every 9 years for a full assessment) the next round of PISA reveals in which countries reforms are undertaken and to what extent they have been effective. To that end, certain indicators and benchmarks are employed, which not only help in assessing the performance, but also legitimizing the success, since assessment is based on evidence (Moutsios, 2010). Consequently, OECD projects in a clear square chart which countries progressed and which did not (OECD, 2012). Thereafter, in a narrative way, some explanations are given, in an attempt to establish a causality relation between a country s progress in the test and the extent to which PISA recommendations are followed. In brief, PISA ensures not only that countries undertake reforms in compliance with OECD recommendations, but also that these reforms have achieved to make the country successful according to PISA indicators of success. To that end, data becomes central and knowledge based in data becomes the governing narrative (Ozga, 2011; Grek, 2012). Conclusions In this paper I argue that OECD uses PISA as an instrument of transnational governance in education. By drawing upon the work of other scholars about soft power and transnational governance, and especially by employing a description of governance processes and stages, I analyse how OECD, through PISA, is acting as a transnational governor. Although these processes are intertwined and may happen simultaneously, I describe them in a linear-staged process. I start by explaining how PISA results are used to persuade governments that there is a crisis and then generate a case for educational reforms, even if previously it was not a policy concern from a national perspective. Thereafter, I explain that through promoting PISA champions, and delivering explicit recommendations, OECD is setting the rules for every country that wants to perform better on PISA. In order to enforce these rules, the OECD uses soft power tactics, such as inducing competition between countries, and following the strategy of glorifying or shaming national governments. Given the high media 8

9 coverage that PISA receives globally, its results pressure governments to choose either to follow PISA s rules for success, or to defend their domestic model, which in any case may bring the country out of this international competition. Finally, through its indicators and benchmarks of success, PISA assesses periodically not only if the governments have undertaken recommended reforms, but also how effectively they have done. In conclusion, I argue that due to its established expertise-based authority, and by relying on comparison through data as a strategy, OECD uses PISA to govern educational policies around the globe. Therefore, PISA it is not merely a test, like many other international ones, but it is an instrument of transnational governance in education. 9

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