1. BILATERAL STRATEGIES AND THE SUPPORT AT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

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1 Strengthening bilateral relations and support in multilateral forums: Brazil-Africa relations ( ) 1 PhD. Juliana J. Costa 2 The research problem of this article is investigate the mechanisms employed by a country to win the votes and support of other countries in multilateral forums. States deepen their bilateral relations to win support at the multilateral level to increase their weight and prestige in international system. Cooperation at international organizations is an important topic, because these institutions are important to diffuse information and as an arena of power to states. Therefore, countries with lower relative power or limited resources use multilateral forums as an instrument to achieve their demands in the current international system. Despite advanced research does not deal with emerging countries, leaving open some questions: How a country with limited economic and political power can win allies at multilateral organizations? What are the benefits offered by an emerging country for this purpose? The strengthening of bilateral relations generates multilateral support? Through Brazil-Africa relations between 1995 and 2010, this article aims to verify whether the increase of bilateral relations generates vote convergence among countries at United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). This study also has the following secondary hypotheses: - Brazil, to win the multilateral support of other states, used bilateral strategies, such as trade and technical cooperation with African countries; - African countries increased their support to Brazil at UNGA during the period. To achieve this goal, this research has three sections. First, studies on the "exchange" of bilateral benefits for support in multilateral forums. The second section presents general African foreign policy in and Lula governments. In addition, shows the variables chosen as indicative of Brazilian strategy to win allies in Africa - bilateral trade and technical cooperation projects between Brazil and Africa. The last section has four parts. At first, the choice of UNGA as a parameter of international alignment. The second presents the methodology and the model used to verify the main hypothesis. In the third, the data, descriptive statistics and their possible results. In the last part, the results and the proof or not of the hypothesis. Finally, in conclusion, it will be possible to answer the research problem that is the strengthening of bilateral relationship increased the support of beneficiary countries at multilateral forums. This article, thus, contributes to the study of emerging countries in the international system, complementing existing research on the strategies used by countries to win allies at international organizations. 1. BILATERAL STRATEGIES AND THE SUPPORT AT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1 This article is part of PhD thesis presented in March 2015 at International Relations Institute at the University of São Paulo (IRI /USP). 2 International PhD Relations at International Relations Institute at University of Sao Paulo and professor at School of Commerce Foundation Alvares Penteado and University Anhembi Morumbi.

2 Some International Relations researchers examines the factors that influences cooperation between States, such as alliances, external assistance or commitment to international institutions. Some states, at international organizations, such as UNGA are more susceptible to bilateral pressures. Thus, the more a state is dependent in terms of trade, aid or protection, is more vulnerable to pressure from the most powerful states. (KEOHANE, 1966, p. 19). From these considerations, in the 60s an extensive literature began to study voting patterns in UNGA (Alker, 1964; Russett, 1966; Kim; Russett, 1996; Voeten, 2000). In the same decade, there were studies investigating the use of foreign aid by United States to influence the votes at UN (Wilcox, 1962; Mason, 1964; Westwood, 1966; Kaplan, 1967; Plan; Riggs 1967, Black, 1968). Andrew Westwood (1966, p. 105) concluded that efforts to make translate aid in ideological support by the beneficiaries would probably not be necessary because the use of foreign aid to promote cooperation has become more important than the ideological issue 1. In the 80s, these studies identified how and when major powers "buy" votes though foreign aid to achieve their expected results (Wittkopf, 1973; Rai, 1980; Kegley and Hook, 1991; Wang, 1999). Besides traditional motivations for development assistance to the least developed countries, donor governments also consider, in their foreign aid allocations, its own national interests, such as political and security interests, investment and trade (Maizels; Nissanke, 1984 p. 879), with political or security interests dominating the results 2. In the 70s and 80s, researchers concluded that bilateral donors pursue their own interests when allocate aid, and there is a strong empirical evidence demonstrating the association between foreign aid and voting behavior at UNGA, focusing on the developed countries, major donors in the world. In recent years, research on cooperation with the US at UN has two sides: first, based on the fact that divisions at UN reflects the wider international cleavages, and states creates preferences similar to US (Kim; Russett 1996; Voeten, 2000). The second highlights the strategic voting and policies made by the United States to create common preferences and to influence to vote with US, known as vote buying. In this case, cooperation is induced by state policies and foreign aid, which would influence the recipient nations. Thus, more dependent a state is from US aid, closer will be their votes convergence with US (Wang, 1999; Lai; Morey, 2006, p 388.). Foreign aid would serve not only to the economic interests of donors, but also to buy political support of receivers 3 (Langhammer, 2004), since US government gives some weight to votes at UNGA. For Alesina and Dollar (2000), the correlation between friendship variables at UN and aid flows can be interpreted in two ways: to help buy votes at UN in favor of the donor; or UN votes are a reliable indicator of political alliances between countries and these alliances defines aid flows (Alesina, Dollar, 2000). According to the authors, the second interpretation is more plausible, as many votes at UN are significant from the point of view of foreign policy. However, it would not be clear why donor countries are concerned to buy these votes, as the voting patterns are strongly correlated with alliances and similarities of political, economic and geopolitical interests. The best interpretation is that donors favors your friends with foreign aid, and an observable proof of friendship would be UN votes, suggesting that an exogenous change in voting patterns indicates a change in geopolitical alliances patterns that would bring a change in aid (Alesina, Dollar, 2000, p. 46)

3 However, the two interpretations are consistent with the view that aid is used for strategic purposes and is not easy disaggregate, econometrically, the two interpretations, or aid causes UN votes or votes at UN causes aid? (Alesina, Dollar, 2000, p. 46) Other studies found evidence that US foreign aid and other developed countries would be offered to members of UNGA to shape their voting patterns (Lay; Morey, 2006). Therefore, the hypothesis that UN voting affects foreign aid is plausible, at least in key voting, for donors. However, political donors agendas are critical and could take aid allocations away from the needs questions (Boone, 1996; Alesina, Dollar, 2000; Collier, Dollar, 2002). The aid distribution, therefore, is strongly related to donors geopolitical interests and foreign policy preferences (Maizels; Nissanke, 1984; Boone, 1996; Cashel-Greement; Schraeder et al, 1998; Svensson, 1999; Alesina, Dollar, 2000; Alesina; Weder, 2002; Neumayer, 2003). The few studies that propose to bring evidence of vote-buying show a connection between changes in aid flows to a US receiver and vote convergence (Wang, 1999). However, these correlations can be explained in two different ways. On the one hand, UN vote would be associated with foreign aid, since this allocation would be used to reward or punish countries to vote in certain ways. On the other hand, UN vote could not be important for donors, but rather a reflection of sincere political preferences between UN members. Thus, any relationship between UN voting and aid flows could be interpreted as an evidence that donors prefer to contribute to regimes with the same view and with similar foreign policy goals. Thus, variable "regime" began to be used to explain the link between UN votes and foreign aid allocation (Lay; Morey, 2006). Democratic governments would be more likely to vote according to their own preferences and a reduction in foreign aid allocation would not influence their vote, because they have the winning coalitions and the electorate support (Bueno Mesquita Et Al., 2003). For autocratic leaders, the lack of popular legitimacy would cause government dependence on supply private goods to elite groups (Bueno Mesquita Et Al., 2003). Other variables are relevant. Carter and Stone (2011, p. 3) believe US punishes or rewards receptors differently depending on their regime type, the government's political orientation, level of development and alliance relationship, would explain the effectiveness US attempts to influence votes at UNGA. The UNGA votes are also used in studies to establish an association between UN votes and aid by many donors and multilateral institutions (Clay; Lee, 2005; Oatley, Thacker, 1999). The most robust study on International Monetary Fund programs (IMF) shows that the loan fund would be significantly shaped by geopolitical preferences of major shareholders, particularly US. In these studies, UN vote is a control variable (Steinwand, Stone, 2008). Thacker (1999) and Barro and Lee (2005) conclude that the increasing vote convergence with US could be associated with a higher probability of IMF loan. Other recent researches emphasizes votes designated as important by United States to study vote buying. Andersen et al. (2006) assumes alignment to US in important UNGA polls as a concession, and use these votes to build a measure of political concessions from the country to US, to then estimate the probability of a country to get an IMF loan. Other studies also attempt to establish a relationship between being a temporary member of Security Council (SC) and the granting of loans by IMF (Kuziemko; Werker, 2006; Dreher et al, 2009.).

4 To Dreher et al. (2009), IMF loans would be a mechanism of major shareholders to gain favors from UNSC members. Some developing countries would give more value to loans than their votes at UNSC, and developed countries would value UNSC votes more than loans. Therefore, some developing countries would be willing to sell their votes in UNSC for IMF loans. The studies on relationship between foreign aid and UNGA voting, although emphasize developed countries, it is important because demonstrates that States are willing to use different tools to influence voting behavior of other countries in multilateral forums. However, this literature does not address support among developing countries at international organizations and tools used by them to form alliances. Therefore, this article, assuming the argument that countries "buys" support in multilateral organizations polls, seeks to prove if it occurs between developing countries which, in recent years, increased their power in international system and its presence at international organizations. As developing countries have a limited capacity of foreign aid, one way to win such support would be bilateral cooperation projects, since money invested would be smaller and would also promote the development of recipient countries. Another one would be trade, because it guarantees, such as cooperation or foreign aid, development and economic growth of the largest commercial attention receptor. The similarity of positions at multilateral level would increase between countries with increasing trade flows. This study therefore aims to investigate vote buying, basically dedicated to developed countries, it may be applied to the analysis of multilateral support among developing countries. 2. BRAZIL-AFRICA RELATIONS IN RECENT YEARS ( ): 2.1. Regions of interest in and Lula foreign policies in numbers: In Lula government, there was a direction to South-South relations, especially Latin America and Africa, by extending or reactivating contacts with non-traditional partners in these regions. Lula's foreign policy creators believed intensifying contacts with the South, Brazil could win allies and their support for their demands at international level - development and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This change can be seen in bilateral presidential trips. While made 48 trips to North (41.7% of total) and 67 to South (58.2%), Lula traveled 47 times to North (26.1% of total) and 123 to South (68 3% of total), especially African countries (Source: MRE, 2010, p.9). This diversification also occurs in trade, with an increase in Brazilian exports, which increases from US$ billion in government, to US$ billion in the next government, increasing 117%. In the period, exports to South surpassed those for North, and the exports volume to South along Lula government, exceeding exports to North, increasing 276% for the former and 76% for the second.

5 US$ billion FOB (year base 2005) Chart 1 Brazilian Exports Destination Evolution 120,00 100,00 80,00 60,00 40,00 20,00 - BRAZILIAN EXPORTS DESTINATION EVOLUTION (US$ BILLION -YEAR BASE 2005) 40,50 25,19 Self elaboration. Source: MDIC ,34 71,20 North South However, change is still slow because the South share in Brazilian exports in Lula government is similar to North participation, and has not grown so much from the previous government, from 39.10% to 49 49%. The change, is marginal, and European and North American markets remain relevant. Chart 2 - Brazilian Exports Destinies by Government BRAZILIAN EXPORTS DESTINIES BY GOVERNMENT 300,00 250,00 200,00 150,00 100,00 50,00 0,00 Self elaboration. Source: MDIC Africa Latin America European Union Middle East Asia (-China) China USA Asia In imports, the movement is similar, but slower. Brazilian imports grew 62%, from US$ billion during Cardoso government, to US$ in Lula government. A change occurred in the origins of Brazilian imports, with an increase in South imports and a decrease of those coming from North. South imports grew from US$ billion to US$ billion, an increase of 123% between the two governments. Imports from North pass from US$ billion to US$ billion in the Lula government, an increase of 31%.

6 US$ billion FOB (year base 2005) Graph 3 - Brazilian imports origins evolution BRAZILIAN IMPORTS ORIGINS EVOLUTION (US$ BILLION - YEAR-BASE 2005) 333,4 173,9 Source: AliceWeb. Self elaboration. 437,4 386,9 North South Noticed an increase in almost all markets, except United States and Middle East. The imports that increases faster are from Asia, largely due to China. Graph 4 Imports origins by market and government 300,0 250,0 200,0 150,0 100,0 50,0 0,0 IMPORTS ORIGINS BY MARKET AND GOVERNMENT Source: AliceWeb. Self elaboration. Africa Latin America European Union Middle East Asia (-china) China Between two governments occurred a fall in almost all markets, except Asia and Africa, which would explain the increase in imports from South. The data collected, until now, confirms the relative change in Brazilian foreign policy hypothesis, with the intensification of contacts with South, which could be a strategy to increase the Brazilian bargaining power in the international system The lines of African politics in comparative perspective The two governments had different strategies of relationship with Africa. In, the approach was selective, especially the relations with South Africa, Angola, countries of South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS, in portuguese) and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP, in portuguese) and greater participation in UN peace missions 4, most of it in Africa and the conclusion of Mercosur South Africa Framework Agreement. USA Asia

7 In Lula government, the approach was more diversified due to the emphasis in foreign policy to the relations with South, based on strategic and economic interests, which one is Brazilian global projection. Presidential trips to Africa shows these characteristics. While visited in his 4 trips to continent, only two countries (Angola and South Africa), Lula, in his 34 trips, visited 29 countries. Lula was also present in regional African summits. closed Brazilian embassies at Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania. In Lula government, the number of Brazilian embassies in Africa doubled, to 34, highlighting the reopening of three closed embassies in the previous government. Figure 1 - Re-opened embassies in Africa Source: MRE, 2010, p. 2. Despite embassies opening in relevant countries for bilateral trade, such as Benin and Ivory Coast, in important countries in region, such Cameroon, and for commercial interests, such Mauritania and Tanzania, with the establishment of Brazilian companies after embassies opening. Also the opening in countries with which Brazil had few contacts and little relevance in the international and African scene, as Botswana and Burkina Faso, featuring a little pragmatic strategy, more focused on speech. Another important action was the debt forgiveness to African countries, according to the Millennium Development Goals, indicating the attempt of Lula government to deepen and diversify its relationship with African Brazil-Africa Trade flow between 1995 and 2010: The trade also presents market diversification the increase of Brazilian exports to Africa, however, African participation in Brazilian exports varies very little, despite the growth in total exports volume of Brazil. Africa's share in exports was 3.1% in, while Lula was 4.9%, an increase of 1.8% (Source: MDIC), confirming the markets diversification. However, Africa's share of total Brazilian exports is still modest, taking, on both governments, the fifth place. Graph 5 - Africa's participation in Brazilian exports by government

8 US$ BILLION (YEAR BASE 2005) AFRICA'S SHARE IN BRAZILIAN EXPORTS BY GOVERNMENTS 6,0% 4,0% 2,0% 0,0% TOTAL 1º MANDATO 2º MANDATO Self elaboration. Source: MDIC. Between 1995 and 2002, exports to Africa grew US$ 500 million, a 26% increase compared to 159% between 2003 and 2010, from US$ 3.03 billion in 2003 to US$ 7.66 billion in 2010 (SOURCE: MDIC). In the exports volume, the difference between two governments is much higher, indicating that the exports growth to Africa region was part of a general increase of movement of Brazilian exports and not a phenomenon of emphasis in Brazilian trade relations with African countries. Chart 6 - Exports to Africa by government EXPORTS TO AFRICA BY GOVERNMENT 0 TOTAL 1º TERM 2º TERM Self elaboration. Source: MDIC. In Exports by African region, there is an equilibrium, except for Central and Eastern Africa, whose exports do not exceed 5% of total exports to the continent. In government which, according to literature favored Portuguese-speaking countries, these countries have a minimum share of Brazilian total exports to Africa, about 6.6% (Source: AliceWeb). Therefore, the selectivity in government is not proven by Brazilian exports share by African region. Moreover, in Lula government, exports increased, especially to Portuguese-speaking countries, with an increase of 111% (Source: AliceWeb), while the share of other regions does not show a significant change.

9 Country Share in Brazilian Exports Chart 7 - African regions shares in Brazilian exports to Africa AFRICAN REGIONS SHARES IN EXPORTS TO AFRICA 45,0% 40,0% 35,0% 30,0% 25,0% 20,0% 15,0% 10,0% 5,0% 0,0% Self elaboration. Source: AliceWeb. There was no diversification in African markets buyers because their participation has not changed from one government to another. There has been a change of position, especially Angola and Algeria, whose exports increased, respectively, 124% and 78%. Chart 8 - Major buyers in Africa Central Africa North Africa South Africa Western Africa Eastern Africa CPLP MAJOR AFRICAN BUYERS 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Self elaboration. Source: AliceWeb There were no major changes in the products exported to Africa, with no change in position of the top ten export products, reflecting low diversification, different from intentions and efforts of Lula government.

10 Prodcts Chart 9 - Products exported to Africa MAJOR PRODUCTS EXPORTED TO AFRICA BY GOVERNMENT FATS AND OILS CHEMICAL PRODUCTS ORE REACTORS SUGAR 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% Share in exports to Africa Self elaboration. Source: AliceWeb. There was an increased African participation in Brazilian imports, which passed from 4.16% in government to 8.09% in Lula government, a growth of 95% (Source: MDIC). However, this increment was due to an expansion in total imports, not changing the position of African countries in imports, continuing to be the sixth market of Brazilian purchases abroad. Graph 10 - African share in Brazilian Imports by government AFRICAN SHARE IN BRAZILIAN IMPORTS BY GOVERNMENT 10,0% 8,0% 6,0% 4,0% 2,0% 0,0% TOTAL 1º MANDATO 2º MANDATO Source: AliceWeb. Self elaboration. Between 1995 and 2002, imports from Africa increased 127%, while in the next government grew 243% (Source: MDIC). This volume grew from US$ 17.8 billion during Cardoso government to US$ 71.1 billion in Lula government, an increase of 299%, much higher than the growth in total imports volume was 105%. This increase was due to the purchase of oil, because Brazil reduced its Middle East imports and started to import it from Africa, through the Brazilian Petrobrás activities.

11 US$ BILLION (YEAR-BASE 2005) Graph 11 Imports Volume from Africa by government 80,0 70,0 60,0 50,0 40,0 30,0 20,0 10,0 0,0 IMPORTS VOLUME FROM AFRICA BY GOVERNMENT TOTAL 1º MANDATO 2º MANDATO Self elaboration. Source: AliceWeb. There were no major changes in African regions of Brazilian imports, with little attention to Central Africa and East Africa, with less than 1.5% together. This is because there are, in these regions, major oil exporters, main product imported by Brazil. The regions with the highest growth were West Africa and CPLP, whose increases were, respectively, 36% and 124%, again due to oil imports originated from Nigeria, in the first region, and Angola, in the second group. There were declines in imports from North Africa and Southern Africa, especially in this last area, the decrease of a traditional Brazilian partner, South Africa. These data demonstrate that was not diversification in imports. On the contrary, there was a concentration in Portuguese-speaking countries and Nigeria. Graph 12 Imports share by African Region IMPORTS SHARE BY AFRICAN REGION 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Central Africa North Africa South Africa Western Africa Eastern Africa Self elaboration. Source: AliceWeb. The analysis of supplier markets confirm the concentration in oil producers since, except Nigeria and Angola - major oil producers - and Morocco - with a discrete high, other markets decreased their share in Brazilian imports.

12 US$ Billion (year-base 2005) Share in Brazilian Imports from Africa Graph 13 - Markets Suppliers by government 55% 50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% MAJOR AFRICAN SUPPLIERS BY GOVERNMENT Self elaboration. Source: AliceWeb. Algeria Nigeria South Africa Morocco Angola Benin There is a concentration of imported products from Africa, and oil and oil products are the main products, a permanent fact in two governments, changing only the participation of these products in imports. Total imports of oil increased from US$ 16.9 billion during Cardoso government to US $ 61.9 billion, growth of 60.9% (Source: AliceWeb). Further, Brazilian imports from Africa remained concentrated on oil, from 78.2% to 87.05%. Brazil-Africa trade balance, between two governments, is in deficit due to high imports of African oil. As well as in imports, the deficit is much higher in Lula government, largely by the increase in oil imports. Between the two governments, flow trade with Africa grew 44%, while trade flow between Brazil and the world in the period increased 84.33% (Source: MDIC). The Brazilian trade with the world has increased almost twice, indicating that exchange with region did not follow the exchange with the world. Chart 14 - Trade Flow with Africa by government - -2,00-4,00-6,00-8,00-10,00-12,00-14,00-16,00 TRADE FLOW WITH AFRICA BY GOVERNMENT Self elaboration. Source: AliceWeb. TOTAL 1º TERM 2º TERM The Brazil-Africa trade relations has shown little change, with a low participation of Africa in Brazilian trade flow and growth below increase in Brazilian total trade.

13 2.4. Technical cooperation between Brazil and Africa: Another important element in Brazil-Africa relations strengthening between and Lula was technical cooperation in areas such as agriculture, health, education, environment and professional training. The basic guideline of Brazilian Technical Cooperation for Development (TCDC) is the transfer of knowledge and technologies to developing countries, human resources and training. The TCDC projects during the period were concentrated in areas considered priorities for foreign policy. - Africa and South America What has changed is the position of these regions. In government, South America ranked first, with 30% and Africa second place with 26%, the next government, the positions are reversed, Africa ranks first 36% of while South America goes to the second place with a 27% (PUENTE, 2008, p. 173). There was a significant growth of technical cooperation with Africa, with diversification in recipient countries and areas of these projects. The government, were 13 African countries benefited in 16 areas and Lula were 38 beneficiaries in 30 different areas (Source: DAI-MRE). Chart 12 - Comparative Table of Beneficiaries and TCDC areas by government COMPARATIVE TABLE OF BENEFICIARIES OF TCDC AND AREAS BY GOVERNMENT BENEFICIARIES AREAS Self elaboration. Source: DAI-MRE. Occurred a greater diversification in African regions, with growth in four of the regions, except for South Africa, with a drop of 27.7 percentage points. In government, the projects were for South Africa, specifically South Africa, CPLP and Western Africa, composed of three Portuguese-speaking countries. In the next government, there was a significant change in regions benefited from cooperation projects, except for the increasing participation of North Africa.

14 Graph 13 - African regions shares in TCDC for Africa AFRICAN REGIONS SHARES IN TCDC FOR AFRICA 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Self elaboration. Source: DAI-MRE. North Africa Central Africa Western Africa Eastern Africa South Africa CPLP Despite diversification of countries benefited by Lula government, there is a centralization in the Portuguese-speaking countries in both governments. In government, these countries account for 52.9% while the next government that number drops to 49.6% (Source: DAI-MRE). Graph 14 - Country share in TCDC for Africa- 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% COUNTRY SHARE - Self elaboration. Source: DAI-MRE.

15 Number of projects Graph 15 - Country share in TCDC for Africa Lula 18% 16% 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% COUNTRY SHARE - Self elaboration. Source: DAI-MRE. The predominant areas are similar, health, education, culture and agriculture. Lula government was responsible for signing of a number of general cooperation agreements - 16 agreements - as its predecessor just signed two agreements 5 (Source: DAI-MRE). Graph 16 - Cooperation projects with Africa by Area and Government PROJECTS BY AREA AND GOVERNMENT Area Source: DAI-MRE. Self elaboration. There was cooperation a greater diversification in regions and countries and in areas which these instruments are signed. The government commercial, diplomatic and technical relationship with Africa was restricted to traditional partners, especially those of Portuguese and South Africa, and the oil-producing countries in the variable trade, keeping the selectivity. With the emphasis on South-South relations, on Lula government there was a revival of African politics through the expansion of African partners not only in trade but in several areas, such as TCDC. Health Education Agriculture Culture Sports General Agreement Science & Technology Thecnical Cooperation Joint Comission

16 In contrast to the strengthening relations with Africa, Brazil has gained, in Lula government, the support of the CPLP countries in several Brazilian candidacies for positions in international organizations such as UN Security Geral and the Directorate- General of Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). These achievements show the "exchange" favors between Brazil and Africa, as pointed out by the literature of developed countries. 3. CONVERGENCE BETWEEN BRAZIL AND AFRICA IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (UNGA) 3.1. UNGA vote as a measure for foreign policies guidelines: There are few tools available to measure quantitatively the guidelines and alignments in international system. One is UNGA votes, where almost every state is present and main issues on international agenda are discussed. However, opinions about this methodology are not consensual. For Dixon (1981) UNGA would be only a passive arena related to States interaction while for Kennedy (2006) that vote would be just symbolic, not a demonstration of countries alignments. Furthermore, there is no way to know precisely whether the UNGA votes are a simple expression of States preferences - which would make the vote a reliable measure of convergence between states and of general foreign policies guidelines - or a reflection of economic incentives between states, something discussed previously. Individual members affect UNGA political processes, in other words, the internal policy could determine what is voted and focus only on voting patterns would be ignore the larger picture of international politics and the UN itself (KEOHANE, 1967). Despite these empirical inconsistencies, many researchers use these data to determine States behavior and to understand the broader elements of international politics, because in the international system, there is no other organization or forum in which all States vote on a regular basis about different international issues. Therefore, the study of these polls in a long period of time and over different areas can reveal possible changes in states behavior (Voeten, 2000, p ) and national foreign policies. UNGA voting is used to evaluate countries position only regional alignments in international issues (Lijphart, 1963; Marin-Bosch, 1998; Selcher, 1978) and as indicators of states foreign policies orientations (Thacker, 1999; Tomlin, 1985; Voeten, 2000). These works support the use of UNGA as a parameter to analyze alignments between the countries in international system and the general direction of national foreign policies Methodology: To prove the research hypothesis - bilateral relations strengthening strategies generate more multilateral support of recipient countries to donors - will be used panel data analysis. The advantage of this model related to cross-sectional models, according Hsio (1986), is the ability to control heterogeneity among individuals and increase estimates accuracy (Cameron; Travedi, 2005). To check the effect of the interest variables were made three separate estimates. First, through the pooled regression model (POLS). After using the random effects model (RA). Finally, using the fixed effects model (FE), which allows consistent estimators in the presence of heterogeneity observed correlated with other covariates. Subsequently, tests were conducted to choose the most appropriate model to maximize the efficiency, given that coefficients are consistent.

17 In POLS model, the estimator considers all information as transversal units, ignoring the element time, that is, we have in the database N x T units. Although frequently used, there is a problem to hypothesis validity that there is no information about idiosyncratic error correlated with explanatory variables. Therefore, disregarding database temporality, the model does not allow the control of specific heterogeneity (ci), causing inconsistency and bias in the estimates if the heterogeneity is correlated with some of the regressors, ie if there is some endogenous regressor. Furthermore, POLS requires exogenous weak, ie that regressor and composes error vit are not correlated in the same period 6. It also requires full rank to avoid perfect multicolinearity, as well as the other two models presented below. POLS model Yit= α + Xit β + εit E(εit / x) = 0; εit ~ IID (0, σ 2 ) (1) The POLS estimation allows the control of annual effects through the use of year dummies (ds), as well as dummies for specific groups of individuals (dj). Thus, the POLS model becomes: POLS model with year and specific groups dummies Yit= α + Xit β + γ ds + λ dj +εit (2) E(εit / x) = 0; εit ~ IID (0, σ 2 ) The random-effects model (RA) deal with the specific unobserved heterogeneity (ci) as a random variable, distributed independently of covariates and with homocedastic variance. In this model, the specific effect becomes part of the error and therefore can not be correlated with any regressor in all periods, otherwise all the estimators will be inconsistent violating one of the Gauss-Markov assumptions of estimation by OLS. Since the exogenous strict hypothesis uit error should not be correlated with the regressors nor specific effect in any time. The random effects model is estimated by generalized least squares (GLS) when the matrix of variance-covariance matrix is known. The estimation of feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) is used when this matrix is unknown. Random effects model: Yit= α + Xit β + vit = α + Xit β + (ci + εit) (3) where vit is the composite error give by ci + εit E(vit / Xis) = 0; to i s vit ~ IID (0, σ 2 ) The fixed effects analysis (FE) examines different intercepts for individuals, assuming that the slopes are constant, as well as variance. The specific effect ci is not treated more like a random variable as in random effects model, but as a parameter to be estimated. Unlike RA, the FE model allows that the specific effect ci be correlated with Xit covariates. The FE estimation requires strict exogeneity, in other words, that all regressors are uncorrelated with ui error for all periods. By making FE estimation, is necessary to use one of the processing techniques to eliminate heterogeneity. The most common are the first differences and the within transformation.

18 Fixed Effects Model: Yit= α + ci + Xit β + εit (4) Transformation to eliminate ci: Yit - Ym = (Xit - Xm) β + (εit εm) E(εit / Xis, ci) = 0; for i s εit ~ IID (0, σ 2 ) After these estimations, tests will be done needed to confirm what are the most consistent estimators and, among these, the most efficient. If there is unobserved heterogeneity not correlated with any regressor, the estimators of fixed and random effects are consistent, the latter being more efficient. If heterogeneity is correlated with a regressor, the first is the only consistent. At the end, I will perform the Breusch- Pagan tests for the presence of specific heterogeneity and Hausman to verify the correlation between this and the covariates 7. An important limitation of fixed effect method is the inability to estimate the effect of constant variables in time. Therefore, if the Hausman test (1978) indicates no difference between the estimators FE and RA, besides the last is the most efficient, it also allows the inclusion of constant variables in time. Votes Convergence Model The sample covers 1158 UNGA resolutions between 1995 and The database has information beyond these four types of variables: political, commercial, economic and geographical, some of them used as a control in the estimates. The model can be explained by the following table: Figure 3 Votes Convergence Model INDEPENDENT VARIABLE INTERVENING VARIABLE DEPENDENT VARIABLE Brazilian share in each african country exports. Brazilian share in each african country imports. Number brazilian cooperation projects with each african country. PIB per capita of each african country Vote convergence between USA and african country. CPLP Colonizing Country Vote Convergence between Brazil and each african country.. The basic equation to be estimated can be summarized as follows: Voting = α + β 1 (coop) it + β 2 (exp ou imp) it + β 3 (Pibpe) it + β 4 (USA2) it + β 5 (CPLP) it + β 6 (Lula) it + β 7 (col) it + ε it (5) where i is the African country, t the year and α e ε it are respectively constant and idiosyncratic error, coop and exp or imp are independent variables and voting is the dependent variable. The variable voting indicates the percentage of convergence vote between Brazil and each of African countries between 1995 and 2010, excluding abstentions 8.

19 The bilateral relations strengthening will be measured by three independent variables: - Number of cooperation projects between Brazil and Africa between 1995 and 2010, called COOP; - Brazil's share in total exports of each African country between 1995 and 2010, called EXP; - Brazilian share in total imports of each African country between 1995 and 2010, called IMP. These variables were chosen because they are the way of an emerging country with limited resources to provide cash assistance to "buy" votes in the UNGA Data: To calculate the dependent variable, were used data collected by Anton Strezhnev and Erik Voeten (2009), with the voting records at UNGA between After collecting similar votes at UNGA between Brazil and each of the African countries between 1995 and 2010, was calculated the convergence percentage between two countries from the total voting they participated 9. The variables related to bilateral trade (EXP and IMP) were calculated from the exports and imports percentage of each African country on Brazilian total exports and imports of these states in each of the years of the staudy. The variable cooperation was calculated from the amount of bilateral cooperation projects signed between Brazil and each African country between 1995 and The per capita GDP of each African country - PIBpercapita (base year 2005) - was chosen to control the influence of development level on voting decisions, taken from data provided by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It was also used the vote convergence among African countries and US in the period, excluding abstentions, due to the same reason explained to Brazil - calculated in the same way that vote - to remove the possible effect of convergence between African and USA - major international power from the results. The variable CPLP was designed because, according to trade and cooperation data, this community has an important role in policy towards Africa. This variable is a dummy call CPLP, and the non-members will be number 0 and members number 1. The following intervening variable is related to colonization. As most of the African countries were colonized, we chose a dummy that takes into account the colonizing country. Countries that were not colonized is zero, the former British colonies the number 1, the former French colonies number 2, the Belgian former colonies the number 3, the former Spanish colonies number 4, the ex- Italian colony number 5, the former German colonies the number 6 and the former colonies Portuguese number 7. The last intervening variable, called Lula, was a dummy to see the behavior of the data from the Lula entry. The data for the years 1995 to 2002 was number 0, while data for 2003 to 2010 was received number 1. Below variables description (Table 1) and their descriptive statistics (Table 2). Table 1 - Description of variables Voting coop Vote percentage between Brazil and African countries Número of cooperation projects Brasil-African countries

20 Brazilian share in African Imports exp ou imp logpibpercapita eua cplp col year ccode Percentage of brazilian share in African country trade log percapita pib of each African country by year Porcentagem similar votes beyween USA and African country Dummy related to CPLP Dummy related to colonization Year of the data Dummy related to each country Continuous Mean Median Standard Mínimum Maximum Variables Deviation Vot Coop Exp Imp Logpibpercapita USA Dummies Frequency Variables cplp col The relationship between chosen variables indicates that vote convergence between a country and a country/region at UNGA can be explained from the share of this country in region/country trade and the number of cooperation projects between one country and this region/country. However, this relationship may be affected by factors such as per capita GDP, convergence with the United States, CPLP membership and fidelity to the colonizing country Data Presentation: After reviewing Brazil-Africa exports, was discovered that Brazilian share in African trade is very low, only 1.76% of African imports. Despite growing from year 2000, it falled from Graph 17 - Brazilian share in African imports EVOLUTION OF BRAZILIAN SHARE IN AFRICAN IMPORTS 3,0% 2,5% 2,0% 1,5% 1,0% 0,5% 0,0% Source: Unctad. Self elaboration. Anos

21 Brazilian Share in African Exports Brazilian share in African imports Between governments, the Brazilian share in African imports increased, a growth of %, from 1.01% to 2.12%. Graph 18 - Brazilian share in African imports by government 2,5% 2,0% 1,5% 1,0% 0,5% 0,0% BRAZILIAN SHARE EVOLUTION IN AFRICAN IMPORTS BY GOVERNMENT TOTAL 1º TERM 2º TERM Source: Unctad. Self elaboration. Brazilian share in African exports is 2.024% during the period. Unlike the predominantly upward trend in imports, Brazilian share in African exports was not constantly growing, with down in certain years and growth from Graph 19 Brazilian share in African exports 3,5% 3,0% 2,5% 2,0% 1,5% 1,0% 0,5% 0,0% BRAZILIAN SHARE EVOLUTION IN AFRICAN EXPORTS Source: Unctad. Self elaboration. YEARS The Brazilian share in African exports between the two governments increased, growing 35.73%, from 1.75% to 2.38%.

22 Number of Cooperation Projects Brazilian Share in African Exports Graph 20 - Brazilian share in African exports by government BRAZILIAN SHARE EVOLUTION IN AFRICAN EXPORTS BY GOVERNMENT 3,0% 2,5% 2,0% 1,5% 1,0% 0,5% 0,0% 1º TERM 2ª TERM TOTAL Source: Unctad. Self elaboration. These data show that, despite the increase of Brazilian share in African imports and exports, Brazil is not a relevant partner for Africa, which would not justify an increasing vote convergence at UNGA, as other countries are more relevant and therefore, deserve more support in the Assembly. In bilateral cooperation, the evolution between 1995 and 2010 was significant, from only 2 projects to 78 projects, despite having suffered some setbacks. Graph 20 - Brazil-Africa bilateral cooperation evolution BRAZIL-AFRICA COOPERATION PROJECTS EVOLUTION Source: DAI-MRE. Self elaboration. Year The significant increase in bilateral cooperation projects is important as it would contribute to grow convergence between Brazil and Africa at UNGA. The voting at UNGA, there was a high degree of convergence between Brazil and Africa, especially when abstentions where considered (VOT1), coming in one of the years to 100% convergence.

23 Brazil-Africa convergence percentage at UNGA Convergence percentage at UNGA Graph 21 - Brazil-Africa convergence of developments in UNGA per year 120,0% 100,0% 80,0% 60,0% 40,0% 20,0% 0,0% BRAZIL AFRICA CONVERGENCE AT UNGA YEARS VOT1 VOT2 Source: UN Strezhnev; Voeten, Self Elaboration The high degree of convergence between Africa and Brazil at UNGA apparently could harm hypothesis proof, since its increase would not point significant changes in the general direction of African countries at UNGA, because there is previous strong convergence, and is not necessary for Brazil "buy" African votes. So, it will only be used convergence excluding abstentions. However, as pointed out in the literature, one reason to "buy" votes would also reward or punish allies. There was no significant change in voting pattern between Africa and Brazil at UNGA between two governments, with a slight setback in vote convergence, including abstentions (VOT1), from 99.4% in to 98.6% in Lula. Without abstentions (VOT2), there is a reverse movement, from 83.7% to 85.6% in. Graph 22 - Brazil-Africa Convergence at UNGA by government BRAZIL-AFRICA CONVERGENCE AT UNGA BY GOVERNMENT 105,0% 100,0% 95,0% 90,0% 85,0% 80,0% 75,0% 70,0% 1º TERM 2º TERM TOTAL VOT1 VOT2 Source: UN Strezhnev; Voeten, Self Elaboration. In both governments, main allies were not countries with Brazil has strong or old bilateral relations. The country with the highest convergence is Seychelles islands, while Angola traditional Brazilian partner - appears among the countries with less convergence. This information is interesting, but not as significant, since convergence is high with all African countries.

24 This evolution shows apparently that efforts to strengthen bilateral relations by Lula government did not change significantly Brazil-Africa convergence at UNGA. It is because this convergence was already high at the beginning of Lula administration, not justifying the government strategies to reinforce relations with Africa to gain their support in multilateral forums, and should therefore have another logic, to be explored by future researches. The descriptive analysis showed that the independent variables did not cause significant changes in Africa's voting patterns related to Brazil, contradicting the hypothesis that these strategies could modify voting patterns in multilateral forums Results: After tests to find the most consistent estimation model, the results of the coefficients were similar for all variables in all models tested. From the results was noticed, in all models, a positive relationship between the variables cooperation and import and vote convergence, the growth on cooperation and Brazilian share in African imports increased Brazil-Africa similar votes. In export and Lula variables, we found a negative relationship with vote convergence, the increase in Brazil's share of African exports and from the Lula government reduced vote convergence at UNGA between the two partners. As all models showed similar relationships between variables, the best method to choose the model would be significance degree and, from the numbers, the most significant model was the random effects (RE), because it was which were found the greatest significance for the chosen variables. After choose the model, variables calculations were made, finding the following correlation coefficients with vote convergence at UNGA. Table 3 - Correlation Coefficients Import vot200 Coeficiente coop imp lula logpibperc~a eua cplp col (omitted) When considered imports, it can be said that there is a positive relationship between cooperation and vote convergence at UNGA, so a cooperation agreement generates an increase of 0.37 percentage point in vote similarity between the two partners. This relationship is also found in the import, which an increase of 1% in imports generates an increase 0.26 percentage point in vote convergence. The logpibpercapita and USA2 control variables also have positive relationship with vote convergence, with higher values than independent variables, showing that exogenous

25 Linear Prediction factors to bilateral strengthening strategies influences vote convergence. Since the cplp and col variables has a negative relationship, which there is a decrease in convergence when considered these elements. The fact that took our attention was Lula variable, with a negative coefficient, ie be Lula government decreases by 2.15 percentage points convergence vote. It was expected an increase in vote convergence if it were found a positive relationship between cooperation and voting, due to the significant increase in cooperation projects in Lula government. However, this expectation was frustrated. One possible explanation is that in previous government the number of projects was very small, ie, the sample was very limited, which meant that the standard error was too high, increasing the range for prediction, becoming impossible, therefore, to find a reliable statistical relationship between variables cooperation and Lula. Figure 2 - Prediction margins with Lula variable Predictive Margins of lula with 95% CIs COOP lula=0 lula=1 In export variable, the results are similar, except for the variable export, with negative value. Table 4 - Correlation Coefficients export vot200 Coefficient coop exp lula logpibperc~a eua cplp col

26 (omitted) When considered exports, the correlation between voting and cooperation is positive, increasing to 0.39, which means that 1 cooperation agreement generates increased 0.39 percentage point in vote convergence between the two partners. The export variable has a negative relationship, which means an increase of 1% in Brazilian share in African exports generates a decrease of percentage point. This fact is interesting, as usually we believed that countries give more importance to their sales and thus converge at UNGA voting with countries that import their products. The logpibpercapita and USA2 control variables have a positive relationship with the dependent variable, with values higher than independent variables, confirming the importance of exogenous factors to bilateral relationship strengthening in vote convergence at UNGA. The control variables related to CPLP and colonization have a negative relationship with the vote variable, having a negative effect on them. Lula variable continued with a negative effect, helping to confirm the argument that was not found a statistical relationship between Lula and cooperation and vote convergence between Brazil and African countries. Until now, were found a relationship between the chosen independent variables - cooperation and export/import - and vote convergence, although relatively low, which means that there is possible evidence "purchase" of African votes by Brazil. However, not possible to determine the influence of government on this strategy. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS Several authors sought to understand alliances at international organizations, leading to an extensive literature on the vote buying of its allies to achieve a favorable position of these organizations on their interests. These studies deal with votes buying by great powers, especially the US, seeking to prove that these countries use international aid to gain the support of recipient countries in multilateral organs, and there is there is no studies that seek to verify the presence of this dynamic in the case of emerging countries. This article aimed to evaluate this phenomenon among emerging countries. For this, was selected Brazil that, in recent years, went through a process of international ascension and sought to increase their ability to influence, particularly at international organizations. For this, Brazil-Africa relationship was chosen as Lula administration, have undertaken strategies to strengthen relations with this region. One of the reasons was to gain the South support to Brazilian multilateral demands. Thus, the general assumption is that countries strengthen their bilateral relationship to gain the recipient countries support at multilateral level. However, the independent variable of literature could not be used in our case because the capacity and amount of international aid provided by developing countries is low. To solve this problem, we used the study of African politics that show, between and Lula government, a significant increase in bilateral trade and cooperation projects with Africa. Thus, the independent variables were bilateral trade and cooperation with African countries. In data analysis, it was clear that between the two governments, there were no major changes in Brazil-Africa relations, focused on traditional partners such as Portuguesespeaking countries, South Africa and oil exporters such as Nigeria and Algeria. However,