What Comes after Musharraf?

Transcription

1 What Comes after Musharraf? What Comes after Musharraf? Katharine Adeney Senior Lecturer University of Sheffield In contrast to India, non-democratic organizations and individuals notably, army chiefs Ayub Khan ( ), Zia-ul Huq ( ) and Pervez Musharraf (1999 present) have dominated Pakistan s political process. Though the democratically elected politicians are still relevant, the army has been vitally important in determining the direction of Pakistan s society, politics, and economy. Even though the military was weakened by the process of partition, the conflict over Kashmir enabled it to emerge as one of the strongest institutions of the state. To make sense of Pakistani politics and the role of the military therein, it is vitally important to understand external factors. International actors, particularly the United States, have helped significantly to shape the internal politics of Pakistan. In particular, at times when the United States has felt the need to preserve a friendly Pakistan for its own security considerations including the cold war when the United States envisaged a pivotal role for Pakistan, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the aftermath of the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001 the Pakistani army has received extensive resources and international support, with concern for democratic consolidation relegated to the back burner. Today, much of the policy guidance imparted by foreign policy advisors in Western capitals is predicated on keeping President General Musharraf in power. Many in the West believe that Musharraf is a safe pair of hands, essential for holding Islamic fundamentalism in check, not least because Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state. This perception is grounded on the assumption that individual leadership really makes a difference. This article will take a different approach of contextualizing current events through the framework that political leaders actions, even in a state such as Pakistan, are constrained by structural forces of state politics. Although individuals have been powerful in Pakistan (and Musharraf is no exception), these individuals and their ac- 41 Katharine Adeney is a senior lecturer in politics at the University of Sheffield, UK. Her publications include Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and Pakistan and Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism. She would like to thank Matthew Nelson for his comments on an earlier version of this article. Copyright 2007 by the Brown Journal of World Affairs Fall/Winter 2007 volume xiv, issue 1

2 Katharine Adeney tions can only be understood by identifying the opportunities and constraints within which they operate. 1 Ultimately, regardless of whether Musharraf remains in power, little substantive change in Pakistani policy is foreseeable in the near future due to the pervasive influence of the military. Pakistan s History 42 Unlike India, which has been governed mostly democratically since 1947, Pakistan has been governed under different forms of military rule for approximately half its existence. There are multiple explanations for the differing democratic trajectories. 2 Pakistan s political parties have been weak compared to India s, and the conflict over Kashmir diverted further resources and power to the army. 3 The strongest institutions in Pakistan are those that form the non-elected parts of the state: the civil and military bureaucracy. Even though there have been periods when elected politicians have appeared more powerful, notably after the secession of Bangladesh in 1971 when the army was seriously weakened, politicians have relied heavily on the army. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the revolution in Iran in 1979 solidified the power of the military under General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, ensuring that Zia was transformed overnight from an international pariah to America s front-line ally in the fight against communism. 4 Western pressures for democratization were therefore absent, and Zia benefitted from massive economic and political aid. Even after democracy was restored following the death of Zia in a suspicious and still officially unexplained air crash in 1988, the military remained powerful. As Ayesha Siddiqa points out, [between 1998 and 1989], the military, as the ultimate arbiter, tweaked the political system every two years, especially when it saw the civilian regime challenging the defense establishment s authority, or it perceived a substantial threat to the polity. 5 An elected prime minister was dismissed three times by the president acting on the behest of the army chief (using the eighth amendment to the constitution that had been introduced by General Zia). When Nawaz Sharif was elected prime minister in 1997, his government amended the constitution to remove this provision. This ensured that when Musharraf sought to remove Sharif, there was no constitutionally sanctioned provision to deploy. Musharraf s Reign: Challenges and Opportunities Musharraf came to international attention in October 1999 when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who was democratically elected and promoted Musharraf over two likely successors to chief of the army, attempted to sack him. 6 Interpretations of Sharif s ac- the brown journal of world affairs

3 What Comes after Musharraf? tions vary, from Sharif s claim that he acted preemptively to prevent Musharraf from launching a coup, to claims that Sharif was trying to appoint an army chief who would be more amenable to his personalization of power. 7 However, the army refused to endorse Sharif s chosen successor and helped secure Musharraf s political ascendance. Subsequently, Sharif was arrested and exiled to Saudi Arabia. Musharraf s takeover was welcomed by many Pakistanis. The quality of leadership had been poor under Sharif, whose administration had been overshadowed by charges of highhandedness and democratic despotism. Musharraf appointed himself as chief executive of Pakistan, and then president in June His coup, or counter-coup, was confirmed by the Supreme Court in May 2000, which also ruled that elections had to be held not later than October During that time the provincial assemblies and National Assembly were dissolved and Musharraf ruled through executive order. The international community s reaction to Musharraf s takeover was unfavorable. Pakistan had already become an international pariah as a result of the 1998 nuclear tests (the resulting sanctions had crippled Pakistan s economy) and the Musharraf-initiated Kargil invasion in May After Musharraf s takeover, the British Commonwealth suspended Pakistan from membership, and when U.S. President Bill Clinton visited in March 2000, he deliberately snubbed Pakistan by staying five hours compared to the five days he spent in India. Under these circumstances it was not surprising that Musharraf indicated his willingness to abide by the Supreme Court of Pakistan s decision that elections be held within three years, again indicating Pakistan s dependence on the goodwill of the United States. Previous generals had made similar promises but with the support of the United States, failed to hold elections Zia-ul-Haq being the most recent example. Many were optimistic that Musharraf would not turn out to be another Zia or Ayub, but instead, a more enlightened general. Upon assuming office Musharraf set out seven aims and objectives, including strengthening the federation, reviving the economy, devolving power, and ensuring accountability. 8 Many Pakistanis were initially favorable towards this governance agenda and allowed themselves to be co-opted by the regime. 9 However, their dreams have been largely shattered tensions in Baluchistan have undermined center provincial harmony, and the economy has grown only because of remittances from Pakistanis returning from jobs in the West and a sizeable increase in U.S. economic aid. Concomitantly, economic disparities between provinces have increased, income is distributed more inequitably, and the local government reforms have been belittled as a device to undermine the provincial governments. 10 Everything changed with 9/11. As Musharraf claimed during his trip to the United States in September 2006, Pakistan would have been bombed back to the stone age if they defied the United States. Musharraf s decision to support the United States is in 43 Fall/Winter 2007 volume xiv, issue 1

4 44 Katharine Adeney line with historical experience: Pakistan has always been extremely dependent on U.S. support and U.S. military aid. 11 As noted, in 2001 Pakistan was internationally isolated. Musharraf was, and is, a secularist with a wide spectrum of associates. He condemned the World Trade Center attacks in unequivocal terms (most Pakistanis were equally horrified). However, the decision to support the United States was not without cost for Musharraf. The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001 led to street demonstrations, although the predictions of the Western media of an imminent downfall of the regime in a violent inferno were completely misjudged. 12 Support for radical interpretations of Islam has increased within Pakistan since 9/11, mostly in response to continuing U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. More important, still, have been the operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. But it should not be forgotten that Musharraf s biggest card to play with the United States is to portray himself as the last bulwark against a so-called nucleararmed Islamist Pakistan; it is therefore in his interests that groups articulating a radical Islamic agenda remain visible. His record on promoting an agenda of Enlightened Moderation, which advocates shunning militancy and extremism and adopt[ing] the path of socioeconomic uplift 13 has therefore been mixed. This agenda has been part of his campaign to portray himself as a mainstream Muslim, and thus as essential to U.S. foreign policy goals in the region. Indeed, in certain cases Musharraf has worked to ease the power of religious law and restrictions on women. 14 But while he has built up his international image as a moderate, Musharraf has also used the religious parties to divide the support of, and supplant, secular political parties such as the Pakistan People s Party (PPP). The alliance of religious parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), did much better than observers had predicted in the 2002 elections, securing 11 percent of the vote. It cannot be denied that these parties benefited from anti-u.s. sentiments after the war in Afghanistan and in anticipation of the widely predicted Iraq invasion. 15 But their success was also facilitated by Pakistani-establishment collusion and pre-poll manipulation. One important element of this was ensuring that many of the MMA alliance politicians who had graduated from madrassahs were not excluded by the newly introduced educational restrictions. Although these parties have opposed many of Musharraf s policies, and sought to limit Musharraf s term in office, it was with their support that Musharraf managed to pass his Legal Framework Order in 2003, which established the National Security Council and reinstated the power of the president to dismiss the prime minister. They supported him after securing a (quickly broken) promise that Musharraf would step down as chief Musharraf s biggest card to play with the United States is to portray himself as the last bulwark against a so-called nuclear-armed Islamist Pakistan. the brown journal of world affairs

5 What Comes after Musharraf? of army staff by the end of Although Musharraf has been seen as a reliable ally in the region, recently the United States has been more vocal in its reservations about his commitment to apprehending members of al-qaeda and the Taliban. In fact, most neutral observers conclude that Pakistan s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been involved in re-arming the Taliban, which is keen to promote a friendly Pashtun government in Afghanistan to counter India and Iran. The October 2006 attack on the Madrassah at Bajaur in FATA, which killed 80 people, was a case in point. It occurred shortly before the visit of Britain s Prince Charles to Pakistan and one month after the Pakistani government had negotiated a peace agreement, strongly opposed by Washington, with tribal elders in the region. Though it is widely believed that this attack was carried out by the United States, the Pakistani military took responsibility for the attack as the less damaging outcome. 16 Musharraf s quest to remain in political power, and maintain U.S. political and military support, have largely dictated his policy agenda to date. However, he has used U.S. fears of Islamic radicalism to promote his own aims of dividing the democratic opposition within Pakistan. Pakistan in 2007 The year 2007 was expected to bring dramatic news for Pakistan. At the time of writing, elections are still due to be held at the end of 2007 or the beginning of At the beginning of 2007, Musharraf looked almost unassailable, barring an assassination attempt. 17 At the time this was an entirely reasonable assumption, but by April, Haris Gazdar noted that the military regime of Pervez Musharraf appears fatally wounded... only very exceptional circumstances will allow Musharraf to remain in power beyond It was the dismissal of the chief justice, Iftikhar Chaudhry, in March on charges of corruption that brought about the change. 19 Chaudhry has recently been reinstated by the Supreme Court, but Musharraf s original decision to oust him was a calculated move to rid himself of a troublesome opponent. The chief justice had demonstrated himself to be a dangerously independent force rejecting the government s attempt to privatize the steel industry and demanding action over the disappeared in Baluchistan. Musharraf desired to be re-elected as president by the existing parliament in which his Kings Party, the PMLQ, heads a coalition, rather than by a future parliament which could be dominated by less quiescent parties. He also desires to retain his position as army chief, correctly perceiving that resignation from this post would condemn him to irrelevance sooner rather than later. If the current parliament were to re-elect him and permit him to retain his uniform, these decisions would in all likelihood be 45 Fall/Winter 2007 volume xiv, issue 1

6 46 Katharine Adeney subject to a Supreme Court challenge hence the importance of the opinions of the chief justice who has expressed doubts as to whether Musharraf could continue as army chief if he were re-elected as president. 20 Musharraf s calculations were upset by the chief justice s decision to challenge the legality of the dismissal, and Musharraf compounded his mistake by the mishandling of the aftermath. The chief justice was filmed being manhandled by police into a car, and a bloody battle between his supporters and riot police was broadcast by several television stations. Several riot police then smashed equipment within one of the television stations, further inflaming the situation. An apology from Musharraf was not enough to put the jack back in the box. Thousands of lawyers and then ordinary Pakistanis flocked to the streets in prolonged agitation. After initially being confined to house arrest, Chaudhry toured Pakistan seeking to drum up support among Provincial Bar Associations, represented by the famous PPP lawyer Aitzaz Ahsan. The police were similarly heavy-handed at many of these rallies. The beginnings of a popular protest were made. Since late 2006 Musharraf has been trying to make a deal with the PPP, including a return to Pakistan for Benazir Bhutto, who was elected prime minister in 1988 and deposed twenty months later. The PPP s mainstream agenda complements Musharraf s own secular leanings better than the agenda of the MMA or even of the PMLQ. This can be seen by the PPP s support in late 2006 for the Women s Protection Bill. The attempt at a deal partly reflects Benazir Bhutto s weakness. Although the Bhutto name is still a powerful rallying force, she has been in exile since 1997 because of corruption charges against her. She fears becoming increasingly irrelevant after failing to contest two consecutive elections. There are international, as well as domestic, pressures for Musharraf to make a deal with Bhutto. The election of a Democratic Congress in the United States has changed the politics. In early 2007 both houses of Congress passed resolutions calling for free and fair parliamentary elections, and one of the reasons for Benazir s newly-found attractiveness to Musharraf has been because of U.S. pressure to make a deal in favor of democracy. 21 This pressure increased in July 2007 when the U.S. Congress passed a bill partially tying future aid to Pakistan to demonstrable progress in... implementing democratic reforms, including allowing free, fair, and inclusive elections at all levels of government in accordance with internationally-recognized democratic norms, and respecting the independence of the press and judiciary. 22 The Future? Where does this leave Musharraf and Pakistan? Musharraf has several options. He can either make a deal with the PPP, try to shore up his current alliance with the PMLQ, the brown journal of world affairs

7 What Comes after Musharraf? or declare a state of emergency. The first scenario involves a deal with the PPP, either in conjunction with other members of the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy or alone. Although talks between Bhutto and Musharraf were called off following the violence in Karachi on 12 May 2007, in which 40 people were killed many of them PPP activists contact resumed during the summer months of The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court to reinstate the chief justice in July and, as significantly, Musharraf s willingness to accept this decision, has made a deal between himself and the PPP more likely because it demonstrates Musharraf s willingness to compromise. If Bhutto is co-opted, then relatively free and fair elections would be held at the end of 2007 or the beginning of 2008 in which it is likely that the PPP would perform even better than they did in 2002 when they received 23 percent of the National Assembly seats and the largest share of the popular vote. However, there are risks for Bhutto of too close an association with Musharraf: her own democratic credentials could be seriously tarnished, and there are rumblings within the PPP about the wisdom of an alliance with the general. In such a scenario it is likely that agreement will be reached on Musharraf s re-election as president of Pakistan from the current assemblies (with the PPP abstaining), with guarantees given of Musharraf stepping down as chief of army staff. If this were to happen, he would be a civilian president, and his future is likely to be short-lived. Despite U.S. pressure for a deal, such a pact would be a sign of a major weakness, but may be more palatable than leaving power altogether. However, previous promises of stepping down were not abided by, and if Bhutto decides to support his re-election prior to him removing his uniform, she will be taking a big risk which could ultimately discredit her status as a democratic politician. Indeed, some have argued that this is Musharraf s strategy. The second option, which is becoming more unlikely, is that Musharraf decides to fight the next election with the increasingly unpopular PMLQ. To win this election, serious poll rigging would be required and international condemnation would be swift. Serious street protests would occur, and it would be difficult for the regime to maintain order without declaring a state of emergency. The recent protests against the dismissal of the chief justice posed such a serious challenge because they were as prominent in the province of Punjab as in the other provinces. This is important because Punjab has been the bastion of the Pakistani state and the major recruitment zone for the army. As well as domestic pressures, serious U.S. disapproval of this course of action could lead to a denial of military and economic aid. However, the current administration is The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court to reinstate the chief justice in July has made a deal between Musharraf and the PPP more likely. 47 Fall/Winter 2007 volume xiv, issue 1

8 48 Katharine Adeney unlikely to cut ties with Musharraf swiftly. Although there are serious concerns in the Bush administration about the lack of results in the war on terror demonstrated by the recently released National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report which called for unilateral U.S. action in FATA, the administration s concern of who would replace Musharraf is likely to be paramount in their consideration. However, whether this policy will survive the Bush presidency is something that Musharraf would be right to be concerned about; recent advocacy of unilateral action within Pakistan by Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama have caused consternation in Pakistan. The third option is that Musharraf decides not to hold elections and declares a state of emergency. This would also be a sign of weakness. The proximate cause of the decision of Musharraf to finally confront the clerics in the Red Mosque in mid- July was the late-june kidnapping of several Chinese nationals accused of running a brothel in Islamabad. This provoked an angry reaction from China, a major investor in Pakistan. Musharraf did not take action in order to bolster his position with the moderates within Pakistan liberal Pakistanis had been calling for action for months against the clerics who announced plans to establish new Islamic courts and urged followers to stage suicide attacks if their Taliban-style movement was blocked. 23 One explanation prevalent in Pakistan is that the action was taken in part to provide justification for a state of emergency as a means to control the violent reaction to the storming of the mosque. The storming of the mosque did indeed provoke a reaction; with over 200 people killed in the two weeks after the attack. It precipitated the breaking of the accord with the tribal leaders in FATA, although this had been under threat for several weeks, if not months, beforehand. It must be stressed that although the response has been a violent and very public one, the stability of the government is not at stake. Indeed, the violence serves to reinforce Musharraf s position as the bulwark against extremism to the west. This is especially necessary given the increased pressure for democratization coming from America. A state of emergency could be sustained for a period of time, but increasing international pressure and domestic opposition would require calling elections sooner rather than later. If international pressure becomes too great and economic and military aid dries up, the possibility of an internal army coup becomes more likely. Musharraf has delivered on his economic and security promises to date, and has been careful to shore up the support of the army, but once he is unable to do that, the army could decide that its interests would be better protected with a new leader. 24 As Ayesha Siddiqa points out, the coup that placed Musharraf in power was not just about defending an individual, it was a matter of upholding the perceived sanctity of the institution. 25 But it is still too soon to write Musharraf off. Although the international community the brown journal of world affairs

9 What Comes after Musharraf? would not approve of a state of emergency and the U.S. secretary of state is widely believed to have personally dissuaded Musharraf from imposing one in August and the NIE report demonstrates increasing U.S frustration over the lack of positive action in FATA, the United States will always be reluctant to risk destabilizing Pakistan. One final scenario to consider is that Musharraf is assassinated. Several attempts have already been made on his life, the most recent in early July 2007, and although his security is extremely tight, the possibility of a successful attempt cannot be ruled out. Such an event would provide an opportunity for elites within the establishment to change course. Another army chief would emerge and in likelihood declare a state of emergency. Much would then depend on the length of time such a state of emergency would remain. Any future individual would have to decide between holding elections almost immediately or following Musharraf s own policy of delaying elections for a specified number of years to sort out the problems in Pakistan. The latter course would be likely to increase conflict, especially given the recent demonstrations that have demonstrated the desire of Pakistanis for a return to democracy. Therefore, elections would likely be held sooner rather than later in this scenario, which would revive the legitimacy of Pakistan s government. Conclusion: Military Remains Decisive What is important about the scenarios set out above, within which several permutations are possible, is that in none of them does the power of the army diminish significantly. At present, Musharraf is weakened, but the army as an institution remains strong. Importantly, the army will remain powerful whether or not Musharraf retains the presidency this was the case between 1988 and 1999, and the army has become even more politically and economically entrenched. 26 Indeed, Musharraf is concerned about relinquishing the position of army chief because he fears becoming irrelevant; he is powerful only as long as he can retain the support of this core constituency. Therefore, whether or not Musharraf remains president, although there may be cosmetic changes in some key areas notably Kashmir, internal ethno-political conflict, and the war on terror much will stay the same. In relation to Kashmir, the conflict between India and Pakistan has thawed and Musharraf has made some important concessions, in particular abandoning the demand for a plebiscite. Kashmir is important to the army because it provides it with a legitimation for the extensive resources that are devoted to it. While relations have calmed and talks continue, little substantive progress has been made. It would be unlikely that a democratically elected government would backtrack on the commitments made, but it is very possible that they will not have the same freedom to maneuver as Musharraf does, and be unable to take the risks 49 Fall/Winter 2007 volume xiv, issue 1

10 50 Katharine Adeney necessary to build a sustainable solution for the region. More changes would be likely in relation to the conflict in Baluchistan, which has escalated as a result of continuing underdevelopment, the alienation of the tribal sardars in the elections of 2002, and the transfer of resources outside the province. The people of Baluchistan have been further alienated by the military operation in the province, which is perceived to be led by Punjabis intent on occupation. Legitimate demands concerning access to resources and development have been radicalized and anti-center rhetoric has increased markedly, although Pakistan is not in danger of losing its territorial integrity. Two reports have suggested constitutional changes that would give Baluchistan a greater share of its resources and restrict the number of outsiders who could work in the province (two key demands). Neither has been implemented under Musharraf s regime, but the chance for a compromise solution would be much more likely to occur under a new leader who was not so personally identified with the conflict. However, the center, whether under democratic or military control, is unlikely to make the radical changes relating to resource distribution that will be necessary to address the legitimate grievances because of the structure of the Pakistani federation. One province, the Punjab, possesses the majority of seats in the National Assembly, and the formula for distributing central finances to the provinces is determined almost entirely by population rather than by need. All governments are beholden to the Punjab, which is already the most developed province in Pakistan. This is a source of tension that is unlikely to disappear in the absence of a wholesale restructuring of the federation. These tensions are enhanced by the fact that Punjabis dominate the non-elected institutions of state, the army, and the bureaucracy. Finally, what about the war on terror? Benazir Bhutto has been vocal in her criticism of Musharraf s policies and has claimed that her government would not have let the situation in FATA get out of control. 27 However, despite her rhetoric, no major changes would be foreseeable because in practice the army and the ISI do not answer to a democratically elected prime minister. This was the case between 1988 and 1999, and the power of the army has increased since then. Very powerful institutions such as the ISI have a vested interest in not alienating the tribal leaders of FATA and have unofficially adopted a policy of re-arming the Taliban to protect Pakistan s interests vis-à-vis Afghanistan. It must be acknowledged that the power of the mullahs has increased over the last ten years. However, they are divided, and although they possess street power, they cannot pose a serious challenge to the stability of the state (as long as a democratically-elected government has the support of the army). The army will remain powerful because there are no structural forces that can challenge its dominance. Political parties remain weak; in most cases they are personalistic machines with weak organization. 28 They are weakened in terms of providing several the brown journal of world affairs

11 What Comes after Musharraf? important elements of a democratic transition, including institutionalizing democratic behavior and attitudes. 29 As they are personalistic machines, they are vulnerable to establishment machinations offering deals in return for their support. Similarly, politicians have made their own deals with the army, renewing its legitimacy and sense of purpose. This was the case with Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s and was repeated by both his daughter and Nawaz Sharif in the 1990s when the military was called on time and again to tip the balance against the regime without any concern for the country s political future. 30 Given that Benazir Bhutto has been willing to consider the prospect of a deal with Musharraf, it can be confidently hypothesized that the relationship between politicians and the army is unlikely to change. The army will continue to be seen as a useful resource by politicians against political opponents, thus increasing its own sense of purpose. Therefore, even if free and fair elections are held, there will be little prospect for democracy to be enhanced in Pakistan in the foreseeable future, however willing the army may be to allow democratically elected politicians to rule. W A Notes 1. Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism, Political Studies 46, no. 5 (1998): ; Katharine Adeney and Andrew Wyatt, Democracy in South Asia: Getting Beyond the Structure-Agency Dichotomy, Political Studies 52, no. 1 (2004): Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (London: Hurst and Company, 2005). See chapter 2 for an excellent overview of the various approaches. 3. Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 4. Talbot, Pakistan, Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan s Military Economy (London & Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2007), Two More Pak Generals Quit, Tribune (India), 9 October Talbot, Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, Address to the Nation, 17 October 1999, 9. Syed Akbar Zaidi, Why Musharraf Succeeds, Economic and Political Weekly, 27 January 2007, Ali Cheema, Bad Politics Crippling Good Economics? Friday Times, May 2007, 18 24; International Crisis Group, Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression? (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 22 March 2004), This was first seen in the early 1950s and confirmed by the SEATO Pact in I do not only write this with the benefit of hindsight. See Katharine Adeney, Pakistan: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, (unpublished analysis, Enterprise LSE, September 2001). For an example of the type of predictions see Rory McCarthy, Pakistan s Clerics Plot Downfall of Military Regime, Guardian, 18 September Pervez Musharraf, A Plea for Enlightened Moderation, Washington Post, 1 June Ismail Khan, Following a Bloody Trail, Dawn, 1 January 2005; Charles Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan: Implementation of the Hudood Ordinances, Asian Survey 28, no. 3 (1988): 307. In particular, the crime of rape no longer had to be proved by the presence of four male witnesses. 15. Katharine Adeney, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and Pakistan (New York: 51 Fall/Winter 2007 volume xiv, issue 1

12 Katharine Adeney Palgrave, 2007), Thousands Protest Bajaur Attack, Daily Times, 4 November 2006; Khalid Hasan, US Didn t Coordinate Bajaur Attack with Pakistan: Musharraf, Daily Times, 30 January Zaidi, Why Musharraf Succeeds, Haris Gazdar, Musharraf s Legacy, Economic and Political Weekly, 7 April 2007, Sections of the analysis in this section originally appeared in Katharine Adeney, In the Line of Fire: Are Things Getting Too Hot for Musharraf? Newsbrief (Royal United Services Institute) 27, no. 6, 2007: M. Ilyas Khan, Judge Row Prompts Pakistan Democracy Questions, BBC News, 12 March 2007, Gazdar, Musharraf s Legacy, United States Congress, To provide for the implementation of the recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (2007) , 25 July Farhan Bokhari, Pakistan Cleric Urges Suicide Attacks, Financial Times, 6 April Syed Shoaib Hasan, Musharraf, the Army and 2007, BBC News, 29 December 2006, bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/ stm. 25. Siddiqa, Military Inc., Ibid. 27. Ginny Dougary, Destiny s Daughter, Times (London), 28 April Mohammad Waseem, Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of the 2002 Elections (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006). 29. Vicky Randall and Lars Svasand, Introduction: The Contribution of Parties to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation, Democratization 9, no. 3 (2002): Siddiqa, Military Inc the brown journal of world affairs