Democratic Transitions and Internal Political Conflict in Southeast Asia

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1 DECEMBER 2015 No.12 STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSIS Democratic Transitions and Internal Political Conflict in Southeast Asia by Robin Ramcharan

2 Democratic Transitions and Internal Political Conflict in Southeast Asia Democracy has been linked to prevalence of peaceful societies resulting in a major push by the international community to advance democratic governance globally in the post-cold War era. However, the nexus between democracy and peace has been examined critically in light of internal conflict and violent unrest in states undergoing a democratic transition. The dark side of democracy has been noted in transitions to democracy, during which the risk of inter-sate war may increase. Emerging democracies typically go through a rocky transition period during which they become more conflict prone than states without a changing regime. The transition to and deepening of democracy in Southeast Asia is by no means complete, and in fact is a slow, grinding process. Sorpong Peou of Ryerson University, 1 Canada, has categorization of the 11 political regimes in Southeast Asia clearly reveals the road that democracy has to travel in the region: undemocratic states under military rule (Myanmar, aka Burma), one under monarchical rule (Brunei), and those with one-communist-party systems (Laos and Vietnam); more democratic countries such as those that maintain hegemonic-party regimes, but that are not liberal: Singapore, Malaysia, and Cambodia; and four out of the 11 that can be considered unconsolidated liberal democratic Indonesia, Thailand (until May 2014), the Philippines, and Timor-Leste. This great variety of regimes, inclusive of dictatorial and one party states, belies ASEAN s purposive adoption of democratic governance as a regional norm in its 2007 Charter. Southeast Asia s multiple transitions to democracy in the last twenty years have borne out the linkage between democratic transitions and internal political conflict. This paper proceeds by examining the turbulent uptake in democracy, the risks of conflict and the principal factors giving rise to violent political conflict in democratic transitions. KEY POINTS Democracy in form has advanced in Southeast Asia over the past two decades. ASEAN has adopted democratic governance as a regional norm. The transition to democracy has been rocky and has occasioned much political unrest and violence. The experience in Southeast Asia bears out research that points to the prevalence of violence in periods of transition. The advancement and consolidation of democracy may be in regression in Southeast Asia. The exception is Indonesia, which seems to be consolidating its democracy since the fall of General Suharto. Factors that must be addressed effectively in the multi-ethnic societies of Southeast Asia in order to avert violence in periods of transition include: electoral integrity, security sector reform, corruption, decentralisation of governance and socio-economic grievances. Enhanced human rights protection mechanisms are critical for a nonviolent future for the region. 1 Peou, Sorpong, The Limits and Potential of Liberal Democratisation in Southeast Asia, 2

3 The Rocky Uptake in Democracy The impressive uptake in democracy over the past two decades in Southeast Asia has been rocky and has suffered setbacks, with the exception of Indonesia following its 2014 general election. A regression of democracy has taken place in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. The region has experienced an impressive uptake of democratic governance. The Philippines People Power routing of the dictatorial Marcos regime in 1986 was followed by Thailand s first democratic Constitution in 1997 and, a decade later, by the fall of the Suharto regime and Indonesia s first general elections in Malaysia s democracy also seemed to have taken a positive turn after the departure of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed, who was not shy of bending Constitutional rules (Majid, 2009). In Singapore, a slight opening up of political space followed the passing over of power from Lee Kuan Yew to Goh Chok Tong in 1990 and then to Lee Hsien Loong in 2004, though the ruling People s Action Party is assured to win and the opposition remains weak. By 2004, scholars hailed the democratic moment, following elections in Malaysia (March 2004), Indonesia (April 2004), the Philippines (May 2004), and Thailand (February 2005). New political actors replaced the old guard, the first direct presidential elections took place in Indonesia and two leaders returned to power in Thailand and the Philippines to serve second terms after democratic elections. Elites in Southeast Asia sensed the clear rumblings of a desire for greater democracy and for better recognition of political and civil rights. Despite the presence of non-democratic states Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam the ASEAN Charter of 2007 announced a new regional norm of democratic governance, replete with the rule of law and protection of human rights. However, political unrest and the risk of violence remains significant in this transition to democracy in the region. Timor Leste s transition from colonial domination to independent democratic state between 1999 and 2002 is a dramatic example of the linkage between democratic transition and violent conflict. In its transition to a democratic political system since 1999, but major violence was orchestrated by pro-autonomy militias after announcement of the results by the UN. External intervention was required to restore some order and again after Timor Leste resembled a failed state. Malaysia s democracy continues to experience one party dominance and attempts to sideline the opposition, notably Anwar Ibrahim who has faced repeated accusations of sodomy, a crime in Malaysia and was sentenced in 2014 to five years in jail. The ruling Barisan National coalition has been accused of strong-arm tactics against opponents. For example, having repealed the dreaded, colonial era Internal Security Act (ISA), the government essentially reinstated provisions allowing for detention without trial. The Philippines is the oldest democracy in the region which has witnessed the assassination of a popular opposition leader, Benino Aquino, and since dictator Marcos in the 1980s, two People Power revolutions sought to depose democratically elected Presidents. Democratic consolidation has remained elusive. Issues affecting the credibility of the Philippine s democracy include: the pervasive influence of political dynasties, the use of political parties for personal political ambitions of key politicians, frequent switching of parties, nepotism, votebuying, and concerns over the verification procedures for electronic voting machines. In Thailand, since the 2006 coup against Thaksin Shinawatra, now in exile, democracy in that country has been compromised. Thai Constitutions have not lasted long. Increasingly serious electoral violence in 2010 and in 2014, has led to a crisis in Thai democracy that saw the army once again take power in early 2014 by overthrowing an elected government. Thai institutions have not fared well in the midst of this contest and have become polarised and politicised. Moreover, harsh lèse-majesté laws, seek to prevent Thais from openly questioning the value of the monarchy are also used to counter political opposition. Constitutional proposals chaperoned by the military regime and rejected in September 2015, envisaged weakening political parties, a largely appointed Senate and an unelected prime minister. Whereas the 1997 constitution was drafted by elected leaders after wide public participation, the 2007 and current drafts have stepped back from that model. The military has extended its stay in power with the rejection of an unacceptable draft constitution. In Myanmar, many challenges remain after the November 2015 elections, including violence in Rakhine state against the Rohingya Muslim 3

4 minority, unsettled conflicts between the state and ethnic minorities, and the continuing dominance by the military of political life of the country. The seeds of future conflict reside in potential non-acceptance by the military of the new government s constitutional and policy reform agenda. The Risk of Violent Political Unrest The risk of instability and conflict is high in situations of transition to democracy. A leading conflict ledger has assessed the risk of potential conflict in 164 countries using internationally recognized methodologies. 2 The likelihood of conflict in the Southeast Asian region transitioning to democratic governance was highest in Timor-Leste, whose risk ratio was approximately 10.1 or 10 times higher than that of the OECD. Timor Leste featured at number 25, in the top 25, with Afghanistan at number one, followed by Guinea Bissau (2), Djibouti (3), Guinea (4) and so on. Countries with the largest increases in risk of instability included Thailand and Myanmar. The former s risk ratio increased from 0.9 ( ) to 2.8 ( ). Myanmar s risk ratio increased from 4.8 to 5.8 in the same periods. The greatest increases in risk of instability have taken place in countries that were classified as partial democracies, which are at greater risk for instability than autocracies or full democracies. Whereas liberal democratic states were largely stable and peaceful, the characteristics that underpin such states were absent in many Southeast Asian states. The risk of political unrest, notably violent conflict, remained potent in such transitions and comes from a variety of sources. 2 Backer, D., Wilkenfeld, J. and Huth, P. (2014) The Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger: Ranking States on Future Risks, Peace and Conflict Boulder, C.: Paradigm. Pp The Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger represents a synthesis of leading research on conceptualizing, explaining and forecasting political instability. Addressing the Roots of Internal Conflict in Democratic Transitions Transitions to democracy in Southeast Asia have faced a number of challenges that pose risks of internal political unrest and violent conflict: inexperience with electoral process or immature electoral processes (before, during, immediately after elections); the weak legitimacy of state institutions; the resiliency of authoritarianism and middle class unrest; the role of the military in politics and enduring corruption; and the airing of socio-economic grievances. The latter is especially important to keep in mind in the context of the many minority and indigenous groups in Southeast Asia. Electoral processes and enhancing respect for electoral integrity Non-respect for electoral integrity, meaning international standards for the free and fair conduct of elections, is an important driver of conflict in the transition to democracy. Elections, especially those being held for the first time, are often accompanied by political, and sometimes violent, unrest. The question of what drives violence in electoral situations has been under scrutiny by the Electoral Integrity Project at the University of Sydney in Australia. Its survey of studies on elections and violence 3, including in Southeast Asia, identified factors typically associated with the onset or recurrence of civil wars: Long-term drivers arising from fixed social conditions (the existence of lack of development, poverty and inequality, the resource curse, and ethnic divisions); Medium-term factors from the design of political institutions (the role of electoral laws, notably the use of winner-take-all electoral systems, the party system, the type of executive checks and balances, and the lack of power-sharing arrangements, the role, capacity and training of security forces and electoral management bodies; the effectiveness of courts and other dispute resolution mechanisms for securing electoral justice); and 3 Electoral Integrity Project, Why Elections Fail and What We can Do About it,

5 Short-term (proximate) factors include such as the role of the mass media and social media in either exacerbating or else reducing conflict; the sequential timing of elections as part of state-building and reconstruction; the role of the international community and observers in preventing or reducing tensions, and problems of electoral malpractices, including real or perceived fraud, corruption and patronage. Electoral violence and contestation of election results has featured across Southeast Asia and in the unconsolidated democracies in particular Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand. In the oldest democracy, the Philippines, commentators have long noted the persistence and allegations of electoral fraud. Electoral results were often contested on the grounds of massive cheating and vote buying. In the Philippines, election outcomes are accompanied by unrest and coup attempts as the results are challenged. Thailand has experienced violent urban conflict in its last two elections as pro- and anti-thaksin forces have clashed. While elections may be well administered in Thailand their acceptance is derailed by partisan rancour and street violence. Resolving electoral disputes has been on the agenda of the civil society organization Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL). The latter announced in March 2015 a set of indicators for the holding of free and fair democratic elections to assess the quality and integrity of elections across the region. A noteworthy aspect of its work is consideration of how to advance the inclusion of minorities in countries where they face challenges to full participation in political life. 4 The resiliency of authoritarianism, security sector reform and middle class unrest Resistance to authoritarian tendencies by the region s middle classes gives rise to potentially violent political unrest. Factors that have driven driving this resistance include the authoritarianism of dominant elites, the continuing influence of military establishments in politics and corruption. Thailand, for example, experienced the highhanded approach of Thaksin Shinawatra, who ran a large telecommunication company. 4 ANFREL Indicators for Free and Fair Elections, E-Bulletin, V.2, No.2, April-June 2015, pp Unaccustomed to the comprises required in politics, his alleged CEO-like approach was disliked and had important repercussions on the brewing conflict in the country s southern provinces, which he sought to reign in by strong military tactics. Since January 2004, violence in southern Thailand has escalated, especially between some Muslim insurgents and the army. Elsewhere, while a new generation of leaders is present, family ties and paternalism fuel a sense of entitlement to leadership. Opposition groups are sufficiently marginalized or held in check to preserve the new generation s hold on power, backed by powerful military establishments. In some instances electoral systems favour ruling parties and individuals. Indonesia provides a necessary and powerful counter-example. Reinforcing the momentum towards democracy also requires sustained efforts to assert civilian control of military establishments. The election of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in Indonesia in 2014 was a significant victory against the military establishment, represented by Jokowi s opponent, Prabowo Subianto, a former army general and the son-in-law of late president Suharto. When compared with its neighbours, Thailand s democratisation process had a similar trajectory to Indonesia s with military regimes giving way to democratic systems since the democratic constitution of However, the military coup in May 2014, allegedly to re-establish security as anti- and pro-thaksin forces clashed, brought martial law once again. The Military s role in Myanmar politics is still controversial. One quarter of the seats in each legislature are reserved for military representatives appointed by the commander-in-chief. The military has supported the elections and has pledged to ensure they are not undermined, but its expectations are unclear. The military seemed ready to accept a victory by the National League for Democracy, provided Aung San Suu Kyi remained barred from the presidency. Eliminating Corruption and Resentment Corruption and money politics weaken state institutions and generate unrest. Corruption fuels middle-class resentment. In the Philippines, commentators have noted the problem of political families and personalities competing fiercely for votes and money politics being almost the order of the day. Malaysia s corruption scandal involving the current Prime Minister is a case in point. Amnesty International has reported 5

6 serious government crack-down on civil society and opposition forces as government officials, including PM Najib (son of a former Malaysian PM), stood accused of siphoning off of some hundreds of millions of dollars from state-owned development company 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB). Singapore s ruling People s Action Party, in power since 1959, has achieved respect for its measures to combat corruption. Ministers and civil servants are paid high salaries to dis-incentivise corrupt practices. Singapore, by all accounts, has succeeded. Its affluent middle classes, despite occasional minor rumblings against paternalism of its leaders, have perceived the Party as noncorrupt. The middle classes in Southeast Asia have come out strongly against authoritarianism and related corruption by rule of elites. Non-corrupt paternalism may still be acceptable but the rampant cronyism and corruption of the past is no longer tolerated. People power in the Philippines and the Indonesian example are powerful demonstrations of the rumblings of peoples of ASEAN for greater participation in governance. The ousting of Suharto and the military from Indonesian political life and mass protests by Thais in Bangkok are clear signs of middle class unrest with authoritarian rule. Even amidst current military rule once again, Thais have developed less tolerance for army intervention in political life. Weak State Institutions and Strengthening of the Civil Service Sector Weak institutions and political legitimacy are perennial problems in the region. The linkage between weak state institutions that are perceived to be illegitimate and violent conflict is nowhere more evident than in Myanmar. The military has been the main institution seeking to enforce the authority of the State over multiple minority groups. Most of the latter have been at war with the State for the last six decades. Thai state institutions have been weakened considerably in the partisanship that has taken place in the last two elections. Whereas 1997 Constitution had led to the establishment of independent agencies and courts to enhance democracy and promote transparency and accountability, these institutions - the Election Commission, the National Commission on Human Rights, the Constitutional Court, the National Counter Corruption Commission, and the State Audit Commission - have used to advance partisan goals. Timor Leste, the newest and weakest state in the region, has similar dilemmas with its new state institutions. Its attempts to decentralise power are so far unsuccessful as traditional, local institutions face redundancy from new, electoral processes and institutions. Demands for Autonomy and Decentralization Demands for autonomy within States must be addressed as part of the transition process. Local grievances and claims for greater selfdetermination have existed throughout the history of Southeast Asia. Democratic transitions bring these claims more sharply to the fore. Decentralisation can take place through deconcentration (transfer of services, not authority), delegation (transfer of decision-making accountable to the centre) or devolution (transfer or authority to local administration). However, decentralisation must be mindful of the resilience of customary forms of political legitimacy. Indonesia, the Philippines and Timor Leste have all embarked on decentralisation processes. The Philippines program began in 1991, with the adoption of Local Government Code to devolve power to the country s provinces, most notably with the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras. This Code was a point of reference for Indonesia in its own decentralisation program. Indonesia, underwent a significant transfer of power to local authorities. Timor Leste s Independence successive plans for decentralization are ongoing but have met with challenges, notably a conflict between socio-political legitimacy in terms of the established patterns of authority and democratic legitimacy in a substantive sense. 5 Federalism is much discussed in relation to Myanmar and is the likely path forward. Ethnic groups, such as the Shan and Karen, demand a real federalism. The major ethnic groups are not seeking independence but now mostly endorse a federalist policy, with autonomy for the ethnic states within a federal union. 6 Decentralisation across the region is a means of addressing deeper historical, economic, social and political grievances in Southeast Asian societies 5 Selver Sahin, Timor-Leste s Foreign Policy: Securing State Identity in the Post-Independence Period, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 2014, V. 33, 2, Marcus Brand, Towards genuine federalism? - Myanmar s inexorable path towards constitutional devolution and decentralized governance, Draft paper for Conference on Constitutionalism and Legal Change in Myanmar Workshop, February 2014 Singapore. 6

7 that have generated much internal conflict since independence. Grievances over Human Rights Violations and Early Warning Measures Grievances over human rights violations obviously surface dramatically in more democratic societies. A discussion paper on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Social Unrest, Conflict and Early Warning, prepared for an expert seminar on this topic organized by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in July 2015, noted that violations of ESCRs are causes, consequences and often predictors of social or civil unrest, violence and even violent conflict. Analysis on the causes of the conflict between the Philippine State and the Moros, a Muslim minority, has pointed to elements such as the failure of the government to provide public goods, its control over rich resources, a dysfunctional legal system in the Moro community, the fact that the Moro people suffer from the highest levels of poverty in the Philippines, and discrimination by the Christian majority towards Muslims. Inequality seems to be a key determinant of the Moro conflict. Conclusion: the Need for Enhanced Human Rights Protection Mechanism Democratic transitions in Southeast Asia have witnessed much political unrest and the risk of internal violence remains significant in the region. A number of factors that lead to violence in democratic transitions have been identified and treated above. Addressing these factors requires, inter alia, the crafting of a credible human rights protection systems. At present they are weak across the region and need assistance. Assessing the risks of violence from grievances rights violations is critical in the absence strong protection mechanisms. The development of early warning systems and risk assessment should be undertaken by national and regional protection mechanisms in Southeast Asia, including the ASEAN Regional Forum. About the author Robin Ramcharan is Adviser to the Asia Centre in Bangkok (asiacentre.co.th) and Professor of International Relations at Webster University in Geneva. He teaches on Asian security affairs, human rights and human security aspects of international intellectual property rights. 7

8 Where knowledge meets experience The GCSP Strategic Security Analysis series are short papers that address a current security issue. They provide background information about the theme, identify the main issues and challenges, and propose policy recommendations. Geneva Centre for Security Policy - GCSP Maison de la paix Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2D P.O. Box 1295 CH-1211 Geneva 1 Tel: Fax: info@gcsp.ch