Causes and Consequence of Types of Anti-Trade Unionism: The Example of South Korea. Professor Chris Rowley* & Dr Kiu Sik Bae**

Transcription

1 1 Causes and Consequence of Types of Anti-Trade Unionism: The Example of South Korea Professor Chris Rowley* & Dr Kiu Sik Bae** *Director, Centre for Research on Asian Management, City University, London, UK; Director of Research and Publications, HEAD Foundation, Singapore ** Research Fellow, Korea Labour Institute, Seoul, Korea Here we follow on from our earlier preliminary piece ( Waxing and waning of waves of antiunionism in South Korea ) on Cass Knowledge ( We report on the next phase of our work and research. 1. Background The history of trade unions, membership, structure and types in South Korea ( Korea for shorthand from now on) indicates a rocky path. In the 19 th century wage earners began to appear and the early labour movement was led mainly by miners and dockers with the Sungjin Dock Workers Union in 1898 the first union. The factory system started and Japanese colonisation ( ) propelled modern production systems and an increase in factory workers and labour organisations. Employers exploited and discriminated against Korean workers. Labour leaders and activities were strongly oppressed under Japanese rule. Thus, labour leaders undertook underground activities and most of the labour movement cooperated with the socialists. Therefore, the labour movement was anti-foreign capital and defiant toward employers and government and was connected with the independence movement. Following independence in 1945 the trade unions were divided by ideology into two national centres: the rightist Korea Federation of Trade Unions (KFTU) and the leftist National Councils of Korea Trade Unions (NCKTU, the Junpyung ). The NCKTU had been originally much stronger, but was weakened by both its own militant strategies and also the red purge of the newly formed government and rightwing forces. The NCKTU was finally outlawed and destroyed just before, and during, the Korean War of (Kim 1993). The Korean War and the division of the Korean peninsula were crucial factors contributing to the evolution of an authoritarian industrial relations environment. Many trade union leaders had connections with the communists and there was a strong ideological legacy of anti-

2 2 communism. However, only the anti-communist labour movement was granted legal approval. So-called yellow or docile unions (with leaders controlled by management and the authorities) developed. Immediately after the Korean War the government enacted the Trade Union Act (TUA) There was US involvement and supported a business unionism model. With this as the legal basis of activities, unions were not able to escape political restrictions under the oppressive political regime. Collective bargaining and union activities were strictly restricted by laws (Kim 1993). Even researching and teaching about labour issues at colleges and universities were restricted. With the destruction of the strong leftist labour movement and a politically controlled labour regime in place, the authoritarian developmental state was able to manoeuvre the labour-exclusive industrialisation strategy in the early 1960s to the mid-1980s (Koo 2001). Korea underwent compressed industrialisation via export between the early 1960s and mid- 1980s. Industrial cities such as Gumi, Ulsan, Changwon, and Busan as well as big industrial zones in Seoul, Inchon, Masan, were successively established during the period of industrial transformation. Light, labour-intensive industries such as textiles and electronic assembly industries which had developed in the early phase of industrialisation, were slowly replaced by ship-building, steel, auto and petrochemical industries in its later phase. Industrialisation gave rise to large numbers of workers concentrated in cities or industrial zones who may sometimes have had collective complaints or demands on wages, inhumane treatment or working conditions. Spatial concentration of industrial workers made those cities or zone a futile potential ground for labour movement (Koo 2001). In the face of this potential labour movement threat, the policy direction of the government was to ensure industrial peace and minimize union influence. A key measure taken was to force trade unions to affiliate to an industrial federation under a single, governmentsponsored, national centre. Thus, the KFTU was reorganized as the Federation of Korea Trade Unions (FKTU) in the early 1960s. It played the role of a junior partner of the state and management under the growth first, distribution later and anti-communism stance and was pro-government and management. A succession of legal revisions followed, mainly to weaken union activities by tight control based on hierarchical labour-management

3 3 relationships at the enterprise level. Democracy in 1987 changed the political landscape with the ending of the military government and marked a turning point for the trade union movement. A boom in unionization (and strikes) followed. Such a growth of union organisation meant the former employer-dominated industrial relations could not be sustained and trade unions became a major player in national politics and the economy. The next major watershed was the 1997 Asian financial crisis and then the post-2008 global financial crisis. The ebbs and flows of union numbers, membership and density over these critical events can be seen in the table. In short, it shows the number of unions at a zenith in 1989 with nearly 8,000, nearly 2 million members and nearly 19% density. The trends in each of the three aspects have fluctuated slightly since then but overall have fallen on each dimension, with union numbers below 4,500, membership less 1.65 million than and density below 10% by Table 1 Enterprise unionism is an essential part of the enterprise-based industrial relations system. Enterprise unionism limits union membership only to employees belonging to particular firms, in other words employee unionism (Kawanishi, 1989). Many aspects of anti-unionism in Korea are closely associated with enterprise unionism. It is much easier for employers to block workers of their firms from organising new unions, while rank-and-file workers face serious difficulties in organising new unions at their own firms. Enterprise unions are separate entities with their own rules and governance mechanisms, making coordination much more difficult. Moreover, it is very difficult for enterprise unions at small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs). Many enterprise unions organised at SMEs until 1989 could not survive on their own and had to dissolve themselves. Therefore, enterprise unionism has been very much unfavourable to organising workers at SMEs, as indicated in the table. Table 2

4 4 Enterprise unionism has encouraged employers to exercise much stronger power or influence to block unionisation than industrial, general or occupational unionism. Enterprise unionism has been a major institutional barrier to organisation of workers at SMEs. 2. Various Forms of Anti-unionism in Korea Anti-unionism in Korea has taken various forms and characteristics since the 1960s, depending on the political context. First, there has been an institutionalised form of antiunionism. Governments had legal power to directly intervene in union affairs, such as union organisation, elections and collective bargaining and industrial action in the name of national security or public order (Kim 2002). The authorities were able to exercise veto power on whether unions would be allowed or not. Apart from these interventions, the authorities were able to crack down on or limit an independent trade union movement by mobilising intelligence police and administrative means. They sometimes decided to dissolve unions seen as independent. Furthermore, labour law allowed only enterprise unions to be organised. 1 This policy made it very hard for workers at the workplace to organise unions because the policy did not allow workers to join unions outside their firms but only to organise their own enterprise unions or join enterprise unions if one already existed. The developmental state was itself a major bulwark of this kind of anti-unionism by restricting union organising, and monitoring and controlling union activities and union leaders through legislation. Another strand of anti-unionist institution was the indirect election of union officers through union delegates at each level, despite membership wishes to elect leaders by direct election. Government and management, together with union officials at the FKTU and industrial federations of trade unions, made indirect elections of union leaders into custom and practice. While management and the authorities were able to control trade unions through already docile, long-serving union leaders, the existing union officials preferred indirect elections to direct ones to help keep their positions for a long time. Management, the authorities and union officials were able to manipulate or intervene in indirect elections of 1. Enterprise unions are not solely related to government policies, but had some connection with labour market developments. Korea had little tradition of craft skills and did not see any developments in occupational labour markets during or after the industrialisation period. There had been few moves to regulate wages or working conditions in the regional or sectoral level by trade unions (Park, 1992).

5 5 union leaders by first electing union delegates close to management. However, rank-and-file members wanted to change union leaders docile to management and the authorities through direct elections. The wish for direct elections of leaders surfaced into demands for union democracy and direct election of leaders from 1987 onwards. Almost all unions which were newly established after 1987 decided to have elections of their leaders as direct, while many existing enterprise unions gradually changed elections from indirect to direct amid the resistance of long-serving union leaders. There was an important institutional element which was not necessarily anti-unionist in orientation, but which was consequently harmful to the union movement. That is the compulsory 3 years military service required for all young men. The military governments before 1987 domesticated some resistance of young men by indoctrinating strong anticommunism mingled with submission to the authoritarianism. The strong military discipline, often accompanied by physical beatings, forced young men in their early 20s to be submissive to authorities and in turn obediently accept control by management and the regime, whether the control was legitimate or not. Military culture, which permeated throughout the whole society, emphasised hierarchical order of despotic command and control from the top, and contributed to patriachism in the workplace (Koo, 2001). Under the military regime there were few male union leaders in the independent trade union movement, whereas there were a number of female union leaders in the same movement. It was not until 1987 that a new generation of young male union leaders appeared. The second form of anti-unionism is attitudinal. This took the form of opposition by both the government and management to any attempt at establishing new enterprise unions, or electing union leadership independent of existing unions orientation. They denied any independent attempt at union organisation from below at the workplace, which was not informally granted by authorities. The independent union movement was deemed to threaten the industrialisation drive led by the government. Therefore, the authorities were very concerned with any move to support an independent union movement by progressive Christian labour missionaries or Catholic labour missionaries in the 1970s and early 1980s. The authorities denounced the missionaries as a third party for intervening in the labour movement. The authorities not only denied independent trade unions, but also limited freedom of association and collective bargaining (Kim, 2002). The state s anti-unionist attitude did not change until 1987.

6 6 New unions could be organised at the time only under FKTU guidance and with the condition of the authorities informal recognition. These unions were not independent and were dominated by existing union leaders or docile enterprise union leaders. Even if the authorities informally granted union organisation at a certain firm, the management at the firm may have been strongly opposed. Management often lobbied the authorities to block any effort of organising unions at their own firms. Management efforts to keep firms from unionisation was effective. Management s anti-union attitudes remained strong, even after Management s anti-unionism became even stronger when they saw firms in the region or the same sector coming under the pressure of strong enterprise unions to negotiate wage agreements. Since 2000 management s strong opposition to industrial unions, especially to industrial bargaining, was conspicuous. A significant number of enterprise unions in the metal industry, hospitals and some of the public sector under the KCTU, reorganised themselves into industrial unions. Management represented by the Korean Employers Federation or the Federation of Korean Industries has worried about the rise of industrial unions and especially attempts at industrial bargaining. The third form of anti-unionism is ideology. With experience of the Korean War, anticommunism ideology still remained very strong in society as a whole. The authorities and management often used such ideology to prevent independent unions from being organised by calling workers or their supporters socialists. The ideology of economic growth first or national revival through industrialisation was given the overwhelming priority to anything from the 1960s onwards. An independent trade union movement would have hindered economic growth or industrialisation altogether, according to the logic of the official propaganda at the time. This kind of stance often discouraged workers from organising their own independent unions. It was not until 1987 that workers really got over the fear of being regarded as socialists or threatening social order or national security. However, there has always been strong anti-unionism sentiments among management, which denies industrial pluralism at the workplace or which regards unions as an obstacle to free markets, partly because political and academic elites were educated and trained in the neo-liberal US, especially from the 1980s onwards. Another prong of anti-unionist ideology has been

7 7 continuous emphasis of management prerogatives on the part of employers, often supported with legislation and administrative interpretations 2 by the government. The fourth form of anti-unionism has been management s drive and often government strategies to separate enterprise unions from the independent and often militant Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) from the late 1980s. Once management and the government recognised enterprise unions, they wanted unions already affiliated to KCTU to distance themselves and finally to withdraw from the KCTU. This anti-unionism among management and government was fuelled through militant industrial action and frequent attempts at general strikes by the KCTU and its member unions. Management often took advantage of unsuccessful, often protracted, illegal strikes by their own enterprise unions affiliated to the KCTU in order for the unions to withdraw from the KCTU in return for ending strikes without many dismissals or discipline of union leaders. The fifth form of anti-unionism involves alternatives to trade unions taken by management. Management with strong anti-union attitudes have taken pre-emptive measures, such as setting up labour-management councils (LMC) or staff councils instead of trade unions (Rowley and Yoo, 2008). Management allowed LMCs to play a significant role, such as collective bargaining, consultation, information sharing and direct election of labour representatives on the councils, as long as they remained as LMCs. In contrast, the organising of a union was been blocked by management with all means and costs. These LMCs at nonunion firms are supposed to be alternatives to trade unions. This kind of anti-unionism has been favoured at the prominent Samsung Group, its sister group CJ, Posco and other business groups over the years. 3. Anti-Unionism to the mid-1980s There had been authoritarian rule under the military governments from the 1960s. Although regular elections for the president and politicians took place and were rare windows of 2. Laws in Korea have the basic clauses and provisions. For their implementation they need subordinate statutes (Presidential Decree, Ordinance of Prime Minister and Ordinance of Ministry). When it is still unclear how to implement laws after going through laws and their subordinate statutes and there are not any relevant legal cases by the court, it is mostly often the case that the course of action relies on administrative interpretations by the relevant department of the government. Administrative interpretations by the government sometimes have exercised strong power. The government had arbitrarily exercised these administrative interpretations to control unions and limit union activities until 1987.

8 8 opportunities for democracy, civil rights were not guaranteed and political democracy was crippled. The economic growth first ideology meant trade unions were more likely to be regarded as obstacles to the economic growth in the rapid industrialisation process by not only employers but also the government and public media. Independent union leaders were unilaterally excluded and expelled from trade unions by the government. Docile trade unions which were cooperative with employers rather than representing workers' interests were recognised by employers and government. The government's authoritarianism involved selective policies towards labour. Individual labour disputes were permitted to be raised and dealt with, but collective labour disputes were oppressed or brokered by the authorities. Union organising activities had been active in the late 1960s and 1970s among workers. While most unions organised under the guidance of the officially recognised FKTU were given certificates and then often recognised from the 1960s, other unions organised by workers below or with the support of outside organisations, such as missionaries of churches and labour activists, were not given certificates and often crushed by the authorities or management. The government allowed docile enterprise unions linked to the FKTU, but cracked down on independent trade unions. Even organising unions by the FKTU was often met by employers' strong opposition. There was very little breathing room for an independent trade union movement to survive. Labour missionaries of Protestant Churches and Catholic Churches, together with some progressive intellectuals and student activists, helped independent unions survive amid the severe oppression of the authorities and management in the 1970s and 1980s. A very small number of trade unions remained independent of employers and the state despite tough political and industrial conditions. Most leaders of those remaining independent unions interestingly were female, whose leadership was based on internal union democracy and strong support from their members. Those independent unions began to be called Democratic Unions opposed to the existing unions subservient to management and the authorities. There were many attempts by the rank-and-file at democratising enterprise unions dominated by management in the

9 9 1970s. 3 However, most enterprise unions and their industrial federations of trade unions were made docile by dominant employers and the oppressive state. There was some potential strength built-up from the growing number of workers during the rapid and compressed industrialization period. Indeed, even with the strong opposition of employers and oppression by the state, more trade unions were organised by the existing officially recognized trade unions, reflecting hope and complaints among rank-and-file workers. Though activities were limited to a narrow range, trade unions were the only legal means workers could rely on in order to increase wages and improve working conditions. Up until 1987 anti-union drives were mainly led by the authorities rather than management to prevent an independent trade union movement. The authorities were able to effectively control the trade union movement, including a few independent unions and made them serve economic growth and subservient to the authoritarian regimes. Management had not developed anti-union policies very well, but rather relied on the authorities. A small number of independent trade unions (called democratic unions at the time) succeeded in surviving in tough political and industrial environments and would become important later on. They mobilised and developed many different forms of industrial action short of strikes to enhance their bargaining power or to keep their independent unions from management attack or the threat of the authorities. Those actions included wearing ribbons, overtime bans and lunch sits-in at company canteens. Despite the anti-unionism by the authorities and management, a small number of independent unions were able to resist and keep going. We provide an example next. The Union of YH Trade was an independent union which faced factory closures and with the help of the opposition party fought against management and authorities. The struggle escalated into a serious political issue and it became an impetus to the ending of the military regime. The experience of those few independent unions provided a groundwork for many strong independent unions from Independent Unions Overcoming Anti-unionism and New Anti-unionism, Most enterprise unions organised after 1987 wanted to become Democratic Unions and to differentiate themselves from the past disgraced yellow unions. That is why the KCYU and its affiliates call themselves Democratic Unions.

10 10 Political democratization in 1987 led to the sudden rise of many new independent trade unions which overcame the strong anti-unionism of employers and government. Workers emboldened in the political democratisation processes no longer feared anti-union institutions and policies of the authorities and management and staged practically general strikes on a national scale. A national wave of strikes swept nearly all medium and large workplaces. Workers went on strike first and then successfully negotiated union recognition and improvements in wages, working conditions and treatment of manual workers. Figure 1 The successes of the strike at Hyundai Engine and Hyundai Heavy Industry in 1987 emboldened workers nationwide. Newly established independent enterprise unions rooted their strong organisational basis in enterprises. The stronger presence of enterprise unions in their workplaces enhanced their bargaining power by controlling their workplace. On the other hand, the leadership of the existing moderate, docile trade unions (the FKTU and its affiliates) recognised under the military government, was put to non-confidence votes or to transform themselves into trade unions more responsive to rank-and-file workers demands. The indirect elections of union leaders as the major obstacle to internal union democracy and elections were reformed under pressure from below and direct elections of union leaders adopted. Although the reform process of union elections was slow because of resistance to keep positions, direct union elections by members brought more democratic governance, especially of enterprise unions. Thus, the FKTU and its affiliate unions were reinvigorated and able to strengthen their bargaining power. There were many confrontations and strikes within workplaces revolving around trade union recogniton. New unions were able to double wages and improve working conditions. The push by strong trade unions continued until the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The exercise of power by strong trade unions had significantly restricted employers' autonomy or prerogatives at large firms. Employers and some government officials developed a new antiunionism in the face of powerful unions at their workplaces. However, even under these kinds of favourable conditions to workers, some big employers such as Samsung and Posco, were able to keep trade unions out by mobilising resources and

11 11 other means. Some firms adopted the physical anti-unionism of the Gusadae ( squad to save companies from trade union destructive strikes and activities, that is, strike breakers). Management organised workers who were relatives of owners or managers or were subject to management for one reason or another, in opposition to new unions or strikes. Gusadae had often tried to drive striking workers from factories who mostly occupied factories. It was common that workers who went on strike mostly occupied their factories because government only allowed strikes within factory gates to prevent strikes from developing into street demonstrations. This practice of strikes accompanied by factory occupations, together with the enterprise union system, actually paradoxically reinforced union presence in the workplace. Big businesses (the chaebol) have been very reluctant in recognising trade unions (Kwon and O Donnell, 2001). Their chairmen have never met or talked with trade union leaders, except a very few occasions, When they were forced to negotiate with trade unions, they sent their agents (chief executives) for negotiations or collective bargaining even if the chairmen still held decision-making power. Anti-unionism among owners remained strong, even in unionised firms. Owners of big business have dealt with trade unions behind the scene, but have not directly been involved in negotiations with trade unions. They have not talked with trade union leaders frankly and have not attempted to reach compromises by persuading or listening to, union leaders. Another important anti-unionism strand developed, a non-union form of representation, which has been pursued and used by employers as a union avoidance strategy. Management at non-union firms were able to use the existing institution of LMCs as alternatives to union representation. LMCs have to be set up at all establishments with at least 30 employees, regardless of whether unionised or not. Whether LMCs at non-union firms are established or not and how much room or rights are allowed for employee representatives on LMCs, were up to management. Less than half of non-union establishments had LMCs at the end of 2009 (see Table). Large, public sector and manufacturing establishments are more likely than others to have LMCs. These employers at non-union firms have given employee representative of LMCs more

12 12 rights and room for representing employees interest. They have sometimes provided time-off facilities for employee representatives of the LMCs and given them collective bargaining rights. These were pre-emptive measures or policies by non-union management to avoid unions. Table 3 So, not all LMCs at non-union firms are union avoidance means. As is indicated in Figure 1, there are some five different types of employee representation at non-union firms through LMCs. Some LMCs at non-union firms have played a role of proper employee representation and do not act as union-replacing organisations. Union replacing LMCs have played more active roles in representing employees interests, not by employees themselves but by management to avoid unions. There are some blurred boundaries where LMCs can play the role of either employ representation or union avoidance or both roles. Figure 2 The anti-unionism of the Gusadae was not very successful in driving away trade unions or striking workers out of the workplace. Gusadae were suspected of violating labour law by being involved in unfair labour practices, such as direct intervention in union internal affairs, violence towards strikers and helping pro-employer s worker organisations in opposition to unions at the workplace. Using Gusadae as a physical force to counter union strength at the workplace was not a largely successful tactic. However, the newly born union movement, especially the KCTU and its affiliated enterprise unions, did not succeed in concluding a stable institutionalised industrial order based on compromise with employers by heavily relying on a militant stance towards wage bargaining or other issues and pursuing workers maximum interests. The moderate FKTU and its affiliate unions were willing to make compromises with management in dealing with various employment issues. During the period, anti-union feelings against the KCTU and its affiliates among employers accumulated. 5. Retreating in the Midst Another Rise of Anti-Unionism Post-1997?

13 13 There was a period of power deadlock during in the middle of an increasing antiunion climate, especially against the KCTU. There were a number of cases where violent strikes and factory occupations by workers led to interventions by riot police to arrest strikers and their leaders. After violent confrontation with employers and finally with the government by occupying and controlling factories, the militant trade unions were often crushed by the police and union leadership changed into moderate ones. The KCTU and its affiliated unions confronted the government on labour law or government policies or the government intervened in so-called illegal major strikes by mobilising the police. The KCTU called general strikes 4 8 times a year in the late 1990s to the mid-2000s. Despite the shrinking number of union members participating in general strikes and public opinion unfavourable to militant union actions, the KCTU and its affiliated unions too often tried to resort to general strikes. Trade union density has fallen since 1990, partly because of industrial restructuring, manufacturing relocation abroad (to Malaysia, China, Vietnam, Indonesia, etc) and the expansion of the service sector, where it is difficult to organise trade unions. Also, the confrontational style of the KCTU and its affiliated enterprise unions gave people a strong impression that they were radical and confrontational. Most working days lost were due to strikes by a few large enterprise unions, as indicated in the table. More people became critical towards large enterprise unions for exercising their strong power via frequent strikes. Too many attempts at general strikes by the KCTU and frequent strikes by large unions brought strong negative responses not just from employers, but also from the general public. Table 4 Trade union structure based on enterprises has unintentionally contributed to the polarization of labour markets between large and small firms and permanent and temporary workers in terms of wages, benefits and working conditions (Rowley et al, 2011). This made public opinion even more hostile toward militant trade unions at large firms increasingly such unions were isolated from public opinion. Now the KCTU and its affiliated unions were

14 14 surrounded and viewed by most employers in a hostile perspective. Anti-union feelings against the KCTU and its affiliates became even stronger among employers. These anti-union feelings developed into anti-union behaviour by large businesses when KCTU-affiliated enterprise unions became weaker for one reason or another. When KCTU affiliated enterprise unions lost a protracted strike, management took advantage of the opportunity and dismissed or disciplined union key leaders for illegally occupying factories or obstructing operations. Management exchanged dismissals or discipline for withdrawal of the enterprise union from the KCTU and thereby got the upper hand over unions. Antiunionism in these occasions took the form of enterprise unions subject to management at the firms. There are many examples of big unions which withdrew from the KCTU and were weakened. However, we cannot lay the blame of this anti-unionism only on employers at those firms. The militancy of KCTU affiliated unions often provoked employers and triggered antiunionism among big employers. Big buisnesses sometimes encouraged militant enterprise unions to go on strike, trapped unions in negotiation deadlock and intentionally protracted strikes without compromise. Despite significant losses, employers prepared for long strikes and the unions were entrapped and increasingly lost the strength of unity among their membership. Divisions among their members emerged often revolving around what compromise or concession to make. Once divisions emerged among the union membership, strikers regrouped into different opinions. At the end of strikes the divisions among union members became acute and the unions were significantly weakened. Employers, especially at big firms, did not miss the opportunity and intervened in union internal affairs. They came up with solutions which favoured moderate members to militant ones and punished the key union leaders of KCTU affiliated unions who led long strikes. Another form of anti-unionism has been the opposition of employers to industrial unions. As mentioned earlier, the trade union movement started the industrial union movement to overcome the shortcomings of enterprise unions, which was led by some industrial federations of trade unions under the KCTU. The proportion of industrial unions in terms of union membership accounted for nearly one-half (48.7%), as seen in the table.

15 15 Table 5 Many employers regarded enterprise unions as part of their firms while seeing industrial unions as outside organisations (or third parties ). Moreover, the newly organised industrial unions went on strike in the metal and hospital sector more frequently than before in order to get employers to recognise industrial unions and force them to negotiate. The tactics of industrial unions pressing employers exacerbated labour-management relations particularly at large companies because employers had power to resist industrial union attempts at industrial bargaining. Although employers at large companies recognised enterprise branches of industrial unions and reluctantly recognised industrial unions themselves, they never sat at industrial bargaining tables. Confrontation between industrial unions and employers at large companies weakened enterprise branches of industrial unions at those firms. For example, in the mid- and late 2000s a number of enterprise branches of the metal industrial union at large companies went back to enterprise unions and withdrew from the metal industrial union and the KCTU under the heavy influence of big employers. As union influence and bargaining power declined, the role of LMCs as either employee representation or union avoidance increasingly weakened. As seen in the table, the role of LMCs in wage increases through negotiations, consultations or discussion significantly reduced. Now management at large non-union firms are less likely to give LMCs rights or room for representing employees interests because pressure or threat of union organisation are felt to be much weaker than before. Table 6 6. A Coming New Watershed for Trade Unions and Anti-Unionism Another critical wave of anti-unionism in Korea has come with two fundamental changes in labour law in First, the legal replacement of the union facilities of full-time union officers paid by their employers by paid time-off facilities for union duties. Second, allowing multiple unions at firms. These changes have significantly lessened and will further weaken, trade unions at the firm level. Anti-unionism has taken the form of a more aggressive strategy of employers towards trade unions than before in order to take advantage of the opportunities of diminishing trade union power at the workplace.

16 16 One of the most important pillars to support the strong presence of unions at firms has been the arrangement of full-time union officers paid by employers which was secured by trade union movement from the late 1980s. 4 The arrangement has also been an institutional anchor for union security at the workplace. The arrangement of full-time union officers paid by employers was achieved by the trade union movement during and after the 1987 mass struggle of workers. It was closely associated with enterprise unionism in Korea. Enterprise unionism seemed to be strongly rooted at firms with the help of full-time union officers paid by each employer at the firm level. The number of full-time union officers and their prominent role at each enterprise unions and industrial federations based on enterprise unions gave the trade union movement substantial influence and bargaining power. There was a criticism that there were too many full-time union officers, particularly at large firms who control work practices and tend to make them too rigid. After a long national debate on industrial relations regulation and its reform in , there was already an incomplete political compromise to introduce a legal ban on full-time union officers and at the same time to allow multiple unions at the workplace in However the political compromise and the following legal changes could not be realised and implemented because some unions and big businesses opposed to its implementation and its implementation were delayed until the end of In the meantime, the political and industrial context of those changes altered. The strength of enterprise unions have declined at almost all firms since the mid-2000s. To allow multiple unions helps employers whipsaw multiple unions to compete each other for bargaining rights with employers. Previously, the principle of one union at one firm which denied multiple unions at firm level, gave the first organised (and often employer-dominated) unions exclusive rights to represent workers rather than later organised unions representing real workers interests. If multiple unions had been allowed in the late 1980s that would have helped independent unions at big companies to replace prior established company unions. However allowing multiple unions at the workplace may now prompt employers to increase their anti-union behaviour by supporting more moderate unions at the workplace by isolating more independent and radical 4. Although union facilities of full-time union officers paid by employers, who are exempt from work at the workplace, had existed since the 1970s, the arrangement was often informally provided in return for enterprise unions cooperation with management.

17 17 unions we need to wait and see. Moreover, the legal ban on full-time union officers paid by employers without giving enterprise unions any opportunity for reorganising themselves into other types of unions such as industrial, regional, general or occupational unions have, to large extent, curtailed trade union power in favour of employers. In fact the number of full-time union officers in 2008 was as many as one officer per every nearly 150 members, as seen in Table 7, but it significantly shrunk to the level just to accommodate time-off provisions as seen in Table 8. The actual number of paid full-time union officers has declined to less than half. The number has fallen more at large firms than at small ones, as seen in Table9. The number of paid full-time union officers at large firms fell more than at medium-sized firms, as seen in Table 10. Tables 7, 8, 9, 10 The current conservative government is regarded as favouring employers and has thoroughly monitored how employers and enterprise unions implemented the new arrangement of timeoff for trade union officers. The degree of implementation of time-off for union officers instead of paid full-time union officers was nearly close to total. The setting up of multiple unions competing for the exact same membership at one firm has made matters worse. More new unions have been established at independent union firms rather than at company-dominated union firms. Employers have been able to whipsaw new unions against independent unions. As a consequence of this new regulation on full-time trade union officers and allowing multiple unions at firms, independent enterprise unions have become much weaker and the decline in trade union power and influence was further accelerated. Anti-unionism has appeared as some employers took on already weakened trade unions, often together with the help of union-busting agencies and set-up new companyfriendly unions. Moreover, the government's anti-union stance has emboldened employers to attack unions and to withdraw agreed collective contracts, which had not been seen before. The government has asked employers in the public sector to take a firm stance on trade unions by withdrawing collective contracts when they found the contracts included some personnel matters which are regarded as infringing employers' prerogatives. The situation

18 18 seems to be more complex than before. However we have to wait and see what will happen in the coming years. For example, some employers in the metal sector in the Kyungjoo region have attacked their enterprise branches of the metal industrial union within the help of a union-busting agency and under the auspice of some administration. Some enterprise branches of the metal union gave in to employers, withdrew from the metal union and reorganised themselves into an enterprise union dominated by employers. The employers adopted an offensive position in the two major restructurings and compulsory redundancies at Ssangyong Motor and Hanjin Shipbuilding. The aggressive redundancies even gave rise to tragic incidents, such as 22 redundant workers or their spouses who committed suicide, arising from psychological agony and trauma at Ssangyong Motor. Another example is the 300 day sit-in by female activists at a sky-high crane within HanJin Shipbuiding which attracted much attention from wide audience and the National Assembly (equivalent to the House of Commons in Britain). However, what the new wave of anti-unionism is likely to be is not yet fully apparent because the full effects of multiple unions are yet to be realised. What has appeared so far as a result of the institutional changes and their associated anti-unionism is so fundamental as to bring in institutional change in the industrial relations system of Korea. 7. Summary and Conclusions Anti-unionism in Korea has been shaped and reshaped during the changing context of history, politics, industrialisation and society. Anti-unionism was, at large, led by the state during the military dictatorship up the mid-1980s. The nature of anti-unionism was legally or administratively institutionalised, attitudinal, ideological, divisive and pre-emptive in Korea. Anti-unionism has remained strong under enterprise unionism because trade union resided within firms and are often likely to collude with employers in controlling working practices. The authoritarian anti-unionism led by the military government was designed to block independent unions up to An independent trade union movement grew out of the antiunionism of the authoritarian government and stubborn employers by overcoming all kinds of anti-unionism.

19 19 When independent unions have been successfully anchored at the workplace and exercised strong bargaining power, as in the late 1980s and 1990s, anti-unionism became weaker. However, new anti-unionism resulted from the interaction or confrontations between assertive independent unions and employers since the 1990s. Another aspect of anti-unionism was opposition to the industrial union movement and industrial bargaining. The more fundamental challenge to trade unions in Korea has come from the two legal changes in union regulation and their associated offensive strategy of management. These changes are likely to weaken trade unions severely. Anti-unionism strategies by employers aimed at taking advantage of those changes favourable to employers and attacking weak trade unions directly. However, what effects the recent fundamental changes finally result in remains to be seen because the full effects of those changes are yet to be materialised. Enterprise unions may expose their risks and weaknesses outside under the new waves of anti-unionism. Anti-unionism in Korea reflects, and altered with, political transition and changes, power relations between employers and trade unions, labour markets and firm organisation, industrial changes and ideologies of major actors. The main characteristics of anti-unionism in Korea comes from the varying patterns of influences stemming from three sources. First, the historical legacies of confrontation with Communist North Korea and Korean War. Second, the enterprise unionism system. Third, the context of compressed industrialisation, political democratisation, industrial upgrading, financial crisis and new division of labour with rapidly industrialising China. The kaleidoscope of these forces is still in play in Korean industrial relations.

20 20 References Bae, Kiu-Sik Noh Yong Jin and Shim SangWan. 2007, Employment Relations in Non-union Firms Labor-management Council and Alternative Employee Representative Body. Seoul, Korea Labour Institute. Kawanishi, Hirosuke Enterprise Unionism in Japan. London: Kegan Paul Kim, Hwang-Joe The Korean Union Movement in Transition, in Organized Labor In the Asia-Pacific Region: A Comparative Study of Trade Unionism in Nine Countries, edited by Stephen Frankel Ithaca, ILR Press. Kim, Junghan Changes in Industrial Relations after the Revision of Labour Law and the Response of Trade Unions to them. Korea Labour Institute. Kim, Samsoo Labour Policies and Industrial Relations under the Era of president Park Junghee Labour Policies of Ban on Freedom of Association and Labour-management Councils within Enterprises. No 18. Social Criticism(in Korean). Korea Labour Institute Workplace Panel Survey 2007, Koo, Hagen Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation. Kwon, S. and O Donnell, M. (2001) The Chaebol and Labour in Korea, Routledge. Ministry of (Employment and) Labour. Dec Monitoring the degree of implementation of Time-off Arrangement. Park, Duk-je Industrial Relations in Korea. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 3(1). Rowley, C. and Yoo, K.S. (2008) Trade Unions in South Korea in J. Benson and Y. Zhu (eds) Trade unionism in Asia, Routledge, pp Ithaca. Cornell University Press Rowley, C.; Yoo, K.S. and Kim, D.H. (2011) Labour Movments in South Korea in J. Benson and Y. Zhu (eds) The Dynamics of Asian Labour Markets, Routledge, pp Kim, Junghan Changes in Industrial Relations after the Revision of Labour Law and the Response of Trade Unions to them. Korea Labour Institute Korea Labour Institute Workplace Panel Survey 2007, 2009.

21 21 Table 1: Union Numbers, Membership and Density in Korea, Year Number Membership ( 000) Density (%) Dependent employment ( 000) , , , , , , , ,551 1, , ,675 1, , ,103 1, , ,164 1, , ,883 1, , ,698 1, , ,656 1, , ,527 1, , ,147 1, , ,025 1, , ,606 1, , ,424 1, , ,733 1, , ,560 1, , ,637 1, , ,698 1, , ,148 1, , ,506 1, , ,257 1, , ,107 1, , ,971 1, , ,889 1, , ,099 1, , ,886 1, , ,689 1, , ,420 1, ,804 Source: The Ministry of Employment and Labour Statistics on Union Organisation in 2010

22 22 Table 2: Union Organisation by Establishment Size Employees/site Less than At least 300 Wage earners 9,969,000 3,432,000 1,711,000 2,041,000 Union membership 11,341 82, , ,671 Union density (%) Source: Ministry of Employment and Labour Statistics on Union Organisation in 2010 Figure 1: Trends in Industrial Action, Source: Ministry of Labour (now Ministry of Employment and Labour)

23 23 Table 3: Labour-Management Councils Set-up at Non-Union Establishments (unit: %) Year Establishment Types Existent Existent, but name only Non-existent 30~99 employees ~ ~ at least private sector (N=31,045) public sector manufacturing (N=30,877) non-manufacturing total ~99 employees ~ ~ at least private sector public sector manufacturing non-manufacturing total Source: Korea Labour Institute Workplace Panel Survey 2007, Table 4: Working Days Lost Due to Strikes by Large Unions (unit: days, %) Year Hyundai Motor Union/ 5 large enterprise 10 large enterprise Total Kia Motor Union unions unions working days lost Working days Working days Working days ratio ratio ratio lost lost lost ,083, , , , ,580, , , , ,298, , , , ,198, , , , , , , , ,200, , , , , , , , Source: Ministry of Employment and Labour. Labour Disputes statistics