Political Dynasties and The Emergence of Local Oligarchs. In Post Suharto Indonesia and The Philippines 1. Najmu L. Sopian 2.

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1 Political Dynasties and The Emergence of Local Oligarchs In Post Suharto Indonesia and The Philippines 1 Najmu L. Sopian 2 Abstract This paper analyzes the relationship between local oligarchs and the emergence of political dynasties in Indonesia and the Philippines. In particular, this paper employs an oligarchic theory to examine political behavior of local oligarchs in Banten, Indonesia and compare it with the case of the Philippines. Sets of literature argue that political dynasties in Indonesia are less prevalent than in the Philippines. In addition, unlike in the Philippines, the use of coercive power to gain political power is considered uncommon in Indonesia. However, recent developments show a salient trend of the emergence of family dynasties and the increasing use of violence undermining Indonesia s democracy. Keywords: Political dynasty; local oligarchs; Jawara; local bossism; Banten. This paper examines the changing political behavior of oligarchs 3 at the local level in Indonesia through the lens of oligarchic theory. 4 Decentralization policies and local direct elections have opened new channels for local oligarchs to pursue wealth defense 5 through 1 This work was conducted under the auspices of an Arryman Fellow award from the Indonesian Scholarship and Research Support Foundation (ISRSF) through generous academic donations from PT Djarum, Bank BCA, PT AKR Corporindo, PT Adaro, the William Soeryadjaya Foundation, the Rajawali Foundation, and the Ford Foundation, and has been submitted to meet requirements of course on Politics of Southeast Asia at the Department of Political Science, Northwestern University Arryman Fellow and pre-doctoral visiting scholar at the Equality Development and Globalization Studies (EDGS), Northwestern University. 3 Winter defines oligarchs as, actors who command and control massive concentration of material resources that can be deployed to defend or enhance their personal wealth and exclusive social position. Jeffrey A. Winters, Oligarchy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p Oligarchic theory claims that, the extreme concentration of wealth empowers small numbers of actors over much larger groups or communities. Winters, ibid., p According to Ford and Pepinsky, a core feature of analyses of Indonesia using the oligarchy framework is the claim that democratization has changed the form of Indonesian politics without eliminating oligarchic rule. Michele Ford and Thomas B. Pepinsky, Beyond Oligarchy? Critical Exchanges on Political Power and Material Inequality in Indonesia, in Beyond Oligarchy. Unpublished manuscript. 5 Oligarchs maintain their power and position through sets of strategic behaviors that is called wealth defense. Wealth defense is the core of oligarchs political struggle, which consist of two forms: (1) property defense, and (2) income defense. The main distinction of these two forms lies on whether or not secure property rights present in a given country. See: Winter, op.cit., p

2 the acquisition of elective offices and build their political dynasties 6 within their respective regions. Since the fall of Suharto, running for office has become a common feature of Indonesian local oligarchs as part of their wealth defense strategies. For example, Chasan Sochibs, arguably the most powerful local oligarch in Banten, 7 exhibited wealth defense behavior by positioning his family members and cronies in almost every strategic business and political positions. Securing political positions is vital for local oligarchs to get access to governmental projects and gain more economic and political power. Another common feature in recent Indonesian politics is the increasing trend of use of force and intimidation to mobilize votes in local elections. Decentralization and the Emergence of Political Dynasties Political dynasty is far from a new phenomenon because it has been long present in Indonesia. 8 The so-called elite families exist throughout Indonesian society; family members hold strategic positions in government, business, and society. In fact, many powerful families and clans have played an important role in local Indonesian politics. For example, 6 Asako, Iida, Matsubayashi, and Ueda define political dynasty as, those whose family members have also served in the same position in the past. Yasushi Asako, Takeshi Iida, Tetsuya Matsubayashi, Michiko Ueda, Dynastic Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Japan, Waseda University Organization for Japan-US Studies Working Paper No , Available at (accessed on January 14 th, 2014). Meanwhile, Querubin (2011) in Kenawas argues that political dynasty is, an example of the elite s persistence, where one or a small number of families dominate the power distribution. Yoes C. Kenawas, The Rise of Political Dynasties in Decentralized Indonesia, Master Thesis at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Academic Year 2012/2013, p Abdul 'Dubbun' Hakim, Jawara and Political Dynasty in Banten, Available at: (accessed on November 12, 2013), p Yoes C. Kenawas, Political Dynasties in Indonesia: What Went Wrong? Available at: (accessed on January 11, 2014). 2

3 the Latuconsina clan has dominated local politics in Maluku region for decades. 9 The Nasution and the Lubis are other examples of prominent clans in Mandailing, North Sumatra. 10 Nevertheless the role of these families in politics and public office before 1998 was not ubiquitous, due mainly to the nature of Suharto s authoritarian regime. At that time, local leaders were chosen by regional legislatures which were still under control of the central governmental. 11 Suharto s politics of proximity 12 made it almost impossible for someone to hold office without having a close relationship to or, at least, a blessing from Suharto s dynasty and his cronies. 13 Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, many significant changes have occurred in Indonesia, including the implementation of direct local elections through the enactment of Law Number 32 Year 2004 concerning Regional Government. Direct local elections generated more open political competition and at the same time triggered people s 9 The Latuconsina clan is originated from district Pelauw, Central Maluku. Their domination in politics has began, at least, since the appointment of Ruswan Latuconsina as the speaker of Maluku regional parliament from 1982 to The clan strengthen their powers when M. Akib Latuconsina was appointed as the Governor of Maluku province , continued by M. Saleh Latuconsina (Governor of Maluku Province , previously the head of Provincial Development and Planning Board ), and Irwan Latuconsina (the speaker of Maluku regional parliament). In 2003, Muhammad Abdullah Mehmed Latuconsina was elected as vice Governor of Maluku, and in 2006 Olivia Latuconsina was elected as vice mayor of Ambon city. To date, the clan continues their domination not only in politics but also in economic sector, particularly in Central Maluku. Source: Author obtains some of the information from the interview with informant from Maluku and from Birgit Brauchler, Mobilizing Culture and Tradition for Peace, in Birgit Brauchler (ed), Reconciling Indonesia: Grassroots Agency for Peace (Asia s Transformations) (New York: Routledge, 2009), p Mandailing.org, Marga-Marga Mandailing Available at (accessed on January 14th, 2014). 11 According to Article 15 (2) and Article 16 (2) of the Law Number 5 of 1974 on Regional Government, the candidacy for governors, regents, and mayors were chosen by regional/local legislature upon approval of the President through the Ministry of Home Affairs. Therefore, final decision eventually lies in the hand of central government. 12 In this politics of proximity, Suharto built some sort of imaginary circles where the closer someone s relationship with Suharto, the more protection and benefits that he will gain. See: Jeffrey A. Winters, Who Will Tame the Oligarchs, Available at (accessed on January 10th, 2014). 13 Yoes C. Kenawas, The Rise of Political Dynasties in Decentralized Indonesia, p

4 democratic participation. However, this new form of election also brought about a new model of dynastic government, which was evidenced by the growth of family politics in several regions that duplicated the style of the New Order Era. Since the installation of local direct elections, many families have established their own political dynasties, including the Sochibs in Banten, the Limpos in South Sulawesi, and the Sjachroedins in Lampung. 14 Furthermore, in the 2009 local elections 57 politicians who were elected to carry on their relatives office positions. 15 These familial dynasties employ corruption, collusion, and nepotism to consolidate power at the local level. They exploit electoral mechanisms to accumulate power and wealth for their own benefit, leaving a large segment of the population to live in poverty. The Sochib dynasty in Banten provides a perfect example of this phenomenon. The Sochibs have concentrated both political power and public resources within their family, controlling almost every strategic position in Banten. The Rise of the Sochib Dynasty in Banten The explanation of political dynasty in Banten is centered on one figure named Tubagus Chasan Sochib, the godfather of the Sochib dynasty. He is a Bantenese oligarch whose financial and social power was accumulated through the procuration of governmental development projects and his status as Jawara since Suharto s era. Born in Serang in 1930, 14 The Sjachroedin dynasty is built by Sjachroedin Zainal Pagaralam, the current governor of Lampung. Two Sjachroedin s sons are currently occupying office positions, namely Rycko Menoza as the regent of South Lampung ( ) and Handitya Narapati as the deputi regent of Pringsewu ( ). Source: The Jakarta Post, Political Dynasties Rampant Country, Available at: (accessed on January 14th, 2014). 15 The report from Director of Regional Autonomy in Berly Martawardaya, Toward Fair Competition, an End to Political Dynasty, The Jakarta Post (March 25, 2013), Available at: (accessed on November 12, 2013). 4

5 Sochib got involved in the Indonesian revolutionary war during as a guerilla fighter. 16 Apparently, this is when his connection with the military began. According to a report from Tempo magazine, Sochib started his business in the 1960s by providing security for the rice and corn trading business in Java and Sumatra. In addition, he also supplied logistical needs for Kodam VI Siliwangi (a military unit in West Java) which had an interest in maintaining political stability in Banten. He was frequently entrusted to handle large-scale construction projects because of his close connections with the military and the West Java provincial government. In 1967 he established PT Sinar Ciomas Raya, the biggest construction company in Banten to date. With even more governmental procurement, he began to build his imperium. 17 In addition to his financial power, Sochib is a well-known Bantenese Jawara. 18 He is one of the founders of the most influential armed organization in Banten, namely Indonesian Association of Champions of Banten Martial Arts (Persatuan Pendekar Persilatan dan Seni Budaya Banten Indonesia, PPPSBBI ). The organization now claims to have 500,000 local martial arts practitioners scattered in 15 provinces. 19 Sochib achieved the peak of his power in the PPPSBBI when he became chairman of the organization. Even though PPPSBBI is not officially affiliated with the Golkar party, the 16 Tempo Magazine, November 10th Ibid. 18 According to Wilson, in common usage the word Jawara literally means champion, an expert at fighting, or indeed anyone who has made a name for them selves in a particular field. In contemporary Sundanese society Jawara can be interchanged meaning with jago, jeger, garong, and preman, covering a range of meanings from champion and tough through to robber and hoodlum. For further reading about the history of Jawara see: Ian Douglas Wilson, The Politics of Inner Power: The Practice of Pencak Silat in West Java, Ph.D. Thesis, School of Asian Studies Murdoch University Western Australia 2002; and Okamoto Masaaki and Abdul Hamid, Jawara in Power, , Indonesia 86 (October 2008). 19 Syarif Hidayat, The Shadow State? Business and Politics in the Province of Banten, in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (eds), Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), p See also: Persatuan Pendekar Persilatan dan Seni Budaya Banten Indonesia, Haji Tubagus Chasan Sochib The Jawara, Pendekar from Banten, Available at (accessed on November 12, 2013). 5

6 organization played an essential role in facilitating Sochib s rise to power in the Golkar party. As Masaki and Hamid note, as a senior politician in the Golkar party, he acted as a bridge between the military and the bureaucracy, as well as to Banten s society, including the underground (criminal) world. 20 Needless to say, Sochib used the Golkar party to increase his sphere of influence in Banten. He used the party not only as a tool to obtain political power but also as an instrument to expand and secure his business interests. 21 In addition to politics, Sochib also controlled business organizations by holding key positions, among others in the Provincial Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Banten (Kamar Dagang dan Industri Daerah Banten/Kadin), the Indonesian National Contractors Association of Banten (Gabungan Pengusaha Konstruksi Nasional Indonesia Banten/Gapensi), and the Indonesia National Construction Services Development Institute of Banten (Lembaga Pengembangan Jasa Konstruksi Nasional Indonesia Banten). 22 With these positions, Sochib s business kingdom is unimpeded. He has invested his money in an array of business areas from the steel industry to tourism and real estate, 23 making him the most notable local oligarch in Banten. Decentralization policies as one of the agendas of reformasi opened a new channel for the Bantenese to advocate their demands to separate Banten from West Java province. As a result, Banten was established as an independent province in 2000 through the enactment of Law Number 23 Year 2000 concerning the Formation of Banten. 24 The Sochib 20 Okamoto Masaaki and Abdul Hamid, Jawara in Power, , p Yanwar Pribadi, Strongmen and Religious Leaders in Java, Al-Jami ah, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2011, p Okamoto Masaaki, Local Politics in Decentralised Indonesia: The Governor General of Banten Province, IIAS Newsletter: July Available at (accessed on November 12, 2013) 23 Ibid. 24 Banten was part of West Java province until 4 Oktober 2000 when it was declared as a new province. Banten is divided into four cities and four regencies with Serang as the capital city. The four cities 6

7 family seen the establishment of Banten province as an opportunity to secure their business monopolies and gain more political power through local governmental positions. As local businessmen who depend on the acquisition of governmental projects, holding office guarantees their access and promises further enrichment. To do so, they did not have many choices but to invest their money in political competition in order to secure and maintain their power in the province. As a newly established province, most of the development programs from in Banten have been focused on upgrading the economic infrastructure and basic services, particularly in Education and Health. Given the huge amount of budget allocated, the procurement of these projects has surely tantalized and attracted many businessmen, including Sochib. 25 Through his material and coercive power, Sochib seized the opportunity to build his political dynasty in Banten, making him and his family the most powerful oligarchs in the province. Table 1 Banten Regional Budget Allocation for Infrastructure/Transportation Facilities and Other Physical Structures from Total Budget Allocation (in billion rupiahs) Year In the 2001 election, Sochib fully supported the candidacy of his daughter Ratu Atut Chosyah as deputy governor and her running mate Djoko Munandar as governor, both representing the Golkar party. Sochib deployed support for his daughter not only by his consist of Serang, Cilegon, South Tangerang, Tangerang city, while the four regencies include Serang, Lebak, Pandeglang, and Tangerang. For a more detail discussion about the history of the establishment of Banten as new province, see: Abdul 'Dubbun' Hakim, Jawara and Political Dynasty in Banten, loc.cit. 25 Syarif Hidayat, The Shadow State? Business and Politics in the Province of Banten, op.cit. p Ibid., table is created by the author. 7

8 funding but also by mobilizing his Jawaras association PPPSBBI. The Jawaras played a role in mobilizing support for Atut s candidacy, using intimidation and shows of force against supporters of other candidates. For example, on September 18 th, 2001 the PPPSBBI sent a letter of support, declaring their full support for Atut as candidate for deputy governor of the Province of Banten. 27 Following the victory of Djoko and Atut, Sochib had a dominant influence over the conduct of local government where in he was able to consolidate control over important bureaucratic positions and developmental projects in the province. 28 His power increased when Atut replaced governor Djoko following his arrest for corruption in Although Sochib remained in a back stage role, he was known as the governor general, private-sector governor or kingmaker because of his ease in obtaining regional projects. 30 He established a network known as the Rau Group consisting of Jawaras, local oligarchs, and bureaucrats. As its name suggests, the group was concentrated around the Rau market in the provincial capital Serang. 31 The implementation of direct local elections in 2007 did little to dismantle the Sochib dynasty s dominance in Banten. 32 In fact, Atut was elected governor of Banten for term and reelected for term. Although Sochib died in 2011, his family continues the upward trajectory to monopolize local politics in Banten. 27 Ibid., p Okamoto Masaaki, An unholy alliance, Inside Indonesia 93: Aug-Oct 2008 Available at: (accessed on November 12, 2013). 29 Djoko was alleged for misusing Rp14 billion of provincial budget to enrich 75 of local parliament members. The Serang district court found him guilty, charged him two years imprisonment and Rp100 million fine. Djoko died in 2008 before the Supreme Court finally approved his appeal and annulled the sentenced declaring he was innocent in See: The Jakarta Post, Banten Governor Gets Two Years Corruption, Available at (accessed on January 14th, 2014). 30 Tempo Magazine, November 10th Okamoto Masaaki, An Unholy Alliance, loc.cit. 32 Ibid. 8

9 As the oldest daughter of Sochib and the current governor of Banten, Atut replaced her father as patron of the family. In her second term as governor, she is more famous for her glamorous life style and fancy dress than her accomplishment in developing Banten. Her wealth is spread throughout the region from properties to hotel and gas station ownership. In the 2011 report to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), she claimed to have a total wealth of Rp42.9 billion (around USD 3.6 million). However, she clamed that she earned most of her wealth on her own before she became deputy governor of Banten in In addition to Atut, almost all strategic politics and businesses, at the regencies, municipalities, and provinces levels of Banten, are controlled by Atut s family or people related to Atut s family. The following table displays the salient of the clan s domination in Banten, making Banten is often referred as Atut s family province. Table 2 Political Biodata of the Sochib Clan 34 No Name Office Position Wealth First Wife, Wasiah Samsudin (Married November 2, 1960 in Serang, Divorced 1991) 1. Ratu Atut Governor of Banten and Rp42.9 billion (2011) Chosiyah 2017 terms. - Land & Buildings: 77 = (Sochib s first Rp21.7 billion child) Chairman of the Golkar Central Leadership Board (DPP). - Vehicles: 38 = Rp3.89 billion - Gold: 50 kg = Rp5 billion - Diamonds: Rp2.7 billion - Stock: Rp7.8 billion Hikmat Tomet (Atut s husband) Member of the House of Representatives (DPR), Commission V, Golkar Party Faction, term Chairman of Indonesian Craft Council Banten (Dewan Kerajinan Nasional Daerah) Chairman of the Golkar Regional Leadership Board (DPP) of Banten. - Saving & Cash: Rp1.2 billion Rp32.99 (2010) - Land & Buildings: 49 = Rp19.6 billion - Vehicles: 9 = Rp4.3 billion - Stock: 4 companies = Rp3.8 billion - Saving & Cash: Rp1 billion 33 Tempo Magazine, November 10th This data is mainly taken from Tempo Magazine, November 10 th 2013 with author s table and additional data from other local newspapers. 9

10 Andika Hazrumy (Atut s oldest son) Ade Rossi Khoerunnisa (Andikas wife /Atut s Daughterin-law) Andiara Aprilia (Atut s second child) 2. Ratu Tatu Chasanah (Second child) 3. Tubagus Chaeri Wardana (aka. Wawan) (Third child) Airin Rachmi Diany (Wawan s wife) Member of Regional Representatives Council (DPD), term Active in number of youth organizations such as Chairman of Taruna Tanggap Bencana (Tagana) Banten, Treasurer of Karang Taruna Banten, and Vice Chariman of Ansor Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Ansor) Banten. Member of Serang City Regional House of Representatives, term Chairman of The National Sports Committee of Indonesia (Komite Olahraga Nasional Indonesia/KONI) of the City of Serang. Rp19.8 billion (2009). - Land & Buildings: 25 = Rp5.2 billion - Vehicles: 9 = Rp8 billion - Lexus (2008) = Rp2 billion - Mercedes (2006) = Rp1.8 billion - Range Rover (2008) = Rp1.4 billion - Hummer (2008) = Rp1.2 billion - Harley-Davidson (2008) = Rp400 million - Gold = Rp120 million - Diamonds: Rp80 million - Stock & Bond: Rp2.8 billion - Saving: Rp220 million - Some of Atut s wealth is kept in the name of her, including Atut s house standing on 12,806 square meters in Serang Deputy regent of Serang Regency, term and Chairman of the Golkar Regional Leadership Board (DPP) of Pandeglang Active as chairman in number of organizations such as Indonesia Red-Cross of Banten, Indonesia Co-operation Council of Banten, National Movement for Social Solidarity of Banten, Indonesian Agribusiness and Agroindustry Community of Banten He is a treasurer of the Banten Golkar Party and Chariman of the Banten Golkar Youth Wing. He is known to be very close to executive and legislative officials. 35 He is chairman of the Banten Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Golkar Youth Wing (Angkatan Muda Partai Golkar) Former Priangan beauty contest winner, Miss Indonesia Finalist in Mayor of South Tangerang, term. Chairman of Indonesia Red Cross of the City of South Tangerang. She previously run for Deputy Mayor of Tangerang in 2009 but failed. Rp9 billon (2010) - Land & Building: 45 = Rp4.1 billion - Vehicle: 12 = Rp1.6 billion - Gold = Rp265 million - Stock = Rp2.3 billion In her report the the KPK, Wawan and Airin s wealth are combined. Rp103.9 billion (2010). - Land & Building: 102 = Rp59 billion - Vehicle: 9 = Rp22 billion - Range Rover (2007) = Rp2.1 billion - Mercedes (2008) = Rp1.5 billion - Lamborghini (2009) = Rp9 billion - Ferrari (2009) = Rp3.5 billion - Porsche Panamera (2009) Rp3.5 billion - Rolls-Royce (not reported) - Nissan GTR (not reported) - Ferrari California (not 35 Tempo Magazine, November 10th

11 reported) - Platinum = Rp300 million - Diamonds = Rp300 million - Stock = Rp2.7 billion - Saving = Rp10.6 billion Second Wife, Ratu Rapiah Suhaemi, Married May 2, 1969 in Serang 1. Tubagus Haerul Deputy Mayor of Serang term and Rp2.4 billion (2008) Jaman (first child) 2. Ratu Lilis Karyawati (second child) Mayor of Serang, term II Chairman of the Regional Leadership of Golkar Party, City of Serang Aden Abudl Member of the Banten Regional House of Khalid (Ratu lilis Representatives, term husband) Third Wife, Chaeriyah, Married May 21, 1968, divorced in Ratu Heni Board of the Indonesian Chamber of Chendrayani (first Commerce and Industry, term child) 2. Ratu Wawat Cherawati (second child) Board of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, term Together with her husband have an estimated wealth of Rp14.5 billion (2012) Fourth Wife, Imas Masnawiyah, Married June 6, 1969 in Pandeglang. Died February 17, 1986 Fifth Wife, Heryani Yuhana, Married May 30, 1988 in Pandeglang Member of Pandeglang Regency Regional House of Representatives, term 1. Heryani Yuhana (Fifth Wife) Sixth Wife, Ratna Komalasari, Married April 8, Ratna Komalasari (Sixth Wife) Member of Serang City Regional House of Representatives, Rp25.6 billion (2009) - Land & Building: 25 = Rp13.4 billion - Vehicle: 4 = Rp2.8 billion - Gold = Rp128 million - Diamonds = Rp146 million - Stock = Rp8.6 billion Based on the data from Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), in Atut s dynasty captured at least 175 provincial projects valued at a total of Rp1.14 trillion (US$100 million). ICW further report that Atut s family owned 10 private companies and 24 other affiliated firms, and it acquired the governmental projects through those enterprises. 36 In addition, according to the estimate data from the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), in Atut embezzled nearly Rp1 trillion (US$87 million) from the regional budget to 36 Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), Membongkar Gurita Bisnis Atut CS, October 11, 2013, Available at: (Accessed on October 28, 2013). 11

12 finance her election campaign. 37 The dynasty, however, is currently under threat following the recent detention of Tubagus Chaeri Wardana (aka. Wawan), Atut s younger brother. He was arrested by the KPK in October 2013 for bribery case involving the chief justice of Constitutional Court Akil Mochtar with regard to the election in Lebak regent. He was also investigated by the KPK for a number of discrepancies in health equipment procurement and in various infrastructure development projects in Banten and South Tangerang. 38 The case of political dynasty in Banten sheds lights on the phenomena in recent Indonesian politics where decentralization and regional autonomy have created greater space for the coalition of oligarchs and bureaucrats who capture state s revenue for their own private gain. Reno called this phenomenon Shadow State. 39 The case of Banten clearly proves that the local government is unable to perform its function in delivering goods and public services due to its own weakness and public malfeasance. 40 It is then not surprising that despite an annual budget of nearly Rp6 trillion, the Banten local government failed to deliver basic people s need such as infrastructure, education and poverty-reduction program, putting the province left behind compared to other provinces. According to data from the Disadvantaged Regions Ministry, Pandeglang and Lebak are among the most disadvantaged regions in the country, where Lebak is home 37 The Jakarta Post, Banten Rises up Against House of Atut, Available at: (accessed on November 30, 2013). 38 Tempo Magazine, November 10th Describing the phenomenon present in various parts of post-colonial Africa, Reno defines Shadow State as, a form of personal rule, where decisions and actions are taken by an individual ruler and do not conform to a set of written laws and procedures, although these might be present. See: William Reno, Clandestine Economies, Violence and States in Africa, Journal of International Affairs (Volume 53, No. 2, 2000). 40 Ibid. 12

13 to 579,373 poor people out of 1.27 million of its total population. 41 The Changing Behavior of Local Oligarchs Compared to national oligarchs, the material resources of local oligarchs are almost always far less in absolute terms. However, this fact does not imply that local oligarchs possess less power than national oligarchs. Local oligarchs dominate social and economic positions in a particular place, giving them special privileges and power in that locality. 42 The democratization process at the local level has a backfire effect in aggravating this domination. The case of Banten shows the changing political strategies of local oligarchs as their response to the political changes in the region. They have successfully adopted the process of democratization and decentralization by establishing power through local electoral politics. 43 From the oligarchic theory perspective, their adaptive behavior as part of their wealth defense strategies can be classified according to two features: First, they are relying more on formal democratic institutions to maintain their political ascendance and to secure further advancement. 44 These strategies typically include control over local executive government (regents, mayors, governors), legislative bodies, and other important political and business organizations. The Sochib s clan seeks direct influence over local formal institutions, making it possible for them to get access to 41 The Jakarta Post, The Clan and the Damage Done, Available at: (Accessed on November 30, 2013). 42 Ford and Pepinsky, op.cit. 43 Abdul 'Dubbun' Hakim, Jawara and Political Dynasty in Banten, loc.cit. 44 Vedi R. Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective (California: Stanford University Press, 2010). 13

14 and monopolize local government s resources for their private gain. 45 The collusive practices between local oligarchs and bureaucrats exacerbate rampant corruption in local government because the ratio in the decision-making process and policy implementation is based on political bargains and economic calculations. 46 Second, the case of Banten presents the collusive relation between Jawaras and local oligarchs, where they both control myriad key positions in politics and business through patron-client network relation. 47 According to Masaaki and Hamid, it is in Banten that a violent local oligarch has most successfully entrenched himself economically and politically, at least to this date. 48 The use of coercive methods to consolidate local power and build political dynasty also occurs in other regions in Indonesia, for example the Limpo Dynasty in South Sulawesi. Muhammad Yasin Limpo, the former regent of Gowa district, formed a political dynasty, with his children and relatives occupying various elective positions in the province. 49 As Buhler notes, they use intimidation and money to gain power. In order to secure their political position, [t]he Limpo family owns several private security forces, such as the Brigade 9-11 and Brigade 02, and controls hundreds of thugs. Syahrul Yasin Limpo, for example, is the head of several motorcycle clubs which control 45 John T. Sidel, Bossism and Democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia: Towards an Alternative Framework for the Study of Local Strongmen, available at: 46 Abdul 'Dubbun' Hakim, Jawara and Political Dynasty in Banten, loc.cit. 47 Ibid., p Okamoto Masaaki and Abdul Hamid, Jawara in Power, , p Five of Yasin s children are currently holding office positions, namely: (1) Irman Yasin Limpo (member of the Provincial Development and Planning Board/Bapeda) (2) Syahrul Yasin Limpo (currently reelected as governor of South Sulawesi for the second term, after previously served two terms as regent of Gowa), and (3) Ichsan Yasin Limpo (the current regent of Gowa), (4) Haris Yasin Limpo (member of the Makassar local parliament) and, (5) Tenri Olle Yasin Limpo (the speaker of Gowa local parliament and the head of Golkar party in Gowa). The family s political dynasty list is getting longer with the involvement of Yasin s grandson and granddaughter including Adnan Purichta Ichsan Yasin Limpo (member of South Sulawesi local parliament) and Indira Chunda Thita Syahrul Yasin Limpo (member of the Indonesian House of Representatives). See: The Jakarta Post, Political Dynasties Rampant Country. loc.cit. 14

15 nightclubs and provide security during social and political events in the province. 50 The political behavior of political dynasties in Indonesia is similar to the situation in the Philippines where rent-seeking behavior and crony capitalism among elite families have been commonplace over the past two centuries. 51 The result of these behaviors has been a high level of wealth disparity between local oligarchs and poor inhabitants who are subject to the arbitrary rule of the oligarchs. 52 The Political Dynasties and Local Bossism in The Philippines Political dynasties have been established in the politics of the Philippines for well over a century. 53 Based on data from the Centre for People Empowerment in Governance, the 2010 national election was dominated by 178 political dynasties which consist of old elites (56%) and new elites (44%). At the local level, 94% of the provinces (73 out of 80 provinces) have political dynasties; six families have monopolized their respective regions for 25 years, and 19 families exclusively control elections in their congressional districts. 54 The resilience of clan dynasties both in prevalence and magnitude has made the Philippines a notable case of what Sidel has termed local bossism Michael Buehler, Rise of the clans, Inside Indonesia 90: Oct-Dec Available at: (accessed on November 12, 2013). 51 Alfred W. McCoy (ed), An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999). 52 Ronald U. Mendoza, Political Dynasties and Poverty: Chicken or the Eggs? Available at: (accessed on January 14 th, 2014). 53 Tuazon even argues that family dynasty has presented in the Philippines for six centuries, which can be traced since pre-colonial era (before the arrival of Spanish in 1521) with the emergence of Maharlika class. See: Bobby M. Tuazon, Six Centuries of Political Dynasties: Why the Philippines will Forever be Ruled by Political Clans? Center for People Empowerment in Governance, Available at: nasties%2012%2010%2012.pdf (accessed on January 14 th, 2014). 54 Ibid. 55 According to Sidel, the term of bosses refers to, local brokers who enjoy an enduring 15

16 However, the key difference between Indonesia and the Philippines is that local bossism that has emerged in Indonesia is less common and less violent than in the Philippines. 56 In this regard, Sidel provides a compelling distinction between the specific manifestations of the local bossism phenomenon in post-authoritarian Southeast Asia, particularly in the respective cases of the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. He shows the origins of local bossism in their respective historical settings and argues that the aspects of timing and context distinguish local bossism in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. 57 According to Sidel, the Philippines colonial experience is the most significant factor in the emergence of bossism in the country. The formal democratic institutions, such as democracy and decentralization policy, which were introduced by US colonialism at the beginning of the twentieth century, gave rise to politically powerful, even dynastic, local families. 58 While the existence of local oligarchs in the Philippines can be traced back for more than a century, Indonesian oligarchs are nowhere to be found until the Suharto era. 59 This timing difference sheds light on the different nature of local oligarchy in those two countries and explains why local oligarchs in the Philippines perpetuate in a more powerful role both monopolistic position over coercive and economic resources within their respective bailiwicks. See: John T. Sidel, Bossism and Democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia: Towards an Alternative Framework for the Study of Local Strongmen, p See among others: Vedi R. Hadiz, Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of Neo-Institutionalist Perspectives, Development and Change 35(4): Institute of Social Studies: Blackwell Publishing; John T. Sidel, Bossism and Democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia: Towards an Alternative Framework for the Study of Local Strongmen, Available at: (accessed on November 4, 2013); Julius Cesar I Trajano and Yoes C Kenawas, Political Dynasties Dominate in Indonesia and the Philippines, RSIS Commentaries No. 018/2013 dated 31 January John T. Sidel, Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines, Contemporary Issues in Asia and Pacific (Stanford University Press, 1999). 58 Ibid. 59 In fact, Suharto is the one who has created Indonesia s oligarchs at the beginning of his regime in the second-half decade of 1960-s. For an extensive explanation about the rise of oligarchs in Indonesia see: Winter, op.cit. p

17 in economic and political positions than those in Indonesia. For another reason, Hadiz argues, the politics of local bossism in Post-Suharto Indonesia are more fluid than in the Philippines due to the wider range of interested parties as well as the widely dispersed local centers of power. 60 However, the pattern of local bossism in the Philippines seems to be more similar to that of Indonesia in the Post-Suharto era, particularly after the installment of local direct elections in 2004 in which the institutional obstacles that Sidel described have disappeared. 61 As Sidel argues, it is Indonesia s electoral system that impeded the proliferation of local strong-men and political dynasties. 62 Indonesia s recent politics shows the emergence of clan dynasties and a collusive relationship between local oligarchs and mafias. This phenomenon is well argued by Hadiz that in recent Indonesian politics there are emerging phenomena of money politics and the use of political violence even though it is not at levels often associated with the Philippines. 63 However, the further question that arises as the localization of power increases is whether local bossism in Indonesia will continue to develop features such as in the Philippines in terms of prevalence and magnitude. 64 Another question is whether the phenomenon of the use of Jawaras and thugs by local strong-men and local oligarchs in gaining powers will exacerbate political violence in Indonesia. 60 Vedi R. Hadiz, op.cit. p Sidel argues that, local bossism in Post-Soeharto Indonesia is less dominated by individual strongmen or dynasties than in Thailand and the Philippines than it is by more fluid clusters and cliques of businessmen, politicians and officials. Sidel further notes that, in the Indonesian system, the heads of local and provincial governments are elected by their respective parliaments; this is in sharp contrast with the direct elections and unrestricted powers of mayors, governors and congressmen in the Philippines, and parliamentarians (MPS) in Thailand. Hence, there are supposed to be institutional obstacles in Indonesia to the rise of Thai-and Filipino-style local bossism. Sidel, loc.cit. p Ibid. 63 Vedi R. Hadiz, Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of Neo-Institutionalist Perspectives, p Vedi R. Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia, p.60 17

18 Closing The domination of Jawaras in Banten and South Sulawesi at both provincial and district levels during the period of decentralization has confirmed the analysis of Hadiz that the democratization process in Indonesia has been hijacked by the predatory patronage of local elites and local oligarchs. 65 Direct elections opened the way for local oligarchs to gain more power through the possession of elective office. Some of them show elite persistence 66 by building political dynasties in their respective bailiwicks and undermining political equilibrium in the region. Furthermore, the success of the Indonesian local oligarchs using Jawaras and thugs demonstrates the tendency to use coercive power to gain political influence in their regions. In this regard, the recent detention of Wawan and the investigation of Atut as well as other members of the Banten dynasty indicate the interesting feature of vulnerability of Indonesian local oligarchs. They show that Indonesia, at least, has institutional barriers to tame a rampant political dynasty through external surveillance such as KPK. Masaaki and Hamid shed light on the susceptibility and limitations of Indonesian local oligarchs noting that they are still subject to the central government surveillance. Therefore, local oligarchs are not fully independent to the central government and still need their supports in the case of criminal investigation such as corruption. 67 While the case is still in process now, the question remains as to whether the Banten dynasty will survive and continue to maintain 65 Vedi R. Hadiz, Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of Neo-Institutionalist Perspectives, loc.cit. 66 Pablo Querubin, Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines, Available at: (Accessed on January 10th, 2014). 67 Okamoto Masaaki and Abdul Hamid, Jawara in Power, , loc.cit, pg

19 their domination and power. *** Bibliography Books Brauchler, Birgit (ed) (2009). Reconciling Indonesia: Grassroots Agency for Peace (Asia s Transformations). New York: Routledge. Hadiz, Vedi. (2010) Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective. California: Stanford University Press. McCoy, Alfred W (ed). (2009) An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. Nordholt, Henk Schulte and Gerry van Klinken (eds.) (2007) Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia. Leiden: KITLV Press. Sidel, John T. (1999) Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines, Contemporary Issues in Asia and Pacific. California: Stanford University Press. Winters, Jeffrey A. (2011) Oligarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Journals, Articles, News, and Reports Asako, Yasushi, Takeshi Iida, Tetsuya Matsubayashi, Michiko Ueda. Dynastic Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Japan. Waseda University Organization for Japan-US Studies Working Paper No Available at (accessed on January 14 th, 2014). Buehler, Michael (2007) Rise of the clans. Inside Indonesia 90: Oct-Dec Available at: (accessed on November 12, 2013). Hadiz, Vedi R. (2004) Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of Neo- Institutionalist Perspectives. Development and Change 35(4): Institute of Social Studies: Blackwell Publishing. Hakim, Abdul 'Dubbun' (2011) Jawara and Political Dynasty in Banten. Available at: (accessed on November 12, 2013). 19

20 Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) (2013) Membongkar Gurita Bisnis Atut CS. October 11, Available at: (Accessed on October 28, 2013). Kenawas, Yoes C. Political Dynasties in Indonesia: What Went Wrong? Available at: (accessed on January 11, 2014). The Rise of Political Dynasties in Decentralized Indonesia. Master Thesis at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Academic Year 2012/2013. Mandailing.org. Marga-Marga Mandailing. Available at (accessed on January 14th, 2014). Martawardaya, Berly. (2013) Toward Fair Competition, an End to Political Dynasty. The Jakarta Post (March 25, 2013). Available at: (accessed on November 12, 2013). Masaaki, Okamoto and Abdul Hamid. (2008) Jawara in Power, Indonesia 86: October Masaaki, Okamoto. (2008) An Unholy Alliance. Inside Indonesia 93: Aug-Oct 2008 Available at: (accessed on November 12, 2013) (2004) Local Politics in Decentralised Indonesia: The Governor General of Banten Province. IIAS Newsletter: July Available at (accessed on November 12, 2013) Mendoza, Ronald U. Political Dynasties and Poverty: Chicken or the Eggs? Available at: (accessed on January 14 th, 2014). Persatuan Pendekar Persilatan dan Seni Budaya Banten Indonesia. (2011) Haji Tubagus Chasan Sochib The Jawara, Pendekar from Banten. Available at (accessed on November 12, 2013). Pribadi, Yanwar (2011) Strongmen and Religious Leaders in Java. Al-Jami ah: Volume 49 No. 1. Querubin, Pablo. Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines. Available at: (Accessed on January 10th, 2014). 20

21 Reno, William. (2000) Clandestine Economies, Violence and States in Africa. Journal of International Affairs: Volume 53 No. 2. Sidel, John T. Bossism and Democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia: Towards an Alternative Framework for the Study of Local Strongmen. Available at: df (accessed on November 4, 2013). Tempo. (2013) Tubagus Men Threaten to Kill Informer. Available at: Informer (accessed on November 30, 2013). Tempo Magazine. (2013) Edition November 10, The Jakarta Post. (2013) Banten rises up against House of Atut. Available at: (accessed on November 30, 2013).. The Clan and the Damage Done. Available at: (Accessed on November 30, 2013).. Banten Governor Gets Two Years Corruption. Available at (accessed on January 14th, 2014). Trajano, Julius Cesar I and Yoes C. Kenawas. (2013) Political Dynasties Dominate in Indonesia and the Philippines. RSIS Commentaries No. 018/2013 dated 31 January Tuazon, Bobby M. Six Centuries of Political Dynasties: Why the Philippines will Forever be Ruled by Political Clans? Center for People Empowerment in Governance. Available at: 20centuries%20of%20dynasties%2012%2010%2012.pdf (accessed on January 14 th, 2014). Wilson, Ian Douglas. (2002) The Politics of Inner Power: The Practice of Pencak Silat in West Java, Ph.D. Thesis, School of Asian Studies Murdoch University Western Australia. Winters, Jeffrey A. (2014) Who Will Tame the Oligarchs. Available at (accessed on January 10th, 2014). 21

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