Asian International Relations and Peace in Korea

Transcription

1 Afrasia Symposium Series Studies on Multicultural Societies No.1 Proceedings of the First Afrasian International Symposium Asian International Relations and Peace in Korea Edited by O-Jung Kwon, Kosuke Shimizu, William Bradley, Masako Otaki and Takumi Honda 24 November 2011 Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University (Phase 2)

2 Mission of the Afrasian Research Centre Today s globalised world has witnessed astonishing political and economic growth in the regions of Asia and Africa. Such progress has been accompanied, however, with a high frequency of various types of conflicts and disputes. The Afrasian Research Centre aims to build on the achievements of its predecessor, the Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies (ACPDS), by applying its great tradition of research towards Asia with the goal of building a new foundation for interdisciplinary research into multicultural societies in the fields of Immigration Studies, International Relations and Communication Theory. In addition, we seek to clarify the processes through which conflicts are resolved, reconciliation is achieved and multicultural societies are established. Building on the expertise and networks that have been accumulated in Ryukoku University in the past (listed below), we will organise research projects to tackle new and emerging issues in the age of globalisation. We aim to disseminate the results of our research internationally, through academic publications and engagement in public discourse. 1. A Tradition of Religious and Cultural Studies 2. Expertise in Participatory Research/ Inter-Civic Relation Studies 3. Expertise in Asian and Africa Studies 4. Expertise in Communication and Education Studies 5. New Approaches to the Understanding of Other Cultures in Japan 6. Domestic and International Networks with Major Research Institutes Afrasia Symposium Series The Afrasia Symposium Series is published by the Afrasian Research Centre and presents the proceedings of international symposia organised by the Centre. For information about the Afrasian Research Centre, see Other publications of the Afrasian Research Centre include Afrasia Working Paper Series: Studies on Multicultural Societies and Research Paper Series. For inquiries about publication of Afrasian Research Centre and to obtain copies, contact: Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University, 1-5 Yokotani, Seta Oe-cho, Otsu, Shiga, Japan, Tel & FAX: afrasian@ad.ryukoku.ac.jp Copyright 2012 Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University Published by the Afrasian Research Centre Printed by Tanaka Print Co. Ltd., Kyoto, Japan

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4 2012 Afrasian Research Centre Ryukoku University 1-5 Yokotani, Seta Oe-cho, Otsu, Shiga, JAPAN All rights reserved. ISBN This opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Afrasian Research Centre. The publication of the Afrasia Symposium Series is supported by the Project for Strategic Research Base Formation Support at Private Universities at Ryukoku University Research into the Possibilities of Establishing Multicultural Societies in the Asia-Pacific Region: Conflict, Negotiation and Migration initiated and funded by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology ( ).

5 CONTENTS PREFACE iii Kosuke Shimizu KEYNOTE SPEECH (Chung-Won Suh) SESSION 1 PEACE PROCESS IN KOREA Introduction 23 Prospects for Economic Cooperation between Kim Jong Un s Collective Leadership System and China 25 Jong-Chol Park Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in East Asia 37 In-Taek Han Unification Education in Korea: Approaches and an Alternative 47 Young-Seog Kim Discussion 59

6 SESSION2 EAST-ASIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Introduction 65 Materialising the Non-Western : Two Stories of Kyoto School Philosophers on Culture and Politics 67 Kosuke Shimizu The Loss of Ryukyu Revisited: China s No Use of Compellence in the Sino-Japanese Border Dispute, Ching-Chang Chen Discussion 109 APPENDIX Programme 115 Organising Committee 117 Participants List 118 Presenters Profiles 119

7 PREFACE Here at Ryukoku University, we had a five-year joint research project to study the aforementioned subjects from 2005 to 2009, funded by a grant by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) as a Project for Advancement of Academic Research at Private Universities. The Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies (ACPDS) was established at that time to act as our main research organization for the project. While the ACPDS s research was completed in 2009, we are delighted to have again been awarded another MEXT grant in 2011 under its Project for Strategic Research Base Formation Support at Private Universities. The Afrasian Research Centre takes over where its predecessor, the ACPDS, left off, leveraging a great tradition of research into Asia and incorporating immigration, international relations and communication theory into its efforts to build a new foundation for interdisciplinary research into multicultural society. What s more, the Centre seeks to clarify the process by which conflicts are resolved, reconciliation is achieved and multicultural societies are born. It aims to do this through research both theoretical and practical needed to enable us to identify issues that need to be overcome and make policy suggestions. We are greatly pleased to hold the first Afrasian International Symposium on the 24th of November 2011 at Seta Campus of Ryukoku University in Shiga. The theme of this Symposium is Asian International Relations and Peace in Korea. The symposium consists of two sessions.we will focus on the issues related to the achievement of peace in the Korean Peninsula and the critical engagement with IR theories from the Asian perspective. We hope this symposium will contribute to the achievement of a permanent peace and the development sustainable international relations in East Asia and in the world. Kosuke Shimizu Programme Chair of the First Afrasian International Symposium November, 2011

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31 INTRODUCTION In the first session, three scholars from South Korea made presentations under the theme of Peace Process in Korea, from different fields of specialization economy, security, and education. This session aimed to discuss about some important issues in today s Korean Peninsula, the most important area for the regional security of East Asia. The presenters in this session focused on recent changes in North Korea-China economic cooperation, the possibility of nuclear-free zone in Asia, and the possible direction of the unification education in Korea. The first presenter, Dr. Jong-Chol Park (Gyeongsang National University) reported the current situation of the economic cooperation between North Korea and China, and commented that there will be many changes in the relationship between two countries in 2012 due to significant political transformation in both countries. According to Dr. Park, China is in dilemma between securing the stability of surrounding countries to face with U.S. surrounding and the maintenance of North Korea s current system. Dr. In-Taek Han (Jeju Peace Institute) introduced conventional approaches to the Nuclear-Free Zone in Asia and examined the value of these approaches for an effective nuclear-free zone treaty. Addressing the lack of a regional nuclear-free zone treaty in East Asia, Dr. Han called for a new approach to realize it in Asia and proposed to see the Six Party Talks as a potential platform to discuss about the issue. The third presenter Dr. Young-Seog Kim (Gyeongsang National University) discussed about various approaches in unification education in South Korea and proposed an alternative approach based on global perspectives. Dr. Kim said unification education in South Korea has often taken a form of anti-communist education which results in insufficient and biased knowledge of citizens about North Korea. Therefore, he argued, incorporating global perspectives enables to provide sufficient information to citizens to make qualified decisions on North Korea issues.

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33 Prospects for Economic Cooperation between Kim Jong Un s Collective Leadership System and China Jong-Chol Park Associate Professor, Gyeongsang National University Introduction Analysis of the friction and strained relations between North Korea and China during the Cold War period reveals a typical asymmetric relationship between a large and a small country with a shared border. In this period, China s economic cooperation with and support for North Korea was more of a strategic type of support aiming for ease control of U.S.-China-Soviet Union relations ( ). North Korea also took advantage of the balance of power relation and attempted to secure the greatest possible economic advantages. China s economic cooperation with North Korea until in the middle of 2000 s mainly took the forms of simple trading and small scale investment. The Chinese government did not approve large scale investment in North Korea. In the late 2000 s, North Korea-China economic cooperation entered a state of borderland infrastructure development and expanding industrial cooperation. After 2009, North Korea-China economic cooperation maintained its background of China-U.S. conflict, a strengthened South Korea-U.S. alliance, serious South Korea-China conflict, and systematic crisis in North Korea. In particular, increasing tension in the Korean Peninsula, North Korea-China economic cooperation, and borderland development after the second nuclear test are strongly correlated. In order to revitalize North Korea-China economic cooperation, China s approach is grounded in the perspective of strengthening the status quo on the Korean Peninsula while North Korea s is rooted in the perspective of maintaining its system strategically. Firstly, this research analyzes Hu Jintao-Xi Jinping s governmental and policy adjustment after North Korea s second nuclear test. Secondly, it treats the structure of economic cooperation in the borderland area and the Hu Jintao-Xi Jinping government s economic cooperation and support of Kim Jong Un s collective leadership system ( ). Lessons have been applied from visits to and observation of the North Korea-China borderland area (as well as the Northeast China region and the Russian Far East) as well as consultation with professionals.

34 1. China s Economic Policy towards North Korea 1.1. Hu Jintao s Global Strategy and Economic Policy towards North Korea China s global strategy under Hu Jintao s ( ) leadership can be summarized as the process of establishing peaceful development, a harmonious world, and a harmonious Asia. According to the analysis of Professor Wang Yizhou s ( ) book Global Politics and China s Foreign Policy ( ), Hu Jintao government s global politics and diplomacy has the goal of developing the China-U.S. relationship in long term and for emerging in Asia-Pacific region in short term. Professor Wang, Yizhou from Peking University summarizes China s policy towards Korean Peninsula as follows. 1 First, China is hoping to be recognized as an influential country with voice together with U.S. Secondly, China should carry out a policy that focuses on achieving a stable status, an equal and favorable relationship with South and North Korea, denuclearization, and prevention of unexpected situations. Hu Jintao s policy toward North Korea is summarized by the diplomatic phrase Inherit tradition, be future-oriented, maintain friendship, and reinforce cooperation ( ). This can be simply interpreted as a change from the ideology centered-relations of the Cold War period to national-benefit-centered relations. Under Hu Jintao s government, the principle of economic cooperation between North Korea and China was announced twice. In January 2006, during North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il s visit, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao proposed: government guidance, corporate participation, and application of market principles ( ). This entails determining North Korean-Chinese economic cooperation based on the standards of both governments, running business based on market economic theories, and putting plans into action through joint ventures of private enterprises from both countries Adjustment of the Chinese Leadership s North Korea Strategy after North Korea s Second Nuclear Test On May 25 th, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test. China made an official announcement and issued a complaint to the North Korean ambassador to the effect that China opposed North Korea s nuclear test from the perspectives of peace in North East Asia, the denuclearization of Korean Peninsula, and the prevention of nuclear proliferation. However, differently from normal campaigns and compared to the situation after the first nuclear test, the Chinese government s voice was toned down and specific actions were not revealed. 1 (2003), pp (2010)

35 Number of meeting regarding China s policy adjustments on North Korea was half opened for better understanding. I think that China explains its strategic intension from the half open China government s strategy. In a closed forum for current affairs that was held at Beijing University on June 6 th, Chinese scholars gave various opinions regarding North Korea-China relations, and there were some interesting developments. Professor Chung, Kiyul (2009) stated that Chinese scholars opinions were divided into six different groups, described as follows Westernization group ( ): This group has the same opinions as the U.S. It wishes to abandon the 1961 Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty and impose sanctions such as by searching ships, among other measures. 2. Spectator group ( ): This group claims that it is not necessary for China to intervene, but would rather allow North Korea to rise and break by itself. 3. Six-party talks group (6 ): This group would like to to have North Korea return to the 6-party talks and realize the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 4. Objective process group ( ): This group holds the opinion that it is not necessary to overreact to the North Korea nuclear issue, and that an arms race is not likely to develop. 5. Chosun (North Korea) support group ( ): This group claims that the U.S. is responsible for the North Korea nuclear issue, and thus China should support North Korea, initiate new resistance to U.S. aggression, and aid North Korea. This represents the stance of Chinese intellectuals and the general public during the Cold War. 6. Full restrictions on Chosun group ( ): This group claims that China should stop aiding Chosun (North Korea) and place full restrictions on Chosun (North Korea) in order to serve China s national interests. On July 15 th, 2009, a meeting of the Chinese Community Party Central Foreign Affairs Leading Group ( ) was held. 3 China s ruling party and major policy decision makers from the Foreign Ministry attended the Conference on China s Policy towards North Korea, and strategic policy adjustment took place at the conference. The North Korean issue and the North Korean nuclear issue should be with dealt separately. The U.S. is fundamentally responsible for North Korea s nuclear issue, and it would be hard for North Korea to give up nuclear arms unless they were able to secure safety. Therefore, the systemic crisis is in a crucial state, and it is unlikely to give up under Kim, Jong Il - Kim, Jong Un system. The U.S. also just looked on the couple of nuclear tests and revising their policy from North Korea s denuclearization to nuclear nonproliferation. 3 (2010)

36 It can be interpreted that China is dealing separately with North Korea in terms of the nuclear issue and economic cooperation. The Chinese leadership s changed strategy regarding North Korea after the second nuclear test can be seen from the change in mutual communication and principles by the North Korean and Chinese leadership. Comparing Wen Jiabao s principles of economic cooperation with North Korea from January 2006, and Hu Jintao s from August 2010, it can be seen that China s policies of economic cooperation towards North Korea have been dramatically revised. With the government s active intervention for economic cooperation for North Korea, major government enterprises are expected to be on the first line in energy and resource-related industries. It also means that previous supportive aid for North Korea is shifting to support North Korea s economic reconstruction. In this context, it can be concluded that China pushed ahead to cooperate economically with North Korea separately from the management of the North Korean nuclear issue during this period. The Chinese government s North Korea economic strategy revision after the second nuclear test can be seen from the change in Chinese leadership s principles. There was a great difference between Hu Jintao s North Korea economic cooperation principles in August 2010 and Wen Jiabao s North Korea economic cooperation principles in January In August 2010, during a meeting with the North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il, the Chinese president Hu Jintao proposed a new China-North Korea cooperation principle characterized as the government leads, corporations are centered, and market principles are applied for mutual benefit ( ), while pointing out that broad-based economic cooperation for mutual benefit would result in basic gains for people in both countries. The China-North Korea economic cooperation principle ameliorated drawbacks of the 2006 North Korea-China economic cooperation. It suggested an operating principle that would result in mutual benefit, development, win-win cooperation, and better economic cooperation for both countries. In other words, the government would lead, and based on investment in/by government companies, the goal of economic cooperation would shift to North Korea s self-rehabilitation. 4 Hu Jintao s North Korea economic principal emphasizes the government s role, and it contains the meaning of transformation of economic cooperation for North Korea s self-rehabilitation based on government enterprises investment and private enterprises cooperation. 5 It can be forecasted that government enterprises would be involved in energy and resource-related fields amid a background of initiating strategic economic cooperation by the government with North Korea. This means that previous consuming North Korea support would be transformed to result in economic cooperation and support for North Korea s economic reconstruction. 4 (2011) 5 (2011)

37 China s governing political party, government, and military have shared control over North Korea policy. The International Department of the Communist Party of China was at the center of all exchanges with socialist countries, including North Korea, as interparty diplomacy during the Cold War. The International Department of the Central Committee of the CPC () has the function of conducting foreign maneuvers for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The Asia Bureau of the International Department is in charge of North-Korea-related matters. During the Cold War, political party relationship was considered to be more important than government diplomacy, and thus the International Department became more important for North Korea-China exchange. Currently, the International Department is at the center of North Korea-China economic cooperation, support, leadership succession, and strategic material support. The nuclear test issue, ballistic missile (satellite) issue, and other sudden issues are controlled mainly by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the People s Liberation Army ( ), and Foreign Ministry is likely to care 6-party talks, the Cheonan Ship issue, and other conflicts. The vice-minister of Foreign Affairs of the Workers Party of Korea, (China part: ) has jurisdiction over North Korea-China economic cooperation Current Status and Structure of Economic Cooperation 2.1. Economic Cooperation and Border Development Plan Status after North Korea s Second Nuclear Test Immediately after the second nuclear test, along with mutual visits of North Korean and Chinese leadership management from June 2009 to August 2009, China s interesting North East development plan was considered to be very important, and that it was approved by the state council (central government). In July and August 2009, an economic development program for Liaoning province and Jilin Province ( ), which are on the border of North Korea, was approved by the state council of the central government (), and was selected as a national project. The Liaoning project, to which Korea is paying attention, is a project for a city near the Yellow Sea coast, and the biggest border city, Dandong ( ) is also included in its scope. East Sea access from the mouth of Tumen River ( ) and North Korea-China border development are included in the Jilin project. Regarding this plan, open-door of Naseon province has attracted attention. In particular, developmental activities for Naseon have become very active since Immediately after the Third Workers Party Representatives Meeting ( ), Jang Sung-Taek s close personnel, J, Jae-Ryoung was appointed as the ambassador to China on October 26, The ambassador has authority, but it can be concluded that the Foreign Affairs Department of the Workers Party has greater authority over North Korea-China economic cooperation. Currently, Lee Seok-Beom is chairman of the North Korea-China Culture Economy Center and vice-minister of Foreign Affairs of the Workers Party, and he is the right hand man of Jang Sung-Taek ( ).

38 For 3 days from October 3 rd, restoration of the two countries relationship was at a peak based on Chinese premier Wen Jiabao s North Korea visit. On October 4 th, China and North Korea signed an economic technology cooperation agreement. The New Amnokgang Bridge ( ) is a size of more than two hundred million and is based on the premise that the cost would be paid for by China. 70% to 80% of North Korea-China land route trade is carried out through Dandong-Sinuiju, and illegal imports are active in the region. When the New Amnokgang Bridge is constructed, North Korea-China trade and exchange will become more active. The New Amnokgang Bridge means for the open-door of Shinuiju which is the main gate to Pyongyang. It is a symbol of North Korea-China fellowship, and at the same time, it also represents China s cooperation with and intervention in North Korea. It was reported that 10-year access to Najin Port Pier 1 has been confirmed. Military tensions on the Korean Peninsula mounted from the sinking of the Cheonan ( ) in March 2010 and the shelling of Yeonpyeongdo ( ) in November. The Korea-U.S. alliance strengthened amid the military tension, and the North Korea-China relationship seemed to become tighter. Although the South Korean government officially spoke tough words to North Korea, a mood of thawing between North Korea and the U.S. was generated in April and May In April, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter visited North Korea as a special envoy. In May 2011, high ranking government officers of the Blue House and the Nation Intelligence Service attended secret talks between South Korea and North Korea. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il also made an unofficial visit to China in May. On June 1 st, the North Korea government opened secret talks in May. Due to North Korea s disclosure, the possibility of South-North cooperation before political turnover became lower, and it was expected that North Korea-China relations would be reinforced. China s influence on North Korea strengthened, and the disclosure can be broadly interpreted as meaning that North Korea was showing confidence based on the talks between Kim Jong Il and Hu Jintao regarding industrial development concerning matters such as energy, coal, and iron ore. However, I believe that the level that China is expecting for the open-door is very different regarding the North Korea-China economic cooperation accomplishments since 2009 from Kim Jong Il s 4 time China visits. For North Korea s lack of ability for economy reconstruction, China is expected to support North Korea with minimal food, energy, and industrial aid, and China will secure coal, iron ore, and rear earth resources for Chinese industry. Although Chinese leadership suggested open doors in the Nampo and Wonsan area, the North Korean leadership pointed to Hwanggumpyong ( ) and Wihwa Island ( ) as special economic zones in which there are no bridges to Sinuiju. The Naseon () area is also a controllable area for the ripple effect throughout all of Hamgyung-do () with China and Russia logistics pass through the East Sea. However, when the New Amnokgang Bridge ( ) between Shinuiju ( ) and Dandong ( ) is fully constructed, it will have an influence on North Korea s economic structure and opening. The distance between Pyongyang and China will be very

39 close, and it is expected to have a somewhat positive effect on the opening of North Korea. It will also maximize China s influence on North Korea Hu Jintao-Xi Jinping System s Cooperation for Collective Leadership System After Kim Jong Il s death, North Korea s power structure has been expected to maintain the status quo in the short run based on Kim Jong Un plus power sharing structure (2 strong plus 2 weak) which is strategically designed to be advantageous for Kim Jong Un. Jang Sung-Taek from Political Affairs ( ), Lee Young-Ho ( ) from the North Korean People s Army, and Kim Ki-Nam ( ), who has less authority than the other two, from the Korean Workers Party, are the people who should be focused upon in terms of power sharing, in addition to Kim Jong Un, descendent of the former leader. Moreover, Choe Ryong-Hae (Commander of the Pyongyang Defense Command, ), a member of the second generation following the revolution, is in charge of the defense of the capital city of Pyongyang, where 60% of the North Korean military force is stationed to prevent any disturbances or coups. He should also be given attention due to his ability to exercise control, his leadership role, and his loyalty. These men have very close relationships (as relatives, and in relation to the revolution) and have been very loyal to the Kim Il Sung-Jong Il-Jong Un family since the anti-japan struggle. Now they are aged men kept in line with mutual checks and balances. The present power struggle doesn t show major power group and its power structure is difficult to take over political party, government and military at the same time for any power group. All the power groups need leadership descendant like Kim Jong Un and justification. It can be analyzed that the collective leadership system is structured with the leadership heir Kim Jong Un at the center. The 2012 collective leadership system of North Korean economy under Kim Jong Un needs to be analyzed taking into account the key term flames of Hamnam. (). One of North Korea s one of major projects in 2012 involves economic construction and measures to deal with the food shortage. The 2012 New Year s address emphasized the flames of Hamnam, and among the greatest economic achievements of Kim Jong Il in 2011 were the Heuicheon Power Plant ( ) and the completion of the Hamhung fertilizer factory ( ). It is forecast that North Korea s food production will increase this year as the Hamhung fertilizer factory is expected to produce two hundred thousand tons of fertilizer. It can be concluded that major promotion of flames of fire means that they are trying to achieve economic reconstruction with the Hamgyeong-do area in the center. It is becoming clearer that economic cooperation between North Korea and China has been strengthening in the two months since Kim Jong Il s death. China issued statements of support for North Korea s stabilization and the Kim Jong Un regime. In particular, they also announced the free supply of a million tons of rice, a half million tons of oil, and a half million tons of fertilizer. They have already supplied a half million tons of rice and a half million tons of oil from Shenyang in January It is possible that a half million tons of rice and a half million tons of fertilizer will be supplied during the first half of 2012.

40 North Korea-China border trading was halted for about a week after Kim Jong Il s death, and the number of North Korean defectors decreased due to strict North Korean border restrictions in January and February. However, North Korean expatriates in China have been increasing that North Korea-China economic cooperation and smuggling become more active Structure of Economic Cooperation China is approaching matters from the perspective of strengthening the Korean Peninsula status quo plus, while the North Korean approach is rooted in the perspective of maintaining its strategic system. The structure of North Korea-China economic cooperation is summarized as follows according to Hu Jintao-Xi Jinping s North Korea economic policy and the status of North Korea-China economic cooperation. First, it can be concluded that since the second nuclear test, China is approaching issues based on a perspective of strengthening the Korean Peninsula status, while the North Korean approach is grounded in the perspective of maintaining its strategic system. Even during the Cold War, North Korea-China economic cooperation had its strategic character for international relations considering relationship of powerful countries. Therefore, further China-U.S. relationship and political changes relating to the Korea Peninsula, such as those resulting from the upcoming presidential election, will act as major factors for North Korea-China economic cooperation, and it can be strongly expected that North Korea-China economic cooperation would result in the potential for change. Second, North Korea-China economic strategy contains strategic character. After Kim Il Sung s death in 1994, China s North Korea policy showed characteristics of humanitarian economic cooperation and passive aid in order to maintain the North Korean system. However, after the second nuclear test, China s North Korea economic policy shifted to strategic economic cooperation in order to maintain the status quo more strongly with the fact that China-U.S. conflict is deeper. For example, the oil pipeline from Dandong to Sinuiju, known as the China-North Korea Friendship Pipeline ( ), symbolizes the strategic character of economic cooperation with North Korea. This pipeline is a symbol of China-North Korea friendship, but when it was needed to restrict North Korea economically, China stopped oil supply under the excuse of pipeline repair. Third, the Sunshine Policy of Korea from 1998 to 2008 allowed private enterprises to lead in the vitalization of economic cooperation according to the principle of separation of political matters from economic matters. However, China s North Korea economic policy from 2008 exhibits a strategic character of the unification of politics and economics. The government and government enterprises are taking the lead in vitalization of economic cooperation based on closed-door negotiations between government leadership. Moreover, 7 For analysis of the power-sharing structure of Kim Jong Un s collective leadership system, the economic development strategy represented by the expression Flames of Hamnam, and analysis of foreign economic relations with the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, please refer to following material: (2012)

41 the local government of China s borderland (the northeast region) exhibits strong will for development and the participation of private enterprises, which has a synergetic effect on economic cooperation. Thus, economic cooperation involves a wide range of variables based on the direction taken by Chinese leadership. Also, China s North Korea economic policy is closely correlated with the political and military situations in the Korean Peninsula and the systemic stabilization of North Korea. As North Korea-China economic cooperation revitalizes, China is likely to have more influence on North Korea, and would tend to replace the decreasing influence of South Korea through economic sanctions on North Korea. Fourth, Hu Jintao announced new North Korea-China economic cooperation principles in August This has the meaning of process from emergency transfusion (economic support, ) to sanguification (economic independence, ). Since South Korea and China established diplomatic relations, simple trading and small scale investment have been the central for China s economic cooperation, and China did not allow large scale investment in North Korea. Recent strategic economic cooperation between North Korea and China is growing through borderland area infrastructure (on the Chinese side) and industrial cooperation. In relation with China s northeast revitalizing policy, China s domestic development, North Korea-China economic cooperation, and borderland development are complimentary and have Plus-Sum effect. Also, China s government enterprises and major enterprises have exclusive positions for primary industry development in areas such as North Korea s mineral and fisheries resources. China is focusing more on primary industry development such as Musan iron mine, rather than other facilities that need constant investment such as the Kaesong industrial complex. It can be analyzed that North Korea-China economic cooperation has a mutually manageable strategic character. If approached from the perspective of North Korea-China borderland development from Northeast revitalizing plan for China s domestic development, North Korea industrial infrastructure can only be developed in line with limitations based on Chinese demand. Currently, in early 2012, a variety of North Korea-China economic cooperation measures are actively in progress in all regions from the Amnok River to the Duman River. In particular, there are significant efforts underway to establish a gateway to the sea in Jilin ( ). Attention should be paid to the fact that the Chinese government and enterprises are hesitating to invest in facilities, except on in the Nason border are and few other locations. Also, there seem to be significant differences in opinions among North Korean and Chinese leadership since there are development crises underway in Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa Island. Hwanggumpyong and the Nason area are comparatively isolated locations in which the North Korea government can exercise control, so it can be concluded that North Korea wants to open restrictively. Therefore, it can be said that the goal of Kim Jong Un s collective leadership system is to stably manage the issue of opening the nation over the long term.

42 Conclusion: Dilemma of Economic Cooperation After the second nuclear test, North Korea-China economic cooperation has a background characterized by the emergence of China, China-U.S. conflict, the South Korea-U.S. alliance on the Korean Peninsula, discussion of Korea-Japan military cooperation, deepening Korea-China conflict, and North Korea s systemic crisis. In particular, borderland development and increasing tensions on the Korean Peninsula after the second nuclear test have close interrelations. For example, China considered South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises and discussion of South Korea-Japan military cooperation as more harmful issues than the Cheonan Ship issue, the Yeonpyeongdo shelling, and the succession issue, and they strengthened North Korea-China economic cooperation. North Korea-China economic cooperation has been maintaining the status quo under Kim Jong Un s collective leadership system following Kim Jong Il s death. Regarding the China-U.S. conflict situation, China cares about North Korea geopolitically as a buffer zone and geo-economically as cooperation partner. As Kim Jong Un s collective leadership system is experiencing systemic crisis, it is at the stage of accepting the reality that its powerful socialist brother country s support is becoming an essential element for maintaining the system and for survival. One of the Hu Jintao-Xi Jinping system s major gains for surrounding countries stabilization is Kim Jong Un s collective leadership system stabilization. Therefore, the Hu Jintao-Xi Jinping system is experiencing a dilemma characterized by reaching for contradictory goals in order to stabilize Kim Jong Un s collective leadership system politically and sociologically, resist military provocations such as light weight nuclear and missile tests, and to carry out economic reform and opening up. At the same time, Kim Jong Un s collective leadership system is also experiencing a serious dilemma as North Korea-China economic cooperation strengthens. North Korea s pro-china economic policy led the North Korean economy to become dependent on China. Microscopically, Pyongyang and the border area are able to use the Chinese yuan and North Korea-China economic cooperation as it seems like resources are taken away, it frets away possibility and foundation of North Korea economy. This means Kim Jong Un s collective leadership system has the difficult tasks of efficiently blocking off the Hu Jintao-Xi Jinping administration s intervention and interference, preventing South Korea-U.S.-Japan s economic sanctions against North Korea using China effectively, and securing maximum economic profit from China. A variety of elements, such as a power struggle within Kim Jong Un s collective leadership system, South Korea s general election, the presidential election in April, policy changes from elections in U.S. and Japan, pressures from the international community, North Korean economic sanctions, and China s investment style, range, and process in North Korea will have effects on economic cooperation between the Hu Jintao-Xi Jinping system and Kim Jong Un s collective leadership system.

43 References International Crisis Group Shade of Red: China s Debate over North Korea, Asia Report No KDI (2011, 9) KDI (2012, 2) KDI (2011, 11)

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45 Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in East Asia 1 In-Taek Han Associate Research Fellow, Jeju Peace Institute Introduction My presentation deals with the idea of establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in East Asia. In this presentation, I will explain why it may be the right time to seriously consider a nuclear weapon-free zone in East Asia. In order to find the implications for East Asia, I will examine nuclear weapon-free zone treaties in other regions. I will also look into nuclear weapon-free zone proposals for East Asia and discuss some of the qualities required for a successful nuclear weapon-free zone treaty in East Asia. I will conclude this presentation by arguing that a nuclear weapon-free zone is an idea worth a close look, but it would not be a panacea. 1. Momentum towards a Nuclear Weapon-Free World 2 For last several years, momentum has been building up towards a nuclear weapon-free world. In 2007 and again in 2008, for instance, four prominent American statesmen George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn called for a nuclear weapon-free world in their famous op-eds in the Wall Street Journal. More importantly, then candidate Barack Obama ran a successful presidential election campaign, advocating a nuclear weapon-free world. As president, President Obama reaffirmed his vision for a nuclear weapon-free world in his April 2009 speech in Prague, the Czech Republic, and also by announcing the hosting of the Global Nuclear Security Summit in April President Obama is not alone in his vision of a world without nuclear weapons. The Norwegian Nobel Committee certainly embraced his vision when it decided to award him the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize. Furthermore, then Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama of Japan also proposed a nuclear weapon-free Northeast Asia. In addition, the 64th session of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly adopted a draft resolution on nuclear disarmament, Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, supported by a record number of countries (170) in the history of UN disarmament. Clearly, a new momentum for nuclear disarmament is building up. South Korea will do its share by hosting 1 This presentation is based on the author s previous study, Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaties: An Analysis of Existing Treaties and Their Implications for East Asia (in Korean), Jeju Peace Institute, This section borrows liberally from (Han 2009).

46 the Second Global Nuclear Security Summit in But will this translate into momentum towards a nuclear weapon-free zone in East Asia, the topic of this presentation? Specifically, how strong is the support for a nuclear weapon-free world in South Korea and Japan? This is the question I will turn to next. 2. Public Opinion in South Korea and Japan For an idea to become a reality, it requires broad support. A nuclear weapon-free zone treaty in East Asia is no exception. In Japan, a nuclear weapon-free zone treaty is not likely to be a hard sell, since the general public is largely anti-nuclear. The story is very different in South Korea, however. About 60 to 70 percent of South Koreans think that their country should develop nuclear weapons. In terms of military strategy, this is understandable: South Korea needs to deter nuclear-armed North Korea, and in a state-to-state relationship at least, the best deterrent to nuclear weapons is, in fact, the possession of nuclear weapons. Still, popular support for nuclear weapons among South Koreans is unsettling to say the least, especially to the Japanese. I do not think, however, that South Korea will go nuclear any time soon. More accurately, South Korea cannot become a nuclear state not because it lacks popular support or the required technology, but because it is heavily dependent on international trade. If South Korea became a nuclear state, it would become the target of economic sanctions. Economic sanctions would make it virtually impossible for South Korea to import the products and commodities it needed for survival, including oil and grain; it would also be very difficult for South Korea to export its products and services such as automobiles, electronics, and K-pop. In other words, the South Korean economy would collapse if the country went nuclear. This may be an outcome that North Koreans would like to see, but no right-minded South Korean would desire such an outcome. What intrigues me if not actually worries me is the possibility of Japan becoming a nuclear state. Admittedly, it is merely a theoretical possibility at this point. Still, a lot can happen in the long term, so we should at least give the possibility some thought. Unlike in South Korea, public support for nuclear armament in Japan is weak. From the point of view of popular support, therefore, Japan is unlikely to become a nuclear state. It is also a trading country, though not to the same extent as South Korea. Therefore, it would be hard to imagine Japan developing nuclear weapons in the face of its anti-nuclear public opinion, not to mention the risk of economic sanctions. However, public opinion can change. So can the risk of economic sanctions. What would happen if Japan became a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council one day? This is obviously a big if question, but Japan has long sought permanent membership. And Japan, together with Germany, has come closer to that position than any other country. As a permanent member, Japan would enjoy the power to veto any UN sanctions against it, i.e., Japan would be in a better position than any other non-nuclear power to develop nuclear weapons without being punished for it economically. But would Japan go nuclear just because it could? The answer is clearly no at this point, particularly because of the strong anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan. Public opinion, however,

47 can change. If, for instance, China became a threat to Japan s national security and North Korea developed nuclear-tipped missiles that could reach Japan, public opinion in Japan might change in favor of nuclear development. If such a day came, a nuclear Japan would no longer be a mere theoretical possibility: Japan already has the technology and materials required to develop nuclear weapons. If it were also a UN Security Council permanent member, it would be able to reduce the risk of sanctions against it. If Japan became a nuclear state, it might be just a matter of days before South Korea went nuclear too, since Japan s nuclearization would give South Korea both a strong reason and excuse to develop its own nuclear arsenal. A nuclear domino effect would be triggered in East Asia. This, of course, is far-fetched imagination at this point but it is sometimes important to be able to imagine such scenarios. In fact, a nuclear weapon-free treaty in East Asia, the very topic of today s presentation, is also a product of the imagination. If South Koreans favor nuclear development and even Japan has the potential to go nuclear under certain circumstances, how relevant is the idea of a nuclear weapon-free zone in East Asia? This is the question I will turn to next. 3. Why the Time May Have Come for Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty? Despite every effort by South Korea and the international community, including the Sunshine policy, financial sanctions, the Six Party Talks, and UN resolutions, North Korea formally announced its possession of nuclear weapons in 2005, which it followed up with two rounds of nuclear tests in 2006 and What North Korea s announcement and subsequent nuclear tests mean is that the nonproliferation policy toward North Korea has apparently failed. Add to this North Korea s shelling of Yeonpyong Island; not only have nonproliferation efforts failed but also military deterrence against North Korea. If current and past efforts have been failures, it may be time to try a different approach. A nuclear weapon-free zone treaty is a novel approach worth a close look. A nuclear weapon-free zone treaty is a legally binding agreement among states that creates a zone free of nuclear weapons. While each nuclear-weapon free zone treaty is different, they all require the absence of nuclear weapons within their respective zones. So far, five nuclear weapon-free zone treaties are in force, covering 116 countries and 33 percent of the world s population. East Asia currently lacks a nuclear weapon-free zone treaty, while Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Africa each have their own nuclear weapon-free treaties. Even more discouraging is the fact that there is not much interest in, let alone debates about, a nuclear weapon-free zone treaty in East Asia. One of the reasons for this unpopularity and the near absence of nuclear weapon-free zone treaty discussions in East Asia is the fact that two nuclear superpowers China and Russia are located in East Asia, while the United States, although an out-of-region nuclear superpower, is strategically involved in the region. Another obvious reason is that North Korea is now a de facto nuclear state. Furthermore, while they are not currently nuclear states, South Korea, Japan, and

48 possibly Taiwan are at the nuclear threshold ; they have the capability to obtain nuclear weapons in a relative short period of time if they intend to. In sum, East Asia is a region consisting of nuclear superpowers in and out of region a de facto nuclear state, and several nuclear threshold states. 4. Morals of Existing Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaties It is, however, unwarranted to conclude that a nuclear weapon-free zone treaty would be destined to fail in East Asia, simply because the region comprises nuclear superpowers and nuclear threshold states. If one actually looks at the history of existing nuclear weapon-free zone treaties, they each began by dealing with nuclear states or nuclear threshold states located or strategically involved in their respective regions. For instance, the push for the Latin American nuclear weapon-free zone treaty, also known as the Tlatelolco Treaty, began in response to the Cuban missile crisis. Cuba, which was at the center of the crisis, eventually became a party to the Tlatelolco Treaty. As another example, the momentum for the South Pacific nuclear weapon-free zone treaty, also known as the Rarotonga Treaty, began when France conducted a nuclear test in the South Pacific. An additional example would be the African nuclear weapon-free zone treaty, also known as the Pelindaba Treaty, which began in response to South Africa s nuclear program. In the end, South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons and became a party to the Pelindaba Treaty. The lesson of these treaties is that a nuclear weapon-free zone treaty is not destined to fail simply because of the existence or involvement of nuclear states or nuclear threshold states. Rather, nuclear weapon-free zone treaties were conceived to deal with such states in the first place, and the existing treaties have all successfully dealt with them in one way or another. There are now five nuclear weapon-free zone treaties in force. While they have all succeeded in creating nuclear weapon-free zones, they differ in their details. Elsewhere, I have examined various aspects of the existing nuclear weapon-free zone treaties to identify features that have contributed to faster enforcement of the treaty or to stronger support from member states and the five official nuclear weapons states. Unfortunately, it was not possible to identify any such features. Simply put, there were no silver bullets in the creation of the nuclear weapon-free zones. 5. Unique Realities of East Asia Even if such silver bullets did exist, or some magical features that could contribute to faster enforcement of a treaty or to stronger support from its member states, they may not work in the same positive way for East Asia. This is because East Asia differs from other regions in some crucial ways. Certain aspects of existing nuclear weapon-free zone treaties that were unproblematic or even conducive to faster enforcement or stronger support in their respective regions may not be so effective in the case of East Asia. For a nuclear weapon-free zone treaty to be accepted and enforced, it needs to take into consideration the unique realities of

49 East Asia. 3 Every nuclear weapon-free zone proposal for East Asia has tried to address the uniqueness of East Asia in one way or another. At the core of East Asia s unique realities lies the existence of China and Russia and the strategic involvement of the United States in the region. Unless their statuses as nuclear states are respected, they are unlikely to support an East Asian nuclear weapon-free zone treaty. However, if their nuclear weapons are not constrained, non-nuclear states are also unlikely to accept the nuclear weapon-free zone treaty. Hence the key to a successful nuclear weapon-free treaty for East Asia is to find a way to respect the status of the existing nuclear states at the same time as guaranteeing non-nuclear states safety from nuclear attacks. 6. Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Proposals for East Asia The nuclear weapon-free zone proposals so far put forward have all tried to accommodate the seemingly conflicting needs of the nuclear states and the non-nuclear states in the region. As such, these proposals are limited in that they all respect the status of the existing nuclear states. In other words, they allow the possession of nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear states in a way or another. However, as far as non-nuclear weapon states are concerned, they are just like any other nuclear weapon-free zone proposals: they prohibit the development, possession, and use of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear states. Below, we will examine proposals by two leading advocates of a nuclear weapon-free zone for East Asia: John Endicott and Hiromichi Umebayashi. John Endicott John Endicott s proposals call for a limited nuclear weapon-free zone in East Asia (Endicott 2008; Endicott and Gorowitz 1999). In his original proposal (see Map 1), Endicott drew a circle centered on Panmunjom, located on the border between North and South Korea. His circle covered the whole of North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. It partially covered China, Russia, and Mongolia. (Mongolia is currently a nuclear weapon-free country.) While his circle does not cover the United States, it does include the U.S. bases in South Korea and Japan. So his original proposal in fact includes the United States in an indirect way. In his later proposal (see Map 2), Endicott drew an ellipse in place of a circle to include part of U.S. territory. 3 An important study that has closely examined the uniqueness of East Asia is (Cheon 2001).

50 Map 1: Circular Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Source: Endicott (2008), p. 17. Another notable feature of Endicott s proposals is that while they prohibit every kind of nuclear weapon for non-nuclear weapon states, they prohibit only tactical nuclear weapons for nuclear weapons states. In other words, China, Russia, and the United States are allowed to maintain their strategic nuclear weapons within Endicott s nuclear weapon-free zones. Thus Endicott s nuclear weapon-free zones are limited not just in terms of the areas covered but also in terms of the weapons prohibited in the case of the nuclear weapons states. Nevertheless, such limitations are clever adaptations to the unique realities of East Asia and can be seen as strengths as much as weaknesses. If he had tried to prohibit both the strategic and tactical weapons of China, Russia, and the United States, the prospects of their supporting a nuclear weapon-free zone in East Asia would be far dimmer. It is also worth mentioning here that strategic nuclear weapons do not pose a threat to the non-nuclear states in the region in a practical manner. For instance, China would not use their ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) to attack South Korea or Japan. Rather, they would choose tactical nuclear weapons, which have a shorter range and smaller destructive power, for that purpose.

51 Map 2: Elliptical Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Source: Endicott (2008), p. 17. Hiromichi Umebayashi Hiromichi Umebayashi has proposed that North Korea, South Korea, and Japan create a nuclear weapon-free zone covering their three countries, and also that China, Russia, and the United States give the two Koreas and Japan a negative security guarantee, i.e., safety from nuclear attacks from the three nuclear weapons states (Umebayashi 2004). His proposal is also known as the 3+3 proposal (see Map 3). When Umebayashi first made his proposal, North Korea and South Korea had agreed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and Japan had been maintaining its traditional three non-nuclear principles. Since then, North Korea has developed and tested nuclear weapons and the agreement to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula is no longer effective. Thus the prospects of Umebayashi s 3+3 proposals are now dimmer than before. What is encouraging, however, is that we now have institutionalized dialogues among the 3+3 countries through the Six Party Talks. So, not all has been lost.

52 Map 3: 3+3 Proposal Source: Umebayashi (2004), p Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Proposals: Ideas Ripe for Action? While imperfect, nuclear weapon-free zone proposals for East Asia, particularly those put forward by Endicott and Umebayashi, are ideas worth close attention. One obvious reason is that all other efforts to solve the North Korean nuclear issue have failed. It is now time to consider approaches that have not been tried before. Another reason is that nuclear weapon-free zone proposals for East Asia, again particularly those of Endicott and Umebayashi, are clever adaptations to the realities of East Asia. They are much more realistic than the existing nuclear weapon-free zone treaties without necessarily being less effective in practical terms than the existing ones. What is more, we now have both a potential platform from which to negotiate an East Asian nuclear weapon-free zone treaty, the Six Party Talks, and the important momentum towards a nuclear weapon-free world both internationally and regionally.