U A R T E R L Y. Centro Militare di Studi Strategici

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1 Q U A R T E R L Y YEAR VI SUMMER 2008 MIDDLE EAST PERSIAN GULF Lebanon: The Doha Agreement ends the first restructuring phase in the post-syrian Lebanon Diego Baliani 5 Centro Militare di Studi Strategici CeMiSS Quarterly is a review supervised by CeMiSS director, Rear Admiral Luciano Callini. It provides a forum to promote the knowledge and understanding of international security affairs, military strategy and other topics of significant interest. The opinions and conclusions expressed in the articles are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Italian Ministry of Defence. Military Center for Strategic Studies Department of International Relations Palazzo Salviati Piazza della Rovere, ROME - ITALY tel fax relintern.cemiss@casd.difesa.it SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE The Balkans after Kosovo. Regional consequences of Kosovo declaration of independence and new political developments Paolo Quercia 15 COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES EASTERN EUROPE The spill-over of Bucharest summit Andrea Grazioso 21 TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS The United States approach towards Iran. Once again. Lucio Martino 31 AFGHAN THEATRE High tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan Fausto Biloslavo 35 AFRICA Africa: between successful approaches for the future and the farce of reality Maria Egizia Gattamorta 41 CINA E INDIA The Sino Japanese axis Nunziante Mastrolia 47 LATIN AMERICA Social cleavages in Bolivia, Argentina and Paraguay Riccardo Gefter Wondrich 51 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The United Nations-African Union cooperation in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding: challenges and opportunities Valerio Bosco 57

2 Middle East - Persian Gulf LEBANON: THE DOHA AGREEMENT ENDS THE FIRST RESTRUCTURING PHASE IN THE POST-SYRIAN LEBANON Diego Baliani The Lebanese Government attacks Hizbullah s militia After 18 months of politico-institutional paralysis and street politics, and 6 months of vacancy in the Lebanese Presidency, the Lebanese political crisis escalated quickly into armed confrontation between pro-government and pro-opposition Lebanese militias during May The clashes killed at least 81 people and wounded at least 250, and officially ended with the signing of the Doha accord, on May 21 st, 1 and the election of the new Lebanese President, on May 25 th. 2 The clashes began when opposition militias, composed mainly the Shia fighters belonging to Hizbullah and Amal, reacted violently against two decisions adopted on May 6 th by the Lebanese government, which is controlled by the Sunni-led March 14 alliance. 3 The first controversial decision had been the reassignment of the Beirut airport s security chief, Gen. Wafiq Shuqayr, accused of sharing sensitive information on Lebanese officials and politicians of the ruling majority with Hizbullah and Amal. The information allegedly collected through a system of hidden cameras and listening devices installed on a runway at Beirut airport. 4 The second controversial decision the declaration of the illegality and unconstitutionality of Hizbullah s independent telephone network. 5 According to media reports and statements provided by its leaders, Hizbullah has an independent, underground fibre-optic telephone network, through which its military leadership exerts the militia s command, control and communication functions. The network reportedly provided secure communications among the militia s commanders, located in South Beirut, and field units, located in South Lebanon, during the 2006 summer war 6. Some media reports also alleged that the network possibly extends to the Mount Lebanon Governatorate and to the new Hizbullah s stronghold in the Bekaa Valley, north of the Litani River. 7 The first relevant consideration is that, for the first time since the April 2005 Syrian withdrawal and the subsequent March 14 electoral victory, the -led government adopted two decisions targeting Hizbullah s military infrastructure. On May 3 rd, just before the adoption of the two government decisions, Walid Jumblatt leader of the Progressive Socialist Party and among the most vocal opponents of Hizbullah vehemently attacked Hizbullah s telephone network and accused the latter of manning a hidden anti-government surveillance system inside the Beirut airport. 8 The significance of Hizbullah s telephone network can be inferred from the statements released by Hizbullah s leaders before the May 6 th government decisions. On May 5 th, Hizbullah s deputy secretary, Shaikh Naim Qassim, warned that Hizbullah will deal with those who interfere with the network as if they were Israeli spies and vowed to fight the government over the telephone network. 9 On May 8 th, during a press conference aired by al- Manar TV, the Secretary General of Hizbullah, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, stated that In the July war, our most important point of strength was the command and control, thanks to the fact that communication between the leadership and the various commanders and field fighters was secured, i.e. Hizbullah s military communication network was not penetrated by the Israeli intelligence services. 10 Mr. Nasrallah also emphasized that the most important recommendation in the [Winograd] report was the need to eliminate Hezbollah s command and control system in 5

3 Middle East - Persian Gulf which telecommunications play a decisive role 11. Being aware of the seriousness of the upcoming crisis, Mr Michel Aoun, the leader of the Change and Reform Bloc and currently allied with Hizbullah and Amal, compared the government decisions to a declaration of war, on May 6 th12. If the above account and considerations are correct, the second relevant consideration is that the extremely violent reaction of Hizbullah and its allied militias could mean that the safeguard of both the militia and the weapons is Hizbullah s top priority and, as such, a non-negotiable issue. Indeed, for the first time Hizbullah turned the weapons of the resistance against its Lebanese rivals, thus breaching its promise to use them only against Israel and never against the Lebanese people. It is remarkable that, during the last 18 months of uninterrupted political crisis, no other government decision had been able to provoke Hizbullah s armed retaliation. Hizbullah s military reaction The opposition s militias reacted to the government s challenge with a well coordinated, quick and effective military action which led to clashes that killed at least 81 people and wounded at least Hizbullah s offensive can be divided into two phases. The first phase took place in Beirut from the 7 th to 10 th of May, during which the clashes killed at least 37 people and wounded at least The opposition fighters led by Hizbullah quickly defeated the militias loyal to the Sunni Saad al-hariri s Future Movement, then turned control over the city to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) 15. The disorder began on May 7 th, when the opposition-backed General Federation of Labour Unions called a street demonstrationand strikes to protest against the salary increase decided by the government, which they deemed insufficient. 16 The demonstration was boycotted by the unions loyal to the majority and quickly turned into an Hizbullah raid that ended with the takeover of the mainly Sunni Western Beirut, an area that hosts the government buildings and the residence of many politicians of the Sunnled March 14 alliance. In about 12 hours, between May 7 th and May 8 th, the Hizbullah-led militias armed mainly with assault rifles and RPGs defeated in a series of clashes the opposing pro-government, mainly Sunni militias, and seized the buildings hosting the political parties and the media loyal to the March According to the accounts, it seems that the opposition s forces included fighters of Hizbullah, Amal and the Syrian National Socialist Party (SNSP), and were coordinated by the better-trained Hizbullah s military commanders 18. Even if Amal s militiamen seemed to be less disciplined Hizbullah s (according to some accounts they possibly profaned some Sunni religious symbols), the military operation was successful and probably planned in advance. The first phase ended on May 10 th, after the government delegated to the LAF the responsibility to decide the fate of the anti-hizbullah measures adopted on May 6 th (i.e. to withdraw them.) As a consequence, Shia militias finished handing over to the LAF the positions seized during the clashes and withdrew form the streets of Beirut 19. After the withdrawal, Hizbullah maintained the civil disobedience campaign to pressure the government to officially withdraw the measures against its militia. On May 11 th, the LAF took control of North-West Beirut 20. The second phase took place in Tripoli, in the North Lebanon Governatorate, as well as in the Druze strongholds of Aley and Chouf, in the Mount Lebanon Governatorate, from the 10 th to 14 th of May. The clashes killed at least 44 people and wounded at least The most serious clashes happened on May 10 th -11 th at Aley, Mount Baruk and Chouf, and pitted the Shia-led 6

4 Middle East - Persian Gulf opposition militia (apparently including some pro-opposition Druze fighters) against the progovernment Druze militia loyal to Walid Jumblatt. The fighters allegedly used machine-gun, RPGs and, for the first time, heavy artillery. Even in this case, the pro-government forces suffered a crushing and quick defeat 22. Faced with the military victory of the opposition militias, the Lebanese government officially withdrew the decisions contested by Hizbullah, on May 14 th. In turn, the opposition promised to end the civil disobedience campaign once the ruling March 14 agrees to talks 23. If the accounts are correct, we can try to some assessments. An assessment of the consequences of the clashes The first assessment about Hizbullah. From a military point of view Hizbullah proved to be the strongest Lebanese militia by quickly defeating the militia loyal to the ruling coalition. Hizbullah also proved to be able to protect its weapons regardless the US and French pressure to disband its militia. However, from a political point of view Hizbullah breached its promise to use its weapons only against Israel, and to never turn them against the Lebanese people. In the short term, this will cause embarrassment to Hizbullah s ally, the Maronite Michel Aoun, who had justified its seemingly odd alliance with the Shia pro-syrian opposition forces arguing that Hizbullah is a nonsectarian national resistance force. Indeed, Mr. Aoun fought Syria between 1989 and 1990 and, after being defeated by the Syrian forces, went into exile until the 2005 withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon. In this respect, it seems that Aoun is one of the few Lebanese politicians that never cooperate with the Syrian regime during Syria s occupation of Lebanon. It si possible that Aoun will exact a heavy political price from Hizbullah his sacrifice. In the long term, the apparently sectarian nature of the clashes will probably undermine the argument adduced by Hizbullah to justify the existence of its private militia, i.e. that it is the only national non-sectarian resistance force able to protect the country from Israel, as it demonstrated during the 2006 war. This will increase pressure on Hizbullah to disband its militia, together with UN Security Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006), the presence of circa UNIFIL forces in South Lebanon (which is successfully avoiding the renewal of hostilities among Israel and Hizbullah), US and French pressure to disarm Hizbullah, the possible upgrading of the ongoing peace negotiation between Israel and Syria officially launched on May 21 st24, and the eventual establishment of formal relations between Lebanon and Syria. The second assessment is about the ruling March 14 alliance, with particular focus on the Future Movement led by Saad al-hariri and the Progressive Socialist Party led by Walid Jumblatt. From a military point of view, the defeat was crushing. The March 14 forces proved not to be able to protect their respective constituencies in case of sectarian armed confrontation with Hizbullah. The defeat could possibly feed the rearmament of the Sunni militias, in particular the Lebanese Jamaa Islamiya. Moreover, the US, French and Saudi political support proved to be an insufficient guarantee in the event of an armed clash with Hizbullah. From a political standpoint, the defeat will possibly undermine the political authority of the March 14 leadership in front of its own constituencies. Even if, after the takeover of Beirut, the March 14 can denounce the sectarian nature of the Hizbullah s militia and label the latter as an occupying force, the former had to recognize the military strength of Hizbullah and its allies 7

5 Middle East - Persian Gulf in Lebanon, and finally agreed to compromise on Hizbullah s political claims in the Doha accord of May 21 st. The third assessment is about the LAF, which at the time of the clashes was headed by Gen. Michel Suleiman, the current Lebanese President. During the fighting occurring from 7 th to 11 th of May, the LAF remained neutral and did not intervene to stop the clashes, limiting themselves to protect the Lebanese government institutions and to assume custody of the Sunni positions seized by Hizbullah during the clashes. 25 There probably were at least three reasons under LAF s decision to stay neutral. The first reason probably was the safeguard of the LAF s internal unity. In a contest characterized by persistent conflicts among powerful private militias, the LAF are the only non-sectarian national armed force that could eventually protect the national security of all Lebanon. After 18 months of sectarian political confrontation and 3 days of armed clashes, the risk of a fragmentation of the LAF along sectarian lines became evident when the Lebanese Army Command warned in a communiqué that the enduring violence poses a threat to the unity of the military establishment 26. The second reason probably was the safeguard of the impartiality of the LAF, which could have been undermined by an eventual LAF s intervention against one of the conflicting militias. Indeed, during the 18 months-long political crisis and the subsequent clashes the LAF were the only Lebanese institution able to preserve an image of national unity in a contest of deep sectarian polarization, that was pitting against each other the Sunni-led ruling coalition against the Shia led-opposition, with the Druze and, most of all, the Christian communities divided among the contenders. The risk of damaging the LAF s impartial image became present on January 27 th, when the LAF intervened to evacuate the street occupied by the opposition s supporters engaged in street protests. After the intervention, the LAF and Mr. Suleiman found themselves involved in the killing of 9 opposition s supporters, affiliated to Hizbullah and Amal, under circumstances that are not clear yet 27. The third reason probably was the safeguard of LAF s military prestige, recently boosted by both the 2006successful deployment of Lebanese troops in South Lebanon for the first time in 40 years alongside the over strong UNIFIL forces and the successful 2007 military campaign against the Islamist group Fatah al-islam, inside the Nahr al-barid refugee camp. Hizbullah is stronger than Fatah al-islam and in case of direct military confrontation could also prevail against the Lebanese Army, thus seriously undermining the military prestige and credibility of the latter. The decision to not intervene in the clashes safeguarded the internal unity and the prestige of the LAF, but could have undermined their image of impartiality. Some officers denounced LAF s inaction during Hizbullah s aggression 28. Moreover, some among the March 14 ranks questioned that LAF s decision to take in custody the positions seized by Hizbullah while the clashes were still ongoing, actually freeing Hizbullah s forces from the task to guard the positions seized and allowing the latter to focus on the conquest of new positions 29. The international dimension of the crisis: the Doha agreement It seems that the foreign powers involved in the Lebanese crisis, i.e. the United States, France and Saudi Arabia (supporting March 14 ) as well as Syria and Iran (supporting Hizbullah) abstained from intervening during the sectarian clashes among Lebanese factions, thus limiting themselves to approve the Doha agreement, that reflect the power balance among the factions established by the conflict. 8

6 Middle East - Persian Gulf The agreement was reached on May 21 st, after 6 days of negotiations 30, with the mediation of the Arab delegation headed by the Qatar s prime minister, His Excellence Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr al-thani, and Arab League s secretary general, Amr Moussa. The factions reached an agreement on five main issues 31. First, they agreed to convene within 24 hours a parliamentary session to elect Michel Suleiman as President (indeed, Mr. Suleiman was elected President on May 25 th with a majority of 118 votes out to 127 living members 32 thus reaching the two third majority required by the opposition and took office on May 26 th ). 33 Second, they agreed to appoint a new national unity government composed of 30 ministries, including 16 ministries to be appointed by the March 14 alliance, 11 ministries to be appointed by the opposition and the remaining 3 ministries to be appointed by the President. Third, they agreed to refer to the Parliament the discussion of the Boutros draft law on the reform of the electoral system, which will be based on the division of Beirut in three districts and the adoption of the qada as an electoral constituency, in conformity with the 1960 electoral law (thus determining a shrinkage of the constituency, which will increase from the current 14 to 26). Fourth, they committed themselves to abstain from the use of weapons and violence to obtain political gains, and to resume a dialogue on promoting the State s authority throughout Lebanon under the aegis of the new President and with the participation of the Arab League. Fifth, the faction s political leaders committed themselves to abstain from the rhetoric of treason or sectarian instigation. As for the election of Michel Suleiman as President, the conflicting parties had long agreed on its candidacy, even if he was not the first choice neither for the Sunni-led majority nor for the Shia-led opposition. From the pro-western March 14 standpoint, President Suleiman proved to be a leader able to promote and safeguard the Lebanese national unity while he was commanding the LAF. He effectively promoted the State authority and protected the Lebanese national security by deploying the Lebanese Army in South Lebanon, in coordination with UNIFIL, and by crushing the Islamist group Fatah al-islam in the north of the country. On the other hand, many among the March 14 ranks complained that Mr. Suleiman indirectly helped Hizbullah s takeover of Beirut, in the light of the fact that the LAF did not intervene militarily to stop Hizbullah s armed aggression and accepted to take in custody the positions seized by Hizbullah while the fighting was still ongoing. From the opposition standpoint, Mr. Suleiman looks like a President able to cooperate with Syria, considering that he was elected commander of the LAF in 1998, while Lebanon was still under Syria s occupation. At the time, it was not possible to assume such an office without Syria s consent. On May 25 th, during his first public address after the parliamentary vote, President Suleiman provided three important indications about his future conduct 34. First, he said that for the future Hizbullah s weapons should only be directed against Israel, thus implicitly confirming that Hizbullah s militia will not be disarmed in the short term. The message is that an eventual disarmament of Hizbullah s militia will be reached through political dialogue between the Lebanese factions rather than coercion against Hizbullah. Second, the Lebanese institutions and factions should launch a national dialogue to agree on a national defence strategy, which will determine the role of the LAF and, as a consequence, the role (and the fate) of Hizbullah s militia. Third, he called for the establishment of excellent and equal relations between Lebanon and Syria, which means that in the future Lebanon will cooperate with Syria, on one hand, and that Syria must formally recognize 9

7 Middle East - Persian Gulf Lebanon s sovereignty and independence by establishing full diplomatic relations with Lebanon, on the other. As for the compromise on the composition of the new government, it is a clear victory for Hizbullah and the opposition as a whole. With 11 ministries out of 30, the opposition obtained the so-called blocking minority, or in other words a veto power on every future government decision on fundamental matters (such as those that require a majority of two thirds in the Lebanese decision-making institutions). The veto power will allow Hizbullah to block every government decision on two fundamental issues, regardless of the distribution of the 11 ministries among the opposition parties: first, the decisions on Hizbullah s militia and weapons; second, the decisions on the establishment of an international tribunal to try those responsible of the murder of Rafiq al-hariri (killed on 14 February 2005), which could possibly convict high ranking Syrian officials and finally destabilize the Syrian regime. The military operation carried out in May demonstrated Hizbullah s willingness to protect its militia by force, even if this could trigger a new Lebanese civil war. That because the militia is the main Hizbullah s asset, which can influence the political destiny of Lebanon even against of the states sponsoring the ruling March 14, i.e. the United States, France and Saudi Arabia. As for the Hariri s tribunal, Hizbullah asserted that it is not against the tribunal in principle, but that it absolutely against using the tribunal as a tool to destabilize the Syrian establishment. Finally, many analyst agree that the proposed electoral reform draft law which should be promoted by the new Lebanese government and enacted before the 2009 parliamentary elections will assure better political representation, thus confirming the predominance of both Sunni and Shia parties, but also guaranteeing that the Christian support will be indispensable to any future Lebanese government (thanks to the foreseen shrinkage of the electoral constituencies to the size of a qada). On July 11 th, the Lebanese premier Fouad Siniora announced the formation of the new Cabinet, after almost five weeks of negotiations between Lebanese factions 35. The opposition obtained the key ministries of foreign affairs which will manage the relations with Syria and telecommunications which will deal with Hizbullah s telephone network. The deal reached among the factions assigned 5 portfolios to Aoun s Change and Reform Bloc (4 ministers, including the telecommunications minister, Gebran Bassil, plus the vice premier), 3 ministers to Amal (including the foreign minister, Fawzi Salloukh), 1 minister to Hizbullah, 1 minister to the SSNP and 1 to the Democratic Party. President Suleiman appointed inter alia the Defence minister, Elias al-murr, and the Interior minister, Ziad Baroud. It is possible that the opposing factions assuming the impartiality of the President left to the latter the appointment of the ministries responsible for national defence and security and, above all, for the establishment of the State s authority all over Lebanon on a non-sectarian basis 36. The conclusion of the first restructuring phase in post-syrian Lebanon The Doha agreement ended an 18 months-long political and institutional crisis that pitted against each other the Lebanese State institutions (the premier v. the speaker of the parliament) and political factions (the Sunni-led March 14 alliance v. the Shia-Maronite opposition alliance), during which the opposing forces engaged in an a long and exhausting tug-of-war finally ended by the small-scale civil-war erupted in May. The opposing Lebanese factions fought relying on different assets. Inside Lebanon, the March 14 alliance relied on both the 10

8 Middle East - Persian Gulf domestic support of the majority of the Lebanese population and the strong anti-syrian sentiment provoked (rightly or wrongly) by the long series of murders that killed at least 9 prominent anti-syrian Lebanese politicians, lawmakers, officials and journalists between 2004 and Outside the country, the March 14 enjoyed the support of the United States, France, Saudi Arabia and the United Nations. Between 2005 and 2007, those domestic and foreign assets allowed the March 14 to dominate both the Parliament and the government, and to pursue an anti-syrian and anti-hizbullah policy that scored the following successes: the March-April 2005 withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon which ended 15 years of Syrian occupation and dominance caused by both the strong international pressure exercised by the United States and France and the wave of anti-syrian protests triggered by the killing of the former Lebanese premier, Rafiq al-hariri 38 ; the victory in the parliamentary elections celebrated between the 29 th of May and the 20 th of June of ; the 2006 approval of UN Security Council resolution 1701, which calls for the disarmament of all Lebanese militias and for the deployment of up to Lebanese troops as well as UNIFIL military personnel in South Lebanon, a former Hizbullah s stronghold 40 ; the 2007 agreement between the Lebanese government and the United Nations that defined the statute of the international tribunal which could eventually pursue those behind the assassination of Rafiq al- Hariri and of several other political murders occurred in Lebanon in the last two years (the statute entered into force on 10 June 2007). The March 14 alliance anti-syrian policy, which joined the broader international anti-syrian policy promoted by the United States and France since 2005, finally clashed with Hizbullah s powerful reaction. Unlike the March 14 alliance, Hizbullah has the most powerful Lebanese militia, which was able to fight the strongest Middle Eastern armed force, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), for 34 days without being destroyed, during the summer of Moreover, the 2 days-beirut takeover of last May proved that Hizbullah is able to defend its weapons and its militia, if provoked. In the aftermath of the 2006 summer war, Hizbullah enjoyed broad support both domestically and regionally because of its military performance against the IDF. Domestically, the Lebanese shared perception of a clear and present Israeli threat motivated for a while the broad Lebanese support in favour of Hizbullah. Regionally, Hizbullah s stiff and successful resistance against the IDF 2006 offensive galvanized the Arab Middle Eastern populations, given that for the first time since 1948 and after five crushing defeats suffered by the Arab armies against Israel in the last 60 years an Arab militia was able to confront the strongest Middle Eastern Army. Once the psychological effect of the war had vanished, the overall support to Hizbullah was suddenly reduced to its core constituencies and sponsor, i.e. the Lebanese Shia community domestically and Syria, Iran and Hamas regionally. Notwithstanding its relative isolation, Hizbullah showed that it can effectively protect its interest in Lebanon without foreign help. A possible assessment is that Hizbullah s victory of last May a victory gained military on the field and officially recognized in the clauses of the Doha agreement determined a new and officially recognized power balance in Lebanon based on the real strength of the competing Lebanese factions. The ruling March 14 alliance with continue to lead the country, thanks to the support of the majority of the Lebanese people and of the International Community. But in deciding the future of the country it will have to take into account the needs of Hizbullah and its militia, in Lebanon, and of Syria, in the Middle East in the light of the historical, 11

9 Middle East - Persian Gulf geographical, economical and cultural ties that links the two neighbouring countries. The coveted veto power in the Cabinet finally obtained by Hizbullah (and by the opposition broadly speaking) does not indicate what Hizbullah s future policy will look like, but rather what the March 14 alliance can not do in the future, i.e. forcefully disbanding Hizbullah s militia and (probably) to use the Hariri s tribunal to destabilize the Syrian establishment. It is probable that the political initiative will rest on the March 14 alliance and its parliamentary majority, given that Hibullah s political platform is not clear at all aside from protecting its militia and its Syrian ally. Hizbullah s political platform as can be inferred from Hizbullah s statute, the 1985 open letter, as well as the behaviour and the statements of its leaders does not indicate well-defined policies, but rather a vague ideological commitment to the principle of the Iranian wilayat al-faqih, the promotion of the anti-israeli resistance community (mujtama muqawin) and the promotion together with Syria, Iran and Hamas of the axis of denial (jabhat almumana a) against the US plan for the Great Middle East 41. It is not clear at all if Hizbullah really pursue the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon, even of this aim is still included in the 1985 open letter. It seems that, at the moment, Hizbullah s political priority is to safeguard its militia. As already noticed above, no other issue triggered such a violent reaction from the Party of God during the 18 months-long political crisis. The series of successes scored by the ruling March 14 alliance between 2005 and 2007 was finally balanced by Hizbullah s show of strength. It is possible that Hizbullah s takeover of Beirut was also favoured by the disclosure of an ongoing Israeli-Syrian pace dialogue, officially recognized by the parties involved on May 21 st42. Indeed, an eventual peace agreement between Syria and Israel would undermine the significance of Hizbullah s resistance both politically and militarily, in the long term. As a consequence, Hizbullah could have decided to cash its political check now that it is in a relative strong position compared to the rival Lebanese factions thanks to its military might. As the time goes on, the political importance of Hizbullah s militia could progressively diminish as a consequence of an eventual easing in the relations among Israel and Syria, France and Syria and Syria and Lebanon, respectively. In the short term, regardless of the eventual persistence of minor clashes in Lebanon, it is possible and even probable the beginning of an official political dialogue between Syria and Lebanon. The election of Mr. Suleiman as President and the appointment of a foreign minister belonging to Amal are strong indicators in this sense and the results were evident during the Paris summit of July 13 th over the French Union for the Mediterranean initiative, during which a Lebanese President, Michel Suleiman, and a Syrian President, Bashar al-assad, met for the first time in history. 43 It is noteworthy that during the sectarian clashes of last May there was not foreign intervention, at least apparently. It seems that the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran did not intervene, essentially leaving the Lebanese factions free to wrestle among themselves to establish the new domestic power balance. Regardless the fact that, on May 9 th, the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, had accused Syria and Iran to be the instigators of Hizbullah s military takeover, eventually all the foreign powers involved in the Lebanese crisis accepted and welcomed the Doha agreement as well as Hizbullah s new power status, as a consequence 44. Even the UN Security Council, on May 22 nd, adopted a non-binding resolution that backed the Doha agreement and called for the respect and implementation of all relevant 12

10 Middle East - Persian Gulf UN resolution on Lebanon, including those over the disarmament of all Lebanese militia. It is noteworthy that the UN Security Council declaration did not mention Hizbullah 45. The final assessment is that the Doha agreement by giving to Hizbullah a veto power in the government and safeguarding its militia officially recognized a new political and institutional power balance in Lebanon closer to the real strength of the competing Lebanese factions, and structurally enshrined this new power balance in the Lebanese institutional system. Considering that the Doha agreement structurally changed the political and institutional Lebanese decisionmaking processes, from May 21 st onward, it is possible to assess that the agreement ended the first restructuring phase of the post-syrian Lebanon. During this phase, lasted from April 2005 to May 2008, the March 14 alliance skilfully used its domestic and international support to score a series of political victories that were not proportionate to its relative strength in Lebanon, if one consider Hizbullah s military might and Syria s power of influence. Hizbullah s reaction brought the Lebanese institutional framework back to the reality of the domestic balance of power in Lebanon. The new Lebanese institutional system, by reflecting more carefully the real power balance among Lebanese faction, may foster political stability and security in Lebanon, and may create the condition for the adoption of truly national policies, i.e. policies agreed by both the majority and the opposition. It is not possible to foreseen if the agreement between the Lebanese factions will last and for how long, but it is certain that it is practically impossible to rule Lebanon without taking into consideration the needs and the role of both Hizbullah and Syria. Diego Baliani 1 See Lebanese factions reach a deal to end crisis, CNN, 21 May See Suleiman Elected President, Naharnet, 25 May See Beirut cabinet challenges Hezbollah, tensions rises, Reuters, 6 May Ibidem. 5 See Tension Running High as Government, Opposition Appear to be on Collision Course, Naharnet, 6 May See A Cell Phone Civil War in Lebanon, Time, 7 May 2008; see also Hezbollah Phone Network Spat Sparks Beirut Street War, The Christian Science Monitor, 9 May See A Cell Phone Civil War in Lebanon, Time, cit. 8 See Lebanon Jumblatt accuses Hizbullah of bid to take over Beirut airport, The Daily Star, 4 May See Hizbullah Vows to Fight Government over Telephone Network, Naharnet, 6 May See Crisis Group Middle East Briefing N 23, Lebanon: Hizbollah s Weapons Turn Inward, 15 May Ibidem. 12 See Aoun s FPM: The Government Declared War, Naharnet, 6 May See Lebanese army says will intervene from Tuesday, Reuters, 12 May See Lebanon political conflict turns violent, Reuters, 7 May See also Hezbollah gunmen start withdrawal from Beirut, Reuters, 10 May See Army Takes Control of North Lebanon, Opposition Ends Beirut Takeover, Naharnet, 11 May See Opposition Workers Call for Beirut Demonstration, Majority Unions Boycott, Tensions Escalates, Naharnet, 6 May

11 Middle East - Persian Gulf 17 See Hizbullah controls Beirut, March 14 Says Violence Will Not Terrorize Us, Naharnet, 9 May See Crisis Group Middle East Briefing N 23, Lebanon: Hizbollah s Weapons Turn Inward, op. cit. 19 See Hezbollah gunmen start withdrawal from Beirut, Reuters, 10 May See Army Takes Control of North Lebanon, Opposition Ends Beirut Takeover, Naharnet, cit. 21 See Lebanese army says will intervene from Tuesday, Reuters, cit. 22 See Hezbollah wages war on Druze in Mount Lebanon, YaLibnan, 11 May See also Hezbollah fighters pile pressure on Lebanon rivals, Reuters, 11 May See Lebanon cancels anti-hezbollah measures, Reuters, 14 May See Israel, Syria holding direct talks in Turkey, YnetNews, 21 May See Lebanese Army says will intervene from Tuesday, Reuters, 11 May See Army Warns: Persisting Tension Threatens Unity of the Troops, Naharnet, 8 May See Riots damage Suleiman s chances at top post, pose conundrum for army, The Daily Star, 29 January See Stand-off ends with Lebanon revocation, Financial Times, 14 May See Crisis Group Middle East Briefing N 23, Lebanon: Hizbollah s Weapons Turn Inward, op.cit. 30 See Lebanon leaders tackle core issues at Qatar talks, Reuters, 17 May For an English translation of the agreement s text, see The Doha Agreement, NOW Lebanon, available in < (last access on 12 July 2008). 32 See Suleiman Elected President, Naharnet, cit. 33 See Suleiman Takes Office, Naharnet, 26 May See Suleiman for unity, Defense Strategy and Diplomatic Ties with Syria, Naharnet, 25 May See New Cabinet born after five weeks of labor, The Daily Star, 12 July Ibidem. See also the list of the ministries of the new Lebanese Cabinet at (last access on 12 July 2008). 37 See Chronology Attacks in Lebanon, Reuters 25 January See Last Syrian troops leave Lebanon, CNN, 27 April See Lebanon votes, YaLibnan, 29 May 2005, and Official election results fro North Lebanon, YaLibnan, 21 June See S/RES/1701 (2006) adopted on 11 August See Crisis Group Middle East Briefing N 23, Lebanon: Hizbollah s Weapons Turn Inward, op.cit. 42 See Israel, Syria holding direct talks in Turkey, YnetNews, cit. 43 See Lebanon, Syria to establish diplomatic relations, Agence France-Press, 12 July See also, Rapprochement «historique» entre la Syrie et le Liban, Le Figaro, 13 July See U.S. Department of State, United States Welcomes the Doha Agreement on Lebanon, 21 May 2008; Pro et anti-syrien trouvent un accord au Liban, Le Figaro, 21 May 2008; Rival Lebanese leaders forge deal to end conflict, Reuters, 21 May 2008; Mottaki: Iran supports Doha accord, PressTV, 26 May 2008; World Welcomes Doha Agreement on Lebanon, al-manar TV, 21 May See U.N. Security Council backs Lebanon peace deal, Reuters, 22 May See also Security Council Support Lebanon Deal, Drops Reference to 1559, Naharnet, 23 May

12 South Estearn Europe THE BALKANS AFTER KOSOVO REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF KOSOVO DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND NEW POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS Paolo Quercia A quiet independence in a troubled neighbourhood The leading event of the first quarter of the year was undoubtedly the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo, followed by the adoption of a new constitution for the newborn Balkan state. The second quarter of the year was an highly expected period for a number of reasons: firstly, it was the initial testing time for the independence and the occasion to asses the first steps of the new government and the reaction of both Serbs minority in Kosovo and of Belgrade. Secondly, Serbia political scene has been stalled by deep political crises subsequent to the collapse of Kostunica s government and the risk of the rise of a radical nationalist government has been faced; thirdly, the old unresolved question of Macedonian identity and nationhood remerged in a second acute Balkan political crises that brought a new government in power in Skopje after an ethnically violent electoral campaign. Fourthly, Kosovo independence brought a new political confrontation among different fragments of the international community, the EU lead vs the UN lead. The region after Kosovo. It is clear that Kosovo declaration of independence was an episode mostly connected with the rituality of the secession than with its substance. It was mostly a formal fact although overloaded with rhetoric and symbolism since an independent Kosovo was de facto working since first under the control and, after 2004, with the mentoring of the UN mission in Kosovo. For this reason the declaration of independence didn t produce major domino effects, since the neighbouring states except Serbia and the European ones have already accommodated in the last years a geopolitical room for the de facto state. First months of independence didn t produce significant improvements in the number of states that did recognise Kosovo compared with the very first weeks after independence. The overall number of countries that established diplomatic relations with Kosovo remains limited, especially to the members of the Euro-Atlantic community. With this limited recognition the world community is not standing against the statehood of Kosovo but it refuses to legitimise ex post the principle of humanitarian war of intervention and the practice of secession in a manner not consistent with the uti possidetis principle and the respect of state integrity. Until middle 2008, we can find four different polarisations in state attitude towards Kosovo: a. states who support Kosovo independence because they have been part of the military coalition that made war to Yugoslavia in 1999 or because they belong to the European Union family and they share a common neighbourhood policy for the Balkans; b. countries who don t have any specific sensitiveness with Kosovo issue but are influenced by United States foreign policy; c. 1 From a certain point of view and limited only to some factors of statehood it is possible to say that Kosovo had a parallel independent or autonomous structures since

13 South Estearn Europe countries who are basically hostile to the recognition of Kosovo independence not for geopolitical reasons but because they are keen to safeguarding the international political existing borders and the principle of non interference in internal affairs; d. regional countries who are sensitive to the Albanian issue in the Balkans (Macedonia and Montenegro) or are receptive to Serbian political inputs (Montenegro and Bosnia Herzegovina). A special case is of course Serbia. On this issue the politics of Belgrade towards Kosovo independence is more bipartisan of what it could appear since leaving ideology and rhetoric apart almost all the political spectrum is nowadays in favour of keeping a similar line over Kosovo: no possibility of recognition. From this point of view, the new Tadic government will keep on the same state policy on Kosovo that characterised the previous government lead by Kostunica. Towards this path are directed the comments of Tadic on the legitimacy of the northern Serbs parallel Parliament that has been established in Mitrovica and that will remain a source of concern for the new Kosovo institutions. What can be expected from Tadic executive, is a different line on the political and diplomatic measures taken in the past months by Serbian government in retaliation for the recognition of Kosovo. Soon or later, it is expected that the new Serbian government will return the ambassadors to some of the countries that recognised Kosovo independence. Tadic government will be characterized also by a softer approach to NATO, developing possible forms of cooperation not based on a membership plan. It is in fact clear the Serbia will not do anything to reduce the Atlantic gap and that only the EU membership should be considered an integration political goal for Belgrade. In this environment, Kosovo government is making the preparations to open nine new embassies abroad in some of the countries that did recognise Kosovo s independence. For the moment new embassies will be opened in USA, Albania, Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland. This geographic distribution of the new embassies indicates already what could be the future geopolitical posture of Kosovo state. Apart the natural, granted and in a way ambiguous relations that will take place between Pristina and Tirana, the real compass of Kosovo international relations will be held in Washington. Kosovo will be guidelined from Tirana and Washington/London more than from Bruxelles, Berlin, Rome or Paris. The European dimension of Kosovo international relations will remain very feeble and it will be mostly limited to the emigration factor, especially as far as Switzerland, Germany and Austria are concerned. More than one third of the Kosovo pre war population is considered to live abroad. These figures could also increase consistently since independence won t bring economic sustainability. According to some forecast Kosovo is entering into a long phase of recession that will increase the number of emigrants towards Europe. It is likely that, if this emigrational trends will be confirmed, soon EU member states will adopt a more rigid visa policy towards Kosovo nationals. A specific issue is related to the formation and selection of the new diplomatic personnel. A framework agreement is already in place between Britain s Foreign Office and Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a second one could be reached with Tirana s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is likely that relations with Italy will remain substantially undetermined for a long time since Italy didn t develop a clear and coherent policy towards Kosovo, despite the high expectations that are present both in Tirana and Pristina. 16

14 South Estearn Europe The revenge of Milosevic. Serbian elections where held on the 11 th of may and they represented a very important turning point in the post Milosevic politics. Serbian first party remained the radicals, leaded by Mr. Nikolic, who collected more than 30% of votes. But the results of the radical outsiders - and somehow outcast is not a real victory. Nikolic party demonstrated already in the last presidential elections that it could significantly pass the threshold of a million votes. But in this election the real challenge for him was after having established an alliance with the conservatives of Kostunica to attempt to bridge the radicals and nationalists into the government, in a similar way as HDZ did in Croatia. This operation failed and this failure could be explained with two different factors. First of all it is a much difficult task to soften moderate and nationalist and radical stances in a political climate of defeat and territorial mutilation (as it was not the case in Croatia). In fact, it would have been a very awkward situation if the independence of Kosovo would have given, at the same time and in the same society, a more nationalist and irredentist spin to Kostunica s DSS (as it happened) and a more moderate and democratic approach to Nikolic s radical party (an outcome that happened only partially). In other words, the political effect of Kosovo independence worked in the direction to bring a more nationalist approach in the political electorate, making impossible for the ultra-nationalist radical party the possibility of moving from radical nationalism to democratic patriotism. The second factor that worked to keep the SRS in a marginalised corner outside the government was the interests of external states. Not only the European Union, but also US and Russia felt quite uncomfortable to the possibility that the radical party could enter a government coalition. If this was obvious for US and EU, it slowly became also Russian position. In fact, the anti western and pro Russian rhetoric of SRS left Moscow virtually unbiased, while the risk of a destabilising political force coming to power in Belgrade could have been armful to the policy of energetic influence of Moscow in the Balkans. In fact the energetic strategy based on transnational acquisition and cross border pipelines brings the necessity of political homogeneity of the region and the creation of the conditions for long-term stability based on the absence of territorial disputes. In this context the political homogeneity created in the Balkans by the United States political and military strategy and by the EU enlargement policy becomes a fertile ground for Russian economic and energetic interests in the region. For this reason Moscow kept good relations with several Serbian political parties, from Tadic DS to the Socialist Party up to the Radicals. The creation of a new government in Belgrade based on the strange alliance between Tadic 5 parties coalition called pro a European Serbia (DS, G17+, SPO, LSV, SDP, that reached 38% of votes with 102 seats ), the libertarians of Jovanovic who are in favour of Kosovo secession from Serbia (LDP, 5,2% and 16 seats), the representatives of the minorities (the Hungarians of Vojvodina with 4 seats, the Bosniaks of Sandjac with 2 seats and the Albanians of Presevo Valley with 1 seat) and the Socialist party of the deceased leader Slobodan Milosevic (who reached 8% and 20 seats, becoming the necessary ally for both Tadic and Kostunica bloc) is still under way, but the alliances are already forged. The decision of the Socialists to enter the government with most of the parties deriving from the former DOS a political bloc that was created in resistance to the power of Milosevic and that masterminded the coup d'état that removed Serbian leader from his post and sending him to the Hague is the most relevant political element of this election. 17

15 South Estearn Europe The paradox of the return of the socialist party to the government in Belgrade brings an end to the political era of the anti-milosevicism in the name of a more realistic approach. It will not be a surprise if the political successors of Milosevic in the new Serbian government will be more pragmatic and less nationalists of democratic and anti Milosevic parties like Kostunica s DSS. In fact according to some interpretations of the war in Yugoslavia the role of Milosevic and of the Serbian socialist party in the secession of Yugoslavia was not the role of an ultra nationalist movement that decided to wage war all across the federation against all the other nationalities. Milosevic was, on the contrary, a modest burocrat of the communist party, originally far from nationalists views who managed to build his political power in a cynic power game becoming the mediator between the radical-nationalist and the more moderate components of the Serbian communist party and society. In this specific political moment of Serbia, where it is necessary to conciliate europeism and liberalism together with mild nationalism and nostalgic irredentism activated by Kosovo independence, the socialist party is again a natural and useful option for Tadic. Its relatively small size and the necessity for the socialists to be progressively re-included into Serbian political life and into international relations could transform it in a loyal government party. If this will happen it will be an historical revenge post mortem for Slobodan Milosevic. The testing ground of this alliance will be represented by the two parliament votes that are awaited in the next that should ratify two important decisions taken by the previous government: the ratification of the Stabilization and Association Agreement between Serbia and the European Union (it must be noted that in the past parliament the socialist party approved a document against the signing of the agreement together with the radical party and the DSS. This action from the DSS formally broke the alliance between Kostunica and Tadic bringing to early political elections); the second vote will deal with the energy. Last January Russia s Gazprom Neft signed a deal to buy 51% stake of the Serbia oil monopoly NIS, while in February Medvedev and Kostunica reached an agreement for including Serbia into the South-stream project, a pipeline for the transit of natural gas through Serbia to Europe, crossing also other Balkan countries. The ratification of the Serbian Russian energetic deals was postponed after the political vote, and it will be now one of the first significant political actions that the new parliament should implement. Macedonia. Going back to Ohrid? An important political change occurred in Macedonia with the new anticipated political elections that produced a new parliament where the VMRO-DPMNE his holding alone the absolute majority. It is a great success for the Prime Minister Nicola Gruevski, who called for earlier elections after Kosovo independence brought important political consequences into the governing coalition with the request of the ethnic Albanian minority party of recognition of Kosovo. The crises that Macedonia went through in the first semester of the year had two sides. One was related to the ethnic Albanian Slavs relations and the second was related to a violent inter ethnic fight between the two Albanian speaking parties. In this context, the pressure coming from Greece for the need to change the name of the country from Macedonia to options, added fuel to the internal political situation and the majority party had an easy game to play the role of the defenders of the national identity. In a context with internal economic problems, troubled borders with the unrecognised northern neighbour of Kosovo, internal inter-ethnic conflicts among the two Albanian political parties, and pressure from Greece to change the 18