African Conflict Prevention Programme (ACPP) Pretoria

Transcription

1 African Conflict Prevention Programme (ACPP) Pretoria ACPP Daily Briefings Week 15 Monday, 18 April 2011 Contents: West Africa: Nigeria: Jonathan President with a bit of good luck Burkina Faso: Blaise Compaore sacks government Southern Africa: Swaziland: Pro- democracy movement versus the government: A lull before the storm?

2 Summary of Briefings West Africa: Nigeria: Jonathan President with a bit of good luck Over the weekend, Nigeria held the much anticipated presidential elections, the fourth since the country returned to democracy in According to various observer missions, these presidential elections have been most transparent and credible in the country s post- independence history. If the results are fair, credit is certainly, to an extent, due to Goodluck Jonathan for not interfering with the work of the electoral commission as his executive predecessors too often did. But one cannot neglect to acknowledge the leadership of the chairman of the electoral commission, Prof. Atahiru Jega who promised to rid Nigeria of its tarnished reputation of fraudulent elections. According to the most recent results released it is clear that Jonathan is leading and possibly heading to an early victory in the first round. So far, he has won more than 22 million votes against 12 million for the opposition leader Muhammadu Buhari. Nigerian electoral law and electoral practice, as laid down in the constitution, is the most complex in Africa and consists of a mixed, hybrid system where a candidate can win through a First Past The Post system. A candidate can achieve victory with a simple majority provided he or she has won at least a quarter of the total vote in two- thirds of states (24 out of 36), including the federal capital. The dynamics of the election might significantly change if Jonathan fails to achieve the necessary totals; so far the majority of his support has come from southern states where he has regularly received over 90% of the vote. Old divisions that could potentially resurface in Nigerian politics such as religion or regional origin (north, south or west) appear in some cases to have re- emerged, and in others, it appears that a candidate s regional identity continues to determine whether he/she is voted for or not, thus trumping party allegiance. In a positive move voters from the eastern region, who have been most marginalised since the Biafran war/civil War, have seen this election as an opportunity to reverse their marginalisation. There is a concern among some observers that riots are likely to occur in the North should Jonathan be the winner. All things considered it is best to advise caution in lieu of Nigeria s electoral history and elections amongst neighbouring states. The main obstacle in the past that marred Nigerian politics was the inability to manage the electoral process but the current situation is comforting. Jonathan has publically stated that he is in favour of only serving one term in office and this could have interesting implications. One term in office means that time is limited to see the implementation of his policies, as he would need substantial time to sort out his government after the election. One possible scenario is that one term of office is potentially destabilising, but much depends on how he constructs his government. A perceived advantage of serving a single term is that he can take unpopular but necessary decisions and not fear the ire of voters in the next elections. It will, however, be important to further unpack the context within which he made that statement as it could be construed within the prism of party politics, where Jonathan s statement was a palliative or a bargaining strategy to attract support for his candidature. Broadly, the external global context must also be borne in mind, given the recent conflict in Cote d Ivoire and possible conflicts in Benin and Burkina Faso, in addition to regional institutional politics in ECOWAS that may influence domestic proceedings in Nigeria. ACPP Daily Briefing, Monday 18 April

3 Burkina Faso: Blaise Compaore sacks government Last week, Burkina Faso citizens woke up to news of another army mutiny. This could have been normal news in the country had it not involved one of the most important units of president Blaise Compaore security apparatus, the presidential guard. According to various media reports, elements of that unit went on rampage, firing in the air, over the failure of Burkina Faso s regime to pay them benefits. Fearing for his life, Compaore fled to his hometown of Ziniare, before returning later to the capital city, Ouagadougou, having convinced himself that it was not an attempted coup d état. Tensions have, broadly, been building up in Burkina Faso for sometime now, and seem to be gaining impetus in the context of the widespread revolt and protests against authoritarian regimes in North Africa. It is apparent that the corresponding media attention that accompanies protests in recent days, in some cases limits the regimes from cracking down strongly and repressing such movements, especially those who possess fearsome repressive capabilities such as Burkina Faso. In Burkina Faso, it was first a series of street riots over high commodity prices that have pushed citizens into the margins of poverty and destitution. Then students went on strike to demand the demilitarisation of the university campuses. These strikes claimed the lives of six students, and the anger has continued to built whilst more protests were planned that the government anticipated by closing down schools and universities in late January. Students, then, believed that one of their leaders Justin Zongo was tortured to death by Compaore s forces while the government claimed he died of meningitis. Many activists had been killed before under similar circumstances and no conclusive investigations were conducted. The assassination of Norbert Zongo in 1998, a newspaper editor who challenged the authority of Compaore over a corruption incident remains one of the most pernicious cases of impunity in Burkina Faso. Indeed, internally, a huge number of people are growing increasingly frustrated over the lack of employment opportunities, service delivery and state repression. Compaore has efficient security/repressive forces, but the very soldiers who constitute his main line of defence in the event of attack have now taken up arms and rampaged through many areas of the capital. Protests by members of the presidential security guard signify that there are major developments looming in Burkina Faso, and that tensions in the governance of the country are barely been appeased. The contextual problems facing the Compaore regime are further beset by numerous external dilemmas, such as a re- assertive France which played palpable role in resolving the Ivorian crisis and conflict, as well as Compaore s past links with Qaddafi, which are contributing to a discrediting of his regime. Compaore s rule is also dented by allegations of his involvement in the various wars in West Africa. But one major thing that Compaore was associated with that has damaged his credentials remains his alleged involvement in the assassination of Thomas Sankara, a youthful icon of Burkina Faso revolution in the 1980s. In spite of all the attempts to wipe out Sankara s memory, his shadow continues to hunt the regime. Even Compaore s attempt to position himself as an important power broker in the West African region has not been successful in exonerating him from his responsibility in the 1987 coup that claimed Sankara s life. The immediate decision by President Blaise Compaore to sack the army chief of staff and his entire cabinet in an attempt to diffuse the tensions in the country proves that the stakes are high and his rule is coming under severe threat. Compaore s rule has always been contested but the regime has managed to survive through repression. Unfortunately, that decision might not be enough to assuage protesters. Opposition parties are already calling for his resignation and will ACPP Daily Briefing, Monday 18 April

4 attempt to build on the ongoing discontent within the army. Lawyers have joined the movement while angry traders burn down the ruling party s headquarters. The sacked administration and the army chief of staff might want to throw their weight behind the country s weak civilian opposition. Three major cities are now affected including Ouagadougou, Po and Tenkodogo while three important military barracks have fallen into the hands of the mutineers. These were Guillaume Ouedraogo, Sangoule Lamizana, and barrack 11-78, which are among the most important military camps in the country. It is feared that the movement might spread throughout the country. How Compaore attempts to survive this challenge to his rule without resorting to massive repression will have implications for his rule and his remaining time in office. Compaore has ruled Burkina Faso since 1987 and has, variously, amended the constitution to remain in power unchallenged. In the past he has abolished and reinstated term limits for presidents, leaving him in a position where he could stand for re- election without any limitation. It is an encouraging sign that people have had the courage to make political statements, seeking to restore their authority over leaders and the socio- political processes of their country. But clearly a revolt from presidential guards in Burkina Faso is a major development in the heart of the state s security apparatus and the survival of Compaore s regime. Southern Africa: Swaziland: pro- democracy movement versus the government: A lull before the Storm? The unions in Swaziland have indefinitely called off the planned three- day pro- democracy protests, following the government s violent crackdown on protesters on April 12. According to the Swaziland National Association of Teachers, the protests were suspended as a strategic retreat to reorganize and mobilize for more effective protests. While the protests may have fallen short of expectations, some gains were made. Importantly, the disproportionate use of force against the protests changed the international perception of the monarchy; it put Swaziland and its need for democracy onto the international agenda; and it highlighted the extreme paranoia of the regime a characteristic of many dictatorships. The campaign for the restoration of multiparty democracy and an end to absolute monarchism has been on the increase in recent years saw a 10,000 strong pro- democracy demonstration in Swaziland, one of largest in the country s history, against growing economic and political impoverishment. The demonstrators sought to draw attention to this plight during the celebrations that marked King Mswati's 40th birthday and Swaziland s 40 years of independence. Unfortunately, the government has consistently refused to acknowledge the growing sentiment for democratic rule, claiming that Swazi people are not ready for democratic rule. The government remains indifferent to the real gravity of the pro- democracy movement in the country, and remains defiant regarding reforms. At a press conference on 12 April, Foreign Minister Lutfo Dlamini s defended the crackdown on protestors maintaining that demonstrations were illegal, violent, and therefore unconstitutional, prompting police action as provided for under the Public Order Act. He also described critique from the international community as political interference. In addition, Swazi government authorities have blacklisted members of South Africa s African National Congress Youth league (ANCYL), the Congress of South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) who are perceived to be helping with the overthrow of the government. The Swazi s movement s main solidarity partner, COSATU, has ACPP Daily Briefing, Monday 18 April

5 committed itself to bringing the campaign to a climax by among others, eventually leading a border blockade between Swaziland and South Africa and staging a bigger protest in September in Swaziland. In a memorandum directed to the King of Swaziland and reportedly delivered to Swazi government authorities, four demands were underlined by COSATU. These are: the unbanning of political parties; unconditional return of Swazis in exile; repeal of laws preventing freedom of association and public assembly and freedoms to choose their future political path. The ANC also released a strongly worded statement on April 14, which calls on the governments to unban political parties and initiate dialogue. More significantly, the South African government finally broke its silence over the political tensions in the Swaziland in a statement released by DIRCO expressing concern on the political situation in the later, recommending political dialogue as the best way to resolve the political tensions. Future developments in Swaziland will surely determine whether the Zuma administration will step up efforts to mediate in the country and give impetus to a change in the tact and approach of the monarchy to pro- democracy calls. A Zuma- led mediation committee, that can initiate such conversation with the monarchy and eventually assist in crafting strategies that balance democracy and monarchism for instance, may be welcome without excessive suspicion. The repression of the protests has also drawn widespread condemnation from key trade partners- the US and the EU, as well as opposition parties, trade unions and NGOs from the southern African region. It remains to be seen whether the events of last week and increasing international pressure will compel the government of Swaziland to initiate a constructive dialogue with opposition movements; whether support for the traditional leadership structure will increase or decrease and how the pro- democracy movement with re- organize and strategise to take advantage of a popular desire for reform. Whilst April 12 was a hugely symbolic day to convene the anti- government protest, other significant dates, which may see mobilized protest action, include April 19 th (birthday of King Mswati III); July 22nd (the birthday of the late King Sobhuza); and the 6th of September, which marks Somhlolo Day or Independence Day. Factors that serve as potential conflict triggers remain primarily latent: political repression, socio- economic inequality, unemployment, and extreme poverty and population pressures. The political struggles in Swaziland are far from over. Compiled by Timothy Walker, ACPP Pretoria Office Intern End ACPP Daily Briefing, Monday 18 April