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1 Kobe University Repository : Kernel タイトル Title 著者 Author(s) 掲載誌 巻号 ページ Citation 刊行日 Issue date 資源タイプ Resource Type 版区分 Resource Version 権利 Rights DOI The same old story? Peace-Keeping and Nation-Building : alternative perspectives on Timor-Leste's history of foreign interventions Valdez Duffau Mathias 六甲台論集. 国際協力研究編,13: Departmental Bulletin Paper / 紀要論文 publisher JaLCDOI / URL PDF issue:

2 The same old story? Peace-Keeping and Nation- Building: alternative perspectives on Timor-Leste s history of foreign interventions Mathias VALDEZ DUFFAU 1 Content 1. Introduction 2. Country Overview 3. Portuguese Colonial Civilization Arrival 4. WWII and the Japanese Occupation 5. Political Awakening and the Failure of the Decolonization Process 6. Cold-War Politics: Indonesia and the Western Powers 7. The Road from Resistance to Self-Determination 8. Self-Determination or UNSC Right to Intervene? 9. From Humanitarian Intervention to the UN Transitional Administration 10. The Transitional Administration as a Sovereign State 11. A Militarized Mission as a State-Builder: a Contradiction in Terms? 12. Securing Australia s Interests 13. Conclusion 14. References 1. Introduction How much is known by the general public about Timor-Leste s history, apart from the fact that it gained UN-sponsored independence in 2002 and that it is one of the newest nations of the 21st century? Presumably, most of the non-timorese readers of this paper might not be knowledgeable of this country s history and about its people. In fact, while I was conducting field research in Timor-Leste in 2011, I was surprised that a number of international staff working there, with whom I had the chance to exchange ideas, were not much more wellinformed either. In particular, they almost homogeneously understood Timor-Leste as a 1 Argentinean Human Rights lawyer granted with a scholarship from the Japanese Ministry of Education who after finishing his Masters in Political Sciences (under the supervision of Prof. Alexander) at the Faculty of International Cooperation Studies (GSICS - Kobe University) is now researching as a PhD student (under the supervision of Prof. Hoshino and Prof. Matsuno) at the Osaka University School of International Public Policy (OSIPP). Contact valdezduffau@gmail.com. 61

3 六甲台論集 - 国際協力研究編 - 第 1 3 号 country that had succeeded through self-determination because of the UN. Moreover, they appeared to be convinced that the UN-led nation-building project was the best (and only) option for the incipient Timorese State. However, dialoguing with Timorese actors revealed a different understanding of the post-independence period. The Timorese had a history based vision of what was taking place in their country, not only from the process itself but also of the committed actors. Reading about Timor-Leste s past clarified that historical facts were not always analyzed in the same manner. Depending on the nationality of the author and of the language of the source, history not only has different versions but also suffers variations. In this sense, by analyzing a broad range of sources, this paper is an attempt to provide alternative perspectives of Peace-Keeping and Nation-Building in the light of Timor-Leste s history of foreign interventions. 2. Country Overview Timor Português, Higashi Timoru, Timor Timur and East Timor are four different ways by which the 13 communities present in the eastern part of the island of Timor were named along its history. While original inhabitants called their mother land Timor Lorosae which means Timor where the sun rises in Tetun 2, the Source: worldatlas.com actual official name is República Democrática de Timor-Leste 3 or just simply Timor-Leste. The following is a brief introduction to Timor-Leste. It is included to help orient the reader to the issues addressed in this paper. Timor-Leste is a country in Southeast Asia situated around 640 km (400 miles) to the northwest of Darwin, Australia. Its territory is composed by an area of 14,609 square kilometers (5,640 square miles), its population is 947,000 and the capital city is Dili. The official languages are Tetun and Portuguese. Nevertheless, Indonesia and English are also spoken by some people. In terms of religion, it is the second Christian (Roman Catholic) country in Asia while the currency is the U.S. dollar. The newest country in the 21 st century still reflects very low standards in life expectancy (49 years), GDP per Capita (U.S. $500) and literacy (48% - around half a million people) 4. 2 One of the local and official languages. 3 Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. 4 Based on information from the following web sites: cia.gov, bbc.co.uk, dfat.gov.au, ausaid.gov.au, timorleste.gov.tl, and state.gov, accessed on March

4 The same old story? Peace-Keeping and Nation-Building 3. Portuguese Colonial Civilization Arrival The Portuguese were the first Europeans to arrive in south-east Asia around Although there were catholic priests presence in Timor by 1556 the territory was only declared a Portuguese colony in The island remained in the periphery of the Portuguese empire without any significant relevance. As Lord Alfred Wallace described in 1869, Timor was a bastard colony, not only because it was the most remote and rebellious but it was also the most neglected by the Portuguese (as cited in Inbaraj 1995: 4). They considered Timor as ante-camara do inferno 5 because it was plagued with malaria and other tropical diseases. By the 18 th century, the Spanish and the Portuguese faced the rising power of the Dutch and the British as the new colonizers in Asia. The Dutch crown was conquering the rest of the archipelago that now forms the Republic of Indonesia, as well as it started occupying the other portion of the island. Rapidly, much of the rest of the region was controlled by the Dutch, known as the Dutch East Indies. The tension between the two colonial powers in the region eventually resulted in a border dispute and by signing the Lisbon Treaty in they split the island in two parts. Portugal ceded the western portion of the island to the Dutch Crown. During the Portuguese period, maize (corn) was introduced and sandalwood and coffee was extracted. The colonizers imposed an exploitative system of forced labor where development remained minimal. This caused a number of rebellions against the Portuguese rulers. The worst one was called The Great Rebellion ( ) and it was put down with a great deal of bloodshed only after thousands of troops had been brought to the colony from other parts of the Portuguese empire in Africa (Budiardjo and Liong 1984: 3). In this way, the colonial stability remained until World War II (WWII). 4. WWII and the Japanese Occupation Despite the fact that Portugal was a neutral nation, in December 1941 Australian and Dutch elite troops were deployed in the island anticipating a Japanese invasion. By early 1942, the Japanese military invaded both sides of the island calling the locals to join them in order to fight against European colonialism. Nevertheless, the Timorese fought on the side of the allies who later withdrew from the island leaving them with no choice but to surrender to the Japanese. Jim Dunn describes the East Timor campaign as one of the great catastrophes of World War Two in terms of relative loss of life (cited by Budiardjo and Liong 1984: 3). Part of that was caused because the Timorese were forced to supply the Japanese with the already scarce food they had causing massive starvation. Moreover and apart from the destruction and looting executed by the Japanese they suffered a number of allied bombings coming from 5 ante-camara do inferno literally means: entrance to hell. 6 The definite border was not decided until 1916 by The Hague and it remains nowadays as the existing boundary between Indonesia and Timor Leste. 63

5 六甲台論集 - 国際協力研究編 - 第 1 3 号 Darwin (Northern Australia). By the end of the war, Australia had lost only forty out of four hundred officers while the Timorese losses were around 45,000 to 70,000. Representing between 10% and 15% of the whole population of 450,000 inhabitants at that time, the number of casualties indicates the significance of the destructive impact that the Japanese occupation had in Timorese society.(durand 2009: 108) Once the war was over the colonial heritage of each side of the island played a significant role in the course of history. While the Dutch East Indies began its path towards independence in 1949, finally becoming Indonesia, the Portuguese rulers were reclaiming Portuguese Timor as their colony. One positive aspect about this post-war period was that the Portuguese allowed the Catholic Church to develop primary and secondary education for the Timorese Political Awakening and the Failure of the Decolonization Process The Carnation Revolution 8 that took place in Portugal in 1974 was a turning point for the Timorese. The Portuguese rulers, Salazar first and then Caetano, became unable to continue suppressing the anti-colonial resistance both domestically in Portugal as well as in the African colonies. As such, the military expenditure for these endeavors in Africa was absorbing most of the budget. This situation provoked the authoritarian regime to collapse. As a consequence, a pacifist revolution, known as the Carnation Revolution, opened the path to democracy in Portugal as well as the decolonization process. Gradually, Portuguese colonial territories were granted independence. Portuguese Guinea was first and then it was followed by the independence of Cape Verde, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe and Angola in The difference with those other colonial transition scenarios was that in Timor there was no independence or liberation war. The Carnation Revolution activated a decolonization process that enabled political dissidence and debate in the Portuguese Timor. Portugal expressed its will to decolonize and according to the schedule by October 1976 there was going to be elections for representatives to form a Constituent Assembly 9. In reality, the course of the events indicated that the rapid withdrawal of a falling apart regime was also the preface of the tragedy that was about to come. The new political situation legalized the creation of local political parties in Timor. The União Democrática Timorense (Timorese Democratic Union; UDT) was the first political power to be proclaimed during the time of the revolution. It was composed of conservative elites with links to the colonial power. Meanwhile, the Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste 7 This improvement did benefit some of the educated urban elites who later became the independent leaders in exile during the Indonesian occupation. 8 The Carnation Revolution (Portuguese: Revolução dos Cravos), started on 25 April 1974, in Lisbon, Portugal, as a result of a civil resistance. This Political Revolution overthrew the Prime Minister Marcelo Caetano producing a transition of regime from an authoritarian dictatorship, known as Estado Novo, into a democracy. 9 Law no. 7/75. 64

6 The same old story? Peace-Keeping and Nation-Building Independente (the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor; Fretilin ) came to the scene with members of urban and educated elite. A third and minor party Associação Popular Democrática Timorense (The Timorese Popular Democratic Association; APODETI) also took action proposing the integration with Indonesia. Later, UDT and Fretilin formed a coalition sharing the goal of self-determination representing in this way the majority of the Timorese population. Internal divisions in the UDT made the coalition last not very long. Moreover, some of UDT members were already in Jakarta requesting Indonesian intervention in East Timor in order to avoid having Fretilin govern the country. Already, Fretilin was seen as akin to rising threat of communism. At the same time, the external powers were playing their game. Portugal reiterated its obligations to the UN about Timor as a non-autonomous territory. 10 Portuguese and Indonesian delegations meet in London to address the Timor issue 11. Indonesia s goal was to convince Portuguese leadership to transfer Timor s sovereignty to Indonesia and to avoid Portugal to call for UN intervention. By this time Indonesian troops were already taking part in incidents at the Oecusse enclave. In June 1975 General Suharto visits the US to persuade President Ford to support Indonesia s plans of invasion. His argument was simple. Fretilin was a communist party that threatened the stability of the region. That proved to be convincing enough to a US Administration that had just lost the Vietnam War in April (Durand 2009: 117). In this context, a so-called civil war started. UDT succeeded in stealing police weapons and on 10 August 1975 launched an operation to seize power and capture Fretilin members. Foreigners left Dili, and by the 20 August Fretilin counter-attacks were able to effectively control Timorese territory within a few days. The Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (the National Liberation Armed Forces of East Timor; Falintil) was created as the armed force of the Fretilin. At this juncture, the Portuguese Administration departed from Dili to the Atauro Island and Indonesia allowed UDT members to become refugees in West Timor. By October 1975, the threat of an invasion became reality. Indonesian forces infiltrated Timor and began taking positions in the western part of the country. Seeking to silence the international press they killed 5 Australian journalists in the town of Balibo 12. Since an invasion was imminent and Portugal was unwilling to protect Timor, Fretilin asked unsuccessfully the UN to deploy an international force in order to secure the territory. Under these circumstances, on 28 November 1975 Fretilin resolved to unilaterally declare independence 13 as a way to call the attention of the international community (Inbaraj 1995: 42). 10 Under article 73 of the UN Charter. 11 Negotiation meetings continued in June 1975 in Hong Kong, in August in Jakarta and in November in Rome. 12 These victims are known as the Balibo 5 and a film called Balibo (2009, Williamson) narrates that episode. 13 The Declaration of Independence states: Expressing the highest aspirations of the people of East Timor and to safeguard the most legitímate interests of national sovereignty, the Central Committee of 65

7 六甲台論集 - 国際協力研究編 - 第 1 3 号 The appointed President was Francisco Xavier do Amaral and the Prime-Minister was Nicolau Lobato. Although Cuba, China and Vietnam, as well as other former Portuguese colonies in Africa, recognized the new state, on 29 November 1975 Portugal rejected both independence and the possibility of integration with Indonesia. The following day, representatives of UDT, Apodeti and other political parties 14 signed the Proclamation of Integration or Declaration of Balibo requesting the integration of Timor-Leste to Indonesia. According to Durand (2009: 120) they were forced to sign it. In reality, the political actors that had lost power against Fretilin and sought refuge in West Timor were now requesting the immediate action to protect the lives of people who considered themselves part of Indonesia, living under the fascist terror and practices of Fretilin, condoned by the Portuguese Government (Resistencia Timorense 2011: 46). 6. Cold-War Politics: Indonesia and the Western Powers By the time Timorese Ministers like Ramos-Horta, Alkatiri and Lobato were heading to different countries looking for external support, the US decision to back up Indonesia s invasion had already been made. On 6 December 1975, the US President Gerald Ford and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met Indonesian General Suharto, this time not in Washington but in Jakarta. They were concerned about the Timor issue and asked for a rapid and drastic action sympathizing with Indonesia s aspirations. Particularly, Mr. Kissinger showed some concern about US-made weapons might be employed but according to Budiardjo & Liong (1984: 9), Washington knew very well that their weapons would be used; by 1975, 90% of the military equipment being used by the Indonesian army was supplied by the USA. The following day, Indonesian forces launched Operation Komodo invading Timor- Leste and opening a new chapter in the history of colonial intervention in Timor Leste. The death of civilians was massive from the beginning of the occupation while Falintil tried to fight back the invaders. The urban population fled to the mountains and the remaining Portuguese Administrators stationed in Atauro left the territory. The UN condemned the invasion of Portuguese Timor and called Indonesia to withdraw immediately in order to respect the right of self-determination and independence of the Timorese People. 15 In other words, nine days after Fretilin s leaders declared Timor-Leste independent from Portugal, Indonesian President Suharto ordered its invasion and military occupation. It was incorporated into Indonesia in July 1976 as the province of Timor Timur. A pacification Fretilin decrees by proclamation, unilaterally, the independence of East Timor, from hours today, declaring the state of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist. Long live to Democratic Republic of East Timor! Long live the people of East Timor, free and independent Long live Fretilin. 28 November Kota and Partido Trabalhista. 15 S/RES/384 (1975) adopted by the Security Council on 22 December

8 The same old story? Peace-Keeping and Nation-Building operation was implemented over the next two decades resulting in the death of an estimated 100,000 to 250,000 Timorese people (Budiardjo & Liong 1984: 9). The UN vote reflected to what extent political interests favoring Indonesia were taking place. Inbaraj (1995: 49) concluded that Many Western powers could not bring themselves to vote against Jakarta and abstained. The political context of a Muslim Indonesia being a close ally with the west in the cold-war against communist expansion produced a divided voting. While 59 countries condemned the occupation, 11 voted against it and the large number of 55 abstained. The abstentions included the United States, Britain, Australia, Germany, France and, surprisingly, Singapore. Japan, the leading investor in Indonesia voted against the resolution (Inbaraj 1995: 49). As Budiardjo and Liong (1984: 7) explained, Indonesia s hostile position towards the independent government in Timor was not only a question of security, but the paranoia of a military regime. The possibility of bordering a democratic and non-aligned country was perceived by Suharto s repressive regime as a great threat. This was seen as a bad example to West Timor and also to other parts of Indonesia that were under the military regime. By labeling the Fretilin government as communist, Suharto naturally benefited from US attention and support. In fact, two other factors were relevant too. First, the US after being defeated in Vietnam left behind a massive arsenal ready to strengthen Suharto s military. Secondly the possibility of the domino effect of communism extending to Timor-Leste appeared to be more than just a hypothesis because the Indonesian propaganda in those days reported links between Vietnam, the USSR and Timorese Fretilin. It was said that arms were smuggled by Soviet submarines while Vietnamese troops were disguised as Chinese in order to support independence (Inbaraj 1995: 46). The ties between Suharto s regime and western powers were not new. In fact, in the Cold-War context Western Powers and some donors had been supporting Suharto s regime for more than a decade. Western Governments had already established strong economic ties with Indonesia after the 1965 coup d état by which Suharto took power. As Budiardjo and Liong (1984: 9) stated the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) was set up in 1967 on the initiative of Japan, who had become Indonesia s chief trading partner and primary source of capital investment its goal was to coordinate economic support for the military regime on the basis of the assessments and advice of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The other members of the IGGI are the USA, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and almost all Western Europe Governments. Concerning the Timorese invasion the IGGI s deliberations have remained totally unaffected by Indonesia s invasion of East Timor: the level of western aid and investment steadily increased throughout the 1970 s and into the 1980 s. Regarding the arms supply, these authors asserted that: 67

9 六甲台論集 - 国際協力研究編 - 第 1 3 号 Military support had also grown substantially since 1975, with the USA being the major western supplier. Others included Australia, the Netherlands, Britain, West Germany, France and Sweden. No country had allowed Indonesia s naked aggression to stand in the way of selling weapons, aircraft and naval vessels, as Indonesia modernized its Armed Forces thereby strengthening their capacity to cope with a protracted war against East Timor. The western powers most directly concerned, the USA and Australia, had made up their minds well before the invasion to give Indonesia a free hand (Budiardjo and Liong 1984: 8). Following the course of history, it is important to note the fact that many of what nowadays are called donor countries had been involved in providing political support, economic aid and weapons to the Suharto regime since That regime emerged as a reaction to counter-attack the spread of communism in Indonesia and therefore in the region. By that time, Indonesia was the home of the largest communist party (PKI) in a non-communist country. Some members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) were also part of the Sukarno Government 16 and the military. Suharto led a military coup in 1965 and as a result of a bloody campaign against PKI members half a million people would lose their lives. From 1975 until the time of the consultation for independence in 1999, the US continued its military support, transferring over a billion dollars of weaponry to the Indonesian regime. Everything from F-16 fighter planes to military helicopters to M-16 combat rifles was used in the suppression of dissent in East Timor and throughout Indonesia 17. The level of cooperation between Washington and Jakarta was qualified by Chomsky (2000: 53) as impressive, stating that: US weapons sales to Indonesia amounted to over $1 billion since the 1975 invasion. Military aid during the Clinton years was at about $150 million. In this respect, Noam Chomsky (2000: 51) comments that: It would have sufficed for the US and its allies to withdraw their active participation, and to inform their close associates in the Indonesian military command that the atrocities must be terminated and the territory granted the right of self-determination that has been upheld by the United Nations and the International Court of Justice. 7. The Road from Resistance to Self-Determination For more than two decades Indonesia carried out a systematic plan of integration of East Timor. Despite the fact that the Indonesian military (TNI 18 and the Kopassus 19 ) found 16 Sukarno is Indonesia s first president and stayed in power for 22 years, from Independence from Holland until the 1965 coup. 17 Some of the US weapons systems sold to Jakarta during this period included: 16 Rockwell OV-10 "Bronco" counter-insurgency aircraft, 3 Lockheed Martin C-130 transport aircraft and 36 Cadillac- Gage V-150 "Commando" armored cars, S-61 helicopters, patrol craft, M-16 rifles, pistols, mortars, machine guns, ammunition, and communications equipment ( 18 TNI means in Indonesian: Tentara Nasional Indonesia, in English: The Indonesian National Armed Forces. 68

10 The same old story? Peace-Keeping and Nation-Building unexpected resistance from the Falintil, the overwhelming military capacity of the invaders encouraged a large number of Timorese civilians to support the resistance cause and fight as clandestinos. 20 Within the first two months after the invasion 60,000 civilian people were estimated to have been killed. During the years of occupation around 200,000 individuals perished as victims either of starvation or under Indonesian military violence 21. Mattoso describes people s resistance in these terms: The East Timorese people have given exemplary evidence of its support to independence. Their supports sustained the armed struggle and gave to half a dozen guerrilla combatants with virtually no weapons or money, the strength to embattle for twenty-four years an army of tenths of thousand men equipped with heavy armament and trained by the strongest military power in the world. Its support turned the slogan Homeland or Death in to a tragically true principle a hundred, or a thousand, times demonstrated by a hundred, or a thousand, cases of humiliation, murder, torture and rape (Resistencia Timorense 2011: 12). It is only after Suharto s demise that on 5 May 1999 an agreement between the UN, Indonesia and Portugal (as the administering power of a non-self-governing territory) allowed a popular consultation to take place in East Timor. The tripartite agreement did not include any kind of Timorese participation and allowed the Indonesian forces to remain in charge of the internal security. By that time, Habibie had become the President 22 of Indonesia and had to deal with another great challenge: organizing the first presidential elections in Indonesia in 44 years. On 11 June 1999 the UN Security Council mandated UNAMET to organize and conduct the consultation. Two months after and despite several impediments and threats of punishment by the Indonesian military, 94% of the Timorese voted in a popular consultation. For the first time in their history, they had the chance to decide by themselves about their future. In this opportunity, there were two options: "Do you accept the proposed special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia?" or "Do you reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor's separation from Indonesia?" An overwhelming majority of 78.5% of the Timorese chose independence. The announcement of the result showed another relevant aspect of the connection between Indonesia and the US. During 1990s the US continued training and advising the TNI and Kopassus in counter-insurgency tactics. Before the consultation, Kopassus was in charge of organizing and arming the militias. Those groups acted to scare Timorese before the 1999 voting and to punish them after the independence vote was won. The US disapproved all intents to deploy an international force to provide security during and after the consultation 19 Kopassus means in Indonesian: Komando Pasukan Khusus, in English Special Forces Command. 20 Clandestine members. 21 Of a population of 600,000 (COMA O PUNTO) inhabitants that means that 30% of east Timorese faced a violent, unjust, or avoidable death. 22 Habibie was Suharto s vice president. 69

11 六甲台論集 - 国際協力研究編 - 第 1 3 号 process, saying that Indonesia was capable of guarantying Timorese security. That policy gave a green light to the Indonesian military at the time of withdrawal to execute a scorched earth policy, burning houses and looting everything in its path. Around 80% of all infrastructure was destroyed and it is believed that more than 1,000 people were murdered (Chomsky 2000: 51). According to Traub, the aftermath of the consultation also highlighted two other significant political aspects. The first one is that the UN was willing to intervene only ex post which means only after the violence spread. The second one is that the international actors that were supportive of Suharto s regime shifted their position making a significant pressure on President Habibie. The peace-keeping force was mandated by the Security Council only after the result of the voting had increased the level of violence and not before or while it was taking place. While Portugal and Australia were demanding the Security Council to act firmly, with Australia offering itself to lead a multinational force, the US was pushing the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to freeze loans to Indonesian Government 23. Only when that took place President Habibie phoned Kofi Annan to tell him that they would accept the Australian-led force (Traub 2000: 79). Wheeler and Dunne (2001: 818) concluded that the pressure posed to the Indonesian Government took two forms. The first one was as a financial coercion with the World Bank and the IMF. The second one was more of a moral censure by which Indonesia feared becoming isolated internationally. While playing international politics the Indonesian government was directly responsible for the outrage of destruction and violence and once more the Timorese had to pay with their lives for their right to independence and self-determination. In other words, this situation proves that some of the contemporary major donors not only were supportive of the Indonesian annexation from the beginning but also their decision seemed to have been enough to put an end to it. 8. Self-Determination or UNSC Right to Intervene? In this regard, it is now relevant to bear in mind that the general principle of selfdetermination is established in the UN Charter. In its first chapter entitled The Purposes of the United Nations the respect for the right of self-determination is established in the article 1.2 where it is clearly stated that the UN purpose is: 2.-To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace (UN Charter first chapter). In Article 2 the principle of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention are outlined and the threat of use of force is expressly banned by asserting that: 1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members and 23 IMF froze a $ 1 billion aid program to Indonesia and the WB a $ 450 million rescue package (Traub 2000: 79). 70

12 The same old story? Peace-Keeping and Nation-Building 4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII (UN Charter first chapter). This means that the rights and principles stated in the first chapter of the UN Charter establishes a limit to the capacity of the UN to enforce measures under the Chapter VII. That also means that the restrictions to the general principles of self-determination, sovereignty and non-intervention can only be exercised by resolutions issued by the Security Council. Under the title: Chapter VII: action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression article 39 establishes that: The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security (UN Charter first chapter). From an international law perspective, during the Indonesian occupation period, Timor-Leste was listed at the UN General Assembly as a non self-governing territory with Portugal as the administering Power. Consequently, no country except Australia has ever recognized the legitimacy of Indonesia's annexation of Timorese territory. Despite Timor s international legal status, in practical terms and according to Traub (2000: 77) the UN Security Council always treated the Timor issue as if it were purely an internal Indonesian problem. In relation to Australia s recognition of the Indonesian annexation and the subsequent negotiation of maritime boundaries in the Timor Gap between the Australian and the Indonesian Government, on February 1991 Portugal instituted proceedings against Australia in the International Court of Justice. 24 The case was labeled as concerning certain activities of Australia with respect to East Timor. According to Portugal s lawsuit Australia had, by its conduct, "failed to observe the obligation to respect the duties and powers of (Portugal) the administering Power (of East Timor)... and... the right of the people of East Timor to selfdetermination and the related rights." In consequence, Portugal argued that Australia had "incurred international responsibility vis-à-vis both the people of East Timor and Portugal" (ICJ 1995, para 1-10). Although the Court, by 14 votes to 2, found that it could not exercise its jurisdiction on the matter, it recognizes the above mentioned international legal status of Timorese territory. In its conclusions, as well as in other parts of the judgment, the Court 24 ICJ case: Concerning East Timor (PORTUGAL vs. AUSTRALIA), Judgment of 30 June

13 六甲台論集 - 国際協力研究編 - 第 1 3 号 recalls in any event that it has taken note in the Judgment that, for the two Parties (Australia and Portugal), the Territory of East Timor remains a non-self governing territory and its people has the right to self-determination (ICJ 1995, para 36-37). The 5 th May Agreement was a result of tripartite talks between Portugal, Indonesia and the UN. It was not only about the popular consultation but also about what to do afterwards. According to the Tripartite Agreement the UN was already legally entitled to intervene in Timor-Leste. Regrettably, the Timorese people were not part of the agreement and they were just expected to vote at the consultation. While Indonesia had de facto control, Portugal was still de jure authority and the UN dealt with them as competing powers over the same territory. In order to seal the agreement to allow the vote of independence, on 20 October 1999, the Portuguese Ambassador to the UN clarified Portugal s position about Timor-Leste sovereignty by stating that his country would relinquish its legal ties to East Timor and consider UNTAET its successor with the passage of the Security Council mandate apparently no other written expression on the part of Portugal was required (Chopra 2002: 984). The agreement also cemented in its Article 7 a window of opportunity for the UN to exercise sovereignty during the transition period 25. The text specified that if the Timorese opted for their independence, Indonesia would ensure peaceful and orderly (as the text establishes) transferring the authority over Timorese territory to the UN by using the words adequate United Nations presence in the text. However, the concession made to the UN guaranteeing its intervention in the aftermath of the vote (in case the independence option won) had been sealed without any Timorese consensus or consultation. Therefore, the UN was about to apply a right to deployment negotiated exclusively by external powers. 9. From Humanitarian Intervention to the UN Transitional Administration As was already explained, once the vote for independence by the popular consultation was made public on 30 August 1999, the situation in Timor-Leste worsened. The Indonesian military developed local militias in order to indiscriminately attack the civilian population. Their intention was clear, to provide a punishment to the extensive majority of Timorese who had chosen independence instead of the path of autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia. When being asked about the ongoing massacre, the Indonesian Government officials affirmed that their troops were trying to deal with a criminal situation. Without specifying whether the criminal situation was the one perpetrated by the militias or by their organizers, in reality, the whole situation appeared to be out of their control. When the destruction and violence produced by the Indonesian withdrawal operation received international interest from the media, the UN decided to launch a humanitarian 25 Article 7 of the agreement establishes that during the interim period between the conclusion of the popular consultation and the start of the implementation of either option, the parties request the Secretary-General to maintain an adequate United Nations presence in East Timor. 72

14 The same old story? Peace-Keeping and Nation-Building intervention in Timor-Leste. On 12 September, Indonesia accepted a UN international peacekeeping force to enter the territory. In response to Australia s pressure on the Security Council on 15 September 1999 an Australian-led multinational coalition force (International Force for East Timor - INTERFET) was allowed to deploy to restore peace and security in Timorese territory. A few days later, on 25 October 1999, a Transitional Administration in the form of a peacekeeping operation (PKO) with a broad state-building mandate and with full executive, legislative and judicial authority, was mandated by the UN Security Council Resolution By February 2000 Timor became a complete UN peace-keeping operation when Australian troops mostly became UN blue helmets. Acting beyond the concession made in the text of the May Agreement in exercising the above mentioned international legal framework (Chapter VII), the UN Security Council created the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) according to this mandate (Resolution 1272/1999): Determining that the continuing situation in East Timor constitutes a threat to peace and security and Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Decides to establish, in accordance with the report of the Secretary General, a United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which will be endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and will be empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice; 2. Decides also that the mandate of UNTAET shall consist of the following elements: (a) To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor; (b) To establish an effective administration; (c) To assist in the development of civil and social services; (d) To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance; (e) To support capacity-building for self-government; (f) To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development; 3. Decides further that UNTAET will have objectives and a structure along the lines set out in part IV of the report of the Secretary-General, and in particular that its main components will be: (a) A governance and public administration component, including an international police element with a strength of up to 1,640 officers; (b) A humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation component; (c) A military component, with a strength of up to 8,950 troops and up to 200 military observers; 4. Authorizes UNTAET to take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate; 73

15 六甲台論集 - 国際協力研究編 - 第 1 3 号 5. Recognizes that, in developing and performing its functions under its mandate, UNTAET will need to draw on the expertise and capacity of Member States, United Nations agencies and other international organizations, including the international financial institutions (UNSC Resolution 1272/1999). It is debatable whether or not the tripartite agreement actually allowed the UNSC to transform an adequate UN presence into a military intervention. The practical justification was that the spread of violence intensified and escalated after the vote of independence. However, the practical implementation of the mission became another particular aspect when the UN Security Council decided to launch a military operation with a hybrid composition: both as a peacekeeping operation and as a transitional administration. From that moment, Timor-Leste was under UN Security Council authority. The UN thus performed not only a peace-keeping operation but also served as a transitional administration. In other words: Without specifically saying so, the UN had ultimate authority of a kind that in the contemporary international system is reserved for sovereign states (Suhrke 2001: 2). The United Nation s role in the case of Timor-Leste appears to the world as a successful endeavor of peace-operation and nation-building. Indeed Timor-Leste offered a unique opportunity to prove that the UN and international donors had the commitment, the capacity and the knowledge to create a modern state based on democratic values respectful of the human rights of its citizens and accountable to the civil society. In order to implement this process UNTAET exerted power in a unique political scenario for a peace keeping operation. The Indonesian army had withdrawn. INTERFET faced no relevant armed resistance or opposition while local people openly welcomed them. Instead of a variety of antagonistic armed groups the UN only had to deal with a single political actor, the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT). Adding to the advantageous situation, by 2000 UNTAET was the second largest peace keeping operation in the world involving many committed nations. It is relevant to bear in mind that the UN PKO humanitarian intervention in Timor- Leste was a clear example of post-cold War politics. After the Cold War, the US intervention in Somalia in 1993 and its subsequent withdrawal 26 provided an unsuccessful lesson of external military interventions for humanitarian reasons. However, the Rwanda episode in 1994 showed that half a million people being massacred was enough for rethinking the role of military intervention. In fact, after Rwanda, military intervention was back in business, and the new role was the maintenance of peace after conflict ended. The peace-keeping interventions became pretty hit-and-miss: some places got lots of troops, others not many (Collier 2008: 125). In the end, as Wheeler and Dunne (2001:805) state the use of force for humanitarian purposes has become a familiar pattern in post-cold War international politics. 26 The US military withdraw after 18 soldiers were killed (Collier 2008:125). 74

16 The same old story? Peace-Keeping and Nation-Building The question was how much of the military peace-keeping was required to secure the operation? Categorically, Collier (2008: 125) explained that about the highest ratio in the world of foreign peacekeepers to population was in East Timor. Hence, why was Timor-Leste so popular for peacekeepers? Collier has illustrated the situation in the following terms: I asked why there were so many peacekeepers in that country. The answer I got about summed up the problems of foreign military intervention: because it was safe there. Governments that send soldiers to serve as UN peacekeepers are paid $1,000 per individual per month. For some countries this is not a bad way of getting some income from their armies. The imperative is then that soldiers should not get themselves killed, so safe environments such as East Timor are ideal, and risky environments such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo are unattractive (Collier 2008: 127). 10. The Transitional Administration as a Sovereign State UNTAET was mandated with a broad scope of state-building attributes that turn it into a sovereign power. According to Chesterman (2001: 2) the transitional administrations are the latest chapter in state-building 27 activities done by the UN where some or all government functions and state sovereignty are assumed by the UN for a certain period of time. The author asserts that "transitional administrations represent the most complex operations attempted by the United Nations. The operations in East Timor and Kosovo are commonly seen as unique in the history of the UN perhaps never to be repeated. In the case of Timor-Leste however, unlike Kosovo, the UN had its first challenge of administrating a territory that had no preexisting institutions. The territory had never been a nation and had no functioning state, no constitution and no currency. In comparison with Kosovo it presented another unique feature. Timor-Leste s future independent status was never in doubt after the popular consultation while Kosovo s UN mission was dealing with a sovereignty issue which had yet to be solved (Traub 2000). It is relevant to highlight that state-building is not a new challenge for the UN. The UN has been in a range of state-building missions since Different missions around the globe were implemented in places like Cambodia, West Papua, Namibia, Western Sahara, Somalia, Eastern Slavonia, Southern Sudan, etc. Some of these places still have UN PKO missions with state-building mandates. 27 Chesterman (2001: 2) defines the term state-building as the extended international involvement (primarily, though not exclusively, through the United Nations) that goes beyond traditional peacekeeping and peace-building mandates, and is directed at developing the institutions of government by assuming some or all of those sovereign powers on a temporary basis. This highlights the linkage between recent events and earlier activities by the United Nations and its predecessor, the League of Nations, in exercising or supervising varying forms of trusteeship over territory. 28 UNTEA in West Papua ( ), UNTAG in Namibia ( ), MINURSO in West Sahara (1991 until now), UNTAC in Cambodia ( ), UNOSOM II in Somalia ( ), UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia ( ). 75

17 六甲台論集 - 国際協力研究編 - 第 1 3 号 It is useful to try imagining in which environment the UN had to face its challenge. The territory had suffered a last devastating operation by the Indonesian occupation. Almost all infrastructures were destroyed and a vast majority of the population displaced. As a way to describe the situation in 1999, Traub (2000: 74) provides the following explanation UN officials in Kosovo used to refer to the bombed-out territory they administered as the empty shell. Then many of them were moved to East Timor, the UN s latest hardship case, where they discovered the true meaning of emptiness. In comparison with the other UN PKO missions, UNTAET may have been the most powerful in terms of the extension of its mandate. Moreover, it can be distinguished from the previous UNAMET mission in Timor during 1999 and with the UNMIK in Kosovo since 1999 in the fact that UNTAET not only had executive, legislative and judicial powers, not for the primary responsibility of organizing elections but with the aspect of dealing with the challenge of starting a country from ground zero. The practice of state-building was broad and covered not only the creation of an army and the police but even extended to negotiating treaties A Militarized Mission as a State-Builder: a Contradiction in Terms? If we ask how it was possible that the UN launched a hybrid peace-operation to do state-building, the answer can be found in the unique post-conflict scenario that Timor-Leste was offering to conduct the state-building experiment. First of all, by the time the UN entered the territory the main security threat, the Indonesian army, had already withdrawn. 30 Moreover, Timorese people were welcoming the mission and at that time the UN officials had the chance to deal with a single political council. 31 Furthermore, UNTAET had not only the financial support of the UN and other donors but a political attribute that cannot even be found in democratic regimes, the exclusiveness of the sum of all powers. Executive, legislative and judiciary powers were under the same Transitional Administrator. The above mentioned circumstances seemed to be the perfect scenario for succeeding to support capacity-building for self-government and to establish an effective administration (UNSC Resolution 1272/1999). How can the UNTAET period be summed up? Edward Rees 32 stated in his interview that that Timor-Leste was governed for 2 and half years by a UN experimental government that did not know how to do it. In fact, only one year after UNTAET was mandated it became fully staffed by which time they were already thinking about how to finish the mission and leave. Despite that, Rees continued saying that UNTAET s delivery was high in many areas 29 UNTAET negotiated with Australia matters concerning with the oil exploitation in the Timor Gap. 30 INTERFET and not the UN had succeeded to disarm the militias and to provide security while the Indonesian army was leaving the territory. 31 The National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT). 32 Executive Director of the Peace Dividend Trust (Timor-Leste s SSR specialist) interviewed in this office in Dili on 28 March

18 The same old story? Peace-Keeping and Nation-Building such as: declaring independence, creating some jobs by boosting the economy, establishing a justice system, and achieving peaceful elections. His conclusion was that UNTAET helped Timor-Leste by giving them 3 years to think about what they wanted to do. Apart from the time constrains, the UN enterprise that was in charge of developing democratic institutions (among other sectors) suffered from an internal contradiction that diminished its capacity to fulfill its mandate successfully. The gap was the result of the two intertwined matters: mandate and structure. In terms of mandate, although the UNSC launched UNTAET as a military operation (PKO) with a broad and vague mandate it was expected to develop a country as a transitional administration. In other words, the UNSC launched a PKO with absolute powers tasked not only with peace keeping, but to provide temporary administration of a territory while doing state building under a mandate that was broad and vague. The UNSC authorized UNTAET to take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate. It commanded the mission to provide security and maintain law and order and to establish an effective administration focusing on capacity-building for self-government. Concerning its structure, the transitional administration itself was a sovereign power that had more attributes than any democratic nation, however, the structure of the mission lacked specific pillars or departments for development and reconstruction making its tasks more difficult to achieve. Suhrke (2001) understood that Timor-Leste was not a successful operation but a test case, an experiment for state-building. In practice, UNTAET s role as state-builder while having a peacekeeping nature would prove this to be the case. According to this author, though it was described as an unprecedented governance and nation-building mission, it suffered also from a very basic gap. The underlying conflict was between its structure and its mandate. Although its role was to prepare Timor-Leste for independence it was established on a basic peacekeeping platform. The fact that UNTAET operated under the militarized standards of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was a serious obstacle because of the limited capacity in governance and state-building that the DPKO had. The contradiction was more evident when looking at the number of UN officials designated to state-building. Resolution 1272 established a governance and public administration component, including an international police element with a strength of up to 1,640 officers, and authorized the deployment of a military component with a strength of up to 8,950 troops and up to 200 military observers (UNSC Resolution 1272/1999). Antero Benedito da Silva 33 summarized this argument assessing that UNTAET was a very militarized intervention and what Timor-Leste needed was more civilian (and not military) advice. He pointed out that the problem was that there were too many military and police forces under UNTAET from the beginning. UN personnel were not able to deal with many non- 33 Professor of the Timor Lorosae University interviewed on 29 March 2011 at the Peace Centre of the University. 77