CONFLICT BRIEFING NOTES

Transcription

1 CONFLICT BRIEFING NOTES CONFLICT BRIEFING NO. 1, August 01 KEY MESSAGES PAGE 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. CONTEXT ANALYSIS & CONFLICT PROFILE 3. POLITICAL. ECONOMIC 3. SOCIAL 6. THE NATIONAL CONTEXT 7. JAS CAPTURES MORE TOWNS & VILLAGES 8. JAS RECRUITS MEMBERS IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES 9. NIGERIAN SOLDIERS DESERT POST TO CAMEROUN 10 UPDATE ON CHIBOK GIRLS IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRAMMING IN NSRP STATES RECOMMENDATIONS 6 7 *Disclaimer: The contents of this briefing note do not necessarily reflect the views of DFID or the UK Government. ** All reports are based on anonymous NSRP sources.

2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY One of the highest civilian casualties in the insurgency in the North East was recorded in August with a reported death toll of about 1,036. The bloody clashes resulting from attacks by suspected JAS militants on communities in Gwoza, Marte, Kukawa and Dikwa LGAs, also claimed about 60 soldiers. The JAS emboldened by lapses in strategy and logistics of military mobilized to take over major areas in Borno state. It also appears the resort to occupation of towns and villages it overran was also a strategy of JAS to connect with Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) which has established a caliphate in sections of Iraq and Syria it has conquered. The ability of JAS to capture and occupy more towns has further eroded public confidence in the Nigerian military that worsened with the lingering captivity of over 0 Chibok school girls. The efforts of the Nigerian military to restore public confidence have been undermined by reports of fleeing soldiers abandoning their posts to neighbouring Cameroun and perceptions that Chadian and Cameroonian military authorities have been more effective in containing the JAS during the month. The Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) became a major national security challenge in the month as health authorities battled to contain it. Consequently, government announced the extension of holiday for primary and secondary schools in the country to prevent infection of pupils and students. However, hopes that the EVD has been contained to Lagos were dashed as a primary contact of the index case escaped quarantine leading to infection of some persons in Port Harcourt. The month of August also witnessed heightening tensions arising from mobilizations by politicians to secure their ambitions in their parties for the upcoming 01 elections. Although the Osun gubernatorial election held without feared violence due to large troop presence, unrestrained inflammatory comments by politicians and mobilization of armed groups by political factions heightened tensions and led to violence in some localities. The candidacy of President Goodluck Jonathan in the 01 election remained the main bone of contention. Context Analysis/Conflict Profile Political Key political drivers of conflict persisted across NSRP target states and nationally. In Kano state, political factions remained divided over the presidential ambition of Kwankwaso and his rumoured attempt to impose an unpopular candidate as his successor as well as the appointment of Alhaji Sanusi Lamido Sanusi as Emir of Kano. Several candidates notably incumbent deputy Governor and a member of the House of Representatives have reportedly started mobilizing support for the Kano governorship against the wishes of Kwankwaso. The Kano state Chapter of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), which experienced a revival with the appointments of Mallam Ibrahim Shekarau and Ambassador Aminu Wali respectively as education minister and foreign affairs minister, elected new party executives at ward, LGA and state levels. Leaders of the PDP claim the party is ready to regain the state, which it lost following the defection of Kwankwaso to the All Peoples Congress (APC) last year. Inflammatory political commentary in the mass and popular social media contributed to heightening tension. Meanwhile, Emir Muhammad Sanusi took steps to consolidate his Emirship by appointing loyalists and de-escalating conflict with Abuja. He reportedly withdrew all legal cases he instituted against the Federal Government over his suspension as Central Bank of Nigeria.

3 In Kaduna state, the main political development was the mobilizations by some political groups to ensure Governor Muktar Ramalan Yero the incumbent, secures an 'automatic ticket' for re-election. This mobilization has generated opposition from some groups in Southern Kaduna who feel the governorship should revert to their zone since their opportunity to produce the state governor was truncated by the death of Late Governor Patrick Yakowa. For instance, Southern Kaduna PDP youth group has openly rejected the proposal for an automatic ticket for Yero. During the month also, several candidates including a former Aviation minister from Southern Kaduna declared their interest to contest for the governorship under the platform of the PDP. Since the idea of automatic ticket is unconstitutional, any attempt to impose it would likely undermine peace. In neighbouring Plateau an uneasy calm continues to reign as politicians have yet to declare their interest in the governorship amidst the mobilizations by the three senatorial districts to produce the next governor. The restraint by politicians is based on fears to courting the hostility and opposition from Governor Jonah Jang, a retired military officer, who is likely going to be the kingmaker. The incumbent reportedly engineered the removal of the chairman of the ruling PDP in June shortly after he started mobilization to become the next governor. The Niger Delta remained a beehive of political activities as various groups jostled for advantage over the candidacy of President Goodluck Jonathan and the governorship in the state. More groups and individuals, including ex-militants mobilised against Chibuike Amaechi and Seriake Dickson (governors of Rivers and Bayelsa states respectively) over their alleged lukewarm attitude to the candidacy of the president. While Amaechi has not denied his position on the candidacy of Jonathan since he decamped to the APC, Dickson, who emerged governor in 01 with the support of the president, has denied the allegation. The rift in Rivers state between pro-jonathan politicians in PDP and Amaechi deepened in the month with clashes between APC and PDP supporters after the later allegedly mobilised to stop the visit of Amaechi to some communities in Obio/Akpor LGA. Economic The North-East continues to experience significant decline in economic activities as a result of the insurgency. Scarcity of food and household provisions has been aggravated by forced migration of population into Maiduguri and Damaturu from the villages and towns that have become victims of frequent attacks by JAS. The commercial city of Kano has experienced a lull in trading activities due largely to the end of the Eid el Fitr celebrations. However, the general economy of the state has profited significantly from the election of new local government council leaders who have started actualizing their electoral promises through development projects in the now local government areas with a view to retaining power come 01. In Plateau state, there are concerns that the planned demolition of Jos Terminus market will affect livelihoods and aggravate hardships faced by residents. The popular market, which was the location of twin bomb attacks in May, was officially designated for demolition in the last week of August 01. Aside from the economic hardship this would bring to the affected traders and their families, there is the rising fear that this development may create a pool of willing 'foot soldiers' that can easily be mobilized to engage in political violence Incidents of oil theft, oil spills and kidnapping produced negative impacts on the economies of the Niger Delta. In August, Shell pushed ahead with plans to divest from its onshore oil fields when it handed over several oil fields for the benefit of indigenous companies. There were concerns that this would affect foreign investment in the region. However, there are expectations that new investments by national oil companies will regenerate the economies and produce jobs for youths. 3

4 Social Kaduna state sustained relative peace during the month. Incidences of violence were reported in Sanga LGA where some communities had started fighting in July. Three persons were killed and 3 others injured during an attack on Gimi village attributed to invading Fulani herdsmen. On August 11, armed cattle thieves attacked the village of Yelwa in Shendam LGA and Dorowa village in Barkin Ladi LGA of Plateau state killing five persons and rustling 13 cows from herdsmen in Plateau state. The Miyatti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBEN) has complained that security agents were overwhelmed and could not respond to alerts by victims of the theft. This loss of confidence is likely to further undermine peace and security as aggrieved groups are likely to launch reprisal attacks on suspected communities. In the Niger Delta, Kidnapping, armed robberies, sea piracy and other forms of organized crimes continue to impair social activities in the region. Particularly in Rivers state, inter and intra cult gang reprisal killings assumed a fearful dimension in the month with 8 persons shot dead at popular bars along Aggrey Road in PortHarcourt. On August 1, members of the Deebam (pro-pdp) and Deewell (pro-apc) cult groups clashed in Gokana LGA resulting in deaths. The cult clashes continued for days until community chiefs waded into the matter and administered traditional oaths to the warring gangs. Fragile peace has now returned to the community. The conflict between the Egbebiri community located on the Northeastern edge of Bayelsa state and the Italian-owned Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC) led to the closure of the NAOC facility in early August. The Egbebiri people accuse the company of destroying their environment stating also that the names of the oil wells do not reflect local culture and have therefore refused to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with NAOC. The people are also demanding that the company change the names they gave to their oil wells on their land to reflect their community names. JAS activities continued to affect the welfare of the people of the North East with rising food prices and strain on the absorptive capacity of internally displaced persons. Destruction of infrastructure has also aggravated living conditions. For instance, human and vehicular traffic in Buni Yadi and Damaturu has been affected by the destruction of Katarko Bridge by JAS militants. Travelers and road users are subjected to the risk of taking boats to cross River Katarko to join waiting vehicles to Buni Yadi or Buni Gari. The National Context JAS captures more towns and villages The month of August 01 witnessed the biggest conquest by JAS - the conquest of Gwoza in Borno state on August, 01 leading to the killing of over 100 persons. Among the casualties were the Chief, the Emir's wife and several soldiers while the Emir escaped into Adamawa state. In the absence of Nigerian security forces, the JAS militants ransacked the area breaking into shops and looting food, alcohol, drugs and other items. NSRP sources indicated that the group had surrounded Gwoza for days before attacking the town and launching an attack on the Police Mobile Training Centre at Limankara, south of Gwoza. Police authorities in Abuja have reported several officers missing in the aftermath of the attack. Residents and leaders of Gwoza have decried the apparent decision of soldiers deployed to protect them to abandon their posts which facilitated incursions by JAS militants.

5 The JAS also reportedly took over the headquarters of Madagali Local Government Area in Adamawa state after dislodging a military base and forcing residents to flee. Madagali is the first town in Adamawa state that JAS has captured. About 10,000 internally displaced persons from Gwoza and Izge were camped in Madagali, which lies about 0 kilometers away from Gwoza. On 0 August, the insurgents captured and hoisted their flag in Buni Yadi, headquarters of Gujba Local Government in Yobe state. The insurgents now move freely in the area brandishing their guns and weapons, occupying locations that were previously manned by the military. JAS recruits members in neighbouring countries Reports from security forces and civilians in Maiduguri suggest that JAS has recruited and trained hundreds of young Cameroonians to carry out attacks in their own country. As the group seeks to gain a foothold in the poor, rural north of Cameroon, security experts warn that violence may spread beyond border areas to other parts of the central African country. At a recent meeting, Amadou Ali Deputy Prime Minister of Cameroon raised an alarm that he had in his possession a list of 0 young people from Kolofata (his hometown) purported to have been recruited by JAS. Kolofata, the hometown of Ali, a prominent figure in Cameroon's fight against Boko Haram, was attacked by suspected JAS militants numbering over 00. Reports claim that Children from Kolofata, Fotokol, Makary and Kousseri Dabanga were conscripted, drugged, manipulated and sent against their own city. The JAS onslaught continued from Borno into Cameroun where they killed three Cameroonian soldiers and nine civilians. The local radio in Cameroon reported that the sect attacked Zigague, a town close to the Nigerian border, and burnt down the traditional ruler's house and a police facility. The district head and two of his sons were also abducted by the militants. The militants reportedly rode in on motor bikes and cars, wielding sophisticated weapons, as they engaged the Cameroonian gendarmes. After this attack, the gendarmes unleashed several attacks on the JAS militants towards the Borno Sate border, killing at least 300 militants and driving the sect deep into the Nigerian territory. Nigerian soldiers desert posts to Cameroon On Monday August, about 80 Nigerian soldiers reportedly deserted their posts and took refuge in Cameroun when the JAS launched an attack on the police station and a military base in Gamboru Ngala. However, military authorities claimed that the soldiers did not flee but crossed the border as part of the tactics against JAS. Their decision to handover weapons to Cameroonian authorities was in line with international law. Analysts said this is the largest reported case of Nigerian troops fleeing from battle so far and it is even more telling that they have crossed the border into Cameroon. It is not clear whether these soldiers intend to return to the Nigerian army or if they have deserted altogether, but it raises the question whether the escalating violence in the north-east is a result of the failures of the Nigerian military as opposed to the strength of Boko Haram, considering there have been glaring problems in the equipping and deployment of soldiers to the frontline. Update on Chibok Girls More than four months after unfruitful search for their abducted girls, some parents of the kidnapped Chibok school girls have reportedly said they want the matter closed. Since the girls have been missing for more than four months, the parents said they presumed the students to have died for which their funeral rites have already been performed in their (parents') minds according to their custom. This loss of hope is coming at a time when recent US surveillance flights over northeastern Nigeria reportedly showed images of large groups of girls held together in remote locations.

6 It seems that parents are hopeless since this is not the first time definite information about the location of the abducted schoolgirls will be made by the international forces who had offered to help search for the kidnapped girls. The Nigerian military has repeatedly claimed that it knew where the girls were but was wary of applying force to avert harm to the girls in rescue operations. In early July, United States defense officials claimed they have spotted a group of 60 to 70 girls held in an open field. Two US defense officials added that a set of roughly 0 girls were also sighted in a different field. The US officials have stated that they do not have conclusive information to confirm whether the two groups of girls they saw are the same. Implications for Programming in Select States (Borno, Yobe, Kano, Kaduna, Plateau, Bayelsa, Rivers and Delta) JAS' hold on occupied territories, expansion to new areas and spillover into neighboring countries continues to present challenges to peace and security programming in the Northeast The recent successes of JAS which has seen the insurgent group declare a caliphate in some of its locations will likely affect programming activities in Borno and Yobe. The impact may manifest in government officials being more reluctant to engage in programming that does not directly address the on-going security challenges facing the region. This should not be mistaken as Northern state representatives not recognizing the on-going social and economic needs for their states, but that the absence of security-related activities that are designed to increase community trust in the state and Federal Government's ability to meet their basic needs of security may be met with hesitation. Increasing political competition in Kano and Kaduna states in preparation for the 01 election may impact relationships with programming stakeholders The campaign mobilization has already begun in Kano state with potential candidates openly stating their intention to compete for leadership in the 01 election. Intra and inter party political rivalries have raised tensions in the state. The political realignments caused by the decamping of key politicians in the state to new parties, have led to conflicts in both the APC and the PDP. For instance, recent ward congresses of the PDP generated tensions since the party has enveloped new members that used to be supporters of the APC. This information is important for those programming activities around issues of governance and accountability. Kaduna state is still polarized along ethno-religious lines and these fissures can be manipulated and mobilized by any number of different political entrepreneurs. Currently, the political scene is slowly becoming more active in relation to the quest of the people of Southern Kaduna to regain power amidst mobilizations of people from Kaduna North and Kaduna Central to support re-election of the incumbent. Therefore, the potential use of ethno-religious factors in soliciting for votes can escalate conflict dynamics in Kaduna state and even potentially trigger sectarian violence before and during elections. This information is also important for those programming activities around issues of governance and accountability Conflict around extractive resources between communities and multi-national companies may signal challenges for programming in the Niger Delta Lingering conflicts between communities and oil companies continue to pose security challenges for the Niger Delta states. Several conflicts recorded in the Niger Delta have been linked to recent withdrawal of multinational oil corporations from onshore fields. This is because some beneficiaries of the handover of the oil fields have reneged on agreements aimed at compensating oil producing communities. This information is also important for those programming activities around issues of security, governance and accountability. 6

7 Recommendations 1. It is recommended that the Federal Government should continue to be pressured to provide strong and just security responses to the insecurity in the Northeast. The risks to long-term sustainable peacebuilding in the region continues to be under threat and it is in the interest of the Federal Government to work towards addressing peace and security concerns while also rebuilding trust ties within the communities that have been under assault by JAS for the last few years. International organizations and donors should continue to support efforts to rebuild trust in peace and security officials and institutions among northern communities, especially those in cross border areas with Chad, Niger and Cameroon.. It is recommended that the international community should leverage its relationship with a number of Nigerian political leaders to de-emphasize the politics of personal relationships and nepotism in the upcoming election process with incentives to encourage parties and leaders to run on issues and platforms of development. Also, incentives for non-violent political congresses should also be stressed. For example, the non-violent process of the PDP congress in Kano State should be recognized, supported and rewarded publically to set the tone for the other parties to follow similar methods. 3. It is recommended that in order to de-escalate conflict tensions in the Niger Delta, any outstanding agreements and documents with communities should be mediated or negotiated to a finalized state with the multi-national companies to avoid any potential negative consequences that may result in violence. It is imperative for international pressure on the multi-national companies to finalize agreements that allow for local communities to feel included and represented, thereby enabling the resolution to have the greatest chance for sustainability. 7