Is the Enemy of My Enemy My Friend? Israel and the Gulf States

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1 Part IV Is the Enemy of My Enemy My Friend? Israel and the Gulf States The fact that the Gulf states are considered politically moderate: that they have never fought Israel (Saudi Arabia sent support troops in the June 1967 Six Day War and Kuwait did so in the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, but they were never involved in combat with Israeli forces); that there is no territorial dispute between the sides; and that they are considered pro-american, leads many people in Israel to see them as partners. The Gulf states are in fact likely to give momentum to peace agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, and when such agreements are reached, they may even help to finance them. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is apparently the only country in the Arab world that can give the Palestinians the religious and political legitimacy to reach an agreement, first and foremost concerning core issues, particularly the question of Jerusalem. Israel is likely to receive important commercial benefits (although more modest than what many people believe) from trade relations with the wealthy Gulf states. Between 2003 and 2011, the bloc of Gulf states was the third largest destination for Israeli goods in the Middle East, after the Palestinian Authority and Turkey. Trade 125

2 126 The Arab Gulf States and Reform in the Middle East with them was generally conducted through a third party, which makes it difficult to receive up-to-date statistical information. However, the estimated value of the trade was more than 500 million dollars a year. 1 Nevertheless, the assumption is that the true extent of trade is much larger than reported. Israel also enjoys a certain access to markets in the Gulf because the Arab boycott does not apply to products that do not have an Israeli label. The authorities in the Gulf are aware of this, but they prefer to look the other way. At the same time, as early as 2005, Saudi Arabia made a commitment, as part of the negotiations for it to join the World Trade Organization, that it would end the secondary and tertiary boycotts of Israeli goods. While compliance with the boycott by international corporations has lessened over the years, the Saudi commitment opened the door for leading automotive, food, and electronics companies, which until then had refrained from maintaining business ties with Israeli companies as a result of the boycott, to invest in Israel. The Gulf states, for their part, are likely to benefit from certain products that Israel can offer. From time to time, there are reports of Israeli companies contributing indirectly to the security of these states by training local military forces and offering advanced military technological solutions. 2 Although the economic potential of relations is likely to be relatively small, the two sides can also cooperate on technology for irrigation, medical tourism, desalinization, and as noted, military knowhow and weapons. In this context, it should be noted that there are reports that Israeli companies have extensive ties with the Gulf states. Thus it was reported, inter alia, that ImageSat, a subsidiary of Israel Aerospace Industries, is supplying the UAE with images from its satellites, 3 and that Israeli company Aeronautics has won a bid to supply drones to Abu Dhabi. 4 The chances of establishing formal, open relations between the Arab Gulf states and Israel are expected however to remain subject to the Arab consensus and the internal politics of the GCC. In addition, relations between Israel and these states cannot have a significant impact on the peace process, especially because of their lack of direct involvement in the conflict. Among the Israeli public, too, the attractiveness of normalization with the Gulf states has faded to a large extent. We can say that the cold peace forced on Israel by the states that have signed peace agreements with it, Egypt and Jordan, harmed the ability to present normalization with countries such as the Gulf states as adequate compensation for Israeli territorial concessions. 5

3 127 It is interesting that the two Gulf states with the closest ties to Iran Qatar and Oman are also those that maintained formal relations with Israel. Among the things that contributed to this are the loose frameworks of the GCC, which allows the members to formulate a separate foreign policy, including in relation to the question of reconciliation with Israel. This fact, as well as the inability of the Gulf states to reach agreement concerning Israel, may actually serve Israeli interests because the common perception is that a unified policy by the GCC states would not be in Israel s favor. It appears that even in the future, if states such as Oman and Qatar make gestures toward Israel, other states in the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, can be expected to continue to display hesitation, if only because of the possibility that open rapprochement with Israel may anger the religious establishment of the monarchy and conservative elements in the kingdom. The saying that Saudi Arabia will be the last country to sign a peace agreement with Israel is as correct today as in the past, although there is a wide distance between full diplomatic relations and total separation that the parties can exploit. The strengthening of relations between Israel and the Gulf states has the potential to soften the Palestinian position. It could also help in funding joint Israeli Palestinian projects and in allowing these states to offer to host political negotiations and thus to give legitimacy to other Arab states that seek to jump on the peace bandwagon. Furthermore, publicly establishing relations with the Gulf states is nevertheless likely to make Israeli public opinion more positive toward concessions in the framework of the peace process. Although relations between Israel and the Arab Gulf states suffer because of a lack of progress in the Israeli Palestinian peace process, it appears that the common threats they face are leading them to continue with contacts. Senior officials from the two sides are continuing to hold meetings, especially outside the borders of the region, and Israelis are continuing to visit the Gulf for various purposes. Thus, for example, Israel s Minister of National Infrastructure, Uzi Landau, visited Abu Dhabi in January 2010 and Binyamin Ben Eliezer, Minister of Industry, Trade, and Labor, was in Doha in May of that year. A short time after the assassination of Hamas official Mahmoud Abdel Rauf al-mabhouh in Dubai in early 2010, an event widely attributed to Israel, Qatar proposed restoring diplomatic relations with Jerusalem in exchange for Israel s approval for carrying out reconstruction work in Gaza. It appears that Israel s opposition to the proposal stemmed, inter alia, from Egyptian

4 128 The Arab Gulf States and Reform in the Middle East pressure, over Qatar s terms, and from Qatar s ties with radical elements, particularly Iran and Hamas. (According to Israeli sources, Qatar is providing Hamas with some 200 million dollars per annum.) 6 According to reports, these ties and virulently anti-israel comments on Qatar s home station, Al Jazeera, 7 led to a decision by Israel to cut off ties with Qatar completely and to close its diplomatic mission in Doha once and for all in March 2011, to ban Qatari passport holders from visiting the West Bank (Judea and Samaria), and to stop cooperation between Qatar and Israel s defense industry. Two months later, in May 2011, it was reported that the prime ministers of Qatar and Israel had met in Paris but had not succeeded in breaking the deadlock in relations between the two states. Nevertheless, Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani was quoted as saying that Qatar would continue its relationship with Israel as long as the latter was serious about the peace process, and he pointed out, as evidence of the continuing ties between the two states, Al-Jazeera photographs of Israelis visiting Doha. 8 The Arab Gulf states, in spite of their religious conservatism and their fear of Iran, are close to the United States and seek to maintain stability in the region. An Israeli Palestinian peace agreement would likely contribute to such stability, and therefore, they would appear to be natural supporters of such an agreement. However, their leaders fear of extremist elements in the region, such as Iran and its proxies, which are likely to undermine the stability of their regimes, makes it difficult for them to establish formal relations with Israel, certainly as long as no peace agreement has been signed. Furthermore, the elites in the Gulf are not interested in angering the Arab street, which traditionally tends to oppose normalization with Israel, and they prefer to remain on the safe ground of the Arab consensus. While public opinion is not the main concern of these elites, nevertheless, they are interested in receiving certain legitimacy from it. Therefore, they would find it difficult to completely ignore it, especially given the turmoil that has taken hold of the Middle East since early 2011 and the greater weight given since then to the Arab street. Any progress on the Palestinian Israeli track would make it easier for the Gulf states to move some of their relations with Israel to the public plane, even though currently, being public about relations with Israel would provide them only modest benefits, and such a move might have negative consequences both at home and abroad. Their basic weakness makes it critical for them to maintain legitimacy among the Arabs.

5 129 Iran: a common threat? The Arab Gulf states and the State of Israel have a common interest in strengthening their relationship to weaken the influence of radical forces in the region, irrespective of progress in the Israeli Palestinian peace process. A bloc of states sharing the same strategic outlook could serve as a counterweight to negative Iranian involvement in the region. In spite of condemnations of Israel by rulers in the Gulf states, the two sides do not perceive each other as a threat. The Palestinian issue is far from being at the top of the Gulf states priorities; Iran s ambitions to develop a nuclear program as a means of achieving hegemony in the Gulf is their main concern, as it is Israel s. These states, which recognize the international community s difficulties in stopping Iran on its way to achieving nuclear capability, and which are interested in avoiding angering their neighbor, prefer to work behind the scenes on this issue. What has connected the two sides in recent years more than anything is that growing fear of Iran. While in the past, it was argued that cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel would not expand to topics of strategic importance, such as Iran s aspiration to obtain nuclear capability, 9 nevertheless, it has been reported that several Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, are holding secret contacts with Israel that include mainly an indirect intelligence dialogue, but also a direct one. It is possible that this dialogue does not directly touch on Iranian nuclear development, but it is not inconceivable that the two sides are working to expose and foil activity by Iran or its proxies in the region. Thus, for example, it has been reported in recent years that officials from Israel and the Gulf states have met and discussed the Iranian issue: former Mossad head Meir Dagan met with Saudi officials, and Prince Bandar met with Israeli officials outside the kingdom. There has also been a series of reports on cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia and on security coordination on the possibility of an Israeli military action against Iranian nuclear facilities, which the two sides hastened to deny. 10 The fact that the reports appeared for the first time in the Iranian media may be a sort of warning by Iran to Saudi Arabia, or an attempt to reveal the connection between it and Israel in order to sabotage it. Researchers in the Gulf also claim that the Arab states there are holding consultations and intelligence exchanges with Israel, in particular on the Iranian threat. 11 In the eyes of the Arab rulers in the Gulf, Israel may be vital to regional security, especially since the United States is engaged in a proc-

6 130 The Arab Gulf States and Reform in the Middle East ess of diluting its forces in the Middle East. The leaking of diplomatic cables from the US State Department by WikiLeaks revealed once again the centrality of the Iranian threat in the eyes of the Gulf states, as well as the tougher line that several of them have taken in order to contend with Iran. The cables also revealed some of the ties between the Gulf states and Israel in the Iranian context. Thus, for example, they revealed intelligence cooperation between Israel and Bahrain and the UAE, which the WikiLeaks documents described as an ongoing secret dialogue. 12 We cannot rule out the possibility that Israel and the Arab Gulf states are coordinating policy on one level or another, including toward the US government, whose policy on the Iranian issue is not entirely consistent with their position: both Israel and the Gulf states fear contacts between Iran and the United States, and they would like the United States to take a much firmer approach to Iran. The Gulf states recognize Israel s military power and its close ties with the United States, and therefore, for this reason as well, they see a value in maintaining some level of coordination with Israel. After the signing of the November 23, 2013 interim agreement between Iran and the P5+1, 13 a flux of reports and commentaries has suggested that a rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia is underway. Indeed, both countries are eager to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear capability and would like to curb Iranian attempts to attain regional hegemony. In addition, both are perturbed by recent developments in US policy, particularly the reluctance to use force against Iran and Syria, and signs of a gradual shift away from the problems of the Middle East. However, in spite of the convergence of interests between Israel and Saudi Arabia, full normalization is not on the agenda as long as there is no significant political breakthrough between Israel and the Palestinians. At the same time, there is a wide range between full diplomatic relations and a total lack of contact, and the two countries can take advantage of this. With the publication of the Fahd initiative in 1982, Saudi Arabia abandoned, at least officially, the policy that had until then rejected Israel s right to exist. Following the Madrid conference in 1991, a certain rapprochement took place between the two countries, and they participated in five working groups to deal with regional issues water, the environment, economics, refugees, and arms control. The Abdullah initiative of 2002, the basis for the Arab Peace Initiative, went a step further, promising Israel normal relations with the Arab and Muslim world if it met a number of conditions. Israel initially rejected the initiative as a

7 131 basis for dialogue with the Arab world, though subsequently a number of senior Israeli officials, including President Shimon Peres and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, expressed support for the positive aspects of the initiative while mindful of the problematic issues (e.g., normal relations were made contingent on completion of the peace process, a withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 lines, and a solution of the refugee problem on the basis of UN General Assembly resolution 194). Apart from the Abdullah initiative, Saudi Arabia has remained on the sidelines of attempts to promote the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians (and Syria as well). Perhaps, then, the initiative was intended to counter the kingdom s negative image following the attacks of September 11, Oman and Qatar, which are generally outside the consensus in the Gulf Cooperation Council, had formal albeit partial relations with Israel. Israel had diplomatic missions in both countries that were ultimately closed in the wake of the second intifada and Operation Cast Lead. On several occasions, the Saudis have announced that they have no intention of making another move that could be interpreted as a gesture toward Israel, and the kingdom has even pressured the small monarchies to follow suit. Similarly, in recent years the Gulf states have refused to comply with the US request to take confidence-building measures toward Israel in order to create a supportive regional atmosphere for the Israeli Palestinian political process. At the same time, however, WikiLeaks documents indicates the aforementioned ongoing and secret dialogue on the Iranian issue. Likewise, it was reported that Israeli companies have assisted Gulf states through security consulting, training of local military forces, and sales of weapons and advanced systems and technologies. In addition, senior officials from both sides have held ongoing meetings in and outside the region. The reports also indicate that Israel has softened its policy on weapons exports to the Gulf states as well as its attempts to restrict sales of advanced weapons by the United States to the Gulf states, in part as a signal that it sees a potential for partnership more than a possible threat. In addition, Israel is enjoying a certain amount of access to markets in the Gulf, as long as the products do not have Israeli labels. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states recognize Israel s military power as well as its close ties with the United States (and its influence in Congress), and they see the value in maintaining some level of coordination with it. However, normal relations the Saudis preferred phrase are not possible, they claim, as long as there is no significant breakthrough in

8 132 The Arab Gulf States and Reform in the Middle East the political process with the Palestinians. Yet if and when Israel and the Palestinians reach a full or partial political agreement, it is far from clear that this will necessarily lead to a political spring between Israel and Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states. Over the years, Saudi Arabia has made demands by the West for reform, openness in relations with Israel, and a contribution to regional stability contingent, first of all, on a solution to the Israeli Palestinian conflict. On the other hand, the peaceful but cold relations with Egypt and Jordan and the upheavals in the Arab world have to some extent harmed as aforesaid the wherewithal of any Israeli government to present normalization to the Israeli public as proper compensation for painful concessions in the political process. To Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, the cost of open relations with Israel at this time may be higher than the benefit, given the position of the Arab street, which rejects recognition of Israel and relations with it. The Arab monarchies in the Gulf are currently benefiting from the fact that covert, unofficial relations allow them to enjoy the advantages of ties with Israel without having to pay a price in public opinion, which has become more vocal since the outbreak of the Arab Spring. In addition, common interests are not common values. To a certain extent, covert relations are also more comfortable for Israel: Israel as such need not confront the moral aspects of ties with absolutist monarchies, and can even present Saudi hostility as another barrier to the confidence-building that is essential to promoting the peace process and producing the fruits of peace. Some have argued recently that Saudi Arabia and Israel s shared disappointment with President Obama s policy toward Iran and Syria constitutes a convergence of interests for formulating some kind of partnership between the two countries. However, Israel would do well to distance itself as much as possible from initiatives to form a common front with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and others against the Obama administration. The perception that there is a united front against the United States could harm relations with Israel s primary ally, which in any case are in a sensitive period. Moreover, a growing threat from Iran will not necessarily make it easier for Saudi Arabia and Israel to cooperate. Shared interests do not denote an identical view of the strategic environment. Thus, for example, the agreement with Iran and the fear of the Islamic Republic could lead Saudi Arabia, for lack of any other option, to hedge closer to Iran in a measured fashion, and later, to be more vocal about the Israeli nuclear issue, since if Iran, then why not Israel? In addi-

9 133 tion, Saudi Arabia may hope for an Israeli strike against Iran s nuclear infrastructures, but it harbors reservations about any appearance of operational cooperation with Israel, lest it be required to pay the price for an Israeli attack. And on a more basic level, there is a psychological and religious barrier that complicates confidence-building between Saudi Arabia and Israel and the establishment of a stable infrastructure for relations, with limited potential gains. 14 It is not clear how and to what extent the developments in the Israeli Palestinian arena and in the Gulf will cause the Arab states there to change their dual policy toward Israel: formal opposition to normalization of relations with Israel, on the one hand, and active, but secret ties, on the other. While the two sides are limited in their ability to cooperate openly and avowedly, their identical threat perception, especially toward Iran, has the potential for more extensive cooperation, even without a direct connection to progress in the Israeli Palestinian diplomatic process. Furthermore, Israel, like Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states, is anxious about the turmoil the Middle East has been undergoing since early 2011 and about the undermining of the regional status quo, and this anxiety could lead the two sides to find another common interest to deepen their tacit alliance. It can be assumed, therefore, that even if cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states today revolves around security issues and is kept secret, there is a possibility that it would be expanded to other issues in the future. At this stage, the relationship that has developed between the two sides should not be underestimated, especially as these are ties between states that do not recognize each other formally. However, we should not exaggerate the added value of these ties: the Gulf states today have no interest in turning the covert alliance with Israel into an open one. From their point of view, keeping the relationship covert allows them to follow Israel s policy on the Iranian issue and to get credit with the United States because of the fact that they speak to the Israelis, and on the other hand, to avoid criticism from radical elements at home because of these ties. It would appear that only progress in the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians can bring about a thaw in relations between the two sides once again and allow more formal ties to be established. While Saudi Arabia thus sees the Israeli Palestinian conflict as a factor undermining stability, it perceives Iran as its main security and ideological problem. Furthermore, the basis for understandings between Israel and Saudi Arabia has expanded following the interim nuclear agreement

10 134 The Arab Gulf States and Reform in the Middle East signed by the major powers and Iran (November 2013), which was not viewed positively in Israel or Saudi Arabia, and the agreement to dismantle Syria s chemical weapons, which gave legitimacy and precious time to the Bashar Assad regime. In addition, there are shared interests in the need to curb Iranian influence, the illegitimacy of the Assad regime, the support for Abdel Fattah el-sisi regime in Egypt, and the basic approach that relies on the United States. These common interests, together with the shared fear of the consequences of the Geneva agreement with Iran and an Iranian American rapprochement, do not have the power to lead to open cooperation and normal relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, but can strengthen the covert coordination and the understandings between them. Moreover, even this form of relationship is important, especially since these are ties between states that do not officially recognize each other. Dialogue helps maintain regional stability, and will certainly not hurt in promoting a political settlement. Yet it is highly doubtful that Saudi Arabia, which purports to lead the Gulf states, will grant Israel the elements of normalization straight away, and any attempt to change the relations from covert to overt could damage them. True progress in the political process between Israel and the Palestinians may expand the basis of common interests and allow Israel to demand greater support from Saudi Arabia to promote political initiatives and assist in building the Palestinian state, even if a comprehensive permanent status agreement is not achieved. Notes 1 Yitzhak Gal, Israeli Trade with Middle East Markets in 2011: Healthy Growth Despite Adverse Political Environment, Iqtisadi, Vol. 2, No. 1, January Yossi Melman, Matti Kochavi Protects the Oil Wells in Abu Dhabi, Ha aretz, September 18, 2008 (Hebrew); see also Zadok Yehezkeli, Guardians of the Gulf, Yediot Ahronot, March 12, 2010 (Hebrew). 3 Yossi Melman, The New Crisis with Turkey, Ha aretz, November 10, 2011 (Hebrew). 4 Orah Koren, Foreign Sources: Aeronautics Wins Bid for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Abu Dhabi, The Marker, January 12, 2012 (Hebrew). 5 Former INSS director Oden Eran at a conference on Iran and the Gulf states, Institute for National Security Studies, May 31, 2011 (Hebrew).

11 Is the Enemy of My Enemy My Friend? Israel and the Gulf States Attila Somfalvi, President Peres Attacks Turkey for Financing Hamas, Ynet, January 28, 2012 (Hebrew). 7 Eli Bernstein, Israel Decides to Cut Ties with Qatar, NRG, Ma ariv, August 25, 2011 (Hebrew). 8 Al-Jazeera, September 10, Sarah Yizraeli, Saudi-Israel Dialogue: What Lies Ahead? Strategic Assessment, Vol. 10, No. 2, Institute for National Security Studies, August Anshel Pfeffer, Mossad Chief Reportedly Visited Saudi Arabia for Talks on Iran, Ha aretz, July 26, See also Barak Ravid, Report: Saudi Arabia Agrees to Israeli Attack on Iran through Saudi Territory. Prime Minister s Bureau: Report Mistaken, Ha aretz, July 5, 2009 (Hebrew). 11 Gulf Arab States Deem Israel Key to Security, Middle East Newsline, July 27, Barak Ravid, WikiLeaks Documents: Tzipi Livneh s Relationship with UAE Foreign Minister, Ha aretz, November 29, 2010 (Hebrew). See also Yossi Melman, Bahraini King Admits Mossad Ties, Ha aretz, April 10, 2011 (Hebrew). 13 Geneva interim agreement, officially titled the Joint Plan of Action. Implementation of the agreement began 20 January 2014: Fredrik Dahl and Justyna Pawlak, West, Iran activate landmark nuclear deal, January 20, Udi Dekel and Yoel Guzansky, Israel and Saudi Arabia: Is the Enemy of My Enemy My Friend?, INSS Insight No. December 22, 2013.