Global Peace. Operations 2009

Transcription

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2 A N N U A L R E V I E W O F Global Peace Operations 2009

3 This volume is a product of the Center on International Cooperation s (CIC) Global Peace Operations program. CIC is an independent institution housed at New York University. Project Team VOLUME EDITOR AND LEAD RESEARCH SCHOLAR A. Sarjoh Bah SERIES EDITOR Bruce D. Jones CONTRIBUTING EDITOR Teresa Whitfield SERIES COORDINATOR Benjamin C. Tortolani RESEARCH OFFICER Victoria DiDomenico GUEST CONTRIBUTORS William J. Durch and Madeline L. England CONTRIBUTORS Louise Andersen, Yoshino Funaki, Jeremy Gordon, Richard Gowan, Berouk Mesfin, David Raikow, Amy Scott, Elizabeth Sellwood, Jake Sherman, Erin Weir The project s advisory board is composed of Lakhdar Brahimi, Jayantha Dhanapala, Rosario Green, Funmi Olonisakin, John Ruggie, Sir Rupert Smith, and Stephen J. Stedman. CIC is grateful for their advice and support. The Center on International Cooperation is solely responsible for the content of this publication. Any errors of fact or analysis, and any and all judgments and interpretations about missions and operations discussed herein, are those of CIC alone. This project was undertaken at the request of and with the support of the Best Practices Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

4 A N N U A L R E V I E W O F Global Peace Operations 2009 A PROJECT OF THE Center on International Cooperation

5 Published in the United States of America in 2009 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc th Street, Boulder, Colorado and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU 2009 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved ISBN: (pbk) (hc) ISSN: Printed and bound in Canada The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z

6 Contents Foreword, Alain Le Roy Preface, Bruce D. Jones List of Mission Acronyms Map of Global Peace Operations, 2008 vii ix xi xiv Strategic Summary The Purposes of Peace Operations 9 William J. Durch with Madeline L. England 2 The Broader Horn: Peacekeeping in a Strategic Vacuum 21 A. Sarjoh Bah 3 Mission Reviews Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT, EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, BONUCA, MICOPAX) Sudan (UNAMID, UNMIS) Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC, EUSEC RD Congo, EUPOL RD Congo) Afghanistan (UNAMA, ISAF) Middle East (UNIFIL, UNDOF, UNTSO, EUBAM Rafah, EUPOL COPPS, TIPH, MFO Sinai) Kosovo (UNMIK, KFOR, OMIK, EULEX Kosovo) 73 4 Mission Notes 81 Alphabetical order by location 4.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea, EUPM, OSCE, NATO Headquarters Sarajevo) Burundi (BINUB) Comoros (MAES) Côte d Ivoire (UNOCI, Operation Licorne) Cyprus (UNFICYP) Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) Georgia (UNOMIG, CIS, OSCE, EUMM) Haiti (MINUSTAH) Iraq (MNF-I, NTM-I, UNAMI) 108 v

7 vi CONTENTS 4.10 Liberia (UNMIL) Mindanao (IMT) Moldova-Transdniestra (CIS) Nepal (UNMIN) Solomon Islands (RAMSI) Somalia (AMISOM) Timor-Leste (UNMIT, ISF) Western Sahara (MINURSO) Global Statistics on UN Missions Global Statistics on Non-UN Missions UN Mission-by-Mission Statistics 197 Alphabetical order by mission acronym 7.1 BINUB (UN Integrated Office in Burundi) MINURCAT (UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad) MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti) MONUC (UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq) UNAMID (AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur) UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force) UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon) UNIOSIL (UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone) UNMEE (UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea) UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia) UNMIN (UN Mission in Nepal) UNMIS (UN Mission in the Sudan) UNMIT (UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste) UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan) UNOCI (UN Operation in Côte d Ivoire) UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia) UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization) 372 Index 379 About the Book 384

8 Foreword Sixty years ago, the UN Security Council dispatched a small group of military observers to the Sinai Peninsula to help implement and monitor a fragile truce. Six decades later, the UN has deployed 63 operations and hundreds of thousands of men and women in the service of peace. Forty-five of these missions have now been closed, the vast majority of them successfully. But the demand has only increased with 18 operations and over 112,000 uniformed and civilian personnel presently in the field, UN peacekeeping is now at an all-time high. The challenges of contemporary peacekeeping are more than just of scale; the scope of our operations has also expanded dramatically. Today s peacekeepers are mandated to confront issues ranging from preserving peace and stability to providing the space and support for long-term peace consolidation. UN missions now have broader mandates than the observation and monitoring roles performed by yesterday s peacekeeping missions, working on an entire range of complex peace and security issues including rule-of-law concerns, judiciary reform, human rights and gender issues, electoral supervision, local institutional capacity building, and security sector reform to name only a few. United Nations forces also find themselves increasingly deployed into environments where there is less and less peace to keep. In Darfur and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for example, UN peacekeepers found themselves in dangerous and violent situations that stretched their ability to function to the very breaking point. Compounding these dilemmas, this past year in several theaters of operation the blue helmets found themselves without the resources and capabilities necessary to respond fully to new challenges as in the case of the DRC and to fulfill completely our Security Council mandated tasks as in the case of Darfur. Troop and police contributions from member states are voluntary; this puts UN peacekeeping in a bind if key assets are not forthcoming (as is the case with helicopters in Darfur). The challenges we face are indeed formidable, and the UN cannot face these problems alone. The international community can leverage more resources from regional and other organizations to meet the growing demand for peacekeepers. Militarily and financially strong states need to develop and deploy more assets to meet the threats posed by state and nonstate actors, especially in cases like Somalia where there is so far no real peace to keep. But let us not forget that there are, of course, many important examples of successful UN peacekeeping that has helped to improve the lives of hundreds of millions of the world s most vulnerable people. Recently, in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Kosovo, circumstances have improved sufficiently to allow the UN to complete or continue drawing down its operations. The situation has also continued to improve in Haiti, Côte d Ivoire, and Timor-Leste. In Lebanon, peacekeepers have helped to build confidence and continued to help prevent the resumption of hostilities along the Litani River. In each case, difficulties remain and the road to peace is long and complicated. But in each, the arrival of the blue helmets has contributed significantly to improving the situation. At the end of August 2008, I took on the position of Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. It has already proved simultaneously uniquely fascinating and remarkably vii

9 viii FOREWORD challenging. As we move forward, we must be unafraid of asking hard questions: Have we reached the limits of our capabilities? Can we continue to function with such a limited pool of major troop- and police-contributing countries? Are there situations where UN peacekeeping is simply not the right tool for the job? In the year 2000, the Brahimi Report laid out a series of reforms to help us make the instrument of peacekeeping more efficient and effective. Almost ten years later, we may need to reexamine this debate to take stock, identify gaps, and chart a path forward. This will also mean a candid examination of our recent operational models to see what has worked and what needs improvement. There is clearly much to do and much at stake. With this in mind, I very much welcome the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations Its presentation of detailed data and objective operational analysis provide an important set of tools that can help all stakeholders to understand more completely the intricate contours of the peacekeeping landscape. As we contemplate the future of global peacekeeping, the need for objective, fact-based analysis of peacekeeping is essential. The Review meets this need, and I commend the Center on International Cooperation and its staff for stimulating and informing this critical debate. Alain Le Roy Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations United Nations

10 Preface The 2009 edition of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations comes at a time of turbulence for peacekeeping. Historic levels of deployment and increasing operational threats have placed the debate on peacekeeping high among the priorities of the United Nations and in international politics. The need for sound, objective, and reliable data and analysis of the major trends and challenges in peacekeeping has never been more acute. In its fourth year of publication, the Review s compilation of data and analysis on both UN and non-un peace operations* continues to serve as an important resource to those making decisions on this critical global enterprise. The Review is editorially independent, but produced with the support of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Best Practices Section and the African Union s (AU) Peace and Security Department. The Center on International Cooperation (CIC) remains grateful to the two institutions for their continued support. Special thanks go to Alain Le Roy, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations for his support and for contributing the Foreword for this edition; to Susana Malcorra, UN Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Field Support; and to Ramtane Lamamra, the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security. Our work is made possible by the continuing financial support from the governments of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom, as well as from the Compton Foundation. I am also grateful to the individuals and institutions that made possible our continuing outreach efforts, especially the staff of the AU Commission for Peace and Security, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Accra, the Berlin-based Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, Refugees International, The Henry L. Stimson Center, the East Africa Standby Brigade Coordinating Mechanism, the Egmont Institute, and the South African Development Community Regional Peacekeeping Training Center. We are particularly indebted to Festus Aboagye, Commodore Albert Addison, Colonel John Agoglia, Kwesi Aning, General John Attipoe, Sven Biscop, Lansana Gberie, Victoria Holt, NATO s Assistant Secretary-General for Peace Operations Martin Howard, Ambassador Class D. Knoop, Winrich Kühne, Ambassador Peter Linder, Ambassador Walter Lindner, Mark Malan, Peter Marwa, Ambassador Thomas Matussek, Colonel Gaudence Milanzi, Simon Mulongo, General (ret.) Joseph Nkaiserry, Ambassador Aggrey Orleans, and General (ret.) Lazarus Sumbeiywo. The 2009 edition of the Review is the output of a small, yet dynamic editorial and research team led by volume editor and lead scholar A. Sarjoh Bah, who authored a timely and important essay in this edition on the need for a more unified strategy for peace operations in the broader Horn of Africa. Benjamin Tortolani, the project s researcher and this year s series coordinator, marshaled the *We define these as in-country peace operations that are authorized by a multilateral body, that are multinational in their composition, that have a substantial military component, and that are deployed principally in support of a peace process or conflict management objective. ix

11 x PREFACE overall editorial process and played an essential role in the drafting and editing phases. Victoria DiDomenico managed the critical assignment of generating the UN data. Contributing editor Teresa Whitfield brought rigor and political acumen to the editing process. I am grateful to Louise Andersen, Tatianna Carayannis, Shepard Forman, Yoshino Funaki, Jeremy Gordon, Richard Gowan, Adele Harmer, Berouk Mesfin, David Raikow, Barnett Rubin, Amy Scott, Elizabeth Sellwood, Jake Sherman, Abby Stoddard, and Erin Weir for their invaluable contributions to this year s volume. The research team also benefited from the support of Romina Kazandjian. My deepest appreciation to all of them. The project team is also indebted to CIC staff members Yvonne Alonzo, Hannah Caporello, Rahul Chandran, Lynn Denesopolis, Antonie Evans, Noah Gall, Andrew Frazer Hart, Ian Johnstone, Laura Martin, Michele Shapiro, and Gigja Sorensen for their support throughout the year. It is one of the strengths of the Review that it provides a space for leading scholars and practitioners of peacekeeping to report their findings and share their experiences. These are not necessarily the views of CIC s editorial team, but the intent here is to stimulate debate. This year s guest contributors, William J. Durch and Madeline L. England, are due significant thanks for their contribution to this edition on a topical subject coinciding with the sixtieth anniversary of peacekeeping. Their chapter on the Purposes of Peace Operations explores the evolution of peacekeeping and demonstrates the extent to which the peacekeeping enterprise has changed from the narrow and unambitious mandates of the first four decades to a period of more ambitious and robust mandates. They highlight the fact that in contemporary operations the line between peacekeeping and war-fighting is increasingly blurred. Durch and England argue that the UN is inherently ill-suited to the task of war-fighting and that peace operations should be kept doctrinally and organizationally distinct. Several people in the UN provided help along the way. We thank in particular Izumi Nakamitsu, Corinna Kuhl, and Paul Keating. Special thanks also to Seth Appiah-Mensah, Semra Asefa, Tania Belisle-Leclerc, Meg Carey, Roy Doyon, Michael Gaouette, Megh Gurung, David Haeri, David Harland, Clare Hutchinson, Vanessa Kent, Jeremy King, Comfort Lamptey, Richard Ponzio, Kevin Steves, Phillippe Tissot, and Fatemeh Ziai. Gratitude also goes to the many UN desk officers who commented on drafts of the mission reviews and notes; CIC of course remains responsible for the final content. We are also thankful for the cooperation of offices throughout the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support for providing information and guidance. We benefited from the support of a number of officials from the AU. We are particularly grateful to Sivuyile Bam, General Benon Biraro, Ambassador Soloman Gomez, Geofrey Mugumya, Bereng Mtimkulu, Biscut Tessema, and El-Ghassim Wane. CIC continues to profit from its ongoing partnership with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute on this project, and we thank Kirsten Soder and Sharon Wiharta for their support. Finally, we remain grateful to the staff at Lynne Rienner Publishers; Steve Barr s patience and support deserve particular recognition. Bruce D. Jones Director and Senior Fellow NYU Center on International Cooperation

12 Mission Acronyms AMISOM BINUB BONUCA CISPKF EUBAM Rafah EUFOR Althea EUFOR TCHAD/RCA EULEX Kosovo EUMM EUPM EUPOL COPPS EUPOL RD Congo EUSEC RD Congo IMT ISAF ISF JCC JPKF KFOR MAES MFO Sinai MICOPAX MINURCAT MINURSO MINUSTAH MNF-I MONUC NTM-I OMIK RAMSI TIPH UNAMA UNAMI UNAMID UNDOF UNFICYP UNIFIL AU Mission in Somalia UN Integrated Office in Burundi UN Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic CIS Peacekeeping Force in Abkhazia-Georgia EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina EU Force in the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo EU Security Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo International Monitoring Team International Security Assistance Force International Security Forces Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force CIS South Ossetia Joint Peacekeeping Forces NATO Kosovo Force AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to Comoros Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai Mission de Consolidation de la Paix UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti Multinational Force in Iraq UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo NATO Training Mission in Iraq OSCE Mission in Kosovo Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands Temporary International Presence in Hebron UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UN Assistance Mission in Iraq UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur UN Disengagement Observer Force UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus UN Interim Force in Lebanon xi

13 xii ACRONYMS UNIOSIL UNIPSIL UNMEE UNMIK UNMIL UNMIN UNMIS UNMIT UNOCI UNOMIG UNTSO UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea UN Interim Administration in Kosovo UN Mission in Liberia UN Mission in Nepal UN Mission in Sudan UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste UN Operation in Côte d Ivoire UN Observer Mission in Georgia UN Truce Supervision Organization

14 A N N U A L R E V I E W O F Global Peace Operations 2009

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18 Strategic Summary 2008

19 2008 was the worst year for peacekeeping in over a decade. The largest and most visible peacekeeping operations worldwide faced serious military and political reversals. These endangered not only specific missions, but also the entire global peacekeeping enterprise. No major peacekeeping provider was unaffected. The United Nations was tested in the Congo and Sudan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Afghanistan, the European Union in Kosovo, and the African Union in Somalia. There were very few bright spots. This was despite the fact that, by the end of the year, there were nearly 200,000 uniformed and civilian peacekeepers under UN and non-un command across over forty missions. Though this represented a record high for global peace operations, their overall increase slowed in After experiencing significant growth for several years at an annual rate of percent, during 2008 the global peacekeeping footprint expanded by only 8.7 percent, with roughly 13,000 military personnel added to the roster almost all in Afghanistan. NATO s Afghanistan mission with 50,700 troops, up 20 percent from 41,100 in late 2007 is now as large as the next three biggest peace operations combined. When we launched the first Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, in 2006, NATO s Afghanistan mission was only the fourth largest operation, with 12,400 troops. Its growth, combined with the Kosovo mission, means that NATO now commands two-fifths of global peacekeepers. And for the second year in a row, the United States, due to its contributions in Afghanistan, was the largest contributor to UN-authorized (if not UN-commanded) peace operations in The United Nations remains the largest institutional provider of peacekeepers, accounting for about half of global deployments with nearly 80,000 military personnel, 12,000 police, and thousands of civilian staff in the field. The UN s forces grew at a rate of about 7 percent in 2008, driven by its African operations (71 percent of its total commitments). Its missions elsewhere largely remained static. Africa remained home to 40 percent of global peacekeeping, from not only UN operations but also AU, EU, and ad hoc deployments. A Grim Year Throughout 2008, these high deployment levels were a source of concern. In some cases, the international community appeared unable to meet its targets. In Sudan, not only did the suffering in Darfur continue with increased violence, but the UN struggled to find troops and helicopters, meanwhile the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that settled the north-south war in 2005 began to fray. In neighboring Somalia, the AU barely managed to deploy just 2,650 of 8,000 authorized troops into a maelstrom of unsettled politics and violence. In Chad, EU forces arrived late after force- and equipment-generation difficulties and rebel advances on the Chadian capital Ndjamena. However, crises emerged even where large deployments were in place. In Afghanistan, NATO lost ground to the Taliban, and the United States confronted acute tensions between its counterterrorism tactics and broader statebuilding goals. In Lebanon, the UN s recently upgraded mission, designed to stabilize the south and help the government disarm 2

20 STRATEGIC SUMMARY Military Deployments in Global Peace Operations: ,000 70,000 Number of Personnel 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 UN NATO CEMAC AU CIS ECOWAS CSCE/OSCE EU Other (MNFs and ad hoc) 10, Global Deployments of Military Personnel: 31 October 2008 Other Organizations 12% UN 48% NATO 40% nonstate groups, could not stop Hezbollah from mounting a major challenge to the government in Beirut. In Kosovo, years of negotiation toward a final settlement were jeopardized by political deadlock between the Western powers and Russia and sizable military and police forces did not prevent Kosovo Serbs from asserting de facto control of northern areas. In the second half of the year, the variety of peacekeeping challenges were underlined by events in Georgia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In Georgia, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and United Nations observers were sidelined during the clash between Georgian and Russian forces. The fact that Georgian and Russian forces had both technically been part of the peace operation undertaken by the Commonwealth of Independent States in South Ossetia (where the Georgians had ceased patrolling) demonstrated how peacekeeping can

21 4 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS be overwhelmed by its internal contradictions. Meanwhile, the UN and OSCE faced the reputational risks associated with observer missions neither mandated nor equipped to influence events a risk taken up by the EU, which deployed a new observer mission to Georgia to monitor Russia s withdrawal and the stabilization that followed. The crisis inflamed already raw tensions between Russia and the other major powers, both Western and non-western. In the DRC, the UN s mission had repeatedly defied caricatures of feckless blue helmets by using force twice in collaboration with the EU to beat back threats to the peace agreement and the civilian population. But with 17,000 troops stretched over a territory four times the size of France and with a mandate inappropriate for the situation at hand, the mission was rapidly overwhelmed when General Laurent Nkunda s Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) forces launched an aggressive assault on government positions in the east in October The UN was confronted with the specter of a replay of the combined failures in Srebenica and Rwanda; only Nkunda s decision to call a tactical cease-fire, generated in part by substantial EU, UK, and US pressure on his alleged Rwandan backers, kept a greater failure at bay. At the end of the year, and as UN-backed negotiations in Nairobi got underway, the prospects for a negotiated settlement appeared remote. There were some bright spots amid the gloom. In Nepal, a medium-sized mission with a limited mandate nevertheless helped the country bring its civil war to a more decisive close and mount democratic elections, leading to the formation of an inclusive government. In Cyprus, there was a return to peace talks for the first time since the collapse of the previous process in And in Timor-Leste, the government stabilized after significant turbulence in the first half of the year. Also, West Africa, once the site of several large peacekeeping operations, made some progress toward greater stability. That was especially so of Sierra Leone, where the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) a peacebuilding mission that had replaced a full-scale military operation in 2006 was in turn replaced by a far smaller office, the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). Liberia entered its third year of postcrisis stability, albeit faced with daunting social and economic challenges. The peace process in Côte d Ivoire made modest gains, but the situation remained tense due to difficulties associated with postponed elections. Elsewhere, though, even peacekeeping missions that had seemed set on a stable foundation in 2007 were rocked by challenges both political and natural in In Haiti, the progress made by MINUSTAH in 2007 toward a credible statebuilding agenda was threatened by a combination of rising food prices, the government s inability to mount a coherent response, subsequent political unrest, and then the devastating effects of hurricanes. In Burundi, renewed fighting between the government and rebels threatened to undermine wider peace consolidation efforts. In Chad, EU and UN missions were deployed to provide security for the humanitarian overflows from Darfur, but met considerable doubt about their efficacy due to limited mandates, a oneyear timeline for the EU mission, and uncertainty over the UN s ability to generate troops for a planned follow-on mission. And on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, the UN, facing obstruction, closed down its monitoring mission increasing the risk of further instability in an already unstable region. Sources of Failure The range of challenges to peace operations throughout 2008 reflected an increasingly complex international environment, preventing simple explanation of what went wrong. What is clear, however, is the regional character of the challenges to peacekeeping in 2008, a reality that is reflected in the regional presentation of Mission Reviews in this edition. In Europe, the primary cause of peacekeeping setbacks was geopolitical. Rising tensions between Russia and the West meant that

22 STRATEGIC SUMMARY Where Peacekeepers Go: UN and Non-UN Military Deployments to Regions, 31 October 2008 Europe 14% Latin America 4% Middle East 10% East Asia and the Pacific 1% Africa 40% Central and South Asia 31% Where Peacekeepers in Africa Come From: Origin of UN and Non-UN Military Personnel in Africa, 31 October 2008 Other Regions 18% Central and South Asia 42% Africa 40% the European theater was once again a political battleground, with UN, NATO, and EU operations in Kosovo direct victims and the UN and OSCE monitoring forces in Georgia suffering significant collateral damage. The political clash with Moscow was acutely felt in Europe, straining emergent EU security and foreign policy structures. More keenly felt in Washington was the military clash in Georgia, which briefly played into the US presidential campaign and sparked a rash of new Cold War analyses by US pundits and policymakers. Later, cooler heads argued that the United States had been running roughshod over key Russian interests in Europe with a singular lack of realism, risking a backlash. The episode cast a pall over international politics, with potentially far-reaching consequences. Among them, several NATO members began expressing doubts as to whether the Afghanistan mission was appropriate for the

23 6 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS Patterns of Deployment 2008 The regional distribution of peace operations changed very little throughout Ninety-five percent of troops continue to be deployed in three large clusters of missions: those of the UN and the AU in Africa, alongside smaller AU and EU deployments; those of NATO and the UN in the broader Middle East, drawing primarily on US and European troops; and those of NATO and the EU in Europe. Africa remained home to 40 percent of global peace operation deployments. The UN remained the largest military deployer on the continent, accounting for approximately 87 percent of all deployments there in The UN provided more than ten times the number of military peacekeepers in Africa than any other organization. Large-scale UN deployments in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Darfur, Liberia, and Côte d Ivoire made up the bulk of these troops. Peacekeepers in Africa emanated primarily from two regions: Africa itself (40 percent) and South and Central Asia (42 percent). In 2008 the European Union deployed a shortterm bridging and humanitarian security operation, the EU Force in the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA), whose mandate was set to expire in March 2009, after which the operation would be replaced by a proposed force of 6,000 UN troops. Within Africa, the broader Horn represents a major locus of activity, accounting for 40 percent of deployments on the continent and includes operations launched by the AU, EU, and UN. When or if proposed deployment levels are reached, including deployment of the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) as well as 20,000 troops for Somalia, over 60,000 peacekeepers will be operating in the region. The broader Middle East and European regions accounted for 55 percent of global military deployments during The nearly 90,000 peacekeepers deployed across these two regions were largely drawn from Europe and the United States and operated mostly under NATO s command in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR). European contingents continued to compose 62 percent of the expanded UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the largest contribution of Western military personnel under UN command. Rounding out the final 5 percent of global deployments in 2008 were regional peacekeeping responses involving troop deployments from nearby states acting through the UN, regional organizations, or multinational forces. Two examples exemplified this pattern of deployment: Haiti, where roughly 60 percent of troops for the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) were drawn from nearby Latin American countries; and Timor-Leste, where the UN Integrated Mission in Timor- Leste (UNMIT) operated alongside the Australian-led International Security Forces (ISF). Similarly, the International Monitoring Team (IMT) sent to oversee the cease-fire on the Philippine island of Mindanao was largely drawn from regional actors Malaysia and Brunei. Police deployments have nearly doubled over the past three years. In 2008 UN deployments grew at a rate of over 33 percent, from 9,000 to 12,000 personnel. The surge in police deployments was also reflected in non-un missions, particularly the large number of EU police authorized for Kosovo. Recognizing the central role of policing and rule of law in contemporary peace operations, in late 2007 the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (ROLSI) was established within the UN s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Led at the level of assistant secretarygeneral, the office integrates five formerly disparate sections of DPKO (police; criminal law and judicial advisement; security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; and mine services) to provide strategic guidance on these critical aspects of peace operations. organization in the context of potentially resurgent East-West tensions. Wavering European support for the NATO mission in Afghanistan added to a host of causes for peacekeeping s troubles in the broader Middle East. But more simply, peacekeepers in Lebanon and especially Afghanistan are deployed in extremely tough situations: highly fractured national politics with a long history of violence; well-armed, well-organized opposition forces, some of them with Manichean worldviews and a willingness to use violence targeted at civilians to achieve their aims; neighbors with a potential interest in destabilization, and the tools to achieve it; and in the case of Afghanistan, extremely inhospitable terrain and mounting cross-border threats to the mission from undergoverned Pakistani territory. Tensions between counterterrorism and peacekeeping objectives complicated the Afghanistan mission as well, as did recurrent

24 STRATEGIC SUMMARY civilian casualties. Some arose from the consequences of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom working with one-eighth of the landto-troop ratio of the US presence in Iraq, resulting in too-frequent recourse to air power. Civilian casualties continued to create significant knock-on political consequences for NATO and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Some of these features also characterized the UN, AU, and EU deployments in the broader Horn of Africa. In Chapter 2 of this Annual Review, A. Sarjoh Bah elucidates the myriad sources of ongoing mission distress in this troubled region. At the core is the continued use of peacekeepers in the absence of a viable political framework when there is no peace to keep, and no immediate prospect of one. This leaves already overstretched peacekeeping operations dependent on consent from governments that have decidedly partial interests in providing it. Here too, counterterrorism objectives clash with peacekeeping objectives. Bah points out that the deployment of the UN- AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), without firm troop commitments, critical mission support elements, or a peace to keep, raises fundamental questions about the risks of ignoring lessons from the past decade. Bah s analysis of the Horn exemplifies what guest contributors William Durch and Madeline L. England identify in Chapter 1 of this Annual Review as a systemic source of tensions in the global peacekeeping enterprise: the steady blurring of the line between peacekeeping and war-fighting. In the face of this growing lack of clarity, Durch and England argue that while a peacekeeping force may need to undertake combat in defense of its mandate or to protect civilians, combat cannot be its baseline stance. Where it is, the authors posit that such missions cease to be peace operations regardless of the mandate on paper and the mandating authority. Durch and England argue that there is a pressing need to reidentify the fundamental purposes of peacekeeping and address the associated questions of when to deploy, who to send, and what to mandate them to do. Previous editions of this Annual Review have described how peacekeeping has gone from unheralded successes in the middle of this decade to the brink of failure just four years later. Another Military Deployments to the Broader Horn of Africa, (and beyond) 70,000 Number of Personnel 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10, Projected

25 8 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS Police and Civilian Staff Deployed in UN Peace Operations: 31 October ,000 20,000 Number of Personnel 15,000 10,000 Civilian UN Police - UN 5, reversal of fortune is not impossible, if states accept more sustained engagement in peace operations. That means a more strategic attitude to mandating missions and a more systematic approach to raising, deploying, and renewing peacekeeping forces. How such an attitude and approach can emerge in a period of wider international instability is unclear. But the sheer scale of the crisis for peacekeeping we outline in this Annual Review should stimulate policymakers worldwide to recognize that if they do not act on it, today s peacekeeping system will soon break. Conclusion The year in review also saw renewed concern about the ability of peacekeeping providers to rapidly deploy suitable civilians to oversee the political aspects of missions or contribute to key statebuilding functions. At the UN, the Security Council mandated a Secretary-General s report on early recovery from conflict, encompassing the question of civilian deployments, while the EU as an institution and several of its member states explored greater national contributions. Largely absent from the discussion was a shared sense of the scale of the problem, or any focused discussion on civilian contributions from the global South. The year ahead looks likely to see sustained attention to the civilian question, as well as to the perennial challenge of linking peacekeeping and broader peacebuilding strategies into a coherent whole. That debate will be complicated if peacekeeping s current malaise deepens, or faces still more acute crisis in any one of the currently troubled theaters.

26 1 The Purposes of Peace Operations William J. Durch with Madeline L. England 9

27 Ever since the United Nations started asking its member states, in the late 1940s, for military officers to observe cease-fires and, in the 1950s, for armed troops to monitor borders and supervise force separations, the purposes of these activities have been dictated case by case, heavily influenced by prevailing global and regional politics and by the national interests of the UN Security Council the five permanent members in particular. Peacekeepers have been deployed to act as fair witnesses (observing and reporting the facts but without the duty or ability to alter the situation on the ground other than through such reporting); as referees of a peace accord (judging compliance but relying on larger powers to enforce it); as police (impartially enforcing an accord through their own authority and means in the short term, using force as necessary, minimally and proportionately, but leaving the long-term verdicts and results to others); as statebuilders (in collaboration with the local parties, shifting primary emphasis from security to development as circumstances and local capacity permit); or as state surrogates (responsible for reconstruction of the apparatus of governance, and for governing until such apparatus, and the human capacity to run it, can be prepared to supplant such outside support). Practical considerations and precedent likely traceable to UN envoy Ralph Bunche 1 established local consent, mission neutrality, and nonuse of force (if there was an option) except in self-defense as the de facto principles of peace observation and traditional (border zone) peacekeeping. As defining terms for peace operations, however, these principles proved inadequate for more complex peace operations like the UN s involvement in the former Belgian Congo ( ). There, a mixed civilianmilitary force became deeply embroiled in both Congolese and Cold War politics, protecting those trying to build a new political consensus, protecting at least some civilians at risk from violence, ousting mercenary troops (albeit haltingly) from a secessionist province, and otherwise far exceeding the purposes of peacekeeping established to that date. The new definition new essence of peace operations that this experience offered was rejected, however, by both UN professionals and UN member states, and was not regenerated until two decades later when fading Cold War tensions ushered in a whole new generation of peace operations. This chapter traces the evolution and adaptation of peace operations, first to the Cold War and then the post Cold War environment, and more recently to the post 11 September 2001 era in which the ever-expanding purposes of peace operations are blurring the line between peacekeeping and war-fighting and threatening peacekeeping s identity as a security-related military function that is honorably separable from war. The chapter concludes with some reasons why that separation should be restored, and how this might be done. Operations Before Agenda for Peace The first UN operations were fair witnesses. The UN Security Council authorized deployment of the first unarmed UN military observers to assist the work of the Consular Commission in monitoring a shaky cease-fire between Dutch and Indonesian forces on Java in August 1947, and authorized similar support in April 1948 for the Truce Commission monitoring the armistice agreements between Arab and Israeli forces. 2 10

28 THE PURPOSES OF PEACE OPERATIONS 11 The term peacekeeping was not coined to describe the tasks of UN-mandated troops or observers, however, until the Suez crisis of 1956, and only gained some official status when the UN General Assembly established the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in February 1965, just after UN forces finished their operation in the Congo. 3 Peacekeeping became a strategic tool by which the UN Security Council could help keep conflict-prone parts of the international system from shaking the stability of the Cold War standoff. Peacekeepers were allowed to bear arms for self-defense beginning in 1956, when Lester Pearson, Canada s minister of external affairs, imagined a force in the Middle East large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out although the United Nations remained averse to using the arms that its forces could now bear. 4 UN peacekeepers were used as police in the early 1960s in the former Belgian Congo, but thereafter fell back to fair witness mode. They became referees again in the late 1980s, in Namibia ( ), Central America ( ), Angola ( ), and Mozambique ( ). The referee role worked well enough except in Angola, where it failed to keep war at bay, twice, with disastrous local consequences. Greater nominal authority was given to the mission in Cambodia ( ) to manage and safeguard processes including elections intended to end the country s long civil war and give it legitimate government. The mission succeeded in part, conducting the elections but lacking the power to enforce the results when the governing party disagreed with them. From Agenda for Peace to the Brahimi Report In January 1992, the Security Council, during its first summit, asked the new UN Secretary- General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to report on ways to strengthen UN capacity for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. By that time, peacekeeping already had been repurposed, case by case, as a tool to help implement Soldiers from the United Nations Emergency Forces stand guard at their observation post on the Egypt and Israel border, 15 November internal political settlements (as in El Salvador, Cambodia, and Angola) and referee determinations of postcolonial status (Western Sahara). In his July 1992 report to the Council, the Secretary-General attempted the Secretariat s first working definition of peacekeeping, but so tepidly that one could not guess from reading it the momentous shifts in purpose then under way. 5 Boutros-Ghali s Agenda for Peace thus missed an opportunity to bind peacekeeping to purposes consistent with its traditional essence and left the Council freer than it might otherwise have been to keep adding new purposes. These included remaking the Somali government over the objections of powerful local faction leaders, and intervening in Bosnia on a very large scale, in an ongoing war, to mitigate suffering but not end it. This continued until peacekeeping failed spectacularly not only in Somalia and Bosnia but also in Rwanda, failing either to anticipate or to stem the genocide of April June In January 1995, the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace cataloged the new purposes but finessed the discussion of their failure and especially the high human costs of that failure. 6 AP Photo

29 12 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS These results discredited complex UN operations for a time, and most peacekeepers in the latter 1990s deployed under the banner of NATO and subregional organizations, not the United Nations. It came as a surprise, then, to the UN Secretariat in particular, when the revival of complex UN peace operations by the Security Council began at the largely untried higher end of the peacekeeping hierarchy as state surrogates and statebuilders in Kosovo and East Timor, the former with an undefined political end and the latter with an illtrained population previously subject to a quarter century of Indonesian domination and four centuries of Portuguese colonial rule. Thus came unprepared new administrators to govern populations that were either resentful but ambitious (Kosovo) or dogged but unprepared (Timor). Shortly after these missions deployed, the Brahimi Report revisited the definitional issue: Peacekeeping is a 50-year-old enterprise that has evolved rapidly in the past decade from a traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefires and force separations after interstate wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars. 7 A complex peace operation, according to the report, represented the joining of peacekeeping with peacebuilding ( activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and [build] something that is more than just the absence of war ). 8 The Brahimi Report addressed peacekeeping s past and ongoing failures (the operation in Sierra Leone appeared to be falling apart as the report was being written) and insisted that troop contributors send well-equipped forces to UN operations; that mandates allow military initiative in dangerous environments; and that impartiality be redefined to mean adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles, rather than arm s-length neutrality. It was argued in the report that, in dangerous situations with obvious aggressors and victims, peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so, and should therefore be equipped with robust rules of engagement. Conversely, the Secretary-General and his team needed to give the Security Council the unvarnished version of conditions in the field, telling their political bosses what they needed to know, not what they wanted to hear. 9 That worked for awhile, but the Council soon tired of hearing regularly that it was trying to force the United Nations to perform beyond its innate capacity in places like Darfur, Chad, or Somalia. From the Brahimi Report to Afghanistan and Darfur The sentiments in the Brahimi Report, minus the tiresome advice about brutal honesty in assessing prospects for success, were embraced by the Security Council for virtually every new UN peace operation authorized in the new century. By mid-2008, over 80 percent of the troops and police deployed in UN-led operations were functioning under mandates that invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter (the enforcement chapter). Although the Brahimi Report stressed that the United Nations does not wage war, 10 the reality of robust peacekeeping is such that the institution now finds itself in situations where it must take forceful action if its robust mandates are not to be forfeit. Such was the situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in the summer and fall of 2008, where peacekeepers found themselves caught between rebel forces, former Rwandan genocidaires, and an incompetent but predatory national army that they were supposed to be supporting. Meanwhile, in Darfur, Sudan, government obstruction and harassment of the UN force continued well into its second year of attempted deployment, risking general mandate failure and certainly a failure to protect Darfur s victims of violence. Continuing a decade-long trend, developed states and institutions were willing to fund, advise at a distance, and provide a degree of logistical support to such beleaguered UN operations, but were not willing to contribute troops,

30 THE PURPOSES OF PEACE OPERATIONS 13 tactical transport, or air cover. They could make these choices and still look in the mirror daily because their troops, transport, and air power (some of it) were engaged in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, or Afghanistan. The UN Secretariat did manage to argue its way out of leading international peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan in 2001, before the Council had grown inured to carefully documented arguments about a new mission being too hard, or half-measures being too risky. Instead, it authorized the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) initially coalition-based, later NATOled to undertake peacekeeping in the capital, Kabul, and separately authorized the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to provide political support and coordination of other international assistance. While ISAF patrolled Kabul, UNAMA was responsible for helping Afghanistan s interim government implement a peace process agreed to in Bonn, Germany, in December That process culminated in a new constitution and elections by fall 2006, but Afghanistan was far from stable thereafter, with a peacebuilding process that moved ahead unevenly, parceled out by sector among seven lead donors. The country s formal economy faltered as its opium-fueled shadow economy took off. The ousted Taliban meanwhile regrouped in the borderlands of Pakistan, learned lessons and borrowed technology from the war in Iraq, and gradually built back their fighting strength. Peacekeepers in Afghanistan were therefore increasingly confronting an insurgency. From Robust Peacekeeping to War-Fighting? Peace operations are most often born and built in crisis, and function in a realm of partial control and competing priorities intrinsic to multinational or multilateral organization. Their lack of innate organizational coherence reflects their practice-based, case-driven history and the locus of primary political-military power in states rather than in the organizations that most frequently sponsor these operations. Every actor involved in postconflict reconstruction efforts, large and small, official or not, is both independent and protective of its own turf. These characteristics make peace operations poor templates for the sort of unified command and unified action required by warfighting. This does not mean that peacekeepers never have to fight, only that they are, structurally, not very good at it. Yet major-power military doctrines have been evolving almost in lockstep with one another, over the past fifteen years, toward just such a melding of peacekeeping and war-fighting. Over the same interval, however, national interests in taking the risks entailed by more robust peace operations have not changed that much. The result is a series of operational, doctrinal, and interest-based dilemmas for robust peace operations. Operational Dilemmas Peace operations work best when they are not only authorized internationally but also invited to deploy under the terms of a peace agreement, offering both local and international legitimacy. A regional or UN mandate can be reassuring both to the host state (as a political barrier to unlimited outside interference) and to the provider (as a tool to prevent mission creep or the growth of unrealistic local expectations regarding outside aid). If and when the going gets rough, an international mandate is also a license to canvass for additional international help. Complexity creeps in, of course, in conflict zones that are only partly pacified, that fall back into violence as a peace process stalls, that harbor parties who resist constraints on their illicit income, or that generate splinter groups who try to muscle their way into a share of political power. Part of a peace operation may need to adopt a combat stance in which defeat of such an opposition force may be temporarily required. Such has been the case periodically for UN forces deployed in the eastern Congo. UN operations elsewhere in the Congo, however, involve little or no proactive use of force, and are broadly invitational, deriving their welcome from a series of national-level peace accords as well as Security Council mandates.

31 14 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS AP Photo/Musadeq Sadeq, File NATO operations in Afghanistan benefit similarly from Council mandates. However, as all international military activities there coalesce under a single command and political stability falters, areas that have until recently been largely free of orchestrated violence are experiencing increased risk, and it is increasingly difficult to distinguish NATO-ISAF s peacekeeping role from NATO s growing counterinsurgency role in the southern and eastern parts of the country. At least in Afghanistan the central government is playing on the same side as the peace enforcers. In Darfur, the UN-AU Hybrid Mission (UNAMID), which has a clear UN mandate, faces willful opposition from a virulently anti-unamid Sudanese government that banks on other states reluctance to challenge its sovereignty, even to halt the violent surrogate campaign that it wages against segments of its own people. To mount such a challenge directly, the sponsoring organizations and troop-contributing countries would have to cross a line that few are willing to cross except when at war coercing Sudanese compliance with international Canadian peacekeepers in NATO s ISAF embark on a counterinsurgency operation while a support helicopter flies overhead in the volatile Kandahar province, Afghanistan, 25 June resolutions, using military force to resist government obstruction of UNAMID deployments, and otherwise taking actions difficult to distinguish from warfare and military occupation. These examples illustrate that robust peace operations can only be so robust before the distinction between peace operations and warfare begins to break down. The distinction is not semantic, but strategic, in that peace operations have not traditionally had declared enemies defined and identified to be legitimate targets of lethal military force wherever encountered, and toward whom the operational objective is victory. By this light, NATO forces in southern Afghanistan that attack identified Taliban targets with lethal force without waiting to be fired on first or even necessarily to be targeted first are waging war, not participating in a peace operation: the enemy is generically defined and targeting is generically legitimated. Rather, peace operations have been intended instead to vanquish conditions that contribute to conflict or human suffering. This objective may require a forceful defensive response when an operation s work is challenged, and may require taking the initiative if tactical intelligence indicates that this is the best way to preempt an imminent attack, especially one that is likely to cause, or is aimed at causing, considerable civilian casualties. But for peacekeepers, these are last rather than first resorts. Finally, peace operations have not traditionally conducted what the US military would call opposed entry, or intervention against armed opposition. Such action may well be necessary to protect a population at risk, but it constitutes war. A duly authorized peace operation may well be the follow-on to such a war, as was the case in Kosovo, but the two do not equate. (There was a partial exception in East Timor, where a UN-mandated multinational force, the International Force in East Timor [INTERFET], fought against local armed opposition to enter the island but only after the consent of the far-larger Indonesian armed services had been secured through a diplomatic process.)

32 THE PURPOSES OF PEACE OPERATIONS 15 Doctrinal Dilemmas Military doctrine is the compilation of experience and belief about the best way to conduct military affairs. Its level of focus can range from abstract principles of warfare to organizational doctrine about the roles and missions, current objectives, and current best practices in the employment of forces by a particular military organization for a particular purpose or in a particular setting. 11 Doctrine for peace operations is about such specific functions and settings, as well as basic principles and strategic objectives. Although the outcomes of wars are often determined by high-level military decisions and large operations, in peace operations the actions of even small groups of soldiers (led by the canonical strategic corporal ), 12 can have major implications for local stability and achievement of the mission. Doctrines for peace operations, then, lay out how key organizations and entities recommend handling such a strategic burden, including at the lowest, tactical levels of deployed forces. Examining how they have changed in response to field experience can yield important insights into how key security providers view the changing strategic environment of peace operations and fit it into the larger mix of military missions. Fifteen years ago, peacekeeping was doctrinally and operationally segregated from warfighting by major powers, perhaps to protect peacekeeping from association with war-fighting, perhaps to protect the war-fighter s ethos or skills from being weakened by rapid or frequent exposure to the more restrained world of peacekeeping. Today, however, key major power doctrines, including those of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and India, give peacekeeping a place on a continuous spectrum of tension that has war-fighting at the other end. The motivation now, as defense resources in many countries thin out, seems to be the construction of an omni-competent force that can spin on a dime physically, operationally, and psychologically from peacekeeping to war-fighting, including counterinsurgency or counterterrorist operations, as complex circumstances dictate. It is not at all clear, however, that soldiers are collectively capable of doing as much roleshifting, and as rapidly, as doctrine now seems to require. One could envisage such adaptation in a thirty-four-year-old special forces sergeant with fifteen years of experience and special education and training in winning local support for his campaign. One has more trouble seeing it in a nineteen-year-old line infantryman with a high school education and at most a year of field experience of any sort under his belt. In all armies, the latter type of personnel far outnumber the former. The recent evolution of major-power doctrines for peace and stability operations suggests that the old walls that initially segregated peace operations from war-fighting are crumbling. The more difficult and risky of peace operations and the lower ranges of war-fighting are increasingly viewed as differing in degree more than in kind. Rather than buying into the relatively humble, if risky, world of peacekeeping as a confidencebuilding measure, a temporary security presence, or a support agent for the voluntary dismantling of belligerent factions and restructuring of hoststate security forces, these powers reconceptualize peace operations as low-intensity conflict with a hearts-and-minds annex. Rather than relying on local consent, going in, as a source of operational legitimacy, these doctrines posit that firm and fair implementation of postconflict reconstruction in an atmosphere of growing public security and tranquillity will generate local consent. After years of missteps, the United States may be demonstrating this proposition in Iraq, but few operations of any sort have the resources of the entire US defense establishment on which to draw. More likely they will have far too few resources and, as in the Congo, find themselves not only outnumbered by local fighters but also the object of civilian anger as the goal of civilian protection remains unmet. Experience in the new decade suggests that there is yet life in the notion of consent, in some form, as a prerequisite to peace operations and as a feature that distinguishes them from other military action. This is the definitional direction

33 16 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS in which the United Nations has tacked most recently, against the flow of doctrine from the great powers and responsive instead, one might argue, to the interests and fears of its majority membership. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, the most recent UN effort to define peacekeeping, takes a more conservative, contrarian approach to doctrine, arguing that robust peacekeeping is permitted at a tactical level with the consent of host authorities and/or the main parties to the conflict, but that such action is different in kind from peace enforcement at a strategic or international level. 13 In taking this approach, it fights the contemporary trend toward doctrinal and operational convergence, fencing off peace operations as a distinctive enterprise with distinctive purposes. Mission Objectives vs. National Interests A further complication of the blurring line between war-fighting and peacekeeping arises from differences in the motivations of contributors to peace operations. In the United Nations, at most fifteen countries decide to go forward with a peace operation (although the membership at large must agree to fund it). In NATO or the European Union, slightly more than two dozen states, give or take, make the decision; in the African Union, it is ten to fifteen (the members of the Peace and Security Council). Those decisions are based on staff work that has laid out the structure and objectives of an operation. That work may or may not be based on close consultation with potential troop- and policecontributing countries. Even if based on such consultation, the states that agree to contribute personnel will not all see the world alike, and they will place differing political constraints on the personnel they contribute. This has been the historical burden of multilateral peace operations, but as their purposes become broader, less predictable, and more risky to execute, these differences matter more. States calculus about risk to troops and sustainability of domestic support is likely to change, and the availability of troops and police and the coherence of missions and not just UN missions are likely to suffer. This would matter less if there were dozens of troop contributors willing to take these risks, but that is not the case. In most regional organizations, a minority of larger powers tends to contribute the bulk of peacekeeping troops, as well as the bulk of the organization s funding. An even smaller minority may be willing to put its troops in harm s way on behalf of a peacekeeping mission. Thus, in NATO, the principal fighting forces come from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, and now perhaps France, while other members, although fielding troops, strive to minimize their exposure to combat. In European Union field operations, the main combat risk thus far has been borne by France. In African Union operations, Nigeria, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, and South Africa have been key troop contributors. The United Nations similarly relies on a comparative handful of states to fill out its uniformed ranks: fifteen states contribute 75 percent of UN forces. Loss of any of the major South Asian contributors would hurt UN capacity badly, as would loss of any large African contributor. Because so many large UN operations are in Africa, African troop and police contributions are at least as important politically as they are operationally. 14 UN operations offer unusual opportunities for field experience to the developing countries that contribute most of the troops and police. There is also prestige associated with international deployments, perhaps a sense of competition with regional rivals, and UN troop reimbursements may offer a net financial gain to the contributing government. Given the increased risk associated with many current UN operations, such gain might be considered the equivalent of hazard pay. However, none of the above motivations necessarily incline a contributor to take risks with those it sends to UN operations. The more democratic the state, the less inclined it may be toward such risk, given the potential for domestic political backlash should national personnel be lost. Wealthy states also stress lossavoidance, and most of their commitments to UN operations are monetary in nature, plus logistical

34 THE PURPOSES OF PEACE OPERATIONS 17 support, sometimes through private sector contractors. These tensions look likely to be played out, and not for the good, in the contemporary mission that potentially most conflates peacekeeping and war-fighting, in Somalia, where Ethiopia and Eritrea have waged a proxy war, the former with tacit US support. Huddled near the Mogadishu airport, re-creating a scenario that played out previously in the fall of 1992, is a small force of peacekeepers then from the United Nations, now from the African Union who are largely powerless to defend even themselves. 15 Now, as then, a replacement force is in the wings; it is to be UN-led and is to replace both its weak multilateral predecessor and the Ethiopian army. It will face, however, even tougher collective opposition and lower prospects of success than did the 1993 UN operation, and since that mission failed almost completely, these prospects are low indeed. Conclusion Peacekeeping is a very useful tool of international politics, but an inherently limited tool. It can and must take on violent local challenges to peace implementation, but only at the margins of a peace process. Should the core of that process lose cohesion, a multinational operation will itself have insufficient cohesion and likely insufficient military strength to make the center hold. This is the main risk of repurposing peace operations as a low-intensity variety of war-fighting, especially if those who most vigorously tout the new purpose are not willing to put their own forces where the Security Council votes to invite others to deploy. Peace operations, especially UN operations, therefore should be distinctly conceptualized. A peacekeeping operation should be one that has international legitimacy derived from an international mandate, and local legitimacy derived either from invitational language in a peace agreement or from its actions in implementing such an agreement: curbing deadly residual violence and protecting the population. Ideally, it should enjoy the consent of all local parties initially, but should be able to work with partial absence of consent and should be prepared to deal with decayed consent. Legitimacy and consent are, to a peace operation, what body armor is to an infantry soldier: something to reduce the probability of catastrophic system failure. At the same time, there are limits to the use of force in peacekeeping operations, and the UN capstone document recognizes those limits: groups of soldiers are not the same as an army. To the extent that the great powers define their own military activities in terms of limited warfare that does not entail the calibrated use of force or a need for international endorsement, they are describing something other than peace operations. The US government is therefore correct to define the supplemental functions of forces in combat zones as stability operations instead of peacekeeping or peace operations. Although a peacekeeping force may need to undertake combat activities in certain places and at certain times, combat is not and cannot be its baseline stance. Should combat become a routine preoccupation, then the operation has transitioned to something else, regardless of who mandated it or what that initial mandate said. That is not to say that stability operations or authorized war-fighting operations will not be needed. But peacekeeping operations should be kept honorably distinct from this range of tasks that they are inherently ill suited to conduct. William J. Durch is codirector of the Future of Peace Operations Program at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. Prior to joining the Henry L. Stimson Center in 1990, Dr. Durch served in the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as a research fellow at the Harvard Center for Science and International Affairs, and as assistant driector for the Defense and Arms Control Studies program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Since joining Stimson, he has been seconded as scienctific advisor to the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency and served as project director for the UN Panel on UN Peace Operations (the

35 18 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS Brahimi Report). He also serves as a consultant on projects focused on improving the effectiveness of peacekeeping at headquarters and in the field. Dr. Durch has lectured on peacekeeping at US colleges and universities and has taught at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins University, the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University (GWU), and the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He holds a PhD from MIT, an MA from GWU, and a BSFS from Georgetown. Madeline L. England is research associate in the Future of Peace Operations Program at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. Ms. England holds a Master s degree in International Relations from Colombia University s School of International and Public Affairs. Notes 1. Bunche supervised the setup of the UN Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East in See Brian Urquhart, Ralph Bunche: An American Odyssey (New York: Norton, 1998), pp. 161, The Middle East observer force still exists. See Mona Ghali, The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, in W. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin s, 1993). The observer mission on Java is less well known. The Consular Commission was established there by UN Security Council Resolution 30 of 25 August At its first meeting, on 1 September 1947, the commission called upon its constituent states (Australia, Belgium, the Republic of China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to provide a total of 24 military officers to observe the cease-fire lines between Dutch and Indonesian forces, later expanded to sixty. For extensive documentation, see Peter Londey, Other People s Wars: A History of Australian Peacekeeping (New South Wales, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2004), pp For a discussion that takes a longer look at peacekeeping and peace observation, see Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics (New York: St. Martin s, 1990). See also Birger Heldt and Peter Wallensteen, Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, , 2nd ed. (Sandoverken, Sweden: Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2006), p Indar Jit Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin s, 1984), p. 1. For a good history of the evolution of terminology, see Trevor Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp Findlay, Use of Force in UN Peace Operations, p Peacekeeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 2nd ed. (New York: United Nations, January 1995), p. 45 (the July 1992 definition). This definition is anything but essence-focused, being so bland as to mention only one of the three ostensible pillars of peacekeeping, and then in a way that suggests its imminent obsolescence. Do peacekeepers watch, report, fight, run fast? We aren t told. 6. Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace, pp. 9 11, United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305- S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, para Ibid., paras. 13, Ibid., paras , 55, 64d. 10. Ibid., para Dennis Drew and Donald Snow, What Is Military Doctrine? in Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems (Montgomery, Ala.: Maxwell Air Force Base, Air University Press, 1988). 12. Gen. Charles D. Krulak, The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War, Marines Magazine, January Issued in January 2008 by the Best Practices section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, this capstone document (so called because it sits atop a large framework of more specialized guidance and operating procedures) defines peacekeeping as a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has halted, and to assist in implementing agreements put into place by peacekeepers. Peace enforcement, on the other hand, involves the application... of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force as mandated by the Security Council. United Nations, United

36 Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, January 2008), p. 18, _doctrine_eng.pdf 14. Four European states (France, Italy, Poland, and Spain) provide over half the troops for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (and 7 percent of total UN forces); European troops are scarce among UN operations in Africa, however. Latin American countries that contribute over a thousand troops each include Uruguay (to the Congo and Haiti) and Brazil (to Haiti). China sends troops and police to several venues in Africa, to Lebanon, and to Haiti, while Indonesia deploys to Lebanon and the Congo. The Latin American and East Asian contributions represent about 4 percent of the total UN deployments apiece. Together with the top fifteen, these states account for 90 percent of deployed UN troops and police. United Nations, Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations (New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, August 2008); see also Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, 2008 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008). 15. As of November 2007, there were an estimated 5,000 Ethiopian troops in Somalia; the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had an estimated 2,500 troops on the ground, about one-fifth of its total proposed strength. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2008 (London: Routledge, 2008), p THE PURPOSES OF PEACE OPERATIONS 19

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38 2 The Broader Horn: Peacekeeping in a Strategic Vacuum A. Sarjoh Bah 21

39 In last year s Annual Review, we warned that peacekeeping has become the reflex solution to crises, often in the absence of viable political agreements. Additionally, peace operations are increasingly given broad mandates without the resources to implement them. The cluster of peace operations in the broader Horn of Africa stretching from the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad, through Sudan, to Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia epitomizes both practices. Moreover, though the conflicts in the region are deeply interlinked, the peace operations there are not, nor do they form part of a broader regional strategy. Lack of a regional strategy compounds preexisting problems of weak commitment and slow implementation. The results have been unsurprisingly poor, at great human cost. The current framework for peacekeeping in the region emerges from complex interactions between the permanent five members of the UN Security Council, powerful states in the African Union, and the host nations. Influence changes from case to case, with France playing a prominent role in the Chad/CAR context, the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt playing key roles in Sudan, and the United States and South Africa more influential in efforts to get UN peacekeepers to Somalia. But within this mix, critical interventions have increasingly been shaped by US policy. When the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in south Sudan was signed, US political engagement was key; it was the United States more than any other state that pushed for a peacekeeping mission in Darfur; and US support to South Africa in calling for a UN peace operation in Somalia was decisive, in the face of reluctance by other permanent members of the Security Council. In theory, this should provide an opportunity for US leadership in forging a coherent regional strategy. In practice, US policy in the region is itself confused, caught between diverse interests ranging from pressures from religious and human rights lobbies to a growing commitment on the part of US policy elites to the concept of the responsibility to protect to a broader interest in stabilizing fragile states. Overlaying all of this is the emergence of the Horn and the Indian Ocean littoral as an important battleground in the global war on terror. Not only do US counterterrorism objectives shape the context for specific operations in the region, but US counterterrorism engagement is also increasingly reshaping the strategic positions of other states and the relations between them, deepening tensions and arguably contributing to the spread of conflict and thus, ironically, to the demand for peacekeepers. When peacekeepers are deployed in the absence of a viable political framework, it heightens the tension between the purposes of their deployment often in large part to provide protection for civilians and the practical requirements of their engagement, which depends on consent from host nations. This tension between protection and consent, which amplifies existing problems of overstretch, is but one way the region exemplifies William Durch and Madeline England s analysis herein of broader disagreement in the international system over the purposes of peacekeeping. The Complexities of Regional Security in the Horn As the UN Security Council and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations bounced from conflict to conflict in West Africa in the 22

40 THE BROADER HORN: PEACEKEEPING IN A STRATEGIC VACUUM 23

41 24 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS late 1990s, they frequently cited the lesson learned that many conflicts were regional in nature and so too should be strategy. That lesson may have been identified, but it certainly has not been learned, if peacekeeping deployments in the Horn are evidence. The interwoven conflicts in the region exhibit the features of a regional security complex, a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another. 1 In the broader Horn, conflict in one state poses grave danger to the security and stability of other states. This has been seen in support for dissident groups from neighboring states, as in Sudan and Chad s support for rebels on either side of their borders, Eritrea s support for groups in Darfur, Ethiopia, Somalia, and eastern Sudan, and Ethiopia s support for groups in Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan. Tit-for-tat support likely enabled rebel advances on Sudan and Chad s respective capitals during Questions of identity, ethnic or otherwise, also feature prominently in most conflicts in the region. Ethnic linkages have been crucial in determining alliances in the Horn, as rebel groups have often invoked these sentiments to gain support from neighboring governments. All this is compounded by the influence of and interference by external powers. China s search to secure supplies of natural resources, France s waning desire to maintain its influence in its former colonies, and the counterterrorism policies of the United States influence the region s politics. US counterterrorism policy has recently been particularly significant, deepening political fissures in the region between countries aligned with US policy and those at odds with it, particularly those believed to support Al-Qaeda affiliated groups. Somalia is the epicenter of these dynamics, as the focus of the US counterterrorism policy in the region, a proxy battleground for Ethiopia and Eritrea, and host now to African Union and soon, maybe, to United Nations peacekeepers, deployed where UN officials have warned peacekeeping cannot succeed courting the risk that the Horn might once again become a locus for blowback against the entire peace operation enterprise. 2 In this complex region, over 25,000 peacekeepers were deployed in five missions during Taken as a whole, the broader Horn is host to the largest concentration of peacekeepers outside of Afghanistan drawn from the United Nations, the African Union, and the European Union. The region will account for about 62 percent of UN deployments in Africa and over 35 percent of UN deployments globally once all authorized and planned missions are deployed in full. The overall presence will surge if the proposed UN operation for Somalia, estimated to reach 20,000 personnel, is in fact deployed. No Peace to Keep As Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed argued in last year s Annual Review, peacekeeping is no substitute for an effective political process. The absence of viable political frameworks has impeded peacekeeping efforts throughout the broader Horn. This is most evident in Somalia and Darfur, but true also of Chad and Ethiopia- Eritrea. The one partial exception is the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for south Sudan, but even the CPA is eroding. As detailed in this year s Sudan mission review, efforts to implement the CPA have floundered due to a combination of factors, the most important being lack of political will by the parties to the agreement, the National Congress Party (NCP), and a weak Sudan People s Liberation Movement (SPLM). These have been exacerbated by limited engagement by crucial regional and international actors. That this is in part a consequence of attention to Darfur highlights the absence of an integrated approach to the complexity of Sudan as a whole. With the northsouth peace process losing traction, both parties are moving to ensure that, in the event of a breakup, they retain enough of the country s oil resources, and are positioning themselves for that eventuality, including through rearmament. If implementation of the CPA was difficult, efforts to restore stability to Somalia and to

42 THE BROADER HORN: PEACEKEEPING IN A STRATEGIC VACUUM 25 rebuild the world s longest-running failed state will be even more challenging. Despite numerous initiatives, the most recent being the Djibouti Agreement (see the Somalia mission notes in this volume), Somalia lacks an inclusive political framework for ending its conflict or restoring state authority. As discussed later in the present chapter, the search for a way out of Somalia s decades-long turmoil is exacerbated by a US counterterrorism framework that seeks to limit political engagement with Islamist forces, due to concerns about affiliation with or support to Al-Qaeda affiliated groups. Those forces have shown an ability to block both political and peacekeeping processes that exclude them. In the meantime, both the EU Force in the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) and the UN Mission in the Central Africa Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) lack the mandate to address the issues underlying the conflict in Chad. Absent a prospect for a political process to resolve the conflict, the risk is that the UN and EU presence will merely contribute to freezing the problem, surely an unsustainable approach. Even if the UN and EU do manage to engage in a political process in Chad, such efforts would need to be closely coordinated with neighboring Sudan and the CAR, and by extension northern Uganda and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo the southern fringe of the security complex. Efforts to restore peace to Chad through initiatives such as the Dakar Agreement and the regional Contact Group would be difficult if they are not coordinated with similar efforts in these countries. Meanwhile, the UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was deployed to implement the largely discredited Darfur Peace Agreement. The focus of international attention has been on the slow deployment of UNAMID. Equally problematic has been the stalled northsouth Darfur peace process. Joint UN-AU mediation in 2008 led by Jan Eliasson and Salim Ahmed Salim failed to gain traction. Despite the presence of UNAMID and a new UN-AU chief mediator, Djibril Bassolé, the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur continues to worsen. Consent, Protection, and Overstretch The absence of viable political processes in these cases means that peacekeeping operations are deployed without the real consent from the host state and from nonstate parties to the conflict. In some cases, the state and nonstate parties have given their nominal consent, as in Darfur. But true consent is largely absent, complicating the mandates to protect civilians and exacerbating preexisting problems of overstretch. Overstretch would be a challenge even in circumstances of real consent, particularly in Sudan and Chad, given their sheer and tough logistical conditions long distances from seaports, inadequate roads, limited water supplies. Troop contributors with battle-ready and selfreliant troops a necessity for remote deployments faced with likely hostilities are reaching the real limits of their forces. But lack of true consent from host nations doubly compounds the problem by creating obstacles to the deployment of effective troops, and deterring contributors who could deploy forces to less unstable contexts. The Security Council s authorization of what is on paper its largest peace operation, UNAMID, without a guarantee of troops and mission support elements, ignores a major recommendation of the Brahimi Report, 3 which warned the Council not to authorize sizable missions until there are firm commitments of troops and critical mission support elements. UNAMID was further weakened by the Council s acceptance of Khartoum s demand to maintain the African character of UNAMID. A Scandinavian proposal to deploy a joint mission support capacity was rejected by Sudan. But even if Sudan had accepted the proposed Scandinavian contributions, Western deployments in Africa would have remained under 10 percent. Contributions from non-african but also non-western countries like Thailand have been slow, due partly to difficulties in establishing camps to house these contingents. But as

43 26 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS detailed in the Sudan mission review, lack of real Sudanese consent is evident also in the bureaucratic obstacles faced by UNAMID in its efforts to deploy troops, mount night reconnaissance, and the like. Peacekeepers in Somalia face similar dilemmas. The deployment of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) without guaranteed commitment of human and material resources and absent an inclusive peace process raises questions about lessons the African Union appears not to have learned from its mission in Darfur, the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which was crippled by the absence of a peace to keep as well as by a lack of resources. After this difficult and sometimes painful experience, the African Union should have been more circumspect with new deployments, especially without firm commitments of troops and equipment, predictable funding, and a viable political process. Both the Sudan and Somalia cases highlight deep tensions between long-standing principles of peacekeeping such as consent and the emerging norm of responsibility to protect. 4 During the middle of the decade, a growing focus on the responsibility to protect was a major part of the drive for peacekeeping action in Darfur. The severity of the situation and the evident lack of will of the government to protect civilians made Darfur a clear case for the doctrine s application. However, the principle of balance of consequences means that fullscale intervention or use of force is neither suitable nor likely. 5 Thus the situation calls for response, but the context requires consent leading to the contradictions discussed above. 6 Similar issues are present in Somalia. Though the case has not generally been discussed in terms of the responsibility to protect, the fact that Somalia has for a decade and a half not had a central government or the capacity to protect its citizens suggests the applicability of the concept and the need for external intervention. However, the practicalities are exceedingly difficult. In formal terms, the AU and the UN took the request for assistance by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) installed with Ethiopian military support as constituting consent for its operations. However, the TFG has limited support and authority within Somalia, and the absence of a broader political framework that encompasses the overthrown Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) parties means that the AU faces not just a lack of consent but also outright hostility from powerful forces on the ground. AMISOM has been faced since its deployment with a growing insurgency waged by a reconstituted UIC and other militias as part of their resistance to the TFG and its Ethiopian backers. The situation in Somalia poses a critical question: In a failed state, whose consent should be sought? The Complications of Counterterrorism That question was complicated in Somalia by the fact that one of the major parties on the ground is an Islamist party with suspected links to terrorist organizations. But the complications of counterterrorism policy in Somalia arise not just from this question; rather, the overall situation in Somalia is compounded by the impact of US counterterrorism policy on interstate tensions in the region. This is particularly the case with respect to Ethiopia and Eritrea, where the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), established in 2000, was terminated in The Security Council ended UNMEE s mandate after Ethiopia s continued disregard of the ruling by the now defunct Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC) that ceded the disputed town of Badme to Eritrea, and the latter s gradual withdrawal of its consent for the continued presence of the UN mission. US counterterrorism posture was part of the backdrop. As Ethiopia and Eritrea found themselves on opposite sides of US counterterrorism posture in the region, preexisting tensions between the two countries were exacerbated. The convergence of US and Ethiopian interests on counterterrorism issues fostered Washington s support for the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December This in turn affirmed Eritrea s feeling of US bias in favor of Ethiopia. To Eritrea, Ethiopia s disregard of the ruling of the

44 THE BROADER HORN: PEACEKEEPING IN A STRATEGIC VACUUM 27 EEBC stemmed from or at least was facilitated by the support that it enjoys in Washington. 7 And indeed, analysts have noted that as the United States and Ethiopia forged closer ties on counterterrorism, Western criticism of Ethiopia s intransigence on the border question softened. 8 For Ethiopia, the deteriorating relations between the United States and Eritrea which led Washington to consider listing Eritrea as a state sponsor of terror reduced the pressure on it to abide by the ruling of the EEBC. The net result was a polarization and hardening of positions on both sides, the collapse of UNMEE, and an escalation of support for insurgent groups in Somalia. While the likelihood of a return to war between Ethiopia and Eritrea is limited, the removal of the interpositional force increases the risk significantly. Meanwhile, the collapse of UNMEE could signal to Sudan and others in the region that failing to cooperate with a UN-authorized peace operation has limited consequences. These broader regional dynamics set the stage for the challenging circumstances peacekeepers find themselves within in Somalia. The challenge of consent is exacerbated by the fact that some of Somalia s insurgents are Islamist, a subset of whom are believed to have ties to Al-Qaeda or Al-Qaeda affiliated groups. The United States has already designated groups such as Al-Shabaab and Al-Itihaad al-islaami as terrorist organizations the latter is believed to have collaborated with Al-Qaeda in carrying out the attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in The challenge not unique to Somalia is distinguishing groups with terrorist links from other armed groups, especially in terms of Islamists who might now be tactically allied with Al-Qaeda affiliated groups but who are not implicated in direct terrorist attacks or committed to Al-Qaeda style goals. 10 This differentiation, if it can be achieved, is critical, because it would allow for the prospect of a political process that brings in partial spoilers while accommodating important counterterrorism objectives a balancing act that is critical to any long-term solution to the Somalia debacle. That this will be difficult is without question. But also without question is the fact that no progress toward this objective will be made absent a shift in US policy in Somalia, away from using counterterrorism as the primary lens and toward an effort to reconcile counterterrorism and statebuilding/stabilization objectives a process the United States is beginning to confront in Afghanistan. Subcontracting peacekeeping to the AU while maintaining a focus on hunting down Al-Qaeda suspects through air strikes and by supporting the TFG and its Ethiopian backers does not make for a long-term strategy. Counterterrorism policy also influences US policy in Sudan. Despite its public stance, including accusing the government of Sudan of being complicit in genocide in Darfur, the United States continues to cooperate with Sudan on some counterterrorism initiatives. This has led some US analysts to argue that Washington s preoccupation with the war on terror outweighs its concerns for Darfur, with counterterrorism now consum[ing] U.S. Policy in the Greater Horn as totally as anticommunism did a generation ago. 11 Certainly, the perception that Washington pulls its punches on questions of Sudanese consent in order not to strain relations on counterterrorism weakens its stance on Darfur and undermines its leadership role in the north-south peace process. Of course, the United States is limited in its ability to influence Sudan toward a more proactive consent for UNAMID, and operates in a manner designed to foster and align with China s more tentative pressure on Khartoum. Looking Ahead The regional dynamic in the broader Horn now is one in which peacekeepers are caught in conflicts where there is no peace to keep, where the absence of consent exacerbates tensions between their purpose for being there, in the protection of civilians, and the practicalities of their operation, which requires consent. The issue of consent is further complicated by counterterrorism politics in the broader Horn, some of which are exacerbating tensions within the region and fueling further conflict in turn

45 28 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS driving further demand for peacekeepers. In short, a vicious circle has emerged, threatening to erode the viability of the overall peace operation enterprise. To escape this dynamic requires a regional strategic framework that can, over time, reconcile national, regional, and international interests in this regional security complex. The deployment of peacekeepers may be part of that framework, but should not substitute for it. While there are no quick fixes, concrete action in several areas is important. First, an integrated strategic framework for tackling the conflicts in the broader Horn needs to be developed, involving national (state and nonstate), regional, and international actors. A first step in this direction would be to find durable solutions to the conflicts between Ethiopia-Eritrea and north-south Sudan, as that would provide an opportunity to address other conflicts in the region, thereby creating a more permissive environment for successful peace operations. Second, there is a need to strengthen the role of regional and subregional organizations in implementing peace agreements. While these institutions lack the capacity to undertake complex peace operations at the moment, as is evidenced by AMIS and AMISOM, they can contribute positively by using their political legitimacy to ensure that the parties adhere to their commitments. Difficulties in implementing the CPA could have been remedied had the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) been stronger and directly involved. Third, there is a need to explore ways of reconciling national, regional, and US security interests, which are often conflicted. Achieving a balanced approach is critical if peace operations are to succeed in the Horn. Experience from the region and elsewhere demonstrates how peace operations can be easily subsumed by counterterrorism operations, thereby blurring the line between peacekeeping and fighting. To maintain credible peace operations, this should be avoided. Fourth, the African Union s Peace and Security Council should avoid authorizing complex peace operations without a firm commitment of troops, equipment, and financing. While the AU is keen to deal with conflicts on the continent, its actions should be guided by existing best practice, from its own operations as well as those of others. Fifth, peacekeepers should be deployed to enhance a political process, in order to better guarantee optimal outcomes. Stability operations, whose mandate is to quell violence and protect civilians, need to be distinguished from operations that are mandated to embark on long-term statebuilding. Finally, the new US administration should provide committed leadership in dealing with the conflicts in the broader Horn, perhaps by appointing a full-time envoy for the region. The absence of US leadership, together with conflicting signals regarding Darfur, Somalia, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and part-time north-south engagement, has weakened international efforts. The new administration has a unique opportunity to provide leadership that is informed by national, regional, and international dynamics. 12 Notes I am very grateful to Bruce Jones, Richard Gowan, Benjamin Tortolani, Teresa Whitfield, Ian Johnstone, and Victoria DiDomenico for their comments on drafts of this chapter. I, of course, remain responsible for any errors or omissions. 1. Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), p Sally Healy, Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel (London: Chatham House, 2008).

46 THE BROADER HORN: PEACEKEEPING IN A STRATEGIC VACUUM United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305- S/2000/809, August International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, December For the UN s agreed position, see the United Nations, World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, 24 October For a comprehensive discussion of the concept and its application, including in Darfur, see Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2008). 6. While efforts by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to indict President Omar al- Bashir for crimes committed in Darfur are laudable, the timing could be problematic and risks further complicating an already difficult relationship between the peace operations and the government. There are concerns that the indictment could plunge the country into chaos, worsening the Darfur crisis and unraveling the CPA. 7. For more on US policy in the region, see Terrence Lyons, Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: US Policy Toward Ethiopia and Ertirea, CRS Report no. 21 (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, December 2006); Jendayi E. Frazer, Somalia: Expanding Crisis in the Horn of Africa, remarks to the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations and the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, US Senate, Washington, D.C., 29 June 2006; Thomas A. Dempsey, Evaluating U.S. Policy Objectives and Options on the Horn of Africa, testimony to the Subcommittee on African Affairs, US Senate, Washington, D.C., 11 March International Crisis Group, Beyond the Fragile Peace Between Ethiopia and Eritrea: Averting a New War, African Report no. 141 (Brussels, 17 June 2008). 9. International Crisis Group, Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained? Africa Report no. 116 (Brussels, 10 August 2006); International Crisis Group, Somalia: The Tough Part Is Ahead, Africa Briefing no. 45 (Brussels, 26 January 2007); Jonathan Stevenson, Risks and Opportunities in Somalia, Survival 49, no. 2 (June 2007): Ken Menkhaus, Governance Without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping, International Security 31, no. 3 (Winter ): John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen, Blowing the Horn, Foreign Affairs 86, no. 2 (March April 2007): The subject of US leadership in the region and beyond is aptly captured in Richard Holbrooke, The Next President: Mastering a Daunting Agenda, Foreign Affairs 87, no. 5 (September October 2008): 2 24.

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48 3 Mission Reviews 31

49 3.1 Chad and the Central African Republic The deployment of parallel United Nations and European Union peace operations to Chad s and the Central African Republic s borders with Sudan in 2008 did little to improve the security and humanitarian situations in either country. The conditions of the refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) remained unchanged as insecurity persisted. The Darfur crisis, which eluded all forms of resolution during the year, continued to complicate efforts to resolve the conflicts in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). In the midst of these challenges, the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and the EU Force in the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) remained deployed but with no mandate to address the political issues that underpin the conflicts. Moreover, both missions were impacted by continued tensions between Chad and Sudan that were heightened by reciprocal attacks on the two countries capitals by rebel forces, leading to finger-pointing between the feuding neighbors. In the face of these challenges, the UN and EU explored plans for a smooth transition at the culmination of EUFOR s one-year mandate. This would see an enhanced MINURCAT assume military responsibilities from EUFOR. However, failure to deal with the political underpinnings of the conflicts especially in Chad will likely remain a source of serious concern for the coming year. Background Chad and the CAR have faced serious internal insecurity for decades, exacerbated in recent years by the spillover from the ongoing conflict in Darfur. Since independence, Chad has been rocked by a series of coups, the most recent of which brought the current president, Idris Déby, to power in Despite a number of elections in the interim, the Chadian government is not widely viewed as truly representative, and over the years both political and violent opposition has mounted. Increasingly well-organized rebel groups have capitalized on regional instability and porous borders, and have consolidated their resistance through a number of high-level military defections. While clashes between government and rebel forces have been responsible for the overall insecurity, the situation has been worsened by acts of banditry, ethnic and intercommunal violence, and a pervading environment of impunity. Armed groups, some of whom have crossed into Chad from Darfur, are responsible for attacking and looting villages, and for driving Chadian civilians off of their land. The combination of these destabilizing forces has led to massive internal displacement and has hampered the delivery of humanitarian assistance to both Chadian IDPs and refugees from Darfur, currently residing in camps in eastern Chad. In the CAR, internal conflict throughout the 1990s prompted the deployment of a series of international and regional peace operations to address a situation characterized by a series of army mutinies, coup attempts, and armed rebellions aided or encouraged by the country s neighbors. The UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) was replaced in 2000 by the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), which sought to consolidate the gains of a 1999 election. BONUCA s mandate was to support the CAR government s efforts to strengthen 32

50 CHAD AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 33 democratic institutions, consolidate national reconciliation processes, and mobilize international support and financial resources for development efforts. Following a steep deterioration of security in 2002, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community deployed the Force Multinational de la Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l Afrique Centrale (FOMUC), a regional peacekeeping force of 380 troops from Chad, Gabon, and the Congo with a mandate to support stability and the reconstruction of the Central African Armed Forces. FOMUC has had neither the mandate nor the capacity to bring stability to the CAR. 1 BONUCA continues to operate in the CAR today, and has expanded its activities to support the government s efforts to reform the security sector, reinforce the rule of law, and disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate ex-combatants. A particular focus during 2008 was an effort to promote an all-inclusive political dialogue involving opposition leaders as well as representatives of the country s several rebel groups. Meanwhile, in June 2008, the CAR became the fourth country to be placed on the agenda of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. In a December 2006 report, then Secretary- General Kofi Annan proposed the deployment of a peacekeeping operation to monitor movements in the border areas, while working to improve security through the facilitation of political dialogue and the protection of civilians under imminent threat. While this proposal was An unusual controversy, with implications for peacekeeping and humanitarian activities in Chad, began in late 2007 and carried over well into In November 2007, a group of French citizens calling themselves Zoe s Ark attempted to remove 103 children and infants from Chadian territory near the border with Darfur, claiming that the children were Darfurian refugees Zoe s Ark The group was arrested as they attempted to load the kidnapped children onto a plane, all of whom were later established to be the children of Chadian citizens and not from Darfur at all. The popular backlash against the group, and indeed against all international actors inside Chad, was immediate and violent. Humanitarian staff and UN personnel from Western countries were attacked, further disrupting the already difficult delivery of humanitarian programs. The legacy of this event has been a heightened mistrust of international and specifically humanitarian actors and the introduction of new bureaucratic regulations designed to monitor the movement of humanitarian staff and the operation of aid programs.

51 34 MISSION REVIEWS UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) Authorization and 25 September 2007 (UNSC Res. 1778) Start Date SRSG Victor Da Silva Angelo (Portugal) Chief Military Liaison François N Diaye (Senegal) Officer Police Commissioner Gerardo Cristian Chaumont (Argentina) Budget $301.1 million (1 July June 2009) Strength as of Military Liaison Officers: October 2008 Police: 236 International Civilian Staff: 307 Local Civilian Staff: 169 UN Volunteers: 77 For detailed mission information see p. 208 Authorization Date 15 October 2007 (EU Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP) Start Date January 2008 Head of Mission Budget EU Force in the Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) Strength as of Troops: 3, September 2008 Lieutenant-General Patrick Nash (Ireland) $98.5 million (October 2007 September 2008) UN Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) Authorization and 15 February 2000 (S/PRST/2000/5) Start Date Strength as of International Civilian Staff: October 2008 Local Civilian Staff: 54 welcomed by President François Bozizé of the CAR, it was rejected by Chad s President Déby, who was concerned that the UN was trying to turn Chad into a rear base for operations aimed at addressing the conflict in Darfur. Déby requested an all-civilian police force instead. After considerable discussion and debate, an agreement was reached that led to the simultaneous deployment of a UN civilian peacekeeping operation, and an EU military bridging force in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR. Authorized by Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007), MINURCAT, when fully deployed, was to comprise 300 civilian police and 50 military liaison officers in addition to appropriate civilian personnel. The mission was mandated to select, train, vet, and advise elements of the Chadian police force (a force that would come to be called the Détachement Intégré de Sécurité [DIS]), and to provide security in and around refugee and IDP sites in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR. Invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Resolution 1778 also authorized the European Union to deploy a military peacekeeping operation alongside MINURCAT. The European mission (EUFOR) was mandated to contribute to the protection of civilians in danger, establish wider security with a view to facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and contribute to the protection of UN and humanitarian personnel. As of October 2008, EUFOR deployed just for a year had reached full strength with 3,307 troops, of whom 200 were deployed to northeastern CAR. MINURCAT had yet to deploy fully, and of the expected 850 DIS officers, 418 had been trained including some 71 commanding officers and the remaining DIS training and deployment was expected to continue into Key Developments The conflicts in Chad, the CAR, and Sudan have a strong regional dimension, and the difficult relationship between Chad and Sudan proved to be one of the central drivers of conflict throughout For years, there have been allegations that the governments of Sudan and Chad have been a source of material support and safe haven to rebel groups fighting in their respective countries. But recent developments in both Chad and Darfur have brought these allegations to the fore.

52 CHAD AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 35 Chad The long and largely uncontrolled border between Sudan and Chad has been an issue of particular concern. Rebels from both sides of the border have been known to use the neighboring territory as a rear base to recruit, train, and regroup for battle. Accusations of Sudanese support to Chadian rebels, and vice versa, came to a head in 2008, with major offensives being launched against the capitals of both Chad and Sudan. In February 2008, rebel groups in Chad joined forces to launch a coordinated attack on the capital, N Djamena. The attack originated from the border region between Chad and Sudan, and it was alleged that Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebels from Darfur long believed to have benefited from the support of the Chadian government entered Chad to reinforce the Chadian national army. Rebel fighters reached the gates of the presidential palace, but the attack was repelled with the help of French forces. This daring move by the rebels further eroded already poor relations between Chad and Sudan, leading to the breaking off of diplomatic ties. In an effort to normalize relations, discussions moderated by Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade were initiated in Dakar in March The result was a commitment to normalize relations and to ban any activity of the armed groups and prevent the use of the territories of any of the two countries to destabilize the other, 2 as well as the formation of a Contact Group, jointly chaired by Libya, Eritrea, and the Republic of Congo, to monitor the implementation of the agreement. The group was also charged with the formation of a peace and security force to monitor and secure the borders between the two countries. The signing of the Dakar Agreement by Sudanese and Chadian authorities was met with skepticism by observers who noted that peace agreements between these countries were almost always followed by a resurgence of violence. This skepticism seemed warranted when, in May 2008, JEM rebels launched an unprecedented attack on Khartoum, reaching Omdurman on the outskirts of the capital. As in Chad, the speed with which the rebels attacked suggested that they had received outside support. The government of Sudan immediately accused Chad of providing JEM with the means to launch the attack and again broke off diplomatic relations with Chad. Following a September 2008 meeting of the Contact Group in Libreville, Gabon, the presidents of Chad and Sudan expressed a renewed commitment to the Dakar Agreement, including an intention to normalize relations and to finalize an experts report meant to delineate the concept of operations for the border monitoring force, as recommended in the Dakar Agreement. The force will, in theory, be drawn from the countries that compose the Contact Group. However, coordination and financial arrangements are still unclear, and it is generally believed that the deployment of this force will be largely contingent upon a marked improvement in relations between Chad and Sudan. Diplomatic ties between the two countries were reestablished in October. In addition to the regional developments, there has been some limited progress toward the fulfillment of certain internal peace agreements within Chad and, perhaps most notably, the CAR. Central African Republic Following recommendations made by a preparatory committee of the inclusive political dialogue, the government signed peace agreements with the Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et la Démocratie (APRD) in May 2008 and with the APRD and the Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR) in June. In early August, both the main coalition of opposition political parties and the rebel groups withdrew from the dialogue process over dissatisfaction with amnesty proposals put forward by the government, necessary for the participation of rebel and other leaders in the dialogue. Some of these problems were overcome in a new amnesty proposal approved by parliament in late September, and in early November President Bozizé announced that the dialogue would take place in December.

53 36 MISSION REVIEWS Another important dimension to the unfolding situation in Chad and the CAR is the role in and influence of France on the central African region. The ex-colonial power continues to be actively engaged in both countries, with an ongoing military presence and a history of intervention on behalf of the respective governments. In both the CAR and Chad, French forces stationed in the countries were rehatted to serve under the auspices of the EUFOR mission. However, France s record of intervention in defense of President Déby in particular continues to generate skepticism over its ability to remain impartial if the Chadian government comes under serious threat. The skepticism was further fueled when, in February 2008, even as European forces were deploying to Chad, France sought and received the tacit support of the UN Security Council to defend the Chadian government when the rebels entered the capital, N Djamena. 3 From FOMUC to MICOPAX While both MINURCAT and EUFOR are deployed in the CAR as well as Chad, their presence in the CAR is much more limited, contained entirely to the northeast, where the CAR borders Sudan. The internal stabilization and peacebuilding dynamics of the CAR have, for some years now, been the remit of BONUCA and FOMUC, the latter a multinational peacekeeping presence led by the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). When initially authorized in late 2002, FOMUC was intended to support a process of national reconciliation and to contribute to the stabilization of the country, by monitoring the border between Chad and the CAR, initiating a disarmament process, and protecting key infrastructure. However, from the very outset, FOMUC was severely underresourced; this fact was highlighted in March 2003 when, three months after its deployment, FOMUC was unable to prevent General François Bozizé s ousting of President Ange-Félix Patassé in a military coup launched from Chad. In July 2008, CEMAC handed over operational authority of FOMUC to the Mission de Consolidation de la Paix (MICOPAX), to be led by the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC). It was hoped that this transition would bring a greater number of regional actors into the effort to stabilize the CAR. The MICOPAX mandate has yet to be formally approved, and as 2008 drew to a close, MICOPAX continued to operate under FOMUC s mandate. However, the mission will take on a much more multidimensional character than its predecessor, incorporating combat troops, civilian police and gendarmes, as well as a civilian component. It is hoped that the new civilian component will play a positive role in reinvigorating political dialogue in the CAR. Both FOMUC and MICOPAX worked collaboratively in 2008 with UN bodies, particularly in Bangui. It is expected that MICOPAX will collaborate closely with BONUCA in the effort to achieve the political and stabilization objectives in their respective mandates. While EUFOR and MINURCAT are both present in northeastern CAR, the MINURCAT deployment in particular continues to be minimal, with limited cooperation and dialogue between it and the other missions. UN-EU Partnership? Though the simultaneous deployment of EU and UN operations is not unprecedented, it is unusual, and the lessons learned from the experience in Chad and the CAR are expected to inform future collaborations between the UN and the EU. The EU s involvement in this effort was politically complex, and carries as much relevance for the future of European peacekeeping intervention as it does for Chadian security and stability. The EU intervention in Chad was approached as a template for future EU peacekeeping interventions, a fact that had implications in the planning stages, particularly with regard to the degree to which UN planners were included in the EU planning process. The decision to deploy an EU force in Chad resulted from Chad s refusal to consent to the deployment of UN troops. Consequently, by the time the EU decided to deploy to Chad, UN planners had already undertaken a number of detailed technical assessment missions to evaluate

54 CHAD AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 37 conditions on the ground. In the wake of Security Council Resolution 1778, and in the context of a longer UN discussion about the deployment of a single, multidimensional peacekeeping operation, UN staff viewed the EU force as a component of a larger UN-led intervention. Conversely, the EU planners approached the EU mission as a parallel deployment of two discreet, if complementary, peacekeeping missions. Interactions with the government of Chad were not approached in a coordinated or collaborative manner, and the terms of reference for each respective mission were elaborated separately, a fact that resulted in delays in the finalization of certain technical agreements. 4 At the field level, the gaps in coordination, different rates of deployment, and the UN Security Council s tendency to view the intervention in Chad as a subsidiary of the more prominent effort in Darfur, had very practical implications for UN and humanitarian actors. In June 2008, a rebel attack on the town of Goz Beida in Chad prompted the deployment of EUFOR troops to protect civilians and evacuate humanitarian personnel. In the wake of the evacuation, serious concerns were raised over the apparent lack of a coordinated security plan. Though MINURCAT had a small team on the ground, the slow pace of deployment meant that a crucial link between EUFOR and the humanitarian community was missing, and the commanding EUFOR officers were forced to improvise their response. In addition to the coordination challenges, it became clear early on in the EUFOR deployment that this well-resourced and highly trained military force was almost entirely unequipped to address the day-to-day security issues that plague the region. Configured to confront a military threat, the European force has neither the mandate, nor the resources to combat the banditry that is at the heart of the insecurity in eastern Chad. 5 The force was designed and deployed primarily with a view to protecting refugees and IDPs from attacks emanating from Darfur, and was poorly configured to Chad s internal security dysfunctions. Once deployed, EUFOR attempted to adapt the existing mandate to the day-to-day realities. Mission de Consolidation de la Paix (MICOPAX) Authorization Date 2 October 2002 Start Date January 2003 Head of Mission Albert Akouéndéngué (Gabon) Budget $19.3 million (October 2007 September 2008) Strength as of Troops: September 2008 Civilian Police: 170 Members of EUFOR TCHAD/RCA speak with villagers while on patrol near the Farchana camp in eastern Chad, 27 June With deployments concentrated in Abeche, Goz Beida, and Iriba, EUFOR commanders instituted long-distance patrols, and attempted to target corridors that are central to the distribution of humanitarian assistance. The strategy has had some positive impact, but EUFOR, with limited troop numbers and a huge, logistically prohibitive area of operations, is constrained in its ability to provide ongoing security. In June 2008, a joint EU-UN assessment team traveled to Chad and the CAR to conduct a midmandate review and begin preparations for the September 2008 Security Council discussions on the renewal and adjustment of the MINURCAT mandate. While it was generally agreed that the EUFOR deployment did not ISSOUF SANOGO/AFP/Getty Images

55 38 MISSION REVIEWS address the core security challenges, it was nevertheless determined that a military capability with the means to project itself quickly and effectively throughout the area of operation would be necessary to confront the ongoing cross-border violence, and to provide for the protection of civilians and humanitarian actors in the instance of a violent attack. In his September 2008 report on the situation in Chad and the CAR, the Secretary-General outlined an expanded MINURCAT mission concept, including a Chapter VII mandate to protect civilians, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and protect UN staff and resources. This concept describes a strategy of deterrence through presence that, given the size and harsh nature of the terrain, will require extensive aerial mobility assets (primarily helicopters) and a strong intelligence-gathering capability. The force size outlined by the Secretary-General includes 6,000 UN peacekeepers, as well as an additional over the horizon response capability. In October 2008, President Déby accepted the proposed expanded UN mission. For its part, the government of Chad requested that the total DIS deployment be increased from 850 to 1,700 officers, a request that was to be reevaluated once the initial 850 officers had taken up their posts. There are a number of challenges that may be associated with the generation of the followon force. From a logistical standpoint, it is estimated that it would take the UN approximately one year to construct the necessary infrastructure to launch the mission that the Secretary- General has described. As such, the Secretary- General s report emphasized the importance of a smooth transition from EUFOR to the expanded MINURCAT, and in particular requested that the government of Chad ensure a full handover of all EUFOR bases and installations to UN control. Some of the existing EUFOR soldiers are expected to be rehatted as MINURCAT troops, alleviating some of the pressure for force generation. However, the Secretary-General s mission concept relies heavily on the availability of helicopters and other aviation assets, resources that have increasingly proved difficult to secure. On 24 September 2008, the UN Security Council voted in support of a resolution (1834) expressing the intention to expand the MINUR- CAT mandate to include a military component upon the expiration of the EUFOR mandate, and calling on the UN and the EU to begin preparations for the transfer of authority from an EU to a UN peacekeeping presence as of 15 March The precise size and shape of the expanded MINURCAT deployment remain unclear. 6 Conclusion As 2008 drew to a close, resolution of the interrelated conflicts in Chad and the CAR remained a work in progress. Despite efforts to enhance MINURCAT, the UN, at the insistence of Chad, lacks an explicit political role for MINURCAT in the effort to resolve Chad s internal political instability. International human rights and humanitarian advocates have called upon the UN to give MINURCAT the mandate to initiate an inclusive political dialogue between the government of Chad, the political opposition, and the numerous armed opposition groups operating in the country. The government of Chad, however, is resistant to formal UN involvement in its domestic politics, and the international community has so far proven unwilling to press the point. In the meantime, while the situation in the CAR saw some modest improvements, it was far from resolved, but a peace and reconciliation conference convened in December, involving some of the key actors in the conflict, raised hopes.

56 CHAD AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 39 Notes 1. United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on Chad and the Central African Republic Pursuant to Paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 of Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006), UN Doc. S/2006/1019, 22 December 2006, p Republic of Senegal, Dakar Agreement Between Sudan and Chad Signed in Dakar, 13 March 2008, para United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2008/3, 4 February United Nations, Action Review (UN-EU planning for EUFOR TCHAD/RCA), June 2007 March 2008, p United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, UN Doc. S/2008/601, 12 September UN Security Council Resolution 1843, UN Doc. S/RES/1834, 24 September 2008.

57 3.2 Sudan Sudan continued to be one of the most challenging environments for peacekeepers in Following intense international pressure to deploy UN troops to Sudan s Darfur region, the UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UN- AMID) took over from the existing AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in December But its deployment began slowly, marred by insecurity, lack of cooperation from the Sudanese government and sensitivities surrounding the composition of the force, as well as logistical challenges. UNAMID was intended to be one element of a three-pronged approach involving peacekeeping alongside humanitarian and peacemaking efforts. 1 But the challenges of this approach became manifest as various parties continued to pursue military solutions to the conflict, the peace process stalled, and the security situation declined. An unprecedented rebel attack on the Sudanese capital and a serious attack on the mission itself demonstrated the difficulties that lay ahead for UNAMID. The question of Darfur s participation in national elections scheduled for 2009 also remains unresolved. The peacekeeping environment in southern Sudan remained equally difficult, despite the presence of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). The south has seen relatively little in peace dividends, and deep-seated differences between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People s Liberation Movement (SPLM) have hampered the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Disagreements revolved around key aspects of the CPA such as border demarcation and the redeployment of troops. Interethnic rivalry, often exacerbated by the civil war and its aftermath, continues to disrupt both security and political stability in the south. As the 2009 elections and 2011 referendum approach, all of these issues become increasingly difficult to sidestep. In the meantime, implementation of the CPA continued to be overshadowed by the Darfur crisis and the 2008 indictment of President Omar al- Bashir by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Darfur: Background UNAMID s predecessor mission AMIS was deployed in June 2004, a year after the commencement of large-scale hostilities in Darfur. Initially a force of 60 observers with 300 troops to protect them, it was later expanded to 6,171 personnel and given a more robust 40

58 SUDAN Humanitarian Organizations Struggle with the Private Security Dilemma At about the same time that scandals regarding the actions of private security companies in Iraq and Afghanistan were emerging, speculation grew that these entities were cultivating new markets within humanitarian operations. Humanitarian organizations operate in many of the world s most dangerous environments, and for the past several years have suffered increasing casualties. Reports suggest that humanitarian agencies have been increasingly turning to private security companies for armed protection. A study released in October 2008 by researchers from the Humanitarian Policy Group of the Overseas Development Institute and from the Center on International Cooperation at New York University featured the first quantitative analysis of the use of private security providers by humanitarian organizations, with an aim of providing a foundation for discussion of the often controversial issue of the role of private security outfits in conflict zones. The report found a measurable increase in the number of humanitarian organizations (UN and international nongovernmental organizations) that have been contracting private security providers, but primarily for unarmed, soft security services such as training, risk assessment, and security management consulting. While armed protection remains an exceptional practice, every major international humanitarian organization cited at least one instance of contracting armed security in the past year. Most aid practitioners agree that the use of arms is a deeply problematic approach to humanitarian security, both in theory and in practice, to be undertaken only as a last resort or as dictated by local security dynamics. In its most striking finding, the report found a near universal lack of policies and protocols among agencies for hiring and managing security contractors. Field staff lack guidance on how to properly vet and oversee security providers, and headquarter personnel are much less informed about field-level security contracting practices as well. Other concerns include the poor quality, low pay, and weak management of local private security providers, despite the regularity with which these entities are contracted. Humanitarian organizations were found to favor contracting private security providers in order to reduce costs and increase time efficiency, as well as to cope with a perceived lack of in-house capacity and expertise. However, the report found that the anticipated benefits of employing private security providers did not always ring true. Additionally, the report emphasized the risks that are posed when private security providers lack understanding of the core principles that underpin humanitarian activities. Given the potential dangers of contracting private security providers in an unregulated environment, the report advocated for a dialogue within the humanitarian community to establish good practices and common guidelines. Source: Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer, and Victoria DiDomenico, The Use of Private Security Providers and Services in Humanitarian Operations, Overseas Development Institute, HPG Report no. 27, September 2008, 27.pdf. mandate, including protection of civilians. The mission lacked the capacity to implement this mandate, however, and was constrained financially and logistically. The government of Sudan, strongly resistant to a UN operation in Darfur, agreed in mid to the deployment of a hybrid UN-AU force. Security Council Resolution 1769 authorized the deployment of UNAMID under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The mission was to comprise 26,000 uniformed personnel, including 19,555 military, 3,772 police, and 19 formed police units of 140 officers each. 2 It was to incorporate AMIS personnel as well as those provided through UN light and heavy support packages for AMIS agreed to during UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Authorization Date 31 July 2007 (UNSC Res. 1769) Start Date 31 December 2007 Joint UN-AU Rodolphe Adada Special Representative (Republic of Congo) Force Commander General Martin Luther Agwai (Nigeria) Police Commissioner Michael J. Fryer (South Africa) Budget $1,699.7 million (1 July June 2009) Strength as of Troops: 8, October 2008 Military Observers: 138 Police: 2,342 International Civilian Staff: 743 Local Civilian Staff: 1,404 UN Volunteers: 246 For detailed mission information see p. 255

59 42 MISSION REVIEWS UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) Authorization and 24 March 2005 (UNSC Res. 1590) Start Date SRSG Ashraf Jehangir Qazi (Pakistan) Force Commander Major-General Paban Jung Thapa (Nepal) Police Commissioner Brigadier Kai Vittrup (Denmark) Budget $820.7 million (1 July June 2009) Strength as of Troops: 8, October 2008 Military Observers: 622 Police: 687 International Civilian Staff: 768 Local Civilian Staff: 2,447 UN Volunteers: 232 For detailed mission information see p. 329 UNAMID was mandated to help provide security for the provision of humanitarian assistance and protect civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence, as well as to monitor compliance with cease-fire agreements, report on the security situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), and assist with the implementation of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement. 3 However, the agreement was signed by only one of the three major rebel movements, and the security situation deteriorated in its wake as the movements fragmented. Talks launched by the AU and UN in October 2007 were boycotted by several key rebel leaders and immediately stalled. With ongoing hostilities and displacement, widespread insecurity, and only a precarious and partial peace agreement in place, conditions for the fulfilment of UNAMID s mandate were inauspicious from the start. Darfur: Key Developments UNAMID took over from AMIS on 1 January 2008 under the leadership of Joint Special Representative Rodolphe Adada and Force Commander General Martin Luther Agwai, already in place under the old AMIS structure. As the force comprised only existing AMIS battalions, the initial impact of the transfer of authority was largely symbolic; even the old AMIS markings remained on vehicles and buildings for some time. From the start, relations with Khartoum were a strong focus; difficult discussions ensued, including over the use of blue UN helmets; land, air, and water rights; and the negotiation of the status of forces agreement. Meanwhile, it was necessary to establish communications and support mechanisms for the hybrid UN-AU mission, including the staffing of a joint support coordination mechanism in Addis Ababa, which had not been fully operational by December Failure to operationalize the joint mechanism was perhaps an indication of the UN s desire to maintain full control of UNAMID, partially undercutting the notion of a hybrid arrangement. The major immediate challenge, and the preoccupation of UN member states, was the deployment of the mission. In compliance with demands by the Sudanese government, Resolution 1769 stressed that the force would have a predominantly African character. However, existing African battalions in Darfur and those poised to deploy did not meet UN standards of self-sustainability, limiting their ability to carry out the mandate. Thus, UNAMID s urgent task was to help African battalions meet the required standards as soon as possible. In April 2008, an enhanced deployment plan was put in place, envisioning an ambitious deployment of 80 percent by the end of 2008, but delays continued, for three main reasons. First, ongoing insecurity, including banditry, significantly constrained the movement of equipment and personnel. Second, the Sudanese government continued to obstruct the deployment through various means, including a lack of blanket clearance for night flights, failure to provide requested land in a timely manner, and slow visa-processing and customs-clearance requirements, although some improvements were seen in the second half of the year. Third, and most significant, logistical challenges arose due to the 2,000-kilometers distance between Darfur and Sudan s nearest port, and the poor quality of the roads, especially during the rainy season.

60 SUDAN 43 As a result, by the end of October 2008, UNAMID s uniformed personnel stood at 11,416 just over a thousand more than were deployed at the close of AMIS including 9,074 military personnel and 2,342 police. At the end of the year, UNAMID had registered 63 percent of its deployment. Recruitment of civilian positions was at 41 percent of full capacity. The force lacked a number of capabilities vital to the implementation of its mandate, including eighteen medium-lift helicopters, six attack helicopters, one aerial reconnaissance unit, one medium transport unit, one heavy transport unit, and one multirole logistics unit. 4 Meeting these crucial needs is essential, but by the end of 2008 no concrete agreements had materialized, hampering UNAMID from responding to growing insecurity. UNAMID s police have received praise for immediately developing a three-phase plan for patrolling camps of internally displaced persons (IDPs), culminating in a twenty-four-hour presence established inside the extremely tense Kalma IDP camp in southern Darfur in September However, for the police, just as for the military, progress has been constrained by gaps in capacity, including a shortage of radios and the continued unavailability of formed police units to provide protection. Of the authorized strength of nineteen formed police units, only twelve have been pledged and only one has been deployed. Darfur: Security Situation Meanwhile, UNAMID faces a deteriorating security environment, characterized by banditry, clashes among rebel groups, the militarization of IDP camps, ethnic clashes over resources, and fighting between government and rebel forces. In January and February 2008, attacks by government forces on villages in western Darfur, controlled by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), left 115 people dead and over 30,000 forcibly displaced, according to some estimates. 5 In May, clashes between factions of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) in north Darfur resulted in the displacement of A Rwandan soldier from UNAMID guards girls as they collect water in the town of Tawila, North Darfur, Sudan, 14 July ,000 civilians. In August, an exchange of fire in the Kalma camp left 33 dead, after Sudanese government forces were sent to enforce a search warrant for weapons. In May 2008, in the most dramatic incident of the year, the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, was brought directly into the conflict for the first time when approximately one thousand JEM fighters launched a surprise attack, infiltrating the city of Omdurman across the river from the capital. The attack led to many casualties and arrests and the government cut off diplomatic ties with Chad, which it accused of sponsoring the rebels. The event highlighted the regional tensions surrounding the cross-border movement of armed groups, which neither UNAMID nor the parallel UN and EU missions in Chad and the CAR are mandated to address. Three months earlier, Chadian opposition groups had attacked N Djamena, allegedly with Sudanese support. They came close to toppling the regime of Idriss Déby and solidified his dependence on Darfur rebels linked to him by a common Zaghawa lineage. The aftermath of the May attack saw a renewal of clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and JEM in west Darfur and aerial attacks in other rebel strongholds, a STUART PRICE/AFP/Getty Images

61 44 MISSION REVIEWS significant escalation of the low-level conflict between the government and the armed groups. UNAMID was not spared the violence, as it was directly targeted. It suffered an attack on a supply convoy in its very first month and then, in April 2008, two UNAMID containers holding equipment for a Chinese engineering company were hijacked along a major supply route and not recovered. In July, in the most serious incident to date, seven UNAMID troops were killed and nineteen were wounded after 200 militia members armed with machine guns and anti-aircraft weapons attacked a military and civilian police patrol in a governmentcontrolled area of north Darfur. UNAMID s lack of air assets rendered it unable to respond and protect its own troops. With its focus on staff security and recruitment of police officers and other personnel restricted, the speed of UNAMID s deployment was further curtailed. An Elusive Peace UNAMID s mandate to assist in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement is problematic because the agreement is ignored by parties on the ground, unrecognized by nonsignatories, and disliked by much of the population. Meanwhile, prospects for a new and more inclusive peace agreement remain remote. In December 2007, a meeting of the rebel movements under the auspices of the SPLM led to the creation of two new coalitions, significantly reducing the total number of factions (one has since collapsed). However, there remained a critical lack of unity among the movements on whether to proceed to peace talks. From March 2008, the UN-AU mediation focused instead on informal and confidence-building measures toward a cessation of hostilities, but failed to convince the main rebel movements to engage. After the UN and AU were criticized for appointing part-time mediators, UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Special Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim sought to identify a single UN- AU joint chief mediator to be based in Sudan. In June 2008, the UN and AU announced the appointment of Djibril Yipènè Bassolé, foreign minister of Burkina Faso, providing hope for a renewed and focused leadership and direction. But just before Bassolé was to commence his duties, the political landscape shifted with the announcement by the ICC Prosecutor of an application for a warrant of arrest against President Bashir, the very first indictment of a sitting head of state by the Court. UNAMID braced for a possible political backlash and a further deterioration of the security situation. Khartoum s initial reaction was instead to search for a political solution, lobbying for the use of Article 16 of the Rome Statute to suspend the proceedings for one year, renewable. Meanwhile, the National Congress Party reached out to its partners in the Government of National Unity and opposition political parties to garner support and drew up plans for a multiparty mechanism to resolve the Darfur conflict. In early November the government launched the Sudan People s Initiative and declared a cease-fire, following an earlier initiative led by Qatar. But prospects for the success of the initiatives were dampened due to a boycott by the main rebel groups. Whether such initiatives will contain the beginnings of an inclusive settlement or will convince Security Council members to implement Article 16 remains to be seen. But the ICC announcement compounded the challenges facing UNAMID. In addition to the ICC announcement, Bassolé s quest for an inclusive peace must confront the national and regional political realities that intersect with the Darfur crisis, not least the timeline for implementation of the CPA. Sudan s fifth population and housing census was conducted in Darfur in April and May 2008, but there was widespread opposition, especially from IDPs, and insecurity prevented enumerators from reaching many areas. There is similar opposition in Darfur to the elections scheduled for Yet the exclusion of the region risks undermining Sudan s democratic transition and the CPA. Meanwhile, Chad and Sudan appeared to have mended fences following the JEM attack. A Contact Group established in support of the March 2008 Dakar Agreement has held discussions on the establishment of a border-monitoring mission. It is not clear, however, whether such a mission can be credible or result in

62 SUDAN 45 either government suspending its assistance to the other s opposition groups. Humanitarian In this environment of insecurity, the humanitarian situation deteriorated in 2008, with 200,000 persons newly displaced during the first half of the year (bringing total IDPs in Darfur to 2.5 million). In the same period, over 120 vehicles were hijacked (more than double the number for the corresponding months of 2007), 8 humanitarian workers were killed, 103 were abducted, and 51 humanitarian premises were assaulted by armed men. Humanitarian access decreased to only 70 percent of the affected population, having declined over the previous three years. Some humanitarian organizations withdrew staff or suspended operations, while the World Food Programme was forced to halve food rations and warned of a possible suspension of food distribution. Meanwhile, international efforts toward the reconstruction and development of Darfur remained stalled, pending an improvement of the security situation and the start of a credible peace process. North-South: Background The Darfur crisis continues to complicate UNMIS s tasks in implementing the CPA. The May attack from Darfur on Omdurman, for example, not only created a security and humanitarian crisis, but also had far-reaching political consequences. Less direct but perhaps even more difficult to address is the potential impact of efforts to prosecute President Omar al-bashir before the ICC. The international community remains focused on Darfur, largely at the expense of the CPA, whose implementation has floundered. The Security Council first authorized the creation of a mission to Sudan the UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) in Resolution 1547, on 11 July 2004, and charged it with laying the groundwork for the UN s role in supporting the CPA. On 24 March 2005, Resolution 1590 expanded and converted UNAMIS into UNMIS, a full-fledged peace operation. UNMIS was given a broad mandate, centered on helping to implement the CPA. Its responsibilities include monitoring and verifying troop redeployments, assisting with the formation of joint integrated units to help secure contested regions, promoting the rule of law (including combating impunity), supporting preparations for elections and referendums, and investigating CPA violations. UNMIS s mandate also specifically includes certain tasks not directly linked to the CPA, including coordinating humanitarian assistance, protecting and promoting human rights, and protecting civilians under imminent threat of violence, using force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter if necessary. North-South: Key Developments Security On 10 May 2008, approximately 300 armed pickup trucks loaded with JEM troops raced across the 1,200-kilometer stretch from Darfur to Khartoum, the Sudanese capital, reaching Omdurman, on Khartoum s outskirts. An estimated 465 people, including 57 civilians, lost their lives during the fighting. The attack and the security measures that followed had an immediate impact on UNMIS s operations, restricting staff movement and impeding the return of displaced populations to their homes in the south. In spite of government restrictions, UNMIS launched investigations into human rights and humanitarian law violations alleged to have taken place during the attack, and publicly raised concerns that the trial of thirty accused JEM members convicted of participating in the attack may not have met international standards. The attack had significant political fallout. While JEM forces were ultimately repulsed, they succeeded for the first time in bringing the Darfur conflict to the government s doorstep, challenging the NCP s political standing. The NCP reacted by jailing opposition leaders who had links to JEM, while rallying other opposition parties to decry the attack and establishing a temporary détente with the SPLM. The attack closely resembled a rebel assault on the Chadian capital, N Djamena, three months earlier. Chad accused Sudan of supporting the rebels

63 46 MISSION REVIEWS who carried out that attack. Given JEM s close ties to the government in N Djamena and rumors that JEM had helped fight off the February attack Sudan asserted that the JEM offensive was intended as retribution, and cut off diplomatic ties with Chad. The Abyei region remains perhaps the most sensitive flashpoint in both local interethnic and national north-south conflicts. Neither side was willing to concede the oil-rich border area during the CPA negotiations, but both eventually agreed in a separate protocol to create the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC), to determine the territory s precise borders. A local referendum would then determine Abyei s status. The NCP rejected the final ABC report immediately upon its release in The two parties have remained deadlocked over the issue, preventing either from establishing an effective civilian administration. The security environment around Abyei began to deteriorate seriously in late 2007; reported incidents included the placement of roadblocks around oil fields, kidnappings, and incursions by rebel groups based in southern Darfur. The SPLM s appointment, with the Sudanese government s approval, of a temporary administrator generated concern among the Misseriya Arabs in the area. On 22 December 2007, a dispute over transit rights sparked a series of firefights between Sudan People s Liberation Army (SPLA) units and the Misseriya that continued sporadically through May On 13 May 2008, the killing of an SAF soldier at an SPLA checkpoint in the town of Abyei triggered the most severe violation of the CPA cease-fire since In spite of several agreements to de-escalate and redeploy troops away from the area, combat between the SAF and SPLA continued through 20 May, resulting in eighty-nine deaths and the destruction of most of Abyei. Approximately 50,000 civilians fled the town and surrounding villages. Both sides kept substantial forces in the area, and tensions remain high. On 7 July, a UN observer was fatally shot in the head thirty kilometers south of Abyei during a dispute between SAF and SPLA troops. UNMIS forces were accused of failing to protect civilians caught in the fighting; the joint integrated units (JIU) deployed in the area effectively dissolved once fighting began. While Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Ashraf Qazi acknowledged some errors, he noted that peacekeepers sheltered more than a hundred civilians during the fighting. He also highlighted that UNMIS forces lacked both the mandate and the capacity to intervene or suppress combat on the scale seen in Abyei during May. In the aftermath of the fighting, UNMIS helped broker a series of meetings that culminated in the adoption of a road map on 8 June that included provisions on the withdrawal of SAF and SPLA forces and deployment of new JIUs, the return of the displaced civilian population, the establishment of a civilian administration, and the distribution of oil revenues. Most significantly, the parties agreed to refer the border dispute to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. As of September 2008, the parties have chosen four of the five members of the arbitral panel. But despite this, Abyei was the scene of another clash between SAF nd SPLA soldiers in December. The role of the JIUs, meant to provide security in disrupted areas, will become increasingly important as the 2009 elections and 2011 referendum approach, especially because the JIUs will be responsible for preventing election-related violence and ensuring peaceful implementation of the results. According to the Secretary-General s July 2008 report on Sudan, UNMIS had verified about 85 percent of the total authorized JIU strength, and was soliciting international support for training and equipping the units. The JIUs performance in Abyei, however, highlighted concerns about their practical effectiveness. Continued distrust between the CPA signatories as well as concerns over interethnic conflicts have impeded disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts, as have funding shortfalls, logistical difficulties, and a lack of local infrastructure and capacity. Slow development in the south and the lack of economic

64 SUDAN 47 opportunities, moreover, provide little incentive for soldiers to reenter civilian life. The parties made some progress in 2008, however. The National Council for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Coordination approved a national reintegration policy, allowing the parties to agree upon a multiyear DDR project outline in June The northern and southern DDR commissions have created technical coordination committees, and begun joint operations in Blue Nile State. In the meantime, moves by the ICC Prosecutor to try President Bashir place UNMIS in an extremely precarious position. UNMIS has neither the capacity nor the mandate to arrest Bashir, and indeed relies on the cooperation of Bashir s administration to function. But working directly with an individual sought by the ICC for such extraordinary crimes could prove corrosive both to the mission s and to the ICC s perceived credibility, particularly given the mission s mandate to promote human rights. Relationships with other regional actors, including neighboring states, the African Union, and the League of Arab States, may also become more delicate as the Sudanese government works to rally others to oppose any arrest warrant. Elections The year 2008 saw significant progress in the preparations for the 2009 national elections and the 2011 referendum as provided for by the CPA. After successive delays, data collection for the national census was completed on 6 May 2008 with extensive UNMIS support. While a number of irregularities and difficulties were reported, including a boycott in southern Kordofan, material shortages, and logistical and security problems, the Sudanese government reported a 90 percent nationwide coverage rate. As 2008 drew to a close, the results were yet to be released. Meanwhile, in July, after more than two and half years of delays, the National Assembly adopted the national election law. Preparations remained behind schedule, however. The government has yet to pass a referendum law, more than a year after the envisaged timeline in the CPA. Moreover, more than a year and half after enacting the Political Parties Act, the government has yet to create the Political Parties Affairs Council as required under that act; as of September 2008, the government was a month late in forming the National Elections Commission. For its part, UNMIS has begun to build its own electoral support capacity, adding technical staff in both Khartoum and Juba. Given the state of election preparations, however, it remains unclear how much and what kind of support the mission will be called upon to provide, leaving open the possibility that it may be forced to scale up its capacity suddenly as the elections draw near. Conclusion Overall the peace operations in Sudan continued to operate in a very hostile environment throughout Slow force generation, deteriorating security and humanitarian situations, a shortage of mission enablers (most notably helicopters), and a stalled peace process complicated UNAMID s first year of operation and cast doubts on the concept of hybridity as a viable model for future peace operations. Meanwhile, the lack of progress in implementing key aspects of the CPA primarily border demarcation, troop deployment, and wealthsharing occupied UNMIS throughout the year. Despite taking the initial steps toward the 2009 elections by conducting a census, the census itself was criticized for the way it was conducted in the war-torn Darfur region, raising more questions about the nature of the planned elections and its impact on the referendum in But it is the efforts by the ICC to prosecute President Bashir for crimes committed in Darfur that could have the most far-reaching consequences for UNAMID and UNMIS, with potential for wider regional repercussions.

65 48 MISSION REVIEWS Notes 1. This approach was outlined by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in UN Security Council Resolution 1769, UN Doc. S/2007/468, 30 July UNAMID s mandate is laid out in United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2007/307/Rev.1, 5 June 2007, paras UNAMID is mandated to protect civilians within its capability and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan. 4. This issue was highlighted in a recent report endorsed by many nongovernmental organizations. See Thomas Withington, Grounded: The International Community s Betrayal of UNAMID, July 2008, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ninth Periodic Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, 20 March 2008, p. 2.

66 3.3 Democratic Republic of Congo The year 2008 saw little relief for the population of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), especially in the volatile eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, where conflict continued and spiked dramatically in the last months of the year. The incomplete disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process is partly responsible for the ongoing crisis. The situation in the east continues to obstruct peace consolidation efforts in the country by consuming most of the resources of the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC); for much of 2008, MONUC maintained over 90 percent of its nearly 17,000 military personnel in the east. In late 2007, and in line with the UN Secretary-General s benchmarks for an eventual drawdown, MONUC shifted its policy toward robust operational support to the government as it attempted to forcibly disarm or disrupt armed groups operating in the DRC. Subsequent agreements between the DRC government and the Congrès National pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP), led by the dissident general Laurent Nkunda, were short-lived. In October 2008, after a series of failed attacks by the DRC s armed forces (the Forces Armées du République Démocratique du Congo [FARDC]) against Nkunda, CNDP forces launched a major offensive which threatened to take the strategic eastern city of Goma before Nkunda s unilateral call for a cease-fire. The fighting in late 2008 not only exposed the weakness of the FARDC, but also highlighted the gap between MONUC s protection-of-civilians mandate and its capacity to implement it in a time of crisis. UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) Authorization and 30 November 1999 (UNSC Res. 1279) Start Date SRSG Alan Doss (United Kingdom) Force Commander Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye (Senegal) Police Commissioner Sudesh Kumar (India) Budget $1,191.1 million (1 July June 2009) Strength as of Troops: 16, October 2008 Military observers: 723 Police: 1,090 International Civilian Staff: 934 Local Civilian Staff: 2,183 UN Volunteers: 565 For detailed mission information see p

67 50 MISSION REVIEWS EU Security Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) Authorization Date 2 May 2005 (EU Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP) Start Date June 2005 Head of Mission Budget General Jean-Paul Michel (France) $14.3 million (October 2007 September 2008) Strength as of Civilian Staff: September 2008 EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) Authorization Date 12 June 2007 (EU Council Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP) Start Date July 2007 Head of Mission Budget Adilio Custodio (Portugal) $8.9 million (October 2007 September 2008) Strength as of Civilian Police: September 2008 Background The Lusaka Agreement, struck in July August 1999, sought to put an end to the brutal second war in the DRC, which had begun on 2 August But it was not until the regionally brokered Global All-Inclusive Accord in 2002 that fighting showed signs of abating, as Ugandan and Rwandan troops began to be withdrawn from the DRC. The agreement established a transitional government for a two-year period leading up to national elections in During 2003, Joseph Kabila assumed the presidency at the head of a transitional government that was also composed of four vice presidents representing the president s party, the People s Party for Reconstruction and Development (PPRD), the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD-Goma), the Movement for Liberation of the Congo (MLC), and the unarmed opposition and civil society. Deployed in 1999, MONUC consisted of 3,900 military observers authorized by Security Council Resolution 1279 with a monitoring and humanitarian assistance mandate. As the challenges in the DRC became apparent, MONUC s mandate was commensurately revised and its strength reinforced with additional military and police personnel. In line with its revised mandate, MONUC was authorized to assist the government in its reconstruction agenda and to protect civilians and UN personnel and equipment. During 2008, MONUC remained the largest UN peace operation in the field, with over 18,000 uniformed personnel, backed by robust rules of engagement. In their national DDR efforts, MONUC and the government employed a framework known as brassage, which aimed to reorganize rebel groups in two respects: dismantling the rebel command and control lines and integrating the former combatants within the FARDC, and physically relocating them to different regions of the country. Implementation of the brassage framework included limited military assistance by MONUC to the FARDC for enforced demobilization. However, a large number of groups in the eastern part of the country stayed out of this process, leading to a second attempt known as mixage, which also failed to disarm the groups in the east. The breakdown of the mixage process was due primarily to the unwillingness of the parties to negotiate timetables for disarmament; other factors included Nkunda s exploitation of the Kigali Agreement to consolidate his position, and the minimal payout to combatants under this process, which left thousands of troops stranded and susceptible to other readily available alternative sources for survival. Meanwhile, in November 2007, the governments of the DRC and Rwanda met in Nairobi, where they agreed on a joint framework to address the security and political threats posed by the remnants of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) still operating in the DRC. The agreement that emerged from what became known as the Nairobi Process called on both countries to refrain from arming and supporting dissident groups, and specified that the DRC government with the support of MONUC would begin disarming foreign armed groups through peaceful and coercive

68 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 51 means. MONUC assisted the FARDC in planning and implementing the program beginning in December By early 2008, of an estimated 6,000 active combatants, 600 had been repatriated to their home countries. Key Developments In November 2007, based on the findings of a technical assessment mission, the UN Secretary- General outlined to the Security Council two key benchmarks necessary to begin MONUC s drawdown: the establishment of a stable security environment throughout the DRC and the consolidation of democratic institutions. These were further refined to include the disarmament of all armed groups to the extent that they would pose no threat to the country s stability, specifically in the restive eastern provinces. The development of the DRC s military and rule of law institutions to the extent that they would be capable of conducting the tasks currently performed by MONUC was identified as the second most important step toward disengagement. Finally, the Secretary-General detailed that MONUC would remain at its full strength until after the successful holding of local elections planned for Faltering Peace Process By the end of 2007, it was obvious that the government s attempt at forced DDR with the support of MONUC had failed when confronted with Nkunda s increasingly strong CNDP forces. With the security and humanitarian situations in the east worsening, in January 2008 President Kabila convened a conference on peace, security, and development in the Kivus in Goma. The conference ultimately brought together some 1,250 delegates representing the DRC government, rebel groups, neighboring countries, MONUC, and the broader international community. The outcome of the conference was the Actes d Engagement, two statements brokered by the United Nations, European Union, and United States, and signed by all delegates as well as MONUC, that committed the parties to accepting a cease-fire to be monitored by a MONUC buffer zone force in North Kivu; agreeing that all rebels would go through the brassage process; and facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons. The Actes d Engagement, however, did not delineate any technical aspects of implementation. In February 2008, the Kabila government issued executive orders establishing a framework for implementation of the Actes d Engagement and support of local reconciliation, called the Amani process. Under this process, the disarming of all rebel groups in the Kivus was planned to commence in July 2008, and President Kabila was designated to oversee the program s oversight bodies. To support the Amani process, and in line with the benchmarks outlined by the Secretary- General at the end of 2007, in early 2008 MONUC, in coordination with the UN Country Support Team, developed a strategy for security and stabilization in the east. The strategy covered four areas of action: the political and diplomatic pillar, under which MONUC would provide political and technical guidance and maintain the engagement of signatories; assistance in extending state authority to the east; facilitating the return of the displaced; and providing support in the security and military realms People throw stones at UN peacekeepers patrolling on a road in Kibati, north of the provincial capital of Goma, DRC, 28 October REUTERS/Stringer

69 52 MISSION REVIEWS to ensure that the DDR process would be conducted. The preliminary elements of the strategy began to be implemented, but the escalation of fighting between the government and the CNDP in late October 2008 halted the Amani process, raising concerns that it could be difficult to resuscitate. In line with the strategy, MONUC modified its military posture, doubling its presence through mobile operating bases in both North and South Kivu that allowed for increased patrolling and cease-fire monitoring. Similarly, MONUC s forward headquarters were moved from Kisangani to Goma. MONUC and the FARDC developed joint plans in early 2008 aimed at increasing military pressure on zones where rebel groups continued to have a hold. Meanwhile, under MONUC s mentoring and logistical support, the FARDC increased its presence in the Kivus, deploying eight battalions in the area. The heavy concentration of MONUC and FARDC resources in the eastern provinces to oversee the Amani process and to deal with the humanitarian crisis was a source of much concern throughout the year. Fears of overstretching MONUC s capacity were expressed both in the field and at UN headquarters in New York. At the same time, the debate focused on whether a military or political approach was the best way of dealing with foreign groups in the DRC. The debate was partially centered on the sensitivities of the DRC s immediate neighbors, especially those whose political and security interests were affected by the activities of these groups. And given MONUC s mandate to support the DRC government, its role in dealing with foreign fighters was also widely debated throughout the year. Thus, efforts to develop a workable strategy to deal with foreign groups in the DRC are bound to feature prominently in continuing stabilization efforts in the eastern provinces. For many, the Actes d Engagement never represented more than words on paper. Violations of the agreement started as soon as it became operational on 10 February 2008, and the Amani process was challenged by Nkunda s refusal to engage in brassage outside the Kivus. Government authority in the east remained weak in comparison to that established by the CNDP through Nkunda, who continued to build up his forces in the area. By August 2008, frequent cease-fire violations escalated into full-blown conflict between the FARDC and the CNDP, requiring MONUC intervention. MONUC resorted to robust measures, including the use of attack helicopters to respond to the renewed fighting and to prevent Nkunda s forces from advancing on key towns. In September 2008, Nkunda claimed that his rebellion had moved from simply protecting ethnic Tutsis in the area, to liberating the entire DRC, and drew several smaller, non-tutsi Congolese militias and their leaders into his coalition. In October, the Actes d Engagement and the cease-fire suffered a fatal blow following the withdrawal of the CNDP and other rebel groups from the agreement and a dramatic increase in clashes that saw FARDC elements dissolving and violently turning on the civilian populations they were there to protect. The conflict in the east had serious consequences for MONUC s public image. The growing humanitarian and security crisis in the Kivus led to violent protests in September, in which two peacekeepers were wounded, over MONUC s perceived failure to protect the population. In the meantime, in November, President Kabila, together with African Union leaders who had assembled to discuss the crisis in the eastern DRC, criticized MONUC for not doing enough to support the government s DDR initiatives, while CNDP officials claimed that MONUC s impartiality had been compromised by the support it had given the FARDC. This situation was further exacerbated by scandals earlier in the year involving MONUC peacekeepers allegedly involved in sexual exploitation, the smuggling of gold, and fraternizing with rebel groups, including Nkunda s CNDP. The unrest in the DRC during 2008 was not contained to the Kivus. In January, the country s western Bas Congo province was rocked by protests by a political and religious group, Bundu Dia Kongo, which challenged the government s authority. The Congolese National

70 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 53 Police responded unevenly, resulting in significant casualties. MONUC deployed a formed police unit and an infantry battalion comprising several teams of military observers to protect the civilian population in the area. Meanwhile, clashes in Ituri between an FDLR and Patriotes Résistants du Congo (PARECO) alliance, the Forces de Résistance Patriotique d Ituri (FRPI) rebel groups, and the FARDC were also reported and were another source of instability that required MONUC s attention. Similarly, in the last weeks of 2008, attacks launched by the Lord s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels from Uganda on civilian populations in northern DRC, prompted MONUC and FARDC to shift their attention to protect those at risk, further complicating an already tenuous security situation. Security Sector Reform Notwithstanding the clashes during the year, reform of DRC s security sector inched forward. However, the pace and quality of the progress achieved remained a source of significant concern. The DRC government maintains that reform of the country s security services is its prerogative and not that of any outside parties. During February 2008, the government presented its long-term security sector reform (SSR) plan to a roundtable discussion in Kinshasa that brought together representatives of the United Nations, the European Union, and principal donor countries. Central to the SSR plan is the development of an FARDC rapid reaction force, for which the DRC concluded assistance programs with Belgium and South Africa. South Africa began providing preliminary assistance in the training and development of the rapid reaction unit, which is viewed as the nucleus of the FARDC and central to restoring peace in the east. Overall, however, the DRC s security sector reform process is still in its infancy. Through MONUC s assistance, ten FARDC integrated battalions had been trained by late 2008 and an additional twelve battalions are to be trained by mid-2009, depending on progress in the brassage process in the east. Questions have been raised about the nature of MONUC s training for the FARDC, which is short-term and relatively basic, and does not address the long-term development of fundamental structural and doctrinal issues that will be critical to shaping the future of the FARDC. These shortfalls were manifest in the MONUC-FARDC joint operations carried out during 2008, in which MONUC identified gaps in the capacity and discipline of the FARDC for the effective fulfillment of its responsibilities. These shortcomings are likely to delay MONUC s eventual withdrawal from the DRC, which is partly contingent on the development of a capable FARDC. Meanwhile, efforts to develop the police and judiciary are also lagging. Indeed, according to representatives of the EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL RD CONGO) and the EU Security Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD CONGO), the process of bringing these two sectors up to international standards could take more than a decade to achieve. Rule of Law and Local Elections MONUC s continued support to the government s efforts to develop the DRC s rule of law sector registered some progress. MONUC s role in this regard consisted of supporting the secretariat of the Conseil Superieur de la Magistratre in cataloguing the resources both human and material available to the court system throughout the country, a process that aimed to develop the capacity of the DRC s judicial system. The mission continued its training program for military magistrates and FARDC personnel on sexual and gender-based crimes during the course of the year. In addition to representing one of the UN s benchmarks for its departure from the DRC, the conduct of local elections has been identified by the government as a crucial element in extending its authority throughout the country. In 2007, the DRC government requested technical and logistical assistance from the UN to execute its plan for the holding of local elections. Recognizing both the importance and the

71 54 MISSION REVIEWS complexity of organizing elections in more than 6,000 constituencies, involving some 200,000 candidates, in early 2008 the Security Council authorized MONUC to provide assistance to the DRC government in the preparation, organization, and conduct of local elections. MONUC consequently continued to support the DRC authorities throughout the year, even as several major logistical and technical obstacles slowed the preparation process, eventually delaying the elections until the first half of Despite the delay, both the DRC government and MONUC expressed commitment to holding the elections, since they are viewed as a crucial step in the long-term consolidation of peace. But given the upsurge in fighting in the country s eastern provinces during the last quarter of 2008, it is doubtful that the elections will take place as planned. In late 2008, Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga resigned after two years of service. The announcement came amid growing criticism of the government s failure to revitalize the country s economy and its inability to stabilize the eastern provinces. Gizenga, whose resignation was blamed on issues of health, was replaced by Adolphe Muzito, and it was hoped the appointment would inject the energy needed for the tough tasks of peace consolidation that lie ahead. Conclusion In the face of escalating violence, international diplomatic pressure involving the African Union, United Nations, European Union, and some of DRC s key bilateral partners increased. As the diplomatic efforts concentrated on ending the fighting and ensuring humanitarian assistance, special attention was paid to dealing with the issue of armed foreign fighters operating in the region, especially the FDLR. The presence of the FDLR (which is believed to have carried out the genocide in 1994) and other armed groups has remained a thorny issue between the DRC and its neighbors, most notably Rwanda. Fearing a repeat of the failures of peacekeeping in the Balkans and Rwanda in the 1990s, the UN Secretary-General appointed Olusegun Obasanjo, former Nigerian president, as his envoy to the DRC. Obasanjo s mandate includes mediating between the parties, including neighboring countries. In December, the government, CNDP, and a variety of other rebel groups met in Nairobi to discuss the faltering peace process. As the year drew to a close, a resolution looked remote, but the Obasanjo-led talks continued, perhaps offering an opportunity for resolution to the conflict. But despite the dire humanitarian situation in the eastern DRC, in October 2008 MONUC presented a disengagement plan that had been approved by the government. The plan emphasized that the Actes d Engagement and the Amani process are the only viable way forward. Meanwhile, the Security Council authorized a temporary surge of 3,000 troops to the eastern DRC to ensure containment of the conflict there and identified the protection of civilians by any means necessary within the mission s capacity as an overriding priority. But with a more belligerent posture by Nkunda and others who had withdrawn from the Goma agreements, the extent to which the deployment of more international troops might lead to sustainable peace in the region, in the absence of resolution of some of the core political and security concerns that underpin the continuing conflict, remained unclear. Given the depth and persistence of the crisis in the east, and its regional implications, MONUC s capacity to contribute to enduring peace and stability in the DRC remained an open question as the year drew to an end. The crisis exposed the disconnect between MONUC s mandate and its capabilities, highlighting a critical dilemma that threatens to undermine the UN s credibility and that of peacekeeping as an effective conflict management instrument.

72 Afghanistan The year 2008 in Afghanistan was marked by increasing pessimism over the prospects of stabilizing the country. Amid a growing tide of violence, few positive developments stood out. The government launched the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), against which donors pledged some $20 billion at the Paris donor conference in June. The ANDS emphasized the need for stronger partnership between the Afghan government and the international community to achieve stability and deliver vital economic development. In support of the ANDS, the Security Council expanded the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), strengthening its coordination role among the Afghan government and international partners. In a symbolic move, Afghan National Security Forces assumed responsibility for security in Kabul in August, a tentative first step toward their leadership and primacy nationwide. And, as a result of counternarcotic efforts, drought, and low prices due to large stocks, the area under opium cultivation decreased 20 percent in 2008 the first decline since However, due to increasing yields in the south, where the insurgency is strongest, actual poppy production did not fall significantly from 2007 s record 8,200 metric tons. Underscoring the deteriorating security environment, civilian and military casualties, as well as terrorist incidents, reached their highest levels since the fall of the Taliban in By October 2008, thirty-one humanitarian workers had been slain compared with fifteen during all of 2007 forcing several aid groups to severely limit, if not halt, their work. Several high-profile attacks demonstrated the growing reach and boldness of insurgents and their international backers, while attacks on international and national forces showed increased coordination and complexity in their tactics. In February 2008, according to US intelligence estimates, the Afghan government controlled only 30 percent of the country s districts; a more conservative estimate by the UN cited 36 of 376 districts as largely inaccessible to Afghan officials and aid workers. 1 Summarizing the situation, the US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, stated on 10 September 2008, Frankly, we are running out of time. 2 Violence related to the armed conflict claimed the lives of more than 1,445 civilians in 2008, making it the deadliest year since As of September 2008, an estimated 395 Afghan civilians had been killed by US and NATO air strikes. Indeed, civilian casualties from air strikes a perennial source of contention received new political urgency following the death of what the UN reported as 92 civilians in Herat province on August 21; initial US estimates of 7 civilians dead were later raised to 33. The incident stoked the growing impatience of Afghans with the international military presence, and strained Afghanistan s relations with the United States as well as with the United Nations. Nor were the challenges facing Afghanistan confined to its own borders. The increasing power and influence of the Pakistan Taliban Movement and other extremist groups operating inside Pakistan, and indications of links between members of Pakistan s Inter-Services Intelligence and terrorists responsible for bombing the Serena Hotel and the Indian embassy in Kabul earlier in the year, as well as an assassination attempt on President Hamid Karzai, threatened stability on both sides of the border. At the same time, the attacks on the Indian city of Mumbai 55

73 56 MISSION REVIEWS inflamed tensions between India and Pakistan, thereby diverting Pakistan s attention from its operations in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. The result was an increase of attacks on NATO supply convoys inside Pakistan that threatened to disrupt the flow of critical resources to NATO forces in Afghanistan. This raised the possibility of diverting supply convoys through Russia at a time of increased tension between that country and the West. Severe food shortages and rising fuel costs meanwhile threatened the livelihoods of 9 million Afghans, risking a humanitarian crisis and adding to civil unrest. UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) Authorization and 28 March 2002 (UNSC Res. 1401) Start Date SRSG Kai Eide (Norway) Senior Military Adviser Brigadier-General Mark Skidmore (Canada) Senior Police Adviser Roberto Bernal (Philippines) Budget $240.0 million Strength as of Military Observers: October 2008 Police: 3 International Civilian Staff: 247 Local Civilian Staff: 1,160 UN Volunteers: 40 For detailed mission information see p. 240 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Authorization and 20 December 2001 (UNSC Res. 1386) Start Date Force Commander General David D. McKiernan (United States) Budget $361.0 million (October 2007 September 2008) Strength as of Troops: 50, October 2008 Background Current international efforts to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan were initiated in 2001 following military action by the US-led coalition forces under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The aim of OEF was to kill or capture the leaders of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, to destroy its training camps, and to deny it a safe base of operations. With the coalition forces focused narrowly on counterterrorism, the signatories to the Bonn Agreement requested the United Nations and other international actors to support the political transition and economic reconstruction. In response, the Security Council established UNAMA in March 2002 (Resolution 1401) with a mandate to assist in the establishment of a permanent Afghan government, encourage aid coordination among donors, and mediate disputes through the good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Under this mandate, UNAMA organized the key political elements called for in Bonn: the 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga, the 2003 Constitutional Loya Jirga, the 2004 presidential elections, and the 2005 parliamentary elections. With the completion of the Bonn Process, many within the international community felt a need for a new framework of cooperation. This resulted, in January 2006, in the Afghanistan Compact, an agreement between the Afghan government and its international partners on high-level benchmarks in the areas of security, governance, reconstruction, and counternarcotics.

74 AFGHANISTAN The Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide On 11 December 2007, the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) detonated a car bomb outside the UN office in Algiers, the capital of Algeria. The attack, which deliberately targeted the United Nations, killed seventeen UN staff, injured forty, and destroyed the building. In response, UN Secretary-General Ban Kimoon established the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide (IPSS), led by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, to recommend improvements to the UN s security management system worldwide. In its June 2008 report, the panel cited several improvements in the security system since the establishment of the Department of Safety and Security in 2005, including the adoption of threat and risk assessment methodology. Nonetheless, it identified several priority areas including weak accountability, leadership, internal management, and oversight that had not been adequately addressed despite similar recommendations made by an independent panel established after the deadly 2003 attack against the UN office in Baghdad, Iraq. The IPSS emphasized the primary responsibility of member states, and called for more transparent information-sharing by governments on matters concerning the security of UN operations. The panel also reaffirmed the decentralization of day-today security decisionmaking under designated officials at the country or mission level; recommended improving both the security training provided to designated officials and UN security team members in the field, and the recruitment profile for security officers; and called for a proactive balance between security needs and program delivery, particularly humanitarian assistance. Among its urgent recommendations, the panel called for replacing the system of security phases with one based on risk management; implementing minimum security standards for UN offices in vulnerable locations; and reducing the perception of inequity between national and international personnel by improving the transparency and accessibility of information on working conditions. The public image of the United Nations also has implications for the safety of its operations. The panel argued that some of the UN s decisions and statements are seen as ignoring the very principles on which the Organization was founded.... The UN is then seen by those directly concerned, and by the many millions around the world sympathetic to their causes, as being on the wrong side of justice. To restore the credibility of the UN, it called for greater adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and greater demonstration of the organization s impartiality and neutrality. Following completion of the panel s report, the Under-Secretary of Safety and Security, Sir David Vaness, resigned, taking full responsibility for any lapses in security that may have led to the high level of fatalities in the December 2007 attack. As of late October 2008, he remained at his post, pending identification and confirmation of a replacement. A subsequent panel, the Independent Panel on Accountability headed by Ralph Zacklin, former assistant secretary-general of the UN Office of Legal Affairs was established by Secretary-General Ban Kimoon on the recommendation of the IPSS to specifically investigate the individual culpability of UN personnel for security shortcomings related to the Algiers attack. The Independent Panel on Accountability submitted its findings in October 2008, recommending administrative measures against several UN staff responsible for security in Algeria. The report also confirmed findings of the IPSS related to the overall supervision and management of the Department of Safety and Security; the political manipulation of the system of security phases by host governments; and security system inconsistencies from country to country, including a preoccupation with high-risk areas of operation, like Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Somalia, at the expense of other potential sources of threat. Implementation of the reforms recommended by the independent panels, many of which are systemic in nature, will be contingent upon finances from the assessed and voluntary budgets. Source: Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide, Towards a Culture of Security and Accountability, June The compact endorsed a central and impartial coordination role for UNAMA, which was given the responsibility of jointly chairing, with the Afghan government, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), the body responsible for overseeing implementation of the compact. Commensurate with this role, the UNAMA mandate was expanded in Security Council Resolutions 1662 (2006) and 1746 (2007). In March 2008, veteran Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide was appointed SRSG by the Secretary-General, replacing Tom Koenigs of Germany. Eide, in his first briefing to the Security Council in July, reported that UNAMA s

75 58 MISSION REVIEWS REUTERS/Fabrizio Bensch A German member of ISAF instructs Afghan National policemen during a training drill in Feyzabad, north of Kabul, Afghanistan, 21 September capacities for supporting the 2009 presidential elections, assisting with coordination of the ANDS, and improving donor aid effectiveness, institution building, and delivery of humanitarian assistance, required strengthening. Additional staff and provision for their security were required for establishing new field offices in support of these activities. Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1806 (2008), UNAMA was mandated to lead international civilian efforts to promote, in its role as cochair of the JCMB, more coherent international support to the Afghan government, to strengthen coordination among national and international civilian and military actors, and to provide political outreach through an expanded field presence. From the outset, delivery of political and development assistance has been contingent on provision of security. The Bonn Agreement called for establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was subsequently established under Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001) to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. ISAF deployment initially was limited to Kabul and its environs due to insistence by European governments on a separate chain of command and related concerns by the United States that a wider ISAF presence would conflict with ongoing counterterrorism operations. Despite repeated calls by Afghanistan, the UN, and nongovernmental organizations to expand ISAF, it remained limited to the Afghan capital until 2003, when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization assumed command of the force. In 2004, under Security Council authorization, NATO began a four-phase expansion of ISAF into the provinces. Existing provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in the north (2004) and west (2005) were transferred to ISAF. In July 2006, the robust deployments by the United Kingdom in Helmand, by Canada in Kandahar, and the Netherlands in Uruzgan transferred to ISAF command. Later that year, some 12,000 US troops previously under OEF were transferred to ISAF command, making it the primary military force on the ground. As of November 2008, forty-one countries had contributed troops to the over 50,000-strong ISAF. Key Developments In the United States, rising demand for increasing forces in Afghanistan ahead of the US election led President George W. Bush to announce that an initial combat brigade would be redeployed in early General David McKiernan of the US Army, the commander of ISAF, later stated that an additional three brigades some 20,000 troops were required to counter the increased violence. In a bid to strengthen stabilization and counterinsurgency efforts, US secretary of defense Robert Gates unveiled plans in August 2008 to restructure OEF. ISAF and OEF maintain separate chains of command, but these are becoming increasingly interlinked. OEF is overseen by the US Central Command and is divided into two component missions: Combined Joint Task Force 82 (CJTF-82), which oversees US forces in Afghanistan, and the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC- A), which is responsible for training the Afghan National Security Forces. Since the expansion of ISAF to eastern Afghanistan, the commander of

76 AFGHANISTAN 59 CJTF-82 has served as the deputy commander of ISAF. The new structure brings nearly all of the 19,000 US forces currently outside of ISAF under the NATO commander, General McKiernan (some 20,000 US troops are already deployed as part of the 50,000-strong ISAF). OEF will maintain a separate, unspecified number of forces for counterterrorism and administration of the detention facilities at Bagram Airbase north of Kabul. Capacity of Afghan Institutions The Afghanistan Compact established highlevel benchmarks for the formation of a professional and effective Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. Amid the increased violence of 2008, the need to build these institutions took on renewed urgency. Shortages of NATO troops and related anger among Afghans over air strikes, as well as renewed attention to Afghanistan in the United States during the run-up to the 2008 US presidential election, prompted calls for accelerating the Afghanization of the military mission. In August 2008, US secretary of defense Robert Gates announced plans for the expansion of the Afghan National Army to 120,000 personnel over the next five years nearly double the current level of 60,000 (of an authorized 80,000). The JCMB subsequently approved a ceiling of 134,000 requested by the Ministry of Defense at its eighth meeting, in September. This includes sustaining institutions such as an Afghan National Air Corps, regional military intelligence offices, an acquisition agency, and communications support. The Afghan National Army has consistently proven itself in combat alongside international military troops. Nonetheless, the force is still operationally and financially dependent on the US military. According to the US Government Accountability Office, only 2 of 105 army units are assessed as being fully capable of conducting their mission, and 65 of 105 are either planned, in basic training, or assessed as partially able or unable to conduct their mission. 3 The assessment cited a lack of leadership within the Afghan National Army, shortfalls in personnel, including trainers, shortages of equipment, and low readiness levels. High levels of attrition and absenteeism were also found. Moreover, the expected price tag of the expansion, $20 billion equal the total pledges at the Paris donor conference means that sustainability of the force remains a major challenge. Maintenance of an expanded Afghan National Army is estimated to cost an additional $2.5 billion per year significantly more than domestic revenue. The United States the lead nation for rebuilding the army has not yet developed a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining [it]. 4 Afghanistan will therefore remain dependent on year-to-year foreign assistance to subsidize its military for the foreseeable future. The numerically superior Afghan National Police lags far behind its Afghan Nation Army counterpart in effectiveness and readiness. Plagued by corruption, inadequate training, and insufficient equipment, the Afghanistan National Police suffers from both a lack of public trust and an inability to protect itself from insurgent attacks. Assessing the police force, the US Government Accountability Office found no unit fully capable of performing its mission, while less than one-quarter of the [force] has police mentors present to provide training in the field, evaluate police capacity, and verify that police are on duty. 5 In May 2008, the European Union agreed to double the size of its EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan), the training mission that succeeded an earlier German-led initiative in June The mission had a strength of 274 staff, including 184 internationals, by mid-september Filling the additional posts remains dependent on the willingness of EU members to field more law enforcement and justice experts. Germany agreed to triple its contribution to the EUPOL force to 120 personnel, despite domestic opposition to the country s role in Afghanistan. The effectiveness of the Afghan National Police is also undermined by Afghanistan s weak judicial system. Efforts to strengthen mechanisms of justice since 2001 have focused predominantly on state institutions, including legal

77 60 MISSION REVIEWS reform, training personnel, and rebuilding infrastructure. In the interim, the Afghan government and donors have begun to explore potential linkages with institutions of customary law and dispute resolution. The challenges faced by the Afghan National Police reflect those of the government as a whole. According to the World Bank, Afghanistan is second only to Somalia as the weakest government in the world. The illegal narcotics industry, as well the vast wealth provided by international assistance, have fueled rampant corruption, which the government has so far proved either unwilling or unable to tackle. Corruption threatens implementation of the ANDS and confidence in the justice and security sectors, undermining the legitimacy of the government overall. At the Paris donor conference, the Afghan government renewed its commitment to combating corruption. Coordination OEF, ISAF, UNAMA, UN agencies, bilateral donors, and international financial institutions each have distinct mandates and missions. International military forces, the UN, and major donors recognize that improved coordination with each other and with the Afghan government is vital to their success. Yet they also acknowledge that the current level of coordination is lacking. Political, military, and development activities frequently have been pursued independent of each other, without agreement among the principal actors on an overarching strategy, let alone a desired end state. Different goals and modus operandi exist not only across the political, military, and development realms, but within each of these individual areas as well. In an effort to bring greater unity of purpose to the diverse actors involved, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other key donors sought the appointment in February 2008 of Lord (Paddy) Ashdown, the former UN High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a super envoy to simultaneously fulfill the roles of SRSG, NATO senior civilian representative, and EU envoy. Ashdown s candidacy and with it the super envoy role was ultimately withdrawn following objections from President Karzai in a move widely regarded as an effort to assert his authority vis-à-vis the West. The need for more effective coordination was subsequently included in the revised mandate for UNAMA. However, better coordination cannot alone align the fundamental differences and justifications among actors for their presence in Afghanistan. In the military realm, ISAF has a unified command in theory, but in practice, each troop-contributing country has control over the deployment of its troops including where and in what role they serve, as well as their terms of engagement. The resulting national caveats are indicative of the wide range of differences among NATO member states on offensive engagement. Individual contingents and PRTs have been more responsive to the political exigencies of national capitals than to the civil-military needs of the provinces in which they are based, or to the need for an overall NATO strategy. Several NATO members have staunchly resisted involvement in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency roles. The revised ISAF operational plan of 2005 clearly delineates that the force will not engage in or command counterterrorism missions. Yet other ISAF contingents particularly those in the south and east have engaged in offensive actions against insurgents and terrorist elements, as in Arghandab district, Kandahar, and Musa Qala district, Helmand. Differences in approach between the United States and other NATO members have also emerged over counterinsurgency tactics, particularly the role of air power, in the face of efforts to win hearts and minds. The shortage of international forces for Afghanistan, combined with tensions between counterterrorism and state-building objectives, has increased reliance on air strikes when engaged with insurgents. This has resulted in high levels of collateral damage. Civilian deaths from air strikes pose a major challenge to the legitimacy and tolerance of international military forces in Afghanistan. Following a series of incidents in July 2008, President Karzai blamed international forces for the rising violence in the country. The

78 AFGHANISTAN 61 Afghan parliament likewise sought without result greater control over the terms of the US military presence. The tide of discontent swelled after the 21 August air strikes in Shindand district, Herat. President Karzai publicly called for a status of forces agreement with the US-led coalition forces, which have thus far operated without a formal legal agreement with the Afghan government. 6 ISAF, by contrast, has a UN mandate and signed a military technical agreement with the government. But both forces are increasingly under pressure for greater government control, as the increased combat role of ISAF, and a command structure interlinked with OEF, have made it more difficult to determine responsibility for errant air operations. Counternarcotics policy is another area where differences among external actors are prevalent. Until recently, the United States has continued to press for eradication as a central component of its efforts, despite opposition from the Afghan government, other major external actors, and evidence that the policy disproportionately harms poor farmers, undermining their livelihoods and strengthening the appeal of Taliban propaganda. The United States initially demonstrated a wariness of multilateralism. It remains the largest troop contributor, controls key command positions both on the ground in OEF and ISAF, and at NATO headquarters, and is also the largest donor. All of these factors contribute to making it among the most difficult of international partners to coordinate with. Meanwhile, civilian casualties further complicate its relationship with other actors. Following the Shindand air strikes, the United Nations challenged the assertion by the United States that thirty to thirty-five of those killed were insurgents and only five to seven were civilians. A joint United Nations and Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission panel of human rights experts dispatched to the site concluded that the victims were civilians. US political and military officials pressured the UN to relent, but SRSG Eide held his ground, underscoring the tensions between his roles as advocate for Afghanistan and in leading international coordination. In a move likely to strengthen the position of the United Nations, the United States ultimately apologized for the deaths. It took the added step of issuing new rules of engagement on 2 September 2008 in an effort to limit future civilian deaths, agreeing to undertake joint investigations with the Afghan government, as well as pledging to offer more rapid compensation to the families of victims. Notwithstanding tensions over air strikes, senior US officials have repeatedly signaled their willingness to support SRSG Eide in taking a more proactive coordination role than his predecessor. The revelation in September 2008 that the George W. Bush administration had authorized cross-border operations into Pakistan by special forces created a new fissure between the United States and its allies. The former stated that it viewed the insurgency in Afghanistan and the threat from Pakistan s tribal regions as a single problem. According to a NATO spokesperson, however, The NATO policy, that is our mandate, ends at the border.... There are no ground or air incursions by NATO forces into Pakistani territory. 7 NATO s engagement in Afghanistan remains a source of strain for the alliance, as the previously clear line between ISAF as the stabilizing force, and the coalition as the warfighting force, has become blurred. National caveats divide ISAF between those countries deploying troops and suffering heavy losses in combat zones in the south and east, and those including Germany, France, Italy, and Spain that have deployed in the relatively safer north and west due to domestic political pressure. The former continue to seek greater equity among the twenty-six NATO members, but despite NATO vows to the contrary, troop commitments remain problematic. Canada threatened to withdraw its troops from Kandahar unless other nations supported its efforts. French president Nicolas Sarkozy increased the size of France s NATO contingent from 700 to 3,300 earlier in Domestic support for deployment plummeted after the killing of ten French troops in August. Following a parliamentary vote on 22 September to maintain its presence in Afghanistan, the French government stated it would

79 62 MISSION REVIEWS provide more matériel and consider sending back special forces troops it had withdrawn in Germany also promised an additional 1,000 troops by year s end to complement its existing contingent of 3,500, and signaled that, for the first time, it would consider deployment to the south. Nonetheless, the crisis in Georgia in August 2008 has caused some European countries to question NATO s out-of-area role. National caveats and calls for withdrawal following the death of soldiers undermine the message to insurgents that international commitment to Afghanistan is unequivocal (ahead of the September 2008 election in Canada, and after the Conservatives pledged to pull out of Afghanistan by 2011 if reelected, the Taliban claimed to have stepped up attacks in order to pressure the government to withdraw its forces). Moreover, the shortage of troops exposes humanitarian and development workers to greater risk. When these organizations are forced to halt work, it justifies the use of terrorist tactics and furthers the insurgent goal of isolating the Afghan population from the government and essential services. International support for the political dimension of stabilization is under UN auspices. The separate authority for military and political realms has led to lack of coherence between military, political, and development goals. Since his appointment, SRSG Eide has, as noted above, sought and received wider powers and resources from the Security Council to fulfill the UN s coordination role. Eide s role as chair of the JCMB which was convened in April 2006 to oversee implementation of the Afghanistan Compact and to improve donor coordination to this end has provided the UN its main source of convening power and leverage over other actors. With twenty-eight members representing the Afghan government, the UN and other multilaterals, major donors and troop contributors, NATO and OEF, as well as regional governments, the JCMB has in the past been criticized as unwieldy. Eide has moved to improve the JCMB, and has restructured the unwieldy Consultative Group process, replacing it with three standing committees one for each pillar of the Afghanistan Compact: security, governance, and development. These committees are supplemented by ad hoc, time-limited subcommittees focused on providing policy recommendations on specific problems, such as counternarcotics. In 2008, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) established offices in Afghanistan separate from UNAMA despite earlier indications that the plan had been rejected. The move followed calls from some quarters of the humanitarian community, challenging the effectiveness of the mission s integrated structure. UNAMA had pledged to keep full responsibility for humanitarian issues and to increase its humanitarian officers. Regional Dynamics The situation in Afghanistan is intrinsically linked to the wider South and Central Asia region through political and economic ties, both licit and criminal. Porous borders exacerbate the inability of the Afghan government, its international partners, as well as its neighbors to control the illegal drug trade and cross-border dimensions of the insurgency. During 2008, events across the shared border with Pakistan threatened to worsen the situation not only in Afghanistan, but in the wider region as well. In the federally administered tribal areas, the growing power of the Pakistan Taliban Movement and other extremist groups provided a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorists hostile to the West and the Afghan and Pakistani governments. Following the resignation of President Pervez Musharraf, the successful bid for power by Asif Ali Zardari of the Pakistan People s Party fractured the governing coalition. The government renewed military operations in the tribal areas, though with questionable commitment and effectiveness. Pakistani military engagement is overshadowed by deep-seated concerns about the threat posed by India and its growing influence in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, US secretary of defense Robert Gates testified in September 2008 that their mere presence and willingness to fight has reduced some of the pressure on the Afghan side of the border. 8

80 AFGHANISTAN 63 Iran and Afghanistan maintain amicable ties, including economic trade and joint efforts to combat illegal drugs. Iran, meanwhile, continues to host over 900,000 Afghan refugees despite deporting nearly 500,000 since the beginning of It again extended its voluntary repatriation program in February Iran exerts political and economic influence in Afghanistan, particularly in the western provinces. The Afghan government dismissed US charges of Iranian collusion with insurgent elements in Afghanistan. China has pledged $170 million to Afghanistan since While ranking well behind other major contributors, China has staked out a seat at the table providing military assistance and support on road reconstruction to reconnect Afghanistan to regional trade routes where security permits overland travel. In the largest foreign direct investment project ever in Afghanistan, China won a $3.5 billion contract to develop the Aynak copper reserve, including a rail link connecting the two countries through Tajikistan and Pakistan. Conclusion Whether the international community and the Afghan government can succeed in stabilizing Afghanistan will depend on whether they are able to reach agreement on an overarching strategy and deliver better coordination in its implementation. NATO members will need to follow up on promises of additional troops and trainers, and donors will need to fulfill their Paris pledges. Maintaining the legitimacy of international forces is another challenge, particularly as the line between stabilization and combat roles is likely to remain blurred, while the development of independent national security forces is still only an aspiration. Effective measures to minimize civilian casualties, should they prove sustainable, would be an important step in this direction. Insecurity may force a delay in Afghanistan s 2009 presidential elections, though key external actors and the Afghan government itself are signaling resolve to see credible elections held on time. Delays would likely undermine the legitimacy of the current government. There is, moreover, a further risk that a delay, combined with the inability of international military forces to rein in the Taliban and other insurgents, would reverse the modest gains made to disband illegal armed groups and further undermine local government control. Finally, stabilizing Afghanistan is dependent on events in the wider region, above all the ability and willingness of Pakistan to address the lawlessness in the federally administered tribal areas. Whether the government can establish greater control over interservice intelligence (ISI) will need to be addressed as part of this solution. Recent discussions between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States on joint missions in the border region could prove a step in the right direction, provided Pakistan s concerns over sovereignty are addressed. As outgoing European Union envoy Francesc Vendrell described the prospect in Afghanistan, The international community is not destined to fail, but we are far from succeeding. 9 Notes 1. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security, UN Doc. A/62/722-S/2008/159, 6 March Robert Burns, Defense Chiefs: Afghan Fighting Is Getting Harder, Associated Press News, 10 September 2008, 3. US Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, June 2008, p Ibid., p Ibid., p The United States and Afghanistan signed a joint declaration of strategic partnership in May 2005 that provided freedom of action for US forces.

81 64 MISSION REVIEWS 7. Augustine Anthony, Karzai Backs U.S. on Pakistan, NATO Holds Back, Reuters, 11 September 2008, 8. Anna Mulrine, Gates Says Pentagon Will Try to Stop Prioritizing Iraq over Afghanistan, US News and World Report, 23 September 2008, 9. Alison Smale, Afghanistan Is in Its Worst Shape Since 2001, European Diplomat Says, New York Times, 14 September 2008,

82 3.5 Middle East Lebanon Tensions between the Lebanese government and opposition militias escalated during the first five months of Parliament was deadlocked over failure to agree on a candidate for president, and assassinations of leading political figures contributed to a growing crisis. Efforts by several mediators failed to resolve these issues during the spring; and in May, when the government declared Hezbollah s communications network illegal, gun battles broke out between progovernment forces and opposition militias in central Beirut. As violence spread to other areas of the country, many feared the renewal of civil war. The crisis in Lebanon was defused on 21 May, when Lebanese parties, meeting in Doha, agreed on steps to resolve the political deadlock. These included the appointment of a consensus presidential candidate, General Michael Suleiman, the establishment of a government of national unity, and the initiation of a national dialogue aimed at extending government authority throughout Lebanon. Since the Doha meeting, Beirut has been calm and the opposition has dismantled its protest camp. Violence elsewhere in the country, notably in Tripoli, has nonetheless continued, and security issues remain, including reports of arms traffic across the Syria-Lebanon border, the growth of Sunni extremism in the north, and the growing prominence of militias in Palestinian refugee camps. In southern Lebanon, where the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is deployed, the situation generally remained calm. The events of May did not have direct impact on UNIFIL. The apparent ease with which Hezbollah seized parts of the capital was clear evidence of its continued military strength north of the Litani River. UNIFIL was challenged in 2008 by armed elements operating in the south. Israel remains deeply concerned that Hezbollah is rearming, and is also worried by the formation of a government of national unity that includes Hezbollah, which espouses the right to resistance against Israeli occupation. Background The UN Interim Force in Lebanon is now the largest UN peace operation in the region. First established in 1978 by Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426, UNIFIL was initially tasked with confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring peace and security, and helping the government of Lebanon to reestablish control over the south. In May 2000, UNIFIL assisted in the withdrawal of Israeli forces behind a Blue Line identified by the UN. Conditions remained unstable, however, with occasional cross-border incidents. The Lebanese government did not deploy forces in the south. Other factors, notably the Syrian armed presence in the rest of Lebanon, led in 2004 to the adoption of Security Council Resolution The Security Council reiterated the demand for an extension of the Lebanese government s authority throughout all of Lebanon, also calling for a withdrawal of Syrian troops (accomplished in 2005) and the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-lebanese militias. 1 War erupted in Lebanon in July 2006 when Hezbollah attacked an Israeli patrol inside Israel and abducted two soldiers. A major military campaign ensued: Israel bombed Lebanon, including Beirut, and invaded Lebanese territory; 65

83 66 MISSION REVIEWS UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Authorization and 19 March 1978 (UNSC Res. 425/426) Start Date Force Commander Major-General Claudio Graziano (Italy) Budget $688.8 million (1 July June 2009) Strength as of Troops: 12, October 2008 International Civilian Staff: 321 Local Civilian Staff: 640 For detailed mission information see p. 279 of hostilities; accompanying and supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces in their deployment to the south, including along the Blue Line; extending its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons; assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces in taking steps toward the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any personnel, assets, and weapons other than those of the government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL; ensuring that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind; protecting UN personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment; ensuring the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel and humanitarian workers; and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the government of Lebanon, protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. Resolution 1701 expanded UNIFIL s authorized strength to 15,000 troops. As of November 2008, UNIFIL stood at 12,733 military personnel, supported by some 321 international civilian and 640 local civilian staff. The UN has a number of mandated tasks in addition to those assigned specifically to UNIFIL. Resolution 1701 set out several political tasks for the UN, and a UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon represents the good offices of the Secretary-General. The UN has also been mandated to conduct an investigation into the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri, and in May 2007 the Security Council decided to establish an international tribunal to try those involved in the Hariri assassination. Hezbollah fired hundreds of rockets into Israel. Over a thousand Lebanese and 161 Israelis were killed, and thousands were displaced on both sides. The war ended after five weeks with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1701 in That resolution established a new mandate for UNIFIL, adding to its original responsibilities the tasks of monitoring the cessation Key Developments Security Since UNIFIL s 2006 enhancement, the Secretary- General has reported continued commitment by the governments of Lebanon and Israel to implementing Resolution The area south of the Litani has witnessed the longest period of relative stability in many years. 2 The Secretary- General, however, pointed out areas of concern

84 MIDDLE EAST 67 that continue to impede the establishment of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution between the parties. 3 One such issue was resolved in July 2008, when Hezbollah returned the bodies of two Israeli soldiers abducted in 2006, in exchange for the release by Israel of five Lebanese prisoners. In other areas, however, serious problems in the implementation of 1701 persist. Resolution 1701 calls for security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL. UNIFIL s most challenging task is to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in establishing this area. 4 The force is mandated to accompany and support the Lebanese Armed Forces as they deploy throughout the south, and also to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind. 5 Hezbollah is believed to be adept at concealing its military operations; much of its military buildup had been hidden from Israeli intelligence before the 2006 war. The task of verifying that Hezbollah is not rearming is therefore a huge challenge. Successive political and security crises elsewhere in Lebanon during 2007 and 2008 have impeded the work of the Lebanese Armed Forces in implementing Resolution Competing security responsibilities in 2007 in the Narh El-Bared camp, and in 2008 in Beirut and the north have drawn the Lebanese Armed Forces away from the south and curtailed some of their coordinated operational activities with UNIFIL. By September 2008, the Lebanese Armed Forces had again deployed to the south, and the operational tempo of work with UNIFIL had resumed. It was hoped that the political change in Beirut would lead to more consistent Lebanese Armed Forces UNIFIL cooperation during the coming year, and that President Michael Suleiman would give priority to the implementation of Resolution The porous nature of the Syria-Lebanon border complicates the efforts of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces to control the area south of the Litani. Resolution 1701 calls upon the government of Lebanon to secure its borders, and authorizes UNIFIL to assist in this effort but only at the government s request. It also calls on states to prevent the supply of arms or military training to individuals or entities except those authorized by the government of Lebanon or UNIFIL. The UN has assumed both advisory and operational roles in promoting better border control. UNIFIL s Maritime Task Force performs interdiction operations to prevent unauthorized arms smuggling. The Secretary-General has also twice dispatched a team of border security experts (the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team [LIBAT]) to assess border monitoring and propose measures to improve border control. However, the second LIBAT mission found in July 2008 that Lebanon has not yet succeeded in enhancing the overall security of its borders in any significant manner. 6 Despite security threats against UNIFIL, the mission continues its efforts to monitor and report developments in its area of operations. 7 UNIFIL s monitoring presence is substantial; in 2008 it maintained 64 permanent positions and 136 observation posts. However, UNIFIL continues to be threatened by armed elements, which in some instances have prevented the force from carrying out effective investigations. UNIFIL has also been unable to prevent persistent violations of Resolution 1701 by Israel. The Israeli Air Force conducted a large number of flights over Lebanese airspace in the first quarter of 2008, using both manned and unmanned aircraft, and continued in the second part of the year despite the release of the bodies of the two abducted soldiers. Israel maintains that overflights are a necessary security measure that will continue until all the measures set out in resolution 1701 (2006) are implemented in full. 8 While the measures set out in Resolution 1701 are therefore far from being fully implemented, UNIFIL has nonetheless made some progress since 2006, as the Blue Line has been remarkably quiet. The size of the force acts as a substantial buffer in the region, and a deterrent to unauthorized military activity.

85 68 MISSION REVIEWS REUTERS/Haidar Hawila Italian members of the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) investigate the site of a rocket attack on Israel in Yaroun village, southern Lebanon, 8 January UNIFIL has also succeeded in building confidence between the parties and resolving practical disputes. It continues to facilitate the tripartite meeting of senior representatives of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces, chaired by the UNIFIL force commander, at which senior Lebanese and Israeli military officials meet to discuss military and security issues. Through this tripartite forum and day-to-day liaison efforts, UNIFIL has defused several tense situations. Negotiations are also under way in the tripartite forum toward agreement for pullout of the Israel Defense Forces from northern Ghajar, a village that is bisected by the Blue Line. Although public attitudes to UNIFIL are hard to assess accurately, the force appears to have maintained a level of public confidence on both sides of the Blue Line. In Lebanon, the Secretary-General reports that the population s attitude towards the Force remained generally positive. This is in part due to the fact that UNIFIL continued its humanitarian assistance activities... as well as the identification and disposal of unexploded ordnance. But UNIFIL s efforts to clear ordnance continue to be impeded by Israel s refusal to hand over detailed information about the location of such ordnance. To enhance relations with the local community in south Lebanon, UNIFIL also uses television and a print magazine to improve the local population s understanding of its mandate and to respond to their concerns. Despite public criticism of UNIFIL by Israeli government officials, especially in 2006 and early 2007, the government of Israel supported the renewal of the mission s mandate in August 2008, and Jerusalem-based UN officials note that Israeli attitudes toward the force have actually changed significantly since The relative quiet along the Blue Line has been noted, and former prime minister Olmert has spoken about the robust international force acting as a buffer in the area between the Litani and the Blue Line. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who succeeded Olmert as leader of the Kadima Party, argues that there is no doubt that the change in the situation in southern Lebanon and the movement of Hizbullah northwards, away from the border, is a direct response to activities carried out by UNIFIL and the Lebanese army. 9 Political UNIFIL s substantial presence has helped to create a period of unusual calm in southern Lebanon. Since August 2006, no shot has been fired between the parties, despite the absence of a formal cease-fire. This period of quiet has enabled the Lebanese and Israeli governments to address domestic constituencies and begin low-key negotiations around outstanding sources of conflict. UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Michael Williams, argued in September 2008 that a renewal of conflict between Lebanon and Israel was unlikely in the coming twelve months. Underlying the current calm, however, is the threat that Hezbollah rearmament might be taking place. Hezbollah has asserted that its resistance continues throughout Lebanon. The question remains as to whether UNIFIL should be more aggressive in enforcing its mandate, or at least clearer about areas of the south that it has been unable to search.

86 MIDDLE EAST 69 Overall, the situation in Lebanon is far from stable, despite some positive political developments. Government efforts to extend control throughout the country still face numerous obstacles. In addition to Hezbollah s continued military strength, the growth of extremist groups operating in northern Lebanon is a source of grave concern. Instability in northern Lebanon has implications for the Lebanon-Syria relationship. Syrian president Bashar Assad has described northern Lebanon as fragile and a bastion of extremism. Syria s decision to send thousands of troops to the Lebanese border in September 2008 officially to stop smuggling prompted Lebanese commentators to speculate that Syria might again intervene and reestablish its military presence. To ensure a long-term solution to the Israeli- Lebanese conflict and movement toward comprehensive regional peace, political progress in a number of different arenas will be essential. Within Lebanon, continued progress in the national dialogue could help to push forward implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1559 and The process and outcome of the 2009 elections will also be crucial in determining how much progress the government of Lebanon can make in consolidating state control over the country. Syria s relationship with Lebanon and with other regional and international actors is another central element in implementation of Resolutions 1559 and During 2008, Syria was increasingly engaged in international dialogue at a number of levels, and may soon establish normal diplomatic relations with Lebanon. There is potential for a change in Syria s regional role if this process of reengagement continues in Further, the direction of engagement in the post Bush and Olmert eras, remains to be seen. A new US administration will remain engaged, but the fact of transition in and of itself constituted a significant challenge as the year drew to a close. The role of the United States continues to be of prime importance to developments in the Middle East. The new US administration s approach toward Iran, Iraq, and Syria will shape regional developments and help to determine broader international policy in the region. Other Missions Negotiations to resolve other aspects of the Arab- Israeli conflict did not yield many dividends. Indirect, Turkish-mediated dialogue between Israel and Syria continues. The Annapolis Process, launched by President George W. Bush to promote agreement on Israeli-Palestinian final status issues, has been under way since November The Annapolis Process has, however, been limited by the domestic weakness of both parties, as well as by the 2008 presidential transition in the United States. Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert resigned in September under pressure. The Palestinians remain divided, with Hamas still in control of Gaza, which is still subject to Israeli border closures. Further complicating this situation was the outbreak of fighting in Gaza in the final days of 2008, a development that will certainly shape the situation in the coming year and have an impact on the various peace operations in the region. UNDOF The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established under the 1974 disengagement of forces agreement between Israel and Syria to provide a buffer between their forces in the Golan Heights. The general situation between Israel and Syria in 2008 was calm. UNDOF reports that both Israel and Syria generally respect the current peace agreement and the presence of UNDOF in the region, although occasional tactical-level violations continue to occur. During 2008, the IDF announced stricter measures against civilians who cross into the territory of the occupied Golan; in response, in an effort to prevent escalation, UNDOF has been proactive in preventing farmers and shepherds from crossing up to the technical fence. UNDOF has also been monitoring the Syrian government s extensive antismuggling campaign. UNDOF has not been affected by indirect Israeli-Syrian peace talks that took place during

87 70 MISSION REVIEWS UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) Authorization and 31 May 1974 (UNSC Res. 350) Start Date Force Commander Major-General Wolfgang Jilke (Austria) Budget $45.7 million (1 July June 2009) Strength as of Troops: 1, October 2008 International Civilian Staff: 38 Local Civilian Staff: 100 For detailed mission information see p. 262 UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) Authorization and 29 May 1948 (UNSC Res. 50) Start Date Chief of Staff Major-General Ian Campbell Gordon (Australia) Budget $31.5 million (1 January 31 December 2008) Strength as of Troops: October 2008 Military Observers: 99 International Civilian Staff: 97 Local Civilian Staff: 133 For detailed mission information see p. 372 EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah (EUBAM Rafah) Authorization Date 12 December 2005 (EU Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP) Start Date November 2005 Head of Mission Budget Major-General Pietro Pistolese (Italy) $7.1 million (October 2007 September 2008) Strength as of Civilian Police: September 2008 International Civilian Staff: under Turkish auspices, nor as yet by Lebanon-Syria discussions about the Shaba farms area. UNTSO The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established in 1948 to monitor observance of cease-fires negotiated between Israel and its neighbors. UNTSO provides observers and logistical and financial support to UNIFIL and UNDOF, as well as a small observer group in Egypt at the request of its government. UNTSO did not undergo any formal changes to its mandate or authorized strength during EUBAM Rafah The EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah (EUBAM Rafah) was established in 2005 following Israeli disengagement from Gaza. EUBAM Rafah aims to assist in implementing the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on Movement and Access by providing a third-party presence at the Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt, to ensure continued opening of the crossing and to build confidence between the parties. When Hamas forces took control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, EUBAM Rafah suspended its operations. Official openings of the Rafah crossing were rare during 2008, and EUBAM Rafah was not present. Smuggling between Gaza and Egypt continues, and the wall at Rafah has occasionally been breached, leading to uncontrolled border traffic. The EU has decided to keep EUBAM Rafah on standby pending a change in the situation. On 10 November 2008, the EU Council adopted a joint action extending the mandate of the mission until 24 November EUPOL COPPS The EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS) was established in 2005 to support and advise the Palestinian Civil Police. A follow-up mission, the EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), began operating in January 2006 with the aim of enhancing EU support and implementing the Palestinian Civil Police Development Program.

88 MIDDLE EAST 71 Like many international operations, EUPOL COPPS was not permitted to engage with the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority or the Government of National Unity. After June 2007, with the establishment of a new Palestinian Authority government led by Salam Fayyad, EUPOL COPPS resumed its work in the West Bank. The operation currently trains Palestinian police officers in a number of areas, including traffic control, interdiction of illegal drugs, and maintenance of public order. EUPOL COPPS has also improved police infrastructure, and helped to foster cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian police services. During 2008, the mandate of EUPOL COPPS was expanded to include work on criminal justice and rule of law. Focus on and funding for its operations increased following a conference on Palestinian security in June The mission is expected to include fifty-three international staff by the end of EU COPPS has not been authorized to work in Gaza while Hamas remains in control of the Strip. TIPH Established by an Israeli-Palestinian agreement in 1994, and temporarily withdrawn and reestablished in 1997, the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) is mandated with providing a secure environment for the residents of Hebron and promoting stability through monitoring, reporting, and assistance activities. TIPH is coordinated by Norway and staffed by personnel from Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. Its mandate is renewed pending approval from Israel and the Palestinian Authority every six months. MFO Sinai The Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai (MFO Sinai) was established in 1981, pursuant to the withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) II in 1979 and the conclusion of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. MFO Sinai s mission is to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the peace treaty and to prevent any violation of its terms. On 1 September 2005, MFO Sinai took on the additional responsibility of monitoring the deployment of border guards along the Egyptian side of the border between Egypt and Gaza. MFO Sinai monitors the border guard force by verifying that its deployment is consistent with the terms agreed between Egypt and Israel (amended on 11 July 2007). MFO Sinai is not mandated to monitor the area of the Sinai immediately adjacent to Gaza, and has thus not been directly affected by serious problems in Gaza and breaches in the Rafah crossing that occurred during Conclusion The Middle East continued to host several peace operations in 2008, most notably the expanded UNIFIL, which have contributed to defusing EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) Authorization Date 14 November 2005 (EU Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP) Start Date January 2006 Head of Mission Budget Colin Smith (United Kingdom) $6.8 million (October 2007 September 2008) Strength as of Civilian Police: September 2008 Civilian Staff: 16 Authorization and Start Date Head of Mission Budget Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) Strength as of Civilian Staff: September January 1997 (Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron) Brigadier-General Roy Grøttheim (Norway) $2.8 million (October 2007 September 2008)

89 72 MISSION REVIEWS Authorization Date 3 August 1981 (Protocol to the Treaty of Peace) Start Date April 1982 Head of Mission Ambassador James A. Larocco Budget Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai (MFO Sinai) (United States) $66.2 million (October 2007 September 2008) Strength as of Military Observers: 1, September 2008 Civilian Staff: 15 tensions and maintaining security in its area of operation. The region witnessed several initiatives, including efforts to establish an inclusive Lebanese government that is capable of extending its authority throughout the country. The Annapolis Process has yet to yield results, and in summer and fall 2008 the political context was heavily shaped by Israeli political transition and the US presidential election. In the meantime, the EU and UN continued to play critical roles in the region through their support for the various peace operations and direct political engagement with the parties. As the year drew to a close, the conflict between Hamas and Israel in Gaza ensures that the Middle East will remain high on the international political agenda and will be the focus of heightened efforts in the year ahead. Notes 1. UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004). 2. United Nations, Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701, 27 June 2008, para Ibid., para UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), paras. 11, Ibid., 1701, para Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team, 27 August The most deadly recent attack occurred in June 2007, when a roadside bomb killed six Spanish peacekeepers. 8. United Nations, Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701, 28 February 2008, para Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, news release, 26 October 2007.

90 3.6 Kosovo In December 2007, international talks on Kosovo s future ended in failure. On 17 February 2008, the province s government declared independence from Serbia, of which it had been nominally part while under UN administration since A number of states including France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States have recognized Kosovo, but the majority of the international community have not. In October, Serbia persuaded the UN General Assembly to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice. Staunch Russian opposition to independence precluded any decisions in the UN Security Council. This meant a year of confusion and conflicting signals for the international presence in Kosovo. The UN and NATO were faced by significant challenges in ethnically Serb north Kosovo after the declaration of independence. But the major dilemma has been the existence of competing legal and political bases for operations emerging from international and local dynamics. The UN has had to manage its role in Kosovo in the face of these contradictions, and Kosovo has been one of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon s priorities through In June 2008, he declared that he no longer believed the UN s role viable in its current form, and acted in his role as the UN s Chief Administrative Officer to reconfigure the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). In reality, this has translated into substantial downsizing of staff and trying to find a modus vivendi with the other international organizations involved. By late 2008, there had been more progress toward this than might have been predicted, with an EU peace operation being accepted by both Kosovar and Serbian authorities but the process remains incomplete. Background In Resolution 1244 of 1999, the Security Council mandated UNMIK and NATO s Kosovo Force (KFOR) to prepare the ground for a political settlement. It did not define parameters for this settlement. Nor (unusually but not uniquely) did it require a periodic renewal of the mandate. Neither the supporters nor opponents of Kosovo s independence have reopened discussions of Resolution Both sides know 73

91 74 MISSION REVIEWS Cost-Benefit Analysis of United Nations Peacekeeping In 2008, a team of researchers led by Paul Collier, working under the Copenhagen Consensus project, published a report providing a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of international military interventions in postconflict societies and the abilities of these interventions to reduce the risk of conflict recurrence. The report found that UN peacekeeping operations are highly cost-effective, as they reduce the possibilities of relapse to conflict and coup attempts and all their negative consequences. While interstate war has declined since the end of the Cold War, the incidence of conflict particularly civil wars in low-income countries has remained relatively constant. Further, the threat posed by the recurrence of conflict or coup attempts in postconflict societies remains high. The average direct cost of a civil war can be upward of $250 billion. This does not include the humanitarian costs, which impact negatively on broader developmental interventions by the international community. The report explored a range of military intervention mechanisms used by the international community, with a primary focus on the curtailment of domestic military spending, the use of peacekeeping forces, and the provision of over-the-horizon security guarantees. The authors concluded that these methods have had positive impacts on the security situation where they were employed, but are not a panacea and need to be applied on a case-by-case basis. The authors found that UN peacekeeping has proven to be extremely cost-effective, especially when the investment in a mission is weighed against the alternative impacts of relapse to conflict and its consequences. The study concluded that spending $850 million on a peacekeeping operation annually over the course of ten years reduces the risk of violence from nearly 40 percent to 7 percent. An even more cost-efficient method of intervention is the use of over-the-horizon security guarantees, which are characterized by maintenance of only small contingents of personnel in-theater, with more robust forces available to be rapidly deployed. Interventions modeled on Britain s ten-year security safeguard for Sierra Leone, provide for diminished operational costs with positive impacts on the security situation. The report concluded that the benefits of postconflict aid are maximized when packaged with the instruments described above. To ensure optimal effect, these efforts require significant coordination among institutional actors, a role that the authors see as a perfect fit for the UN s Peacebuilding Commission. Source: Paul Collier, Lisa Chauvet, and Haavard Hegre, The Security Challenge in Conflict-Prone Countries, Copenhagen Consensus 2008 Challenge Paper, UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) Authorization and 10 June 1999 (UNSC Res. 1244) Start Date (note: paragraph 19 of the resolution states that international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of twelve months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise) SRSG Lamberto Zannier (Italy) Chief Military Major-General Raul Cunha (Portugal) Liaison Officer Police Commissioner Richard Monk (United Kingdom) Budget $198.0 million (1 July June 2009) Strength as of Military Observers: October 2008 Police: 1,871 International Civilian Staff: 381 Local Civilian Staff: 1,719 Un Volunteers: 108 For detailed mission information see p. 305 that the other could muster at least one Security Council veto on alterations to the mandate. The resolution has thus remained in force, and UNMIK and KFOR continued to operate throughout the year, as they had previously. Their role has been complicated by early elements of an alternative international presence under the political auspices of the European Union. The EU sent planners to Kosovo in 2006, on the assumption that it would receive full international recognition and so achieve a smooth transfer from UN administration. In early 2007, UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari published a plan envisaging an EU rule of law and police mission and a (European) International Civilian Representative (ICR) to provide political advice in an independent Kosovo. The Ahtisaari plan foresaw the redefinition of KFOR as an international military presence

92 KOSOVO 75 (IMP), still under NATO command and providing direct security, but also training a new Kosovo Security Force. It also proposed an autonomous mission under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) to monitor legal and rights issues, most obviously to safeguard Kosovo s Serb minority (about 5 percent of the population). The EU and OSCE had previously operated in Kosovo under the authority of UNMIK, the former dealing with economic issues and the latter dealing with human rights and institution building. While the Ahtisaari plan called for UNMIK s dissolution, it nonetheless allowed for a degree of continuity in the international presence. Key Developments Legal In the context of Kosovo s unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008, however, the Ahtisaari proposals have effectively offered an alternative basis for peace operations to Resolution The Ahtisaari plan had no status in international law, but the bulk of its provisions were included in Kosovo s constitution, ratified on 9 April. Following earlier EU planning assumptions, endorsed by Ahtisaari, that a transition from the UN would take four months, the Kosovar authorities declared the constitution in force on 15 June. All elements of the international community have had to navigate between what some officials call the two legal universes of Resolution 1244 and the new constitution. The one exception to this was the EU pillar within UNMIK, which had dealt with economic matters, whose work was already believed done in The European Commission closed its economic operations within UNMIK after the independence declaration, with only limited consultation from the UN. The UN and OSCE, both requiring Russian (and in the OSCE s case, Serbian) approval for their continued activities, continue to act on the basis of Resolution Both declared NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) Authorization and 10 June 1999 (UNSC Res. 1244) Start Date Force Commander Lieutenant-General Giuseppe Emilio Gay (Italy) Budget $44.1 million (October 2007 September 2008) Strength as of Troops: 14, September 2008 Authorization and Start Date Head of Mission Budget OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) 1 July 1999 (PC.DEC/305) Ambassador Tim Guldimann (Switzerland) $46.0 million (October 2007 September 2008) Strength as of Civilian Staff: September 2008 themselves status neutral, implying that they could fulfill their duties without reference to the political claims of domestic actors. The OSCE adopted this term in late 2007, prior to the annual meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, while the UN did so in the days immediately prior to independence. By contrast, the International Civilian Representative, Pieter Fieth, and his staff operate solely on the consent of the Kosovar government. Fieth had been chosen for the post in 2007, but did not arrive until after Kosovo s independence declaration. There was considerable public speculation about the relationship between the ICR and the UN s Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), then Joachim Rücker. While Fieth was initially thought to be taking a highly assertive stance, he adopted a more measured approach as the year progressed. The existence of two legal universes posed particular problems for NATO and the

93 76 MISSION REVIEWS EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) Authorization and Start Date Head of Mission Budget 4 February 2008 (EU Council Joint Action 2008/124/CSFP) Yves de Kermabon (France) $133.6 million (February 2008 January 2009) Strength as of Police: September 2008 International Civilian Staff: 95 EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo). The overlapping membership of both organizations split over whether to recognize Kosovo. While only a few European states have not recognized Kosovo s independence, dissenters including Spain (the fifth biggest troop contributor to KFOR in early 2008) and Slovakia have complicated consensus-based decisionmaking in Brussels. Even among recognizing states, there have been divisions over how boldly to proceed. For NATO, the question was whether its presence should continue as KFOR, recognized in Resolution 1244, or take on the expanded remit envisaged by Ahtisaari for the IMP. While NATO s immediate concern in the first quarter of 2008 was security in north Kosovo, its French field commanders insisted that they continue to act as KFOR. But the North Atlantic Council decided in June to mandate KFOR to train a Kosovo Security Force, apparently to some surprise within the mission. While nonrecognizing states indicated that they would not participate, planning was under way by fall The role of EULEX was even more problematic because the mission was designed to operate closely with Kosovo s new constitutional order, including not only police but also judges and prosecutors, as well as a border security element. While it began to deploy in late February 2008, originally aiming to be operational by the time Kosovo s constitution came into force, its lack of a clear legal basis and operational challenges led to speculation in Brussels that it might be dissolved. With the mission still far from operational by the middle of the year, the EU and UN explored whether EULEX could be a status neutral actor, fulfilling the law and order aspects of Resolution There were serious complications as EULEX s claim to status neutrality sat uneasily with its earlier purpose: fostering a Kosovar state. Resolution 1244 explicitly states that the SRSG is the ultimate authority in Kosovo, but EU members did not want their personnel under a UN line of command answering directly to New York. Nonrecognizing states, concerned by the status of their personnel, wanted EULEX staff to enjoy the rights and immunities granted to UN staff as they could not accept any such rights offered by the Kosovar government. But they did not want the UN to be able to revoke these immunities. Discussions of these problems progressed slowly in the third quarter of By September, a working group of UNMIK and EULEX officials had been formed to address them. However, officials doubted that a resolution could be found unless the Serbian government were to drop objections to EULEX taking responsibilities from the UN. This reflected the extent to which maintaining a presence in Serb areas of Kosovo was essential to the international community s credibility. In late November 2008, authorities from both Kosovo and Serbia reluctantly agreed to a plan that would let EULEX officially begin its operation. The compromise stipulated that the EU will take over the day-to-day administrative activities, but UNMIK would retain overall authority. That they did so resulted from both an improving security situation and compromises by international officials. Security Kosovo was calm in the run-up to the February declaration of independence. There were fewer incidents of political violence in the fall and early winter of 2007 than in comparable seasons in earlier years. Nonetheless, almost all international officials assumed that the independence announcement would stimulate interethnic clashes.

94 KOSOVO 77 These had two possible centers of gravity. One was the enclaves scattered throughout Kosovo that are home to about half its Serb populations. The other was north Kosovo, which houses the other half and is contiguous with Serbia proper. The most likely flashpoint was Mitrovica, a town on the border of the north and site of many past skirmishes. KFOR made a number of well-publicized troop rotations into north Kosovo while sponsoring an advertising campaign throughout the province, underlining its friendly role. Its commanders stated that it would be ready for any eventuality, after NATO held an exercise in the Adriatic in 2007 to show its will. In the event, Albanian violence against Serb enclaves failed to materialize. This almost certainly reflected efforts by the Kosovar authorities to urge restraint, but opinion polls suggested that there was little desire for violence in the Albanian community. UNMIK officials found that the Serb enclaves exhibited a high sense of personal security. By contrast, the situation in north Kosovo deteriorated rapidly after independence was declared. Mobs destroyed customs checkpoints between Kosovo and Serbia proper, and demonstrations in Kosovo won global press attention. It is probable that this violence was coordinated by Serbian security services, also implicated in an attack on the US embassy in Belgrade. By mid-march 2008, however, UNMIK and KFOR appeared close to losing control of the north completely. The Serbs made symbolic moves to affirm their authority there, such as reclaiming control of the railway in that region. The international community s response was complicated by long-standing disagreements over how to treat the Serbs inhabiting the region between UNMIK s headquarters in Pristina and its Mitrovica office. The situation escalated on 13 March when Mitrovica s courthouse was occupied by about fifty Serbs, apparently court staff from Yugoslav times. What followed is still open to dispute; a detailed UN report has not been circulated even to the Security Council. It appears that over the weekend of March, senior UNMIK and KFOR officials agreed that UNMIK police should retake the courthouse, with KFOR in reserve. They seem not to have consulted closely with French KFOR officers in the area or with the UNMIK office in Mitrovica, possibly for fear of leaks. The decision may have been motivated by reports of further Serb provocations looming the following week. The initial operation took place on 17 March 2008, and the courthouse was soon secured the Serb occupiers were briefly taken to Pristina, although later released without charge. This was a particularly inflammatory gesture given that on 17 March 2004, KFOR and UNMIK had failed to handle large-scale anti-serb rioting throughout Kosovo. A mob soon formed in Mitrovica, although it was well armed enough to suggest premeditation. In the violence that followed, a Ukrainian UNMIK policeman was mortally wounded and the French KFOR troops sent to relieve the courthouse sustained eighty casualties. The ad hoc nature of the operation was highlighted by the fact that UNMIK and KFOR did not have a joint medical evacuation plan, and staff at a KFOR field hospital initially refused to admit police casualties, including Ukrainian policemen, while treating the French. The head of UNMIK s Mitrovica office offered to resign in an on the defeat, which was soon reproduced in the Serbian press. His resignation was not accepted. SRSG Joachim Rücker (who was away during the operation) and his deputy Larry Rosin (who had been in charge) also tendered their resignations. Their resignations were accepted. Nonetheless, there were no major acts of violence in north Kosovo thereafter, and there was a cooling of rhetoric from Belgrade. The episode may have deterred all involved from further use of force. The closure of the courthouse impacted heavily on the Kosovo Serbs, as it was not reopened and the day-to-day administration of justice in the north effectively halted. Many Serb-ethnicity Kosovo police had stopped work upon the declaration of independence (also a problem in the enclaves), and while some patrols continued in the region, cases could not be

95 78 MISSION REVIEWS REUTERS/Marko Djurica UN and NATO peacekeeping vehicles burn during clashes with Serb protesters in Mitrovica, Kosovo, 17 March taken for trial. While KFOR mounted a number of exercises there, the Kosovar authorities opened customs posts between the north and Kosovo proper. This legal limbo did not lead to chaos, perhaps because of the influence of plainclothes Serbian police and security officers, but organized criminals such as fuel racketeers benefited. UNMIK worked quietly to ensure that funds earmarked for the north were transferred. By the end of 2008, the estimated 6,000 Albanians who live in the north had gone unmolested, and had even enjoyed increased freedom of movement suggesting a gradual acceptance of the new reality by the Serbs. The decisive factor in shaping events in north Kosovo, however, was probably the elections held in Serbia proper in May Initially, these caused UNMIK embarrassment, as it decided to permit polling in Serb areas, contravening Resolution But the elections resulted, after prolonged coalition negotiations, in the formation of a liberal government more deeply committed to working with the European Union and the United States than had been its predecessor. The new government appointed a moderate from Mitrovica as its minister for Kosovo. Belgrade appears to have reined in the security services in north Kosovo, and moved to strip more radical figures in the area of various vested interests. Growing rumors that it might even agree to allow EU personnel to patrol Serb areas led to a wave of protests in the enclaves in October. October also saw a success for UNMIK, which was finally able to reopen the Mitrovica courthouse for urgent cases after extensive negotiations with Belgrade on the issue. These were part of a wider program of talks designed by UNMIK to engage Serbia on practical matters in the area, circumventing political difficulties. The talks took place in parallel with much broader negotiations between the EU and Serbia (also relatively detached from the EU presence in Kosovo), and might have had less chance in isolation. Nonetheless, many UN officials assumed through much of 2008 that they would have to continue to lead in relations with the Serbs inside Kosovo. Plans were drawn up for a residual police presence of about 500 UN officers in the north after EULEX deployed. But these were complicated by continuing questions over EULEX s deployment, arising not only from high-level tensions in the Security Council but also from administrative hiccups. The Long Transition The questions about EULEX s base in international law overshadowed many planning assumptions about its arrival. Although the EU wished to distinguish itself from UNMIK choosing to reemploy only a small number of UN international staff it wanted to take over the mission s headquarters, vehicles, and items such as computers. In taking on rule of law duties, it also needed to learn about existing cases and challenges from the UN. With no Security Council mandate for the EU, however, the extent to which the UN could cooperate was unclear. In line with Ban Kimoon s decision to reconfigure the mission, UNMIK found ways to work with the EU, but personal relations were frequently poor. There was a feeling that EU staff saw their predecessors

96 KOSOVO 79 as jaded, while UNMIK saw their successors as naive. Particular problems emerged around the transfer of property and vehicles and over Kosovo s courts. In the legal sector, tensions arose around the transfer of cases including war crimes cases from UN to EU supervision. While UN judges and prosecutors had played executive roles in the Kosovar system since 1999, their EU successors were meant to be advisers only. While waiting to take on this more limited role, the European lawyers requested to see active files, leading to concerns on the UN side about breaching client confidentiality. Issues such as this soured some UNMIK staff against its political leadership, which they saw as too ready to compromise with EULEX. Consultation in the mission seems to have suffered. But all involved understood that the mission leadership was ultimately responsible for redefining the mission in a way that would satisfy Resolution 1244 while having little or no operational identity (with the possible exception of the north). In September 2008, an 80 percent staff cut was announced, and senior officials envisaged the emergence of an essentially political mission, rather than a peacekeeping one, in the medium term. The responsibilities of this mission are likely to include activities far removed from blue helmets. One area in which UNMIK has already played a facilitating role is in regional and international forums in which Kosovo cannot win recognition due to Serbian opposition (this includes regional stability and development initiatives). UNMIK officials now attend to represent Kosovo, but bring Kosovar representatives in their team allowing Kosovo to act more like a state despite its recognition difficulties. In the meantime, EULEX and the ICR s staff continued putting their missions together. While EULEX still had fewer than 300 personnel by the fourth quarter of 2008, it appeared to be suffering internal tensions resulting from differences between the operational cultures of its police, judicial, and border security elements. While the compromise agreement to allow EULEX to operate under UNMIK authority provided some clarity as to the EU s role, the operation will only reach full strength by spring The ICR s role remained troubled by the continued existence of the UN SRSG, although Joachim Rücker s replacement, Lamberto Zannieri, appears to have reduced tensions. The OSCE s role also remains uncertain. In early 2008, Serbia was positive about the OSCE s presence, presumably seeing it as an advocate in Kosovo. But Belgrade has grown more critical, perhaps because the organization has done little to slow the gradual emergence of a functioning Kosovar state. The OSCE also managed to irritate the Kosovar government by releasing a detailed and highly critical report on governance and rule of law in the six months after the independence declaration. Nonetheless, its officials have also been quietly helpful, carrying messages between the Kosovo Serbs and other elements of the international system where direct contact has not been possible. KFOR perhaps has the most straightforward future in the province, although it remains to be seen whether it will transform into an IMP. After the peak of violence in March 2008, the mission appears more confident in the security situation: as of November 2008, it had 14,579 troops in place, down from 16,000 the previous year. But the current lull in north Serbia is not guaranteed to last, especially if radical Serbs choose to defy the Belgrade moderates. Conclusion While not as envisioned in the Ahtisaari plan, the transition from UN to EU day-to-day administration has taken place, and the main challenge in the coming year will be bringing the EU operations up to their full capacity. But many in Kosovo believe that the imperfections of this transition had one lasting political effect in 2008: the Kosovar government enjoyed a great deal of freedom. Kosovo has moved more rapidly to real statehood than it might have in the case of a smoother transition.

97

98 4 Mission Notes 81

99 4.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina Authorization Date 12 July 2004 (EU Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP), 9 July 2004 (UNSC Res. 1551) Start Date December 2004 Head of Mission Major-General Ignacio Martín Villalaín Budget EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) Strength as of Troops: 2, September 2008 (Spain) $43.3 million (October 2007 September 2008) Authorization Date 11 March 2002 (EU Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP) Start Date January 2003 Head of Mission Brigadier-General Vincenzo Coppola Budget EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) (Italy) $21.5 million (October 2007 September 2008) Strength as of Police: September 2008 Civilian Staff: 31 OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina Authorization and 8 December 1995 Start Date (Fifth Meeting of the Ministerial Council) Head of Mission Ambassador Douglas Davidson (United States) Budget $23.3 million (October 2007 September 2008) Strength as of Civilian Staff: September 2008 Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) made significant strides in peace consolidation during 2008, but remains split along Bosnian Serb and Bosniak/Croat ethnic lines. This division has impeded progress in crucial areas such as police reform and redrafting of the constitution, raising serious concern among the international community, and once again delayed the withdrawal of international administrators. Meanwhile, with the security situation stable throughout the year, the EU military operation in BiH, the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea), was able to begin ceding more responsibility to the BiH armed forces and began contemplating its eventual withdrawal. Thirteen years since the end of its conflict, Bosnia remains host to a complex peacekeeping architecture that evolved out of the Dayton Accords of Originally intended to be a shortlived international presence, NATO s Stabilization Force (SFOR), the UN s International Police Task Force (IPTF), an Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission, and the ad hoc Office of the High Representative (OHR) entrenched their roles in the late 1990s to maintain postconflict stability. The European Union has since taken on the bulk of security responsibilities, with the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) replacing IPTF in January 2003, and the EUFOR Althea military mission taking over from SFOR in December These transitions took place under the administration of Lord (Paddy) Ashdown, head of the OHR, who was appointed in 2002, and also double-hatted as the EU s Special Representative. He took a highly assertive approach to his mandate, intervening in domestic politics and dismissing a number of elected politicians. 82

100 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 83 Christian Schwarz-Schilling replaced Ashdown during 2006, promising a more moderate approach, while maintaining emphasis on BiH s EU accession aims. With little progress made, Schwarz-Schilling was replaced by Miroslav Lajčák in July Under Lajčák s more stringent guidance, in 2008 the BiH government was able to break a two-year political deadlock on police reform that had hindered the country s EU membership aspirations specifically, the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), an EU preaccession treaty. EU standards require that all legislative and budgetary matters for police be vested at the state rather than the local level, and that technical criteria rather than ethnic divisions determine areas of Authorization Date NATO Headquarters Sarajevo Start Date December 2004 Head of Mission 28 June 2004 (Communiqué of NATO Istanbul Summit), 22 November 2004 (UNSC Res. 1575) Major-General Richard O. Wightman (United States) police operations. The new agreement meets these EU standards and BiH signed the SAA on 16 June However, the police reform was in some respects only cosmetic, in that it created federal police oversight bodies to control

101 84 MISSION NOTES and coordinate national police work, rather than merging the two separate Serb and Croat/ Bosniak police forces. Further, the police reform bill did little to assuage the overall dysfunction and division within the BiH government, which delayed implementing the police reform package until the greater task of drafting a new constitution can be completed. The signing of the SAA is, however, a significant milestone in BiH s postconflict progress: it brings the country one step closer to diminished international oversight and administration, as it eliminates one of two criteria for transforming the OHR to the less intrusive EU Special Representative (EUSR). While it had been envisioned that the OHR would wind down its operations during 2008, that possibility seemed quite remote as the year drew to a close, with the difficult political work involved in stabilizing the political situation and agreeing to a new constitution registering little progress. During the course of the year, Lajčák reiterated on several occasions that the OHR would stay in BiH until all of its objectives were met. The EUPM s efforts to assist in the reform of BiH s police force and build its capacity have been severely constrained since 2006 by the political deadlock on police reform. It is hoped that the police reform agreement, however cosmetic, will provide the opportunity for the EUPM to contribute substantially to the development of the BiH police in the coming year. As of October 2008, EUPM maintained 163 personnel in BiH; its mandate is due to expire at the end of Despite a stable security situation in BiH throughout the year, at the regional level Kosovo s declaration of independence in February 2008 brought with it the potential for instability. Consequently, EUFOR Althea maintained its authorized force strength to ensure that it had the capacity to perform its twofold mandate: providing security in BiH as its priority, and serving as a rapid reaction reinforcement to NATO s Kosovo Force (KFOR) if the need for its engagement should arise. EU troops also continue to cooperate with US forces, which are commanded by a residual NATO headquarters in Sarajevo. Recognizing the progress registered in BiH s military reform process, in 2008 EUFOR Althea handed over control of BiH military movements and weapon storage sites to the BiH armed forces. During October 2008, EU defense ministers agreed in principle to a plan to phase out EUFOR Althea in due course and replace it with a civilian mission and an over the horizon military force; a formal decision is expected in early In January 2008, BiH signed the Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO, bringing the country within one step of graduating from the Partnership for Peace Program and attaining full NATO membership. The capture of the notorious former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić in July 2008 was a significant international event that gave closure to the many BiH citizens impacted by the atrocities carried out by his regime. But Karadžić s arrest also highlighted the fraught nature of ethnic and political relations in the country, as news of the arrest spurred nationalistic and secessionist rhetoric among the Bosnian Serbs. During November, the three main political parties of BiH struck an unexpected agreement stating their determination to collectively implement the reforms necessary for EU membership. This development was met with circumspection from the international community, which, only one month earlier, had cited the deep fissures among the political parties in BiH. Beyond this gesture, BiH remains dangerously divided along ethnic lines and the prospects for a unified government are still remote. With this in mind, the situation in BiH will require the close oversight of the international community until a workable system of government for BiH can be devised and accepted by all parties involved.

102 4.2 Burundi Despite a steep deterioration in the political, security, and humanitarian situation in Burundi in the latter part of 2007 and early 2008, efforts to revitalize the 2006 peace agreement between the government of President Pierre Nkurunziza and the Peuple Hutu Forces Nationales de Libération (Palipehutu-FNL) received a boost with the signing of a cease-fire between the parties in May and the subsequent compromise agreements on Palipehutu-FNL s unconstitutional Hutu reference in its name and FNL s status as a political party in December However, by the end of the year, delays in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), as well as what some perceived to be a growing tone of authoritarianism from the ruling party, the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD), had raised doubts about the stability of the cease-fire agreement and the country s future. In the meantime, South Africa, in its capacity as facilitator, established a Political Directorate to address issues relating to the implementation of the September 2006 peace agreement. Meanwhile, the AU Special Task Force continued to manage the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM) and provide security for FNL leaders and other related groups. Background Burundi has experienced decades of ethnicbased conflict that set Hutu against Tutsi in violent outbursts that have often extended beyond its borders. The most recent period of conflict was triggered by the assassination of the country s first democratically elected Hutu president in This plunged the country into a bloody civil war between the Tutsi-dominated military and various Hutu rebel movements, including the CNDD-FDD and the Palipehutu-FNL, that would continue for nearly a decade. Regional mediation efforts eventually led to the signing of the Arusha Accords in August 2000, creating a new power-sharing transitional government, but fighting continued as the CNDD-FDD and FNL refused to accept the agreement. The CNDD- FDD eventually declared a cease-fire and joined the transitional administration in November 2003; the FNL, the remaining rebel group, did not reach a peace agreement with the government until September In June 2004, the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was deployed to take over for the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB), which had been deployed in Following the FNL s ceasefire agreement, ONUB was brought to an end in December 2006 and replaced by the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB). The latter UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) Authorization Date 25 October 2006 (UNSC Res. 1719) Start Date 1 January 2007 ERSG Youssef Mahmoud (Tunisia) Budget $39.0 million (1 January December 2009) Strength as of Military Observers: 8 31 October 2008 Police: 10 International Civilian Staff: 118 Local Civilian Staff: 221 UN Volunteers: 50 For detailed mission information see p

103 86 MISSION NOTES is mandated to support the government s peace consolidation efforts, provide assistance in DDR and security sector reform (SSR), promote human rights, and facilitate donor and UN agency coordination. In 2007, BINUB provided close support to the government s interactions with the UN Peacebuilding Commission, which had chosen Burundi as one of the first two countries on its agenda. Key Developments During the first few months of 2008, Burundi suffered a noted deterioration in its security environment, including increased armed attacks on civilians, and in some cases on provincial government officials, and a considerable rise in criminal activity. Large-scale hostilities between the government and the FNL resumed in April and continued until the signing of the cease-fire agreement on 26 May. It was particularly worrying that this deterioration occurred in parallel to major setbacks in the political situation, including paralysis of both the broadbased government formed in November 2007 and the National Assembly. In the face of these developments, a series of efforts were made and mechanisms instituted to revive the peace process. The Political Directorate, comprising the UN Secretary-General s Executive Representative, representatives of the South African facilitator and the Regional Peace Initiative, as well as the African Union, European Union, South Africa, Uganda, and Tanzania, and representatives of the government and FNL, considered proposals put to it by the facilitator in mid-january 2008 that aimed at restarting the stalled peace process. In the following month, a meeting of regional and international stakeholders held in Cape Town agreed on an action plan to further the peace process in Burundi. Meanwhile, a Group of Special Envoys for Burundi was formed in order to support the work of the Facilitator and the Political Directorate. Guided by the objectives outlined in the UN Peacebuilding Commission s 2007 strategic framework aimed at promoting good governance, strengthening rule of law, reforming the security sector, and ensuring community recovery, the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism was established in November Identifying clear benchmarks and indicators, as well as potential roles for other relevant actors, the JVMM s mandated tasks included monitoring implementation of the cease-fire agreement and of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. In June 2008, in the context of progress during late May the new cease-fire that had been reached with the FNL and the subsequent return of exiled rebel leaders, including the FNL s chairperson, Agaton Rwasa the UN Peacebuilding Commission released a progress report. It cited the need for cooperation of all parties in implementing the peace agreement, called for DDR efforts to conclude in December 2008, and called for a functioning electoral commission to be established by the first half of 2009 in preparation for the 2010 elections. A number of UN Peacebuilding Fund projects were implemented during the year to support progress on these priority issues. The precantonment process for the FNL began in June 2008, but stalled shortly thereafter following the government s arrest of several rebel members accused of violating the cease-fire by continuing recruitment. The FNL denied the charges. However, the government remained skeptical given that the FNL had not officially applied for party affiliation and had missed a 12 July deadline for turning over its list of soldiers to the JVMM, a step necessary to facilitate the cantonment process. Uncertainty over the number of FNL members undermined the DDR process and raised doubts about the FNL s commitment to the peace agreement. Additionally, the low number of weapons surrendered at cantonment sites and acts of banditry by FNL members continued to impede the process. Political differences were further aggravated by the ruling CNDD-FDD s authorization of the replacement of twenty-two sitting parliamentarians with CNDD-FDD supporters. This spurred fears of unchecked powers and the potential reemergence of an ethnically divided government. Meanwhile, human rights groups continued to report increased violence emerging

104 BURUNDI Security Council Resolution 1820: Women, Peace, and Security On 19 June 2008, the UN Security Council held an open debate titled Women, Peace, and Security: Sexual Violence in Situations of Armed Conflict and unanimously adopted Resolution 1820, recognizing that sexual violence as a tactic of war is not just a gender issue, but also a matter of international peace and security, especially in peacekeeping contexts. Resolution 1820 states that widespread and systematic sexual violence can exacerbate conflict, impede the restoration of international peace and security, and have negative consequences for peace, reconciliation, and development. Resolution 1820 reinforces and is intended to complement the landmark Resolution 1325 (2000), which urges all actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspectives in all UN peace and security efforts. Eight years after the adoption of Resolution 1325, member states reiterated their deep concern about violence against women and children in armed conflict, which is becoming systematic and widespread especially in conflict zones. This was aptly characterized by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon at the beginning of the June 2008 debate, when he stated that violence against women has reached unspeakable and pandemic proportions in some societies attempting to recover from conflict. He added that violence poses a grave threat to women s security in fragile post-conflict countries and undermines efforts to cement peace... by creating a culture that punishes violence and elevates women to their rightful role, we can lay the foundation for lasting stability, where women are not victims of violence, but agents of peace. The Secretary-General stated that, in order for a strategy to succeed, awareness must be raised and effective security measures must be established, including training of national military and police forces, close monitoring of human rights, and prosecution of perpetrators. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) will play a significant role in the implementation of Resolution 1820 by developing appropriate guidance and training resources for peacekeeping missions, ensuring continued engagement and partnership with troop- and policecontributing countries, facilitating the increased deployment of female uniformed personnel, and continuing to uphold the policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peacekeeping operations. In order to comply with the provisions of the resolution, DPKO will lead a UN systemwide effort to prepare a report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution, which is due by June from issues related to the redistribution of land. With 400,000 Burundians recently repatriated, and an estimated 90,000 in 2008 alone, serious concerns have been raised regarding the government s ability to deal with the redistribution of property and what mechanisms could be used to verify claims made by returnees. In a positive turn of events, on 4 December 2008, at the Great Lakes summit in Bujumbura, President Nkurunziza and Agathon Rwasa, leader of the FNL, were able to reach agreement on several issues that had previously impeded peace consolidation. In particular, the two agreed that the FNL would drop the Hutu ethnic reference from its name, move its forces into assembly sites, and assume a greater role in government. Nevertheless, by the end of the year, the challenges facing Burundi remained considerable. The unsatisfactory pace of implementation of the peace agreement between the government and the FNL could still derail the modest gains achieved in the peace process. The slow progress of DDR efforts, combined with the perceived lack of commitment to an ethnically integrated government, indicate that much more work needs to be done toward aligning the interests of all parties. Meanwhile, preparations for the planned 2010 elections are placing enormous pressure on all aspects of the revived peace process. The anticipated large number of returnees, particularly from Tanzania, among whom FNL has a considerable support base, would likely add to the tense political climate. The international community, including the UN Peacebuilding Commission, faces daunting challenges during the year ahead as they continue to support peace consolidation efforts in Burundi.

105 4.3 Comoros AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to Comoros (MAES) Authorization Date 9 May 2007 (Communiqué of the AU Peace and Security Council) Strength as of Troops: September 2008 Following the removal of renegade president Mohamed Bacar of Anjouan in early 2008, the tripartite government of Comoros was able to complete the election cycle that started in The elections took place largely without incident, thanks to support from the AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to Comoros (MAES), deployed since When separatist violence broke out in Comoros in 1997, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) intervened by deploying the Observer Mission to Comoros (OMIC) in The OAU supported talks that culminated in the Fomboni Accords in 2001, which provided for a referendum on a new constitution in advance of national elections. Under the Fomboni Accords, each island (Anjouan, Grand Comore, and Moheli) has substantial autonomy, with its own president and parliament, operating under an overall four-year rotating presidency. At the request of the Comoros president, in 2006 the AU Mission in Support of Elections in Comoros (AMISEC) was deployed to the island to oversee the election for an overall Comoros president. The 2006 election was to be followed by elections for new presidents on each of the three islands on 10 June But President Mohamed Bacar of Anjouan refused to relinquish power at the end of his term. Following the federal government s appointment of an interim president for Anjouan in early May 2007, forces loyal to Bacar attacked federal offices and clashed with federal forces stationed there, killing two. That same month, in response to the continuing tensions, the African Union deployed its second peace operation to the island, MAES, with a mandate to provide security during the election period. While Grand Comore and Moheli chose to delay their 10 June elections due to the unrest, Anjouan proceeded on schedule, with the defiant Bacar claiming 89 percent of the votes in an election deemed illegitimate by the international community. In the face of Bacar s continued intransigence, in late 2007 the African Union broadened MAES s mandate to include enforcement of travel and financial sanctions on Bacar and his supporters. In early 2008, Comoros and MAES forces began amassing in Moheli and, on the morning of 25 March, stormed Anjouan, taking control of the island and forcing Bacar to flee. Following the removal of Bacar, who ultimately sought refuge in Benin, two rounds of elections were held in Anjouan, in June and July, with Moussa Toybou winning the presidency. The elections were considered free and fair; though MAES troops responded to several disruptions, there was no violence. At the end of 2008, Comoros remained stable, with the AU force continuing to provide support to the newly elected government. 88

106 4.4 Côte d Ivoire Côte d Ivoire s peace process continued throughout 2008 as the parties worked to implement the Ouagadougou Agreement. But despite important elements of progress, Côte d Ivoire remains precariously close to its conflict-ridden past. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants, as well as electoral preparations, have lagged as a consequence of logistical and financial shortfalls and uncertain political will. While the country remained largely stable in 2008, sporadic acts of violence, including an increased spate of armed robberies and demonstrations over unpaid allowances by former combatants and the country s military, exposed the fragility of Côte d Ivoire s security. Background Côte d Ivoire was plunged into conflict in September 2002 following a mutiny and a failed coup attempt by soldiers of the country s armed forces. The country has since played host to peace operations led by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations, and France. Established in April 2004, the UN Mission in Côte d Ivoire (UNOCI) was mandated to support implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Accord, signed in Since then, the mission has supported the implementation of several follow-on peace deals, including, most recently, the Ouagadougou Agreement, signed on 4 March 2007 under the auspices of President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, chairman of ECOWAS. France s Operation Licorne forces, deployed to operate alongside the earlier ECOWAS Mission in Côte d Ivoire (ECOMICI), continue to complement the UN mission by providing additional rapid reaction capabilities. UN Operation in Côte d Ivoire (UNOCI) Authorization Date 27 February 2004 (UNSC Res. 1528) Start Date 4 April 2004 SRSG Choi Young-Jin (Republic of Korea) Force Commander Major-General Fernand Marcel Amoussou (Benin) Police Commissioner Major-General Gerardo Cristian Chaumont (Argentina) Budget $475.4 million (1 July June 2009) Strength as of Troops: 7, October 2008 Military Observers: 189 Police: 1,144 International Civilian Staff: 366 Local Civilian Staff: 508 UN Volunteers: 286 For detailed mission information see p. 354 Operation Licorne Authorization Date 24 January 2006 (UNSC Res. 1652) Start Date February 2004 Force Commander General Philippe Houbron (France) Budget $191.6 million (October 2007 September 2008) Strength as of Troops: 1, September 2008 The Ouagadougou Agreement laid out a road map for the feuding parties and UNOCI, addressing, among other things, issues of identification and voter registration, holding of elections, 89

107 90 MISSION NOTES disarmament of militias, reestablishment of state administration throughout the country, removal of the zone of confidence, and perhaps most importantly, the merging of rebel and government forces through the establishment of an integrated command center. It established clear timelines for implementation, and created two follow-up mechanisms. One is a standing consultative mechanism composed of current president Laurent Gbagbo, current prime minister Guillaume Soro, former president Konan Bedie, former prime minister Alassane Ouattara, and President Compaoré in his capacity as facilitator. The second follow-up mechanism the Evaluation and Monitoring Committee (EMC) is comprised of the facilitator as the chair, and three representatives from the signatories to the agreement. The consultative mechanism was mandated to address all issues pertaining to the agreement, while the EMC is charged with assessing and recommending ways of enhancing the peace process. Despite being a bilateral agreement between Gbagbo and Soro, the Ouagadougou Agreement enjoys broad political support from Ivorian opposition parties and civil society. This support is based in part on a popular sense of the agreement being a homegrown initiative, in contrast to previous efforts to secure peace. Key Developments Overall, the political and security environments in Côte d Ivoire remained relatively calm throughout But the apparent stability belied a potentially volatile situation, and the slow implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement was a cause of concern throughout the year. Following months of intensive negotiations, in April 2008 the government of Côte d Ivoire announced its intention to hold the first round of presidential elections on 30 November While the announcement was welcomed after more than two years of political deadlock on the subject, the actual holding of the elections would be contingent on the successful conduct of contentious civilian identification and voter registration programs within an extremely tight time span. With support from UNOCI, the government began to identify and register voters in the second half of Out of the 9 million anticipated voters, by October 2008 only 5,849 had been registered and only 1,500 of the 6,000 registration kits needed throughout the country in advance of the elections had been delivered. Further complicating matters was the issue of internally displaced persons, who have no identification papers but are regarded as a necessary component of an inclusive electoral process. While observers felt that the initiation of the identification and voter registration processes had set the country on an irreversible path toward the polls, questions about the feasibility of holding the elections as planned began to be raised as the election date grew closer and progress lagged. In mid-november, the signatories of the Ouagadougou Agreement decided to delay the elections, once again citing slow voter registration. Following the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement, the zone of confidence that had divided Côte d Ivoire since 2002 was dismantled and replaced by a green line patrolled by new mixed police units, consisting of the national police and those from the Forces Nouvelles, and overseen by seventeen UNOCI observation posts. By July 2008, UNOCI had dismantled all of its observation posts along the green line in reflection of the findings of a technical assessment of the security situation and consultations with all parties involved. The removal of the observation posts demonstrated significant progress in the reunification process, but the security situation remained fragile, mainly as a consequence of the stalled DDR of former combatants. The government committed to paying the equivalent of three months allowance to each demobilized combatant. However, complaints of nonpayment of the country s armed forces and demobilized combatants led to demonstrations that required the response of UNOCI and Operation Licorne to calm the situation. This is a critical issue, because

108 CÔTE D IVOIRE Sierra Leone UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) Authorization Date 31 August 2005 (UNSC Res. 1620) Start Date 1 January 2006 End Date 30 September 2008 (UNSC Res. 1793) Acting ERSG Michael von der Schulenburg (Germany) Chief Military Liaison Officer Colonel Sven-Olof Broman (Sweden) Senior Police Adviser Budget Following successful presidential and parliamentary elections during 2007, Sierra Leone s peace consolidation efforts continued in 2008 and benefited from the active engagement of regional and international actors. Support from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations, and other bilateral actors helped create the foundations for socioeconomic and political progress. Meanwhile, the country continued to make contributions to UN peacekeeping operations by deploying twenty police officers with the UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and through other military observers deployed to Timor-Leste and Nepal. Rudolfo Landeros (United States) $27.0 million (1 January December 2009) Strength as of 30 September 2008 Military Observers: 5 Police: 2 International Civilian Staff: 73 Local Civilian Staff: 198 UN Volunteers: 18 For detailed mission information see p. 289 UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) Authorization Date 4 August 2008 (UNSC Res. 1829) ERSG Michael von der Schulenburg (Germany) Start Date 1 October 2008 Strength as of 31 October 2008 International Civilian Staff: 14 Local Civilian Staff: 1 The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) departed in December 2005 after six years of operation that saw the return to multiparty politics. UNAMSIL was replaced with a special political mission, the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), mandated to support the government in consolidating its postconflict gains. In July 2007, UNIOSIL supported the national electoral commission in conducting elections that installed President Ernest Bai Koroma. This achievement, along with progress in the development of independent media, implementation of some of the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and prosecution of human rights abuses by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, was matched by a relatively calm security situation. During 2007 the government identified high youth unemployment, justice and security sector reform, democracy consolidation, and good governance as priority areas for engagement with the international community, most notably the UN Peacebuilding Commission. In December of that year the commission and the government agreed to a peacebuilding cooperation framework that highlighted challenges to existing national strategies and identified the need for a timely and effective implementation based on mutual accountability and sustained engagement. Meanwhile, the official drawdown date for UNIOSIL was set for September During its final months, UNIOSIL supported the national electoral commission in conducting local council elections in July 2008, and assisted in the streamlining and professionalizing of the military and police forces in tandem with the UK-led International Military Training and Advisory Team. In October, UNIOSIL was replaced by the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), led by the UN s Department of Political Affairs with support from the UN Development Programme. UNIPSIL will support the work of the Peacebuilding Commission and the implementation of the peacebuilding cooperation framework. Meanwhile, Sierra Leone made progress on its development objectives through several new initiatives aimed at strengthening anticorruption, implementing justice sector reform and investment, and establishing strategy and policy units in the office of the president. But economic recovery was severely slowed by global food and fuel crises during Despite these challenges, Sierra Leone has emerged as one of the success cases for regional and UN peacekeeping efforts during the past decade. a disgruntled military has been the source of unrest in the past. Despite its exclusion from the two followup mechanisms provided by the Ouagadougou Agreement, UNOCI continued to support DDR efforts in other ways. In April 2008, for example, it established a DDR operations center focused on building the planning and coordination capacities of the integrated government and Forces Nouvelles contingents. However, the lack of resources to implement the integration program remained an ongoing

109 92 MISSION NOTES source of tension. In April 2008, the Forces Nouvelles, together with the chiefs of staff of Côte d Ivoire s national armed forces and government officials, presented its cantonment plan to Operation Licorne and UNOCI force commanders. The plan indicated that 36,000 Forces Nouvelles personnel would be cantoned during a five-month period. By October, 11,364 Forces Nouvelles personnel had been cantoned; 7,598 of these elected to be demobilized, while 3,766, including 28 women, chose to join the national armed forces. UNOCI provided logistical and technical support to this process, but as in the past, financial shortfalls stalled the reintegration process. It was reported that the government had failed to provide a promised $214 monthly allowance over the course of three months to cantoned combatants. Recognizing this challenge, the World Bank promised the Forces Nouvelles that its $40 million reinsertion and community rehabilitation program would prioritize former combatants. In this vein, in August 2008, UNOCI launched a $5 million project aimed at the reintegration of former combatants. Named the 1,000 Micro Projects, the initiative is aimed at ex-combatants as well as youth and women at risk. It will support technical training aimed at providing employment opportunities. Meanwhile, militia groups in the western region of the country have remained largely outside the DDR process. According to the Ouagadougou Agreement, militias were to have begun disarming in December 2007; however, their leaderships have refused and instead have continued to demand support packages similar to those received by other militias that demobilized under a different agreement during Furthermore, the handover of Forces Nouvelles weapons proceeded at an alarmingly slow rate. By the end of July 2008, only eighty-six weapons had been turned over, a mere ten of which were serviceable. This is a paltry figure given the large stocks in the hands of the Forces Nouvelles, raising questions as to its commitment to the peace process. The integrated command center reached its authorized strength in 2008, combining 587 government and Forces Nouvelles personnel. Despite reaching this milestone, the command center remains beset by shortfalls in logistics and financial resources. During the second half of the year, it was reported that this situation resulted in the nondelivery of food and fuel to members of the integrated units for five months, and that members of the Forces Nouvelles had not received salaries since their deployment. Meanwhile, the unification of the forces remained stalled over disagreements about the numbers and ranks of Forces Nouvelles to be integrated into the new force. The extension of state authority throughout Côte d Ivoire registered mixed results. Power was gradually transferred to national administrators in the north, but limited progress was made in the deployment of crucial elements such as magistrates and judges. The Ouagadougou Agreement stipulated that state officials from the south were to be redeployed to the north, and that parallel governing and tax structures were to be terminated in the region. But by October 2008, very few judges and tax or customs officials had been redeployed, and even the few who had faced serious obstacles from the Forces Nouvelles, who were not willing to hand over territorial control to national authorities. The prevailing environment remained one of insecurity as crime and banditry increased throughout the country. Nonetheless, the relatively stable security situation led to the withdrawal of 600 Operation Licorne personnel, leaving the operation s total strength at 1,800. Meanwhile, UNOCI s troop strength remained at the authorized level, pending developments regarding the planned elections. Conclusion While no open conflict was reported in Côte d Ivoire in 2008, competition over representation in both military and public institutions exposed the deep fault lines in the country. Slow progress in implementing DDR, extending state authority throughout the country, registering

110 CÔTE D IVOIRE 93 voters, and creating a unified military continued to occupy regional and international attention. But it was the postponement of national elections for the third time that was the most significant source of concern at the end of 2008, as the elections are recognized to be a crucial first step in restoring the legitimacy of the government and consolidating stability in the country.

111 4.5 Cyprus UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) Authorization and 4 March 1964 (UNSC Res. 186) Start Date SRSG Tayé-Brook Zerihoun (Ethiopia) Force Commander Rear Admiral Mario César Sánchez Debernardi (Peru) Budget $56.5 million (1 July June 2009) Strength as of Troops: October 2008 Police: 69 International Civilian Staff: 39 Local Civilian Staff: 105 For detailed mission information see p. 270 During 2008, the resumption of reunification talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the opening of several key crossing points between the two communities were encouraging signs of progress in Cyprus after forty-four years of division. Officials from the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) have nevertheless stressed the need for continued patience and commitment in order to allow negotiations between the parties to progress toward a comprehensive settlement and the eventual reunification of the island. UNFICYP was initially established in 1964 with a mandate to prevent violence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the north. In 1974, renewed fighting led to a UN-brokered ceasefire and an expansion of UNFICYP s mandate to include cease-fire monitoring and administration of the buffer zone between the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot forces. Since that time, UNFICYP s mandate has consistently been renewed on a six-month basis. Over the decades, negotiations between the leaders of the two sides have had limited success. A large-scale effort launched by the UN Secretary-General in 1999 led to the resumption of face-to-face peace talks in December But the process came to an abrupt end in April 2004 when an ambitious UN reunification plan was rejected in a referendum by the Greek Cypriot population, even as the Turkish Cypriot population gave it their support. In 2003, the first crossing point between the north and south was opened. Since then, seven more have followed, including, on 3 April 2008, the crossing point at Ledra Street, Nicosia s main thoroughfare. The opening of the Ledra Street crossing represented a significant breakthrough: after forty-four years of closure, it is now used by thousands of people on a daily basis. Progress on the political front accelerated after February 2008 elections in the Republic of Cyprus brought to power Demetris Christofias, who immediately reached out to the Turkish Cypriots and their leader, Mehmet Ali Talat. Three weeks after Christofias s inauguration, the two men met in the presence of the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, and agreed on a path toward a comprehensive settlement. In May, the two leaders committed to a partnership that will comprise a federal government with a single international identity, along with a Turkish Cypriot constituent state and a Greek Cypriot constituent state, which will be of equal status. In July, the UN Secretary-General appointed the former foreign minister of Australia, Alexander Downer, as his Special Adviser on Cyprus. Full-fledged talks on reunification began in September 2008 under UN sponsorship and 94

112 CYPRUS 95 with the support of UNFICYP. In October, as they addressed issues related to the powers of the federal government, Christofias and Talat agreed to meet on a weekly basis to maintain the momentum of the process. As talks continued through the end of the year and grew more substantive addressing complex issues of power-sharing and property rights public opinion polls showed diminished optimism on both sides for the prospects of reunification. Nevertheless, with strong political commitments on both sides, prospects for a reunited Cyprus looked increasingly realistic.

113 4.6 Ethiopia and Eritrea Authorization and 31 July 2000 (UNSC Res. 1312) Start Date End Date 31 July 2008 Acting SRSG Azouz Ennifar (Tunisia) Force Commander Brigadier Patrick Davidson-Houston Budget UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) (United Kingdom) $100.4 million (1 July June 2009) Strength as of Troops: July 2008 Military Observers: 71 International Civilian Staff: 141 Local Civilian Staff: 196 UN Volunteers: 56 For detailed mission information see p. 296 In the face of continued obstruction from Eritrea and a failure to reach an amenable solution to the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in 2008 the Security Council unanimously decided to close the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) after eight years of operation. Tensions and recriminations between the two countries are still high, however, and the removal of UNMEE could increase the prospect of renewed conflict. Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war in 1998 over disputed border territory around the town of Badme. The Algiers Agreement of 2000 provided for the withdrawal and separation of forces by a temporary security zone (TSZ) along the Eritrean side of the border. UNMEE was mandated under Chapter VI of the UN Charter to monitor the withdrawal of troops from the TSZ, chair a joint military commission, and coordinate mine clearance. In 2003, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) clarified that its 2002 ruling that cedes Badme to Eritrea a decision that Eritrea sees as final, and one that Ethiopia regards as illegal and has refused to implement is final and binding on the parties. This was followed by an escalation of tensions along the TSZ that reduced the chances of an amicable settlement of the dispute. Since 2003, both Ethiopia and Eritrea have acted contrary to the Algiers Agreement by amassing and developing military elements in and adjacent to the TSZ. A steady and incremental curtailment of UNMEE s freedom to observe started in 2005, resulting in a serious gap in the mission s information on the current situation. These restrictions, while most glaringly associated with Eritrea s 2005 ban on UNMEE helicopter observation flights, also included restrictions on land patrols in both Ethiopian territory and the TSZ. Reflecting these limitations, between 2006 and 2007 the Security Council reduced UNMEE s authorized force strength. Originally authorized with 4,000 troops, by the end of 2007 UNMEE comprised 1,700 peacekeepers, including 230 military observers. In the last quarter of 2007, the EEBC convened the parties at The Hague for a last-ditch effort to demarcate the border, but no progress was made. Subsequent to this, the EEBC upheld its 2003 decision in favor of Eritrea and terminated its operation on 30 November 2007, leaving future deliberations regarding the border to Ethiopia and Eritrea. With the EEBC disbanded, in late 2007 Eritrea increased its hostility toward UNMEE, as the country saw the mission as an occupying force, since the border issue had been legally resolved, albeit unrecognized by Ethiopia. In a dramatic move, in December 2007, Eritrea cut 96

114 ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA 97 off all fuel deliveries and refused to allow the importation of fuel for UNMEE troops stationed on the Eritrean side of the TSZ. Despite requests from the UN, including the Security Council, fuel delivery was never resumed, thereby paralyzing UNMEE s operations. Consequently, daily patrols dropped from sixty to twenty, and during the first months of 2008 the safety of mission personnel became a growing concern. In the face of dwindling fuel reserves, UNMEE evacuated Eritrea on 15 February, temporarily relocating the military observers and associated civilian staff and equipment to Ethiopia. Given the lack of cooperation and UNMEE s reduced role in implementing the Algiers Agreement, the Security Council initiated discussion of UNMEE s eventual drawdown. On 30 July the Security Council voted unanimously to shut down the operation, and by 15 October the last UNMEE peacekeepers had left Ethiopia. As the year drew to a close, the conflict between the two countries remained far from resolved as they engaged in a proxy war in neighboring Somalia. With the interpositional force removed, international attention focused elsewhere in the region as both sides hardened their positions, increasing the prospects for renewed hostilities.

115 4.7 Georgia UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) Authorization and 24 August 1993 (UNSC Res. 858) Start Date SRSG Johan Verbeke (Belgium) Chief Military Observer Niaz Muhammad Khan Khattak (Pakistan) Senior Police Advisor Oleksiy Telychkin (Ukraine) Budget $34.1 million (1 July June 2009) Strength as of Military Observers: October 2008 Police: 18 International Civilian Staff: 102 Local Civilian Staff: 189 UN Volunteer: 1 For detailed mission information see p. 364 dramatically changed the face of peacekeeping in the southern Caucasus. Five days of fighting saw Georgia launch a military offensive on the contested enclave of South Ossetia; Russian forces responded robustly by pushing into and holding Georgian territory; conflict in Georgia s other secessionist region, Abkhazia; and widespread international concern. While the extant peace operations of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), United Nations, and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were overtaken by the dynamics of the conflict, a European Union brokered peace agreement made way for the deployment of a new EU monitoring mission. In the aftermath of the confrontation, Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states; only Nicaragua joined Russia in this move. Georgia declared the 1994 Moscow Agreement, which was the basis of the presence of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UN- OMIG) in Abkhazia, null and void. In addition, Georgia severed diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation, provided notification of its decision to terminate the peacekeeping operations of the CIS in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and withdrew from the CIS itself. The situation stabilized in the last months of the year as Russian forces pulled back and the EU s military observers deployed. Meanwhile, in December the OSCE ceased operating in the country when Russia objected to renewing the mission s mandate. At the start of 2009, Georgia s security remains fragile, and the future of international engagement in the country remains uncertain. The brief conflict between Georgia and Russia that followed the outbreak of hostilities in South Ossetia on 7 8 August 2008 has Background Georgia s internal conflicts date back to the Soviet period, and the subsequent breakup of 98

116 GEORGIA 99 the Soviet Union after the end of the Cold War. Violent conflict erupted in the region of South Ossetia in January 1991, after the Georgian government denied a request by Ossetian officials for autonomous status. The war continued until June 1992 and ended with the Agreement on the Principles for Peace Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict, between Georgia and Russia, which established both a cease-fire and the Joint Control Commission (JCC). This body, composed of representatives from Georgia, Russia, and North and South Ossetia, was to monitor the terms of the agreement, implement settlement measures, coordinate economic reconstruction, and facilitate the return of displaced persons. It was also tasked with coordinating the efforts of the CIS South Ossetia Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF), a peacekeeping battalion of 1,500 troops led by Russia. In December 1992, following the end of fighting in South Ossetia, the OSCE established a mission in Georgia to assist the government in conflict settlement, democratization, human rights protection, and establishment of rule of law. Since its initial deployment, the OSCE s mandate in Georgia has widened to include confidence building within the Ossetian crisis zone and providing assistance to UNOMIG as the latter oversees the peace process in Abkhazia. This situation remained stable for more than a decade, while the conflict itself was unresolved. In 2004, the newly elected Georgian president, Mikhail Saakashvili, made restoration of Georgian territorial integrity a priority for his administration. In the context of an antismuggling campaign, Saakashvili closed the Ergneti market outside Tskhinvali and ordered a significant number of Georgian troops to the region s border. This move spurred renewed violence and threatened to drive the conflict into war. While an August 2004 cease-fire agreement ended the direct military confrontation in South Ossetia in the short term, the conflict zone remained volatile. Meanwhile, shortly after Georgia gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Abkhazia, a region in the northwest of the country on the Black Sea coast, also sought its CIS Peacekeeping Force (CISPKF) in Abkhazia-Georgia Authorization Date 14 May 1994 Start Date 21 June 1994 Force Commander Major-General Sergey Chaban (Russia) Strength as of Troops: 2,542 August 2008 CIS South Ossetia Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) Authorization Date 24 June 1992 Start Date July 1992 Force Commander General Marat Kulakhmetov (Russia) Strength as of Troops: 1,519 August 2008 OSCE Mission to Georgia Authorization Date 6 November 1992 Start Date December 1992 Head of Mission Terhi Hakala (Finland) Budget $14.6 million (September 2007 October 2008) Strength as of Civilian Staff: September 2008 EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) Authorization Date 15 September 2008 Start Date 1 October 2008 Head of Mission Hansjörg Haber (Germany) Budget $35.0 million (September 2008 August 2009) Strength as of Monitors: December 2008 separation from Georgia. Fighting broke out in August 1992 after Georgian forces entered the Abkhaz capital, Sukhumi, and continued, despite

117 100 MISSION NOTES three cease-fires brokered by Russia, until September The United Nations became increasingly involved in diplomatic efforts to secure peace and in August 1993 established UNOMIG to verify compliance with a cease-fire reached the month before. In early 1994, the two sides negotiated a cease-fire and separation of forces agreement, known as the Moscow Agreement, which mandated the presence of a CIS Peacekeeping Force (CISPKF) in Abkhazia. The CISPKF was to promote the safe return of refugees, provide a security zone, and supervise implementation of the agreement. In July 1994, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 937, expanding UNOMIG s mandate to include monitoring of the CISPKF, the cease-fire agreement, and Georgian troop withdrawal from the Kodori Valley in northeastern Abkhazia. A peacemaking role for the UN Secretary- General and UNOMIG was reinforced from 1997 onward by the engagement of a Group of Friends for the Secretary-General for Georgia (France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). But negotiations to find a political settlement of the conflict and bring about the return of Georgian refugees to Abkhazia made little progress. From early 2006 onward, the situation of both breakaway republics became more deeply entwined with broader concerns rooted in deteriorating relations between Georgia and Russia, and the implications of both developments in Kosovo and Georgia s pursuit of membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The government of Georgia made it clear that it took very seriously the possibility that Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia might depend on the outcome of the debate over the future status of Kosovo. Russia, meanwhile, made its opposition to Georgia s moves toward membership in NATO equally plain. Key Developments The risks inherent in these rising tensions were evident by late 2007 when, concerned by the large number of allegations about military deployment and buildup on both sides of the Georgian- Abkhaz cease-fire line, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a public statement appealing to both sides to show restraint. As he did so, he supported the call by the UN Security Council (Resolution 1781) to all parties to consider and address seriously each other s legitimate security concerns, to refrain from any acts of violence and provocation, and to comply fully with previous agreements regarding cease-fires and the nonuse of violence. These warnings proved sadly prescient for 2008, a year in which escalating mistrust and the consequent deterioration of the internal situation took on an increasingly international dimension. Following Kosovo s declaration of independence and its recognition by several countries in early 2008, Russia took steps to strengthen its ties to both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On 6 March 2008, it broke with other CIS member states and lifted economic sanctions that had been in place since 1996, enraging Georgian authorities. Meanwhile, on 6 7 March, South Ossetia and Abkhazia themselves called for international recognition, citing the Kosovo precedent. Ties between Russia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia were further enhanced when, on 16 April 2008, outgoing president Vladimir Putin issued an instruction authorizing direct relations between government bodies in Russia and the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in a number of fields. The Georgian government protested strongly at what it considered a blatant violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Frustrated with the lack of progress on South Ossetia s status under the JCC negotiating structure, in early 2008 Georgia had suggested altering the format to include the EU, the OSCE, Russia, and both the Georgian and the South Ossetian governments as formal parties to the negotiations. Russia rejected the proposal, prompting Georgia s withdrawal from the JCC negotiations. In the successive months, the security situation deteriorated, with a series of clashes taking place between the Georgian army and separatist forces. Events in South Ossetia assumed a new pace and gravity in July 2008 with the shelling of the capital, Tskhinvali, by Georgian forces, following an attack on the Tbilisi-backed head

118 GEORGIA 101 of the South Ossetian administration (as opposed to the leader of the de facto authorities). Meanwhile, Russian fighter jets were reported to have flown over Georgian airspace in response to claims that Georgia was building up its military forces around South Ossetia in preparation for operations aimed at rescuing captured servicemen. In response, Georgia recalled its ambassador to Moscow for consultations, while the OSCE stepped up its mediation efforts by sending Special Envoy Heikki Talvitie to visit the region. The situation in Abkhazia followed a similarly difficult trajectory. The Georgian government introduced new proposals to resolve the conflict in late March 2008 and emphasized the need to change the negotiating format. Negotiations, however, remained suspended, as they had since 2006, as a consequence of the Abkhaz insistence on the withdrawal of Georgian forces introduced into the upper Kodori Valley in September 2006 and Georgia s refusal to sign an agreement on the nonresumption of hostilities. In an increasingly hostile environment accusations and counteraccusations proliferated. Georgia s claim that Russia shot down an unmanned aerial vehicle over Abkhazia was confirmed by a UN report. Meanwhile, UNOMIG reported that Georgia had on several occasions violated the cease-fire by flying fighter jets over the Abkhaz side of the zone of conflict. Incidents of overflight, reportedly by Georgian and Russian aircraft, continued throughout the year. Georgia and Russia responded to such incidents by mobilizing troops. Citing the possibility of an impending deterioration in the security situation, in late April 2008 Russia reinforced the CISPKF with 525 additional troops. A month later it also deployed a controversial military railway unit to rehabilitate Abkhazia s decrepit railway system. In an effort to assuage the military buildup and escalating rhetoric between Abkhaz and Georgian authorities, Germany, the coordinator of the Group of Friends, proposed a three-phased peace initiative in July, aimed at restoring confidence on both sides. With the peace process far off track, UNOMIG continued to monitor the situation, but the tense environment impeded its Members of EUMM speak with a Russian soldier as he dismantles a position in Nakreti, some 10km from the Gori checkpoint in Georgia, 6 October efforts on the political front. In late July and early August, tensions continued to rise. The mounting hostility reached a climax on 7 August 2008, when Georgian forces launched rocket attacks on South Ossetia, which independent military observers have deemed both unprovoked and indiscriminate. In response to Georgia s actions, and voicing its need to protect its peacekeepers and citizens in South Ossetia, Russia retaliated robustly, deploying ground troops, fighter jets, and tanks into the separatist territory, repulsing the Georgians and eventually expanding military operations deep into Georgia and along its territorial waters. The conflict quickly expanded beyond South Ossetia and the surrounding region as Russian forces pushed into Georgia s northwest from Abkhazia and Abkhaz forces moved quickly to regain control of the upper Kodori Valley. The fighting lasted a mere five days, but caused hundreds of casualties and the displacement, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), of 30,000 ethnic Ossetians and 85,000 ethnic Georgians, as well as the devastation of the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, and the destruction of several key Georgian military installations. VANO SHLAMOV/AFP/Getty Images

119 102 MISSION NOTES Negotiations initiated on 12 August 2008 by the French presidency of the European Union yielded a six-point cease-fire and peace agreement. Among other things, this called for the withdrawal of Russian and Georgian forces to their positions prior to the hostilities and the opening of international discussion on the modalities of security and stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the successive weeks, Russian forces began to withdraw from undisputed Georgian territory. Yet it was evident that there could be no return to the status quo ante. The CISPKF had effectively ceased to exist once the conflict began. After it ended, Russia s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, and a unanimous resolution by the Georgian parliament declaring Abkhazia and South Ossetia as territories occupied by the Russian Federation and the Russian peacekeepers, only underlined the depth of the transformation that had taken place. Changes in the other peacekeeping structures in Georgia were quickly initiated but will take some time to be completed. The OSCE added another 100 observers to its personnel already in place in Georgia. This reinforcement proved temporary, however, as the OSCE was forced to cease its operation at the end of the year when Russia s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia divided the organization and blocked the renewal of the mission s mandate. The European Union deployed the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) in September 2008 and began operations on 1 October. Its more than 200 monitors observe the stabilization process, centering on full compliance with the six-point agreement, the normalization process of civil governance, and the return of displaced persons, and contribute to reduce tensions through facilitating contacts between parties and undertaking other confidence-building measures. The mission established four field offices, in Poti, Zugdidi, Gori, and Tbilisi, and deployed patrols to the areas adjacent to Abkhazia and South Ossetia not within them. On 10 October the EU confirmed that Russian armed forces had completed their planned withdrawal from these areas to Abkhazia and Georgia. Meanwhile, by year s end the consequences for the United Nations in Georgia still remained unclear. During the August 2008 hostilities, its role was limited by the restriction of UNOMIG s mandate to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. In early September, elaborations on the six-point plan of 12 August reaffirmed that UNOMIG would continue to carry out its mandate at the same personnel levels and deployment pattern as had existed on 7 August, subject to possible future adjustments decided on by the Security Council. In the dramatically changed context within which UNOMIG found itself operating, the impact on its operations was not yet known. It was unclear, for example, which elements, if any, of the 1994 Moscow Agreement, which had formed the basis of its observation mandate, would be retained, or what arrangement would assume a role in the separation of forces between the two sides hitherto performed by the CISPKF. When the Security Council met in mid- October 2008, it was consequently unsurprising that it decided to extend UNOMIG s mandate for four months, pending greater clarity in the situation on the ground. Conclusion The dramatic events of August 2008 represented an extraordinary setback to peace operations in Georgia, but also had a geopolitical impact that struck far beyond the relatively small theater of Georgia s separatist conflicts. That the severity of the conflict, when it burst into the open, came as a surprise to many, is undeniable. But it also followed a long period of serious deterioration in relations between the parties involved, rooted in a growing skepticism regarding the possibilities of reaching negotiated settlements. By the end of 2008, with the dust still settling from the August hostilities, it was still too soon to identify a clear path forward. However, the prompt dispatch of the new European Union mission offers a clear demonstration of the importance attached to peace and security in a region whose potential for instability, as 2008 demonstrated, is unwise to underestimate.

120 4.8 Haiti Haiti experienced a difficult period in 2008 as the rise in the global prices of basic commodities imposed new levels of hardship on the country s struggling population and exposed the incapacity of its political institutions to provide an adequate response. In early April, a spate of violent demonstrations erupted in response to the rising cost of living in the preceding months. Although short in duration and quickly contained by military and police elements of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the demonstrations underlined the fragility of the political consensus supporting the government as well as the precarious nature of the country s social and economic circumstances. The development of events proved particularly disappointing given that the stability achieved through MINUSTAH s peacekeeping activities during 2006 and 2007 had provided hope that, after many difficult years, Haitian authorities, MINUSTAH, and the broader international community could turn their attention to long-term efforts to strengthen the state and its institutions. The political and economic difficulties were compounded by a series of devastating tropical storms in the latter part of the year that created new hardship for Haiti s long-suffering population and halted all reconstruction work. Taken as a whole, 2008 provided a sobering view of the magnitude of the challenges facing Haiti and its international partners as they maintain their efforts to secure and support the country s stability. UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) Authorization Date 30 April 2004 (UNSC Res. 1542) Start Date 1 June 2004 SRSG Hédi Annabi (Tunisia) Force Commander Major-General Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz (Brazil) Police Commissioner Mamadou Mountaga Diallo (Guinea) Budget $574.9 million (1 July June 2009) Strength as of Troops: 7, October 2008 Police: 2,019 International Civilian Staff: 490 Local Civilian Staff: 1,206 UN Volunteers: 205 For detailed mission information see p. 221 Background The military coup that ousted President Jean- Bertrand Aristide in 1991 threw Haiti into a cycle of civil conflict interspersed with violence that 103

121 104 MISSION NOTES The Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP), undertaken by the Organization of American States (OAS), continued to operate during 2008, but its previous successes showed signs of their fragility during the year. First deployed in 2004, MAPP is mandated to verify and monitor demobilization of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), a right-wing rebel group, as well as to provide support to communities who are victims of violence. Following a critical assessment of MAPP s performance by the OAS in late 2005, and growing criticism from Colombian nongovernmental organizations that MAPP lacked the resources to go beyond basic demobilization verification, the mission received enhanced funding, allowing it to grow from fortyfour civilian staff in 2005 to eighty-three by the end of The enhanced mission Colombia strength yielded a heightened MAPP presence and activity in the field. Since 2004, MAPP has assisted in disarming over 30,000 paramilitaries. Despite this progress, OAS Secretary-General José Miguel Insulza warned in 2008 that several underlying challenges regarding reintegration of demobilized rebels threatened MAPP s achievements as it entered the complex postdemobilization phase of its deployment. Indeed, during the year, MAPP observed the increasing phenomenon of paramilitary recycling the emergence of criminal groups composed of dismantled AUC forces. These illegal units are connected to drug-trafficking activities, which continue to have a negative impact on communities via murders and acts of intimidation. MAPP observed the presence of twenty-two of these groups in the country throughout Demobilized individuals find themselves disaffected from large portions of Colombia s society, and find it difficult to secure employment. Recognizing the necessity for heightened attention to reintegration of demobilized rebels, MAPP worked closely in 2008 with Colombia s Department for Reintegration. But one year since its inception, the department has yet to publish a policy on the reintegration process, an issue that MAPP officials see as cause for concern. From MAPP s perspective, Colombia s reintegration model needs to be adjusted from focusing solely on the individual, to involving communities as active subjects in the peacebuilding process. Bearing this in mind, it is clear that the more difficult task of completing the reintegration portion of the process will require the concentrated attention of MAPP and the Colombian government for some time to come. has elicited an extraordinary range of international intervention since. In 1993 the Security Council established the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to assist in modernizing the country s armed forces and establish a new police force. Its objectives were never realized, though, as its deployment was blocked by the ruling military junta. In July 1994 the Security Council authorized deployment of a 20,000- strong multinational force to ensure the return of Aristide and the legitimate Haitian authorities, and to promote a stable return to civilian rule. From 1994 to 2001, Haiti witnessed a succession of UN peacekeeping missions, including the UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), the UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), and the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH). Presidential and parliamentary elections in 2000 saw President Aristide and his Fanmi Lavalas party victorious after a turnout of only about 10 percent of voters. The opposition contested the results, and by late 2003 called for Aristide s resignation. In February 2004, armed conflict broke out, with insurgents quickly taking control of the northern part of the country, forcing Aristide to flee. The Security Council authorized deployment of US-led multinational interim force (MIF), tasked with supporting local police, facilitating humanitarian aid, and promoting the protection of human rights and rule of law. MINUSTAH, the seventh peace operation to be deployed since 1993, replaced the MIF in June 2004 and oversaw the establishment of a transitional government. MINUSTAH is mandated to maintain security, facilitate the creation of a stable government, disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate all armed groups, and assist in the reform of the police and judiciary. While the mission s mandated tasks are broad, for the first three years of its operation it was preoccupied with restoring security. A dramatic rise in violence during 2005 prompted the Security Council to adopt Resolution 1608, which approved an increase in MINUSTAH s

122 HAITI 105 military and police strength from 6,700 and 1,622 to 7,500 and 1,897 respectively. The Security Council simultaneously requested that the Secretary-General begin devising a drawdown plan for MINUSTAH that would follow planned elections and reflect the security situation on the ground. The enhanced MINUSTAH began launching operations against groups of gangs and bandits in the Cité Soleil slum of Port-au- Prince during These operations were successful in quelling violent incidents, but did not eradicate the core of the gangs. Meanwhile, MINUSTAH s traditional disarmament program proved inappropriate for the situation in Haiti and yielded slow progress, with large number of weapons remaining in circulation. MINUSTAH oversaw presidential elections in February 2006 that brought former prime minister and Aristide ally René Préval to office. The elections were followed by a brief lull in violence, but in the context of Haiti s widespread poverty, unemployment, and corruption, the security situation quickly deteriorated. By July 2006, steady gang violence in Port-au-Prince and surrounding neighborhoods worsened, with a bloody massacre occurring in the Martissant slum, where wanton murders and widespread kidnappings by armed gangs prevailed. With persistent instability threatening the gains from elections, MINUSTAH, alongside the growing Haitian National Police (HNP), responded to a request from President Préval to counter the gangs of the Port-au-Prince slums directly. The joint MINUSTAH-HNP operations conducted between December 2006 and July 2007 in Cité Soleil and Martissant succeeded in removing the gang leadership and their members and replacing them with MINUSTAH and local authorities, resulting in a dramatic drop in violence. In view of the improved security situation, in the second half of 2007 President Préval requested a reorientation of MINUSTAH s heavy focus on security matters, asking that the mission dedicate more attention to building Haiti s fragile and underresourced state institutions and providing border control support. The Jordanian members of MINUSTAH carry children through floodwaters after being rescued from an orphanage destroyed by a hurricane, Port au Prince, Haiti, 7 September Secretary-General endorsed this request in his August 2007 report on MINUSTAH and recommended that the Security Council maintain MINUSTAH s initial mandate, but approve the reorientation of the mission commensurate to the improved security situation, altering the mission s troop and police components. On 15 October 2007, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1780, authorizing MINUSTAH s reorientation; its military presence was to be redeployed from calm rural and urban local areas to more vulnerable border posts and maritime areas, its police component was to be increased by 140 officers, with an eye toward increased joint patrols and training for the HNP. Resolution 1780 also requested the Secretary-General, in coordination with the Haitian government, to begin devising a consolidation plan with appropriate benchmarks to track Haiti s progress, with the ultimate goal of MINUSTAH s eventual withdrawal. In early 2008, the Secretary-General laid out five benchmarks: resolution of political differences through nonviolent means and completion of the elections; extension of state authority; establishment of reliable security structures; development of (UN Photo/Marco Dormino)

123 106 MISSION NOTES credible judicial and penal institutions; and improvement in socioeconomic conditions. Key Developments Hopes that the relative stability achieved in 2007 represented a turning a point in Haiti s recovery process were cast into doubt early in In February, Haiti s impoverished population initiated a series of antigovernment protests calling for relief to counter the rising costs of food and fuel. The Haitian government claimed it had no means to alleviate the pressure, a response that resulted in a vote of no confidence within the Haitian parliament on 28 February 2008 on the already divided government, led by Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard Alexis. The Alexis government survived the no confidence vote, but the period that followed was marked by a steady escalation of protests throughout the country, highlighting deep discontent among the population. The demonstrations climaxed in early April when protesters turned violent and attacked government and MINUSTAH installations and looted private property. With the HNP incapable of containing the escalating violence, MINUSTAH moved in to quell the riots. The violence claimed the lives of several civilians, including one UN peacekeeper, and culminated in an attempt to overrun the national palace. In the wake of the riots, a second vote of no confidence ousted the Alexis government on 12 April It was only at this point that President Préval announced a subsidy program for the rising costs of food and fuel as well as measures to revive national agricultural production. The level and scale of the demonstrations had suggested to many observers that they had been manipulated for political purposes and other ends. They triggered a political crisis that left Haiti without a government until the end of July, when Preval s third nominee for prime minister, Michèle Duvivier Pierre-Louis, was finally approved by the Senate. Even then, Pierre-Louis s appointment was further delayed by competition for powerful positions in the new government. Pierre-Louis was finally able to take up the office of prime minister in early September. While the formation of a new government that has prioritized putting Haiti back on track was a welcome development, the country suffered huge setbacks during the months of turmoil. Beyond the food riots, the security situation in Haiti remained relatively calm throughout An increase in kidnappings in the first half of the year, motivated by the possibility of ransom, led to increased MINUSTAH-HNP joint policing operations and MINUSTAH support to the antikidnapping cell of the HNP. The net effect of these measures was a decline in kidnappings. Similarly, in an effort to address a rise in crime and banditry in urban areas, MINUSTAH alongside HNP launched Operation Blue Shield in and around Port-au-Prince in mid-december. Reflecting the force reorganization approved by the Security Council in Resolution 1780, MINUSTAH remained focused on maintaining the integrity of Haiti s borders by deploying its maritime police component to key ports and increasing its aerial border surveillance through the use of additional aircraft. Haiti s political turmoil paralyzed the government and obstructed MINUSTAH s activities for much of the year. With no central authority in place, government business ground to a halt, stalling the passing of new legislation, civil service reform, and the drafting of key bills such as budgets. A donor conference scheduled to launch Haiti s poverty reduction strategy paper in late April was first delayed and then canceled. Once the new government took its place, it worked with the legislative branch and MINUSTAH to pass emergency legislation and adopt a supplementary budget during October. Unsurprisingly, the development of Haiti s security sector, which is a central element of MI- NUSTAH s mandate, suffered during Of the 14,000 vetted and trained HNP officers projected to be active by 2011, 8,546 were operational by November The number of serving HNP officers would have been significantly higher had the training of 700 additional recruits not been delayed due to the political crisis.

124 HAITI 107 The reform of Haiti s judicial system, however, registered some progress through MINUSTAH s provision of technical advice and support to a three-year justice reform plan agreed to in It was anticipated that the judiciary s Superior Council a body foreseen as playing an important role in the administration and regulation of the justice system would be operational by the end of Meanwhile, on 7 July 2008, the School for Magistrates reopened, for the first time since 2004, to begin training courses for justices of the peace. As the year drew to a close, Haiti s capacity to arrest and prosecute criminals on an independent basis remained low, and the country s security matters remained largely in the hands of MINUSTAH. Conclusion At the close of 2008, efforts to revamp Haitian national institutions and ensure long-term sustainable development had suffered significant setbacks. The events of the year proved detrimental to Haiti s stabilization. Meeting the benchmarks laid out by the Secretary-General for the eventual withdrawal of MINUSTAH appeared increasingly remote, and consequently the mission was extended at its current strength, for another year in October. Haiti s difficulties were further amplified in September 2008 when the island was devastated by four tropical storms that caused an estimated $1 billion in damage. The storms struck at the height of the harvest season, wiping out onethird of Haiti s crucial rice crop and destroying seeds needed for the coming year s planting. The subsequent flooding and mudslides left scores dead and many more homeless, outstripping MINUSTAH s resources. While steps were taken to deal with the immediate aftermath of the floods, including the development of a recovery framework by the UN, the EU, and the World Bank, with the Haitian government leading the process, delivery of aid was slow and it was feared that the storms would aggravate an already dire food crisis. In November, the World Bank approved a $20 million grant to Haiti to finance its reconstruction of key infrastructure, while the United States provided more than $30 million in stormrelated relief. But these efforts were seen by some observers as inadequate considering the magnitude of the damage and in comparison to responses to similar natural disasters in the past. Reversing the trends evident throughout the period under review will require continued and coordinated international engagement for years to come.

125 4.9 Iraq Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I) Authorization Date 16 October 2003(UNSC Res. 1511), 8 June 2004 (UNSC Res. 1546) Start Date November 2003 Force Commander General Raymond Odierno Strength as of Troops: 147, September 2008 Authorization Date 8 June 2004 (UNSC Res. 1546), 30 July 2004 (Establishment of NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq [NTM-I]), 16 December 2004 (modified into fullfledged training mission) Start Date August 2004 Force Commander Lieutenant-General Frank G. Helmick Budget NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) Strength as of Troops: September 2008 (United States) $27.2 million (September 2007 October 2008) By the end of 2008, violence in Iraq had reached its lowest levels since the arrival of US-led coalition forces in 2003, making room for progress in further development of organic Iraqi security structures and concerted dialogue regarding the withdrawal of foreign forces. By December, civilian casualties had dropped to below 500 per month, down from the height of over 3,000 per month in 2006, and overall attacks on civilians and military had dropped by 80 percent. While the stabilization of Iraqi security is a significant achievement considering the violent and chaotic four years that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein s regime, it is not certain that these advances are permanent. The fundamental nature of the conflict has gone unchanged, as stark divisions along sectarian lines continue to impede political progress on issues crucial to national cohesion. Starting in May 2003, Iraq was governed by the Coalition Provisional Authority, led by the United States under its obligations as an occupying power. Iraqi sovereignty was restored with the creation of an interim government on 28 June The Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I), which succeeded the coalition forces, is deployed at the request of the Iraqi government and authorized by Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004). Apart from the United States, which supplies the bulk of the MNF-I s 147,000 troops, leading contributors as of late 2008 included the United Kingdom and Romania. MNF-I s mandate is subject to ongoing Iraqi consent. Its mission is to contribute to security in the country, including through combat operations against forces hostile to the transition and by training and equipping Iraqi security forces. Along similar lines, since August 2004, NATO s Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) has, at the government s request, provided training and logistical support to the developing Iraqi Security Forces. NTM-I s support targets midto senior-level military staff, with an eye toward building a professional military leadership. The UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) was established in Following an August 2003 bomb attack on its headquarters that killed Special Representative Sergio Vieira de Mello and twenty-one staff members, the remaining staff relocated to Amman, Jordan, 108

126 IRAQ 109 until 2004, when it returned to the Baghdad headquarters to resume its mandated task of giving support to Iraq in establishing new governing structures. During 2007, the Security Council enhanced UNAMI s mandate to involve greater political efforts toward advising and assisting political facilitation, and the promotion of regional cooperation between Iraq and the countries of the region. Elections in 2005 led to the inauguration of Nouri al-maliki as prime minister, and it was hoped that consensus around an agenda for national reconciliation would follow soon thereafter. However, such hopes were dashed with the deterioration of the political and security situations. In the face of a dire security situation in early 2007, President George W. Bush announced a change in MNF-I s approach in Iraq. Otherwise known as the surge, the plan enlarged US commitments by approximately 40,000 troops, which brought the total number of US forces to a height of over 170,000, allowing for increases in counterinsurgency operations and an overall heightened presence in and around Baghdad. The dramatic decrease in violence during 2008 was partially attributable to the surge, but this result was also a function of the convergence of several other positive developments during the year. Most important was the halting of military operations by Moktada al-sadr, leader of the powerful Mahdi army, which had controlled large swaths of Baghdad and the surrounding areas and impeded the extension of government authority. The continued development of the Iraqi security forces also gave a tremendous boost to the surge operations. Newly trained forces were able to shoulder significant counterinsurgency and security responsibilities, extending the authority of the Iraqi government. By the end of the year, MNF-I support to the Iraqi security forces had resulted in the training and operational readiness of over 560,000 troops and police, but their ability to contain a resurgence of violence without the backstopping of MNF-I forces remained uncertain. Finally, the growing dissatisfaction with Authorization and 14 August 2003 (UNSC Res. 1500); Start Date expanded 8 June 2004 (UNSC Res. 1546); expanded 10 August 2007 (UNSC Res. 1770) SRSG Budget UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) Staffan de Mistura (Sweden) $302.1 million (1 January December 2009) Strength as of Troops: October 2008 Military Observers: 7 International Civilian Staff: 290 Local Civilian Staff: 378 For detailed mission information see p. 248 insurgent operations among minority Sunni elements steered them to join MNF-I forces in the battle against Al-Qaeda related militants through the establishment of local militias known as Awakening Councils. By August 2008, all of the additional surge forces had been withdrawn. The stabilization of the security environment was not matched by progress in political reconciliation, however. UNAMI continued to support the development of Iraqi governing structures throughout the year, but these efforts proved difficult, as exemplified in the process of passing provincial election legislation, which was fraught with difficulties over ethnic representation of the Sunni, Shi a, and Kurdish groups. The law was approved in September, but provincial elections scheduled for October were delayed until January 2009 while questions of political reconciliation still lingered. Meanwhile, the development of Iraq s rule of law institutions moved at a slow pace due to a lack of local capacity and frequent intimidation and assassination of judges. By the end of the year, progress made in Iraq led to negotiations regarding timelines for the withdrawal of MNF-I forces. A US proposal for MNF-I forces to remain in operation under a diminished, over-the-horizon capacity until 2011 was met with considerable opposition from Iraqi

127 110 MISSION NOTES authorities, who saw the proposal as providing an open invitation for long-term occupation. While the UN mandate authorizing the MNF-I s presence was to expire at the end of 2008, concerns remained over Iraq s ability to sustain the security gains registered since In mid-november the Iraqi cabinet and its US counterparts signed an agreement that ensured the withdrawal of US troops in three years. The agreement was then approved by the Iraqi parliament and presidency council in early December, thus defining Iraqi and US engagement and the role of US forces until The agreement was met with a mild uptick in violence throughout the country, a development that underscored the fragility of the security gains made and the magnitude of political reconciliation still to be achieved.

128 4.10 Liberia Five years into its postconflict transition, Liberia continues to make progress toward sustained recovery. The government of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf is pursuing a comprehensive reform agenda that seeks to build strong systems of governance while simultaneously revitalizing the country s traditional sources of economic growth: rubber, timber, and mining. Efforts are hampered, however, by the lack of basic infrastructure most roads and all power plants were destroyed during the fourteen-year civil war as well as persistent patterns of corruption and mismanagement. During 2008, the overall situation in the country remained stable. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) continued to provide security throughout the country, although demonstrations and violent disturbances, including mobrelated violence, were widespread. In most cases, UNMIL had to respond to restore calm. In September 2008, the UN Security Council extended UNMIL s mandate for a period of twelve months and authorized the Secretary-General to continue the drawdown that began in October The Council further endorsed the Secretary-General s recommendation to increase the number of UNMIL police officers in response to shortcomings in the Liberian National Police (LNP). Background Fourteen years of brutal war in Liberia ended in August 2003 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra, Ghana. The war killed an estimated 270,000 people, displaced one-third of the population, and left the country in ruins physically, institutionally, and economically. The costs of the war were felt throughout the region, most notably in neighboring Sierra Leone. The Economic Community of West African Countries (ECOWAS) brokered the 2003 peace talks and was subsequently authorized by the Security Council to establish a vanguard multinational force, the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). This mission paved the way for the deployment in October 2003 of UNMIL. UNMIL has a multidimensional mandate that authorizes it to provide security while assisting in laying the foundations for lasting peace. UNMIL is mandated to support the implementation of the cease-fire agreement; develop and implement a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program; protect UN personnel as well as civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; facilitate humanitarian assistance; support security sector reform, in particular police reform; assist in the reestablishment of national authority throughout the country; and assist in national elections, which were held in To accommodate this multidimensional mandate, UNMIL was established as an integrated mission, seeking to bring in all the activities of the UN under the common leadership of the Secretary-General s Special Representative (SRSG). In January 2008, Ellen Margrethe Løj replaced Alan Doss as SRSG, the only female to hold this title during Key Developments Security Situation Liberia is experiencing its longest stretch of stability since the outbreak of war in December Significant progress has been achieved toward consolidating the economy and ensuring a sustained recovery. During 2008, the government succeeded in securing debt relief from the 111

129 112 MISSION NOTES UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) Authorization and 19 September 2003 (UNSC Res. 1509) Start Date SRSG Ellen Margrethe Løj (Denmark) Force Commander Lieutenant-General A. T. M. Zahirol Alam (Bangladesh) Acting Police Henrik Stiernblad (Sweden) Commissioner Budget $603.8 million (1 July June 2009) Strength as of Troops: 11, October 2008 Military Observers: 210 Police: 1,074 International Civilian Staff: 471 Local Civilian Staff: 968 UN Volunteers: 231 For detailed mission information see p. 313 International Monetary Fund and in finalizing its first national poverty reduction strategy, which won substantial donor support at the June 2008 Liberia Poverty Reduction Forum in Berlin, Germany. However, a joint security assessment conducted by the government of Liberia, UNMIL, and the UN Country Team in May 2008 confirmed that the situation in Liberia remains fragile. The main threats to peace and stability are related to the maintenance of law and order, insufficient progress in reintegration of ex-combatants, and the high level of youth unemployment. Violent criminal activities, especially armed robbery and rape, are on the rise, while the police and justice system continue to lack the capacity to respond. As a result, public confidence in the rule of law is lacking and mob justice has become an increasingly common occurrence across the country. Insecurity, and with it the potential for instability, is also related to the competition over natural resources. Rubber plantations and surrounding communities were theaters for frequent violent clashes between illegal tappers and plantation security units throughout The high unemployment rate is driving young men into illegal exploitation of natural resources, whose appeal has only been enhanced by their increased value on the international market. While efforts by the UN and the government of Liberia have made progress in bringing the diamond sector under control, gold mining remains largely unregulated, and the number of ex-combatants engaged in related activities is reportedly growing. In general, ex-combatant groups, which have often maintained command structures established during the war, operate in remote and inaccessible areas, and pose a threat not only to security in Liberia but also to neighboring countries. UNMIL Drawdown A gradual, three-phase drawdown of UNMIL began in 2007, and is scheduled for completion in The first phase of the drawdown took place in 2008, which saw the repatriation of 2,450 troops. In August, the Secretary-General recommended that the second phase (October 2008 September 2009) should involve the repatriation of 1,460 military personnel, while he envisioned that the third phase (October 2009 December 2010) would entail a further reduction of 2,100 troops. This would bring UNMIL to a strength of 8,131 troops by the end of 2010 almost half its original size, yet still among the larger UN peace operations. During his visit to Liberia in May 2008, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon explicitly linked his drawdown recommendations with the Liberian government s ability to take complete control of its national security. In the face of continued lack of law enforcement capacity by the government, the Secretary-General recommended the deployment of two additional formed police units to supplement the reduction in the mission s military strength. In September 2008, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNMIL through September 2009 and authorized the Secretary-General to proceed with the planned reduction of the operation s personnel, including the recommended increase in the mission s police strength. The Secretary-General was further requested to report to the Security Council by 15 February 2009 on progress in the core benchmarks for the

130 LIBERIA HIV-AIDS and United Nations Peacekeeping In 2007 and 2008, Sopiato Likimani was commissioned by the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum to examine the medical and public health implications of HIV and AIDS in peacekeeping. In addition to reviewing medical records at UN headquarters in New York, Likimani selected three missions for detailed investigation: the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), and the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). These three missions comprise over 40,000 peacekeepers, nearly half of the UN s peacekeeping deployment. Likimani s review of medical records revealed that data were not recorded uniformly across the missions. Additionally, while chief medical officers send monthly reports to the Department of Medical Services at UN headquarters, some repatriation and mortality information for those affected with HIV and AIDS had to be updated during the assessment, indicating that information is not always sent to headquarters in a routine and timely manner. Field reports indicate that counseling is rare among troop-contributing countries that have mandatory HIV testing policies. Additionally, while guidelines established by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) exclude clinical AIDS cases from deployment one limitation is that the clinical case definition for AIDS has a sensitivity of 50 percent, meaning that half of hospitalized HIV-positive patients do not fulfill clinical AIDS-case definition. Between 2003 and 2005, HIV-related repatriations and deaths in UNMIL were quite high, at forty-three and nineteen respectively, with the majority of cases coming from two troop-contributing countries that did not have predeployment HIV testing policies. When these two countries introduced mandatory predeployment testing in 2006, HIV-related repatriations and deaths decreased significantly, leading the principal investigator to conclude that HIV problems experienced in peacekeeping missions can often be related to the deployment of undiagnosed immune deficient HIV-positive personnel. The risk of peacekeepers acquiring HIV infection through sexual relations depends on their behavior while deployed, including number of partners, HIV status, and consistency of condom use. While it is difficult to determine cases of HIV transmission during deployment, knowledge, aptitude, and practices surveys of two missions (UNMIL in 2005, MINUSTAH in 2007) show that 18 percent of respondents in UNMIL and 6.5 percent of respondents in MINUSTAH reported having sexual relations while deployed. Additionally, 21 percent of those who had sex while deployed in UNMIL reported not always using a condom, which placed them at risk of contracting HIV and other sexually transmitted infections. Likimani s recommendations included standardizing repatriation and mortality medical records and establishing a centralized medical database at DPKO headquarters; analyzing medical reports to evaluate the burden of HIV repatriations and deaths on DPKO, with administrative debiting of troop-contributing countries to improve compliance with predeployment medical regulations; moving toward universal HIV testing, with counseling; targeting civilian staff for fuller participation in existing mission HIV-awareness programs and advocacy to ensure that condoms are seen as an essential public health prevention tool and not a license for sexual abuse and exploitation. Source: Sopiato Likimani, Medical and Public Health Implications of HIV and AIDS in Peacekeeping: Field Evaluation and Analysis (New York: Social Science Research Council, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, February 2008). drawdown and to recommend any further adjustments needed. Security Sector Reform Liberia remains far from having a coherent and viable security infrastructure. The postwar security sector is characterized by a number of agencies performing overlapping functions in the face of a deep-seated lack of confidence on the part of the public. In spring 2008, the government presented a national security sector strategy that provides a first attempt at a coherent vision for broad security sector reform. The bulk of the strategy aims to enhance ongoing efforts to rebuild the army and reform the police. In addition, the strategy provides a plan for the rationalization of the security sector, including the disbandment of several agencies. As a key provider of assistance to police reform, UNMIL plays a major role in the ongoing security reform efforts. By far the largest international role, however, is played by the United States, which is leading the restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The US government has pledged $210 million to the task and has contracted two US private security

131 114 MISSION NOTES companies (DynCorp and Pacific Architects Engineers) to create an effective, 2,000-strong Liberian army and to reestablish three military bases by the end of Progress has been slow, however. Basic training for the last batch of 500 recruits and 29 officers began in June By 15 August 2008, 1,631 recruits had completed basic training, with 45 recruits commissioned as officers. Effective operational capacity of the army is lagging. Shortcomings are particularly acute in establishing an effective command structure. Progress in police reform has been somewhat faster, owing in part to the fact that attempts were not made to rebuild the police from scratch. UNMIL focused on vetting the existing force and providing basic training to 3,500 police officers, including new recruits. These goals were reached in 2007, with 90 percent of the reformed police force deployed countywide by the end of But serious concerns have been raised that too much attention is being paid to meeting quantitative measures (number of police officers trained) rather than promoting qualitative changes in police performance. Operations are hampered by a lack of basic infrastructure and police equipment, and continued problems of discipline and misconduct indicate systemic weaknesses in command and control. In December 2007, a new program to train 500 police officers for a specialized anticrime and riot control unit (emergency response unit) was established. In contrast to the ordinary police force, this unit will be armed. Training, equipment, and construction of facilities will primarily be provided by the United States. But as of August 2008, funding gaps and late arrival of equipment, including weapons and uniforms, were causing delays in the implementation of this program. Meanwhile, the establishment of civilian management and oversight, especially legislative oversight, has yet to be achieved and requires urgent attention. While the national security sector strategy promises to create civilian oversight mechanisms, it does not provide details of how this will be done. Governance and the Rule of Law Issues of poor governance were at the heart of the Liberian crisis. The present government has consequently invested considerable effort in building transparent, inclusive, and accountable governance systems. Progress is being made. According to the World Bank s governance indicators, Liberia has shown the largest improvement of any country in the world in controlling corruption, moving up 72 places in the world rankings (from 185th to 113th) in two years. The government s anticorruption efforts are supported by the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), which entails the deployment of internationally recruited financial controllers with cosignature authority to key state institutions. While initially seen as controversial due to its intrusive character, GEMAP now seems more widely accepted in Liberia. A midterm evaluation of the program was undertaken in June 2008 and talks are ongoing with regard to its future. Emphasis is likely to shift toward building national capacity to take over from the international controllers. In her annual message to the national legislature, the president acknowledged that, despite improvements, corruption in Liberia is alive and well, and that the country has fallen short of achieving its governance and rule of law goals. In particular, the justice system suffers from chronic capacity constraints. UNMIL is mandated to assist the government of Liberia in developing a strategy for consolidating a national legal framework, including judicial institutions, and is conscious that ideally the administration of justice should be strengthened as an extension of the security sector. The UN Secretary-General, however, is seriously concerned over the limited progress being made on rule of law. The lack of a coherent strategic plan for the justice sector constrains coordination and impedes enhanced donor support. To facilitate participatory and inclusive governance, Liberia has mandated the Governance Commission to make recommendations for constitutional reform, including a comprehensive

132 LIBERIA 115 decentralization policy. The commission is also working on land reform an area considered crucial for sustainable peacebuilding in Liberia. During 2008, land disputes frequently led to violence that claimed several lives. On 8 January 2008, public hearings began at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Monrovia. But by the end of 2008, few key people have appeared before the commission, and it remains uncertain whether the commission can succeed in fulfilling its mandate of creating a clear picture of the past and facilitating genuine healing and reconciliation. Meanwhile, the relationship between the legislative and executive branches showed consistent signs of improvement in After some initial delays, important bills, including the Liberian Anticorruption Commission Act and the Defense Act, were passed in August. Corruption trials against leading politicians, including the former chairman of the transitional government and the former speaker of the House of Representatives, have continued. Conclusion Liberia has come a long way since its war ended in Public and international confidence in the government has grown and the prospects for continued recovery and stabilization appear promising. Yet many of the dynamics that fueled the conflict are still present; the country remains caught in a fragile situation, and even small setbacks could erode the gains that have been registered. UNMIL s presence and continued international assistance are preconditions not only for maintaining security but also for providing space for the reform and recovery so vital to Liberia s stability. Developments in 2008 underlined that the peacebuilding challenges in Liberia go far beyond security. Serious efforts by the government and its international partners will need to be maintained to ensure that the peace dividend is translated into tangible improvements, including employment opportunities that may help ensure the youth of Liberia a better future.

133 4.11 Mindanao International Monitoring Team (IMT) Authorization Date 22 June 2001 Start Date October 2004 Head of Mission Dato Pahlawan Amzah bin Sulaiman (Malaysia) Strength as of Military Observers: September 2008 A draft agreement concluded between the government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in July 2008 on the creation of a Muslim homeland fostered hope that an end to three decades of conflict on the island of Mindanao might be within reach. However, the prospects for longterm peace were dashed when the agreement was rejected by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. As a new round of fighting escalated, both sides recognized that the 2003 cease-fire agreement was no longer in effect, leaving the International Monitoring Team (IMT) without a mandated role. The 1996 peace agreement signed by the secular-nationalist Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Philippine government established the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), but the agreement failed to address the demands of the radical MILF branch of the MNLF, whose aim is for an independent Muslim state. After several failed attempts at negotiations, the parties resumed peace talks, brokered by Malaysia on behalf of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in In mid-2004, the MILF agreed to cooperate with the government s armed forces against Jemaah Islamiah, a network connected to Al-Qaeda, as well as against other terrorist elements, while the government dropped its criminal charges against MILF personnel over alleged bombings in In September 2004, the parties agreed to the creation of the IMT to oversee the cease-fire and act as a neutral investigator of violations. The IMT s observers wear official military uniforms, bear no weapons, and are escorted by government or MILF security forces. The monitors are paid by their respective governments and come mainly from Brunei and Malaysia. Since the IMT s initial deployment, its mandate has been extended annually at the request of the MILF and the government. After talks broke down during 2006, both the MILF and the Philippine government expressed their willingness to resume negotiations regarding the issue of limited autonomy for Mindanao, though the resumption of negotiations was postponed several times throughout 2007 in the face of escalating violence. However, preparations continued behind the scenes. Talks resumed from March to July 2008, concluding in the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain, which acknowledged the Muslims of Mindanao, the Bangsamoro, as a first nation and laid the groundwork for the establishment of a homeland for them, a key MILF demand. The signing of the memorandum had been scheduled for 5 August 2008, but under pressure from local officials who maintained that they had not been consulted, and facing widespread opposition from the largely Roman Catholic Philippine population, the Supreme Court of the Philippines issued a temporary restraining order preventing its signing. This injunction led to intense fighting between MILF and government forces that, by mid-october, resulted in the displacement of 116

134 MINDANAO 117 nearly 400,000 Filipinos. On 14 October, the Supreme Court ruled that that the memorandum was unconstitutional, a major blow to what was left of the peace process. While the IMT threatened to withdraw, its mandate was extended for three months, until 30 November 2008, following the Supreme Court s injunction in August and the subsequent spike in violence. Operationally constrained by the violent developments of the year, and with only a formal request from the Philippine government for IMT to remain, the mission withdrew its remaining observers at the end of the year, promising to return if and when the parties re-engage in the cease-fire agreement.

135 4.12 Moldova-Transdniestria Joint Control Commission (JCC) Peacekeeping Force Authorization and 21 July 1992 Start Date Head of Mission Colonel Anatoly Zverev (Russia) Strength as of Troops: 1, September 2008 Military Observers: 10 While the year 2008 started with signs of progress in the sixteen-year conflict between Moldova and Transdniestria, the brief war between Russia and Georgia during August presented a serious challenge to this momentum. Geographically isolated within Moldova by the Dnestr River, and historically and linguistically tied to Ukraine and Russia, Transdniestria declared its independence from Moldova in September 1990 in response to fears that the latter would merge with Romania upon the collapse of the Soviet Union. A full-scale conflict ensued between Dniestrian militias and the Moldovan government that lasted until a ceasefire was reached in July 1992 with Russian oversight. The Moscow-Chisinau peace agreement mandated a cease-fire, Russian recognition of Moldova s territorial integrity, and provisions for Dniestrian independence should Moldova join Romania. The agreement also established a 140-mile security zone along the Dnestr River, to be patrolled by a joint peacekeeping force composed of Russian, Transdniestrian, and Moldovan units. Operations of the joint peacekeeping force have been overseen by the Joint Control Commission (JCC), consisting of representatives from Russia, Moldova, Transdniestria, Ukraine, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Since September 2005, the JCC has also included representatives from the United States as well as EU observers. In addition to monitoring the activities of the peacekeeping force, the JCC is responsible for overseeing the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, and for undertaking confidence-building measures. An EU border assistance mission, in place since December 2005, is mandated to monitor the Transdniestrian section of the common border with Ukraine and Moldova. The first meeting of the new JCC arrangement was halted when Transdniestria suspended its participation in the negotiations in March 2006 in response to more stringent customs regulations imposed by Ukraine and Moldova. At the request of Transdniestria, Russia sent additional troops to the region. As of September 2008, the peacekeeping contingents in and around the separatist territory numbered 1,278, where they served as peacekeepers as well as guardians of 20,000 tons of ammunition. The last quarter of 2007 saw a relative easing of tensions in the conflict. In October, the Transdniestrian parliament abolished a series of import duties on Moldovan goods, along with a border transit fee for Moldovan citizens. Shortly thereafter, Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin developed two proposals, one that would unify the Moldovan and Transdniestrian militaries, and another that would fully demilitarize Moldova on both sides of the Dnestr River. A consensus on either proposal, however, failed to be reached. The defining event of 2008 came in April, when President Voronin met the leader of the breakaway Transdniestrian region for the first 118

136 MOLDOVA-TRANSDNIESTRIA 119 time in seven years. Seeking to build on the momentum from the summit, the EU declared in May that it was ready to do absolutely everything to support the conflict resolution process with Transdniestria. Progress continued in July as representatives from the JCC met for only the second time since negotiations broke down in February However, the conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 over South Ossetia slowed progress significantly, with Transdniestria threatening to break off relations with Chisinau unless the latter denounced Georgia s actions in the conflict, and the Russian government issuing a warning against any attempts by Moldova to take back Transdniestria by force. In contrast to Georgia s breakaway territories, Russian attitudes toward a settlement for Transdniestria remained positive, with President Dimitry Medvedev optimistic that there were good chances for reaching a solution.

137 4.13 Nepal UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) Authorization and 23 January 2007 (UNSC Res. 1740) Start Date SRSG Ian Martin (United Kingdom) Budget $62.1 million (1 January December 2009) Strength as of Military Observers: October 2008 International Civilian Staff: 106 Local Civilian Staff: 158 UN Volunteers: 33 For detailed mission information see p. 323 During 2008, Nepal elected a Constituent Assembly, declared the country a federal democratic republic, and formed a coalition government remarkable achievements for a country that saw the end of hostilities just two years earlier. For the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), these developments had a transformative effect. While the mission had been due to complete its mandated tasks in July 2008, Nepal requested that UNMIN stay on until early 2009 in a diminished capacity. However, by late 2008, with the transition from the temporary arrangements for monitoring the arms and armies still outstanding in particular some 19,000 Maoist combatants still in cantonments it seemed likely that UNMIN would be again be extended in early UNMIN was established in early 2007 to assist in the implementation of specific elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended the decade-long conflict between the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) and the Nepali state in Conceived as a special political mission of limited duration, UNMIN was mandated to monitor the parties management of arms and armed personnel, provide technical support for the election of a Constituent Assembly, and assist in monitoring nonmilitary aspects of cease-fire arrangements. Initially slated for June 2007, elections for Nepal s Constituent Assembly were postponed twice, but eventually took place on 10 April Throughout 2007 and the early months of 2008, UNMIN s electoral assistance office provided support to Nepal s electoral commission, establishing a presence at the commission s Kathmandu headquarters as well as at its regional resource centers. In May 2008, once the elections were complete, UNMIN s electoral staff were withdrawn from the districts and regions, and its electoral assistance office was closed. To the surprise of many observers, the Maoists emerged as the strongest party in the Constituent Assembly, with 240 out of 601 seats. After a protracted period of political wrangling, Ram Baran Yadav of the Nepal Congress Party was installed as the country s first president in July, and Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the Maoist leader more commonly known as Prachanda, became prime minister in August. The new government identified three priorities: completing the peace process, ensuring the drafting of the constitution, and achieving rapid economic progress. UNMIN continued to monitor the management of military equipment and personnel throughout the year, but with a reduction of arms monitors from 155 to 85 (out of an authorized strength of 90). As part of its downsizing plan, the arms-monitoring office reorganized its deployment to maintain continuity of 120

138 NEPAL 121 operations despite its decreased personnel strength. It also continued to chair the Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee, a mechanism within which senior members of the Nepal and Maoist armies convene to address violations of the agreement and resolve disputes. Notably effective since its initiation, by September 2008 the committee had held eighty-five meetings. Uncertainty regarding UNMIN s departure stemmed from delays in the integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist army combatants, which was supposed to have been completed within six months of the formation of the new government. By late 2008, however, it seemed evident that this goal would not be met and that there would thus be a need for UNMIN s continued presence. A request for UNMIN to extend its presence in Nepal was submitted to the UN in mid-december India and Pakistan UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) Authorization Date 21 April 1948 (UNSC Res. 47) Start Date 1 January 1949 Chief Military Officer Major-General Kim Moon Hwa (Republic of Korea) Budget $8.1 million (1 January December 2008) Strength as of 31 October 2008 Military Observers: 44 International Civilian Staff: 23 Local Civilian Staff: 46 For detailed mission information see p. 348 In 2008, the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) monitored an increasingly tense situation along the contested Jammu-Kashmir border. During September, on the margins of the meetings of the UN General Assembly, the parties agreed to a new round of peace talks before the end of the year; and in October, cross-border trade resumed, breaking a sixty-year hiatus. But, despite these promising developments, the terrorist attacks in India s financial capital, Mumbai, in Novermber served to undermine India- Pakistan relations. UNMOGIP observes the cease-fire established by the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949, despite India s official position that UNMOGIP has had no operational role to play since the signing of the 1972 Simla Agreement, which established the line of control separating the two armies. The mission continues to monitor the 1972 line of control, which has been only slightly revised since the 1949 Karachi Agreement. Following tensions in 2003 that raised the prospect of nuclear confrontation, political relations took a positive turn in January 2004, when an agreement was reached to commence a bilateral composite dialogue on an agreed range of issues, including those related to Jammu-Kashmir. Numerous confidence-building measures were initiated, and a minisummit was held in April 2005 to discuss the fate of Jammu- Kashmir. At talks in December 2006, Pakistan s former president Pervez Musharraf put forward a four-point plan involving demilitarization by both sides of the line of control, self-government, and joint control over the disputed areas in Kashmir. India responded cautiously to the terms of the plan, with talks continuing through Political upheaval in Pakistan in late 2007 led to the postponement of the scheduled talks. However, the two sides agreed to resume meeting in May Increased Islamic rebel violence and violent anti-india demonstrations were the cause of much concern throughout the year, leading India s foreign minister to declare in July that the peace talks were under duress. The surge in violence led to a dramatic violation of the cease-fire the first in five years that saw the two armies engage in a fierce gun battle. Each side blamed the other for the provocation, and in August, India accused Pakistan of complicity in the bombing of its embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. Recriminations between the two countries were followed by violent demonstrations in the contested area, with India deploying fighter jets in response to what it saw as increased Pakistani support for Islamic militants. India-Pakistan tensions peaked in late November and early December following the terrorist attacks on Mumbai, which were attributed to Lashkar-e-Taiba, a militant group based in the Pakistani-controlled region of Kashmir. At the end of the year, India had taken a more confrontational stance toward the Pakistani government, raising questions as to the prospects of resolving the decades-old conflict over Kashmir.

139 4.14 Solomon Islands Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) Authorization Date 23 October 2000 (Pacific Islands Forum Communiqué) Start Date July 2003 Head of Mission Budget Tim George (Australia) $179.5 million (October 2007 September 2008) Strength as of Troops: September 2008 Civilian Police: 306 Civilian Staff: 161 The year 2008 marked thirty years of Solomon Island independence and the fifth year of operation for the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Following several years of tense relations between RAMSI and the government, improved relations during the year allowed for significant progress in establishing more efficient governing and security structures. In 2003, after consultation with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), RAMSI was established at the request of then prime minister Sir Alan Kemakeza, in tandem with the Facilitation of International Assistance Act, passed by parliament in 2003 to help restore law and order to the island after five years of conflict between Malatian and Guale ethnic groups. During the conflict, both factions used government positions and resources to support their causes, with devastating impact on the country s infrastructure. Invoking their military and police components known as the Combined Task Force, and the Participating Police Force, RAMSI deployed on 24 July 2003 and was able to secure the surrender of both parties, collect weapons, arrest and charge perpetrators, and remove rogue elements from the Solomon Island Police Force. In addition to assisting in the initial security stabilization phase, RAMSI was mandated to assist in the development of the Solomon Islands in three key areas: law and justice, economic governance, and the development of the government. After reinstituting law and order, the Participating Police Force set out to train the Solomon Island Police Force, while the civilian component of RAMSI embedded representatives in the Solomon Island government to work on capacity building. While Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, beginning in 2006, adopted an anti- RAMSI stance due to its predominantly Australian composition, riots during April 2006 in Honiara, the capital, highlighted the need for continued support. After several failed attempts, the opposition succeeded in passing a vote of no confidence on Sogavare in December The election of Prime Minister Derek Sikua shortly after brought about a new phase of cooperation between the government and RAMSI. In February 2008, the Solomon Island government, RAMSI, and the PIF convened the third round of consultations on Solomon Island RAMSI cooperation, known as the Enhanced Consultative Mechanism. Based on a 2007 PIF- RAMSI task force report, the parties agreed to the creation of the Forum of Ministerial Standing Committee (FMSC) to foster communication and coordination among themselves. The FMSC comprises the foreign ministers of the past, present, and future chairs of the Pacific Islands Forum, plus representatives from the Solomon Islands and Australia, and is supported at 122

140 SOLOMON ISLANDS 123 the official level by the Enhanced Consultative Mechanism and a triumvirate composed of the RAMSI Special Coordinator, the Solomon Island Special Envoy, and the PIF representative to the Solomon Islands. The inaugural meeting of the FMSC decided that RAMSI should report directly to the Solomon Islands government and should shift its priority from collective security to nation building. As part of RAMSI s continued engagement, in July 2008 it announced support for a ten-year Australian-funded public service improvement program to support development of the civil service sector and effective public institutions. Australia pledged an additional 140 soldiers for a four-month deployment in order to assist the Participating Police Force with street patrols. In May 2008, Prime Minister Sikua stated that he saw a need for RAMSI over the next decade. If the prevaling good relations between the government and the mission are maintained, the prospects for the Solomon Islands consolidating its hard-won peace in the coming year are high.

141 4.15 Somalia AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Authorization Date 6 December 2006 (UNSC Res. 1725) Start Date March 2007 Force Commander General Francis Okello (Uganda) Strength as of Troops: 2, September 2008 The year 2008 saw the continued deployment of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and deliberations over a UN force, all set against a backdrop of rising violence. The country remained volatile as a violent insurgency against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its Ethiopian backers intensified and widened. That elements of the insurgency within the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS) are backed by Eritrea while Ethiopia backs the TFG demonstrates the extent to which the conflict in Somalia is part of the wider regional conflict dynamics. AMISOM peacekeepers have struggled to operate in this environment and have been subjected to direct attacks by insurgents. Debate about a transition from AMISOM to a UN peace operation stalled as violence escalated in Mogadishu and its surrounding areas. Efforts to engage the various opposition groups and the TFG in political negotiations floundered despite a political agreement between the TFG and one faction of the ARS in June in Djibouti. The radical elements of the ARS insisted on the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops as a precondition for talks with the TFG, even as infighting among the TFG led to a further polarization of the country. The situation was further complicated by the continued efforts of the United States to hunt for Al-Qaeda operatives in the region, often through air strikes, with Somalia becoming a central locus of the war on terror in the Horn of Africa. Background In October 2004, the president of Somalia s new Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI), Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, appealed to the international community for a multinational peacekeeping force of up to 20,000 troops to restore security in Somalia and enable the TFI s return from exile to Mogadishu. The request was eventually supported by the African Union in early 2005 and then by the UN Security Council. The 124

142 SOMALIA 125 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) agreed to take the lead in establishing a peace support mission, which was approved by the African Union in February However, efforts to deploy the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) were abandoned in the face of objections to the inclusion of troops from neighboring countries in the mission. In December 2006, the UN Security Council amended its arms embargo on Somalia, removing a major legal obstacle to any deployment. With the deployment of IGASOM not feasible, the AU s Peace and Security Council authorized instead the deployment of the AU Mission in Somalia. The AU council stressed the need to involve the United Nations from the start, since it viewed a transition to a UN-led operation as its exit strategy, and viewed the expertise and resources of the United Nations as critical to the long-term stabilization and postconflict reconstruction of Somalia. Deployed in January 2007, AMISOM was mandated to support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia by providing protection for the TFI and key security infrastructures in carrying out their government functions; assisting in implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan, in particular the effective reestablishment and training of all-inclusive Somali security forces; and contributing to the creation of security conditions necessary for humanitarian assistance. By the end of 2008, despite initial interest by several African states to contribute troops, AMISOM s strength stood at 2,650, composed of one Burundian and two Ugandan battalions. Key Developments In addition to slow force generation, AMISOM was faced with a daunting set of challenges and a deteriorating security situation. The challenges included financial and logistics shortfalls, inadequate and unreliable communication equipment and hostile propaganda, as well as direct attacks on its troops. AMISOM s lack of progress in securing additional troops was attributable both to the AU s inability to guarantee financial and logistic support for new troop contributors and to the shifting and uncertain security environment within which it was operating. Despite the deteriorating security situation, the mission continued to provide security to the TFG and strategic locations such as the national airport and the seaport, thereby ensuring the continued flow of much needed humanitarian assistance. In May 2008, AMISOM convened a workshop in Nairobi, Kenya, involving key stakeholders, representatives of the TFG, the two troopcontributing countries, and the UN and other bilateral actors, to explore ways of enhancing strategic partnership among them. The meeting reiterated the importance of a viable political process for the success of AMISOM and as such called on the AU and other international actors to mainstream Somalia in their plans. In the meantime, the AU asked the UN to provide support to ensure the full deployment of AMISOM. In agreeing to consider the request, the Secretary- General outlined two principles that would underpin such support: first, that UN assistance would be geared toward strengthening the AU s capacities to adequately manage AMISOM, and second, that troops deployed under AMISOM met UN standards to ensure a smooth transition if and when that was approved. In the interim, the AU signed a memorandum of understanding with the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) for the establishment of AMISOM s headquarters in the capital, Mogadishu. Some members of the Security Council, most notably the United States and South Africa, pushed for a transition from AMISOM to a UN force. But the Secretary-General, the UN s Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and other members of the Security Council, including the United Kingdom, remained cautious about authorizing such a deployment in the absence of a viable peace agreement and an actual peace to keep. At the political level, international efforts led by the UN succeeded in forging a peace deal between the TFG and the Asmara-based ARS. On 19 August 2008, the TFG and the ARS concluded a peace and reconciliation agreement in Djibouti that provided for the cessation of armed hostilities for an initial period of 90 days within

143 126 MISSION NOTES 30 days of the agreement; submission of a request to the UN to authorize and deploy an international stabilization force within 120 days; the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia after the deployment of a sufficient number of UN forces; the disassociation of the ARS from any armed groups or individuals that did not adhere to the terms of the agreement; the commitment of parties to ensure unhindered access and assistance to affected populations; and the establishment of a joint security committee to follow up on implementation of agreed security arrangements, and a high-level committee to address challenges related to political, justice, and reconciliation issues. But the period that followed the agreement was marked by the fragmentation of the main signatories to the agreement, the ARS and the TFG. The ARS split into two factions: the socalled moderates, who signed the Djibouti Agreement, and the more hard-line elements based in Asmara, who were not party to the agreement. Meanwhile, the TFG was also shaken by rifts between President Yusuf and Prime Minister Nur Adde Hussien. The differences between the two leaders widened after the prime minister fired Mogadishu s mayor for alleged mismanagement of public funds. The president and the prime minister failed to agree on a new message of political reconciliation, manifested in the prime minister s willingness to engage with Islamists, who had been labeled as terrorists by President Yusuf. This tension peaked dramatically in December 2008, when President Yusuf sacked Prime Minister Nur and replaced him with a new nominee. Yusuf s move was met with considerable Somali and international resistance eventually leading to the resignation of Yusuf himself at the close of the year, demonstrating the tremendous political challenges ahead. With deepening rifts on both sides, implementation of the Djibouti Agreement appeared remote, removing the glimmer of hope for Somalia that it had promised. On the contrary, as the fissures among and between the ARS and the TFG deepened, the security situation deteriorated. Critics of the agreement maintain that it was flawed from the start because it was concluded without the participation of all parties to the conflict. The Al-Shabaab militia, who are driving the insurgency and the more hard-line elements of the ARS, were not represented in Djibouti. Moreover, it is argued that the timelines set for the implementation of the agreement were unrealistic. In the meantime, the TFG failed to establish a government of national unity that would promote reconciliation. Instead, the government consists of a small number of clans and does not proportionally represent the Hawiye, the dominant clan in Mogadishu. The TFG s refusal to negotiate with the Union of Islamic Courts is viewed in some quarters as a manifestation of its desire to monopolize power. Thus, politically, the TFG has been unable to gain internal cohesion and popular legitimacy. Security Unsurprisingly, security continued to deteriorate in Somalia throughout 2008, especially in Mogadishu and the surrounding areas. Gun battles among TFG soldiers, their Ethiopian backers, and the insurgents resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians, as mortars often landed in crowded public places, most notably the Baraka market. The growing toll of civilian deaths blamed on Ethiopian troops increased public opposition to their presence and drove more people to support the insurgency. While the source of some of the mortars that killed many civilians was often contested, this nonetheless proved to be a potent weapon for the insurgents in their propaganda campaign against Ethiopian troops. It also served as a convenient recruitment tool for the insurgency. The security situation in Somalia was further exacerbated by the return to the scene of warlords who took advantage of the TFG s weakness. The wrestling for strategic assets by warlords added to the misery of civilians caught in the fighting. The continued proliferation of arms to Somalia undermined any efforts to disarm armed individuals and groups. Initial attempts by the TFG to disarm militias in Mogadishu were resisted, since they did not include the Darod militias, which constitute the bulk of the TFG forces. The move was resisted by other clans, most notably the Hawiye.

144 SOMALIA 127 Humanitarian Civilians endured the brunt of the suffering, with internally displaced persons reaching an estimated 1.1 million. The surge in fighting during the last quarter of 2008 led to the forced exodus of approximately 12,000 civilians from Mogadishu per week. An estimated 60 percent of the population of Mogadishu had already fled the capital due to the spike in violence, while many of those remaining did not have the means to leave and continued to toil in abject poverty. The untenable security situation was compounded by droughts, flooding, and the global food crisis, with the number of people in need of food aid rising to 3.25 million, 43 percent of the country s total population. To make matters worse, humanitarian access was significantly reduced as aid workers found it difficult to reach those in need of assistance. As of mid- November, forty aid workers had been killed, with a total of 111 security incidents reported, in 2008 alone. With a virtually nonexistent state security apparatus and hyperinflation causing up to a 1,000 percent increase in food prices, the targeting of aid deliveries, which serve as a source of spoils and power, became a common occurrence. The continued attacks on humanitarian workers severely strained international aid efforts and forced some agencies to suspend operations in parts of the country, leaving hundreds of thousands of civilians stranded without any form of external support. In October, fifty-two nongovernmental organizations released a statement on the humanitarian crisis, stating that the international community had failed the people of Somalia and calling on all parties to the conflict to allow unhindered access for humanitarian workers. During 2008 the most visible of these attacks, increased piracy off the coast of Somalia, became a matter of global concern. The menacing activities of pirates, including the hijacking of a vessel loaded with tanks and other weaponry in September, undermined the safety of maritime transport in and around the strategic Gulf of Aden. Meanwhile, pirates also targeted humanitarian cargo, forcing aid agencies to scale back their operations. The rise in piracy prompted a A Burundian peacekeeper from AMISOM distributes food to the internally displaced in Mogadishu, Somalia, 20 June number of initiatives, including the deployment of warships by Canada, Malaysia, the United States, China, India, and Russia, as well as NATO s authorization for its Operation Allied Provider, whereby member states provide naval escorts to humanitarian ships in the troubled waters. Similarly, the EU authorized its own operation for Somalia s coastline, EU NAVFOR Somalia. At the UN, the Security Council adopted a resolution in December that allows willing member states to pursue pirates on Somali territory, provided they first gain the consent of the TFG. Conclusion As 2008 drew a close, Somalia remained mired in conflict with little hope of an end in sight. The TFG remained weak and divided, having failed to inspire national reconciliation. The presence of Ethiopian troops continued to generate resistance, thereby both feeding the insurgency and perpetuating the proxy conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which continued its support of the ARS. In the face of these challenges, AMISOM remained deployed, struggling to attract more troop contributors, even as it confronted acute difficulties in sustaining those troops it did have REUTERS/Feisal Omar

145 128 MISSION NOTES on the ground and faced increasing hostility toward its presence. In mid-november, then President Yusuf admitted for the first time that the insurgents control most parts of the country. Meanwhile, in December, Ethiopia began withdrawing its forces, as the UN continued to resist calls for the deployment of blue berets.

146 4.16 Timor-Leste On the morning of 11 February 2008, rebels loyal to the fugitive Alfredo Reinado staged attacks on both the president and the prime minister of Timor-Leste. While President José Ramos-Horta was critically wounded, the attacks were repulsed, and Reinado was killed in ambiguous circumstances. Confronted with these developments, Timor s government and security institutions demonstrated a level of resilience and initiative that was in contrast to the events of two years earlier, when a crisis in the security sector precipitated an outbreak of violence that imperiled the young state and led to the formation of a new and complex peacekeeping operation, the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). What followed was a year of relative stability in Timor-Leste, albeit one in which the government found itself torn between addressing challenges entrenched in the country s difficult past, and preparing for a future in which the promise of rising petroleum revenues offers hope, but also an ever-present set of concerns related to institutional capacity and budget execution. While the security situation after the attacks remained calm, local politics were at times marked by tension between the ruling coalition and the former ruling party, now in opposition. The coalition government showed determination in the course of the year as it worked to push forward the development of its core institutions and achieve demonstrable results. However, problems within the security sector, persistently high levels of youth unemployment, and the impact of the global food crisis all represented significant threats to the country s social, political, and economic stability. Like the events of February, they highlighted the fragile nature of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) Authorization and 25 August 2006 (UNSC Res. 1704) Start Date SRSG Atul Khare (India) Chief Military Colonel Graeme Roger Williams Liaison Officer (New Zealand) Police Commissioner Juan Carlos Arévalo Linares (El Salvador) Budget $173.4 million (1 July June 2009) Strength as of Military Observers: October 2008 Police: 1,556 International Civilian Staff: 343 Local Civilian Staff: 879 UN Volunteers: 129 For detailed mission information see p

147 130 MISSION NOTES International Security Forces (ISF) Authorization and 25 May 2006 Start Date Force Commander Brigadier Mark Holmes (Australia) Budget $145.6 million (October 2007 September 2008) Strength as of Troops: September 2008 country s development and the likely necessity of an international presence and assistance for some time to come. Background Timor-Leste s declaration of independence from Portugal in 1975 was followed by its invasion and annexation by Indonesia. In August 1999, an overwhelming majority of the Timorese people opted for independence over autonomy in a referendum supervised by the UN. Pro-Indonesian militias backed by the government and military launched a campaign of violence soon after, leading to the deaths of approximately 2,000 Timorese and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more. The violence that followed the referendum elicited the emergency deployment of an Australian-led stabilization force, which made way for the UN to establish the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Charged with the daunting task of building a state from the ground up, UNTAET administered Timor- Leste until it assumed its independence in In the process, the mission oversaw the election of resistance hero José Alexandre Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão as the country s first president, and a parliamentary government led by the Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente (FRETILIN). UNTAET s successor, the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), was authorized to provide interim law enforcement and public security and continued to assist in the development of the East Timor Police Service (later called the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste [PNTL]). In 2001, a new Timorese defense force, the F-FDTL (comprising the Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste [FALINTIL] and the Forças de Defesa de Timor- Leste [FDTL]), was created with bilateral support, but a significant number of fighters were demobilized and not incorporated within it. In 2005, UNMISET was replaced by the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), a considerably smaller mission designed to assist in the transition from peacekeeping to coordinated development assistance. With member states unwilling to support it financially, UNOTIL was scheduled to close in May The crisis that erupted in April and May 2006 led to a rapid reassessment of Timor- Leste s security and assistance needs. With its origins in the dismissal of a number of disgruntled F-FDTL soldiers ( petitioners ), the escalating hostility exposed the centrality of bitter divisions within and between Timor-Leste s defense and police forces as well as profound failings in the international efforts to develop and nurture the new state institutions. Thirtyseven people died in the violence, many houses were destroyed, and 150,000 Timorese 15 percent of the population were displaced from their homes. In mid-may 2006, the Timorese authorities requested international assistance. The Australian Defense Forces, with support from the New Zealand Defense Forces, arrived in Dili on 26 May, helping to calm the situation. A multidimensional assessment team led by a Special Envoy of the Secretary-General recommended a return to a larger UN peacekeeping operation focused on security and judicial sector reform. Security Council Resolution 1704 established the UN Integrated Mission in Timor Leste in August UNMIT s broad mandate is rooted in the provision of support to the government and related institutions in their efforts to consolidate stability, bring about national reconciliation, and foster social cohesion. In addition to supporting the elections in 2007, its current mandate includes ensuring the restoration and

148 TIMOR-LESTE 131 maintenance of public security through support to the PNTL; assisting the government in conducting a review of the security sector; justice sector development; relocation of displaced persons; good offices; and a coordinating role in executing the compact through which Timorese national development plans, the UN, and bilateral donors are to be dovetailed in the provision of humanitarian assistance and the promotion of sustainable development. UNMIT, alongside 1,000 Australian and New Zealand troops operating in the International Security Forces (ISF), brought a measure of security to the country. In May 2007, it oversaw presidential elections won by José Ramos- Horta, who defeated the FRETILIN candidate. Although it remained the largest party in terms of seats, FRETILIN was unable to persuade enough other parties to join it in a coalition, and in August 2007 an alliance of parties led by former president now prime minister Gusmão established a new government. During 2007, UNMIT and the government were faced by a multitude of complex issues rooted in social, economic, and governance problems: high unemployment, rapid population growth, inadequate infrastructure, a weak public sector with limited service capacity, and fragile state institutions. Above all, rivalries and dysfunction within and between the PNTL and the F-FDTL and estranged elements from the latter most notably the armed group led by the former major Alfredo Reinado, who had deserted the F-FDTL in May 2006 remained a serious threat to Timor-Leste s efforts to move away from the 2006 crisis. Key Developments Security Situation In August 2007, President Ramos-Horta initiated discussions with Alfredo Reinado and his renegade troops in an attempt to negotiate his surrender. These negotiations culminated in the fateful encounter of 11 February 2008, in which Reinado was shot dead by the president s bodyguards. The incident led to a flurry of finger-pointing between the F-FDTL, the PNTL, and UN police as to whose failure had led to the attacks. In the meantime, the government declared a state of siege in which the military took control of security operations, while Australia bolstered the ISF force with an extra company of troops as well as seventy extra police. In response to the emergency, on 17 February, the Timorese Council of Ministers approved a resolution mandating the commander of F- FDTL to create a Joint Command integrating members of the F-FDTL and the PNTL for security operations; however, this was done without the prior consultation of the UN. The Joint Command was credited with the apprehension of Reinado supporters associated with the February attacks. It was subsequently disbanded in June 2008 after the state of siege expired and the security situation stabilized. The cooperation of the PNTL and the F-FDTL proved that their coordination is possible even in a politically sensitive engagement. However, the legality and the need for the Joint Command has been questioned and highlights the need for a clear definition of their respective roles in a future national security policy. Although apparently successful as an ad hoc mechanism, the Joint Command also exposed the problems in the professional standards of both the F-FDTL and the PNTL. These were manifest in instances of human rights violations that the Joint Command appeared either unable or unwilling to address, as well as failures to heed command, including activities that continued without legal basis after the end of the state of siege. Coordination between UNMIT and the Joint Command whose PNTL officers fell outside UNMIT s direct supervision or responsibility generally functioned well, although there were some notable exceptions. The death of Reinado contributed significantly to the possibility of addressing two significant issues the F-FDTL petitioners and the internally displaced persons outstanding as consequences of the 2006 crisis. In its aftermath, a trickle of petitioners arriving at a camp in Dili in response to a government invitation to dialogue swelled to a flood of 709 by the end

149 132 MISSION NOTES REUTERS/Lirio Da Fonseca Timor-Leste s President José Ramos-Horta presents medallions to UNMIT police officers for their service to the country, Dili, Timor-Leste, 18 April of May On 4 June, the government offered financial compensation to those former F-FDTL personnel who turned themselves over to a civilian life. Meanwhile, returns of internally displaced persons also accelerated considerably; between May and September, for example, the International Organization for Migration helped the government facilitate the return and reintegration of almost 6,000 families living in camps within and around Dili. Security Sector Reform The performance of the Joint Command illustrates the need for the holistic approach to the development of Timor s security sector that had been evident in the wake of the 2006 crisis. However, political sensitivities surrounding the security forces remained high. Thus, while UNMIT has devoted extensive effort and resources to assistance to the PNTL, it was only after the establishment of Timor s new government in August 2007 that it began to try to assist the government in the security sector review process with which it was also mandated. Timor-Leste made progress in addressing security sector reform at an institutional level during In May, the government adopted the Law of Information Systems, which defined the frameworks for Timor s intelligence sector and gave the National Information Service authority over the intelligence branches of both the military and the police. The Council of Ministers also approved a legislative decree defining the roles and responsibilities of Timor s Ministry of Defense and Security. In the following month, the government and UNMIT s Deputy Special Representative, in his capacity as Resident Representative of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), agreed on a project document that outlined UN support of a comprehensive evaluation of the security sector. In the meantime, UNMIT is also providing support to a government-led process to develop a national security policy. UNMIT s progress in helping reestablish the PNTL, following its near collapse after the 2006 crisis, has been encouraging, if not straightforward. In March 2008, an expert mission led by the UN Police Advisor visited Timor-Leste to conduct an assessment of the requirements of the national police as well as possible adjustments needed to UNMIT police skill sets. It found that the PNTL as an institution was still understaffed, lacked political support, and in many instances continued to be resistant to UNMIT supervision. The PNTL suffered from insufficient funding, unclear command structures, and a subsequent lack of accountability. As a result of these findings, the UN s Standing Police Capacity, with support from the International Center for Transitional Justice, was deployed for eight weeks to help implement the expert mission s recommendations. The secretary of state for security was subsequently able to devise a strategy and timetable for the resumption of policing by the PNTL. This began in August 2008 and is to be completed during the first half of In the meantime, by June, provisional certification of PNTL officers had ended and over 3,000 officers were deemed fit to proceed in the mentoring and training process leading up to full certification. A separate set of challenges for the PNTL, as for any emergent police force, relate to the difficulty of building legitimacy in the face of

150 TIMOR-LESTE 133 persistent deficiencies within the justice sector. With ongoing assistance by UNMIT and other international partners, some progress was made in ensuring that an increasing number of Timorese judicial personnel worked as judges, prosecutors, and public defenders, and that their presence in the districts increased. However, between July 2007 and July 2008, the backlog of cases for prosecution in Dili alone increased from 2,413 to an estimated 4,700. Meanwhile, many of the population turned to traditional dispute resolution mechanisms outside the legal framework. Political and Other Developments Beyond the security sector, the February emergency also served to highlight a level of dialogue and reconciliation among the erstwhile-divided Timor government and FRETILIN. The High Level Coordination Committee the most prominent of a number of dialogue and coordination mechanisms established by the government and UNMIT met several times at the height of the crisis to consult on national responses to the attack. That these meetings included the leadership of FRETILIN demonstrates a growing commitment to dialogue on the part of the Timorese political elite. Nevertheless, while the overall response to the events of February was positive, and the long-term prospects for Timor-Leste are boosted by its rapidly growing petroleum revenue, the challenges the country is still facing are considerable. Its institutions remain fragile and the state as a whole is vulnerable to further unrest as a consequence of a number of factors, including the combination of soaring food prices and high unemployment and continued tensions over veterans issues. UNMIT and the UN Country Team continued to support the development of Timor s governance and civil service institutions in 2008 the year of administrative reform, as the prime minister announced in May. In addition to the organization of a national workshop, this support took the form of policy advice to the government as it developed frameworks to establish a civil service commission, reformulate the office of the inspector general, and establish an anticorruption agency. UNMIT also began assisting in the development of a better-functioning radio broadcast system, expanding the capacity of the national broadcast agency capacity to reach 80 percent of the territory, while training journalists, producers, and technicians. Issues surrounding reconciliation and accountability remain complex and contentious. Accountability received a blow when, in April, Ramos-Horta issued a presidential decree by which 94 out of Timor s 179 prisoners received a pardon or partial commutation of their sentence. Also pardoned was Indonesian militia leader Joni Marquez, who had been convicted in 2001 of crimes against humanity, including torture and murder, committed before and after the 1999 referendum, and had been sentenced to thirty-three years in prison. Among those receiving commutations of their sentence was former interior minister Rogerio Lobato, who had been found guilty of crimes committed in the context of the 2006 crisis. On 15 July 2008, the Commission of Truth and Friendship formally presented its final report. While concerns remained that the commission had prioritized relations between Indonesia and Timor-Leste over truth and justice, the report did find that Indonesia bore by far the greater responsibility for the gross human rights violations that occurred, and no amnesties were recommended. It also put on the official record the direct links between the proautonomy militia and the Indonesian military. During September 2008, the national parliament drafted resolutions to implement the recommendations from both an earlier report of the Commission for Truth, Reception, and Reconciliation and the July 2008 report of the Commission of Truth and Friendship. This was a notable development, given that the parliament had delayed discussion of the more comprehensive earlier report for more than two years. Conclusion The attacks of February 2008 constituted one of the gravest challenges to Timor-Leste in its short

151 134 MISSION NOTES life as a nation. The measured actions taken by the government, with the support of UNMIT, helped ensure stability, and resolved some issues outstanding from the 2006 crisis. While progress has been made in the reestablishment of the PNTL, persistent concerns about the resilience of the police force and more generally about the security institutions continue to illustrate the importance of a holistic approach to security in Timor-Leste as the basis for lasting peace and stability in the country and an eventual drawdown of the UN mission.

152 4.17 Western Sahara The situation in Western Sahara, the longestrunning territorial dispute in Africa, showed little sign of improvement during Although representatives of the parties met in March for a fourth round of talks, no progress was made in addressing the substantive differences that divide them. In August 2008, the contract of the Secretary-General s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara was not renewed, a replacement was not named until early 2009, leaving a five month gap and raising questions regarding the future direction of the political process. Meanwhile, the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) remained deployed in the field, monitoring and observing the cease-fire, defusing tensions as they arose and encouraging confidence-building measures between the parties. MINURSO was established in 1991 to verify the cease-fire between the government of Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-hamra y de Río de Oro (POLISARIO) and to organize and conduct a referendum that would allow the people of Western Sahara to decide the future status of the territory. This had been reintegrated by Morocco in 1976, but was claimed by POLIS- ARIO on the basis of the right to self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. It had originally been envisaged that the referendum would take place in January However, despite a series of efforts first to promote agreement on the terms of the referendum and then to seek a political settlement, the UN s primary achievement in the intervening period since 1991 has been to preserve the status quo. In 2003, the Secretary-General Personal Envoy at the time, former US secretary of state James Baker, presented a peace plan that allowed UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Authorization and 29 April 1991 (UNSC Res. 690) Start Date SRSG Julian Harston (United Kingdom) Force Commander Major-General Zhao Jingmin (China) Budget $48.4 million (1 July June 2009) Strength as of Troops: October 2008 Military Observers: 194 Police: 6 International Civilian Staff: 99 Local Civilian Staff: 153 UN Volunteers: 19 For detailed mission information see p. 214 for some elements of governance-sharing, while providing for a referendum that would include the option of independence. POLISARIO accepted the plan in Morocco, however, rejected it the following year on the grounds that it could not agree to any plan that might lead to an independent Western Sahara. Baker resigned shortly afterward. In recognition of this political deadlock, which was accentuated by the Security Council s insistence on a consensual solution, Baker s successor as Personal Envoy, Dutch diplomat Peter van Walsum, pursued direct and unconditional negotiations. Four rounds of talks were held in 2007 and 2008 with the encouragement of Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon. The talks were attended by representatives of both parties, as well as van Walsum, and representatives of neighboring countries Algeria and Mauritania were present at the opening and closing sessions. During the March 2008 talks held, as previously, in Manhasset, New York the parties considered a 135

153 136 MISSION NOTES number of proposals to expand confidencebuilding measures and agreed to explore the establishment of family visits by land, in addition to the existing program by air. However, little progress was made in narrowing the gulf between an autonomy proposal put forward by Morocco and POLISARIO s adherence to a referendum including the option for independence. That van Walsum told the Security Council that an independent Western Sahara was not a realistic proposition in a situation in which Morocco had control of the territory and the Security Council was unwilling to put pressure upon it, led to his criticism by POLISARIO and its followers. In late August 2008, van Walsum s contract expired, and in early January 2009, the Secretary-General appointed Christopher Ross as his new Personal Envoy for Western Sahara. In April 2008, the Security Council renewed MINURSO s mandate for the thirty-sixth time. In contrast to the difficulties encountered at the political level, the overall situation in MINURSO s area of responsibility remained generally calm during the year. Violations of military movements along the cease-fire decreased, and both parties continued to cooperate with MINURSO in the marking and disposal of mines, unexploded ordinance, and expired ammunition. Meanwhile, confidence-building measure led by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), including family visits and free telephone service between the refugee camps in Tindouf and the territory, also continued without interruption. The establishment of family visits by land, as discussed during the March talks, offered the possibility to significantly increase the number of beneficiaries. These positive developments, however, cannot counter discontent at the lack of progress at the political level on both sides of the cease-fire line.

154 5 Global Statistics on UN Missions 137

155 The data in this chapter covers all UN missions in the period running from 1 July 2007 to the third quarter of While a number of exceptions are noted, the coverage reflects the UN s 2007/2008 budgetary year (which concluded on 30 June 2008) in addition to information available on later months. In almost all cases, the data presented here is aggregated from the mission-by-mission figures presented in Chapter 7. Where other sources have been used, they are indicated in the footnotes. 5.1 Total UN Troops: July 2007 October ,000 77,000 Total Number of Troops 75,000 73,000 71,000 69,000 67,000 65,000 July 07 Aug. 07 Sept. 07 Oct. 07 Nov. 07 Dec. 07 Jan. 08 Feb. 08 Mar. 08 Apr. 08 May 08 June 08 July 08 Aug. 08 Sept. 08 Oct. 08 Source: DPKO FGS. Note: Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions and DFS-supported political mission (UNAMI). 138

156 GLOBAL STATISTICS ON UN MISSIONS Top Twenty Troop Contributors to UN Missions: 31 October ,000 9,721 8,000 8,349 8,080 Number of Troops 6,000 4,000 4,648 3,044 2,826 2,617 2,603 2,464 2,000 2,147 2,106 2,021 1,891 1,782 1,560 1,554 1,338 1,217 1,178 1,147 0 Pakistan Bangladesh India Nigeria Nepal Rwanda Ghana Italy Uruguay Ethiopia France Jordan China South Africa Egypt Morocco Senegal Brazil Benin Spain Source: DPKO FGS. Note: Includes contributions to all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions and DFS-supported political mission (UNAMI). 5.3 Troops Deployed by UN Mission: 31 October ,000 16,702 16,000 14,000 12,733 Number of Troops 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 11,436 8,935 8,728 7,823 7,009 4,000 2,000 0 MONUC UNIFIL UNMIL UNAMID UNMIS UNOCI MINUSTAH 1,041 UNDOF 858 UNFICYP 222 UNAMI 28 MINURSO 0 BINUB 0 MINURCAT 0 UNAMA 0 UNMIK 0 UNMIN 0 UNMIT 0 UNMOGIP 0 0 UNOMIG UNTSO Source: DPKO FGS.

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158 GLOBAL STATISTICS ON UN MISSIONS Total UN Military Observers: July 2007 October ,250 Total Number of Military Observers 3,000 2,750 2,500 2,250 2,000 July 07 Aug. 07 Sept. 07 Oct. 07 Nov. 07 Dec. 07 Jan. 08 Feb. 08 Mar. 08 Apr. 08 May 08 June 08 July 08 Aug. 08 Sept. 08 Oct. 08 Source: DPKO FGS. Note: Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA, UNIOSIL), and DFS-supported political missions (UNAMI, UNMIN). 5.5 Top Twenty Military Observer Contributors to UN Missions: 31 October Number of Military Observers Pakistan Bangladesh Egypt Nigeria India Russia Jordan Uruguay Ghana Nepal Yemen China Romania Malaysia Brazil Zambia Germany Senegal Bolivia Indonesia Paraguay Source: DPKO FGS. Note: Includes contributions to all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA), and DFS-supported political missions (UNAMI, UNMIN).

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160 GLOBAL STATISTICS ON UN MISSIONS Military Observers Deployed by UN Mission: 31 October Number of Military Observers MONUC UNMIS UNMIL UNOCI MINURSO UNTSO UNAMID UNOMIG UNMIN MINURCAT UNMOGIP UNMIT UNMIK UNAMA BINUB UNAMI MINUSTAH UNDOF UNFICYP UNIFIL Source: DPKO FGS. 5.7 Total UN Police: July 2007 October ,000 12,500 12,000 Total Number of Police 11,500 11,000 10,500 10,000 9,500 9,000 8,500 8,000 July 07 Aug. 07 Sept. 07 Oct. 07 Nov. 07 Dec. 07 Jan. 08 Feb. 08 Mar. 08 Apr. 08 May 08 June 08 July 08 Aug. 08 Sept. 08 Oct. 08 Source: DPKO PD. Notes: Formed police units included. Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA, UNIOSIL), and DFS-supported political mission (UNMIN).

161 144 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS 5.8 Top Twenty Police Contributors to UN Missions: 31 October ,200 1,151 1,000 1,011 Number of Police Bangladesh Jordan Nepal Pakistan India Nigeria Ghana Senegal Philippines United States Turkey Malaysia Romania Niger China Ukraine Portugal Côte d Ivoire Cameroon South Africa Source: DPKO PD. Notes: Formed police units included. Includes contributions to all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA), and DFS-supported political missions (UNMIN). 5.9 Police Deployed by UN Mission: 31 October ,500 2,342 2,000 2,019 1,871 1,500 1, UNAMID MINUSTAH UNMIK UNMIT UNOCI MONUC UNMIL UNMIS MINURCAT UNFICYP UNOMIG BINUB MINURSO UNAMA UNAMI UNDOF UNIFIL UNMIN UNMOGIP UNTSO Number of Police 1,556 1,144 1,090 1, Source: DPKO PD. Note: Formed police units included.

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163 146 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS 5.10 Formed Police by UN Mission: October 2007 and October ,200 1,135 1, Oct Oct Number of Police MINUSTAH UNOCI MONUC UNMIL UNMIK UNMIT UNAMID Source: DPKO PD Formed Police Contributions by UN Mission: 31 October 2008 MINUSTAH MONUC UNAMID UNMIK UNMIL UNMIT UNOCI Total Bangladesh Jordan Pakistan Nepal India Senegal Nigeria Ukraine Indonesia Malaysia Portugal China Romania Poland Total 1, ,826 Source: DPKO PD.

164 GLOBAL STATISTICS ON UN MISSIONS Origin of UN Military Personnel by Region: 31 October 2008 Central and South America 8.1% North America 0.1% Europe 13.4% Africa 29.8% Middle East 2.8% Central and South Asia 39.1% East Asia and the Pacific 6.7% Region Troops/Military Observers Percentage of Total Africa 23, % East Asia and the Pacific 5, % Central and South Asia 30, % Middle East 2, % Europe 10, % Central and South America 6, % North America % Total 78,118 Source: DPKO FGS. Note: The regions used here and in the charts below are defined as follows: Africa: all members of the African Union and Morocco (but see Middle East below.) Central and South Asia: all members of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (including Afghanistan) and all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States to the east of the Caspian Sea, other than Russia. East Asia and the Pacific: all states in or bordering on the Pacific, the states of South-East Asia and Mongolia. Central and South America: all members of the Organization of American States other than Canada, the United States, and Mexico. Europe: all states to the north of the Mediterranean, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Georgia, Malta, Russia and Turkey. Middle East: all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Yemen. (While Egypt is included under Africa as a member of the AU, the contingent of UNTSO stationed on the Suez Canal is counted under the Middle East deployment section to reflect its line of command.) North America: Canada, the United States, and Mexico.

165 148 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS 5.13 Deployment of UN Military Personnel by Region: 31 October 2008 Europe 1.3% Central and South America 9.0% Middle East 18.1% Central and South Asia 0.2% East Asia and the Pacific 0.0% Africa 71.4% Region Troops/Military Observers Percentage of Total Africa 55, % East Asia and the Pacific % Central and South Asia % Middle East 14, % Europe 1, % Central and South America 7, % North America Total 78,118 Source: DPKO FGS.

166 GLOBAL STATISTICS ON UN MISSIONS Origin of UN Police Personnel by Region: 31 October 2008 Central and South America 1.1% North America 3.2% Europe 15.4% Africa 32.7% Middle East 9.1% Central and South Asia 29.2% East Asia and the Pacific 9.3% Region Police Percentage of Total Africa 3, % East Asia and the Pacific 1, % Central and South Asia 3, % Middle East 1, % Europe 1, % Central and South America % North America % Total 12,125 Source: DPKO PD. Note: Formed police units included.

167 150 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS 5.15 Deployment of UN Police Personnel by Region: 31 October 2008 Central and South America 16.7% Europe 16.1% Central and South Asia 0.0% Africa 54.3% East Asia and the Pacific 12.8% Region Police Percentage of Total Africa 6, % East Asia and the Pacific 1, % Central and South Asia 3 0.0% Middle East Europe 1, % Central and South America 2, % North America Total 12,125 Source: DPKO PD. Note: Formed police units included.

168 GLOBAL STATISTICS ON UN MISSIONS Origin of UN Military Personnel in Africa by Region: 31 October 2008 Central and South America 3.4% Europe 1.8% Middle East 2.5% North America 0.1% Africa 40.0% Central and South Asia 47.6% East Asia and the Pacific 4.6% Region Troops/Military Observers Percentage of Total Africa 22, % East Asia and the Pacific 2, % Central and South Asia 26, % Middle East 1, % Europe 1, % Central and South America 1, % North America % Total 55,776 Source: DPKO FGS.

169 152 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS 5.17 Origin of UN Police Personnel in Africa by Region: 31 October 2008 Middle East 10.2% Central and South America 0.8% Europe 4.9% North America 0.7% Africa 46.0% Central and South Asia 31.3% East Asia and the Pacific 6.1% Region Police Percentage of Total Africa 3, % East Asia and the Pacific % Central and South Asia 2, % Middle East % Europe % Central and South America % North America % Total 6,589 Source: DPKO PD. Note: Formed police units included.

170 GLOBAL STATISTICS ON UN MISSIONS Origin of UN Military Personnel in the Middle East by Region: 31 October 2008 Europe 61.5% Central and South America 0.4% North America 0.1% Africa 6.8% East Asia and the Pacific 17.4% Central and South Asia 13.8% Middle East 0.0% Region Troops/Military Observers Percentage of Total Africa % East Asia and the Pacific 2, % Central and South Asia 1, % Middle East 3 0.0% Europe 8, % Central and South America % North America % Total 14,154 Source: DPKO FGS.

171 154 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS 5.19 Total UN Civilian Personnel (International, Local, and UNV): July 2007 October ,000 25,000 Total Civilian Personnel 24,000 23,000 22,000 21,000 20,000 July 07 Aug. 07 Sept. 07 Oct. 07 Nov. 07 Dec. 07 Jan. 08 Feb. 08 Mar. 08 Apr. 08 May 08 June 08 July 08 Aug. 08 Sept. 08 Oct. 08 Sources: DFS FPD; UNV Programme. Notes: Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA, UNIOSIL), and DFS-supported political missions (UNAMI, UNMIN). Staff at UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not included. Figures do not include staff from UN specialized agencies, funds, and programs.

172 GLOBAL STATISTICS ON UN MISSIONS UN International Civilian Staff and DPKO Headquarters Personnel Occupational Groups: 31 October 2008 International Percentage Percentage Percentage Civilian International DFS DFS DPKO DPKO Occupation Staff Staff HQ Staff HQ Staff HQ Staff HQ Staff Administration % % % Aviation % % Civil Affairs % Economic Affairs 1 0.0% Electoral Affairs % Engineering % 7 1.9% Financial Management % % 2 0.6% Human Resources % % 3 0.9% Human Rights % Humanitarian Affairs % Information Management % 4 1.2% Information Systems and Technology % % 8 2.4% Legal Affairs % Logistics % % 1 0.3% Management and Program Analysis 7 0.1% Medical Services % 4 1.1% Military % Police % Political Affairs % % Procurement % Programme Management % 6 1.6% % Public Information % 2 0.6% Rule of Law % % Security % Social Affairs % 1 0.3% 2 0.6% Training % Transport % Total 6, Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO EO. Notes: Mission occupations include all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA), and DFS-supported political missions (UNAMI, UNMIN). Staff at UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not included. DPKO HQ occupations include both professional and general service staff, but exclude professional staff on contracts of less than one year.

173 156 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS 5.21 UN Mission International Staff Occupations: 31 October , % 14.0% 13.3% Number of International Staff % 5.9% 5.2% 4.3% 4.3% 3.9% 3.6% 3.0% 2.9% 2.9% 2.6% 2.2% 1.9% 1.4% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 0.8% 0.6% 0.1% 0.0% 0 Security Administration Logistics Info. Systems & Tech. Political Affairs Engineering Transport Human Resources Financial Mgmt. Civil Affairs Aviation Rule of Law Human Rights Public Info. Procurement Program Mgmt. Legal Affairs Medical Services Electoral Affairs Humanitarian Affairs Social Affairs Information Mgmt. Mgmt. & Program Analysis Economic Affairs Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO EO. Notes: Mission occupations include all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA), and DFS-supported political missions (UNAMI, UNMIN). Staff at UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not represented DFS and DPKO Headquarters Personnel Occupations: 31 October Number of Headquarters Personnel DFS 20 0 Administration Political Affairs Military Police Program Mgmt. Human Resources Training Rule of Law Info. Mgmt. Social Affairs Logistics Medical Services Info. Systems and Tech. Humanitarian Affairs Engineering Aviation Public Info. Financial Mgmt. DPKO Source: DPKO EO. Note: HQ occupations include both professional and general service staff, but exclude professional staff on contracts of less than one year.

174 GLOBAL STATISTICS ON UN MISSIONS Highest National Representation in UN Missions: 31 October 2008 UN Missions DPKO Missions International Professional and General Service Staff Local Professional and General Service Staff Total International Staff in Missions = 6,810 Total Local Staff in Missions = 14,910 Number of Percentage of Total Number of Percentage of Rank Country International Staff International Staff Rank Mission Local Staff Total Local Staff 1 United States % 1 UNMIS 2, % 2 Kenya % 2 MONUC 2, % 3 Philippines % 3 UNMIK 1, % 4 Canada % 4 UNAMID 1, % 5 India % 5 MINUSTAH 1, % 6 United Kingdom % 6 UNAMA 1, % 7 Ghana % 7 UNMIL % 8 France % 8 UNMIT % 9 Sierra Leone % 9 UNOCI % 10 Ethiopia % 10 UNIFIL % 11 Nigeria % 11 UNAMI % 12 Serbia % 12 BINUB % 13 Australia % 13 UNOMIG % 14 Pakistan % 14 MINURCAT % 15 Tanzania % 15 UNMIN % 16 Uganda % 16 MINURSO % 17 Cameroon % 17 UNTSO % 18 Germany % 18 UNFICYP % 19 Croatia % 19 UNDOF % 20 Fiji % 20 UNMOGIP % Source: DFS FPD. Note: Total international staff include all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions, DPA-led, DFS-supported political and peace building missions and the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi.

175 158 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS 5.24 Highest National Representation in UN DPKO Headquarters: 31 October 2008 Total DPKO Headquarters Staff: Professional Staff and 306 General Service Staff DFS and Percentage of Total Rank Country DFS DPKO DPKO DPKO HQ Staff 1 United States % 2 Philippines % 3 United Kingdom % 4 France % 5 Germany % 6 India % 7 Canada % 8 Nigeria % 9 Australia % 10 Japan % 11 Nepal % 12 Ghana % 13 Kenya % 14 Uruguay % 15 Italy % 16 Myanmar % 17 Pakistan % 18 Russia % 19 Sweden % 20 Bangladesh % 21 Peru % Source: DPKO EO. Note: DPKO HQ occupation include both professional and general service staff, but exclude professional staff on contracts of less than one year.

176 GLOBAL STATISTICS ON UN MISSIONS Total Personnel in UN Missions: 31 October 2008 Military International Mission Troops Observers Police Staff Local Staff UNVs Total MONUC 16, , , ,197 UNMIL 11, , ,390 UNAMID 8, , , ,808 UNIFIL 12, ,694 UNMIS 8, , ,484 MINUSTAH 7,009 2, , ,929 UNOCI 7, , ,521 UNMIK 26 1, , ,105 UNMIT 32 1, ,939 UNAMA , ,467 UNDOF 1, ,179 UNFICYP ,071 UNAMI MINURCAT MINURSO UNOMIG BINUB UNTSO UNMIN UNMOGIP Total 75,515 2,603 12,125 6,344 14,910 2, ,719 Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; UNV Programme. Note: Formed police units included UN Personnel Gender Statistics: 31 October 2008 Percentage Percentage Personnel Type Male Female Male Female Troops 73,815 1, % 2.3% Military Observers 2, % 3.4% Police 11, % 7.2% International Civilian Staff 4,458 1, % 29.7% Local Civilian Staff 12,176 2, % 18.3% DFS HQ Professional % 38.0% DFS HQ General Service % 70.6% DPKO HQ Professional % 28.8% DPKO HQ General Service % 75.2% UN Logistics Base Brindisi % 35.5% Total 104,717 7, % 6.9% Sources: DFS FPD; DPKO FGS; DPKO PD; DPKO EO. Notes: International and local civilian staff include all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA), and DFS-supported political missions (UNAMI, UNMIN). Police figures include formed police units. DPKO HQ staff include all general service staff and all professional staff with contracts of one year or more.

177 160 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS 5.27 Total Monthly Fatalities in UN Missions: July 2007 October Number of Fatalities July 07 Aug. 07 Sept. 07 Oct. 07 Nov. 07 Dec. 07 Jan. 08 Feb. 08 Mar. 08 Apr. 08 May 08 June 08 July 08 Aug. 08 Sept. 08 Oct. 08 Source: DPKO Situation Center. Notes: Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA, UNIOSIL), and DFS-supported political missions (UNAMI, UNMIN). UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not included Fatalities by UN Missions: 1 July October 2008 Number of Fatalities Percentage of Fatalities UNMIL % MONUC % UNAMID % UNOCI % UNMIS % UNIFIL % MINUSTAH 8 6.1% UNMIK 7 5.3% UNMIN 6 4.6% UNAMI 5 3.8% UNFICYP 3 2.3% UNAMA 2 1.5% UNMIT 2 1.5% MINURSO 1 0.8% UNDOF 1 0.8% UNIOSIL 1 0.8% UNMEE 1 0.8% UNTSO 1 0.8% BINUB MINURCAT UNMOGIP UNOMIG Total 150 Source: DPKO Situation Center.

178 GLOBAL STATISTICS ON UN MISSIONS Fatalities in UN Missions by Incident Type: 1 July October 2008 Other 16.0% Accident 32.0% Malicious Act 7.3% Illness 44.7% Source: DPKO Situation Center. Notes: Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA, UNIOSIL), and DFS-supported political missions (UNAMI, UNMIN). UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not included. Malicious acts include both what were previously referred to as hostile acts and crime. Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted Fatalities in UN Missions by Personnel Type: 1 July October 2008 Police 13.3% Military Observers 3.3% International Staff 9.3% Troops 50.0% Local Staff 24.0% Source: DPKO Situation Center. Notes: Includes all UN DPKO peacekeeping missions, DPKO-led political missions (BINUB, UNAMA, UNIOSIL), and DFS-supported political missions (UNAMI, UNMIN). UN Logistics Base in Brindisi not included.

179 162 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS 5.31 UN Peacekeeping Budgets: 1 July June 2009 Budget (in thousands of US dollars) 1,600,000 1,400,000 1,200,000 1,000, , , , ,000 1 July June 08 1 July June 09 0 UNAMID MONUC UNMIS UNIFIL UNMIL MINUSTAH UNOCI MINURCAT UNMIK UNMIT UNMEE UNFICYP MINURSO UNDOF UNOMIG UNLB Support Account Sources: UN Documents A/C.5/62/23 and A/C.5/62/31; DFS FBFD. Note: Figures above include only peacekeeping operations funded out of the peacekeeping budget; see table below for missions funded from the regular UN budget Other Peace Operations Budgets: 1 January 31 December 2008 (in thousands of US dollars) Appropriations DFS 3,887.8 DPKO 5,231.6 BINUB 31,124.6 UNAMA 76,068.7 UNAMI 140,308.1 UNIOSIL 27,034.7 UNMIN 55,121.5 UNMOGIP 8,478.6 UNTSO 33,108.5 Total 380,364.0 Sources: UN Documents A/62/6/Add.1 and A/63/346; DFS FBFD. Notes: DPKO and DFS budget lines are for peacekeeping operations executive direction and management costs, program of work, and program support. The budgets for DPKO, DFS, UNTSO, and UNMOGIP are estimates based on one-half of program budget for the biennium

180 GLOBAL STATISTICS ON UN MISSIONS Top Twenty Providers of Assessed Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Budget Percentage of Assessed Contribution 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 26.4% 16.5% 8.5% 7.8% 7.4% 5.0% 3.1% 3.0% 3.0% 2.1% 1.9% 1.8% 1.4% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% United States Japan Germany United Kingdom France Italy China Canada Spain Republic of Korea Netherlands Australia Russia Switzerland Belgium Sweden Austria Norway Denmark Greece Source: DM OPPBA Top Twenty Providers of Assessed Contributions to UN Regular Budget Percentage of Assessed Contribution 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 22.0% 16.6% 8.6% 0% United States Japan Germany United Kingdom France Italy Canada Spain China Mexico Republic of Korea Netherlands Australia Switzerland Russia Belgium Sweden Austria Brazil Norway 6.6% 6.3% 5.1% 3.0% 3.0% 2.7% 2.3% 2.2% 1.9% 1.8% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% Source: DM OPPBA.

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182 GLOBAL STATISTICS ON UN MISSIONS Top Twenty Assessed Financial Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations: 30 September 2008 (in thousands of US dollars) Outstanding Assessments Collections Credits Oustanding 2008 Effective Contributions as at Issued Received Utilized Contributions as at Member State Assessment Rate 31 December 2007 in 2008 in 2008 in September 2008 United States 26.4% 1,084, ,732, ,077,994.5 (123,907.3) 1,614,410.3 Japan 16.5% 729, ,083, ,716.0 (77,983.3) 924,488.8 Germany 8.5% 39, , ,617.8 (39,423.4) 48,008.5 United Kingdom 7.8% 511, ,403.2 (36,196.8) 43,571.7 France 7.4% 186, , ,850.7 (34,338.4) 212,551.2 Italy 5.0% 331, ,995.5 (23,345.1) 80,705.9 China 3.1% 69, , ,692.8 (14,630.4) 181,703.5 Canada 3.0% 194, ,806.9 (13,683.5) 16,548.5 Spain 3.0% 139, , ,460.3 (13,922.9) 193,826.1 Republic of Korea 2.1% 10, , ,827.1 (9,007.7) 51,651.1 Netherlands 1.9% 3, , ,575.5 (8,786.3) 32,430.9 Australia 1.8% 116, ,258.6 (8,213.8) 10,002.5 Russia 1.4% 6, , ,204.8 (6,539.6) 29,744.7 Switzerland 1.2% 8, , ,467.9 (5,589.2) 18,950.0 Belgium 1.1% 38, , ,313.0 (5,065.2) 41,612.3 Sweden 1.1% 69, ,193.9 (4,922.8) 16,690.3 Austria 0.9% 57, ,772.4 (4,077.0) 4,964.9 Norway 0.8% 6, , ,978.6 (3,594.4) 4,347.4 Denmark 0.7% , ,664.0 (3,396.7) 4,107.9 Greece 0.6% 44, , ,124.3 (2,795.8) 42,690.9 Source: DM OPPBA. Note: Credits utilized are derived from unencumbered balance of appropriations and other income for peacekeeping operations utilized at the time that assessments for the same operations were issued.

183 166 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS 5.36 UN Mandate Renewals: July 2007 December 2008 MINURCAT 12 months 6 months UNAMID 12 months 12 months UNMIN BINUB 12 months 12 months 6 months 6 months 12 months 12 mos. UNMIT 12 months 12 months UNIOSIL 12 months 9 months UNMIS MINUSTAH UNOCI 6 months 8 months 6 mos. 6 months 6 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 6 months 6 months UNMIL 6 months 12 months 12 months UNAMI UNAMA 12 mos. 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months UNMEE MONUC 6 mos. 6 months 12 months 6 months 12 months 12 mos. UNMIK Ongoing until Security Council decides otherwise UNOMIG 6 months 6 months 6 months 4 months MINURSO UNDOF 6 months 6 months 6 months 12 months 6 months 6 months 6 mos. UNIFIL UNFICYP 12 mos. 6 months 12 months 12 months 6 months 6 months 6 mos. UNMOGIP Ongoing until Security Council decides otherwise UNTSO Ongoing until Security Council decides otherwise July 07 Aug. 07 Sept. 07 Oct. 07 Nov. 07 Dec. 07 Jan. 08 Feb. 08 Mar. 08 Apr. 08 May 08 June 08 July 08 Aug. 08 Sept. 08 Oct. 08 Nov. 08 Dec. 08 Source: UN Security Council Resolutions. Notes: Mandate duration noted is mission authorization as per initial Security Council resolution. In some cases, mission authorization was renewed prior to the end of the previous mandate; in such cases the mandate duration may not match the timeline on the graph.

184 GLOBAL STATISTICS ON UN MISSIONS UN Operations Timeline: UN Mission and Location UNMOGIP (India/Pakistan) UNTSO (Middle East) MINURCAT (Chad, CAR) UNAMID (Darfur, Sudan) UNMIN (Nepal) BINUB (Burundi) UNMIT (Timor-Leste) UNIOSIL (Sierra Leone) UNOTIL (Timor-Leste) UNMIS (Sudan) ONUB (Burundi) UNOCI (Côte d Ivoire) MINUSTAH (Haiti) UNMIL (Liberia) UNMISET (Timor-Leste ) UNAMA (Afghanistan) UNMEE (Ethiopia/Eritrea) MONUC (Dem. Republic of Congo) UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) UNTAET (East Timor) Current missions UNMIK (Kosovo) UNOMSIL (Sierra Leone) Closed missions MINURCA (Central African Republic) UNPSG (Croatia) UNTMIH (Haiti) MONUA (Angola) MIPONUH (Haiti) MINUGUA (Guatemala) UNSMIH (Haiti) UNMOP (Previaka) UNTAES (E.Slavonia, Baranja, W. Sirmium) UNMIBH (Bosnia and Herzegovina) UNPREDEP (Macedonia) UNCRO (Croatia) UNAVEM III (Angola) UNMOT (Tajikistan) UNASOG (Chad/Libya) UNAMIR (Rwanda) UNOMIL (Liberia) UNMIH (Haiti) UNOMIG (Georgia) UNOMOR (Uganda/Rwanda) UNOSOM II (Somalia) ONUMOZ (Mozambique) UNOSOM I (Somalia) UNPROFOR (Balkans) UNTAC (Cambodia) UNAMIC (Cambodia) MINURSO (Western Sahara) ONUSAL (El Salvador) UNAVEM II (Angola) UNIKOM (Iraq/Kuwait) ONUCA (Central America) UNTAG (Namibia) UNAVEM I (Angola) UNIMOG (Iran/Iraq) UNGOMAP (Afghanistan/Pakistan) UNIFIL (Lebanon) UNDOF (Golan Heights) UNEF II (Egypt) UNIPOM (India/Pakistan) DOMREP (Dominican Republic) UNFICYP (Cyprus) UNYOM (Yemen) UNSF (West New Guinea) ONUC (Congo) UNOGIL (Lebanon) UNEF (Egypt) Source: UNSC resolutions Duration Source: UN Security Council Resolutions.

185

186 6 Global Statistics on Non-UN Missions 169

187 This chapter presents data on peace operations conducted under the authority of regional organizations and nonstanding coalitions of states; these data are compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). * * * Listed here are 31 non-un multilateral peace operations that started, were ongoing, or terminated in Unless otherwise stated, all figures in this chapter are as of 30 September 2008, or in the case of operations that were terminated in 2008, the date of closure. The chapter lists only operations conducted by regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions of states with the stated intention to: (1) serve as an instrument to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements already in place, (2) support a peace process, or (3) assist conflict prevention and/or peacebuilding efforts. SIPRI uses the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) description of peacekeeping as a mechanism to assist conflictridden countries to create conditions for sustainable peace this may include monitoring and observing ceasefire agreements; serving as confidence-building measures; protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance; assisting with demobilization and reintegration processes; strengthening institutional capacities in the areas of judiciary and the rule of law (including penal institutions), policing, and human rights; electoral support; and economic and social development. The chapter thus covers a broad range of peace missions to reflect the growing complexity of mandates of peace operations and the potential for operations to change over the course of their mandate. The chapter does not include good offices, fact-finding, or electoral assistance missions. The operations are divided into two loosely defined categories: those with military and observer functions (Table 6.10) and those with primarily policing and other civilian functions (Table 6.11). Legal instruments underlying the establishment of an operation UN Security Council resolutions or formal decisions by regional organizations are cited in the third column. The start dates for the operations refer to dates of first deployments. The list of contributing countries presented in this volume refers only to the main contributors to a mission. For a complete list of countries participating in each mission, consult the SIPRI Yearbook. Mission fatalities are recorded as a total from the beginning of the mission until the last reported date for 2008 and as a total for Fatality figures are broken down by cause of death hostilities, accidents, and illness. Subtotals owing to hostilities, accidents, and illness may not add up to the total number of deaths in 2008 because some deaths have not yet been classified or were the result of other causes. Data on multilateral peace operations are obtained from the following categories of open source: (1) official information provided by the secretariat of the authorizing organization; (2) information from the mission on the ground, either in official publications or in responses to annual SIPRI questionnaires; and (3) information from national governments contributing to the mission in question. These primary sources are supplemented with a wide selection of publicly available secondary sources consisting of specialist journals; research reports; news agencies; and international, regional, and local newspapers. 170

188 GLOBAL STATISTICS ON NON-UN MISSIONS 171 Table 6.12 lists the estimated declared costs of the peace operations underway in Budget figures are for the period 1 October September Budget figures are given in millions of US dollars and conversions from budgets set in other currencies are based on the aggregated market exchange rates of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the reporting year and are expressed in current dollar terms. The issue of financing of peace operations is a complicated one and warrants a brief explanation on the different ways in which peacekeeping budgets are calculated and the manner in which they are financed. Unlike UN budgets, figures for operations conducted by regional organizations such as the EU and NATO refer only to common costs. This includes mainly the running costs of EU and NATO headquarters (the costs of civilian personnel and operations and maintenance) and investments in the infrastructure necessary to support the operation. The costs of deploying personnel are borne by individual sending states and do not appear in the budget figures given here. Most EU missions are financed in one of two ways, depending on whether they are civilian or military missions. Civilian missions are funded through the Community Budget, while military missions or missions with military components are funded through the ATHENA mechanism to which only the participating member states contribute. In missions by other organizations and generally the ad hoc missions budget figures may include program implementation. For these reasons, budget figures presented in this table are best viewed as estimates, and the budgets for different missions should not be compared. There are certain limitations to the data. The main problems of reliability are due to varying definitions of what constitutes the total cost of an operation. The coverage of official data varies significantly between operations; sometimes a budget is an estimate while in other cases it is an actual expenditure.

189 172 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS 6.1 Top Twenty Troop Contributors to Non-UN Missions: 30 September ,000 22,092 20,000 Total Number of Troops 15,000 10,000 8,556 8,253 5,000 5,681 4, ,500 2,024 1,972 1,9241,882 1,800 1,5881, United States United Kingdom France Germany Italy Canada Poland Australia Netherlands Spain Uganda Turkey Denmark Romania Austria Czech Republic Greece Ireland Finland Sweden Notes: These figures represent the number of personnel deployed in large-scale units and may exclude some additional personnel deployed individually or in small scale units. For scaling reasons, MNF-Iraq figures are not included in this ranking. 6.2 Top Twenty Police Contributors to Non-UN Missions: 30 September Total Number of Police Australia Angola Germany France Itally New Zealand United Kingdom Finland Belgium Sweden Gabon Denmark Netherlands Spain Romania Portugal Canada Czech Republic Greece Hungary Note: As the figures for largest contributors represent personnel deployed in large scale units, there may be variations with actual field strength.

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192 GLOBAL STATISTICS ON NON-UN MISSIONS Contributions of Military Personnel to Non-UN Missions by Organization: 30 September 2008 Economic Community of the Central African States African Union 1% 4% Coalitions/ Ad hoc 6% European Union Commonwealth of 7% Independent States 6% North Atlantic Treaty Organization 76% Organization Troops/Military Observers Percentage of Total North Atlantic Treaty Organization 65,703 76% European Union 5,698 7% Commonwealth of Independent States 5,349 6% Coalitions/Ad hoc 4,685 6% African Union 3,070 4% Economic Community of the Central African States 498 1% Total 85,003 Note: For scaling reasons, MNF-Iraq figures are not included in this ranking.

193 176 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS 6.4 Deployment of Non-UN Military Personnel to Regions: 30 September 2008 Europe 26% Africa 10% East Asia and the Pacific 1% Middle East 2% Central and South Asia 61% Organization Troops/Military Observers Percentage of Total Central and South Asia 50,719 61% Europe 22,499 26% Africa 8,675 10% Middle East 1,912 2% East Asia and the Pacific 1,198 1% Central and South America North America Total 85,003 Note: For scaling reasons, MNF-Iraq figures are not included in this ranking.

194 GLOBAL STATISTICS ON NON-UN MISSIONS Deployment of Non-UN Police By Organization: 30 September 2008 Economic Community of the Central African States 18% Coalitions/ Ad hoc 32% European Union 50% Organization Police Percentage of Total European Union % Coalitions/Ad hoc % Economic Community of the Central African States % Total 961

195 178 ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS 6.6 Deployment of Non-UN Police to Regions: 30 September 2008 Region Civilian Police Percentage of Total East Asia and the Pacific % Europe % Africa % Central and South Asia % Middle East 41 4% Central and South America North America Total 961