Sri Lanka Tsunami Recovery Programming and Follow-Up Needs Assessment Mission Report, WFP, May 2005

Transcription

1 Sri Lanka Tsunami Recovery Programming and Follow-Up Needs Assessment Mission Report, WFP, May 2005 Mission members: Nicholas Crawford, Emergencies and Transitions, Rome Anette Haller, Needs Assessments, Rome Neville Edirisinghe, WFP consultant

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. Background and methodology 3 Background 3 Methodology 4 II. Update on Tsunami Response and Recovery 4 III. Assessment of Recovery Prospects and the Re-Establishment of Food 7 Security among Tsunami-affected The displaced and the buffer zone 9 Markets, food availability and impact on food aid 10 Basic relief and recovery assistance provided 11 IV. Summary of WFP Response to Date 13 Targeting lessons from implementation of the GFD 14 V. Objectives and Role of Food Aid for Continued WFP Assistance 15 Objectives 15 Role of food aid in the VGF 15 VI. Findings and recommendations 15 General findings and recommendations 15 Recommendations for targeting 16 Justification for the targeting criteria 17 VII. Longer-term relief-to-recovery programming through Food-for-Work initiatives 18 Cash-forWork (CFW) initiatives 19 Food-for-Livelihoods 20 VIII. Exit Strategy 22 2

3 Tsunami Recovery Programming and Follow-Up Needs Assessment Mission Sri Lanka, May 2005 I. Background and methodology Background 1. Following the tsunami disaster in Sri Lanka, WFP fielded a needs assessment mission in January The Emergency Needs Assessment Report (ENA) recommended a mix of short-term food responses (general food distribution) and medium and longer-term social safety net responses (vulnerable group feeding, school feeding, MCN, and supplementary feeding). The mission recommended a follow-up needs assessment mission in May/June to review the assumptions behind its original recommendations in light of actual implementation and recovery developments. A subsequent recovery programming mission in March reviewed implementation of the emergency response. Given the actual trajectory of WFP and government assistance, the mission recommended that the follow-up assessment exercise be carried out sooner rather than later. 2. The transition to more targeted food interventions as originally foreseen in the ENA report has been slowed as a result of the delay, extension-in-time and increase in beneficiary numbers under the general food distribution programme. The ENA, as of end January, recommended a general food distribution, peaking at 845,000 beneficiaries in January and falling to 650,000 in March. Beginning in April, widespread general food distributions were to be replaced by more targeted interventions. The proposed beneficiary caseload for April was 400,000 and would fall to 180,000 in September. 3. As things stand, the relief programme has been substantially increased at the request of the government, with WFP being committed to providing a full food basket (value Rs 175/per beneficiary per week) within a 16 week entitlement programme to more than 900,000 tsunami-affected people (estimated number of ration coupon holders 931,000). The government at the same time provides cash to the beneficiaries (Rs 200/per beneficiary per week). The end date of this 16 week programme has been extended until 10 June as in many areas the coupon system was only introduced end of February. A subsequent 10 weeks programme through end of August has now been announced by the government, bringing the general food distribution to 20 weeks beyond the date originally recommended in the ENA. 4. It is widely recognized that the current food aid coverage even if roughly one fourth of the planned 900,000 plus beneficiaries are not actually receiving rations - includes a substantial number of people who would not normally qualify for WFP assistance. 3

4 Methodology 5. The purpose of the mission was to make recommendations for future WFP food assistance for tsunami-affected people, re-visiting the assumptions of the January assessment and bearing in mind the practical realities on the ground - including the political dimensions of tsunami assistance the actual performance of the WFP intervention to date, and the pace of relief and recovery in the country. The mission was in Sri Lanka from 4-20 May, carrying out field visits and focus group discussions, and key informant interviews in the Districts of Ampara, Batticaloa, Hambantota, Matara, Galle and Kalutara. Structured focus group discussions with different livelihood groups (e.g., fishermen, small traders, farmers) were held in each area visited. The mission met also with government officials, bilaterals, WFP staff and partners in Colombo. 6. The mission calculated beneficiary figures for the future Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) using secondary data from the Census of persons, housing units and other buildings affected by the Tsunami, which was conducted by the Department of Census and Statistics in January /February 2005 in areas directly affected by the tidal waves. During this census extensive information was gathered from affected households on their livelihood, assets, living conditions, income etc. Unfortunately, the data for the North East are still analysed and were not available to the mission at the time of writing the report. 7. To get a better understanding of the current situation of households, especially their access to food, primary data were collected through a quick survey covering 390 households. The questionnaire focussed on sources of income and food, expenditure on food, and relief received. It covered 8 affected districts in the North-East West and South (see attachment). Households were stratified into four groups, with the last one serving as control group: Displaced in camps Displaced outside camps Affected but not displaced households and Households in not affected adjacent divisions. 8. WFP Food Aid Monitors most of whom were recently trained in Beneficiary Contact Monitoring (BCM) - conducted the interviews. The survey results are not statistically representative, but they provide some firsthand information to complement the interviews and focus group discussions of the mission. Despite the relatively small sample size, the results are quite consistent with the mission s general observations and findings, and can be used to analyse progress/changes when compared to the larger household survey that was conducted in January in collaboration with ILO. 9. In addition, the results of the country office BCM survey were considered by the mission. II. Update on Tsunami Response and Recovery 10. The current official estimates of damage from Sri Lanka s worst natural disaster in history are: 38,000 people killed; 5,000 missing; 443,000 displaced; and 5 percent of the population (or 1 million people) affected. The World Bank estimates that $ billion in financing is required for tsunami recovery, including $500 million for short-term assistance. 4

5 According to the Government, the 3-5 year financing needs for reconstruction are roughly $2 billion. Donor pledges for reconstruction and rehabilitation currently stand at $2.15 billion (excluding relief assistance). The World Bank estimates the overall commitments from donors for tsunami relief and recovery, including $720 million from NGOs and the private sector, to be $2.745 billion. The recent Sri Lanka development forum garnered pledges of $2.2 billion for longer term development and poverty reduction activities, some of which overlap with tsunami recovery activities In less than 5 months since the tsunami, Sri Lanka has taken major steps to meet immediate humanitarian needs and begin the process of re-establishing sustainable livelihoods. Since May, organisations are moving towards a recovery approach, reflected, for example, in the shift from transitional to permanent housing, from small canoes to boats with outboard engines and multi day boats, and from cash grants to micro credit schemes. According to government officials (national and local), bilateral donor representatives, international NGOs, and UN agencies interviewed by the mission, there will be major progress in the re-establishment of livelihoods (especially the fishing industry) in the sixmonth period from July-December. Figure 1 Number of houses before the Tsunami and damaged houses in affected blocks in 11districts Colombo Gampaha Kalutara Galle Matara Hambantota Jaffna Mullaitivu Batticaloa Ampara Trincomalee houses before Tsunami damaged houses (cannot be used) 12. Adequate housing is the main preoccupation of people most directly affected by the tsunami. As shown in figure 1, the greatest destruction in terms of absolute number of houses was in the East, in Ampara and Batticaloa, followed by Galle in the South. However, in relative terms, the North - Mullaithivu and Jaffna had the highest share of houses damaged. 13. Under the overall coordination of the government task forces TAFOR (Task Force for Relief) and TAFREN (Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation) displaced people have been 1 It is difficult to untangle pledges for relief, recovery and longer-term development. The figures cited are from: World Bank: Sri Lanka Development Forum: The Economy, the Tsunami and Poverty Reduction; May 16-17, 2005 and Government of Sri Lanka: Post Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Strategy, May

6 temporarily sheltered. These shelters range from camps composed of simple tents to semipermanent wood structures; generally the camps are well serviced with water and sanitation. The government has also taken significant progress towards providing permanent housing to those who lost their houses. Roughly 100,000 people are living in relief camps or transitional housing while the rest of the displaced have moved in with friends or relatives. 14. Increasingly, families are being provided with transitional houses (simple wood and corrugated metal structures that offer more protection and can be used for a year or more until permanent houses are ready). According to the government, about 47,000 transitional housing units are needed, of which 23,000 have already been completed and 12,000 are currently under construction. Donor pledges have been received to build 97,000 permanent housing units. Government land for new houses has been identified and set aside in all but a few divisions. The target for completion of permanent houses is 2 years. On average in Sri Lanka, about 8,000 houses a year are constructed, so the government target date for finishing the replacement houses is quite ambitious. The increased demand for building materials (especially concrete) and other inputs is already having an inflationary effect on the economy. 15. For families whose houses were damaged the Government is providing grants of Rs 100,000 (approx US$ 1,000) for repair. For those whose houses were completely destroyed, the Government provides a grant of 250,000(US$ 2500) to build new ones However, only families living outside the buffer-zone are eligible as the government does not allow any (re- )construction activities inside the m zone. More than 8,000 households have already received the first instalment of Rs 50,000. Subsequent instalments for these households will only be paid upon evidence of construction progress. 16. The Government grant to build a new house is widely considered inadequate. For example, in some areas new permanent houses are being built and provided free or charge by various organisations (IOM, World Vision, CARE, IRC, Sewa Lanka) according to a standard design that costs around Rs. 600,000 per unit. It appears that in many instances the grants and the provision of permanent houses are not well coordinated and some beneficiaries will actually receive both. For instance in Beruwala Division, World Vision plans to complete 1000 permanent houses by end of 2005, replacing all completely and partially damaged houses, while already some 400 households have received the government grants. 17. The re-establishment of livelihoods with fishing being the industry most damaged is another major focus. Coordinating the procurement and distribution of livelihood inputs, especially fishing equipment, is proving more complex and time-consuming than originally hoped, though the mission saw some progress (e.g., the distribution of many new small boats/canoes) and ample anecdotal evidence of the fishing industry picking up. Some 15,300 boats and one million nets were destroyed or damaged by the tsunami. According to the Government, 7,300 boats have been repaired free of charge and donor pledges have been received to replace 12,900 boats. Likewise, there are positive developments in the tourism sector: according to the government, the overall number of tourists in April 2005 was up 38 percent over the previous year. There is less information on the state of informal and selfemployed industries that were devastated by the tsunami. These industries, such as smallscale fish preservation or coir production, are often run by women and there is little evidence of progress in replacing their production inputs. 6

7 18. While progress implementing these schemes has been considerable, it is still lagging behind the expectations of the affected people. These expectations have been raised by large pledges of aid and promises from the Government that all tsunami-affected people will quickly have their basic assets and livelihoods replaced (houses, fishing equipment, production machinery, lost stocks, etc.). There is a high degree of tension in communities when real or perceived tsunami entitlements are cut, delayed or withdrawn. There is likewise tension as a result of perceptions of favouritism by Government officials in the distribution of assistance (for instance, a common complaint is about the lack of transparent decision-making in the restitution of fishing boats). In this context, the cash coupons and (even more so) the food coupons have been the only direct and predictable resource transfers received by the affected population. 19. Generally, the affect of the tsunami on the country s macro-economic situation has been less than originally feared. GDP growth may slow by up to 1 percentage point in 2005 (from 6% growth to 5%), though this likely be mitigated by aid transfers and greater construction activities. Demand for construction materials and labour shortages for all the new construction may have an inflationary impact; together with cash-for-work programmes, construction activities are already pushing up the daily unskilled wage rate (from roughly Rs 250 pre-tsunami to Rs in affected areas) 20. On the political front, there is still hope that the Government and LTTE will intensify cooperation as a result of the tsunami and further solidify their still-tenuous peace agreement. A joint mechanism between the government and the LTTE for the management of tsunami aid considered a potentially significant symbol of cooperation - is being actively debated and seems likely to be approved. 21. Overall financing for tsunami recovery in Sri Lanka appears to be adequate. And rehabilitation and recovery activities are underway in the context of generally healthy economic growth. The government, though, has noted delays in the conversion of pledges to actual donations. These delays, as well as the complexities inherent in permanently resettling large numbers of people and re-establishing livelihoods that have been completely decimated, mean that vulnerable groups affected by the tsunami continue to rely heavily on shorter-term relief and recovery assistance, such as the joint WFP-GoSL food (general food distribution) and cash transfer programme that is underway for the period February-July Furthermore, recovery will be slower in the worst affected districts including in the conflict areas of the North and East - since poverty was already above the national average in these areas before the tsunami. III. Assessment of Recovery Prospects and the Re-Establishment of Food Security among Tsunami-affected 22. A number of factors point to continued high food and income vulnerability among some groups affected by the tsunami. However, it appears that the nutritional situation remains stable and unchanged from earlier in the year. A UNICEF/WFP update on the January report on the nutritional status of tsunami-affected districts is expected mid-year, 23. The mission s quick household survey showed that most affected livelihood groups are still struggling to recover and continue to rely heavily on government and private welfare (see graph below), albeit less than in January. Reliance on welfare had dropped from 45 percent of the affected households right after the Tsunami to one third in May. 7

8 24. Among the affected income groups, fishermen, who account for almost two thirds of those who lost their livelihoods, appear to fare better than others. This is likely the result of early and continued focus on relief aid for this sector; other smaller and less visible livelihood groups have received less attention. In comparison with the results of the household survey conducted in January, the share of households that relied on fishing as a primary source of income had gone up from 2 percent right after the Tsunami to14 percent in May. Figure 2 Main income source before the Tsunami and now (May 2005) 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Agriculture Fisheries Manufacturing Hospitality Retail Remittances Other services Government Welfare Private Charity Other before after 25. In all of the fishing communities visited by the mission, some families had received replacement day boats, others had received nets and still others outboard motors. Yet, without the whole package together, fishermen can not begin. Multi-day boats have not yet been replaced. Each day boat provides a direct income for several fishing families; multiday boats provide direct and indirect income for a much larger number. Apart from the owners of multi-day boats (who have savings and other assets or who may not live in the affected areas), there is little to distinguish between the vulnerability of boat owners and boat workers most of whom were concentrated in or close to the buffer zone - at this stage. In addition, the fishing season varies according to region, but generally speaking the main season will be over by mid Even if boats and other equipment arrive from May/June and on, fishing will not begin again in earnest until the new season, starting around January According to FAO, agricultural land was less damaged then originally feared. Less than 5 percent of affected households lost their main income in agriculture. Some 7,700 rice farmers have been affected by the tsunami and 27,000 homestead gardeners. Heavy rains have desalinated much of the affected land, allowing farmers to plant again during the smaller rice season (May-July). In addition, many of the affected farmers had some land that was not affected. 8

9 27. As noted above, many of the owners of small shops and small-scale household industries that were destroyed were women. A number of donor programmes, such as micro-enterprise grants and lending, are beginning, but these families many of whom lived in the buffer zone have yet to re-establish any income. In addition, they have to face competition from the many affected households have taken up petty trade as an additional source of income. The displaced and the buffer zone 28. Generally, the displaced are most vulnerable since they have lost all their assets, including homes, home-based livelihoods and savings in the form of stocks, household goods, etc. Being within the buffer zone further compounds the situation. In general, those living closer to the beach were poorer to begin with prior to the tsunami. There was also greater destruction inside the buffer zone. Finally, those displaced from the buffer zone as well as those whose houses were damaged in the buffer zone do not have access to the government reconstruction grants (Rs100, ,000). Instead, they will be resettled in new areas a more time-consuming process and one that could risk longer-term disruption of their livelihoods (e.g., how will fishermen cope with being resettled several kilometres inland?) Figure 3 Current household expenditure on food Percentage of households 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Displaced camp Displaced outside camp Not displaced affected Not displaced adjacent Less than 50% 50-75% Over 75% 29. The household survey supports a focus on displaced people: almost two thirds of the displaced households spend more than 75 percent of their cash resources on food, compared to one third for those not displaced. For 40 percent of the displaced, relief food assistance is the main food source; another one third relies on market purchases. For the not displaced population, market purchases are the main source of food, although one third still depends mainly on relief. IDPs outside camps seem to be slightly better off, though the difference is not very pronounced. They depend less on welfare/charity and spend a smaller share of their income on food. 9

10 Figure 4 60% Current main sources of food Percentage of households 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Displaced camp Displaced outside camp Not displaced affected Not displaced adjacent Ow n Production Market Purchases Borrow ing Relief Others Markets, food availability and impact of food aid 30. Food is widely available throughout the country and the integration of markets is strong, meaning that prices do not vary considerably from region to region. Because of this, there has only been a marginal effect on rice prices as a result of WFP s rice assistance. 31. Secondary sources to understand the extent of market integration for food commodities are not available, but the views expressed by the Ministry of Agriculture s Agrarian Research and Training Institute and Department of Census and Statistics, as well as the district level administrators point towards consensus that food markets are reasonably well integrated. The presence of a comprehensive network of roads, sizeable transport sector, a large number of wholesalers and traders and a large number of active regional markets support this view. Interviews with traders and wholesalers in the districts visited clearly indicated how the surpluses in food producing areas meet the demand from urban centers and other areas that do not produce food. The rural markets also have linkages with the central markets to obtain supplies of imported foods such as sugar and pulses in adequate quantities. In general, hardly any views were expressed on the presence of any significant marketing bottlenecks. 32. The visual impressions during field visits in Ampara and Batticaloa districts and information obtained from key informants indicated that most of the local market structures have not been damaged by the tsunami waves to any significant degree in the Eastern Province because of their location somewhat away from the sea. In the Southern Province, several local markets located along the coastal line were subject to destruction and disruption. It appeared that within a few months most of the normal marketing activities had revived. 33. There has been no complete loss of demand for food items associated with the WFPprovided rations because a relatively large proportion of the consumers dependent on these markets were not affected by the disaster. The informants in general found no substantial reason to believe that the market will not be able to muster the required finances, transportation, processing and storage to meet any additional demand for food that may 10

11 come from cash transfers. Those affected by the disaster were dependent on the same markets but may have additional purchasing power than before for food purchases because of cash transfers. This additional demand for food is not expected to be at a magnitude that cannot be met by the present market structure. 34. One of the complaints of the traders is that market prices have tended to depress because of the issue of food rations. However, district price data do not provide strong support to this view, especially in the case of food items such as wheat flour, red lentils, coconut oil and sugar. In the case of rice, prices have tended to decline from January to April (last month for which data is available) in This reflects the usual seasonal pattern of prices that is influenced by the harvest of the major rice crop during the first few months of the year. Rice prices have not declined in general during January April, notwithstanding the bumper harvest, which reflects primarily the continuation of a significant inflationary process coming from the previous year and fueled by the drastic increases in energy prices and perhaps also of the increase in wage rates. These observations also indicate that the rice trade has been able to respond to surplus situations by storage for future release and/or export to other deficit areas. 35. The mission focus group discussions, as well as the household survey and WFP s Beneficiary Contact Monitoring findings demonstrate that consumption of the WFPprovided food basket is high and sales of WFP food are low. Imported rice is frequently exchanged for local rice (sometimes at the unfavourable rate of 2 to 1), though poorer beneficiaries tend to limit the amount of rice they will exchange. In some areas, wheat flour is also exchanged because of strong preference for rice. When asked whether they would prefer receiving food or cash at the value of Rs 175 weekly, women almost universally voiced a strong preference for food. It should be noted that the preference for food was expressed in the context of also receiving the Rs 200 weekly cash stipend that allows beneficiaries to purchase other basic needs and supplement the WFP food basket. Basic relief and recovery assistance provided 36. Sri Lanka has a long-standing tradition of social welfare, and the Government response to the tsunami has reinforced this. Affected people have little incentive to explore new livelihood options since the government has promised to compensate them for losses and restore their old livelihoods. Donor commitments for cash-for-work programmes have been significant (US$40-60 million according to Government figures), but current projects are almost exclusively related to debris clean-up (which is phasing out); they are available in some places and not others; and typically they employ someone for a maximum of about 15 days. There are plans through ILO and others to offer more sustainable employment and broader coverage, but these programmes have yet to be implemented. Assistance from other sources donations in-kind through INGOs, for example has slowed and remains unpredictable (and haphazardly distributed). 37. The Government-WFP cash/food (GFD) transfer programme (equivalent to Rs 375/week) has been the only widespread, ongoing and predictable source of assistance for tsunami-affected populations. In fact, the food component has actually been the most predictable since at many of the sites visited by the mission, beneficiaries reported (and their coupons confirmed) that the cash portion had frequently been delayed or cancelled. This is reflected in the survey results that show that more than 90 percent of all affected have received food with hardly any difference between IDPs in camps or outside camps; a 11

12 slightly smaller share received cash. The next most widespread support received by around 40 percent of the affected (as well as by almost one fifth of non-affected families) is Mother and Child Health services. Overall, it seems that IDPs in camps have easier access to external assistance as reflected in the higher share of households that benefited from repair/replacement support, housing and other miscellaneous assistance. Figure 5 Relief received by different household categories 120% percentage of households 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Displaced camp Displaced outside camp Not displaced affected Not displaced adjacent GFD Cash Housing Replacement/Repair Microcredit MCH Others 38. The access to food of vulnerable tsunami-affected people on the market will suffer a significant downturn in mid-july when the Government-financed Rs200 weekly emergency allowance is terminated. A continued safety net in the form of food rations under a targeted and time-bound vulnerable group feeding programme will help these families cover their basic food needs in the critical months while programmes for housing and livelihood rehabilitation come on line. Table 1. Summary of the Basic Safety Net and Recovery Assistance Delivered to Tsunami-Affected People Type of assistance Value duration Eligible recipients Government funeral Rs 15,000 for One-time payment Surviving assistance each death in a families household Government cash programme WFP food basket Government NFI payout for household utensils Government livelihood recovery support Status of payment Paid for all deaths except for those still officially listed as missing Rs 200/weekly February-July 921,000 2 To be discontinued effective 15/7 Equiv. February-July 921,000 Approved to 15/7 Rs175/weekly Rs 2500 One time All displaced paid families Rs 5000 per family per month 4 months All affected families 2 months paid; additional 2 months pending 2 Refers to all tsunami-affected: directly and economically affected registered by the Government at the District level and issued food/cash coupons. According to WFP figures, a substantially smaller number (on average about 700, ,000 people per month) are actually redeeming their food coupons. Actual numbers of those redeeming their cash coupons are not available. 12

13 IV. Summary of WFP Response to Date 39. The Government and WFP food aid response has not followed the overall recommendations of the WFP February 2002 Needs Assessment. Instead, WFP s assistance has been integrated into a broader government-adopted social welfare response to the tsunami. The result is a much larger general food distribution (GFD) caseload than originally foreseen and a longer duration of the programme. The expansion of the GFD has also meant delays in the implementation of more targeted relief and recovery activities, especially vulnerable group feeding (VGF) and food-for-work or other food for recovery activities (MCN, school feeding, and supplementary feeding under the EMOP have begun as of May 2005; FFW has thus far not been viable). The Government has identified up to 921,000 people as eligible for food assistance, based on calculation of the district authorities, but the actual number of GFD beneficiaries, according to WFP monitoring data, is significantly less. As the chart below shows, in the 11 worst affected districts in the month of May, some 878,000 people were eligible for food assistance, but the actual number of beneficiaries was 634,000. The average number of beneficiaries over the period February- April, according to WFP monitoring data, was approximately 700,000. Figure 6 - Eligible vs. actual beneficiaries under General Food Distribution in affected divisions in 11 districts Colombo Gampaha Kalutara Galle Matara Hambantota** Jaffna Mullaitivu Batticaloa Ampara Trincomalee Eligible beneficiaries Actual beneficiaries Targeting lessons from implementation of the GFD 40. The Government faced major political pressure to respond to quickly and decisively to this major quick-onset emergency. WFP likewise needed to rely on existing distribution systems (e.g., the Government cooperative shop system) in order to achieve an efficient and rapid response. But accepting integration into the Government system has also meant having to accept compromises in this case significant inclusion errors in WFP s targeting. The overall number of GFD beneficiaries is widely agreed to be too high. WFP staff and some government officials readily estimated to the mission that the GFD numbers 13

14 should be cut by one quarter to one half. WFP s targeting aspirations, in the case of the tsunami response in Sri Lanka, needed to be adjusted to political realities and to the capacity of WFP or other partners to enforce a distribution system with stricter criteria. As a result of fully integrating with the Government relief response, WFP s tsunami response in Sri Lanka has become part of a temporary Government welfare system, providing an income transfer that is helping to tied families over while investments for livelihood recovery are organized and delivered. At this stage, when the GFD will be phased into a targeted vulnerable group feeding intervention, WFP shares responsibility with the Government to ensure that a wellcommunicated and implemented phase down is planned. V. Objectives and Role of Food Aid for Continued WFP Assistance Objectives 41. The overall objectives of WFP assistance beyond July should be (i) to contribute to the re-establishment of livelihoods of vulnerable people affected by the tsunami (income transfer) and (ii) to help prevent deterioration of their nutritional status through the provision of a nutritious family food ration. Role of food aid in the VGF 42. For families with a potential breadwinner, food provides an income transfer while Government, donors and households themselves replace livelihood assets (equipment, housing, etc); the food basket covers basic food needs and ensures that harmful coping mechanisms are not adopted (e.g., migration, selling last assets, depleting any left savings, etc.) 43. For families and individuals without a breadwinner: food aid covers basic food needs during an interim period while GoSL integrates this group into its social welfare systems such as the Samurdhi; VI. Findings and Recommendations 3 : 44. General findings and recommendations A core group of GFD beneficiaries are unlikely to re-establish their livelihoods to a degree that would ensure their continued food security before late/end 2005; continued assistance to this group is warranted, especially in light of the government cash stipend ending; The numbers currently targeted under the GDF though understandable within the political context of the Government response to the disaster - can now be significantly reduced and folded into a VGF programme; Planned (or eligible) beneficiary numbers (coupon holders) and deliveries are significantly higher than actual numbers and deliveries. The absence of widespread 3 The rationale for recovery investments in school feeding and MCN remain unchanged from the previous assessment and recovery planning missions. Therefore, the findings and recommendations of the mission concentrate on the introduction of a targeted VGF programme to replace the current GFD. 14

15 complaints (and the mission heard of only minor discrepancies and found no coupon holders who were not receiving food) further argues for a significant reduction as WFP moves towards VGF; A number of factors suggest that criteria for VGF targeting must be, to the extent possible, clear, unambiguous, easily enforceable, and easily monitored. These factors include: weak government implementation capacity at the local level; a high degree of tension and suspicion among beneficiaries and with local officials; and enormous expectations among beneficiaries for continued food and cash assistance as long as they have not received compensation for lost livelihoods; Replace the GFD with a VGF programme covering up to 350,000 beneficiaries for a period of 4 months, from mid-august to 15 December; As agreed in principle with the Government, pursue a small pilot scheme (within the VGF programme), comparing cash for vulnerable groups in one area versus food for vulnerable groups in another area (German contribution); this would be implemented in collaboration with the SENAC action research initiative and in conjunction with ODI and Save the Children research on cash/vouchers in emergencies; Continue to pursue the option as previously recommended of providing cash-inlieu of rice (German contribution), ensuring that necessary safeguards are established for funds accountability; Should cash-in-lieu-of-rice not be feasible, provide only locally purchased rice (purchased by WFP and not by the Government on behalf of WFP), which has a significantly (up to 50%) higher value to beneficiaries; Continue to provide the same food basket (and income transfer value) under the VGF during August-December; adjust the ration of wheat flour to rice according to local tastes; Definitively end the VGF in December 2005, with no possibility of extension; this should be clearly communicated to Government and beneficiaries; MCN, school feeding, food-for-work and food for livelihood recovery should continue in 2006 within the PRRO in selected divisions (i.e., in areas heavily damaged by the tsunami and highly food insecure prior to the tsunami) 45. Recommendations for targeting: Continue with the current geographic coverage except for Kilinochchi and Puttalam (to be excluded since beneficiary numbers are so low); De-link WFP targeting from government targeting (especially if Government should reconsider its decision to stop the Rs 200 weekly payment scheme) o Issue own ration cards o Give a ceiling (tonnage) for each DS Division based on Annex II Targeted Vulnerable Group Feeding: Breakdown by Division o Provide clear, unambiguous criteria, limiting to the extent possible subjective decision-making by local officials; clearly communicate the criteria to affected communities; it is not realistic in the current political situation to enforce or ask local government (GN) officials or communities to apply subjective interpretations of relative need among tsunami-affected; the only subjective decision-making by the FAC should be for a small number of destitute households (see Table 2 below); Establish local food aid committees (FACs) comprising o WFP 15

16 o GS/GN o DS Division o Community representatives o Local CBOs In order to ensure transparency, the FACs should select beneficiaries based on the published criteria (cross checking with census data); lists of beneficiaries should be reviewed by FAC twice between July and December Table 2 Beneficiary Households Breakdown by District Damaged houses inside bufferzone lost livelihoods inside buffer zone Excluding government employees & wealthy business District Lost destitute houses households TOTAL Colombo Gampaha Kalutara Galle Matara Hambantota** Jaffna Mullaitivu Batticaloa Ampara Trincomalee TOTAL Calculation of VGF Beneficiaries September to December 2005 inside outside no. of buffer bufferzone households numbers available for all divisions house lost X X house damaged but still usable X Percentage of damaged houses inside bufferzone used for calculation. North East: assumption is 60 % are inside the buffer sub-total exclude government employees & other salaried employees and wealthy business people X X X X sub-total livelihood lost X SouthWest: Actual no. of government employees deducted plus another 5 percent to account for better off In the North East, 15 percent of affected were deducted eligible: all households in the bufferzone with no damage to their houses assumption: 10 % of the affected with no damage to their houses destitute households (lost income earner, no able bodied worker, high dependency ratio, FHH etc.) X X percent of the affected population sub-total TOTAL households = beneficiaries 16

17 46. Justification for the targeting criteria emphasizes displacement the loss of a house requires major new investments for livelihood recovery, putting families at risk of food shortages; emphasizes buffer zone where the most vulnerable (especially fishermen) were living prior to the tsunami and where government benefits to the affected are more delayed (permanent housing is provided more slowly than government and NGO assistance for rebuilding outside the buffer zone); transparent and clear-cut: the criteria recognizes limited local capacity for more sophisticated targeting as well as the pressures faced by local government officials if a system of subjective criteria is introduced; based on data collected and readily available at the GN level; offers a flexible contingency for the most destitute who are not eligible under the criteria; selection of these beneficiaries will be decided at the community level; VII. Longer-term relief-to-recovery programming through 2006 Food-for-Work initiatives 47. As most directly affected families will be receiving family rations through the end of the year, there is limited scope for FFW activities for tsunami-affected areas during Households who are not eligible for the VGF program have in theory regained capacity to meet their food needs due to some degree of recovery of livelihoods and/or receipt of transfers and other forms of assistance that come from various sources, including friends, relations and NGOs. In addition, these households (as well as those who are eligible under the VGF programme) are being targeted for livelihood recovery assistance by a large number of national and international NGOs. 48. However, if community-driven opportunities to establish FFW or FFW/Cash-for-Work programmes are identified they should be pursued, though care should be taken to ensure that labour market and beneficiary duplication concerns are addressed (see discussion immediately below). Beginning in 2006, with the VGF programme phased out, FFW/CFW initiatives are likely to be more feasible. These should be integrated into the WFP s PRRO (PRRO Sri Lanka Assistance to Vulnerable Groups for Peace Building in Conflictaffected Areas). 49. The special case of FFW in tsunami-affected areas: Under the on-going PRRO, FFW schemes are expected to simultaneously help rehabilitation of communal and individual assets and improve access to food for the conflict-affected people. The types of FFW activities addressed in the PRRO (rehabilitation of village infrastructure, land clearing, repairing houses, creating productive assets) are also largely applicable to the tsunami context. In addition, there could be other area-specific activities that may include land reclamation, cleaning-up of lagoons to revive fisheries activities, labor-intensive construction of protective bunds, environmental protection activities such as tree planting, rehabilitation/new construction of roads, rehabilitation of drainage and canal systems, preparation and construction of homesteads, and cleaning-up of dug wells. However, FFW programming within the VGF context that is, during would have to address two major issues related to labor market conditions and potential duplication of food issues. 17

18 50. Labor market issue: Planning of FFW activities in the PRRO takes into consideration fluctuations in labor supply in the market that are fashioned by the demand for labor in the agricultural sector. Economic activities in the areas coming under the PRRO are predominantly agricultural, with an overwhelming focus on rice cultivation. The major (Maha) rice season runs from September/October to February/March and the lean (Yala) season runs from March/April to July/August. PRRO activities are generally focused on the Dry Zone, where an active Yala season often does not exist due to insufficient rainfall. Hence, labor availability is highest in the dry period from April to September in the Dry Zone. In the tsunami-affected areas, which lie both in the dry zone and the wet zone, the agricultural sector is far less important than the fisheries sector and the tourism sector. In these sectors, seasonality for labor demand is much less pronounced than in the agricultural sector. Relatively long periods of surplus labor availability may not be forthcoming, making planning and implementation of FFW activities a difficult task. 51. Another potential challenge would be labour already available under cash-for-work (CFW) activities that are being implemented by a relatively large number of NGOs. The mission observed that the wage rates offered in CFW schemes ranged between Rs.300 to Rs.450 per day. The family food ration given in FFW activities works out to not more than Rs.125 per day. 4 This potential competition for labor from the CFW activities implies that FFW activities may have to go to areas that are not covered by CFW activities. 52. Duplication of food recipients: The presence of two types of food delivery programs - one through FFW activities and the other through the VGF program - in the same areas could result in some households obtaining an excessive amount of food relative to the norms of food distribution to ensure household food security. Households receiving food rations under the VGF program may be enticed to participate in FFW activities because of the potential income enhancement that results from such participation. Given that FFW is a self-targeting mechanism, new stipulations/regulations may be necessary to avoid duplication of food transfers to same households. This entails a somewhat intensive degree of policing, which may not augur well for a humanitarian assistance program. 53. These issues related to FFW will be much less relevant in 2006 and beyond, when all recovery activities in the tsunami-affected areas could be absorbed into the PRRO. The number of FFW beneficiaries in the PRRO originally planned for 2006 stood at 257,000; this number is now increased to 300,000, allowing about 43,000 new additions from the tsunami-affected areas. Cash-for-Work (CFW) initiatives 54. Because of the relatively well-functioning market in much of the tsunami-affected areas, the mission also briefly examined the feasibility and desirability of contributing to the recovery of household food security through cash-for-work programmes or combined FFW and CFW programmes. The mission finds certain practical reasons why it may not be feasible for WFP to engage in CFW activity. FFW and CFW are essentially self-targeting mechanisms. The basis for a self-targeting decision by an individual is the opportunity cost of his/her labor and time. In other words, the participant has to be convinced that he/she would be better-off by participation in the program because any alternative opportunities available bring lower benefits. If WFP is to initiate a CFW program, the level of the cash 4 The indicated value of the individual food ration for a week in the present GFD program is Rs

19 payment will be guided by the value of the food rations that is typically provided in its FFW activities or GFD activities. The value of this ration for a family of five for a day is approximately Rs.125, compared with the average market wage rate of about Rs.300 for unskilled labor. This wage rate is a reflection of the interaction between the supply of labor and the demand for labor in the market. WFP will not be able to attract labor for its CFW activities at the substantially lower wage rate it is obliged to offer. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact the other development actors are offering CFW at much higher wage rates than Rs.300 per day and the general view is that such activity will continue to be available at least until the end of According to preliminary data collected by the ILO Labor-based Infrastructure Program, Colombo, Sri Lanka, funds allocated for cash CFW and livelihood enhancement projects by donors and INGOs amount to more than 250 million dollars. 55. It appears that most of the current CFW activities attempt to transfer incomes to the able-bodied persons in the affected areas by engaging them in socially useful activities, such as debris cleaning. The dominance of the income transfer element is evident in the fact the labor is paid wages equal to or above the market rates, implicitly to attract labor for types of work they are not been used to traditionally. In this sense, these CFW activities cannot be viewed from the traditional motivation for CFW as providers of last resort with an in-built self-targeting mechanism. They compete in the market and have tended to distort labor market relations by offering wage rates much higher than the market rates. The latter issue is being addressed by TAFREN, which is handling donor coordination in the livelihoods support sector. 56. One could rightly argue that Rs125 wage rate could be offered to any one who is willing to work for that rate (self-targeting). One cannot rule out the possibility that this rate may attract some persons. However, given the large gap between the market rate and the Rs125 rate, WFP may not be able to mount a project of the size required for effective engagement of its resources. Food-for-Livelihoods 57. In PRRO Sri Lanka , one of the objectives of using food assistance is to rehabilitate the livelihoods and food security of the targeted households through rehabilitation and creation of individual assets involving such activities as clearing land, repairing houses and creation of productive assets. This objective could hold equally well for targeted assistance to people/households affected by tsunami. In other words, WFP could use its FFW modality to assist rehabilitation or creation of livelihoods among affected populations. However, the bulk of potential FW activities is community-based (rehabilitation of rural infrastructure, environmental protection measures, land reclamation, drainage, canal repairs) and is only indirectly related to individual livelihood rehabilitation. The approach of the PRRO should be modified to include individual livelihood rehabilitation and in particular housing repair and reconstruction. 58. Food aid can serve as an income transfer to more needy members of a community (in the most badly damaged areas) who are trying to rebuild their homes. For the poorest sectors of the affected population, access to government grants for reconstruction is likely to be difficult (e.g., establishing past land records, accessing local government services, coming up with the family contribution to construction, etc). This is probably even more the case in conflict-affected areas of the North and East where government services are uneven 19