Democratizing the Enemy: The Japanese American Internment. Brian Masaru Hayashi (2004)

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1 Marybeth O Connor Raynham Middle School B RRSD Democratizing the Enemy: The Japanese American Internment Brian Masaru Hayashi (2004) The internment of Japanese Americans during World War II is often referenced as one of America s most embarrassing episodes. It is compared, unfavorably, to the treatment of suspected German or Italian sympathizers who were imprisoned only if there was information they might actively be working against the American government. Since all Japanese Americans were put into internment camps the assumption for many years has been that it was a race based decision exhibiting bias against the people who don t look like us. The residents of these camps have been portrayed as loyal Americans bewildered and fearful of their imprisonment who were harshly treated. An image kept alive by those seeking reparations in the 1970s and 1980s. Brian Masaru Hayashi s Democratizing the Enemy: The Japanese American Internment presents a much different image of the residents of these World War II internment camps and a more nuanced reason for the possible necessity of them. Following the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 (and the reparations it required) documents, both private and public, were released for study. Hayashi makes use of these documents to capture the victims viewpoints but also to explain the complexity of its causes and consequences. (page 8) His study uses three different camps Manzanar, Topaz, and Poston that represented the variety of economic, educational, and political backgrounds of both the internees and the governors. The internees also had the mix of Japanese born residents (Issei), American born residents (Nissei) and American born but Japanese educated residents (Kibei). He uses primary source 1

2 documents but chose not to use the camp newspapers or oral interviews because he felt they did not accurately relate what occurred in the camps (page XV). Hayashi makes use of the anthropological studies done by both Euro Americans and Japanese Americans of the camps at the time of internment. In addition to studying events at the camps, governing choices, and resident reactions, Hayashi also looks deeply at the relationship and conflicts of race, culture, and loyalty. Hayashi first examines the backgrounds of the governors of the camps, finding those with a military or a more conservative political background desiring a prison like environment where the administration would set the rules of the camps. The progressives with backgrounds more toward the social sciences believed the internees should govern themselves as much as possible. The self governing model was the one used. The irony was that this approach resulted in more, not less, conflicts between the governors and the governed. (page 106) The lower level administrators, who were often from the local community and had less education than the top administrators, were the most biased against the Japanese Americans and least likely to treat them fairly. The backgrounds of the internees were also very diverse. The spectrum included those from Northern California who, for economic reasons, had many ties to other ethnic groups including Euro Americans. And, were often better educated and of a higher income bracket than their Southern California counterparts. This led to political organizations, like the Japanese Association in northern California, to work across ethnic line to secure their socioeconomic status and interests (page 51). They worked for success and permanency in the United States. The leaders of these organizations often became the leaders in the camps, at least initially. 2

3 Los Angeles area contained wealthy Japanese Americans but they did not have the cross ties of northern California. There were also higher numbers of poorer and less educated community members. Southern California Japanese Americans were economically on the fringe with small businesses concentrated in their ethnic neighborhoods. They were not as committed to permanent settlement. They sent more money back to their villages in Japan. Some believed they would return there. The political organizations in this area often helped raise money for Japan in the war against China, buying both personal items and military hardware. The extreme other end of the spectrum was on Terminal Island off the coast of Southern California where only 14% owned any property, a third intended to return, and the most commonly used language was Japanese. Even the Euro American children on the island spoke it. (page 65) Among the southern California residents were some whose loyalty to Japan was demonstrated by passing on to the Japanese government detailed information of Los Angeles Harbor and the Panama Canal Zone (page 65). Knowing that a war with Japan would most likely occur, the federal government began taking steps to remove any risk from the Japanese American community. This included the freezing of financial assets. Then, after Pearl Harbor, the internment of those identified as enemy aliens. This was not unlike their treatment of Germans suspected of aiding the enemy. (Italians were not worrisome since FDR said they were nothing but a bunch of opera singers page 77). This was also not any different from what other countries were doing with resident aliens from enemy countries. The change to large scale internment started with the military necessity of removing West Coast Japanese. Part of the idea of military necessity was public sentiment, such as racial antagonism against those of Japanese descent. (page 78) There was also the political pressure from other countries in the 3

4 Western Hemisphere who were interning the Japanese (both resident aliens and citizens) in their own countries. This included Canada and Mexico (page 82). And the final justification for the Japanese internment was anticipation of harsh treatment of American civilians in Japan and Japanese controlled territory; giving the American government hostages to influence the behavior of Japan towards American prisoners. The location of the camps was based on a variety of issues. Each of the three camps studied had different objectives in the decision. Poston, in Arizona, was chosen for its water rights. The Southern Reserve of the Colorado River Indian Tribes reservation was large and had water rights to the Colorado River. Locating a camp there would further secure the rights and would begin the land development for the Hopi Indians scheduled to occupy the area (page 88). The reaction of the Indians on the local reservation was antagonistic to both the camp internees and administrators. In retrospect, this attitude was probably valid as the government charged them for the improvements, never completed the land development, and the water rights were taken to the Supreme Court in Ultimately, few Hopi Indians were able to live on this land. (page 207) Topaz in Utah was welcomed by the local community. The land was considered marginal and the inclusion of a camp could only improve the situation. Unfortunately, following the dismantling of the internment camp in the late 1940s, the locals did not profit from it as the physical structure and equipment was sold to private and governmental agencies outside the area. Owens Valley, California was the site of Manzanar. It was the most hostile of the communities as the locals saw it as a significant drain on local resources and a veiled attempt by Los Angeles City to take more local land. (page 89) Ironically, Owens Valley profited the most from the camp, both local businesses that had steady camp clientele and post war low priced building sales and equipment donations to the community. (page 208) 4

5 The Japanese Americans who were to be interned were, for the most part, accepting of their fate. They saw it as an inevitable outcome of war, as refuge from anti Japanese violence, and some even hoped their cooperation would secure the release of family members arrested by the FBI. Once in the camps, the Japanese Americans were give limited self government. Arranged in blocks, with representatives from each, and camp councils, internees were expected to control daily activities and short range policymaking with the understanding that administrators retained veto power over all decisions. The initial rules also required those selected for these positions to be Nissei or American born and educated. They were often less competent in the Japanese language, better educated, had property in the United States and leaned pro American. Ultimately, this led to conflicts within the camps. Support for Japan, or pro Japanese sentiments, did not automatically mean anti American attitudes. Japan, through the intermediary of the Spanish Consulate, promised postwar reparations and relocations. The opportunities after the war (which they believed would end either in a negotiated peace treaty or the defeat of United States) made support logical (page 122). Those who contemplated an American victory feared that the hatred and discrimination against Japanese would only increase, making repatriation or expatriation to Japan a choice for protection. There was a group who promoted American loyalty. Unfortunately many in this group spied on their neighbors and became informants for the FBI. Called inus, or dogs, these informants were central to the riots in the camps and the later requirements for loyalty oaths. The information passed on to the FBI caused widespread arrests in the camps. This caused groups to begin searching for the informants and publicly identify and punish them. Most internees supported inu beatings (page 129). This conflict was further inflamed by the JACL s (Japanese American Citizens League) petition to stop the Japan backers 5

6 within the camp and induct loyal Japanese Americans into the armed forces (page 129). At Poston, it resulted in a strike where internees were so angry that they marched to Japanese martial music carrying the Rising Sun flag. It was primarily a protest against informants and the FBI. The end result was the movement of the strike organizers to other camps as well as relocation of the pro American faction. This left a leadership void that was filled by internees with less extreme, more moderate views. The strike at Poston and a similar riot at Manzanar also began a propaganda campaign by federal officials to improve the public perception of the internees. The first step was to segregate those who were loyal by having them answer a series of questions. This would assure the American public and industry of their loyalty. Then those loyal would be allowed to relocate outside the camps if they wished. Two questions in particular caused widespread problems, numbers 27 and 28, asked about their willingness to serve in the armed forces and to foreswear any allegiance to Japan and its Emperor. The military then used them to enforce the draft to American born males of the correct males living within the camps. They formed Japanese American combat teams as well as integrating some into the regular units for the propaganda value of showing Japan that it wasn t a race based war. These questions were problematic for the internees. If they answered as loyal to the United States, would it hinder future reparations as promised by the government of Japan? Would it put them in an awkward position should Japan win? Why should a draft eligible male serve while living as a prisoner of war since that would violate the Geneva Convention? Why should they be tools of the American military propaganda machine? Through a combination of intimidation and coercion, most answered the loyalty questions positively. Those who did not, were expected to repatriate to Japan after the war. They were moved to another camp for the duration. Interestingly, 26% of the repatriates and expatriates were from Terminal Island (page 155). 6

7 Towards the end of the war, after those who wished to relocate had been moved out of the camps and those wishing to stay loyal to Japan were moved to other camps, little disruption occurred in the running of the three camps studied. The U.S. government was disappointed in the lackluster response to conscription of soldiers and the request for relocation. But, by this time, the internees were trying legal, court driven means to change the draft, protect their property, and increase their civil rights. Finally, by January 1945, the Western Defense Command (military) terminated the exclusion of all Japanese Americans based on ancestry, while retaining the rights to exclude individuals. The reaction by the residents of the camps to this announcement was unexpected. most residents were sad rather than glad, listening in hushed silence rather than in celebration of the U.S. Army s announcement of the lifting of mass exclusion. (page 192) The cause of this reaction was varied. Some feared the loss of promised Japanese reparations if they left. Those whose economic situation prior to the war was poor and had no savings or property to fall back on preferred the camp. It provided housing, food, medical, education, entertainment and even income if they worked outside the camp. The camp was also a source of protection from the potential mistreatment outside. Most wanted reparations from the American government to subsidize their relocation (pages ). By the end of the war, internees were focused on themselves and their ability to relocate than on the collective. The unconditional surrender of Japan forced the closure of the camps, the inevitability of relocation in America with no hope of reparations from Japan. Post war America proved far less harsh than the internees feared. While they did suffer from some harassment and discrimination, the overall situation showed a decline in legal discrimination. The hated Anti Alien Land Law was overturned by Unfortunately, the internees lost significantly more financially compared to American citizens in Asia. They received only $37 million in compensation for 7

8 losses estimated at $350 $400 million in the late 1940s and $1.2 $3.1 billion (1983 dollars) in the 1980s (page 214). It also increased the number on welfare following the war. The increase in Los Angeles County alone was from two dozen prior to the war to thousands after it(page 214). Analysis of the organization of the camps and the behavior of the internees was used to make decision in future military and government decisions. Hayashi ends the book with the example of Toshio Yatsushiro, an American Operations Missions researcher in 1966, who recommends that a small village in northeast Thailand not be put under martial law for their possible assistance to their communist neighbors. Instead, the government should eliminate economic woes as best possible and allow local self determination. This recommendation was based on his study of the internment camps. This one example of democracy learned from the Japanese American internment camps of World War II does leave the title of this book open for criticism. It isn t clear which enemy was democratized by the internment camps. Still, the book has substantial information about the establishment and administration of the camps, political attitudes of the Japanese American community before and during internment, and an explanation of military necessity that goes beyond racial discrimination. It is a presentation of the internment camps beyond the fearful and bewildered, loyal Americans imprisoned because of their race. It shows the diversity of the people living in the camps and of their opinions. There is no justification sufficient for the internment of all Japanese Americans without regard to their potential for treason. But Hayashi s book allows us to see that there are many sides to the story. 8

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