Democratic Consolidation, Non-consolidation or Deconsolidation: Evidence from East Asia

Transcription

1 Democratic Consolidation, Non-consolidation or Deconsolidation: Evidence from East Asia Chong-Min Park Department of Public Administration Korea University (Preliminary draft Not for citation) Prepared for the delivery at the 25th World Congress of Political Science organized by the International Political Science Association, July 21-25, 2018, Brisbane, Australia

2 Since the third-wave of democratization reached the region in late 1980s, there have been six democratic transitions across East Asia: the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, Thailand, and Indonesia. With Japan, the only second-wave democracy in the region, they constituted the democratic part of the region: the oldest democracy in the region (Japan); two affluent democracies with a legacy of economic development under authoritarian development (South Korea and Taiwan); the most populous Muslim democracy in the world (Indonesia) and the most populous Catholic democracy in the region (Philippines); the most unlikely democracy from the communist world (Mongolia) and a one-time democratic role model for its neighbors (Thailand). In the context of East Asia, more than a decade ago Doh Shin and Jason Wells (2005) asked: to what extent are the new East Asian democracies consolidated? To what degree do East Asians embrace democracy as only game in town? By using public opinion data drawn from the first round of Asian Barometer Survey (then East Asian Barometer Survey), they concluded that it is only in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan that democracy is the only game in town and that in these three economically prosperous countries distinguishable from other poorer countries such as Mongolia, the Philippines and Thailand can democracy at present be considered well on the way to consolidation. In view of a recent debate about democratic deconsolidation across the established democracies of North America and Western Europe (Foa and Mounk 2016 and 2017; Inglehart 2016), there is no better time than now to reexamine the question in the context of East Asia. Thanks to a series of ABS data collected over more than decade since the early, we are in a better position to determine to what extent East Asian democracies are consolidated or deconsolidated. In this paper we examine public support for or commitment to democratic principles and norms and explore the mass-level attitudinal foundations of democracy across the democratic part of East Asia. In doing so, we seek to ascertain to what extent East Asia democracies are consolidated or deconsolidated. Democratic Transition in East Asia Since democratic consolidation assumes the installment of an electoral democracy, this study - 1 -

3 includes seven East Asian counties: Indonesia, Japan, Mongolia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Japan, a second wave-democracy, had been the sole democracy for a long time before third-wave democracies emerged across the region in the late 1980s. East Asia s first third-wave democracy appeared in the Philippines in 1986 when a popular movement ended the country s longstanding dictatorship. South Korea s transition took place with the adoption of a democratic constitution and founding election in Taiwan, whose transition began that same year with the lifting of martial law, held its first presidential election almost a decade later in Mongolia made a rapid transition to democracy in 1990, abolishing one-party communist rule and holding its first multiparty election in more than sixty years. Thailand transition to democracy began in 1992, but its democracy was interrupted by a military coup in After years of political turmoil, a democracy reemerged in 2010 but broke down with another military coup in With the third wave of democratization being at an ebb, Indonesia embarked on the transition to democracy in 1998 with the forced resignation of a longtime autocrat and the holding of open, multiparty parliamentary elections in 1999 (Chu et al. 2008; Fung and Drakeley 2014). Freedom House s Freedom in the World assigns the designation electoral democracy to countries that meet certain minimum standards for political rights and civil liberties. 1 Since the publication of Freedom in the World , Freedom House has listed electoral democracies. For the entire period Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia have been designated as electoral democracies; the Philippines have been designated as an electoral democracy except between 2007 and 2009; Thailand, except between 2006 and 2010 and between 2014 and the present; and Indonesia has been designated as an electoral democracy since the transition. For the 2001 to 2016 period covered by the four rounds of Asian Barometer Survey, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, and Indonesia all have been rated as electoral democracies. By contrast, during the period the Philippines suffered one democratic breakdown and Thailand, two since the democratic transitions. The Polity IV project evaluates the authority characteristics of polities on a single autocracy- 1 Freedom House s electoral democracy designation is distinguished from liberal democracy which implies a more robust observance of democratic ideals and a wider array of civil liberties

4 democracy scale from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The Polity IV scores are converted into three regime categories: autocracies (-10 to -6), anocracies (-5 to +5), and democracies (+6 to +10). Japan has maintained a democracy with a score of 10 over 65 years since 1952; South Korea, a democracy with a score of 6 or 8 over 29 years since 1988; Taiwan, a democracy with a score of 7, 8, 9 or 10 over 24 years since 1992; the Philippines, a democracy with a score of 8 over 30 years since 1987 (no democratic breakdown); Mongolia, a democracy with a score of 9 or 10 over 25 years since 1992; and Indonesia, a democracy with a score of 6, 8, or 9 over 17 years since Thailand had been a democracy with a score of 9 or 8 over 14 years since 1992 but became an anocracy with a score of -5, -1 or 4 between 2006 and It was upgraded as a democracy with a score of 7 between 2011 and 2014 and downgraded as an anocracy with a score of - 3 since For the 2001 to 2016 period Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, the Philippines, and Indonesia have always remained democracies. The only exception is Thailand. For this study we rely on a series of public opinion data drawn from Asian Barometer Survey (ABS). The survey represents the first comparative survey project monitoring support for democracy in East Asia. For more than a decade since 2001 four rounds of ABS haven been conducted across much of the region. In this study we include seven cases of democratic transition. The first round of ABS includes six cases (Japan, Mongolia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand) while the other rounds add one more case (Indonesia). The data points covered by ABS constitute the period between the early and the mid-). 2 The number of data points analyzed for each sample country ranges from a low of three to a high of four. It should be emphasized that a few data points make it hazardous to determine whether changes, if any, constitute trends or simple fluctuations. Consolidation, Non-consolidation or Deconsolidation Democratization or democratic transition begins with the breakdown of the former authoritarian regime and ends with the establishment of a democratic regime (O Donnell and Schmitter 1986; 2 The survey year of each round of ABS for each country is as follows: Japan (2003, 2007, 2011 and 2016); South Korea (2003, 2006, 2011 and 2015); Taiwan (2001, 2006, 2010 and 2014); Mongolia (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014); the Philippines (2002, 2005, 2010 and 2014); Thailand (2001, 2006, 2010 and 2014); and Indonesia (2006, 2011 and 2016)

5 Huntington 1991; ). The process of consolidating a democracy begins where democratic transition ends (Gunther et al. 1995). But how do we distinguish consolidated democracies from nonconsolidated ones? In their study of the transition to and the consolidation of democracy, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) propose a narrow definition of democratic consolidation which combines behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional dimensions. Their working definition of a consolidated democracy entails: (1) Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede from the state; (2) Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society such as theirs and when the support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces; and (3) Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process. According to them, a democracy is consolidated when it has become the only game in town. The mass-level attitudinal dimension emphasize that democracy becomes the only game in town when the majority of the citizenry hold the view that democratic methods and procedures are the most appropriate way to govern the country. Principled and reliable commitment to democratic principles and institutions among the majority of the population constitutes the attitudinal foundation of democratic consolidation. In his approach to democracy in developmental perspective, Larry Diamond (1999) emphasizes that the essence of democratic consolidation is a behavioral and attitudinal embrace of democratic principles and method by both elites and mass. According to him, consolidation takes place in two dimensions-attitudinal and behavioral- and at three levels-elites, organizations, and mass public. Although it is one of six domains, mass attitudes are crucial to consolidation. He considers democratic - 4 -

6 consolidation the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine. At the mass level, there must be a broad normative and behavioral consensus on the legitimacy of democracy. The installment of electoral democracy or democratic transition cannot be equated with democratic consolidation (O Donnell 1996). A democracy cannot be regarded as consolidated unless there is broad and deep public support for democratic principles and institutions. The mass-level attitudinal foundation of democratic consolidation emphasizes that ordinary people must exhibit reliable commitment to democracy as the only game in town. No doubt mass attitudes are not the sole determinant of the fragility or robustness of democracy. Nonetheless, as Diamond points out, mass attitudes work in combination with other factors in consolidating democracy. By acknowledging the important role of the attitudes and norms of the mass public, Gunther et al (1995: 17) believe that if a significant portion of a population were to question the legitimacy of a regime and its key institutions, reject democratic rules of the game, or regard an authoritarian alternative as preferable to the current democratic regime, we conclude that consolidation is incomplete. High levels of mass support for democracy alone do not make a democracy become consolidated. However, a lack of reliable mass commitment to democracy undermines the stability of a democracy. Democratic transition emphasizes that a new political regime must embody the procedural minimal conditions of democracy that it distinguishes itself from the previous non-democratic regime. It is the opposite of democratic breakdown. Democratic consolidation involves the stability and persistence of the new political regime. Hence, it emphasizes that the new democracy must be seen as the only game in town that a return to some form of authoritarian rule is no longer likely. It should be distinguished from non-consolidation which indicates that the new democracy is not yet to be seen as the only game in town that it is uncertain whether it will continue or not. Democratic deconsolidation emphasizes that the consolidated democracy is no longer seen as the only game in town that a return to some form of authoritarian rule is not unlikely

7 Research associated with democratic transition emphasizes a narrow definition of democracy because it is important to distinguish a new political regime deemed democratic from the old political regime deemed authoritarian. When a new political regime embodies the minimal conditions of democracy such as free and fair elections, universal suffrage and multiparty competition (Dahl 1971), democratic transition is said to be complete. Since the process of consolidating a democracy begins where democratic transition ends, democratic consolidation draws on this minimal definition of democracy (Mainwaring 1992; O Donnell 1996). Keeping these conceptual distinctions in mine, we now turn to the analysis of a series of public opinion data collected over more than a decade. Support for Democracy The attitudinal foundation of democratic consolidation includes principled and reliable commitment to democracy among a strong majority of the population. Over more than a decade ABS asked East Asians to choose among the following three statements they agree most: (1) Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government ; (2) Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one ; (3) For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a nondemocratic one. This question has been widely used to measure popular beliefs in democratic legitimacy. However, its main drawback is that it uses the term democracy and unfortunately the meaning of democracy differs from one respondent to another. Bearing this in mind, we examine how East Asians answered this question over time (See Table 1). In the early, Thailand (84%) displayed the highest level of mass support. Strikingly, Thais were most enthusiastic about the idea of democracy. Its support level was even higher than that found in Japan (69%), the oldest affluent democracy. Even in the Philippines (65%) a two-thirds majority expressed unconditional support for democracy. In Mongolia (55%) a majority, if not a large majority, expressed such support. By contrast, only less than half in South Korea (49%) and Taiwan (43%) subscribed to the first statement, suggesting nostalgia for economic development under authoritarian rule. (Table 1 about here) - 6 -

8 Over more than a decade since the early the pattern of change in support for democracy differed from one country to another. In Japan public support for democracy displayed little change (from 69% in 2003 to 68% in 2016). South Korea displayed a large rise especially for the last decade (from 49% in 2003 to 63% in 2015). Taiwan showed a steady increase for a decade up to the early (from 43% in 2001 to 51% in 2010 and 46% in 2014). Over the entire period surveyed South Koreans and Taiwanese became more confident in democracy. As to support for democracy, Mongolia, the Philippines, and Thailand are distinguishable from South Korea and Taiwan. In Mongolia mass support for democracy displayed a downward trend (from 55% in 2002 to 44% in 2014), with a cyclical fluctuation. A similar pattern was found in the Philippines (from 65% in 2002 to 47% in 2014). Thailand is the most notable case, deserving of our attention. While in the early it displayed the highest level of mass support, it displayed a large decline over the period surveyed (from 84% in 2001 to 51% in 2014). As compared with other East Asian counties, its level of support for democracy still remained high. However, just over a decade, mass support for democracy declined by 33 percentage points. In the 2006 survey conducted just before a military coup, which overthrew the democratically elected government of Thaksin, Thais expressed less support for democracy than they did five years ago. In the 2014 survey conducted just before another military coup, which overthrew the democratically elected government of Yingluck, mass support for democracy declined to the lowest level for the entire period surveyed. Indonesia, the most recent case of democratic transition in the region, displayed a slight decline over a decade (from 64% in 2006 to 58% in 2016). If a two-thirds majority is used as a minimum threshold for the mass-level attitudinal dimension of democratic consolidation, in the mid- only Japan and South Korea meets or nearly meet this criterion. In general, democracies in East Asia appear to suffer from a weak and less reliable mass support. When offered the choice between democracy and authoritarian government, the majority of the population does not always embrace democracy as the only legitimate form of government, suggesting that popular opposition is less likely when faced with democratic backsliding

9 Support for Authoritarian Alternatives The attitudinal foundation of democratic consolidation at the mass level emphasizes not only support for democracy but also rejection of authoritarian alternatives. When support for democracy is not accompanied by rejection of authoritarian alternatives, support for democracy may not be deep and robust. If support for democracy coexists with support for authoritarian alternatives, support for democracy would be superficial and even hollow. In this section we examine public support for three common forms of authoritarian rule civilian autocracy, military dictatorship and one-party rule (See Table 2). Support for strongman rule. First, ABA asked East Asians whether they agree or disagree with the proposition that We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things. Affirmative responses to the question indicate rejection of democratic institutions such as elections and parliament. The first panel of Table 2 shows the percentage of those favoring civilian autocracy. In the early, those favoring a return to strongmen rule constituted minorities in all six countries surveyed. However, the size of these minorities varies considerably. Mongolia (39%) displayed the highest level: nearly two in five Mongolians were supportive of overthrowing democratic institutions away. It was followed by the Philippines (30%), and Thailand (22%). By contrast, Japan (13%) displayed the lowest level. It was followed closely by South Korea (15%) and Taiwan (17%). Notable is that in the early in South Korea and Taiwan not majorities expressed unconditional support for democracy while only small minorities favored a return to strongman rule. Over more than a decade since the early, East Asian democracies exhibited different patterns of change in mass support for civilian autocracy. Japan (from 13% in 2003 to 12% in 2016) and Taiwan (from 15% in 2001 to 15% in 2014) displayed little change. By contrast, South Korea showed a slight rise (from 15% in 2003 to 20% in 2015). A similar pattern was found in Indonesia where those favoring a return to strongman rule grew (from 10% in 2006 to 15% in 2016). Over the entire period surveyed, nonetheless, those favoring civilian autocracy always constituted small minorities in these - 8 -

10 countries. In the Philippines (from 30% in 2002 to 28% in 2014) the size of those supporting strongman rule did not diminish over the period surveyed. In Thailand (from 22% in 2001 to 33% in 2014) the size of those supporting civilian autocracy grew after a series of political convulsions in the early. The most striking case is Mongolia displaying a large increase (from 39% in 2002 to 62% in 2006, 54% in 2010 and 64% in 2014): those favoring a return to civilian autocracy constituted the majority of the population for the past decade, suggesting that public commitment to democratic institutions such as parliament and elections has been greatly diminished over time. (Table 2 about here) Support for military rule. We now turn to support for military dictatorship. ABS asked East Asians whether they agree or disagree with the statement that The army (military) should come in to govern the country. The second panel of Table 2 shows the percentage of those favoring military government. In the early military government was the least popular form of authoritarian rule across the democratic part of the regime, with the exception of the Philippines, where 36% would welcome military rule. In other East Asian democracies those favoring a return to military dictatorship constituted only small minorities of their publics (a low of 1% for Thailand to a high of 12% for Mongolia). Over more than a decade since the early, mass support for military dictatorship remained low in Japan (from 2% in 2003 to 3% 2016), South Korea (from 10% in 2003 to 9% in 2015), and Taiwan (from 6% in 2001 to 4% in 2014). By contrast, in Thailand those favoring a return to military rule swelled from 1% in 2001 to 12% in A similar pattern was found in Mongolia where support for military rule increased (from 12% in 2002 to 20% in 2014). Despite its long history of militarybacked authoritarian regime, in the mid- support for military rule in Indonesia remained lower than that in the Philippines and Mongolia, but grew over the past decade (from 8% in 2006 to 14% in 2016). The most striking case is the Philippines, where support for military rule remained substantial, - 9 -

11 although it declined over the period surveyed (from 36% in 2002 to 28% in 2014). The Philippines stands out as the only country where those favoring a return to military government nearly always constituted the majority of the population. Support for one-party rule. We now turn to support for one-party rule. ABS asked East Asians whether they agree or disagree with the statement that Only one political party should be allowed to stand for election and hold office. 3 Affirmative responses to this question reflect rejection of the electoral principle of democracy which emphasizes multiparty contestation for power. The third panel of Table 2 shows the percentage of those favoring one-party rule. In the early Thailand displayed the lowest level of support: nearly no one endorsed one-party rule. It was followed by South Korea (13%) and Taiwan (15%), where those in favor of one-party rule constituted small minorities. Notable is that in Japan, where one party ruled over several decades, more than one in five were in favor of one-party rule. Strikingly, the Philippines (30%) displayed the highest level of support. It was followed closely by Mongolia (26%). In these countries more than one-quarter of their publics favored a return to one-party rule. Over more than a decade since the early, East Asian democracies displayed different patterns of change in support for one-party rule. Japan displayed a steady decline (from 22% in 2003 to 15% in 2016). A similar pattern of change was found in Taiwan (from 15% in 2001 to 8% in 2014). South Korea displayed a steady increase since the mid- (from 7% in 2006 to 14% in 2015). Similarly, Mongolia displayed an increase, especially for the past decade (from 26% in 2002 to 31% in 2014). By contrast, the Philippines showed a slight decline for the last decade (from 33% in 2005 to 28% in 2015). As noted above, in the early nearly no one in Thailand endorsed one-party rule but in the mid- one in ten favored a return to one-party rule. Notable is that Indonesia displayed a rise in support for one-party rule over the past decade (from 5% in 2006 to 15% in 2016). Despite the recent increase, support for one-party rule in Thailand and Indonesia was still far lower than that in Mongolia and the Philippines. 3 The first round of ABS used a somewhat differently worded question, which read Only one political party should be allowed to compete for power

12 Support for authoritarian rule. The last panel of Table 1 shows the percentage of respondents who were supportive of at least one form of authoritarian rule over the period surveyed. This captures popular affinity for authoritarian rule. In the early East Asian democracies displayed varying levels of support for authoritarian rule. Taiwan (23%) displayed the lowest level of support. It was followed by Japan (28%) and South Korea (28%). In these affluent democracies those favoring some form of authoritarian rule constituted minorities of their publics. By contrast, the Philippines (60%) displayed the highest level of support. It was followed by Mongolia (54%) and Thailand (52%). In these poorer countries those favoring some form of authoritarian rule constituted the majorities of their publics. After more than a decade since the democratic transition mass support of authoritarian rule remained prevalent in these new democracies, suggesting weak attitudinal foundations of consolidation at the mass level. Over the period surveyed popular affinity for authoritarian did not diminish in all countries surveyed. Japan (from 28% in 2003 to 15% in 2016) and Taiwan (from 23% in 2001 to 19% in 2014) displayed a steady decline. South Korea (from 28% in 2003 to 28% in 2015) displayed no change. For the period surveyed those favoring some form of authoritarian rule always constituted small minorities of their publics (a low of 15% to a high of 28% for Japan; a low of 15% to a high of 28% for South Korea; and a low of 19% to a high of 23% for Taiwan). Thailand displayed a slight increase (from 52% in 2001 to 56% in 2014) after a decade of decline. Mongolia displayed an increase (from 54% in 2002 to 67% in 2014) with a cyclical fluctuation. By contrast, Indonesia displayed a slight increase (from 33% in 2006 to 36%) for the past decade. The Philippines displayed a steady decline (from 60% in 2002 to 51% in 2014). Despite different patterns of change, popular affinity for authoritarian rule remained deep and strong in Mongolia, the Philippines and Thailand, suggesting that the mass-level attitudinal foundations of consolidation have diminished over the last decade. Considering mass support for each form of authoritarian rule, Mongolia becomes more susceptible to civilian autocracy or one-party dictatorship, if not military dictatorship. The Philippines remain susceptible to any form of authoritarian rule including military

13 dictatorship. Thailand becomes more susceptible to civilian autocracy, if not one-party or military dictatorship. The findings presented above raise questions about whether East Asian democracies are consolidated as the only game in town. If free and fair elections, universal suffrage, and multiparty competition for power constitute key institutions of electoral, if not liberal, democracy, the results suggest that democracies in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are consolidated as electoral democracies, although there remains some nostalgia for authoritarian rule in South Korea and Taiwan. By contrast, democracies in Mongolia, the Philippines and Indonesia are not yet to be consolidated even as electoral democracies. In these countries high level of mass support for democracy appear to coexist with high levels of mass support for authoritarian rule. There seem notable differences in popular attraction to authoritarian alternatives between more affluent democracies and poorer democracies in the region. Support for Democracy: Electoral or Liberal Democracy means different things to different people. Hence, responses to a question which uses the word democracy draw upon different understandings of democracy (Coppedge and Gerring 2011). So, we select a set of questions which do not use the word democracy to discern the masslevel attitudinal foundation of democratic consolidation. Among different principles of democracy, we focus on some electoral and liberal principles. The electoral principle of democracy emphasizes institutions such as elections, political parties, and universal suffrage, while the liberal principle of democracy, institutions such as civil liberties, checks and balances, and rule of law. Given the availability of survey questions, we focus on universal suffrage (inclusive citizenship), checks and balances (independent judiciary and legislative control), and rule of law (law-abiding government). By analyzing mass support for these institutions of democracy, we explore whether East Asian democracies enjoy the attitudinal foundation of electoral or liberal democracy at the mass level. Support for inclusive citizenship. One of the institutions associated with electoral democracy is universal suffrage, which consists of the right to vote of all adult citizens regardless of

14 gender, literacy, wealth, social status, language, religion, race, or ethnicity. Universal suffrage includes not only the right to vote but also the right to run for public office. It emphasizes political equality of all citizens and inclusive citizenship. Hence, we consider mass support for universal suffrage or inclusive citizenship to constitute the attitudinal foundation of electoral democratic consolidation. Over more than a decade ABS asked East Asians whether they agree or disagree with the statement that People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly-educated people. Affirmative responses to the question reflect support for universal suffrage or political equality regardless of literacy. The first panel of Table 3 shows the percentage of respondents who endorse inclusive citizenship regardless of literacy. In the early mass support for inclusive citizenship regardless of literacy was overwhelming in Taiwan (84%), Japan (83%), Mongolia (80%), and South Korea (72%) where more than two-thirds majorities agreed with the statement. The only exception was the Philippines (56%) where a bare majority expressed such support. Over more than a decade since the early support for inclusive citizenship either rose or remained more or less the same. Japan (from 83% in 2003 to 83% in 2016), South Korea (from 72% in 2003 to 73% in 2015), and Mongolia (from 80% in 2002 to 84% in 2014) displayed not much change, despite some fluctuation over the past decade. Thailand also displayed little change over the last decade (from 76% in 2006 to 75% in 2014). By contrast, Taiwan displayed a steady increase (from 84% in 2001 to 90% in 2014). A similar pattern was found in the Philippines (from 56% in 2002 to 77% in 2014). Indonesia registered a modest decline over the past decade (from 79% in 2006 to 73% in 2016). While patterns of change differ from one country to another, in the mid- those endorsing inclusive citizenship regardless of literacy always constitutes majorities in all East Asians countries surveyed (a low of 83% to a high of 89% for Japan; a low of 72% to a high of 87% for South Korea; a low of 84% to a high of 90% for Taiwan; a low of 55% to high of 89% for Mongolia; a low of 56% to a high of 77% for the Philippines; a low of 75% to a high of 86% in Thailand; and a low of 73% to a high of 79% for Indonesia). (Table 3 about here)

15 In the context of East Asia women s suffrage may be more important for establishing inclusive citizenship. In the last two rounds of ABS, East Asians were asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement that Women should not be involved in politics as much as men. Negative responses to the question reflect support for inclusive citizenship regardless of gender. The second panel of Table 3 shows the percentage of respondents who endorse inclusive citizenship regardless of gender. In the early mass support for political equality between men and women was overwhelming across the democratic part of the region except for Indonesia. Those who endorsed inclusive citizenship regardless of gender constituted large majorities in Japan (92%), South Korea (86%), Taiwan (93%), Mongolia (72%), the Philippines (72%) and Thailand (77%). The only exception was Indonesia (52%) where only a bare majority of the population endorsed inclusive citizenship regardless gender. Over the period surveyed high levels of support changed little in Japan (from 93% in 2011 to 90% in 2016), South Korea (from 87% in 2003 to 84% in 2015), Taiwan (from 93% in 2010 to 92% in 2014), and the Philippines (from 71% in 2011 to 73% in 2014). By contrast, Mongolia (from 77% in 2010 to 67% in 2014) and Thailand (81% in 2010 to 73% in 2014) displayed a decline, although levels of support remained high. Notable is that support for inclusive citizenship regardless of gender did not grow in Indonesia (51% in 2011 to 52% in 2016). By counting pro-democratic responses to both questions, we examine how East Asians are committed to the electoral principle of democracy, namely universal suffrage or inclusive citizenship. As shown in the last panel of Table 3, in the early Taiwan (82%) displayed the highest level of support. It was followed closely by Japan (80%), Thailand (72%), South Korea (71%), and Mongolia (69%). In these countries more than a two-thirds majority endorsed inclusive citizenship. By contrast, in the Philippines (50%) and Indonesia (39%) only a half or a small minority expressed such support. Over the period surveyed high levels of support changed little in Japan (from 80% in 2011 to 77% in 2016) and Taiwan (from 82% in 2010 to 85% in 2014). By contrast, South Korea (from 71% in 2011 to 61% in 2015), Mongolia (from 69% in 2010 to 59% in 2014), and Thailand (from 72% in 2010 to

16 57% in 2014) displayed a decline. Low levels of support did not grow much in the Philippines (from 50% in 2010 to 55% in 2014) and Indonesia (from 39% in 2011 to 40% in 2016). Over the last decade surveyed those embracing inclusive citizenship always constituted large majorities in Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and Mongolia while bare majorities in the Philippines. By contrast, those endorsing inclusive citizenship always constituted minorities in Indonesia, suggesting that public support for democracy appears to be superficial or hollow. Support for independent judiciary. We now turn to support for checks and balances, one of the key institutions of liberal democracy. ABS asked East Asians whether they agree or disagree with the statement that When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch. Negative responses to the question reflect support for independent judiciary. The first panel of Table 4 shows the percentage of respondents endorsing independent judiciary. In the early South Korea (69%) and Mongolia (69%) displayed the highest level of support. They were followed by Japan (62%). Surprisingly, the number was lower in Taiwan (57%). In these countries those rejecting judiciary subservience to the executive consisted of majorities of their publics. The Philippines (38%) and Thailand (40%) were distinguishable from other East Asian democracies: only minorities were supportive of independent judiciary. Over more than a decade since the early East Asian countries displayed different pattern of change in support for independent judiciary. Japan (from 62% in 2003 to 69% in 2016) displayed a slight increase. South Korea (from 69% in 2003 to 68% in 2015) and Taiwan (from 57% in 2001 to 58% in 2014) displayed little change. By contrast, Mongolia (from 69% in 2002 to 50% in 2014) displayed a sharp steady decline. Thailand displayed a large cyclical fluctuation, perhaps responding to the politicization of the constitutional court: support for independent judiciary sharply dropped from 40% in 2001 to 28% in 2006 and then skyrocketed to 60% in 2010 and then again plummeted to 36% in The Philippines (40% in 2002 to 35% in 2014) displayed a slight decline. Striking is that Indonesia displayed a downward trend (from 56% in 2006 to 36% in 2016, with a decline of 20 percentage points just over a decade). Over the period surveyed those embracing independent

17 judiciary always or most of the time constituted majorities in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, and Mongolia while minorities in the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia. (Table 4 about here) Support for legislative constraints on the executive. We now turn to support for legislative control, another component of checks and balances. ABS asked East Asians whether they agree or disagree with the statement that If the government is constantly checked by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things. Negative responses to the question reflect support for legislative constraints on the executive. The second panel of Table 4 shows the percentage of respondents endorsing legislative control. In the early South Korea (54%) displayed the highest level of support. It was followed closely by Japan (51%) and the Philippines (51%). Only in these countries those favoring legislative control constituted majorities of their publics. Surprisingly, Taiwan (26%) displayed the lowest level of support, perhaps because of the excessive politicization of the legislature. In Mongolia (38%) and Thailand (48%) as well as Taiwan, those supporting legislative control constituted minorities of their publics. Over more than a decade since the early East Asian countries displayed different patterns of change in support for legislative control. Japan (from 51% in 2003 to 57% in 2016) displayed a modest increase. A similar pattern was found in South Korea (from 54% in 2003 to 57% in 2015). Notably, in Taiwan mass support for legislative control swelled from 26% in 2001 to 39% in 2014, although the level of support remained the lowest even in the mid-. Similarly, Mongolia (from 38% in 2002 to 46% in 2014) displayed a steady increase. By contrast, in the Philippines (from 51% in 2002 to 42% in 2014), Thailand (from 48% in 2001 to 41% in 2014) and Indonesia (from 56% in 2006 to 43% in 2016) mass support for legislative control declined. For the period surveyed those endorsing legislative control always constituted majorities in Japan and South Korea while always or most of the time constituted minorities in other East Asian democracies. Combining responses to both questions, we seek to ascertain the level of public support for checks

18 and balances that limit the use of executive power. As presented in the last panel of Table 4, in the early Japan (40%) displayed the highest level of support. It was followed closely by South Korea (39%). In the remaining countries the numbers were considerably lower (Mongolia, 30%; the Philippines, 25%; Thailand, 24%; and Taiwan, 18%). Over the period surveyed, mass support for checks and balances increased in Japan (from 40% in 2003 to 47% in 2016), South Korea (from 39% in 2003 to 44% in 2015) and Taiwan (from 18% in 2001 to 26% in 2014). It stayed more or less the same in Mongolia (from 30% in 2002 to 28% in 2014) and Thailand (from 24% in 2001 to 27% in 2014). By contrast, it declined in the Philippines (from 25% in 2002 to 21% in 2014) and Indonesia (from 37% in 2006 to 24% in 2016). Over the period surveyed no East Asian democracy ever enjoyed the majority support for the liberal principle of checks and balances. Those endorsing checks and balances always constituted minorities across the democratic part of the region. Support for legal constraints on the executive. Lastly, we turn to mass support for legal constraints on the executive, one aspect of rule of law. ABS asked East Asians whether they agree or disagree with the statement that When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation. Negative responses to the question reflect support for legal constraints on the executive. Table 5 shows the percentage of respondents endorsing this aspect of rule of law. In the early the majorities of their publics were supportive of legal constraints on the executive in most East Asian democracies except for Thailand. In South Korea (77%), Japan (73%) and the Philippines (70%) as well as Taiwan (60%) and Mongolia (59%) those endorsing law-based governance constituted either large or small majorities of their publics. By contrast, in Thailand only less than half of ordinary people were supportive of legal constraints on the executive. (Table 5 about here) Over the period surveyed Japan displayed little change. Notable is that Taiwan displayed a steady increase (from 60% in 2001 to 76% in 2014). By contrast, South Korea displayed a steady decline (from 77% in 2003 to 69% in 2015). A similar pattern was found in the remaining countries. Mongolia

19 (from 59% in 2002 to 37% in 2014), the Philippines (from 70% in 2002 to 59% in 2014), Thailand (from 49% in 2001 to 35% in 2014), and Indonesia (from 68% in 2006 to 52% in 2016) all registered either a modest or a sharp decline in support for law-based governance. Over the period surveyed those endorsing legal constraints on the executive always or most of the time constituted more than two-thirds majorities in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Conclusion: Consolidation, Non-consolidation or Deconsolidation of What? The emergence of electoral democracy or democratic transition cannot be equated with democratic consolidation (Carothers 2002). If electoral democracy should be distinguished from liberal democracy, the attitudinal foundation of electoral democratic consolidation should be distinguished from that of liberal democratic consolidation (Schedler 1998; Coppedge and Gerring 2011; Mechkova et al. 2017). In this study we distinguish between electoral democratic consolidation (a narrow definition) and liberal democratic consolidation (an expanded definition). We consider electoral democratic consolidation to indicate that the majority of the citizenry expresses support for the institutions of electoral democracy (or the rules of the democratic game, as outlined in a minimal definition of democracy). Similarly, we regarded liberal democratic consolidation as indicating that the majority of the citizenry expresses support for the institutions of liberal democracy. Considering the nature of liberal democracy, those favoring liberal democracy should be supportive of not only the electoral principle of democracy but also the liberal principle of limited government. However, those supporting electoral democracy do not necessarily favor the liberal principle of limited government. On the basis of our findings, we examine to what extent East Asians are support for the electoral or liberal principle of democracy. We measure support for electoral democracy by combining responses to two forms of authoritarian rule, namely strongman rule and one-party rule. We consider rejection of both strongman rule (meaning support for representative institutions such as parliament and elections) and one-party rule (meaning support for multiparty competition) to indicate support for electoral democracy as the outcome of democratic transition. We measure support for liberal democracy by combining responses to independent judiciary and legal constraints on the executive, both of which

20 are associated with the liberal principle of limited government such as checks and balances and rule of law. Table 6 shows the percentage of respondents supporting institutions associated with electoral or liberal democracy. As presented in the first panel of Table 6, over the period surveyed those endorsing electoral democracy (by rejecting both strongman rule and one-party rule) always constituted the majorities of the citizenry in Japan (a low of 59% to a high of 80%), South Korea (a low of 71% to a high of 79%), Taiwan (a low of 62% to a high of 76%) and Indonesia (a low of 65% to a high of 78%) while most of the time in the Philippines (a low of 46% to a high of 58%) and Thailand (a low of 47% to a high of 63%). By contrast, those endorsing electoral democracy always constituted the minority of its citizenry in Mongolia (a low of 29% to a high of 48%). Over the period surveyed public support for electoral democracy increased in Japan (from 59% in 2003 to 80% in 2016), Taiwan (from 62% in 2001 to 76% in 2014), and the Philippines (from 54% in 2002 to 58% in 2014). By contrast, it declined in South Korea (from 75% in 2003 to 71% in 2015), Mongolia (from 48% in 2002 to 29% in 2014), Thailand (from 54% in 2001 to 47% in 2014) and Indonesia (from 78% in 2006 to 65% in 2016). In the mid- those favoring electoral democracy constituted the large majorities in Japan (80%), South Korea (71%) and Taiwan (76%) while the minorities in Mongolia (29%) and Thailand (47%). Indonesia (65%) and the Philippines (58%) fall between them. The findings suggest that the democracies in Japan, South Korean, and Taiwan become consolidated as electoral democracies while the democracy in Mongolia is not yet consolidated as an electoral democracy. Indonesia seems on the way to electoral democratic consolidation. In the Philippines and Thailand, the mass-level attitudinal foundations for electoral democratic consolidation is not deep and reliable, suggesting the fragility of electoral democracy. (Table 6 about here) As presented in the second panel of Table 6, over the period surveyed, those endorsing the liberal principle of democracy (by supporting both independent judiciary and legislative constraints on the executive) always or some of the time constituted the majorities in South Korea (a low of 52 to a high

21 of 56%) and Japan (a low of 44% to a high of 55%). Strikingly, those endorsing the liberal principle of democracy always constituted the minorities in Taiwan (a low of 38% to a high of 49%), Mongolia (a low of 22% to a high of 40%), the Philippines (a low of 20% to a high of 28%), Thailand (a low of 14% to a high of 29%), and Indonesia (a low of 25% to a high of 43%). Over the period surveyed most East Asian countries suffered a decline in mass support for the liberal principle of democracy. Two exceptions were Japan (from 49% in 2003 to 55% in 2016) and Taiwan (from 38% in 2001 to 49% in 2014). Mongolia registered the sharpest decline (from 40% in 2002 to 20% in 2014). A similar pattern was found in Indonesia (from 43% in 2006 to 25% in 2016). South Korea (from 56% in 2003 to 54% in 2015), the Philippines (from 28% in 2002 to 23% in 2014) and Thailand (19% in 2001 to 17% in 2014) also marked a slight decline. In the mid-2010 those supporting the liberal principle of democracy constituted majorities or near majorities in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. By contrast, in the remaining countries those supporting the liberal principle of democracy constituted only small minorities of their publics. The findings suggest that Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are well on the way to liberal democratic consolidation. By contrast, Mongolia, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia lack the mass-level attitudinal foundation of liberal democracy. Overall, East Asians are less supportive of the liberal principle of democracy than the electoral principle. Support for democracy is not accompanied by support for the liberal principle of democracy. The majorities of the publics in most East Asian countries remain skeptical of the liberal principle of democracy such as checks and balances and rule of law. The findings suggest that the attitudinal foundation for liberal democratic consolidation is lacking across much of the democratic part of the region. Whether mass attitudes towards democracy are the product of existing institutions or their cause remains ambiguous. Nonetheless, that low or declining support for democracy often goes with democratic backsliding in some East Asian countries warns us against complacency about democratic consolidation in the region, especially in the midst of authoritarian resurgence around the world (Diamond et al. 2013)

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