Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A)

Transcription

1 AMY C. EDMONDSON REV: OCTOBER 21, 2002 Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A) At 8:45 p.m. EST on January 27, 1986, 32 individuals from three locations Huntsville, Alabama; Brigham City, Utah; and Merrit Island, Florida joined in a teleconference 12 hours and 53 minutes prior to scheduled launch of the Challenger Shuttle, known inside NASA as 51-L. 1 (Exhibit 1 lists attendees at each site). The three sites joined two organizations NASA and Morton Thiokol that were intimately involved in the Shuttle program. Roger Boisjoly, an engineer with Morton Thiokol, had instigated the telconference meeting upon hearing an Air Force weather forecast of 19 degrees Farenheit for the next morning at Kennedy Space Center in Merrit Island. Boisjoly had been increasingly vocal over the last few months about the performance of a component of the Shuttle design, the O-Rings, at low temperatures (Exhibit 2 lists events from the year prior to launch). What were the implications of this new weather forecast for the launch of the Challenger? National Aeronautics and Space Administration The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created in 1958 by the U.S. government one year after the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union. Although NASA was created as a civilian space exploration program, in many ways the organization was the expression of a military culture in which the goal was to establish U.S. dominance over the Soviet Union in space exploration. To this end, NASA received abundant funding from Congress and by 1969 the crew of the Apollo mission walked on the moon. Following Apollo, the goal of U.S. space exploration was to establish a permanent, manned space station. A three-point plan was presented to a nation that had become increasingly embroiled in the Vietnam War. Tight funding meant that plans for the space program were scaled down; in March 1970, Nixon approved the Space Transportation System (STS), the backbone of the three projects supporting NASA s long-term goal. History of the Shuttle Program The Space Transportation System, or Shuttle Program, was conceptualized as a fleet of reusable spacecraft that would reduce the cost of putting objects into orbit and essentially service the yet-to- 1 For Space Shuttle flights one through nine, NASA used the designation STS (Space Transport System). After STS-9 NASA changed the method on numbering missions: each flight was since designated by two numbers and a letter, e.g. 41-B. The first digit indicated the fiscal year of the scheduled launch ( 4 for 1984), the second digit identified the launch site ( 1 Kennedy Space Center, Florida, 2 Vandenberg Air Force Base, California), and the letter corresponded to the alphabetic sequence for the fiscal year ( B the second mission scheduled). Professor Amy C. Edmondson and Research Associate Laura R. Feldman prepared this case. This case was developed from published sources. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. Copyright 2002 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call , write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the permission of Harvard Business School.

2 Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A) be-developed space station. Continued financial constraints prompted NASA to accept a proposal from the Air Force to build the Shuttle to Air Force specifications (i.e. meet criteria for military use) in exchange for additional funding from Congress and the White House. However, the Air Force was unwilling to pay for some of the specifications that they required. A 1971 analysis by Mathematica, Inc. (a Princeton, New Jersey-based think tank), found that even with the Air Force-induced increase in development costs, the Shuttle Program could pay for itself if it were launched very frequently (over 30 times per year). Program survival was dependent on routine flights, recovering costs, and making money on commercial payload. 2 Funding for the STS program was scaled down to $5.1 billion; modifications to the Shuttle design reflected the lower-cost operation. A new design replaced the costly all-liquid fuel system with a mixed solid (Solid Rocket Booster, or SRB) and liquid (External Tank) system. The three components of the Shuttle included a reusable Orbiter, an expendable External Fuel Tank, and two reusable SRBs, shown in Exhibit 3. NASA divided responsibility for the Shuttle among three of its field centers: the Johnson Space Center in Houston dealt with the Orbiter; the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama was assigned the main engines, External Tank, and SRBs; and the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Merrit Island, Florida (the launch site), had to assemble the components. Morton Thiokol On November 20, 1973, NASA granted the contract to build the SRBs to the engineering firm Morton Thiokol. Two factors contributed to Thiokol winning this contract: 1) their bid was $100 million lower than those of the other competitors (Aerojet Solid Propulsion Co., Lockheed Propulsion Co., and United Technologies) and 2) they proposed an innovative modular design that would allow them to build the SRB components in Utah and ship them to Florida for assembly. The modular design relied upon O-Rings to seal its large yet narrow enough to transport through highway tunnels component parts. When assembled, each SRB was 149 feet in length (by comparison, the Statue of Liberty was 151 feet tall), 12.7 feet in diameter, and weighed 2 million pounds. Thiokol s segmented design was modeled after United Technologies 1950 s Titan III solid fuel rocket motor. 3 Unlike United s design, which relied on a single rubber O-ring, Thiokol used two O- rings to seal the joint between each segment and prevent blow-by, or leakage of hot gases during take-off (see Exhibit 4 for a drawing of the SRB and joint). Thiokol management assumed redundancy in design the similarity to United s successful Titan III motor and the double layer of O-rings would translate to safety in use. O-rings Problems with Thiokol s SRB design were uncovered as early as Analysis of a pre-flight hydroburst test found joint rotation between the clevis and tang did not apply the required amount of pressure to the O-rings for them to seal the joint properly. NASA and Thiokol officials continued 2 Payload is the load (including passengers or instruments) carried by a vehicle exclusive of what is necessary for its operation. The participation of civilian Christa McAuliffe, Payload Specialist for the Teacher in Space Project, was widely publicized, heightening media coverage of flight 51-L. 2 3 Thiokol s and United s SRBs differed in one significant way: United s SRB was designed for a single use while Thiokol s was intended for repeated usage.

3 Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A) to monitor two conditions erosion of the primary O-ring and blow-by both of which reduced the integrity of the joint seal. If the primary O-ring was eroded then the secondary O-ring, instead of serving as a backup, could actually reduce the chances that the joint would seal. Erosion of the primary O-ring on the November 1982 STS-5 flight prompted NASA to increase the criticality rating of the primary O-ring. 4 However, this change was not thoroughly communicated within Thiokol. Boisjoly, an engineer of 27 years and an expert on booster seal joints, performed post-flight analysis on SRBs recovered from the Atlantic Ocean. Boisjoly learned of the reclassification only in He became increasingly alarmed about seal failure following the April 29, 1985 launch of flight 51-B in which both O-rings in the nozzle joint eroded, the primary O-ring by two-thirds of its diameter. Despite the higher criticality rating, NASA responded to the mounting risk by waiving launch constraints on a case-by-case basis, rather than grounding the entire fleet of Shuttles. One contributor to the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident observed the decision-making involved was A kind of Russian roulette... (The Shuttle) flies (with O-ring erosion) and nothing happens. Then it is suggested, therefore, that the risk is no longer so high for the next flights. We can lower our standards a little bit because we got away with it last time... You got away with it, but it shouldn't be done over and over again like that. 5 In July 1985 Thiokol formed an unofficial seal task force to solve the O-ring problems. Along with data from previous Shuttle launches, the task force focused attention on a test from March of that year demonstrating O-ring rigidity and failure to seal at low temperatures. Dissatisfied by Thiokol s attitude towards the task force and the seal problem, Boisjoly wrote a memo to his boss, Bob Lund, in which he warned of the catastrophic consequences of uncorrected O-rings (the memo is reproduced in Exhibit 5). Following receipt of the memo, Boisjoly was accused of histrionics by Joe Kilminster, VP for Space Booster Programs, in the Thiokol cafeteria. In an October 4, 1985 SRM Seal Problem Task Team Status memo Boisjoly wrote: The team generally has been experiencing trouble from the business-as-usual attitude from supporting organizations. Part of this is due to lack of understanding of how important this task team activity is and the rest is due to pure operating procedure inertia which prevents timely results to a specific request 6 January 27, 1986 A teleconference between several Thiokol and NASA officials convened at 5:45 p.m. EST to discuss Thiokol s concerns and recommendation against launch before noon due the effect of low temperatures on SRB joints. The teleconference ended by scheduling a second conference for 8:45 that evening, allowing more personnel to be present and adequate time for Thiokol to prepare materials for facsimile to KSC and MSFC. (Exhibit 6 shows the materials transmitted by fax from Thiokol to NASA at the beginning of the 8:45 p.m. EST meeting). 4 Criticality ratings indicated the degree of uncertainty involved with the reliability of a component or system. 5 Source: Report to the President By the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Vol II, Appendix F. Available at l/docs/rogers-commission/chapter-6.txt (accessed October 10, 2002). 6 Source: Ibid, Appendix D. Available at (accessed October 10, 2002). 3

4 Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A) Exhibit 1 Teleconference Attendees Present at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Huntsville, Alabama 1. George B. Handy, Deputy Director, Science and Engineering 2. Judson A. Lovingood, Deputy Manager, Shuttle Projects Office 3. Leslie F. Adams, Deputy Manager, SRB Project 4. Lawrence O. Wear, Manager, SRM Project Office 5. John Q. Miller, Technical Assistant, SRM Project 6. J. Wayne Littles, Associate Director for Engineering 7. Robert J. Schwinghamer, Director, Material and Processes Laboratory 8. Wilbur A. Riehl, Chief, Nonmetallic Materials Division 9. John P. McCarty, Deputy Director, Structures and Propulsion Laboratory 10. Ben Powers, Engineering Structures and Propulsion Laboratory 11. James Smith, Chief Engineer, SRB Program 12. Keith E. Coates, Chief Engineer, Special Projects Office 13. John Schell, Retired Engineer, Material Laboratory 14. Boyd C. Brinton, Morton Thiokol Manager, Space Booster Project 15. Kyle Speas, Morton Thiokol Ballistics Engineer 14. Cecil Houston, MSCF Resident Manager, at KSC 15. Stanley R. Reinartz, Manager, Shuttle Projects Office 16. Lawrence B. Mulloy, Manager, SRB Project Present at Morton Thiokol Wasatch Division Brigham City, Utah 1. Jerald Mason, Senior Vice President, Wasatch Operations 2. Calvin Wiggins, Vice President and General Manager, Space Division 3. Joe C. Kilminster, Vice President, Space Booster Programs 4. Robert K. Lund, Vice President, Engineering 5. Larry H. Sayer, Director, Engineering and Design 6. William Macbeth, Manager, Case Projects, Space Booster Project 7. Donald M. Ketner, Supervisor, Gas Dynamics Section and Head Seal Task Force 8. Roger Boisjoly, Member, Seal Task Force 9. Arnold R. Thompson, Supervisor, Rocket Motor Cases 10. Jack R. Kapp, Manager, Applied Mechanics Department 11. Jerry Burn, Associate Engineer, Applied Mechanics 12. Joel Maw, Associate Scientist, Heat Transfer Section 13. Brian Russell, Manager, Special Projects, SRM Project 14. Robert Ebeling, Manager, Ignition System and Final Assembly, SRB Project Present at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Merrit Island Florida 1. Allan J. McDonald, Morton Thiokol Director, SRM Project 2. Jack Buchanan, Morton Thiokol Manager, KSC Operations Source: Report to the President By the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1, Chapter 5. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Available at (accessed October 15, 2002). 4

5 Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A) Exhibit 2 The year leading up to the launch Challenger Flight 51-L was originally scheduled for July 1985, but by the time the crew was assigned in January 1985, launch had been postponed to late November to accommodate changes in payloads. The launch was subsequently delayed further and finally rescheduled for January 22, 1986.! January Boisjoly discovers serious erosion of the O-rings from the Discovery (51-C).! March Preliminary tests at Thiokol suggest that O-rings do not work as well in low temperatures.! April O-ring failure in nozzle joint occurs at launch temperature of 70 degrees. NASA requests full review of rocket joints.! August Thiokol management briefs NASA on all joint seal problems. NASA concludes it is not an issue worth grounding the entire fleet and tells Thiokol to fix it as they go along.! January 12, Columbia (61-C) lifts off after a record-setting seven delays over 25 days.! January 21, NASA announces it is seeking bids for a second source (besides Thiokol) to supply SRBs.! Late January, Several delays to the Challenger mission because of weather.! January 27, Dan Rather stated on the CBS evening news, Yet another costly, red-faces-allaround space-shuttle-launch-delay. This time a bad bolt on a hatch and a bad weather bolt from the blue are being blamed. Launch rescheduled for 9:38 a.m., January 28, Sources: Adapted by casewriter from Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996; and from materials used by Action Design Associates in conjunction with video to teach interpersonal skills for organizational learning. 5

6 Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A) Exhibit 3 Space Shuttle Systems Artist s drawing depicts the Shuttle stacked for launch in view from dorsal side of Orbiter (left) and from the left side of stack. Source: Report to the President By the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1, Chapter 1. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Available at (accessed October 10, 2002). 6

7 Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A) Exhibit 4 Thiokol s Solid Rocket Booster 7

8 Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A) Exhibit 4 continued Thiokol s SRB joint Source: Report to the President By the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1, Chapter 4. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Available at (accessed October 10, 2002). 8

9 Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A) Exhibit 5 Boisjoly s memo to Bob Lund 9

10 Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A) Exhibit 5 continued Source: Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Appendix D. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Available at (accessed October 10, 2002). 10

11 Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A) Exhibit 6 Facsimile from Thiokol to NASA officials Source: Report to the President By the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1, Chapter 5. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Available at (accessed October 10, 2002). 11

12 Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A) Exhibit 6, continued Source: Report to the President By the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 4, Hearings of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident: February 14, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Available at (accessed October 10, 2002). 12

13 Exhibit 6, continued Plot of Flights with O-Ring Incidents versus Weather-Induced Joint Temperature Source: Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1, Chapter 6, p 146. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Available at (accessed October 11, 2002).