Understanding Public System Management In Bihar: The Case of Kosi Floods

Transcription

1 Understanding Public System Management In Bihar: The Case of Kosi Floods Independent Research Project Submitted to Prof. Shambu Prasad & SRC Members By Joseph Sebastian U /7/2009

2 Acknowledgment I take this opportunity to thank Xavier Institute of Management (XIM), Bhubaneswar, for providing us with the opportunity of pursuing an area of academic interest in the form of an Independent Research Project (IRP). I owe a special thanks to my guide, Dr. C. Shambu Prasad, for allowing me to undertake the IRP on the Kosi floods in Bihar, despite the restrictions imposed by the distance and the class schedule to go there for data collection and interview. Without his guidance and suggestions it would not have been possible for me to complete this work. I am grateful to Prof. Shambu for introducing me to the actor oriented approaches and guiding me to apply the actor oriented tools for the institutional analysis of Kosi flood management system. I also express my sincere gratitude to the student research committee (SRC) members, Prof. S. Peppin and prof. S.S Singh for their guidance and suggestions. I am greatly indebted to Dr. Dinesh Kumar Mishra on whose writings I have relied upon as the most authentic account on the Kosi River and flood management. His painstaking efforts for two decades on behalf of the embankment victims have produced the most researched and complete accounts of the river, the embankment strategy and the plight of the embankment victims. I am especially grateful to him for his valuables suggestions on the timeline of the events related to Kosi River and flood control measures prepared based on his book, Trapped! Between the Devil and Deep Waters. Finally I also thank my companions for all their assistance, support and encouragement. Joseph Sebastian 11 th February 2009 ii

3 Table of Contents List of Acronyms... v Executive Summary vi 1.Introduction Scope of the Paper Methodology A Brief Overview of the Kosi river and Flood Control Measures 4 2.1The Characteristics of the Kosi River The History of Flood Control Measures in Kosi Basin The Colonial Era: Pre independence The Post independence Actor oriented Approaches for Institutional Innovation The Rationale for Actor oriented Tools The Actor Oriented Approach The List of Major Actors in Kosi Flood Management System Actor Linkage Map Actor Linkage Map of the Kosi Project Actor Linkage Matrix Determinants Diagram Analysis The Saga of Neglect and Mismanagement Human Folly and Kusaha Breach Plethora of Institutions: Messy affair of The issue of Indo Nepal Coordination.18 iii

4 4.3 The Harvesters of the forth Crop The Social Cost of the Embankments Ecological Disaster, Reduction in agriculture Productivity Performance of the Irrigation Projects Human Tragedy Public System Management in Bihar Key Indicators: Health of the State Reasons for Backwardness The Mismanagement of the Social Delivery System The Burden of Inertia The Silver Lining: The Success Stories of Participatory Governance The Way Forward: Institutional Innovation Conclusion 28 Bibliography.29 Annexure 31 Annexure 1: The integrated Timeline of Various Events Related to Kosi Project 31 Annexure 2: Determinants Diagram: Alternative Flood Management..41 Annexure 3: Determinants Diagram: India Nepal Link..42 iv

5 List of Acronyms ALM BMA CAG CIHRCP CWC CWPC CWINC CGWB CSO EKMC GFCC GoB GoI GoN HDI KMSS KHLC KPVP MEA NHDR PWD WKC WRD Actor Linkage Matrix Barh Mukti Abhiyan Comptroller and Auditor General Central Irrigation and Hydrodynamic Research Centre Poona Central Water Commission Central Water Power Commission Central Water Irrigation and Navigation Commission Central Ground Water Board Civil Society Organisations Easter Kosi Main Canal Ganga Flood Control Commission Government of Bihar Government of India Government of Nepal Human Development Index Kosi Mukti Sangharsh Samiti Kosi High Level Committee Kosi Pirit Vikas Pradhikar Ministry of External Affairs National Human Development Report Public Works Department Western Kosi Canal Water Resource Department v

6 Executive Summary On 18 th August 2008, the Kosi River breached its embankment at Kusaha in Nepal, upstream of the Kosi barrage, changed its course and shifted over 120 km eastwards, rediscovering channels it had abandoned over 250 years ago. The surging waters of Kosi got the state administration completely unawares despite warnings and its disaster preparedness was in total disarray. The Kosi flood was a severe indictment of the public system management in Bihar. Apart from the misery and destruction it unleashed, for once, the 2008 flood exposed the culture of neglect and the burden of inertia that characterize the public administration in Bihar as never before. It also exposed the myth of the only we know attitude of the experts. The paper underlines the necessity of system approach in dealing with complex issues such as Kosi floods. Any development intervention in a natural context must be treated as a natural innovation system. The study proposes the actor oriented approaches and tools as effective instruments in promoting institutional innovations by mapping the linkages and information among the actors, coalitions and networks. Actor oriented tools can thus effect institutional change by altering the perceptions of development actors and encouraging them to engage with the social and political context of their activities in a holistic and constructive manner. The actor oriented tools can be used in tantrum with the traditional project management tools for diagnosis, planning, implementation and monitoring of any project. Moving beyond treating the case of Kosi floods as an isolated, one of its kind system failures, effort has been made in this paper to link the Kosi story to the extreme backwardness of the state. Bihar s backwardness cannot be comprehended with umbrella terms such as poverty or Bihari politics. They fail to capture the role of institutions and the alienation of people and civil society from them. What is really aimed at in this paper is to bring forth the importance of the role of institutions and the underlying processes for the successful implementation and management of a development intervention. vi

7 1. Introduction On 18 th August 2008, the Kosi River breached its embankment at Kusaha in Nepal, upstream of the Kosi barrage, changed its course and shifted over 120 km eastwards, rediscovering channels it had abandoned over 150 years ago. This was the channel in which Kosi flowed between the 1850 and The surging waters of Kosi got the state administration completely unawares despite warnings and its disaster preparedness was in total disarray. According to the official sources, till 23 January 2009, 993 villages spread over 35 blocks in 5 districts were hit by the resultant floods. The flood waters engulfed lakhs people residing over 3.4 lakh hectares of land, killing 530 persons and 10,844 cattle besides destroying 2,85,798 houses. While the Chief Minister, Nitish Kumar described the flood as a pralaya, catastrophe, the Prime Minister declared it a national calamity and sanctioned 1000 cr. towards relief and rehabilitation. Whatever name one may call it, 2008 flood was above all a severe indictment of the public system management in Bihar. After every disaster, what occupies the centre stage is the acrimony and blame game between state and central governments and among various departments within the state. Apart from the misery and destruction it unleashed, for once the 2008 flood has highlighted not only the culture of neglect and the burden of inertia 1 that characterizes the public administration in Bihar, but also exposed the emptiness of the we know attitude of the experts as never before. The 2008 flood also raises many questions about the embankment strategy as an effective flood control measure. It speaks volumes about the systemic failure and lack of coordination among various agenesis in flood management, maintenance of embankments and disaster preparedness. The big question, therefore, is how much of it is due to human folly and how much of it is due to the river s fury. If embankments are not the ideal solutions, how did they come about? How were people managing the fury of such turbulent Himalayan rivers before the advent of embankments? Can we prepare and enable people to live with the inevitable minimizing damage and displacement? These are important questions that need to be engaged in for a long time to come. How inclusive and diverse this dialogue is going to be? Will the common people, their experience and expertise find a respectful hearing from the so called technical experts? 1 This phrase was used by economist, Jean Dreze and Haris Gazdar in their book titled Utter Pradesh: The Burden of Inertia. However I was introduced this phrase from a report titled Utter Pradesh and Bihar: the burden of inertia URL: accessed on 26/8/2006 1

8 Moving beyond treating the case of Kosi floods as an isolated, one of its kind system failures, effort has been made in this paper to link the Kosi story to the extreme backwardness of the state to understand the deeper reasons behind the dismal record of public system management. In this regard, system approach and the actor oriented tools are used to unravel the internal dynamics of Kosi flood management system. The insights and conclusions are applied to the larger context of institutional innovation as a remedy for the malfunctioning of public system management in Bihar. 1.1 Scope of the Paper The scope of this paper is to highlight the importance of actor oriented approach to facilitate discussion and dialogue regarding development interventions in highly complex natural innovation systems leading to institutional innovations. This study attempts to apply three actor related tools namely, Actor Linkage Map, Actor Linkage Matrix and Determinants Diagram to study the Kosi Project and flood management system in Bihar. The multiplicity and complexity of the institutional actors involved and the long time frame of the project makes this a herculean task. It is virtually impossible to map relationship and information flow between all the key actors. What is aimed at in this paper is to map the coalition and alliances and the flow of information within them and with other actors to facilitate an assessment of the present scenario and point towards the possible future course of action. The ultimate aim of this paper is however to link the Kosi story to the general backwardness of the state and draw some conclusions regarding public system management in Bihar. What is really aimed at is to bring forth the importance of the role of institutions and the underlying processes for the successful implementation and management of a development intervention. The case of Kosi floods is used as an entry point and a representative phenomenon of any development intervention in the state. The paper also emphasizes the importance of system thinking and actor oriented tools for diagnosis, planning, implementation and monitoring of any project. 1.2 Methodology This study will be mostly based on the available literature and secondary data. Constrained by time, class schedule and distance it was not possible to have gone to Bihar and collected primary data for the work and interviewed the key actors. This is a major limitation of the study. However sincere attempts are made to gather divers yet authentic information regarding Kosi flood management system. The major source of data has been the writings of Dr. Dinesh Kumar Mishra. Particularly his recently published book, Trapped! Between the Devil and Deep 2

9 Waters has been the main resource book. Apart from this, his entire articles published in Economic and Political Weakly along with articles of other scholars too form part of my reference. The study has also benefitted from the discussions on Kosi that have emerged in cyberspace as well as the representation of Kosi in some earlier e groups recently. Firstly, with respect to the specific case of the Kosi river and flood management, an attempt is made to reconstruct the story of Kosi flood management system, its embankments and breaches, and the political economy behind it through constructing a detailed timeline of all the important happenings related to Kosi. Secondly, through the use of actor oriented tools and approaches an effort is made to highlight key actors, their networks, alliances and coalitions by mapping the information flow among different actors. These tools are used as diagnostic, dialogical and in futuristic perspective for further discussion and action. It is suggested that actor oriented tools might be able to provide better insights in public policy than conventional economic assessments and these tools could also be used by policy makers to further dialogue and information flow amongst the various stakeholders. Finally, based on the insights gained in the above analysis, a humble attempt is made to look at the public institutions and its administration in Bihar to see how it is related to the underdevelopment of Bihar. The key socio economic indicators of the state are compared with the national average and the performance of other states to arrive at institutional mismanagement as the main reason for the backwardness of Bihar. The analysis of the Kosi floods is used as a case to drive home the need for system approach and participatory decision making for the efficient management of development initiatives. However, before engaging with the actor oriented tools and institutional analysis, it is essential to acquaint ourselves with a brief overview of the Kosi River, the Kosi project and the complexity associated with it for a better understanding of the key actors, their relationships, alliances and information flows. 3

10 2. A Brief Overview of the Kosi River and Flood Control Measures 2.1 The Characteristics of the Kosi River The Kosi River, a major tributary of Ganga river system, is a trans boundary river between India and Nepal. The river originates at a height of 7000m in the Himalayan mountain ranges spreading its upper catchment area in both Nepal and Tibet. The total catchment area of the Kosi is estimated to be 74,030 sq.km, of which only 11,410 sq.km falls within Indian territory (Mishra, 2008). For the last two and a half centuries, the Kosi has changed its course 120 km from east to west and in the latest beach of 18 th August 2008 at Kusaha the river once again started flowing through channels which it had abandoned years ago. This maundering nature of the river is attributed to the high sediment load it carries during monsoon season. Counted among one of the most silt laden rivers of the country, the Kosi, is called the sorrow of Bihar as it has caused immense misery and displacement of people due to its volatile nature and frequent flooding. The volatile and maundering nature of the Kosi River is just one aspect of its enigmatic presence. The Kosi is also the life line of the people of Mithila region in Bihar. It is ingrained in the history, myth, legend, and folklore of the place. The stories and songs are the symbolic expression of the common people about the overwhelming presence of Kosi. Accordingly, Kosi is experienced and perceived as life and death, prosperity and destruction, a mother and an enchanting virgin. These songs and stories remind us two important things while dealing with Kosi that viewing Kosi only as a destructive river that needs to be tamed is far from the truth and secondly, any effort to tame Kosi will be counterproductive. 2.2 The History of Flood Control Measures in Kosi Basin The first attempt to embank the Kosi was recorded in 12 th century AD when king Lakshmana II tried to tame Kosi by constructing a 32km long bund on western bank at Bhim Nagar in Supaul district. Though he earned the title Bir for this heroic activity, the project was abandoned immediately (Mishra, 2008) The Colonial Era: Pre independence The British, though initially toyed with the idea of embanking the river, having learned their lesson from the Damodar experience, left it to the indigo farmers and zamindars to deal with floods in their own individual capacities. Moreover the embankments along the Gandak River in 4

11 Bihar kept the British in tender hooks. In 1797 the colonial government spent Rs. 36,000 to repair these embankments but only to recover the entire amount from the zamindars later. The Gantak embankments gave way in 1872 and marooned more than 30 villages. 2 One more reason why the colonial dispensation refused to embark on a structural flood control route could be that the rivers in north Bihar have its origin in Nepal and any structural solution requires the full cooperation of Nepal as well. The British was not very keen on engaging with Nepal on this issue. This policy of allowing farmers to devise their own flood control measures resulted in numerous small bunds of low height and weak embankments. Nevertheless the British failed to see the utility of these indigenous flood protection measures. According to elders of the place as mentioned by Dr. Dinesh Kumar Mishra, Their function was to hold back small floods. After a stage, they used to prepare for breaching of the embankments did not breach on their own, they were cut en masse. Thus the floods were moderated automatically and the river was free to perform its duty of land building. The fields used to get the top layer water from rivers, containing the fertilizing silt. They were never cast with coarse sand and their fertility was never lost. 3 This policy of non interference with the rivers of north Bihar was a marked departure from the colonial practice of flood control as a political agenda in Orissa. Rohan D Souza of JNU describes the political economy behind the colonial flood control measures in Orissa delta beautifully in his remarkable book Drowned and Dammed. According to him, the many colonial attempts to dominate the region s rivers were inextricably entwined with imperatives for disciplining the local populace and forging specific economic and social relations. In the course of over a century of torturous hydraulic interventions, British colonialism brought a massive and unprecedented ecological rupture in the delta. To put differently, through the rubric of floodcontrol, the Orissa Delta was transformed from being a flood dependent agrarian regime into a flood vulnerable landscape. 4 (D Souza, 2006). The colonial response to floods in the rivers of eastern India was uncertain and confused. The sheer size and enormity of the water they carry were quiet new to the British. Initially, thinking that the raised mounds as breached embankments along the river, they tried to bridge the gaps and ended up building embankments unintentionally. The administration also made an attempt to strengthen the embankments and built some new one too. However frequent breaches, flooding and water logging forced them to abandon the embankment strategy. One thing is quiet certain that flood as an issue of natural disaster became prominent in India during the colonial dispensation. (Mishra, 2008) 2 Dinesh Kumar Mishra, Trapped! Between the Devil and Deep Waters, People s Science Institute and SANDRP, DehraDun, Uttarakhand and Delhi. P.15 3 Ibid. p Rohan Desouza, Drowned and Dammed Colonial Capitalism and Flood Control in eastern India, Oxford University press, New Delhi, 2006, p. ix (from the preface) 5

12 The colonial rule, even though refrained from constructing levees, contributed greatly to the worsening of flood situation in north Bihar by resorting to indiscriminate construction of roads and railway track for improved communication and transportation facilities which was a pressing need for then in the wake of the freedom struggle during The development of railways and roads were strategic requirements for the mobilization of military to maintain law and order, to repress any rebellion and for the exploitation of natural resources. Undoubtedly, these huge networks of railway lines and roads criss crossing the state improved the transportation and communication facility but simultaneously brought vast areas of agricultural land under water logging and flooding for most part of the year (Mishra, 2008). During the later period of colonial rule, for about 100 years, the debate over various flood control measures was very much alive with the pro and anti embankment engineers arguing their case with minimum or no political interference. The highlight of this lively debate was that there was a greater acceptance of the view of the anti embankment engineers and consensus towards policy of not tampering with the natural course of the river till the benefit of jacketing the river was conclusively established. The famous Calcutta conference on flood (1897) cautioned against any major flood control measures, except for small embankments. Subsequently the Patna flood conference in 1937 also voted against embankment strategy to tame the river. According to the chief engineer, G.F Hall, Embankments merely transferred trouble from one area to another and that they give rise to false sense of security. 5 (Rajive Sinha, 2008). Further investigation by C.G Inglis once again came to the same conclusion that the reason for the frequent vagaries of Kosi is the building up of submontaneous delta due to very large influx of silt load. The debate between the supporters of pro and anti embankment continued until The Post independent Scenario: the Kosi Project and Embankment Strategy However, the century old debate was deliberately put to rest after the independence under political expediency. And the decision not to embank the river was reversed. The severe floods in and the subsequent social and political pressure shifted the momentum in favour of the pro embankment lobby. Eventually under the cover of the findings of the Puna laboratory, government of India accepted Kosi Project in The decision to embank the river was more of a political decision as the engineers who opposed the construction of embankment suddenly found them technically feasible and sound. The Kosi Project (1953) was comprised of the following components: a) a barrage at Bhim Nagar in Nepal and an afflux bund, b) eastern and western embankments downstream of barrage, c) eastern and western canal system, d) 5 Rajive Sinha, Kosi; Rising Waters, Dynamic Channels and Human Disasters, Economic and Political Weekly, November 15, P. 44 6

13 hydroelectric power station in eastern canal, and d) a high dam at Barahkshetra. This was a multipurpose project that aimed at achieving three important goals in one go i.e., providing lasting flood control solution, increasing agricultural productivity by providing irrigation and generation of electricity. However there was wide spread opposition to this move from the beginning as they knew that their life would change forever for the worst if the embankments were constructed. The government, politicians and experts projected a rosy picture to the people about the benefits that are bound to occur and cajoled the opponents to participate with such acts of nation building (Mishra, 2008). On 14 January 1955 the foundation stone for Kosi project was laid by then Chief Minister of Bihar, Srikrishna Sinha near Bhutaha village close to Nirmali, in Saharsha district. Subsequently the foundation stone for the eastern embankment was laid by President Rajendra Prasad on 22 March 1955 near Bairia village close to Supaul. This project was meant to protect ha land on the country side from recurring floods. The Eastern and Western canal system were supposed to provide irrigation to 712,000ha. However, the myth of providing lasting and permanent solution to frequent flooding is exposed as the Kosi has already breached eight times after being embanked, the August 18 th 2008 breach at Kusala being a slap on the face of the experts and their structural flood control measures. In the wake of such dismal outcome, frequent breaches resulting in devastating floods, and the millions who are condemned to be trapped within the embankments, the question arises; what is the way out of this terrible mess that we have created? How can we ensure that future of course of action will not contribute towards further deterioration of already grim situation? It is in this regard that actor oriented approach and tools become handy as diagnostic, planning and monitoring tool that facilitate the process of dialogue, planning and action. 7

14 3. The Actor Oriented Approach for Institutional Innovation 3.1 The Rationale for Actor Oriented Tools The complex issue of Kosi river and flood management requires a change of perspective and a new approach to problem solving. It is a wicked problem and the usual simplistic piecemeal approach to such a complex issue must give way to broader perspective of system approach where the role and behavior of actors from the social, political, cultural, economic, technical and administrative arenas become crucial determinants of the outcome of the project 6 (Biggs and Messerschmidt, 2005). In other words, the Kosi River and the flood management must be conceived as an innovation system. By innovation system what is meant here is the system of all major social actors affecting the revealing, acknowledgment, generation and diffusion of technical and institutional knowledge over time 7 (Biggs and Matsaert, 2004). Here the focus is more on understanding the role of different actors in the processes of decision making, implementation. The system needs to be repaired through institutional change and innovation to make it more responsive, accountable and inclusive that development interventions in a natural innovation system be truly sustainable and beneficial to people and environment. Most important project management tools, such as, Log Frame approach focuses on activities and outcomes through specific, measurable indicators. They are arrived at through priority setting exercises with well defined goals, objectives, activities, outcomes and indicators in a time frame. This is an important planning and monitoring tool. This kind of monitoring and evaluation of a project is more analytical and quantitative in nature, using surveys, measuring the rate of return, resource allocation and timeliness etc. Often the success or failure of the project is measured through well defined indicators but what or who contributed to the success or failure is not focused. Thus in this activity-outcome approach what are often overlooked are the processes and linkages among various actors that determine the outcome. The actor oriented approach, on the other hand, primarily focuses on mapping the relationship and flow of information among various actors in a system to facilitate reflection and action (Biggs and Matsaert, 2004). These qualitative tools are developed from social sciences, such as, social network research, stakeholder analysis and anthropology. The actor-oriented tools can be effectively used to complement other planning tools such as Log Frame and other conventional 6 Stephen Biggs and Don Messerschmidt, Social Responsibility in Hand Made Paper Industry of Nepal, World Development Vol.33,N o.11 pp , Biggs S., Matsaert, H Strengthening Poverty Reduction Programmes Using An Actor Oriented Approach: Examples From Natural Resources Innovation Systems. ODI Agricultural Research & Extension Network. Network paper No

15 monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Actor oriented tools provide practical ways to monitor, document, and assess and thus legitimise crucial institutional strengthening activities. 8 (Biggs and Matsaert, 2004) 3.2 Actor Oriented Approach The success or failure of a project depends mainly on the linkage among key actors, coalitions, alliances and information flow among them. The first step towards application of any actor oriented tool is to identify the key actors. Key actors are persons or institutions whose roles and decisions have critical bearings on the progress of the project. They facilitate or prevent change. Accordingly in this approach it is always the people who make critical decisions who define the group. For example, it would be researchers and not research be the category, because research just does not happen. It is done by people (Biggs and Matsaert, 2004). 9 The term project is understood here in a broader sense that takes into consideration the entire context (natural innovation system) in which the development intervention is implemented. The critical actors, therefore, are identified from various stakeholders of a project based on their ability to influence the outcome positively or negatively. Similarly, coalitions and alliance represent the group of actors within a system having strong linkage and better information flow between and among them. The important tools used in actor oriented approach are: Actor linkage map Actor linkage matrix (ALM) Actor time lines Actor determinants diagram Actor learning and response analysis These tools can be successfully used for inclusive, participatory planning and policy making, better implementation and monitoring etc. As a diagnostic and implementing tool, actor oriented tools can be used to identify and change perceptions of various actors encouraging them to engage with the socio political context of the project in a productive way. The three actor oriented tools in this study are: actor linkage map, actor linkage matrix, actor determinants diagram. 8 Biggs S., Matsaert, H Strengthening Poverty Reduction Programmes Using An Actor Oriented Approach: Examples From Natural Resources Innovation Systems. ODI Agricultural Research & Extension Network. Network paper No Ibid 9

16 Before we proceed with the specific tools and its application, it is important to list the key actors of the Kosi flood management system. 3.3 The List of Major Actors in Kosi Flood Management System Policy Makers and Regulators Union Govt. Agencies Ministry of WRD Ministry of Irrigation Dept. Central Water Power commission (CWPC) Central Water Commission (CWC) Central Water Irrigation and Navigation Commission (CWINC) Central Ground Water Board (CGWB) Ganga Flood Control Commission (GFCC) MEA Bihar Govt. Agencies Ministry of WRD Ministry of Irrigation Dept. Nepal Govt. Agencies Ministry of WRD Ministry of Irri. Dept. Policy Implementers Quasi govt. agencies WRD/Irr.Dept/ Rehab.Dept. and other departments Kosi High Level Committee (KHLC) PWD MEA Kosi Project Authority/ Kosi Area Development Authority (KADA) Revenue Dept. Rehabilit ation & Flood Control Kosi Control Board /Kosi Pirit Vikas Pradhikar Flood control/ Disaster management Dept. Policy Influencers Research Institutions/ intermediaries Central Irrigation and Hydrodynamic Research Centre, Poona Geological Survey of India Irrigation Research Institute, Calcutta Politicians Proembankment engineers Bureaucrats Contractors Policy Suffers People People Entrapped People Affected by water logging People affected by decreased agriculture production Sufferers of repeated disasters Policy opponents Civil society Organisations Barh Mukti Abhiyan (BMA) Kosi Mukti Sangharsh Samiti (KMSS) Antiembankment engineers Other CSOs/ individuals 3.4 The Actor Linkage Map This tool is a diagnostic tool that captures the key actors, coalitions and flow of information in the form of a diagram for easy visualization and identification of the nature of information flow and networking operative in a project management system. While the arrow between the 10

17 actors represent the direction of the flow of information, the colour, thickness or type of line represent the strength or weakness or quality of this relationship and information flow. The actor linkage map will provide us with the information flow and networks that are actually existing and not the ideal representation as per the official documents or organogram Actor Linkage Map of the Kosi Project 11

18 The actor linkage map that is drawn above represents only the most important key actors and linkages associated with the Kosi project. Each key actor identified in the map has various other actors as part of it. For example, government of Bihar and its agencies include, water resource department, irrigation department, revenue department, public works department etc. Though it is ideal to capture all the independent actors individually, it is not possible in an actor linkage map. This is to avoid clutter of lines that makes the map very incomprehensible. In the absence of direct interaction with the actors, these linkages are drawn solely based on my reading and understanding of Mishraji s book. As the map reveals, there are three blocks of actors and four kinds of linkages. The first block contains Nepal, Indian, Bihar governments, their agencies along with the special agencies set up for the coordination, supervision and implementation of the Kosi project. The second set of actors forms politicians, contractors, bureaucrats, pro embankment engineers etc. They are the key actors whose influence on the decision making and implementation of the project is crucial. The third set of actors form the suffering people within and outside embankment, CSOs, anti embankment engineers who propose traditional ways of flood management with minimum interference with the nature. BMA and KMSS are selected as key actors as they have taken up the banner of those who are very adversely affected by this project. 3.5 Actor Linkage Matrix (ALM) The actor linkage map has its limitation and is basically used as start up tool for preliminary level of understanding and comprehension. A greater amount of detail can be incorporated into another tool called the Actor Linkage Matrix. The main advantage of ALM over actor linkage map is that it can accommodate greater number of stakeholders and the flow of information in a very intelligible manner in the form of a matrix. The key stakeholders are listed out on the vertical and horizontal axis of the matrix as shown above. The corresponding cell of any two actors, i.e., an actor in the row to an actor in the column, is used to represent the relationship, strength of information flow etc. With the help of this tool we are able to identify crucial links, coalitions, the type of relationship and the strength or quality of information flow. Ideally ALM is prepared based on interviews of the key actors or after discussing in detail with the key actors about the relationships and information flows. 12

19 Basically three kinds of linkages are identified: a) Weak linkage The flow of information is bare minimum and need based. b) Medium linkage The flow of information is again need based, target specific; the flow information is restricted. c) Strong Linkage there is a direct free flow of information between the actors. The colours represent the nature of linkage as represented in the legend. 13

20 3.6 Determinants Diagram Determinants diagram is basically a group discussion tool. This tool is employed to analyze the nature of a crucial linkage without which the project will not achieve its objective. Determinants diagram is very much similar to the problem tree. But here the strengthening and weakening factors of a particular linkage are assessed and the action plans for both scenarios are planned through group discussion. For the study here the two critical linkages identified are: The linkages government of Bihar needs to establish to initiate institution innovation to promote alternative flood management policy and India Nepal Linkage (Annexture 2&3). Therefore, two separate determinants diagrams are prepared depicting the strengthening and weakening factors and the steps to reinforce the strengthening factor and move towards creative actions. In the same way the diagram depicts the weakening factors and what steps to be taken to dilute the effect of the weakening factors and counter the negative outcome. As depicted above through various actor oriented tools, there is great asymmetry of information flow within the kosi flood management system. The present institutional processes and structures are dominated by the network of politicians, bureaucrats, contractors and experts. The policy sufferers and those who advocate alternative flood management policy are excluded or weakly linked to the powerful coalition of the policy makers, influencers, regulators and implementers. In the following section we shall discuss what this means in actual terms. 14

21 4. Analysis 4.1The Saga of Neglect and Mismanagement The big question we asked in the beginning, how much of this recurrent floods and devastation are due to human folly and how much due to river s fury needs to be examined to put the whole issue of flood management in perspective. The plains of north Bihar reel under the devastating effects of routine floods. While the geographical location makes north Bihar vulnerable to the surging waters of the Himalayan rivers during the monsoon, the devastation caused by the overflow of rivers could have been far less had there been an alert and responsive administration. The eight breaches that have occurred in the Kosi embankments between 1963 and 2008 reveal a series of shocking failures. The officials have attributed reasons such as, fox and rat holes, Nepal releasing water, anti social elements breaching the embankments to the latest version of climate change as the cause of these tragedies. It is nothing but experts way of misleading the public and evading responsibility and hiding their culpability. 10 To deal with the kind of volatility and unpredictability associated with the river Kosi we require an efficient, responsive administration at the state and the centre with proper coordination among intra government and inter government agencies, including a proper understanding with Nepal. An analysis of the 2008 flood and the role of various governmental agencies can help us to understand the fact that it is often the gross negligence, indifference and mismanagement by the state and central government that give birth to such calamities. Dr. Dinesh Mishra has in detail analyzed all the breaches prior to 2008 in his book Trapped! Between Devil and Deep Waters, and has effectively demonstrated with many individual accounts of the eye witnesses and people who were directly involved the callousness, neglect and the political economy that were responsible for those breaches. 11 Hence, special focus is given in this paper to the 2008 flood Human Folly and Kusaha Breach Ref: Embankments or should we say entombments? the interview of Dinesh Mishra published in The Hindu on 19/09/2008 URL: 11 Dinesh Kumar Mishra, Trapped! Between the Devil and Deep Waters, People s Science Institute and SANDRP, DehraDun, Uttarakhand and Delhi. pp This particular section is based in the articles published in the three national magazines; Outlook, september15, pp.40 43; India today, September 15, Pp

22 Every year before the onset of monsoons, the state WRD undertake the maintenance of the weak points of the embankments. Anti erosion work for last year was completed in 12 th June as per the recommendation made by KHLC on 27 th October However, according to the reports published in leading national magazines and news papers, in the first week of August 2008, when heavy downpour was reported in the catchment areas of the Kosi, the project Chief Engineer, E. Satyanarayanan, from Birpur had sent a series of messages to Project Liaison Officer Arun Kumar, stationed in Kathmandu, warning about the impending danger to the project and requesting him to initiate quick action. However, Arun Kumar was on leave. By then the Kosi had started attacking the embankment at Kusaha, upstream of the barrage in the Indo Nepal Border. He had also informed the senior officials in Patna about the seriousness of the situation and the imminent catastrophe. According Satyanarayanan he sent four emergency message to the state government between August 9 and 17 apart from the message sent to Arun Kumar. The first letter was faxed on August 9, the second on August 14, third on August 15, and when got no response, he sent a telegram. The fax connection at Kumar s office was disconnected due to non payment of bills. Even the ISD connection at Birpur office was withdrawn because phone bills were not cleared. 13 The fact that the state WRD sent its contractors and engineers on August 16 to assess the situation and carry out the repair work reveals the fact that Bihar government knew about the erosion. The contractors ran into trouble with the Nepali locals over an existing dispute between the contractors and Maoist led Young Communist League over the demand of higher wages. There are reports that Bihar government had not paid wages to about 2000 labourers. Durgananda jha, a contractor based in Hanuman Nagar, the barrage site, said he was not paid any money for a work on embankment in Though the contractors launched a complaint with the commercial counselor of the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu, there was delay in providing security by the local Nepali administration. It was also reported that the materials sent from India for the repair works, like boulders, were detained by the customs authorities though it was permissible as per the bilateral agreement between two countries. The Kosi River had no business to wait till the administrative delays were sorted out. Within a span of 11 days, about 1km of the embankment at Kusaha was swept away by swirling waters. Despite this, the irrigation and flood control department in its bulletin on 17 th August 2008 claimed that the embankments were safe. Similarly the Central Flood Control Room in its bulletins on August 16 and 17 also claimed that the embankments under the Water Resource Department were safe. 15 The state government had crucial two weeks between 5 th August the day when the erosion started and 18 th August, the day of the breach, to put all emergency 13 Down To Earth vol17,no.9, September 20, 2008 URL: 14 Ibid 15 Ibid 16

23 services for rescue and evacuation in place and, warn people. On September 7, the Chief Minister, Nitish Kumar said that he was unaware of the gravity of the situation as WRD had appraised of the flood as the regular kind. However, the statement of the Deputy Chief Minister Sushil Kumar Modi contradicts the CM s version. According to him the Centre was informed of the erosion on August 5. Had there been coordination and proper information flow among various agencies, this unprecedented tragedy could have been easily averted. Ironically, it is only a day after the breach that the state government approached the Nepal government for security of its engineers and workers Plethora of Institutions: The Messy Affair of Responsibility and Accountability The dereliction of duty and lack of coordination are much more wide spread. The request for additional checks along the embankments near Kusaha by the field engineers was rejected by the Kosi High Level Committee (KHLC). Instead of the requested amount of Rs. 35 lakh, the sanctioned amount was mere Rs. 4 lakh. The multilateral entity, KHLC comprises of members from Bihar and Nepal governments, the Central Water and Power Commission (CWPC), Delhi and Central Water and Power research Station Pune and chaired by the Ganaga flood control commission (GFCC) under the union water resource ministry. The responsibility of KHLC is to assess the damage caused to the embankments by the previous monsoon and recommend the appropriate is repair works. The state government too is equally culpable and indifferent. The maintenance and repair work of the embankment by the state WRD was supposed to be complete by 15 th of April. The state governments apparently prepared the estimate for the maintenance work only in June. The state government did not even respond to the three letters received from the director of coordination, GFCC, H.S Choudhary to the engineer in chief of north Bihar between April 1 and 12 June 2008 requesting the progress report on the flood protection measures. 16 The distribution of responsibilities and accountability is another big messy affair between the centre and the state. While the state is the implementing agency and responsible for everyday operation, ultimately it is the union water resource ministry which is entrusted with the power to ensure that proper action is taken. Even a cursory glance through the timeline of the Kosi project(ref.appendix) reveal the plethora of committees appointed by both central and state governments at different times and to evaluate and reevaluate various projects with very little or no consequence. Appointing committees has been a ploy to buy time by the administration and to quell any public anger or protest. The typical example can be the case of the rehabilitation of the embankment victims. 16 Ibid 17

24 The GoB appointed three committees in 1962, 1967, and 1981 to study and issue of rehabilitation. These committees continued the tradition of inaction. The report of the Chandra Kishor Pathak committee of 1981 remained under consideration until On 14 th April 1987 GoB constituted Kosi Pirit Vikas Pradhikar (Kosi sufferers development authority) which has been a defunct body since inception. The disturbibg fact is that till today at least 10,000 more families are yet to be rehabilitated (Timeline, appendix). The above mentioned issues of coordination, accountability, indifference etc. are pictorially depicted in the actor linkage map through the dotted line representing week linkage and imperfect and skewed information flows among various government agencies. It has been a long standing demand that the entire responsibility of the embankment be entrusted to a single department. However, even today various responsibilities are spread across many departments such as, irrigation department, water resource department, revenue department, public works department etc. This is a clever bureaucratic ploy supported by the failure of the political system to evade accountability by passing the buck between departments in case of any eventuality 4.2 The Issue of Indo Nepal Co ordination Without proper understanding and cooperation from Nepal, India cannot deal successfully with the issue of water management of the Himalayan Rivers, like, Kosi. The charge of poor maintenance has led to mutual recriminations between Indian and Nepali Officials. Considering that the barrage and embankments were Indian structures on Nepalese soil, and that the responsibility of maintenance was clearly that of India (Bihar) in terms of the old Kosi agreement, it appears prima facie that the failure here is largely that of India., says Ramaswamy R Iyer ( EPW Nov 15, 2008). 17 There were issues of non cooperation or law and order problem in Nepal preventing the repair works of the embankments in the past. The Indian Officials should have brought such incidents promptly to the higher levels in both countries with proper warnings about the dangers involved. Negotiations between India and Nepal on water related issues began way back in 1910 during the time of the British. India and Nepal signed a treaty in 1954 to share the Kosi waters. It was subsequently revised again in However, Nepal still feels uncomfortable about it as there is a general feeling that India has manipulated the treaty and the benefits are skewed towards the big brother. The younger generation of Nepal is not aware of the fact that Chatra canal on the east of the Kosi River was constructed by India at a cost of 15 crore. The Mahakali treaty between the two countries was signed in After the initial enthusiasm of the treaty 17 Ramaswamy R Iyer, Floods, Himalayan Rivers, Nepal: Some Heresies EPW, November 15, P.37 18

25 subsided, total inaction followed though there was a provision to prepare a detailed project report (DPR) within six months of signing it. It is a fact that 61 villages of Nepal, with a population of nearly 150,000 are trapped within the embankments of Kosi. The promised irrigation is not available to the people in Nepal too. Nepal, being a land locked country, is also demanding one more trade route at the west cost of India is another big hurdle for cooperation. 18 This calls for greater imagination and urgency from India to tackle the issue innovatively. The snail paced hydrocrats of India s water resources ministries rule the roost, fighting needless little battles against their Nepalese counterparts while ignoring the war against many shifting rivers the two countries share. What is needed is a large heart, an intelligent approach and sustained attention at the top levels...experts say India must abandon the narrow and extremely technical approach, which is designed to give bureaucratic cover and not solving the problem, says Seema Sirohi 19 (outlook, 15 sept 2008). Only trust and confidence between neighbours can guarantee better water management through faster decisions, hassle free coordination and effective implementation. The proposed Barakhshetra dam is still in the incubator as no decision has been taken about it despite years of consultation and negotiation. Is Barakhshetra dam is the real solution? The embankment experience so far and the peculiar geographical characteristics of the location suggest the opposite. The risk associated with it definitely outweighs the proposed benefits. May be we need to think about something innovative that helps to decelerate the flow of water coupled with massive reforestation of the Himalayan ranges in Nepal. What is required is controlled flooding and not total insulation from floods. 4.3 Politicians, Bureaucrats, Contractors and Engineers: The Harvesters of the Forth Crop There was a growing demand for protection from frequent floods from a section of the cultivators of north Bihar at the time of independence. To satisfy their demand under political compulsion, government of India decided to initiate a number of flood protection measures along the Kosi River. Construction of levees along the rivers was one such measure. This was taken ignoring the protest from another section of the population and the engineers opposing the embankment strategy and the construction of dam as permanent flood protection 18 Dinesh Kumar Mishra, Trapped! Between the Devil and Deep Waters, People s Science Institute and SANDRP, DehraDun, Uttarakhand and Delhi. pp Seema Sirohi, Every stream sees a capsize Outlook, september15, P

26 measures. Embankments were legitimized, politically and technically, when engineers backtracked on their previous conclusions. says Albert Rorabacher. 20 The construction and annual maintenance of embankment running into millions of rupees, offers a good business opportunity for engineers, contractors and politicians. Each group has a vested interest in keeping the levees in place. None wants to cut the throat of its own personal cash cow. Added to the annual maintenance costs are the relief costs. 21 With repeated breaches of embankments and annual floods, the network comprising of contractors, bureaucrats, engineers and politicians (as shown in actor linkage map and matrix) has new opportunity of harvesting the crop of relief. It is estimated that government sponsored relief reaches no more than per cent of the affected people. What happens to the huge sum of money and supply is only anybody s guess. Apart from this, every flood season is followed by a spate of constructions and repair works of roads, railways, embankments, buildings, etc. Plugging breaches is more lucrative than maintaining the structure. For example; according to Dinesh Kumar Mishra, There have been three breaches within Nepal. The first was in 1963 at Dalwa, where the loss of property was relatively small, and there were no casualties. A potent lesson was on offer at that point: the embankment that could have been maintained at a cost of INR 1.5 million ended up requiring INR 11.5 million in repairs. In the second breach, in 1991 at Joginia, the river eroded the embankment for a stretch of about two km, but receded without causing any damage. Again, the cost of plugging the breach totaled some INR 52.7 million, in addition to compensation of nearly INR 2 million to Nepal for crop losses, shifting houses and the like. This year, the routine maintenance cost would have been around INR 8 million, while the estimated cost of repairs now looks to add up to close to INR 2 billion. 22 During his visit to the flood affected area on 28 th August 2008, the Prime Minister announced a central grant of 1000cr towards relief and rehabilitation measures. The centre also handed over Rs 200 million as relief package to Nepal on 16 th 0ctober In addition to this, on 24 th Jan 2009 the central government again granted a whooping 8 billion towards the repair and reconstruction of the Saptakosi embankment. 24 Over and above Bihar has received billions of rupees as relief assistance from European Union and other international and national agencies. Will There is a strong linkage and networking among the politicians, bureaucrats, contractors and pro embankments engineers. This nexus has been at the heart of the issue of flood 20 J Albert Rorabacher, Gerrymandering, Poverty and Flooding: A Perennial Story of Bihar EPW, February 16, 2008, p Ibid p in the dike_nw2420.html From kosi?hl=en 20

27 management in Bihar. The strong network that exists in their coalition is for self serving objectives and hijacks the whole debate in their favour. 4.4 The Social Cost of the Embankments Ecological Disaster, Reduction in Agriculture Productivity The Kosi project adopted under political compulsion after independence has not only miserably failed to deliver on its promises but also caused irreparable damage to millions of people entrapped within embankments, their livelihoods, thousands of hectares of agricultural land and ecology. In 1954, when the Bihar flood policy was first introduced, Bihar had around 160 kms of embankments. These embankments were called as zamindari and maharaji bandhs and the flood prone area was approximately 2.5 million hectares. Today after the completion of 3,465 kms long embankment system with an estimated cost of 1,600 crore, the flood prone area has increased 2.5 fold to a staggering 6.89 million hectares (1994 figure). 25 Moreover, the river is prevented from its duty of land building by jacketing it within embankments. This has drastically brought down agriculture productivity outside the levees as well. The high sediment load of the river, on the other hand, results in the rapid increase in the height of river bed which in turn raises the water level constantly putting the embankment and the people at danger. Despite this government is continuing with the embankment construction with a Rs. 792 crore package to tame the Baghmati, one of the tributaries of the Kosi. There is another proposal to embank the tributaries of Mahananda at an estimated cost of Rs. 850 crore. 26 The balance sheet of the Kosi project on important parameters further demonstrates the dismal performance and the huge gap between the promised outcome and the delivery Performance of the Irrigation Projects Eastern Kosi Main Canal (EKMC) Promised Irrigation through EKMC 712,000 hectares Revised target in ,000 hectares Actual irrigation ,170 hectares (19.94%) ,560 hectares (12.86%) ,170 hectares (20.95%) ,130 hectares (17.43%) 25 J Albert Rorabacher, Gerrymandering, Poverty and Flooding: A Perennial Story of Bihar EPW, February 16, 2008, p Engineering Flood Down To Earth(9/20/2008) 21

28 ,180 hectares (19.13%) Maximum Irrigation achieved was in ,133 hectares (29.93%) Western Kosi Canal (WKC) Irrigation promised through WKC 325,000 hectares Actual irrigation ,750 hectares (4.23%) ,390 hectares (5.35%) ,620 hectares (6.65%) ,310 hectares (7.79%) ,770 hectares (7.31%) The initial estimated cost in 1963 was Rs Cr. Till March 2008 Rs Cr. has been spent and the canal is still incomplete. Flood Protection Promised area 214,000 hectares Waterlogged area on the east of eastern embankment 182,000 hectares (a) Waterlogged area on the west of the western embankment 123,000 hectares (b) Land permanently exposed to flooding/erosion/sand casting between the two embankments 110,000 hectares The total area (a)+()b+(c) 415,000 hectares (Source: Dinesh Kumar, discuss The bottom line is that the embankment strategy has not produced the desired result and they have almost outlived their effective life span as well. To borrow the words of Rohan D souza, the structural flood control strategy has transformed the Kosi basin from previously being a flood dependent agrarian regime into a flood vulnerable landscape Human Tragedy According Dr. Mishraji, there are 380 villages with a population of 9.88 lakh trapped between the two embankments of the Kosi as per the 2001 Census 28. The continuous sufferings endured by these people are unfathomable and they are quite outside the scheme of things as far as governments or NGOs are concerned. Since the completion of embankments in 1963, in the last 45 years while the Kosi has breached the embankments eight times these people have suffered 27 Rohan Desouza, Drowned and Dammed Colonial Capitalism and Flood Control in eastern India, Oxford University press, New Delhi, 2006, p. ix 28 Dinesh Kumar Mishra, The Kosi and the Embankment Story EPW, November 15, P

29 inundation a whopping 37 times! The inundation continues for three to four months isolating them from the rest of the world. During floods they take shelter on the embankments and even remain there for months at times, depending on the relief provided by government agencies and other voluntary agencies. Relief has become a way of life for these villagers. The people living within the embankments are deprived of basic civic amnesties such as hospitals, colleges, banks, or cinema hall. Their plight can be beautifully summarized in the words of Dinesh Mishra, Farmers that were making a respectable living until 1950s have been reduced to paupers, while their environment, culture, social fabric, flora and fauna have all been dramatically degraded. Families from outside the embankments refuse to marry their daughters to boys from within. 29 Barh Mukti Abhiyan (BMA) in general and Dr. Dinesh Kumar Mishra in particular have become synonymous with the struggles and voice of these people entrapped within the embankments. This is not to discount the contribution of many others who are involved in the struggles of the people. They advocate a dialogue between the engineers skill and people s wisdom based on their intimate relationship with the river. 30 They also propagate minimum interference with the natural course of the river. Another civil society organization, Kosi Mukti Sangharsh Samiti (KMSS), under the leadership of Advocate Dev Kumar Singh, has taken up the issue of rehabilitation and has become the sustained voice of the embankment victims over the last fifteen years. Apart from these civil society organizations, no other national or international organizations are really working towards a long term solution to the problems of these people. Their activities are limited to providing relief assistance. As the actor linkage map and matrix reveal, there exists a strong linkage among these actors. However, this network is very weakly linked to the other institutional actors and networks. As a result their voice is not reflected in the decision making process or the decisions of the government agencies. The strong network of politicians, contractors and bureaucrats still rule the roost. The dialogue between the experts skill and traditional wisdom is absent at the moment and for any lasting solution this link needs to be strengthened. Today the solution to Kosi floods cannot be the breaking down of embankments. They have come to stay. How will we ensure proper and timely maintenance of these? How can we prevent the advent of such draconian structures anymore? To ensure this we need institutional innovations at all levels of public administration where the experts skills and traditional wisdom are in constant interaction resulting in innovative solutions that are human and nature friendly. Actor oriented tools are important instruments of this process. 29 Dinesh Kumar Mishra Finger in the dike Himal in the dike_nw2420.html 30 Embankments or should we say entombments? 23

30 The Kosi fiasco is not an isolated incident of system failure and mismanagement in Bihar. The entire public administration in the state needs a thorough overhauling in the above mentioned direction. 5. Public System Management in Bihar Let us now look at Bihar as a whole. We have examined in detail how the state has performed in the critically important area of water management by analyzing the Kosi flood management system in detail. From the analysis of Kosi floods can we draw some conclusions on the way public system in general, is managed in Bihar? The question, why most of the development projects have failed or continue to fail in Bihar needs an answer beyond the usual text book answers of umbrella terms such as poverty, corruption etc. Such answers leave out the institutional actors and processes that contribute towards the undoing of Bihar. Before we proceed with the analysis, let us gather the state of affairs from the key socio economic indicators of the state. 5.1 Key Indicators: The Health of the State Bihar, over the years, has acquired the status of a failed state despite an abundance of natural resources. Third biggest in terms of population, Bihar consistently fares poorly on all socioeconomic indicators among the states in India. No matter which development index you refer to, Bihar is either at the bottom or is very near to the bottom. According to the 2001 census, the population living below poverty line in the state is 43.2 per cent which is almost double the national average (27.5). Similarly 48 per cent of landless agriculture labourers in Bihar is the highest rate in the country. The Human Development Index (HDI) is generally used to measure the human well being socio economic policies and performance of a state. The HDI indicator of Bihar is about 20 per cent lower than the national HDI, that is, according to the HDI data of 2006 the national HDI is and the Bihar HDI is only Bihar s literacy level of 48 per cent is way below the national average at 65 per cent. Around 70% of the women in rural Bihar is illiterate (NHDR 2001). Primary school enrolment is 52%, as against the national average of 77%. According to the planning commission s National Human Development Report (NHDR), 2001, female life expectancy in Bihar in was around 55 years. Only 10% of the children in Bihar are fully immunized. The maternal mortality rate is 707 per 100,000 women, compared to the national average of 404. Per capita income in India has grown from Rs. 8,760 in 1994 to Rs. 13,333 in 2004 which is an increase of 52.2%. whereas during the same period in Bihar the 24

31 per capita income has grown from Rs. 3,333 in 1994 to Rs. 4,088 in 2004, an increase of just 22.6 per cent The Reasons for Backwardness The common reasons attributed to such dismal state of affairs are: poverty, inadequate infrastructure and low public expenditure. These reasons are valid and true, however they are alone not sufficient to explain the consistent poor performance of Bihar after independence. Poverty, poor infrastructure and low public expenditure on social sector are common to many or many other states as well. But most of them seem to perform better in comparison to Bihar. In other words, the explanation has to be sought elsewhere. Understanding the underdevelopment of Bihar using umbrella concepts such as Bihari politics also fails to capture the role of institutions and the alienation of people and civil society from them. According to the famous management guru Peter Drucker there is no under developed economy, but only under managed economy. 32 The real issue is the management of the public systems and institutions that deliver social security and services Mismanagement of the Social Delivery Systems According to the National Human Development Report (NDHR), 2001, only 20 per cent of the births in rural Bihar were attended by health professionals. In comparison, 60 % of the births in rural Andhra Pradesh and 80% of the births in rural Tamil Nadu were attended by health professionals. 33 While in rural Bihar only 9% of the children were fully immunized, 50% of the children in rural Karnataka and Maharashtra were vaccinated. Difference of this magnitude cannot be explained on the basis of public expenditure alone. This clearly indicates the failure or mismanagement of the health care system in Bihar. According to the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report for the year ended march 2004 says that the state s rural health care system is literally gasping for breath. Forty nine percent of health centres, 41% of primary and auxiliary health centres and 5% of referral hospitals have no buildings of their own. Referral hospitals do not provide emergency services These figures are collated from two reports: Bihar: Poverty and Potential and Utter Pradesh and Bihar: The burden of inertia URL: 32 As quoted by a professor in the class 33 Utter Pradesh and Bihar: The burden of inertia 34 Bihar: poverty and Potential 25

32 5.2.2 The Burden of Inertia : Factionalism and Patronage Surely, the backwardness of Bihar has much to do with defective and inequitable function of public services. 35 According to economists Jean Dreze and Haris Gazdar, the reason for backwardness is inertia. This has two important dimensions: apathy of the state and the failure of civil society to overthrow oppressive social structures and relations. 36 Our analysis of Kosi floods has amply demonstrated the apathy and inaction action of the state especially in addressing the humanitarian crisis of the embankment victims. This culture of inertia is nurtured and propagated by factional politics and patronage in public service. Political mobilization is no more based on ideology but factionalism, mostly of caste and religion. Factionalism permeates politics from village to the state level. Factionalism also breads criminalization of public life. Patronage, on the other hand, exerts a great role in the use of public resources. Development programmes are treated by factional leaders as useful channels for the recruitment and reward of supporters. Rewards for political support are distributed in the form of government employment, subsidies and contracts. 37 As a result the major causalities are; common good and accountability. The overall public interest becomes irrelevant in comparison to the factional interest and accountability all most non existent. All these show the governance and public administration of Bihar in poor light. The civil society feels frustrated and alienated as nothing changes. 5.3 The Silver Lining: Success Stories of Participatory Governance In the midst of this gloomy picture, there exists reason for hope. There are examples of well managed and successful development initiatives in Bihar. The Bihar State Cooperative Milk Producers Federation (COMFED) is one such success story. The Pahliganj Participatory Water Management scheme is yet another inspiring story. Under this scheme the irrigation management was transferred from public sector to farmers. In association with Water and Land Management Institute, farmers extended irrigation facility from 4000 to 6000 hectares. There was an overall improvement and increase in the carrying capacity of the canals, agriculture production and most importantly the system was better maintained. 38 All these success stories proclaim one thing loud and clear people s participation is a must for the successful administration and management of any project. Bihar has a huge network of 35 Utter Pradesh and Bihar: The burden of Inertia 36 Ibid 37 Ibid 38 Bihar: Poverty and Potential 26

33 women s groups whose potential is very much underutilized. They can be empowered and collaborated with for effective monitoring and better service delivery. 50% reservation for women and other socially excluded groups in Panchayat Raj system in Bihar is unique in the country and holds the promise of revolutionizing the polity and public administration. However, it requires a change in the mindset and attitudes of the people, political leaders and bureaucrats, lest the third tier of governance can be a breading place of factionalism and patronage. 5.4 The Way Forward: Institutional Innovation Bihar needs to revamp its administrative system urgently to make it efficient and responsive. The recruitment and promotion to public administration must be based on objective criterion and not on factional affiliation. The process of decision making, planning, and implementing need to be inclusive and decentralized for better service delivery. It will ensure better utilization of central government grants for various projects. Bihar has the dubious distinction of returning most of the central government funds without being able to utilize for the specified programme even after the March loot. In the absence of this will to reform, Bihar will be further pushed into backwardness and the state will continue to lose human capital as people resort to migration as a survival strategy. 27

34 6. Conclusion Our analysis of the Kosi floods and the general backwardness of Bihar has brought to home the following facts; The Kosi project and flood management has failed due to, in the words of Dipak Gyawali, former Minister of Water Resources, the unholy confluence of three things: wrong technological choice, wrong institutional arrangements and wrong conduct in public service 39 It beautifully summarizes our findings on the Kosi debacle as well. The same can be said of many other development projects in the state. Development interventions in complex natural context must be conceived as a natural innovation system wherein there is a free flow of information among key actors from the socio political context and especially between the experts skills and the traditional wisdom of people for its successful outcome. The diagnostic, planning and implementation tools such as, actor oriented approaches can be quite a handy tool in bringing about institutional innovation in any particular development intervention. It complements the conventional project management tools such as, Log Frame approach. Actor oriented tools can thus effect institutional change by altering the perceptions of development actors and encouraging them to engage with the social and political context of their activities in a holistic and constructive manner. Bihar s backwardness cannot be comprehended with umbrella terms such as poverty or Bihari politics. What has been attempted in this paper is to bring to focus the often unnoticed dimensions of the role of institutions and the alienation of people and civil society from them. Bihar can probably retain its past glory only if it undertakes reform in governance and democratization of its institutions in a big way. The burden of inertia propagated by factionalism and patronage must give way to democratization of institutions and participatory governance as illustrated in the few success stories. 39 Taken from an interview published in The New Nation titled, Kosi catastrophe: A Nepali perspective URL: 28

35 Bibliography BOOKS ARTICLES D souza Rohan, Drowned and Dammed Colonial Capitalism and Flood Control in Eastern India, Oxford University press, New Delhi, Mishra K. Dinesh, Trapped! Between the Devil and Deep Waters, People s Science Institute and SANDRP, DehraDun, Uttarakhand and Delhi Biggs S., Matsaert, H Strengthening Poverty Reduction Programmes Using An Actor Oriented Approach: Examples From Natural Resources Innovation Systems. ODI Agricultural Research & Extension Network. Network paper No. 134 Biggs S and Messerschmidt D, Social Responsibility in Hand Made Paper Industry of Nepal, World Development Vol.33,N o.11 pp , 2005 Mishra Kumar Dinesh, Living with Floods People s Perspective, Economic and Political Weekly, July 21, 2001 Mishra Dinesh Kumar, The Kosi and the Embankment Story Economic and Political Weekly, November 15, Mishra Dinesh Kumar, The Inevitable has Happened Economic and Political Weekly, September 6, Iyer Ramaswamy R, Floods, Himalayan Rivers, Nepal: Some Heresies Economic and Political Weekly, November 15, Rorabacher J Albert, Gerrymandering, Poverty and Flooding: A Perennial Story of Bihar Economic and Political Weekly, February 16, Sinha C.P., Management of Floods in Bihar, Economic and Political Weekly, November 15,

36 MAGAZINES Sinha Rajive, Rising Waters, Dynamic Channels and Human Disasters Economic and Political Weekly, November 15, Down To Earth, Volume 17, Number 9, September 20, 2008 Frontline, Volume: 25, Issue 19 India Today, Volume: XXXIII, Number 37, September 15, Outlook, Volume XLVIII, Number 37, September 15, WEB RESOURCES E group in the dike_nw2420.html discuss-kosigroups@gmail.com 30

37 ANNEXURE: 1 Integrated Timeline of Various Events Related to Kosi River and Flood Management 40 Year In the Myths In folklores 12 th century AD Event Kosi finds mention in the Bal Kand section of Valmiki Ramayana. Kosi was known as Kausiki, the form assumed by Satyavati after her death. Satyavati was the elder sister of Viswamitra, descendants of Kushak dynasty. In Markendeya Purana Kosi is described as the primal force. It also says that as Shiva emerged from the body of Parvati, she came to be known as Kaushiki. According to Mahabharata epic, the God of death took the form of a woman and resides on the banks of the river to keep the growth of human population under check. Kosi resonates with the folklore of Mithila region. The most important depictions of Kosi in folklore are Kosi as a virgin absolutely care free and full of energy; As a frustrated wife of old hermit Richeek wandering in Himalayas. Kosi is also invoked as the mother Kosi Mayee. These images capture the contradiction that is inherent in the Kosi River as a source of life and death, prosperity and destruction; a mother and an enchanting virgin. The Eastern most Kosi channel was known as the Parman or the Panar Dhar. In earlier times it used to reach Mahananda. This was the first attempt made to tame the Kosi river. King Lakshmana II embanked the Kosi and subsequently he was called Bir. The 32 km long bund on the west bank at Bhim Nagar in Supaul district was called Bir bund. However, the work was stopped suddenly. Kosi was Believed to have flown east of Purnea and was known as the Bhinsana Kosi. However it was called Kamla in the lower reaches. The Kajri or Kari/kali Kosi : Kosi flawed through west of Purnea in this channel. It was the main channel till Beginning of 16 th C (time of Akbar) The Dulardei/Soura Kosi: This channel used to flow between the old Purnea and Purnea town The Kamla Kosi: A new channel of Kosi, travelled southward and adopted the path of Kali Kosi The Libri Kosi: A new channel originated from Kamla and Kosi flowed in this till The Dhamdaha Kosi, also known as Faraini in the upper reaches. Kosi flowed in this channel in this period The Hiran Kosi: This channel shifted westward by 3.2km and was active till , 1870 There were serious floods in the Kosi basin. Purinea was severely affected causing wide spread damage to crops and cattle. Flood had become almost an annual phenomenon. This forced the administration to consider embanking Kosi. Though the idea was eventually scrapped, it sawed the seeds of expectation of permanent flood control in the minds of the people. The main reason for the British to abandon the idea was the strained relations with Nepal, whose cooperation was essential for any effort to tame Kosi The Dhaus Kosi: Kosi passed though this channel during this period Towards the end of 19 th century the relations between the India and Nepal improved considerably and an agreement Suguali Pact was signed between the two countries. The government then tried to build embankments on Kosi with an expense of Rs /. However this time heavy rain prevented the construction 1893 There was a strong apprehension that Kosi would change its course and flow in some of its abandoned channels in the east. W.A Inglis, the Chief Engineer of Bengal Province undertook a detailed tour of Kosi area. However, he refrained from suggesting any measures to tame Kosi. 40 This timeline is almost entirely based on Dr. Dinesh Mishra s book Trapped! Between the Devil and Deep waters (2008), except the details regarding the 18th August 2008 breach at Kusaha and the resultant devastating flood. It is a chronological account of various events and not particular events separately. 31

38 1895 Debate on the nature of Kosi and how to address the issue of its vagaries. The Indigo farmer, Shillingford, compared Kosi to the pendulum of a clock that swung between the eastern and western boundaries back and forth. But there was no scientific evidence to prove this. Charles Elliot (1895) disagreed with Shillingford and cautioned about embanking Kosi. According to him the merits of embankment are obvious and immediate, but the long term effects would be devastating. 1893, 1921 The Loran Kosi: Kosi passed through this channel for 18 years. First instant when Kosi took a southwesterly turn Upstream of Chatra in Nepal. Feb 24 th 1897 The Calcutta Flood Conference: The senior officers of the secretariat of the government of India met in Calcutta to take stalk of the damage suffered in the Kosi basin due to previous years flooding. The conference was to come up also with an appropriate strategy to deal with the issue. Various proposals were discussed, including embanking the river. However, the conference reached the conclusion that no steps are feasible to control the course of this tremendous river with its numerous channels and their wide and elevated beds, beyond protecting by short length of embankments isolated tracts exposed to floods Nepal and India had reached consensus on building short embankment near Chatra. The work, however, never took off. But as a side effect of the decision to build small embankments, many such structures were built by local authorities and indigo planters all over north Bihar Cpt. F.C Hirst made a well considered observation that the bunds built by private people will be a cause for future menace. He wanted the issue to be debated widely and propagated non or minimum interference with the working of nature Capt. Hirst estimated the sediment load of Kosi to be 55 million tons per year W.A Inglis, the retired Chief Engineer of Bengal replied to Capt. F.C Hirst. He rejected the theory of non interference with nature advocated by Capt. Hirst; he instead proposed the notion of controlled flooding with low height embankments The Dhusan Kosi: This was the channel that had turned south west and entered India at Bagia Ghat 1926 The Tilawe Kosi: Kosi again turned towards the west below Chatra and passed through Tilawe Dhar 1930 The Dhemura Dhar: Kosi followed this channel and crossed Saharsha Supaul Rail line. The earth quake of 1936 brought many changes in the course of the river 1936 The Soharain Kosi: Kosi once again changed its path below Hanuman Nagar in Nepal November 1937 Patna Flood Conference: A Three day conference was organized in Patna to take stock of the flood situation in Bihar. This conference was attended by prominent people and experts. The major views expressed by them are as follows: Governor of Bihar, Mr. Hallet opinioned that similar problem was faced by China, and America. Their experiment with measures to tame the river was not successful Dr. Rajendra Prasad ascertained that the private embankments, railway lines and roads, creating problem of drainage and water logging. Capt. G.F Hall, then Chief Engineer was of the firm opinion that flood prevention was undesirable and bunds increase flooding. Jimut Bahan Sen, Secretary for PWD requested for a dam across Kosi in Nepal. However, except Capt. Hall, majority were indifferent to the issue. Nirapad Mukherji, leader of the small pro embankment lobby was of the opinion that anti bund argument was the manifestation of a defeatist mentality A survey of all the old and new channels of the Kosi entering through Nepal was conducted by Tirhoot Waterways Division of the newly elected state Govt. headed by Sikrishna Sinha.The motive for the survey was clearly building embankments. This event could be termed as the beginning of the politicization of flood control An investigation of the Kosi was done by Sir Claude Inglis, the director of Central Irrigation and Hydrodynamic Research Centre, Poona. His study was inconclusive due to want of data and second world war. But he observed that the higher land level west of Tamuria (Lakhnaur Block of 32

39 Madhubani district) would prevent further shifting of the Kosi to the west Once again a detailed study of the floods in Bihar was carried out by P.C Ghosh. His report proposed construction of dames on the tributaries of Kosi in Nepal to reduce the velocity of waters as it entered the plains in Bihar, and suggested afforestation to contain the sediment load The Thilyuga: This was the main channel of Kosi for six years. In 1955 Thilyuga was joined to Kosi at Nirmali within the embankments 1945 A definite plan to restrict Kosi between two embankments separated by 16 km was prepared. The plan, however, was not approved by the central government During the floods, the Maharaja of Darbhanga, sir Kameshwar Singh, invited the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, to have a firsthand view of the floods 1946 As a follow up, the Central Water Irrigation and Navigation Commission Chairman (CWINC), Rai Bahadur Ayodhya Nath A.N Khosla was asked to prepare a preliminary report on Barahkshetra Dam, assisted by J.B Oden, K.K.Dutta of Geological survey of India. They were also assisted by the United States Bureau of Reclamation in preparing the initial draft. 1946, may 30 Finance minister of the state, Anugrah Narayan Singh during his speech in the assembly even suggested compulsorily shifting the population of the Kosi basin as a permanent solution to frequent flooding. His statement was drawn flank from people. 1947, April 6 A conference of Kosi sufferes (60000) was held at Nirmalion this day. It was attended by many prominent people such as, C.H Bhaba, Member Ministry of Works, Mines and Power, Dr. Rajenfdra Prasad, Rajendra Misra, Hari Nath mishra, A.N Singh, Binodanand Jha, Baidya Nath Choudhary, Dhanraj Sharma, B.P Jhunjhunwala, Jamuna Karyee and Dr. Srikrishna Sinhaas. The conference also discussed the proposed concrete dam of 229m high at Barakshetra in Nepal at a cost of 100 cr to be completed in ten years. It would produce 1200MW of power and irrigate 1.25Mha of land in Nepal and India. The suffering people were assured of not only permanent solution to flood but facilities of irrigation and electricity as well Rai Bahdur A.N Khosla, then Chairman of the Central Board of Irrigation and Power spoke for a fair distribution of benefits by resettling and rehabilitating the people who made sacrifice There was wide media coverage for the proposed Barakhshetra dam in media during this period. However no work was undertaken and the scheme got postponed for various reasons. Meanwhile the project cost too got escalated from 100 cr to 177 cr. 5June 1951 A committee was constituted under chairmanship of S.C Majumdar, Advisor Engineer govt. of Bengal with 4 others as members to give an expert opinion on the dam project. Though the committee approved the project in general, it came up with an alternative proposal that would address the problem of unproductive blockage of capital and the under utilization of the huge power generation: The Belka Reservoir Scheme. The highlights of this scheme were: a) Construction of a 26km earthen dam, with a concrete spill way down stream of Belka hills b) A hydroelectric generation unit to produce 68MW, for use in Bihar and Nepal c) The Eastern Kosi Canal System to irrigate 615,000ha land in Bihar d) The Western Kosi Canal System to irrigate 470,000ha land in Nepal and Bihar e) The Nepal Eastern Canal System to be constructed exclusively for Nepal f) Additional power generation of 30MW making use of canal falls g) A 56 km long embankment from Kusaha to Bhagavanpur to arrest the westward movement of Kosi Mr. Majumdar s suggestion to construct embankment was a complete reversal of his views expressed 12 years ago as the Chief Engineer of Bangal The creation of Bharat Sevak Samaj (BSS), voluntary organization by GoI to ensure people s participation in public projects, especially, the labour intensive river valley projects like Kosi. Sept, The Belka dam dproposal was debated in the Vidhan Sabha. Serious dissatisfaction over the repeated postponement and delay in the project was expressed by various members. 11 August 1953 A congress delegation from Bihar met Prime Minister Nehru and voiced concern over the dillydallying of the project.they argued that it would seriously dent the party s image. The delegation also met Deputy Chairman Planning Commission, Chairman of CWPC. 33

40 29 Sept 1953 A statement was issued in the Lok Sabha byj.l. Hathi that the investigation into the scheme is still under way. 31 Oct & Nehru visited Bihar and initiated further action on the Kosi project. 1Nov 1953 After this GoI constituted another committee of experts Venkata Krishna Aiyar,Chif Eng Andhra, Kanvar Sain, Chairman CWPC, M.P Matharani, Chief.Engineer Bihar and N.K. Bose, Director Irrigation Research Institute, Calcutta to provide expert opinion on the status of Kosi project. 9 Dec 1953 The committee conducted an aerial survey of the project area Dec 13, 1953 Submitted their final report on the Kosi project. Dec14, 1953 Based on the report submitted by the committee Gulzari Lal Nanda Presented the final plans of kosi project in parliament. The scheme is also known as CWPC Plan (1953) for the Kosi 1954 T.P Singh, The Administrator of Kosi project dumps the Barakhshetra dam project and Belka proposal as unviable and seeks a scheme that suits the financial resources and could be implemented immediately May 3, 1954, The planning minister of GoI,Gulzari Lal Nanda defended the plan quoting American and Chinese experts in the parliament May 1954 GoI once again not fully convinced of the feasibility of the proposed project sent Kanwar Sen Chairman of CWPC and K.L Rao, Dir. CWPC to China to study in detail the performance of the embankments there. Upon returning from China, they approved the technical soundness of the Kosi project claiming that the silt carried by Kosi could be harnesses to discharge in the sea. This visit was an eye wash as the decision to embank the river had alredy taken in The trip was arranged to ensure that the people were told that the engineers had no problem with the embankments. 3 Sept 1954 The GoI unveiled the first flood control policy. It had immediate, short term, and long term plans to be implemented. The expectation was to control flood effectively within years. This policy put to rest the 100 years old debate about flood control measures. For the first time embankments are accepted as effective flood control measures. Oct 17 24, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, The President of India Visited the Kosi basin and requested people to 1954 participate in the yagjna of nation building. This was a ploy to quell any resistence to the project from the public. This was contrary to the personal opinion of Dr. Rajendra Prasad expressed during the Patna flood conference with regard to embankments. 2 Dec 1954 Kosi Control Board allotted the work of public cooperation t o BSS Nov 20, 1954 Rai Bahadur A.G Chatterji, former Chief Engineer of Bettia Raj, tried to convince the government of the uselessness of the project by calling it a waste of money. 2 Dec 1954 Lalit Narain Mishra alluded to various model testing done by the Poona laboratory to assure the BSS workers that only 4 inch water will enter villages and therefore rehabilitation will not be a major issue Bihar government published detailed maps of proposed embankments. 14 Jan 1955 Foundation was layed for the Kosi project by Srikrishna Sinha near Bhutaha village close to Nirmali, in Saharsha district, Bihar. 22 Mar1955 Dr. Rajendra Prasad laid foundation stone for the eastern embankment near Bairia village in Supaul End of 1955 A movement started on the Western embankment to protest against the alignment of the embankment 1955 The administrator of Kosi project, T.P Sing promised that fair compensation will be paid to people whose land would be trapped within the embankments in the shortest possible time. 24 Jan 1956 Protesters met the Administrator and Chief Engineer of Kosi and asked them to stick to the original alignment plan Feb 1956 After the commencement of the Kosi scheme, GoI invited Sir Claude Inglis for a reassessment of the Kosi plan (1953). He observed that the embankment might give way in future; the reservoir behind the barrage would be filled up in seven and half years. This led to a lot of controversies. Kanwar Sain was forced to issue a clarification on the technical soundness of the project. But he indirectly admitted that the present plan is nothing more than an ad hoc plan that is meant to be somewhere in between of the demand by people for flood protection measures and an ideal 34

41 solution to frequent floods. 2 Mar 1956 The Kosi Control Board discussed the issue of compensation and rehabilitation. CWPC members were against paying any compensation to the embankment victims as it would set a wrong precedence and in the future people would demand rehabilitation. 13 Mar 1956 Government issued a clarification regarding the alignment of the embankment stating that the effort is to minimize the number of villages trapped between the embankments. 11 June 1956 The Public meeting of BSS workers at Ghoghardiha drew the attention of the central and state governments to the plight of the embankment victims October 1956 According to the laboratories of the Central board of irrigation and Power there was no evidence to suggest that water level had risen as a result of embankment construction. These findings were later on proved to be a cruel joke on the people. End of 1956 People within the embankments started organizing themselves and demanded compensation and other amenities. 31 Dec 1956 People attempted to breach the embankment at Alaula, but restrained from doing it and decided to give govt. another chance Having received no attention from the government towards their problems, a movement was launched under the leadership of Bhushan Gupta, Chairman of the Saharsha District Board to take up the cause of people trapped. The only assurance they managed to obtain was nothing untoward would happen Nirmali s ring Bund to save the town (big market for rice and Jute) in Supaul district 1957 High level committee on flood, under the chairmanship of Balwant Singh Nag put an end to the flood debate existed from It came to a conclusion that was opposite to the engineering consensus that prevailed for over hundred years. This sudden change of position had very little to do with technical facts, but much to do with political expediency. 4 Feb 1957 Under the leadership of Jaidev Salhaita, people from 87 villages accused that to save 14 villages the alignment of the embankment is compromised.they demanded that the original plan must be adhered to. 6 Feb 1957 People sat on a dharna and opposed the construction of the embankment 16 Mar 1957 Armed Police were deployed at all strategic points. 17 Mar 1957 The work resumed on the Western embankment July 1957 Govt. Proposes a deflated rehabilitation Package Agriculture, habitation land@ Rs. 500/acre Uncultivated agriculture land@ 200/acre and fallow land Rs. 100/acre 1957 The commencement of the construction of 43 km long Eastern Kosi Main Canal (EKMC) from upstream of Kosi barrage near Bhim Nagar that terminates in the Parman river near Forbesgunj. It was supposed to irrigate 569,000ha 1957 Foundation for western Kosi Canal (WKC) was laid by Jagjivan Ram, then Union Minister to derive political mileage just before the general election. This canal was not part of the original Kosi project (1953). The actual construction started only in The Kosi barrage from where the head works for WKC begins is located entirely in Nepal. The initial 35.13km of the canal too is in Nepal. WKC was meant to irrigate agricultural land in Darbhanga and Maghubani districts. To obtain consent from Nepal was an issue and politics delayed the construction of the canal beyond the head works. 3 Dec 1958 The Govt. in Vidhan Sabha promised to provide the following: 1. An equivalent area of homestead land at a reasonable distance 2. Additional land for community services 3. Water supply at the rehabilitation site 4. Grants for building houses Boats as to be used as means of transport to and from agricultural land within embankments 18 Dec 1958 A list of villages trapped between the embankments was placed in Vidhan Sabha. This list was incorrect as it contained names of villages that were completely outside the embankment As per the plan the Kosi embankments were completed: 125 km embankments on the eastern bank of Kosi from Birpur to Kopadia and 126 Km long on the western bank from Bhardah in Nepal 35

42 to Ghonghepur in Saharsa. They were supposed to protect 214,000ha of land from recurrent floods. However, extensions were planned. 15 Feb 1960 Vidhan Sabha was told that 70 out of 304 villages have been rehabilitated. This indicates the extremely slow pace of rehabilitation. 18June 1961 Another foundation lying ceremony in Sikri for WKCwas performed by Srikrishna Snha February 1962 Yet another foundation laying ceremony was done by the CM, Binod Nand Jha, near Berdepur village before the general elections. The cost of the project was estimated to be 13.49cr with a potential to irrigate 9300ha in Nepal and 2,61000ha in India. When calculated for multiple crops area that would receive irrigation would be 10,500ha in Nepal and 325,000ha in in Bihar 1962 The construction of Rajpur canal was started 1962 Kosi started attacking the eastern embankment at various places 1962 GoB formed a committee to plan and execute special programmes on agriculture, health, revenue collection, extension and cooperatives. However, the committee was ineffective. 31 March 1963 June 1963 Barrage across the river near Birpur was completed. It was meant to irrigate 712,000ha, through eastern main canal. Western Kosi canal was meant to irrigate 325,000ha. The foundation stone was laid for this in 1959; however the work is still in progress. Within four years of taming the river, it started shifting towards western embankment at Dalwa in Nepal 29 July 1963 Irrigation Minister GoB & Chief Engineer of Kosi project air surveyed Dalwa and were Satisfied with the repair works 2 August Irrigation Minister, Dr. K.L Rao, GoI also air surveyed the area. He advised caution and constant 1963 monitoring though at present the situation seemed to be under control. 9 Aug 1963 Irrigation Minister GoN visited the site to take stalk of the situation 10 Aug 1963 The erosion gradually worsened and now it became 1.5 m wide and 600m long. Construction of a retired line was started employing more than 2000 labourers and 300 technical persons were working round the clock to save the embankment 12 Aug 1963 The repair work became impossible and the safety of the embankments fell from the hands of the engineers. Chief Minister Binod Jha and along with a high level team visited the site Dalwa 13 Aug 1963 The Chief minister visited the area again. In a sudden turn the river moved 3m away from the embankments. However, 20 villages were evacuated and boats were kept ready for emergency. 16 Aug 1963 K.L.Rao visted Dalwa and expressed satisfaction over the progress of work 20 Aug 1963 The Kosi suddenly attacked Banarjhoola, 400m north of the erosion point at Dalwa. The embankment breached near sluice gate. Since the land on the other side was higher water flowed back into the river. This was the first breach of the Kosi embankment. 21 Aug 1963 The waters spilt over the embankments and breached the retired line. Flood waters spread into Dalwa. There was no loss of life and property as the river flow was low. 22 Aug 1963 Dr. K.L Rao issued a statement in the Lok Sabha that if the attempt to close the breach in the ring bund became successful then there wouldn t be any further damage 8 July 1964 CM, Krisna Ballabh Sahay released the 1 st irrigation water from EKMC.T he EKMC system consisted of four sub branch canals meant to irrigate 117,000ha and cropped area of 143,000ha 1965 Agitation by people demanding speedy execution of WKC in Darbhanga Debasis Mukherji, Chief Engineer distanced the engineers role from any negative impact of the project and future accountability by saying, It must be mentioned here that the present scheme is not the final replay to the kosi problems. Final and lasting answer lies in the construction of a dam across the kosi as well as some check dams across the tributaries. 24 April 1965 Nepal granted permission to build WKC. Once again Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri laid foundation for the canal GoI constituted a committee under Kanwar Sain, enquire into the affairs of kosi project 1966 The committee submitted the report recommending reducing the flow in Kosi by constructing a barrage near Dagmara. 19 Dec 1966 A revised agreement was signed between India and Nepal 36

43 12 July 1967 K.L. Rao, the union irrigation minister informed the Lok Sabha that the plan to construct the second barrage was abandoned due to safety issues based on the model study. Oct 1967 The survey report of WKC was sent to CWPC 1967 GoB Once again constituted another committee under the chairmanship of Kosi Area Development Commissioner, further expanding its scope to include the aspects of industry and economic rehabilitation over and above the areas specified to the previous committee. As usual, this too repeated its non performance. 3, 4 Oct 1968 There was heavy and untimely rain in the catchment area of Kosi in Nepal 5 Oct 1968 Water flow rose to 913,000 cusecs, 56 gates of Birpur barrage opened simultaneously. The maximum discharge observed in Kosi so far was 854,000 cusecs. 6 Oct 1968 The embankment breached at Jamalpur and four other points. There was wide spread loss of life and property. 6 Oct 1968 Chief Administrator of the Kosi Project, S.A.F Abbas after the aerial survey was quite impressed by the tenacity of the embankments to withstand the pressure of such unprecedented quantum of water. 11 Oct 1968 K.L Rao, Union Irrigation minister air surveyed the flood hit area 12, 13 Oct Chief. Eng. Central water commission visited the site to enquire into the causes of the breach. There were controversies and conflicting claims with regard to the causes of the breach Kosi breach haunted the politicians and the Lok Sabha witnessed heated debate on the same The Rajpur canal started irrigating. The planned gross command area for both the canals was712, 000ha. However the actual maximum irrigation achieved was only 2,13000ha in April 1968 The report was forwarded to the ministry of external affairs. 1July A revised project report was sent to Nepal 1 May 1969 Darbhanga bandh to demand the completion of WKC 1969 Dagmara barrage accepted statement in Vidhan Sabha by Lahtan Choudhary on behalf of GoB 1969 All the five breaches in the western embankment were sealed Only 6650 families were relocated outside the embankments. Over families were still need to be settled. Jan 1971 GoB sets up another committee to study Kosi matters. It recommended the construction of Dagmara barrage. 3 Aug 1971 Hari Nath Mishra met Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi to find a solution to this prolonged state of indecision and inaction. 12 Aug 1971 Collapse of Bhatania Approach Bund on the eastern embankment occurred on this day and within two days the bund was completely eroded. 27 Oct 1971 Agreement was signed between India and Nepal. The original WKC scheme was restored and the Dgmara barrage dropped. Nepal also demanded a lift irrigation scheme to irrigate an additional 13,800ha. The cost of the project was estimated to be Rs. 37cr. According to the agreement the work was to be completed by February Nov 1971 K.L Rao announced in the Lok Sabha that GoB has to raise its own resources, Rs. 37cr 1972 Centre agrees to disburse Rs. 2 cr annually for the construction of WKC 1972 Problems of very low irrigation levels, water logging, sand casting and spread of sand came under severe criticism. 27 Sept 1973 Kosi irrigation committee was constituted by GoB to look into the affairs of the EKMC and suggest corrective measures The construction work of WKC was held up over a dispute over land acquisition in Nepal over not paying the compensation. The state govt. was losing Rs per day. 15 Jan 1974 Amarendra Mishra, MLA requested the chairman of the public accounts committee of Bihar Vidhan Sabha to probe into the causes of the breach. He accused the Kosi project authorities with deliration of duty. 30 Jan 1974 Fifth foundation laying ceremony for the WKC by Abdul Ghafoor, CM of Bihar. Work began in the Indian portion. 37

44 20 Feb 1975 The irrigation Minister GoB, Jagannath Mishra told the Vidhan Sabha that the revised estimate of the project is now Rs. 51 cr and the project would be completed by Mar 1975 Kosi irrigation committee submitted its report. It brought down the irrigation target to 374,000ha only 52% of the original 712,000ha. 21 Nov 1975 Public accounts committee members toured the Bhatania Approach Bundh area and found out that that the repairing cost exceeded many fold (2.86 cr.) the cost incurred in building the bund Rs.316,887) Kosi Kranti, a special programme was launched as a pilot project for Purunia. The chief architects of this project were the famous journalist B.G Vargheese, and Karpuri Thakur, the former CM of Bihar. But it started falling apart with a year of its launch Evaluation of Kosi project by planning commission to find out the impact of the Kosi project on augmenting income of the people and in the generation of employment opportunities in the area. October 1979 Deputy Home minister GoI (Jantha govt.) Visited the area and found out that out of the 59 structures only 17 had been completed Kosi came closer to eastern embankment at km Spurs were built to protect the embankment. 11 Jan 1980 Another memorandum to PM, Indira Gandhi by Harinath Mishra asking for her personal intervention in the western Kosi canal project. The estimated cost had gone up by now to Rs cr 8Aug 1980 The eastern Kosi embankment breached at Bahuarawa Under duress from people GoB appointed another committee to examine the possibilities of economic rehabilitation under the Chairmanship of Chandra Kisore Pathak, then chairman of Saharsha District board Feb 1982 The committee submitted its report. The report, however, remained under consideration till Aprl 1982 Terminated the services 37 workers of Kosi Kranti. The much hyped programme was wound up eventually. 13 Mar 1984 Kosi Contol Board recommends immediate repair and strengthening of embankment and 5 cr was allocated 5July, 1984 Aryavarta, daily news paper warns of the impending danger to the eastern embankment in its editorial 4 Sept 1984 Non gazetted employees of the state went on an indefinite strike. This crippled the administration 5 Sept 1984 Breach of Eastern Kosi embankment at Navhatta 75 km from Bhim Nagar barrage. More than people were affected apart from the loss of life and damage to property. Nothing was done between 13 th March and 2 nd September 19 Nov ,000 Satyagrahis demonstrated before the district collector, Saharsha demanding compensation, enquiry into the reasons of the breach and employment March 1985 Navhatta breach was plugged with a retied line costing 8 Cr WKC commissioned (a portion) 30 Jan 1987 GoB accepted the recommendations of Chandra Kisore after a period of 5 years of its submission. By now, 30 years since the construction of embankments, the population of people swelled from 1,92,000 to 4,50, Apr 1987 GoB constituted Kosi Pirit Vikas Pradikar (Kosi sufferers Development authority). A 19 member committee under the chairmanship of Lahtan Choudhary for the management of the same. This is a defunct body. It does not have its own office, staff or budget, any power to execute things, except that the Chairman enjoys the privileges of a cabinet minister. Today the voice of the people trapped in the embankments is represented by a movemrnt called Kosi Mukti Sangharsh Samiti (KMSS). Itwas formed by Adv. Devi kumar Singh, Supaul; KMSS presented the issue of rehabilitation before the Chief Secretary GoB and even the President of the country Samani and Ghongherpur Breach in the western embankment 30 May 1988 Having received no positive response from the state government. Over the rehabilitation issue, KMSS petitioned to NHRC placing a 15 point demand and requesting its intervention in this issue of 38

45 the violation of basic human rights. 20 Feb 1989 Supreme Court judgment on the petition filed by REALS for compensation (REALS vs Govt. of Bihar). Asked the state government to constitute a high level committee to probe into the reasons for 1984 embankment breach and assess the loss of property WKC breached due to embankment breach 1991 Water resource minister publically stated that he would resign in the event of a breach. He held that corruption was the main cause of the breaches July The Kosi started flowing very close and eroding the embankment at Joginia th July 1991 Non cooperation of Nepali truck drivers and works and agitating mob prevented the repair work. The allegation was that Nepali workers payments were due for 3 4 years. 17 h July 1991 Nepalese Police asked the Indian Engineers to leave the sight to ease the tension 17 July Nepalese officials visited the site 17 July 1991 of The western embankment breached near Joginia 18 July 1991 Nepalese Police and Royal Army gave protection to the Indian engineers to resume the repair work 1991 Water Resource Minister GoB tendered resignation 3 April 1992 Over the inaction of state Govt. over the judgment of the apex court, REALS filed a contempt petition. However this was not followed up to its logical conclusion During this season WKC irrigated 16,000ha 30 Mar 1993 The 11 member committee constituted by the Speaker of the Vdhan Sabha submitted its report. According to the report lack of coordination with the Nepalese officials was the main problem behind the breach Second Irrigation Commission of Bihar, estimated the sediment load to be 92.5 million cubic meter annually 1998 WKC canal was defunct by flood 12 Aug 1998 NHRC asked the Chief Secretary GoB to submit the status report of the demands made by KMSS. 22 Mar 1999 Since there was no response from GoB, NHRC issued a second letter to the Chief Secretary GoB 2000 Environmental impact study of WKC 11 Oct 2001 The GoB replied to NHRC clarify its stand that the people are rehabilitated as per the rehabilitation scheme There are obvious gaps in the report. Whereas the water resource department claims to have rehabilitated 39,527 families, the quoted figure of the number of families in 1956 was 45,219. There is a gap of 6000 families. In addition to this, after the extension of eastern Kosi embankment in 1980, 76 more villages were trapped. A reasonable estimate would put at least 10,000 families yet to be rehabilitated Engineers from Japan called to explore the possibility of renovating the Kataiya plant. Nothing has happened till date 13 May 2004 NHRC forwarded the reply of GoB to KMSS. KMSS raised the issue of equality of all citizens before law and requested NHRC to reconsider afresh the whole issue 10 Dec 2004 NHRC closed the case after forwarding the reply of KMSS to GoB for further action End of 2004 An ambitious programme to de silt the EKMC was launched at an estimated cost of 54 cr by water resource department. June 2005 De silting was completed with 4000 tractors. Large scale corruption in de silting programme was reported. EKMC is a typical case of Poor planning, mismanagement, and inaction Only 7.79 per cent l of what was promised in 1963(167,000ha) was irrigated by WKC De silting of WKC started 5 Aug 2008 River Kosi exerted pressure on the spurs at Kusaha, 12km upstream of the barrage in Nepal and began to erode the embankment. 5 Aug 2008 The Chief Engineer GoB, E. Satyanarayan stationed at Birpur alerts state governments Kosi project liaison officer, Arun Kumar Singh in Kathmandu. He was on leave and no action was taken Aug 2008 As the situation got worsened, Satyanarayan sent telegraph to 11 senior officials associated with flood management in Patna alerting them of the imminent danger. 39

46 16 Aug 2008 Locals in Nepal prevent the repair work on the embankment. Engineers treat this as instigated by the Maoist. 17 Aug 2008 Bihar irrigation and flood control department in a bulletin claimed those embankments are safe. 18 August Aug 2008 Forty five years after Dalwa breach Kosi breached the eastern embankment near Kusaha in Nepal. First time the embankment breached upstream of the Kosi barrage. The Kosi shifted 120km towards the east and started flowing in its one of the earlier channels. According to official sources 194 people lost their lives. The untamed waters of Kosi swept across five districts, 114 blocks and 2528 villages in North Bihar. An estimated 3.2 million people have lost their houses and livelihood. The swirling waters destroyed the standing crops in more than 110,000ha of fertile land. The state irrigation minister Bijendra Prasad Yadav takes only routine steps and did not alert Centre. Sand bags were not stocked in advance and the 5 lakh cubic ft boulders in stock were not used either. Chief minister Nitish Kumar conducted aerial survey 20Aug Aug 2008 Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh declares it as a National Calamity and Sanctioned 1000 Cr. for relief End of 2008 The WKC still incomplete. The portion in Nepal is complete, 99% of the main and branch canals in India too are complete. But only 32 % of the field channels were ready By June 2009 Canal to be completed according to the written statement in Vidhan Sabha. But this appears to be doubtful. 40

47 ANNEXTURE: 2 Determinants Diagram for Alternative Flood Management Mechanism through Institutional Innovation Embankments cannot be wished away today, they have to be maintained and saved from breaches. High raised platforms, helipads are to be constructed for effective relief operation and for the safety of the people during floods We need to have a new paradigm of flood management and not flood control. Traditional knowledge must be taken into consideration while designing new strategies. People must be helped to live with floods. The nexus among politicians, engineers, contractors and bureaucrats needs to be countered through appropriate institutional innovation What to do? Repeated failure of embankments, annual floods & water logging Millions of rupees being spent yearly for upkeep, maintenance and repair of embankments that do not offer flood protection The misery of people trapped within embankments, the mismanagement of relief, and rehabilitation, decrease in agricultural production Strengthening factors What the Government of Bihar Must do: Establish a strong linkage between the traditional wisdom of people and govt. agencies, engineers, policy makers to promote an alternative method of flood management and the implementing mechanism People harping for complete flood control measures Continuing with the flood control measures based on engineering solutions like building a dam Rampant corruption/inertia/ patronage/factionalism/ the nexus of politicians/contractors/bureaucrats Weakening Factor People should be made aware that complete flood control is impossible. They must be taught to live with floods while enough measures are taken for mitigation and community preparedness There must be an honest and open dialogue on flood control measures and an assessment of the benefits derived from such measures 41 Institutional innovation at planning, monitoring and implementation level with the participation of CSOs. What to do?