Why empowerment and accountability matters

Transcription

1 Africa Regional Empowerment and Accountability Programme Case study 4 Why empowerment and accountability matters Exploring the extent to which such initiatives make a difference to governance in Africa: examples from AREAP Partners

2 The Africa Regional Empowerment and Accountability Programme is a four-year project funded by the Department for International Development (DFID). It aims to improve access to high quality relevant data, evidence and analysis for African citizens, non-state actors and policy makers. It also supports the development of coalitions of citizens to use this information, voice their concerns and interests, and influence decisions of the state. Three implementing partners (IPs) deliver AREAP: Afrobarometer (AB) conducts citizen perception surveys across 35 countries in Africa The Southern Africa Trust (the Trust) undertakes policy advocacy, capacity building and disbursement of grants provided for pro-poor regional integration The State of the Union Coalition (SOTU) focuses on engagement in policy development and monitoring state compliance AREAP s Learning Information and Communication Hub (the Learning Hub) is managed and led by Triple Line Consulting. The Learning Hub was established in December 2014 to identify lessons and capitalise on synergies and joint working between the partners. The Learning Hub facilitates the partners to share experiences and learn from the practices, processes and outcomes of AREAP s empowerment and accountability work. The case study, Understanding off the lograme results, is the work of Andrew Osiany, Janah Ncube, and Osai Ojigho (The State of the Union Coalition); Carolyn Logan and Boniface Dulani (Afrobarometer); and Lusungu Kanchenche and Bhekinkosi Moyo (The Southern African Trust); with support from Janah Ncube. Helen Appleton produced the case study with additional inputs from Juliette Seibold and Mary Straker. Front cover photo: Afrobarometer, interview with young mother in southern Africa,

3 Abstract Based on the work of AREAP Partners this case study explores the extent to which empowerment and accountability initiatives make a difference to governance in Africa. To verify the effectiveness of different initiatives, the case study poses the question what would happen if these initiatives had not taken place or if they were to cease? We argue that it is possible to identify and capture different levels of achievement for empowerment and accountability, and that based on this indicators can be developed for monitoring and guiding current and future interventions. The study concludes by acknowledging that measuring progress is challenging and that processes and mechanisms that support empowerment and accountability take time to build and can be slow to take effect. Nevertheless, citizens with accurate data, formal mandates and opportunities to engage with local and national bodies and or continental governance bodies have been able to change the discourse and shift boundaries in terms of demanding improved transparency and accountability of leaders and representatives. Youth Exchange, Sayxchange - Southern Africa Trust Africa Regional Empowerment and Accountability Programme 3

4 Introduction 1 This case study examines the experiences of AREAP Partners 1 in implementing Empowerment and Accountability programmes and projects, and considers what these initiatives have contributed and what might happen if they were to cease. We argue that it is possible to measure different levels of achievement in relation to empowerment and accountability, and that examples can provide helpful pointers in relation to identifying, monitoring, measuring and guiding current and future interventions. 2 What is meant by empowerment and accountability? There are a number of definitions for empowerment, some of which relate to the handing over of power from one party to another. In the contexts in which AREAP Partners are working, however, the concept is less about power being handed over and more about women and men and marginalised or vulnerable groups (e.g. young people, migrants, informal workers) developing greater capacity to bring about changes in their lives. Here are some examples: 1. Having the skills and space to realise abilities and potential; 2. Having decision-making power; 3. Having access to information and resources; 4. Having a range of options from which to make choices; 5. Having opportunities to learn; 6. Having the ability to think critically; 7. Being able to be assertive; 8. Having the feeling of being able to make a difference. 2 3 Accountability is less problematic: most definitions describe the quality or state of being accountable as an obligation or willingness to accept responsibility and/or to account for one s actions, either as an individual or an institution (such as a government). 3 4 We have identified four levels of achievement for empowerment and accountability programmes working with civil society, which are illustrating on page 5 and described below. Having the information and having a seat at the table with which to make arguments (levels 1 and 2) are necessary but not sufficient conditions to achieve levels 3 and 4, where citizens views shape and change the debate and policy-making processes. There are many other factors involved in achieving these levels, including changing social norms and attitudes. Sometimes citizens will not succeed even when they have the space and the information. In some cases, governments continue to act with impunity and/ or use force in the face of citizen protests. 4 On other occasions, citizens have been able to achieve some of their demands. Thus, shaping policy through socially inclusive processes is a complex endeavour, involving compromise and characterised by incremental gains along the way, and losses too. 5 AREAP Partners efforts are largely focused around levels 1 (social inclusion) and 2 (evidence/informed engagement). In this study we argue that these levels of aspiration drive advocacy and practices that leads to strengthened government accountability and citizen empowerment: the more that citizens have seats at the table, the more it becomes accepted that citizens should be at the table. Subsequently, the more that citizens are well informed and skilled in engaging with political leaders and others, the more likely it is that they will shape the debates and influence policy. It is a step-by-step process which may not be linear, but can lead to a light being shone on governance where previously issues were covered up. 6 This case study presents a number of AREAP Partner initiatives. Although AREAP Partners approach the subject of empowerment and accountability differently to each other, they all include a critical focus on making available the information that citizens need to demand greater accountability from governments and public institutions. They all engage in strengthening citizens capacities in different ways so that they are empowered to analyse this information and use it to develop positions and arguments in relation to government policy, and to lobby for improvements. 7 Afrobarometer, for example, ensures that high quality information (citizen perception surveys) on key aspects of men and women s lives 5 in 35 African states is collected, analysed and made 4

5 Different levels of achievement of empowerment and accountability available to be publicly debated. The data for each country is comparable year on year, so performance over time can be assessed and compared with other countries. 8 SOTU creates and supports one continental and ten national civil society platforms to convene citizens, raise their awareness of poverty and rights issues, and discuss and debate their governments progress in compliance with the African Union standards and norms. 9 The Southern Africa Trust works both with governments and with civil society to establish mechanisms for sustained and institutionalised policy engagement between the state and nonstate actors, and directly with poorer and more marginalised groups to enable participation in key regional policy debates and forums such as the SADC Regional Poverty Observatory (RPO). Africa Regional Empowerment and Accountability Programme 5

6 A closer look at how AREAP Partners have worked 10 This section provides insights, for each of the AREAP Partners, into the evolution of processes that are aimed at addressing poverty through continental, regional and national policies, debates, and discussions and advocacy. The Trust: changing the regional discourse on poverty 11 The Trust s role in ensuring a poverty focus in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) regional agenda has been significant. Although Article 5 of the 1992 SADC Treaty highlights poverty alleviation as one of the core objectives, historically it has not reflected strongly in policies of SADC member states. 6 In 2006, through Trust support in consultation and advocacy processes of civil society groups, SADC members agreed to hold a regional forum in 2008 to focus on strengthening policies and practices to address poverty reduction. From 2006 to 2008, the Trust provided grants to civil society organisations across SADC member states and facilitated their participation to ensure effective representation of citizens voices, as well as commissioning research on critical poverty themes. The 2008 SADC Conference on Poverty and Development was the first to enable space for citizens opinions to be heard, and it led to the development of a SADC Regional Poverty Reduction Framework. To ensure implementation of the Framework SADC members, with support from the Trust, agreed to set up a Regional Poverty Observatory (SADC RPO) to convene government officials and representatives of business, labour, civil society, and gender and faith-based organisations to discuss policies and share expertise about alleviating poverty. 12 The RPO proposal was finally approved by the SADC Council of Ministers, endorsed by heads of state in 2010 and formed in the SADC Secretariat s Policy, Planning and Resource Mobilisation Directorate in The RPO acts as a multi-stakeholder consultative forum for monitoring the objectives, targets and actions identified in the SADC Poverty Reduction Framework. 7 It has enabled a new form of engagement between member states, CSOs and the business community. 8 This is especially evident in the 25-member RPO Steering Committee, the main governance body, which exemplifies the multi-stakeholder approach. 13 The RPO Steering Committee is made up of: i. Government: one Senior Official from the Ministry responsible for poverty issues in each MS (15); ii. Civil Society: four representatives from regional apex organisations; iii. Business Sector: one representative from the Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce & Industry; iv. Experts on poverty and development issues drawn from the region: three; and v. International Cooperating Partners: two representatives. 14 Businesses continue to be drawn in as their understanding of the relevance of SADC to their work strengthens. Southern African countries that have established National Poverty Observatories (NPOs) or similar mechanisms 6

7 Achievements of the RPO brought about through the Trust s support include: Intevriew, Zambia - Afrobarometer include the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique, South Africa and Mauritius. In Zambia, a Civil Society Poverty Observatory Group has been established and is advocating for formal status. According to a recent survey, Namibia, Lesotho and Zimbabwe have also expressed interest in establishing national poverty observatories. Considering the counterfactual 15 The outcomes and impact of Empowerment and Accountability initiatives are hard to measure, and it is probably best to identify indicators that measure change in relation to the counterfactual: if x had not happened, then y and z also would not have happened, or may have taken longer. In this case, if the Trust and its civil society grant partners had not worked to establish the RPO (level 1 social inclusion), there would have been no agreed agenda for poverty reduction among elected government officials in the SADC region, no unit responsible for implementation and no formal spaces for regular multi-stakeholder discussions on development, accountability and poverty in SADC (level 2 having the information, and level 3 shaping debates). Despite the slow progress with the RPO, these are significant gains, which have changed expectations about how business is done in SADC. 1. Achieving formal status within SADC Secretariat to monitor and analyse poverty trends coordinated at regional levels. Supported by a Trust-seconded senior policy advisor and senior policy researcher, to strengthen RPO capacity to generate credible poverty data, build research and information networks, and support more effective monitoring of poverty reduction. 2. A governance and accountability framework: Steering Committee operational, Poverty Status Report underway, all with government NSA equal participation and ownership. 3. Increased understanding of stakeholders on multi-dimensional poverty indicators: joint training in March 2012 by the RPO and Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative. 4. Multi-dimensional indicators 9 for tracking poverty researched by regional non-state actors and approved by the RPO Steering Committee in 2013 and SADC Council in August Enhanced RPO stakeholder engagement in SADC meetings to implement the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). Evidence of SADC s recognition of the Trust s added value on poverty and social inclusion: 1. SADC commissioned the Trust to propose a new mechanism to facilitate wider participation in SADC s regional integration agenda. 2. The SADC Council of NGOs appointed the Trust to coordinate civil society participation in the Steering Committee, strengthen National Poverty Observatories where they exist, or advocate for their establishment. 3. SADC agreed to a Poverty Status Report for each of the 15 SADC member states, proposed by the Trust. This provides impetus for states to tackle poverty, as the reports will be made public. Africa Regional Empowerment and Accountability Programme 7

8 Afrobarometer: information checks power 16 The example of a second AREAP Partner, Afrobarometer, illustrates the importance of having accurate information in the public arena even if the short-term outcomes are variable. 17 Africa, like many areas of the world, has leaders who refuse to relinquish the reins of power. The establishment and enforcement of presidential term limits is considered critical to the advancement of democracy and accountability, as limits provide a mechanism for holding leaders accountable, reducing corruption by ensuring political turnover, and giving new generations the opportunity to compete for political office. Before Afrobarometer s public perception data was available, African leaders and elites ( presidents for life ) could say that they held on to power because the people want me. 10 However, Afrobarometer survey data is reshaping popular debates about the extension of presidential terms in favour of greater accountability. This demonstrates that high quality data can change the political discourse, and it has on occasions contributed to change in outcomes. 18 During , the issue of presidential terms has come to the fore. Six African countries Benin, Burundi, Burkina Faso, DRC, Rwanda and Togo with elections scheduled during this period had or have presidents who have served two terms, but who want to continue, even though in most cases their constitutions set limits preventing this. Afrobarometer opinion polls show that 74 per cent of Africans support a two-term presidential limit, and country-specific data for Benin, Burundi, Burkina Faso and Togo also demonstrates citizens opposition to extending limits. During the last year, Afrobarometer has been disseminating these findings through press releases, media briefings and dispatches. 11 In each case, the data has been widely discussed in public debates, challenging the respective leaders claims that their terms should be extended. The outcomes of these efforts are varied, and some presidents have resorted to force to extend their tenure. However, even where there has been no change there have been shifts in the discourse: the knowledge that the public supports term limits is now widespread in all of these countries, and the leaders who have extended their tenure now know that local and international public opinion stands against them. 19 Afrobarometer data was clearly not the only variable in holding African presidents to account on tenure. Other factors (history, presidential popularity, strength of opposition, civil society responses, the role of the military and the presidents willingness to use force) were also significant. However, in all of the above cases Afrobarometer findings were used in TV and radio news broadcasts, chat shows and other public discussions to strengthen arguments around upholding the constitution. These efforts have ensured that that no individual could turn himself into a president for life without citizens being able at least to demand an informed debate and a parliamentary vote. Whatever the outcome, in each case a clear line has been drawn in relation to publicly available and accessible information, and citizens capacity to understand and use that information in national debates. 20 These examples demonstrate the importance of citizens being able to have a seat at the table (in these cases largely facilitated by the media), having the information to engage in debates and challenge governments and, in some cases, being able to contribute to changing outcomes. Where there is no data 21 Given that Afrobarometer does not conduct surveys in two countries with ongoing term-limit debates (DRC and Rwanda), both of these offer a counterfactual of what happens when reliable information on public opinion is not available. The Rwanda case is particularly striking: in August 2015 it was reported that after a threeweek consultation with millions of Rwandans, 8

9 Enforcing presidential term limits: Afrobarometer s contribution in Burundi, Togo, Burkina Faso and Benin Context Afrombarmoter actions Afrobarometer issues a press release reporting that 62% of citizens support a limit on presidential terms (up from 51% previously). Intermediary actions Afrobarometer s data is widely quoted in debates and cited in regional and international media. After a coup attempt in May, the government cracks down on protesters, media and civil society advocates of term limits. Outcomes Burundi April 2014 President Nkurunziza announces plans to run for a third term in June. Protests break out. President Nkurunziza claims his first term did not count as he was elected by parliament, not by the people, and thus had not served two elected terms. Presidential term limits are abolished in 2002 by President Gnassingbe. His son, Faure Gnassingbe, wins elections in 2005 and 2010 and announces his plan to run for a third term in President Campaore announces his intention to stand for a third term. Protests break out. Nkurunziza is re-elected in June, but the election is regarded as deeply flawed. Violence and protests are ongoing. Togo October 2014 Afrobarometer issues a press release reporting that 84% of citizens support the two-term limit. Afrobarometer s finding are widely cited in the media and the information is used by the opposition to bolster demands to reinstate presidential term limits. Despite public protests, the April elections take place and President Gnassingbe is re-elected. Burkina Faso October 2014 Afrobarometer issues a press release reporting that 64% of citizens support the two-term limit. Protests grow in strength. In November, Campaore relinquishes power and an interim government led by Michel Kafando takes over. A short-lived coup temporarily displaces this government but national and regional diplomacy successfully reinstates Kafondo. The leader of the unsuccessful coup gives citizens wishes as the reason for giving up. Elections to restore democratic government are scheduled for November Benin May 2015 A two term limit is introduced in With elections scheduled for 2016, there is speculation in early 2015 that incumbent President Yayi Boni will try to remove the limit. Afrobarometer issues a press release reporting that 90% of citizens support the two-term limit. In June the President states that he will stand down at the end of his tenure. Afrobarometer data is reshaping the debate about the extension of presidential terms in favour of greater accountability. Africa Regional Empowerment and Accountability Programme 9

10 According to the Afrobarometer, which is the gold standard for independent opinion polls in Africa, 84 per cent of Africans support free and fair elections, 77 per cent reject one-party rule, and 72 per cent believe democracy is preferable to any other system of governance. These are not abstract data points. These are overwhelming and powerful numbers that reflect the very real opinions of millions of people. 13 the country s lawmakers found only 10 people opposed to Paul Kagame running for a third term as president. 12 Afrobarometer s assessment is that Rwanda is too politically closed at present to ensure a valid independent public opinion survey. 22 Afrobarometer data has also been used in international advocacy. Most notably, the US deputy secretary of state for Africa, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, published a prominent op-ed in October 2014 in Jeune Afrique (in both French and English), drawing on the data to make the case for term limits. 23 African leaders are feeling the pressure. A senior DRC official responded to Thomas-Greenfield, arguing against the notion that African citizens support term limits. 14 In Rwanda, Kagame has been particularly outspoken. Although the battle is not won, evidence on citizen s opinions has played a constructive role in reshaping the debate, and in putting pressure on leaders who are reluctant to relinquish power. 10

11 the instruments. 15 However, the process has proved to be long and sometimes it is exclusive rather than inclusive. In Malawi, for example, the exclusion of Parliament from the ratification process ensured a relatively speedy ratification, but with the drawback that a lack of awareness on the part of MPs means that debates in the National Assembly rarely reference African Union instruments. SOTU: building empowerment and accountability processes 24 SOTU operates through national platforms or coalitions in its ten member countries. Each platform has a broad range of members, including CSOs and other bodies with skills in areas such as education, health, finance, media, research, human rights, governance and gender. SOTU has prioritised 14 key African Union (AU) instruments to strengthen democratic governance, economic and social and civil and political rights. The coalitions advocate for national implementation of these instruments with the aim of reducing poverty and widening access to rights and services. The example of SOTU s work explored in this case study underlines the importance of getting in place processes and mechanisms that support sustainable, citizen-focused institutional arrangements to track the implementation of the 14 instruments and strengthen accountability. Progress in this area can change the way that African Union business is done at continental and national levels. 25 SOTU provides broad guidelines on the formation and management of country platforms, but each may take different advocacy and campaigning approaches according to context. The national platforms offer seats at the table for different groups of citizens, providing space for policy engagement and discussion. Some countries have signed and ratified all 14 prioritised instruments but implementation is weak. Others have signed but not ratified and others still have yet to sign anything. In all cases, the national platforms facilitate governments in moving through the steps of signing, ratifying and implementing 26 There are five main advantages to SOTU s strategic approach of advocating through civil society coalitions: The coalitions cannot be ignored and are taken more seriously than individual organisations. They form webs of interlinked CSOs at continental and national level. They focus on priority issues and their numbers lend force to advocacy campaigns within the ten member states on priority instruments. They remind governments to implement commitments and demonstrate compliance. They share and combine their skills, knowledge and expertise. They bring African continental standards to the national level. They engage African citizens to nudge their governments towards implementing the standards set out by the African Union. 27 SOTU coalition members produce national compliance reports for their country which are then aggregated by the SOTU Secretariat into a continental compliance report (in English, French, Portuguese and Arabic). 16 The report launch (continental and national) is a significant undertaking and provides an important opportunity for media coverage, debate and discussion. SOTU changes the landscape for empowerment and accountability 28 SOTU supports a strong governance structure for CSOs comprising a Coalition Governing Team (CGT) at its apex, a Secretariat and National Platforms (NPs) at national levels. The architecture gives wide and in-depth reach across the continent, making it possible to sit in Nairobi, for example, and talk about issues with civil society in northern Tunisia or southern Rwanda or central Cameroon. Africa Regional Empowerment and Accountability Programme 11

12 29 Organising around a process and an approach: All SOTU members are working on the same broad agenda: i) compliance with standards; ii) gathering evidence of why compliance matters (i.e. monitoring government allocations including, for example, health and agriculture, and the impact of these allocations on citizens); and iii) advocacy around compliance reporting, covering hosting and convening governments and citizens, and persuading, influencing and following up at national and continental level. 30 Building transparency: Country-level progress is made public worldwide through the national compliance reports on strengthening democracy and governance; women s rights; and natural resource management. Instruments such as the ratification table allow for comparison. Some countries produce policy briefs and other research products Mobilising: The unique value of SOTU is to bring national CSOs and citizens to continental spaces, such as African Union summits, the Pan African Parliament, the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, and NEPAD the African Union s executive agency. 18 Facilitating these opportunities is a critical factor in strengthening government accountability and citizen empowerment, even if progress is slow. Once citizen space is secured it is difficult to close it down, and media coverage, debates, radio programmes, TV talk shows etc. help to create and sustain momentum for change around the issues covered in compliance reports. Why does process, transparency and mobilisation matter? 32 Like other AREAP Partners, SOTU has established an architecture that helps to ensure citizens voices are being heard, and can change the way governments and those in power act across Africa. African CSOs and citizens are more able to engage with national governments and pan-african institutions to raise treaty compliance and implementation issues. There are clear examples of success that would not have happened without SOTU engagement, illustrated below. To strengthen its evidence base, SOTU is conducting a perception study among policy makers to gauge their views on the value of SOTU s work. 33 Despite SOTU s efforts, overall implementation of the 14 AU standards at national levels can be disappointing. 20 One reason for slow Examples of SOTU s first time results in policy dialogue 1. SOTU provided the first ever-formal avenue for CSOs to engage with AU on affairs concerning compliance with AU instruments. 2. SOTU provided the first forum for peer learning between countries around policy advocacy on AU instruments and compliance to their provisions. 3. SOTU is credited for bridging the gap between the AU and Africa s citizens. SOTU, for instance, through organising the Public forum on the state of the African Union: The role of the youth in the African Union Agenda 2063 at the University of Nairobi in Kenya. 1,500 students attended this event. The Forum offered the students an opportunity to directly express their views and priorities to His Excellency, Ambassador Jean Baptiste Natama, the Chief of Staff of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Dr. Dlamini Zuma

13 Launch of the Malawi Compliance Report, State of the Union SOTU s role in the domestication of African Union treaties SOTU submitted of a policy brief on the role of legislature in accelerating domestication of AU instruments at the national level. They then made a presentation at the 6th annual Speakers Conference in As a result, delegates urged Pan African, Regional and National parliaments to work with SOTU to develop mechanisms to monitor the ratification and domestication of AU legal instruments. SOTU has since commissioned research on Developing Mechanisms for Monitoring Compliance to AU instruments at the AU & SADC. The final paper will be disseminated in early Africa Regional Empowerment and Accountability Programme 13

14 progress is that government decision making is split between the executive (presidents, prime ministers, ministers) who sign treaties, and parliaments and bureaucracies which implement. Knowledge of AU ratifications and details of treaty standards and implementation can fall into gaps between different arms of government. To overcome this, SOTU advocates for the establishment of national coordination and monitoring mechanisms to gauge progress on implementation. 34 The example to the right describes how SOTU managed to persuade the Ministry of Justice in Rwanda to set up an African Union monitoring desk. Without SOTU, this potential accountability mechanism would not have been established. Encouraging the Government of Rwanda to implement the AU Charter of Human and Peoples Rights The SOTU partner in Rwanda, CLADHO, wrote to Rwanda s Ministry of Justice (MINIJUST), inviting them to present their progress in taking forward Rwanda s commitment to the AU Charter of Human and Peoples Rights, establishing the Africa Court of Human Rights. MINIJUST acknowledged SOTU s contribution to Rwanda s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) system. SOTU expressed its frustration that the Review only focused on human rights treaties, and ignored AU treaties and protocols. After further consultations, MINIJUST agreed to monitor compliance with AU decisions and, with SOTU s support (to conceptualise the mandate), they established a dedicated AU monitoring desk in the ministry. The government has since formally requested SOTU and CSOs in Rwanda to support the initiative, which has the potential to provide space and information for citizens to engage. 14

15 Conclusions and lessons learned Measuring progress on empowerment and accountability, including in the work of AREAP, is challenging. In all countries, within governments and the private sector the processes and mechanisms that support accountability and transparency take time to build, and move slowly in taking effect. 21 Nevertheless, citizens with accurate data, formal mandates and opportunities to engage with local, national and/or continental government bodies have begun to shift boundaries in terms of demanding improved transparency, greater effectiveness and enhanced accountability of their leaders and representatives. This has impacted on the lives of ordinary Africans, as demonstrated by AREAP in a variety of ways: 1. When the perspectives of ordinary people are represented in meetings, heard in the media and referred to in key policy debates, it changes the narrative. It puts different topics on the agenda and encourages new ways of thinking about old problems. Citizens presence becomes established. 2. Strong and accessible evidence about citizens views of service delivery, governance, corruption and satisfaction with democracy not only brings in other citizens voices to the debate but also empowers people (men and women) with knowledge to challenge cultures of impunity and hold leaders to account. But this process needs to be repeated year on year. 3. Not all politicians oppose citizens input into accountability processes: today s politicians are beginning to appreciate the role of evidence in public policy making, implementation and monitoring. Where CSOs provide credible data, some governments have been receptive to CSOs efforts in tackling socio-economic problems. Malawi and Rwanda, for instance, have incorporated policy advice from CSOs in dealing with issues around coordination among government agencies with regard to treaty implementation and monitoring. 4. Tracking the incremental gains of Empowerment and Accountability programmes is important to ensure aid budgets are effective. Therefore, a key component of the learning agenda for AREAP is to consider the gaps in monitoring and evaluation tools and to identify indicators and data collection tools that may contribute. This requires time and investment. 5. Indicators to measure progress are most likely to be associated with actions and results in establishing processes and institutions of democracy, governance and social inclusion. 22 Questions that may be asked include: a. What would provide confidence that the work of civil society is nudging public institutions in the right direction? b. How can citizens engagement in debates be captured? c. What kinds of indicators can be used to record achievements in relation to process as well as in relation to outcome? d. How long will anticipated results take to achieve? (i.e. is the timeframe realistic?) e. For donors: if impact is elusive over the shorter term, is the response to cut funding, or to continue investing? Africa Regional Empowerment and Accountability Programme 15

16 Endnotes 1 Afrobarometer, the State of the Union Coalition and the Southern Africa Trust. 2 Adapted from Chamberlin, J., A working definition of empowerment, National Empowerment Center, available at 3 Merriam-Webster dictionary definition: 4 For example, the government of Eritrea s crackdown on student protests in 2001 where 2,000 students were arrested and detained at desert camp for refusing to sign up for a compulsory work programme organised by the government, and for demanding the release of the student union chairman Semere Kesete. Two students died, and a demonstration of mothers protesting against the detention was brutally broken up by police with batons. Temperatures at the camp reach as high as 50C. 5 Such as basic service delivery, quality of governance and the state of the economy. 6 Approximately 45 per cent of the people in SADC s 15 member states are living on less than US$1 per day. 7 See Regional: Alliance represented as the SADC Regional Poverty Observatory meet, Southern Africa Gender Protocol Alliance, available at regional-alliance-represented-as-the-sadc-regional-povertyobservatory-meet The real difference between the RPO and previous initiatives looking at poverty on a regional level is that, for the first time, both state and non-state actors are involved. Our opinion as labour is that now, for the first time, we have everyone around a table and it is a learning curve for everybody. Tendai Makanza (20 June 2014) Making sure the poor get SADC s attention, Mail and Guardian, available at 20-making-sure-the-poor-get-sadcs-attention. 9 The indicators are a result of negotiations between the member states, and researchers use them to compile data on poverty in SADC countries. Due to resource constraints, the exercise will start with Zimbabwe at the end of The Trust is mobilising more resources to support the development of the inaugural poverty status report and map. 10 We [in Africa] put a rope around our own neck and say leaders must only have two terms It is a democracy, if people want a leader to continue, let him continue. AU Chairperson Robert Mugabe, speaking at the AU Summit in South Africa, News24 (14 June 2015) Mugabe slams two-term limit on African leaders, available at SouthAfrica/News/Mugabe-slams-two-term-limit-on-Africanleaders No surveys are currently carried out in DRC or Rwanda, for security reasons and because of the difficulties of obtaining accurate data. 12 Times Live (11 August 2015) Only 10 Rwandans oppose Kagame third term: report, available at co.za/africa/2015/08/11/only-10-rwandans-oppose-kagamethird-term-report#; Tshabalala, S. (11 August 2015) Only 10 Rwandans apparently oppose president Paul Kagame s plan to stay in power, Quartz Africa, available at only-10-people-apparently-oppose-kagames-plan-to-stay-inpower-and-thats-a-problem-for-the-whole-of-africa/. 13 IIP Digital (16 October 2014) Term limits under threat in Africa, says States Thomas-Greenfield, available at article/2014/10/ html#axzz3dujx8amz. 14 Jeune Afrique (15 October 2014) RDC: Lambert Mende répond à Linda Thomas-Greenfield, available at jeuneafrique.com/42436/politique/rdc-lambert-mende-r-pondlinda-thomas-greenfield/. 15 The most recent table of ratification can be found at: 16 For further information see the reports on SOTU s website: 17 See reports on SOTU s website: reports-downloads/. 18 This is demonstrated by the fact that during the 6th Annual Conference of Speakers of African Parliaments, the conference urged the Pan African Parliament and regional and national parliaments to work with the African Union Commission and SOTU partners to develop mechanisms to monitor the ratification and domestication of AU legal instruments. 19 See the photo at 20 See ratification table at footnote There is considerable global variation in the passing of Freedom of (or Right to) Information Acts, for example, many countries enshrining this in their constitutions (Sweden s dates from 1766) or approving legislation in the 1980s or 1990s. The UK Freedom of Information Act, by contrast, did not come fully into force until See Freedom of information laws by country, Wikipedia, at of_information_laws_by_country. 22 In other DFID Empowerment and Accountability work (i.e. Civil Society Challenge Fund, GPAF ) a range of indicators of success have been used, including: raised awareness of rights; social inclusion at local and national decision-making forums; changes in the discourse; pro-poor policy formulation; policy enactment; policy implementation; and monitoring by government/civil society. These can be strong indicators but are not necessarily right for all aspects of Empowerment and Accountability work. 16

17 Acronyms AB AREAP AU CGT CLADHO CSO DFID IPs MINIJUST NEPAD NPO NPs RISDP RPO SADC SOTU UPR Afrobarometer Africa Regional Empowerment and Accountability Programme African Union Coalition Governing Team Collectif des Ligues et Association de Défense des Droits de l Homme au Rwanda Civil society organisation Department for International Development Implementing partners Rwanda Ministry of Justice New Partnership for Africa s Development National Poverty Observatories National Platforms Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan SADC Regional Poverty Observatory Southern African Development Community State of the Union Coalition Universal Periodic Review The AREAP case studies were developed by the AREAP Partners and the Learning, Information and Communication Hub, established in December The Learning Hub is facilitated by Triple Line Consulting. It brings AREAP Partners together every quarter to share experiences and examine evidence so as to reflect and learn. Case study development involved successive in-depth focus group interviews and reviews of secondary data generated through programme implementation processes. Credit for photographs and images (in order, including cover): Afrobarometer, Southern Africa Trust, Liddy Greenaway (Piktochart), Aha-Soft, Nikita Kozin, Yamini Ahluwalia, State of the Union Africa Regional Empowerment and Accountability Programme 17

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