Trend in Conflicts in Europe
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2 Trend in Conflicts in Europe y = x R 2 = Number of Conflicts Year
3 Can We (Just) Get Along? Erik Gartzke 154A, Lecture 3 January 20, 2009
4 Recap: Conflict Conflict (war) requires three things: Capability: Must be able to fight (opportunity) Incompatibility: Must be difference of interests (willingness) Diplomacy: Must not prefer alternatives (bargaining)
5 Getting Along If conflict is natural, cooperation is even moreso Getting along is what most of us want to do Human beings have always cooperated Must do so to survive, prosper (compare to the realist argument that conflict is inherent) Yet, phantom menace often interferes
6 Getting Along Three dimensions of cooperation: Continuum of cooperation and conflict Harmony - Affinity - Coexistence - Tension - War Range of values (important/valuable, or not) Level of interdependence
7 The Continuum Def: Harmony: the unanimity of interests among two or more separate individuals or groups Harmony does not require politics: Individuals acting in their own interests can cooperate more-or-less spontaneously
8 The Continuum, cont. Def: Affinity: similar but not identical interests Politics required to smooth over differences Degrees of affinity: Coordination Cooperation
9 The Continuum, cont. 2 Def: Co-existence: the independence of interests among two or individuals or groups Co-existence may or may not require politics Individuals or groups can co-exist as long as their interests do not overlap or collide Very hard to do in a world full of people One of the things government does is to facilitate co-existence among individuals
10 The Phantom Menace Co-existence is tricky because it requires that we not be affected by others (pos. or negative) Some force interferes ( Phantom Menace ) The nature of politics (collective, conflictual) Makes cooperation appealing BUT ALSO makes it hard for people to just get along
11 Interdependence Def: Interdependence: joint productive effort of two or more individuals or groups exceeds the sum of their separate productive efforts Def: Autarchy: production in isolation (i.e. no trade)
12 The Ricardian Model Units of good per units of labor Airplane Automobile Japan 2 6 United States 1 2
13 The Ricardian Model, cont. Autarchy (50%,50%) Airplane Automobile Japan (100,100) United States (100,100) World
14 The Ricardian Model, cont. 2 Trade (interdependence) Airplane Automobile Japan (50,150) United States (200,0) World [+100]
15 The Ricardian Model, cont. 3 Trade (interdependence) Airplane Automobile Japan (50,150) 200 (100) 600 (900) United States (200,0) 100 (200) 300 (0) [+100] World
16 The Ricardian Model, cont. 3 Trade (interdependence) Japan (50,150) Airplane 200 (100) Automobile 700 (900) [+100] United States (200,0) 100 (200) 200 (0) World
17 Invisible Hands of Conflict Government can address disputes over surplus Remember definition of politics ( authoritative allocation of goods and services ) This is the normative rationale for government. But government must span the actors Must continue to provide producers incentive to produce What if surplus is negative? (same story)
18 Summary PD Game is story of Collective Action among egoistic actors Summarizes main normative problem addressed by liberalism How to get states to cooperate? Tension between individual incentives to compete, collective incentives to cooperate Individual incentives lead to socially nonoptimal outcomes Solve the game using Nash EQ Strictly dominating strategies Way(s) out: Iterate the game Cooperation can Evolve out of individual self-interest
19 Prisoner's Dilemma
20 Prisoner's Dilemma: Dominant Strategy for A
21 Prisoner's Dilemma: Dominant Strategy for B
22 Prisoner's Dilemma: Nash Solution to the Game
23 Prisoner's Dilemma: A Way Out--Iterated Games
24 Return of the Phantom Menace Human productivity and security depend on collective action Different kinds of challenges to cooperation Collective action problems Prisoners dilemma game Externalities Club goods Private goods
25 The Ricardian Model Nature of good Rival Non-Rival Excludable Private Good Club Good Non- Excludable Externality Pure Public Good
26 Solutions: Leviathan (Hobbes): force people to cooperate Shadow of the Future Compromise Problem of the commons has technical solutions but not technological solutions Challenges are durable, continue
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