Hans-Joachim Heintze Policy Recommendations as a Response to the Haiti Disaster

Transcription

1 Hans-Joachim Heintze Humanitarian Aid A Tool to Build A Functioning State? Policy Paper 32 Policy s as a Response to the Haiti Disaster

2 2 Humanitarian Aid A Tool to Build A Functioning State? Haiti is a vivid example of the problems created by failed states, both for their own populations and for their neighbourhoods. With reference to this example, this Policy Paper considers to what extent humanitarian aid can, and should, make a contribution to building a functioning state. The first section describes how Haiti is affected by a double disaster : the earthquake which occurred in January 2010 with such devastating consequences was preceded by a long period of ultimately unsuccessful state-building. This double disaster and various other examples described in Section II make it clear that the international community must provide far more consistent support to build functioning statehood than it has done in the past. Failed states not only endanger their own populations; they can also pose a threat to regional or even international peace. Section III explains why the international community has an obligation to provide humanitarian aid, but also warns about the negative consequences of politicising such aid. With reference to the humanitarian interventions in Somalia and Haiti, it then describes the bases in international law and the political justification for intervention and identifies some of the pitfalls. It concludes that the provision of aid in response to humanitarian crises should be viewed not as a curtailment of state sovereignty but as a way of helping to create the conditions necessary for its effective performance. Military interventions, in order to be able to contribute to the establishment of functioning statehood, must be subject to clear and precise rules of engagement; close coordination with humanitarian agencies is essential as well. Furthermore, as Section IV shows, emergency aid must tie in with measures to support reconstruction and longterm development. In the final section, this Policy Paper considers whether more far-reaching measures, extending beyond classic humanitarian aid, may be required in order to stabilise failed states such as Haiti. I. Haiti s double disaster The Republic of Haiti, which came into being as an independent state back in 1804, is a country of grinding poverty in the Caribbean. It shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic which gained independence from Haiti in With a total area of 27,750 square km, Haiti is roughly the size of Belgium. It has a population of 9.7 million, with a substantial proportion 2.5 million people concentrated in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Haiti s gross domestic product (GDP) of approximately 6.69 billion US dollars is low compared with that of its neighbour, the Dominican Republic, which, with roughly the same population size as Haiti, is achieving an annual GDP of around billion US dollars. Some four million Haitians live abroad, mainly in the United States. This is one of the reasons why the country s fate has generated such interest worldwide. Haiti s severe poverty and decades of political instability are other factors which have prompted the international community to focus attention on Haiti. Frequent natural disasters have worsened conditions in Haiti, but none had such devastating effects as the earthquake in January The earthquake in Port-au-Prince On 12 January 2010, Haiti was hit by an earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale, whose epicentre was located close to the densely populated capital Port-au-Prince. Most of the city was destroyed. The country s already poor infrastructure collapsed, making it extremely difficult to deliver aid to the victims. According to figures published by the Haitian government at the end of March, 222,570 people died as a result of the natural disaster and 300,572 were injured (source: key_statistics). In other words, despite having occurred in such a small area, the earthquake caused almost as many deaths as the tsunami in the Indian Ocean in late 2004, which affected an entire world region and claimed some 226,000 lives. The number of casualties in the Haiti earthquake will never be determined precisely, however. The earthquake also destroyed or badly damaged around 60 percent of the buildings in the capital. According to the United Nations (UN), three-quarters of the one million people made homeless by the disaster have received emergency shelter from international aid organisations. However, tens of thousands are still living in poor conditions in the makeshift camps which have sprung up all over the city since the disaster. Failed state-building in Haiti and the international community s response The disaster which befell Haiti on 12 January was caused by one of the natural events which are by no means uncommon in this world region. However, its appalling impacts were exacerbated by Haiti s status as what the literature commonly terms a failed state. Throughout its history, Haiti has been beset by political instability, with frequent interventions by the United States, which exercised de facto control over Haiti from 1915 to The US s role was then taken over by various oppressive Haitian leaders, who ruthlessly exploited the country. After a series of coups, the first free elections in Haiti took

3 Policy Paper 32 of the Development and Peace Foundation 3 place in 1990, and were won by President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. He assumed office in February 1991 but was overthrown by a military coup in September the same year. This was followed by human rights violations on a massive scale, prompting the Organization of American States (OAS) to condemn the actions of the military. The UN General Assembly also stressed the illegality of the coup and consequently refused to recognise the new regime. However, a Security Council response to the situation was blocked by China and India, which along with various Latin American states viewed the situation as an internal matter for Haiti. It was only when the grave human rights violations created a large-scale exodus of Haitian refugees to the United States that the Security Council finally took action, also in response to a request from Haiti s own Permanent Representative. Invoking Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council finally imposed an oil and arms embargo on Haiti. This brought the ruling generals to heel and forced them to agree to negotiations with the US. The outcome was the Governors Island Agreement, which included a commitment that President Aristide would be restored to power. However, the military regime reneged on the Agreement, so the Security Council adopted Resolution 940 (1994) authorising military intervention by a multinational force. The US-led force entered Haiti unopposed, forcing the departure of the military regime shortly before any actual fighting began. Aristide was reinstated, but Haiti remained a fragile state, suffering unprecedented levels of corruption, mismanagement and crime under Aristide s presidency. After Aristide rigged the vote in the 2000 elections, fighting broke out and the situation in Haiti steadily deteriorated. By 2004, almost half the country was under rebel control, and Aristide was forced into exile. In order to support Haiti s reconstruction, the UN Security Council voted to deploy various (military) missions. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUS- TAH), established by Security Council Resolution 1542 on 30 April 2004, should be mentioned in particular. MINUS- TAH was deployed after Aristide s departure, because the Security Council deemed the situation in Haiti to be a threat to peace and security in the region. It was also responding to an official request from acting President Boniface Alexandre asking for a multinational peacekeeping force for Haiti. MINUSTAH s mandate was to restore a secure and stable environment, to promote the political process (democratic elections, decentralisation), and to monitor the human rights situation. At operational level, all the activities of the various UN agencies were coordinated by MINUSTAH. In the early days, this innovative mission faced great difficulties in stabilising the situation. It was only after coercive measures were taken to create a secure and stable environment that improvements were achieved. Nonetheless, the security situation remained fragile, and attempts to disarm the militias and criminal gangs were unsuccessful. Measures to set up a functioning police force and establish the rule of law also faltered. The Security Council has regularly extended MINUS- TAH s mandate, most recently with the adoption of Resolution 1892 on 13 October While welcoming the fact that some progress has been achieved, the Security Council has determined on each occasion that the situation in Haiti still constitutes a threat to international peace, and it therefore continues to act under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. II. Failed states as a threat to peace What constitutes a failed state? In general political theory, states are defined as political and legal associations with effective sovereignty over a geographic area and population which comply with the following three qualifications: a defined territory; a permanent population; and government. They are bound by the provisions of international law in their relations with other states, and they regulate their internal affairs in accordance with the principles of self-government. There is currently no legal definition of what constitutes a failed state, but various attempts have been made to describe it. Such entities lack functioning statehood. Their internal governance structures are collapsing or have never been fully established. The state s monopoly on the use of force a fundamental achievement of humankind no longer exists, or never existed at all. A failed state lacks government institutions with the capacity not only to take but also to enforce decisions. The vacuum created by the absence of effective governance is filled by chaos and anarchy, interspersed with despotic excesses resulting from intermittent attempts to restore order. Notionally, however, the failed state continues to exist, for it retains its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community despite its inability to govern at home. This legitimacy is guaranteed by the international community, not least because especially in light of the large number of quasi-states (Robert Jackson) the regulatory concept of a community of sovereign states would otherwise be called into question. The countries frequently mentioned in this context, besides Haiti, are Somalia and Afghanistan. These are states whose existence in law will continue until their peoples, invoking the right of self-determination, establish a new state. With a view to maintaining international stability, the international community has an interest in functioning statehood and supports it in a variety of ways.

4 4 Humanitarian Aid A Tool to Build A Functioning State? In the literature, such state-building is defined as a catalogue of measures which aim to stabilise a system of government, without necessarily being based on Western ideas of democracy. Nation-building, on the other hand, is intended to create a consciousness in the sense of a national identity which supports the consolidation of a state and also includes democracy-building and economic development. However, creating a properly functioning state is a complex task, even with massive political, military and economic support from the international community, as the example of Afghanistan vividly demonstrates. During the Cold War, the superpowers were unable to resist the temptation to exploit the political conflicts in Afghanistan for their global power games. The Soviet Union committed massive military resources in a ten-year effort to shore up what it saw as an ideologically acceptable regime in Afghanistan, while the US supported the opposing forces which later evolved into the Taliban. These forces, in turn, emerged as the victors in the civil war which followed the Soviet withdrawal and turned against the US and its allies. This history of intervention is part and parcel, as well as an expression, of state failure in Afghanistan. The threat that Afghanistan, as a failed state, poses to its own people, its neighbourhood and indeed to global stability is now obvious. In Somalia, too, the failure of the state has become an international threat, as is evident, not least, from the problem of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and far beyond. Yet again, it is becoming apparent that failed states can pose a threat to regional and even to international peace and security. As the examples show, the failure of a state can have various consequences under international law; international or national responses must comply with the principle of proportionality. In Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban regime was overthrown in a military intervention by the United States, prompted by the Taliban s involvement in international terrorism, and was replaced by a new government, whereas the international community has responded to state failure in Somalia by deploying naval units to safeguard the freedom of movement and security of shipping from pirate attacks. However, this is merely a response to the international manifestations of state failure in Somalia. Since the unsuccessful intervention in Somalia in 1992/1993, the international community has shown little desire to help re-establish a functioning state in Somalia or commit any resources for this purpose. In Haiti, on the other hand, the failure of the state was manifested at other levels, in the form of mismanagement, corruption, violence and a lack of respect for human dignity. Key functions of the state were not performed. The first priority here, then, was to protect the population from the effects of their country s fragile statehood, although the state s inability or its leaders unwillingness to provide security for their own population had international implications as well. The exodus of refugees and soaring levels of crime began to pose a threat to peace in the region, prompting the international community to intervene on several occasions. Failed states pose a threat to domestic and often external security and require intensive efforts by the international community to restore a functioning state. Despite the high costs associated with these endeavours, the international community must provide continuous support for this purpose. The objectives and means by which this is achieved must be proportionate and may vary from case to case. The example of Haiti shows that in failed states, the costs of reconstruction, not only after conflicts but also after natural disasters, are far higher than those associated with the provision of consistent support to establish effective systems of governance. The UN s attempt at nation-building in Haiti The large-scale exodus of refugees triggered by the massive human rights violations after the military coup in 1991 prompted the UN Security Council to adopt Resolution 940 (1994) authorising humanitarian intervention in Haiti, led by the US. The stated aims were to reinstate the democratically elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and to end the human rights violations. At first glance, it might seem that the Security Council was intent on enforcing the Haitian people s right to a democratic form of government. However, such an impression is misleading. Failed states are a highly unsuitable field for experimenting with Western-style democratisation. In failed states, the main priority is to establish institutions which enable the populace to live in conditions compatible with human dignity, with the problems of democratic state-building being addressed only as the next step. In Haiti, it became apparent that in 1994, the expectations of what Aristide s democratically elected government could or would achieve were too high. The international community and particularly the US were relying on rapid democratisation taking place in a country which, in practice, was still characterised by colonial structures. Due to mismanagement by Aristide s government, valuable time that could have been spent on building institutions of governance was wasted. Numerous UN missions starting in 1996 with Resolution 1063 and including efforts to safeguard Haiti s elections and the establishment of a United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) under Resolution 1141 (1997), later extended by Resolution 1277 (1999) were also unable to provide any real guarantee that the Haitian government would perform the state s functions effectively. Finally, following the outbreak of violence in 2004, Resolution 1542 authorised the establishment of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUS- TAH) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The mission has been extended on a year-by-year basis ever since.

5 Policy Paper 32 of the Development and Peace Foundation 5 Under MINUSTAH s mandate, the UN s objective, with this mission, is to pursue an ambitious exercise in nationbuilding. Hence in the preamble to Resolution 1892 (2009), the Security Council underlines the contribution to political stability and consolidation of democracy in Haiti. The list of tasks to be performed by this UN mission reads like a nation-building textbook, for it makes reference to promoting democratic dialogue between key stakeholders in the country, achieving significant progress on the rule of law, public safety and public order and institutional reform, and development. Other objectives include security sector reform, the establishment of a judicial reform programme to strengthen the administration of justice, and measures to tackle crime, human trafficking and the threats along Haiti s land and sea borders. To monitor implementation of this broad mandate, the Security Council appointed former US President Bill Clinton as Special Envoy for Haiti. To what extent these objectives have been fulfilled is a matter for debate. The fact that after the earthquake, the UN Secretary-General, speaking on 29 March 2010, said that renewal, not restoration of the status quo ante, should be the goal for Haiti, is telling. MINUSTAH has faced a similar problem to all the UN s missions: the expectations of what it could achieve were too ambitious, and the available resources were inadequate. Nonetheless, the list of objectives certainly points in the right direction to overcome the collapse of governance in Haiti and restore a functioning state. The rudimentary nation-building process was savagely interrupted by the earthquake. This disaster befell a state which was already barely functioning. In particular, it had never been in a position to fulfil its obligation to guarantee the protection and security of its citizens or enforce the rule of law. In consequence, the impacts of the natural disaster were bound to be more devastating here than in countries with a properly functioning system of governance. Sadly, nature itself supplied evidence to support this hypothesis in March 2010, when another major earthquake occurred on the same continent, this time in Chile. Chile s functioning system of governance and institutions meant that the relief effort could be organised swiftly, limiting the extent of the human suffering. By contrast, the people of Haiti were helplessly exposed to the appalling aftermath of the earthquake. The international dimension of this natural event as a threat to peace also cannot be ignored. Inevitably, many Haitians are attempting to leave the country. In the provision of international aid for failed states, the initial priority is to start with state-building, i.e. the creation of stable government institutions which are recognised and accepted by citizens. These institutions must be obliged to uphold and enforce the rule of law. The development and organisation of a civil society should also be supported. Only then, in a second step, should nation-building, including support for democracybuilding, feature on the agenda. III. The international community s obligation to provide humanitarian aid Natural and man-made disasters can endanger or claim human lives and do not stop at national borders. A theoretical and practical distinction is often made between the provision of emergency relief in response to natural disasters, and humanitarian assistance in the context of wars and conflicts. In Haiti s case, however, this distinction does not apply. Here, both forms of assistance are required, for the natural disaster has simply exacerbated albeit dramatically the existing conflicts. In such a situation, the humanitarian dimension must, as a matter of principle, be the priority. This raises the question of the obligations of the affected country and the international community under international law. The affected country s obligation to provide information The affected country has an obligation, under customary international law, to notify other states of the event and its effects. This obligation arises from each state s responsibility to protect the lives and physical integrity of the people living on its territory and, where relevant, else- where, if the event also endangers people outside the affected state s own jurisdiction. The threat to human life is the truly dramatic aspect of natural disasters. However, the obligation to notify other states depends, in turn, on the affected state having functioning institutions, for the data that form the basis of risk assessment and mitigation can only be collected and analysed if sovereign powers are being exercised effectively throughout the affected state s territory. By definition, a failed state affected by a natural disaster will require assistance from the international community, especially from the highly developed countries. In Haiti s case, this obligation fell primarily on the US, which, since the overthrow of democratically elected President Aristide in 1991 and the ensuing mass exodus in the direction of the US, has scaled up its use of satellite-based intelligence systems in order to remain fully informed about developments in this Western-hemisphere country. During a disaster, this kind of intelligence can be crucially important for the organisation of relief operations, and may even be helpful in detecting signs of an impending disaster, thereby supporting mitigation of its impacts.

6 6 Humanitarian Aid A Tool to Build A Functioning State? The highly developed countries should utilise all the scientific, technical and technological options at their disposal to provide failed states affected by disasters and humanitarian organisations with the information required for relief operations; this should take place as swiftly as possible and no charges should be imposed. The same applies to early warning and disaster prevention systems. The obligation to provide humanitarian aid In accordance with the principle of humanity, the international community is obliged to provide assistance to the victims of disasters. The Geneva Conventions (Articles 23 and 55 in particular) and Article 70 of the First Additional Protocol impose a fundamental obligation on states to ensure and allow the passage of humanitarian aid. However, the provision of humanitarian aid must comply with the principles of impartiality, independence and neutrality, which means that in general, it should not be undertaken by states themselves. States must, however, assist humanitarian operations. The principle of humanity not only provides the moral and legal basis for the provision of aid; it also prohibits discrimination in such provision. It is immaterial which group or faction the victims belong to: aid must be provided on an impartial basis. It must also comply with the principle of proportionality; in other words, based on identified needs, the weakest and most vulnerable must be assisted first. In order to fulfil these requirements, humanitarian organisations must be independent and must not be subject to states control or supervision. They must also uphold the principle of neutrality, which means that they must not take a position in a conflict. This is particularly important in the case of armed conflicts, but also applies to natural disasters. The politicisation of humanitarian aid Aid is not divorced from politics, however. After all, besides the humanitarian organisations, a range of other actors such as government representatives, UN organisations or multinational forces are also involved in the provision of aid, all of whom pursue political interests. A key factor in the politicisation of humanitarian aid is that when major disasters such as the Haiti earthquake occur, cooperation between the aid agencies and assisting countries armed forces is unavoidable. In such cases, the mandate governing the military operation, which is decided at political level, invariably clashes with the principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality which govern the work of humanitarian non-governmental organisations. Furthermore, the mass media also have a politicising effect, since politicians and non-governmental organisa- tions are keen to show themselves in a good light. Aid agencies are heavily dependent on donations to carry out their relief operations and rely on the media to broadcast their appeals and reach their target audience. Indeed, humanitarian assistance is popular with the general public in countries that provide relief, and the public offers generous emotional and financial support for humanitarian operations. When it comes to securing a share of the available funds, however, there are no holds barred: all the humanitarian agencies attempt to exert influence and compete to raise their profile via the mass media. This makes it almost impossible to present a more detailed, critical and nuanced picture. Natural disasters in failed states or military dictatorships should not be seen as an opportunity to voice criticism of conditions in these countries. The cyclone which caused devastation in Myanmar (Burma) on 2 May 2008, for example, became a vehicle for a political campaign against the country s leaders, who had brutally crushed opposition to the regime the previous year. After the cyclone, the country s military leaders refused to allow international aid organisations to operate freely in the country. This prompted sharp criticism from the Western countries, with French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner even calling for the responsibility to protect (R2P) to be invoked as the basis for the delivery of humanitarian aid, if necessary against the will of the military government. As a consequence of this campaign, the real issue, namely the relief operation itself, largely faded from view. In fact, the humanitarian organisations were able to deliver their aid as far as the albeit completely overstretched airport in Rangoon. From there, it was transported into the affected areas by local staff, with whom the aid agencies had been cooperating very effectively for many years. The politically motivated campaign against Burma s leaders tended to disrupt the provision of aid. The fact that the country s leaders used the relief operation to gain the goodwill of the people and therefore concealed the actual origin of the goods by re-labelling them did not alter the fact that aid did arrive in the country and that it was inappropriate to use the crisis as an opportunity to voice criticism of its leaders. The outcome of the political campaign against the military leaders was a regrettable decline in the willingness to donate on the part of the public in the donor states, who had gained the impression that the aid was not reaching the victims. Politicians must resist the temptation to link humanitarian aid for victims of a natural disaster with political demands for regime change or improvements in the human rights situation. Access to the media must be used solely to draw attention to the humanitarian crisis and thus encourage the general public to give the requisite support to the relief operation.

7 Policy Paper 32 of the Development and Peace Foundation 7 IV. Humanitarian assistance and building a functioning state The term humanitarian is in vogue in modern international law. Undoubtedly, this is associated with the emergence of human rights as a new branch of international law over the past 60 years. In reality, these rights impose drastic conditionality on state sovereignty. Respecting human rights is now one of the fundamental obligations of every state, and includes the duty to protect the rights of all persons under its jurisdiction. In light of this obligation, which must be fulfilled unconditionally, the question which arises is what happens if a state is unwilling or unable to comply with this obligation. In failed states, the latter, at least, is often the case. As recent state practice shows, in such cases the international community may consider that it has no option but to intervene using all necessary means including military means in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter, even though Article 2, paragraph 7 and Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter prohibit intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, as well as the unilateral use of force in international relations. Why can, or must, the international community intervene for humanitarian reasons? A key feature of modern international law is that its enforcement is centred on a system of collective security within the United Nations framework. In this system, a legal relationship is established between the individual members, i.e. all the states currently in existence. The members pledge that they will uphold the norms enshrined in the UN Charter. In the event of these norms being violated, law-abiding countries can seek to influence the behaviour of the law-breaker via the organs of the system of collective security, in accordance with the principle of proportionality. The most stringent sanctions are envisaged in cases when international peace is violated or threatened; in such cases, the relevant body representing the international community, namely the UN Security Council, can compel by military or non-military means the state concerned to revert to law-abiding behaviour. In classic international law, only inter-state conflicts were regarded as a threat to peace, with aggression by one state against another being viewed as a breach of the peace. This changed after the end of the Cold War: from then on, the full potential of the UN Charter could be used to protect human rights. The implications of this development were revealed with particular clarity in the case of Somalia, where the dictator Mohamed Siad Barre had been overthrown in 1991, leading to a complete collapse of law and order. The capital Mogadishu was destroyed in the ensuing inter-clan fighting, which lasted for some time. The war and drought caused famine, but anarchy and violence prevented international aid from getting through. When the UN Secretary-General was informed about the conditions in the country, he put the issue on the Security Council agenda. A number of states refused to address the issue of Somalia on the grounds that the UN was prohibited from intervening in member states internal affairs. This objection lost its impact, however, when Somalia s own chargé d affaires at the UN ultimately requested the Security Council to turn its attention to the human tragedy unfolding in his country. As this sequence of events shows, the majority of countries continue to respect others sovereignty, including that of failed states. Finally, with the adoption of Resolution 794 on 3 December 1992, the Security Council authorised member states to deploy a military intervention force to enable the delivery of humanitarian aid to the people of Somalia despite obstruction by local clans and warlords. This was an historic decision: for the first time, a government s inability to fulfil its responsibility to protect the people under its jurisdiction was regarded as a threat to regional peace. In 1992, the Security Council authorised the US to assume command of the military operation, known as Restore Hope. Differences of opinion arose over its mandate, however, and although the mission was successful in that the Somali people were supplied with aid, it was unsuccessful to the extent that it failed to rebuild a functioning state in Somalia. This failure was due to the fact that the military was not given a clear mandate on how to deal with the warlords and clan chiefs. Furthermore, no effort had been made to analyse the causes of the conflict or Somalia s social structures; instead, one of the clan leaders, quite arbitrarily, was held responsible for the conflict. The deployment of the military had tragic consequences for the further provision of humanitarian aid once the acute crisis had abated. Due to the military s role in enforcing the delivery of aid, the traditional and well-functioning contacts between regional warlords/clan chiefs and the humanitarian organisations which had been operating in the country for years were interrupted. After the abrupt withdrawal of the troops which was viewed by the warring factions as a victory and by the US as a defeat it proved impossible to re-establish these relationships, which were based on mutual recognition, to their former extent. This had a detrimental effect on the provision of humanitarian aid. Policy-makers must ensure that the opportunities afforded by the UN Charter to safeguard human rights in accordance with the responsibility to protect are utilised. As the first step, this means that grave human rights violations must be defined as a threat to peace. Adequate resources must then be deployed to safeguard human rights, possibly including the use of military force under a UN mandate. Military interventions must be subject to clear and precise rules of engagement.

8 8 Humanitarian Aid A Tool to Build A Functioning State? The sovereignty of failed states in crisis situations A key issue to be addressed is to what extent the sovereignty of a failed state poses an obstacle to international engagement. In the case of Haiti, for example, President René Garcia Préval expressed frustration that the Haitian government had been bypassed in the coordination of the relief effort, while Ecuador s President Rafael Correa lambasted what he saw as imperialism among the donors. A particular criticism was that most of the money donated goes back to the donor countries. This criticism raises further questions: to what extent can and should the government of a failed state be involved in humanitarian relief operations? And where should the goods distributed as part of the relief effort come from? Legally, even failed states are sovereign states. Thus the UN Security Council, in the preamble to its Resolution 1892 (2009) states explicitly that it acts: Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Haiti, welcoming the progress achieved so far in critical areas for the consolidation of Haiti s stability, reaffirming its support to the Government of Haiti and welcoming its contribution to political stability and consolidation of democracy in Haiti. This implies that the aid must be coordinated, as a matter of principle, with the (notional) government of the failed state concerned. However, this responsibility is likely to overwhelm the government, since it does not exert effective control over the entire national territory. Furthermore, the country s rudimentary government institutions are invariably discredited in the eyes of the populace due to mismanagement, corruption and criminal associations. In Haiti, a further factor undermining the state s capacities to deal with the aftermath of the earthquake was that large numbers of Haiti s local police were victims of the disaster. One of the most serious problems affecting the relief effort, besides the collapse of Haiti s infrastructure, therefore proved to be the total absence of public security and law and order. As a consequence, it was impossible to guarantee the systematic provision of aid to those in need. To that extent, the immediate acceptance of the United States offer to deploy 11,000 troops in Haiti is understandable. A further 4,000 troops followed at the end of January. The troops mandate was clearly defined: to maintain order and support the distribution of emergency supplies. The troops were present on the streets and distributed food, although this was not coordinated with the humanitarian organisations and fell short of professional standards, in that aid was not distributed to those in need in a planned manner but was handed out indiscriminately. This in turn caused such scenes of chaos that the humanitarian organisations were forced to temporarily suspend their systematic, needs-based distribution of food aid, which was based on ID cards as proof of entitlement. The question, then, is why the armed forces role was not restricted to maintaining order but also included involvement in the distribution of humanitarian aid. This can only be explained in terms of the general chaos prevailing in Haiti and the United States attempt for domestic policy reasons to demonstrate that it was actively assisting its neighbour. A further factor may have been the desire to increase the local population s acceptance of the presence of foreign troops by having them play a role in the relief operation, thus reducing the risk of food riots and clashes between aid workers and people desperate for help. The criticism voiced by Venezuela and Bolivia, which described the deployment of US troops as an occupation, is unfounded: as the operation was approved by the Haitian government, this view lacks any legal basis. Haiti s sovereignty was respected, despite the deployment of foreign troops in the country. It may be necessary to deploy armed forces to help mitigate the impacts of disasters. This must be based, as a matter of principle, on a UN Security Council mandate and must respect the sovereignty of the state concerned. The troops mandate must be clearly defined and coordinated with the humanitarian organisations. The priority is to create a secure and stable environment in order to ensure that aid genuinely reaches those in need and does not contribute to the emergence of a crisis economy. Humanitarian aid and overcoming state failure in Haiti The earthquake reversed efforts to establish functioning state structures in Haiti and created chaotic conditions which are likely to persist for some time. Due to the lack of a functioning state, many people have no option but to remain in the devastated downtown area of the capital Port-au-Prince. They must personally defend their legal claims to the plots of land where their homes once stood. As the land registers no longer exist and Haiti has no administration, they simply wait around in the ruins of their homes, in appalling and unhygienic conditions. With the hurricane season just around the corner, the outbreak of epidemics is almost inevitable. Nonetheless, people are unwilling to move to the refugee camps being set up outside the city, for by doing so, they are likely to lose what is left of their property. It would also put them at even greater risk of falling victim to crime, which is rife. In the capital, due to a lack of a police presence, they have formed private neighbourhood militias to provide at least a modicum of security.

9 Policy Paper 32 of the Development and Peace Foundation 9 The conditions in Haiti show that the humanitarian operation, on its own, cannot assist the victims of the disaster in accordance with its own principles. Under these conditions, it is not always those in greatest need who get priority access to aid, as there is no system of local governance to provide a guiding hand. The international relief effort began immediately after the disaster, and its coordination swiftly passed to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Although the UN s own team in Haiti was very badly affected by the earthquake, the tasks of assessing needs and coordinating the relief effort very soon began. Difficulties inevitably arose, however, because the government of Haiti was unable to play a joint role with the UN in coordinating the relief effort. The relief operation was intended to supply the victims of the earthquake with basic essentials as quickly as possible. In this particular case, key priorities were search and rescue, the provision of accommodation, security, food and clean water. Mainly due to the lack of a police presence, these tasks could only be implemented to a partial extent. Normally, the reconstruction phase would begin around 10 weeks after a disaster. After a major disaster on the scale of the Haiti earthquake, the reconstruction process will last for many years and will require close cooperation with the country s government. The participation of local politicians and functionaries at every stage of the planning and decision-making process will also support the establishment of a functioning state, especially as components and objectives of the subsequent development process must be integrated into the reconstruction phase. As part of the process, capacity-building for local experts and institution-building are essential in order to reduce vulnerability to future disasters. The psychological effects of the disaster, too, can be overcome most effectively by involving local people in the reconstruction process. This concept, which combines emergency relief, reconstruction and development in a process known as the continuum, obviously makes sense. When it works, it can genuinely contribute to building better governance and a functioning state. To date, however, very little practical experience has been gained with this concept. s Emergency relief in Haiti can only make a contribution to building a functioning state if it is linked with reconstruction and development support. Policy-makers must therefore ensure that the international community and humanitarian organisations remain engaged in Haiti for a longer period of time and are adequately resourced. In order to mitigate the impacts of the earthquake and state failure, local partners are needed who are accepted by the populace and have a measure of authority. Efforts to build better governance and a functioning state must therefore be accompanied by measures to support the development of a civil society. V. The need for more far-reaching measures Does an international responsibility to protect (R2P) exist? The concept of the international community s responsibility to protect (R2P) has emerged over the past decade. It is derived from the general obligation of all states to protect every individual within their jurisdiction. If a state is unwilling or unable to protect its populations from genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing or war crimes, the responsibility to protect passes to the international community. In the text which the UN General Assembly voted on in 2005, endorsing the R2P concept, the international community is represented by the Security Council. The concept developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which formed the starting point for the UN resolution, envisaged that following the failure of the Security Council to act, a military intervention may be undertaken by a coalition of law-abiding states as a last resort, with due regard for the principle of proportionality and with the prospect of success. This remains a contentious issue. What is certain, however, is that the resolution adopted by the General Assembly establishes an obligation for the international community to intervene in cases of grave human rights violations. In Haiti s case, it is beyond doubt that the government does not or cannot guarantee human rights, starting with the security of its citizens and respect for their human dignity. To date, the Security Council has taken action in respect of Haiti by invoking its obligation to maintain international peace. However, the recognition of R2P now offers the opportunity to take action without resorting to this device. It could thus be invoked to justify measures which go far beyond maintaining international peace and security and aim to safeguard human security in the country concerned. The international community in accordance with the principle of the responsibility to protect should in future start from the premise that failed states sovereignty is no obstacle to international efforts to establish functioning statehood, if the states concerned cannot fulfil their fundamental obligation to protect their own populations, which is a constituent element of sovereignty.

10 10 Humanitarian Aid A Tool to Build A Functioning State? Should an international administration be established? Even before the earthquake, the Haitian government was unable to prevent state failure in Haiti. The deployment of MINUSTAH brought about some improvements but did not, in practice, establish a functioning state. The Security Council responded to the natural disaster by adopting Resolution 1908 (2010), which increased the number of troops deployed in Haiti to 8,940 and the police component to 3,711, compared with 6,940 and 2,211 respectively in It is probably obvious that this is an inadequate response to the chaotic conditions in Haiti. To date, the UN has relied on traditional models of cooperation with the Haitian government and donor conferences. It is estimated that the country will need around 11.5 billion US dollars in aid for comprehensive reconstruction and development over the next 10 years. The donor conference in March 2010 secured pledges of around 9.9 billion US dollars, far surpassing expectations. The EU is the largest donor to Haiti and intends to contribute 1.6 billion US dollars. Motivated by a desire to exert political influence, countries such as Venezuela have pledged substantial sums as well. However, pledges are all very well, but the actual provision of funds is quite another matter. Furthermore, the willingness to donate invariably wanes once the disaster and its tragic individual fates have vanished from the headlines. This happens in all natural disasters once the initial shock has abated and in Haiti s case, is reinforced by the public s mistrust of the government agencies supposedly responsible for reconstruction. In that sense, even the financing of emergency relief could pose problems in Haiti. A further concern is that some potential donors will argue that the Haitian government is not a partner who can be trusted to make appropriate use of donated funds. The international community s emergency relief operation in Haiti is gradually moving into the reconstruction phase, which will require close cooperation with the government and other local agencies. In view of the massive extent of human suffering, there is not much time available to test whether this cooperation works. Unless it can be established on a secure footing very swiftly, other forms of international assistance must be considered. There are various possible options. At present, and for the foreseeable future, Haiti faces a crisis comparable to the situation in East Timor in The UN had established a mission in East Timor in June 1999 whose mandate was to organise and monitor a referendum on the future of this former Portuguese colony, which was occupied by Indonesia. When the referendum produced a clear majority in favour of independence, pro-indonesian militias embarked on a campaign of violence and terror, murdering and displacing the people of East Timor. The East Timorese elite in particular fell victim to the massacres. There was a complete collapse of law and order, and the infrastructure was destroyed. The UN mission was also attacked, forcing staff to flee. The Indonesian armed forces, which the government was now powerless to control, not only tolerated the situation, which was in effect a civil war; it was apparent that they were implicated from the start. Finally, after lengthy prevarication, the Indonesian government agreed to the deployment of an international peacekeeping force for East Timor in September One persistent criticism levelled at the UN was that this deployment came far too late, as the violence perpetrated by the Indonesian militias had been predicted well in advance. After Indonesia renounced all its claims to East Timor in October 1999, its officials were withdrawn, leaving the country without any civil administration. The UN Security Council then adopted Resolution 1272 (1999), establishing a United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). It was endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and was empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority. It was mandated to provide security and maintain law and order, to establish an effective administration, to assist in the development of civil and social services, and to ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance. The mission was headed by a Special Representative, who was empowered to amend and repeal laws. The original 16-month mandate was extended twice. Thus for the first time, a new state was born under the UN s administration. Without the UN to act as midwife, this state-building process would have been impossible. The question is whether this example could provide some useful ideas to help consolidate the situation in Haiti as well. The scale of the complex emergency in Haiti is such that it exceeds the Haitian government s capacities. Already a failed state prior to the disaster, Haiti needs intensive support from the international community in order to stabilise the situation. In particular, security and protection must be provided for the local population and international aid workers. The economy must also be rebuilt. With a view to facilitating the requisite coordination and to establish the administration on a secure footing, it would be helpful to consider whether, with the consent of the Haitian government, a temporary international administration for Haiti should be put in place.