ORGANIZING GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS IN METROPOLITAN AREAS IN RESPONSE TO GROWTH AND CHANGE: A Critical Overview

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1 ORGANIZING GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS IN METROPOLITAN AREAS IN RESPONSE TO GROWTH AND CHANGE: A Critical Overview DAVID K. HAMILTON Roosevelt University ABSTRACT: Articles and books have recently appeared on a wide variety of regionalism issues. Some writers have attempted to refocus the discussion of the topic from government to governance, while others have proposed frameworks and models to categorize areas by the extent of their regionalism and explain why some metropolitan areas are more regional than others. Taking into account the government and governance issues and previous efforts at model building, the author proposes another framework to aid in the study of regionalism in metropolitan areas. A regional process is triggered when an urban area experiences growth or change pressures that extend beyond individual political boundaries. Various influences are exerted to restore equilibrium. The influences promote either independent and autonomous responses, or regionalism and cooperation responses. Many factors determine the strength of the influences, including previous responses and state and federal policies. Responses to the regional issue are a function of the interplay of the various influences and will result in either a more independent and autonomous or a more regional and cooperative governing system. The author applies the framework in the analysis of Pittsburgh s responses to regionalism pressures. Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in regionalism. A number of books and articles have been written in the past few years analyzing the effect of local government structures comparing centralized and decentralized metropolitan areas on a variety of performance measures (Ledebur & Barnes, 1993; Rusk, 1993; Savitch, Collins, Sanders, & Markham, 1993). Publications have also appeared purporting to link many of the present urban pathologies of sprawl, congestion, central city problems, urban fiscal disparities, economic development problems, and extreme segregation of blacks and the poor in metropolitan areas with the polycentric system of local government found in most metropolitan areas (Cisneros, 1995; Downs, 1994; Peirce, 1993). Models and approaches have been recently published providing insights on the development of regional governing systems and interrelationships of local governments in metropolitan areas (Burns, 1994; Foster, 1993, 1997b; Leo, 1998; Savitch & Vogel, 1996). New directions or strategies have *Direct all correspondence to: David K. Hamilton, Public Administration Program, Roosevelt University, 420 South Michigan Avenue, Chicago, IL JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Volume 22, Number 1, pages Copyright 2000 Urban Affairs Association All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISSN:

2 66 6 JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS 6 Vol. 22/No. 1/2000 been advocated for the regional governance movement (Barnes & Ledebur, 1998; Dodge, 1996; Grossman, 1994; Orfield, 1997; Wallis, 1993, 1994a). In addition, professional associations have recommended regional approaches to solve problems. For example, the International City Management Association s Futures/Vision Consortium said in a 1991 report: Local governments face problems that cannot be addressed by single jurisdictions and recommended creating regional solutions to address common issues. A 1987 report issued by the National Association of Regional Councils states that recognition of the region as the playing field for public and private activity is increasing: not because of federal requirements but because of the practicalities of business activity, the larger geographical realm in which people live and work and the need for more realistic public decision making (as cited in Florestano & Wilson- Gentry, 1994, p. 27). Some social scientists have questioned the traditional way of framing the debate in which political fragmentation in metropolitan areas is the major focus. An alternative approach is advocated by Dodge (1996), and Barnes and Ledebur (1998). They maintain that framing the debate in terms of the extent of government centralization or decentralization, and sorting out the roles of governments in regions, is counterproductive to achieving effective regionalism. Reorienting the debate from whether centralization or decentralization is in the public s best interest, and what roles and responsibilities each government should have, to one of addressing substantive regional issues opens up new ways of viewing the problem. The focus then shifts to how to address regional concerns. It moves the debate to governance instead of government structure. It also encourages a sharing of roles and a more inclusive and open regional policy process. Questions surrounding structure are not germane to the governance process according to Dodge, Barnes, and Ledebur. One problem with their approach, however, is the assumption that leadership will simply materialize to start the process and bring other leaders together for the betterment of the region without any political structure or constituency. Getting local political leaders to set aside their particularized and parochial agendas in favor of a vaguely defined regional entity with little or no constituency support is extremely problematic. Myron Orfield (1997) tries to circumvent the leadership problem by advocating a conflict approach. He suggests that the have-not municipalities in the metropolitan areas (poor inner suburbs) join forces with the central city to overwhelm the resistance of the affluent communities. By appealing to the sense of fairness of state legislators outside the metropolitan area, he claims it would be possible to gain enough support to achieve a regional agenda of at least a more equitable balance between needs and resources. Orfield s strategy, or the necessary statesman-like leadership, may be a possibility for some jurisdictions where a number of local constituencies can identity with regional interests. However, some group will invariably actively oppose any regional effort and polarize the debate. The resulting conflict and controversy will lead either to failure or a bitterness that will make future regional efforts more difficult. Because of the need to compromise to achieve some success, this approach will also result in a hit-or-miss process and will undoubtedly not be well coordinated with other regional efforts. Moreover, the longevity of such a process will be dependent upon the leadership that is able to bring the other stakeholders to the table and keep them involved. Leaders, particularly political leaders, are notorious for their short-term interests and often short tenures. However, despite the problems inherent in the approach that eschews structure, legal authority, and orderliness in favor of a process that simply happens, some regional issues have been addressed successfully through this strategy. The problems in the regions where this process has taken place include: (1) the lack of longevity without some structure, (2) the lack of legal authority to implement plans, and (3) the lack of a fairly permanent funding source to continue the process. Another recent initiative is the development of models and classifications to aid in understanding regionalism. Savitch and Vogel (1996) place metropolitan areas on a continuum according to the amount of structural consolidation and the extent of cooperative relationships. On one end of the continuum is comprehensive adjustment, typified by single-tier city-county consolidation or two-tier

3 6 Organizing Government Structure and Governance Functions 6 67 metropolitan government. In the middle is mutual adjustment typified by interlocal agreements and public/private partnerships. These arrangements rely on existing agencies or networks of actors to achieve coordination in the area. On the other end of the continuum is a negative response to regional pressures typified by noncooperation, avoidance, and conflict. Savitch and Vogel identify the Jacksonville-Duval County consolidation as an example of a single-tier approach; the Twin Cities, Portland, and Miami are examples of the two-tier approach; Louisville, Washington, DC, and Pittsburgh are examples of mutual adjustment, and New York, Los Angeles, and St. Louis are examples of efforts to maintain and perpetuate the decentralized status quo. A problem with this classification system is that the categories combine both structural consolidation and regional relationships (governance) into one dimension. There is no differentiation between structure and governance. Partially consolidated or federated areas may exhibit many of the same regional governance problems as decentralized areas. Savitch and Vogel acknowledge this problem when they question how to categorize a two-tier government that, through politics and population expansion, has become increasingly similar to a conflict-ridden polycentric government structure. For example, it appears that regional relationships in the Miami area are not much different from those in Los Angeles, even though Miami is classified as a two-tier federation. Additionally, some researchers argue that Washington, DC is not a good example of mutual adjustment as evidenced by the inability of its council of governments to obtain agreement on major issues facing the region (Henig, Brunori, & Ebert, 1996). The St. Louis region, an example of the most conflict-ridden system according to their categorization, has been identified by others as a good example of regional governance due to its extensive interregional cooperation (Parks & Oakerson, 1993). Foster (1997b) posits another methodology to measure regionalism. She identifies 10 variables that she calls impulses. These are: (1) natural resources, (2) the extent of similar economies, (3) the extent of central city dominance, (4) the extent of common growth and development experiences, (5) socioeconomic similarities or dissimilarities, (6) the incentive for shared service delivery, (7) the extent of support or opposition for redistribution of resources, (8) political similarities or differences within the region, (9) state and federal policies, and (10) historical factors. She postulates that these impulses either hinder or advance regional outcomes. According to her methodology, the interaction between these elements determines the extent of regionalism within a given metropolitan area. When she applied these impulses to the Buffalo region, she found that state and federal policies, historical factors, the incentive for shared service delivery, and political influences promote regional outcomes. She also found that substantial diversity within the region in socioeconomic differences, incentive for shared service delivery, economic growth, and political differences created barriers to regionalism. Her framework, however, lacks precision and the ability to quantify the impact of each influence. The categories that she identified as the most significant are also open to interpretation and redefinition. There is not agreement that her categories are the most significant influences on regional outcomes. Finally, her categorization of regional and anti-regional outcomes does not measure the extent of cooperation or noncooperation among governments. What may pass for regionalism in her categories may, in fact, be a way for communities to retain their independence and noncooperation. For example, the number of regional special districts does not necessarily indicate cooperation among governments. It could indicate an effort to maintain independence and autonomy. Likewise, councils of governments (COGs) may not be satisfactory vehicles to promote effective cooperation and regionalism, even though they would be listed as regional outcomes. Because each metropolitan area is unique, this methodology calls for a case by case approach. Despite these criticisms, her framework makes an important contribution to the literature on understanding the nature of regionalism. A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK Using this research as a foundation and recognizing the problems of attempting to postulate frameworks to categorize, explain, and analyze regionalism, in this article I propose another framework. In doing so, I offer a perspective that seeks to identify influences that promote either independence and autonomy or regional outcomes in the governing system in metropolitan areas. This framework, how-

4 68 6 JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS 6 Vol. 22/No. 1/2000 ever, does not just categorize the responses by whether they promote regional or anti-regional outcomes, but also classifies them by whether they impact the political structure or the governance of the region. In this sense, the framework adds another dimension to regional responses. My proposed framework also suffers from a lack of precision and the ability to quantify the influences that lead to a given response. Because each metropolitan area is unique, it is not possible to predict that a given set of influences will result in a particular outcome. This proposed framework is exploratory and its generalizability will be determined through a succession of case analyses. Exploratory as it may be, it adds to the literature on model building to study the differences in regionalism among metropolitan areas. This approach categorizes the various responses to growth by whether they promote regionalism and cooperation or independence and autonomy in structure and governance. My critical discussion explores the question: As urban areas face regional issues, what is the interplay of influences and what is the response of the governing system to those influences? I propose a classification scheme that goes beyond a simple structural centralization decentralization division to look at regionalism and autonomy, not only in relation to government structure, but also relative to a functional or governance category. This governance dimension is concerned with the extent of cooperation or noncooperation among governments in metropolitan areas. This additional dimension addresses the issue raised in the Savitch-Vogel discussion about the problem of differentiating among governmental units within a region that is structurally more united than many others, but is decentralized as far as the governance of the region is concerned. In addition, this proposed framework is able to encompass the new regionalism movement. This movement is not structurally, but functionally based with its own set of responses that promote regional governance within a structurally decentralized system (Dodge, 1996; Wallis, 1994b). This is a process framework that incorporates past influences and responses in an attempt to understand present regionalism and predict future directions. It will be argued that previous influences and responses establish a general direction that influences and informs present responses to regional initiatives. Although specific past influences may or may not be factors in current responses, they should nonetheless be considered. Knowledge of the nature and extent of the influences and past responses to regionalism pressures is important in the study and understanding of current responses. This is particularly so as the basic local government structure has experienced very few dramatic changes since the beginning of the twentieth century. Changes tend to be made at the margin and are evolutionary in nature. A change in the condition of the metropolitan area starts the process. The interaction of various influences determine the response. These influences promote either regionalism and cooperation or independence and noncooperation. The range of responses is also a function of the legal parameters established by the state. Depending upon the result of the response, the governing system may become more centralized or decentralized. The resulting configuration informs the metropolitan condition which potentially encourages another regional iteration. This becomes a dynamic process with the regional influences vying with anti-regional influences that may lead to another response and effect and another iteration. Depending upon the metropolitan area, the process may be continual or may take place very infrequently. The framework is depicted in Figure 1. METROPOLITAN CONDITION Concern and dissatisfaction with existing conditions in the metropolitan area can also start the process. Dissatisfaction is usually related to changes in political policy or demographic and economic shifts. These changes create or exacerbate one or more issues, such as an unwelcome central city policy affecting suburbanites, spatial mismatch of jobs and workers, central city deterioration, congestion, pollution, concentration of poverty, provision of municipal services to developing areas, the emergence of sprawl, etc. Population and economic changes are usually evolutionary and, like most public policy issues, require considerable exposure and support by the public or influential people to move into the policy process. Public awareness of a regional issue is, by itself, not enough to guar-

5 6 Organizing Government Structure and Governance Functions 6 69 FIGURE 1 The Regional Governing System: The Process of Change antee that it will be placed on the public agenda (Gordon, 1992; Wayne, MacKenzie, O Brien, & Cole, 1998). Placement on the public agenda may require years of population growth, increasing sprawl and congestion, or business relocation to the suburbs. On the other hand, an opportunity or crisis may suddenly appear calling for, or benefitting from, a regional response. This was the situation in Atlanta when the city was awarded the 1996 Olympics. In order for the city to put on a successful Olympics, the various local governments in the region and the business sector had to come together in a collaborative effort. Through this collaborative effort, networks and relationships were formed that continue as Atlanta addresses regional issues (Sjoquist, 1997). If there is sufficient public and leadership interest in the metropolitan condition resulting from growth, change, crisis, or opportunity, the interplay of influences will lead to a response. Influences will be dormant or have little impact until the metropolitan condition arouses public and leadership interest to the point of response. Reports and studies by those supporting regional solutions can attempt to build public support, but if the changes in the metropolitan condition are not sufficient to arouse strong interest, studies and reports will generally be ignored or will have little success in convincing the public or the community leadership that changes are necessary. Numerous studies of successful and unsuccessful regionalism efforts have shown that the public must be convinced that there is a need before regional governance will be accepted. (See, for example, Bowden & Hamilton, 1972; Hamilton, 1978; Hawkins, 1966; Rosenbaum & Kammerer, 1974). The status quo is always easier to defend. Influences promoting autonomy and independence are generally stronger, as described below, than are influences promoting regionalism. INFLUENCES ON OUTCOMES Influences can promote regional responses, autonomy and independence, or both. As there are a number of conflicting influences at work at any given time, the perceived or actual severity of the

6 70 6 JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS 6 Vol. 22/No. 1/2000 TABLE 1 Major Regional Influences on Local Governing Systems Influences Promote Regionalism and Cooperation Promote Independence and Autonomy State and Federal Policies X X Active Civic Sector X Business Leaders and Media X Philosophical and Social X Self-Determination X Developers X Service Provision X X Taxes X Reform Movement X Economic Development X X impact of the change coupled with the type, interaction, and relative strength of the various influences determine the response. There are a number of variables that influence the direction of the response. One variable is the time at which the growth or change occurs. At various times influences may promote regionalism and at other times may promote independence. Moreover, some influences may promote both regionalism and autonomy at the same time. Different metropolitan areas react to influences in different ways. Taking into consideration Foster s (1997b) work on regional influences and based upon research of the literature on regionalism, I have identified 10 major variables that influence regional or anti-regional responses. Table 1 lists these major influences and whether they promote regionalism or autonomy. The responses to the interplay of the influences listed in Table 1 shape the local governing system. Once a direction or response has been chosen, influences that resulted in the particular response become stronger while countervailing influences tend to become weaker. This does not mean that countervailing influences dissipate. It means that, once movement has been established, it is more difficult to alter its general direction. For example, most older industrial regions in the Northeast and Midwest have established decentralized, polycentric governing systems. Influences promoting regionalism are less effective in these areas than in newer growth areas that have not firmly locked in a particular governing system or have not chosen a number of previous responses orienting the system in a particular direction. Thus, historical influences and responses have a major impact on current influences and responses. The anti-regional influences do not start from a blank slate, but from a history and tradition in independence and autonomy. The natural response is a desire to be independent and autonomous. Moreover, as there is inertia in the status quo, any influences that would significantly alter the status quo of a generally polycentric government system must be strong and well supported. The discussion of the influences that follows proceeds from an historical perspective. Influences Promoting Independence and Autonomy The literature indicates that early American philosophers and many influential members of society favored small, independent, autonomous local governments. Thomas Jefferson was a strong advocate for this type of system. His model was the small New England town where all citizens could participate in policy making for their community (Weiher, 1991; Wolman, 1995). Throughout the nineteenth century, philosophers and influential writers championed rural, small town America. In addition to philosophical support for small towns, there has been a strong anti-city bias in American intellectual thought. Henry David Thoreau, Henry James, and other writers of the nineteenth century wrote about the evils, unhealthiness, pollution, and the ugliness of the cities (Jackson, 1985). Beauregard (1993) documented a continuing anti-city bias in the twentieth century.

7 6 Organizing Government Structure and Governance Functions 6 71 Social and traditional American values also foster a small, autonomous system of local governments. Research by sociologists (Kasinitz, 1995) indicates that within urban areas the emotional attachment is usually to the community or neighborhood where people live rather than the larger city where they work and engage in other activities. Within America s heterogenous society, there is a sorting that takes place that results in numerous small homogeneous enclaves within the larger region. America s cities are a series of small, homogeneous neighborhoods, and America s suburbs are a series of small homogeneous communities. The desire to maintain a homogeneous community also results in less willingness to cooperate with other communities. This finding was confirmed by Foster in her recent research (Foster, 1997b). There is a natural desire for human beings to seek to belong to and maintain an exclusive community of people with similar values and characteristics. For this reason people of the same religious, ethnic, socioeconomic, or racial identification often seek to live in close proximity to one another. Philosophical and social influences are important factors in suburbanization (Fishman, 1987; Jackson, 1985). Research shows that the desire to control what happens in these homogeneous enclaves is a strong influence that promotes independence and autonomy. It is not enough to have homogeneous communities. There must also be local control of what takes place in these communities. In the late 1800s, a number of suburban municipalities incorporated to avoid annexation or voted against annexation to larger cities strictly to retain control over the dispensing of liquor and the establishment of saloons (Cain, 1983; Keating, 1988). Burns (1994) maintained that race was a major sorting factor in the twentieth century with the establishment of numerous suburban governments that acted effectively to exclude African Americans. Orum (1995) and Jackson (1985) indicated that areas with large heterogenous populations incorporated into numerous small, independent communities as one way for people to maintain their exclusive communities. Burns (1994), Fishman (1987), and Keating (1988) document the strong influence that developers had on the establishment of the polycentric government system. Developers could usually obtain real estate far cheaper outside the city s boundaries and could build less expensively than in the city. This was particularly the case with the housing boom after World War II. Developers encouraged and supported incorporation, annexation, or alternatively, the establishment of special districts to obtain services to their property. Developers needed an organized municipality to provide services to make their subdivisions more attractive. Municipal services enhanced the value of their development and drew home buyers from the city who were accustomed to, or were seeking, a certain level of services. Organized governments were needed to provide educational services and to maintain the roads built by the developers. In addition to the attraction of obtaining more house for the price, developers also promoted the philosophical and social benefits of smaller, more exclusive communities with local control vested in people with similar values. The desire to avoid city taxes also promoted autonomy and independence. The perception is that the cost of government in the city is higher than in the suburbs. Historically, this was the case as Keating (1988) indicated in her study of early suburban development outside Chicago. People left the city to avoid paying taxes for city services they could not afford. They were willing to trade less government services for less taxes. However, because of large tax increases in the suburbs in the decades after World War II to pay for infrastructure and schools, suburban property taxes now often exceed those in the city. Despite large suburban tax increases, the perception remains that property taxes are less in the suburbs, or that they are being used for more appropriate purposes. Burns (1994) showed that as central city social services increased in the 1960s and attracted increased numbers of poor to the central cities, tax considerations and avoidance of the social problems associated with the increased concentration of poor was an important influence spurring suburban growth and efforts to remain independent from the city. Influences Promoting Both Regionalism and Autonomy Research shows that the influence of local government services promoted regionalism as well as independence and autonomy. Historically, people sought to incorporate to be able to provide services.

8 72 6 JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS 6 Vol. 22/No. 1/2000 They also often annexed to the city to receive superior and less expensive services. For this reason, not all annexations in the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century were opposed by the residents of the community to be annexed. Teaford (1979) documented a number of examples of voter approval because of the desire for improved or lower cost services. Fear of disease from inadequate sewer and water systems prompted many favorable votes. However, when basic services, with costs benefitting from scale economies, started to be provided through regional districts and authorities, there was less incentive to join the city. Indeed, it was often a disincentive to annex to the city simply to receive a specific service. Smaller municipalities could provide basic services to their residents using a combination of local government and district or authority provision, often at less cost than the city (Fosler & Berger, 1982). State and federal policies encouraged both regionalism and autonomy at different times. State policies initially provided for generally easy annexation and merger laws. In many states, consolidation occurred by legislative fiat, in other states, by majority vote of all voters. For example, residents of the area had no vote in the reconfiguration of New York City s boundaries in The vote to merge Allegheny and Pittsburgh in 1907 proceeded despite its rejection by Allegheny voters. In the late nineteenth century, annexation procedures changed when state legislatures started allowing voters to decide whether they wanted to join the central city. In the majority of the states annexation now requires majority approval of the voters of the suburb to be merged with the larger city. Moreover, as indicated above, state policy allowing the establishment of special districts covering an entire county or large geographical area for the provision of services requiring large capital investment eliminated a major influence for joining the large city (Bollens & Schmandt, 1975). Federal government policies initially promoted autonomy and independence. Many researchers have documented this impact (Kleinberg, 1995; O Connell, 1989; Silverman, 1989). Federal programs provided financial incentives for highway and new housing construction that lead to a boom in suburban growth and municipal incorporation after World War II. War production policies that located plants in the suburbs resulted in post-war manufacturing moving to the suburbs as the US switched from war production. After 1946, manufacturing employment moved to the suburbs faster than the residential population (Burns, 1994). In addition, federal infrastructure grants to local governments for sewer and water systems, and other community services made it possible for small suburban communities to provide essential services that otherwise might have been financially prohibitive (Wacquant, 1995). In the 1960s, the federal government established policies to encourage regionalism. Regional planning was required as a prerequisite for the distribution of specific federal grants and loans. The evidence indicates that the federal government s change in direction had little effect in reversing, or even slowing, its policies encouraging decentralization. Furthermore, by the early 1980s, the federal government s efforts to promote regionalism were significantly scaled back. In the 1990s, the federal government once again became more involved in promoting regionalism through its transportation policies. Transportation projects in metropolitan areas utilizing federal funds must be approved by a regional planning agency. However, the ability of most regional planning agencies to maintain a firm regional agenda in the face of strong local government interests is problematic. Economic development has emerged recently in the literature as another significant influence supportive of regionalism. Recent studies tout the advantages of a metropolitan approach to economic development for regions (Barnes & Ledebur, 1998; Peirce, 1993; Rusk, 1993). Studies suggest a number of advantages for regions that are united for economic development purposes: A reduction in competition among municipalities for economic development A more orderly development of the region A single set of requirements for the business community rather than a hodgepodge of zoning and building regulations More resources to develop and market prime commercial and industrial land Greater community pride and a more favorable image to attract business development (Hawkins, Ward, & Becker, 1991).

9 6 Organizing Government Structure and Governance Functions 6 73 Many regions focus economic development efforts around a facility or function, such as an airport or seaport, that is important to the economic development of the region. An example is the Port of Seattle. The port became the catalyst around which a public-private collaborative effort developed to market the region. A trade alliance was organized consisting of public officials, labor, and business that has had considerable success promoting the region internationally (Stafford & Kaplan, 1997). However, in the fragmented governing system, economic development may promote fierce competition and animosity among independent governments. Communities often seek to attract development from other municipalities to expand their tax base. The competition to maintain and enhance the tax base results in a lack of cooperation and acrimony. Indeed, the desire to add to the tax base through economic development is a major influence promoting independence and autonomy among governments. Influences Promoting Regionalism The literature shows that the progressive government reform movement of the early twentieth century had (and continues to have) a major influence on organizing governing systems in metropolitan areas. Early reformers advocated combining the numerous municipalities in the region into one local government for efficiency and effectiveness purposes (Anderson, 1925). Reformers initially promoted combining the city and its suburbs to increase efficiency and effectiveness and to reduce the political machine s control of the central city through the influx of suburban voters (Jackson, 1985; Wallis, 1994a). Regionalists in the 1960s further expounded these business and political principles and added an additional reason. They argued that political fragmentation in urban areas created an aggravating mismatch of needs (mainly in the central city) and resources (mainly located in the growing and affluent suburbs) (Bollens, & Schmandt, 1965). They asserted that regional government would reduce government duplication and overlap, thereby improving efficiency and reducing costs. It would also provide a more equitable and effective delivery of services throughout the metropolitan area as well as allow resources to be directed at the needs regardless of where they were located in the region (Wood, 1961). The literature indicates that the media, business and civic communities are usually strong supporters of regionalism (Foster, 1997a, 1997b; Mead, 1994). For example, the prestigious Committee for Economic Development (CED) in 1966 strongly supported the concept of regional government (Committee for Economic Development, 1966). A recent study, co-sponsored by Bank of America, supported regional growth management for California. The study indicated that sprawl was threatening to inhibit growth and degrade the quality of life (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1995). Business and civic groups with an interest in the downtown, or who are strongly invested in the region, will generally support regionalism because they view the metropolitan area as one economic or social unit with the downtown as the most important business focal point for the area. A major focus of regionalism is a strong, viable central business district (CBD). However, business support for regionalism is not automatic. Businesses with no strong commitment to the area may be ambivalent. Developers may not support regionalism measures that restrict their ability to develop land. However, as Leo (1998) documented in his study of the Portland regional growth management regime, developer support can be obtained even for regional growth boundaries if there are sufficient incentives. By and large, businesses tend to see their interests connected with a regional approach to governing the metropolitan area. Many business-supported groups have changed their name to reflect a more regional focus. Examples include the Greater Baltimore Committee and the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee (Wray, 1997). Social scientists have documented a strong link between a vibrant civic community and cooperation in metropolitan areas. Fosler and Berger (1982) conclude that the civic infrastructure is the necessary support system that nurtures and sustains the regional cooperation effort. Political scientist Robert Putnam (1993) found in his research of regional government in Italy that areas with an historically strong civic infrastructure and an informed and involved electorate had more effective regional government than those areas without these attributes. He found that the more civic infrastructure

10 74 6 JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS 6 Vol. 22/No. 1/2000 a region had, the more effective was its regional government. Civic networks foster communication and interaction among peers without the constraints of parochialism or political boundaries. Civic engagement overcomes barriers of suspicion and mistrust and promotes community-regarding behavior and cooperation in resolving community issues. The greater the communication among peers, other things being equal, the greater their ability to develop mutual trust and to cooperate and work together. He found that networks of civic engagement engender success at collaboration and serve as a model for future successful collaboration. Examples of cities that have been successful in reform efforts invariably exhibit involved business and civic communities. RESPONSES Responses are categorized by how the local government system responds to the influences described above. Responses to these influences impact the structure or governance of the region. Although each region responds to growth in its own unique way, there are a limited number of possible responses. The framework is used to categorize the responses to the various influences on two dimensions. One dimension is the direction of the response and whether it promotes regionalism and cooperation or independence and autonomy. The other dimension is the nature of the response. There are two types of general responses in this dimension. One type is structural, that is, whether the response affects the general purpose government configuration in the region. The other type of response is concerned with governance. This response does not change the structure of general purpose governments, but instead deals with functions and processes within the existing general government system. Government structure is defined for this study as general purpose local governments, such as cities, towns and municipalities, with elected bodies responsible for provision of local services to residents. The term governance is not concerned with government structure, per se, but with relationships among governments and governmental processes and functions. Governance is, therefore, a functional and issue-oriented approach to addressing problems of a regional nature. It includes the extent of functional arrangements for provision of services, how regional policy issues are addressed, and the processes of regional cooperation. The governance dimension is used to categorize whether the responses to the influences in terms of processes, the provision of services, and the addressing of regional issues promotes cooperation or autonomy. The structural dimension is used to categorize the responses to the influences irrespective of whether they promote the establishment of a polycentric or a centralized government system. By differentiating governance and government structure, one is able to study the interrelationships between the extent of fragmentation of political structures in a metropolitan area and the extent of regional governance. Regional responses are actions that absorb adjacent, developed, unincorporated areas into already established, incorporated governments, reduce the number of governments, or reduce the number of governments performing functions. They promote regional cooperation on a broad scale, such as the establishment of regional mechanisms or processes to address regional issues. Regional responses simplify government structure and governance by reducing duplication and by promoting the establishment of processes to address regional problems. Independent and autonomous government structural responses promote a polycentric system with political control in metropolitan areas vested in a multiplicity of small general purpose governments. Anti-regional governance responses protect the status quo by allowing governments to retain their independence and autonomy. For example, a regional special purpose district to provide a specific regional function would not foster regional cooperation. The basic intent of independent government responses is to make adjustments to provide specific services on a regional basis without the loss of individual government autonomy and independence. The responses are displayed in Table 2. Responses to influences vary by metropolitan area and by the period in which the major growth occurs. Government responses during the industrial period tended to be more regional or centralizing, whereas the post-industrial period experienced more autonomous or decentralizing responses. Post-World War II growth areas had more options because they developed later and under different

11 6 Organizing Government Structure and Governance Functions 6 75 TABLE 2 Response to Regional Influences Government Structure Governance Regionalism and Annexation and mergers Urban county Cooperation City-county consolidation Consolidation of functions Responses Two-tier metropolitan government Regional governance processes Regional tax sharing Multi-purpose metropolitan districts Regional coordinating agencies Federal and state grants and policies encouraging regionalism Autonomy and Suburban development Single purpose districts Independence Easy incorporation laws Interlocal agreements Responses Addition of different forms of general purpose government. Privatization Federal and state grants and policies supporting fragmentation Regional councils with no authority Neighborhood government in central cities technological conditions and federal and state policies. These growth areas are able to simultaneously pursue a number of responses that were not available to the growth areas of the nineteenth century. In addition, past experiences of older metropolitan areas inform responses for current growth areas. Most urban regions, as they grow and develop, have experiences with each category of responses. For example, most metropolitan areas have central cities that have been involved in annexation programs; many have made attempts at major structural reform such as city-county consolidation or some form of metropolitan government; special districts and regional councils have been established to provide specific regional services and comply with federal regulations on the distribution of funds in metropolitan areas; and many metropolitan areas are experiencing increasing interest in cooperation among governments and collaboration with the private and nonprofit sectors to address regional issues. Structural Responses Structural responses to the influences can either foster regionalism or decentralization. The initial structural response to influences promoting autonomy and independence is suburban development. As suburbs develop, they can be absorbed by the central city, incorporate as independent communities, or remain unincorporated. The response is dependent upon the options that are readily available and the mix of influences present at the time of growth. For example, regional and independence responses were largely complementary during the early years of the development of the United States. Communities on the edge of cities eventually expected to be absorbed by the city as it grew. There was a certain stature and an increase in the availability and quality of services when suburban development became part of the city. The major regional response of cities to urban development outside their political boundaries is annexation. This response is preferred when there are easy annexation laws and unincorporated territory. However, as the nineteenth century came to an end, annexation became more problematic for the growth cities of that period. The influences promoting regionalism receded and the influences promoting political deconcentration gained ascendancy in large urban areas. Suburban communities started to resist annexation to the central city. One of the earliest successful efforts of a suburban municipality to resist the encroachment of the central city was the failed effort by Boston to annex Brookline in Inspired by Brookline s success, other suburbs in the region and in the nation

12 76 6 JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS 6 Vol. 22/No. 1/2000 became more aggressive in their resistance (Karr, 1989). There were also other reasons for the ascendancy of a decentralized government system. One reason is that central cities were able to absorb only so much suburban development at a time. For example, after its massive annexation in 1889, Chicago did not seek further annexation for more than a dozen years as it struggled to extend services to the newly acquired territory (Cain, 1983). Another favorable factor supporting the polycentric government system was the state s provision of additional municipal forms of government and state laws making it easier for communities to incorporate. As metropolitan areas grew in the nineteenth century, different forms of government emerged from the pressure to provide services. In the developing areas of the Northeast and the Midwest, responses to suburban pressure for improved services and self-determination were to allow small rural settlements and suburban subdivisions to incorporate as villages. The Boston area was a major exception to suburban subdivisions incorporating as villages. Another new form of government was the incorporated township. By the mid-nineteenth century, state legislatures across the country, especially those strongly influenced by precedents in New York, granted charters to virtually any community that requested them, encouraging this new application of what had once been a rarely granted privilege (Keating, 1988). Small communities were thus able to obtain self-governing powers essentially similar to larger cities. In most states, the passage of general incorporation legislation also provided communities with relatively easy incorporation requirements. Easy incorporation requirements and general act incorporation legislation provided the mechanisms that facilitated the establishment of the polycentric government system. Allowing local self-determination on annexation decisions and the easier incorporation process did not seem to hinder central city expansion as long as the central city offered superior services. But easier incorporation and local self-determination became obstacles when alternative methods of obtaining services became available. To the extent that some forms of government were not successful in providing adequate services, annexation to the central city was facilitated. To the extent that the incorporated municipality was successful in providing services, self-determination and easier incorporation laws brought central city annexation to a halt. Special districts to provide capital-intensive services were another development that aided in the establishment and continuance of a polycentric government system. Around the turn of the century, many state legislatures established regional districts for the provision of services requiring large capital investment. For example, in Illinois, the Metropolitan Sanitary District Act, which had been approved by the state legislature in 1889, was in full operation well before 1909 when Evanston voted against annexation to Chicago (Cain, 1983). With the Evanston defeat, Chicago s major growth ended. With the development of professional government and single purpose districts providing services on a regional basis, suburban municipalities are able to provide adequate and often better services than the central city. Therefore, a major enticement for joining the large city in the nineteenth century, to have access to superior municipal services, is no longer an enticement in the twentieth century. With the closing of the window of opportunity for annexation for mature, industrial-era, growth cities in the early 1900s, the regionalists advocated city-county consolidations and metropolitan government. The intent of city-county consolidation is minimally to combine the city and the county into one government bringing all remaining unincorporated land under the city s jurisdiction and maximally merging the county and all incorporated governments in the county into the city. Metropolitan government was advocated as an alternative to city-county consolidation when reformers realized that the suburbs had no reason to give up their independence and were not willing to do so. Reformers also realized that city-county consolidation in most large metropolitan areas would not achieve comprehensive government as urban areas generally extended beyond the county borders. Even the Committee for Economic Development, which in 1966 advocated the reduction of local governments by at least 80%, in a 1970 study, proposed that the two-tier solution become the model of reform for American metropolitan areas (Gunlicks, 1981). Under the metropolitan government concept, services would be assigned to the metropolitan level and the municipal governments based on the level that could most efficiently and effectively provide the service in the best interest of the entire metropolitan area. The metropolitan government would