Selected Papers from the 2 nd World Forum on China Studies (Abstracts) Panel 6 China in the Eyes of the World Intellectuals: Perception and Image

Transcription

1 Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences World Forum on China Studies Selected Papers from the 2 nd World Forum on China Studies (Abstracts) Panel 6 China in the Eyes of the World Intellectuals: Perception and Image Contents: 1. OST-Cold War ASEAN-China Relations: Exploring Worldview Convergence and Its Security Implications By Aileen Baviera (Philippine) 2. China s International Image - A View from Europe By Axel Berkofsky (Belgium) 3. China s Trade Linkages with EU, US and Japan: Could They Be Deepened? By Jean Berthelemy (France) 4. Constructing Visions of China: Theories and Purposes By Shaun Breslin (United Kingdom) 5. On the Principles of Keeping a Low Profile and Doing Something By Zhiying Cui (China) 6. China s Policy and National Image Building in Central Asia: A Perspective on Cultural Communication By Jianping Ni (China)

2 Panel 6 China in the Eyes of the World Intellectuals: Perception and Image 1) OST-Cold War ASEAN-China Relations: Exploring Worldview Convergence and Its Security Implications By Aileen Baviera (Philippine) Abstracts: This study looks at how worldviews (defined as norms, principles, values, and identities with respect to the international system) influence how China and the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) define their respective strategic interests and foreign policy goals. Convergence or divergence of worldviews affect the direction of their relations, in particular enhancing the prospects for either cooperation or conflict vis-à-vis the regional security environment. Using worldviews as the starting point of analyses, the study employs the constructivist approach to further build on the understanding of China-ASEAN relations provided by neorealist scholars. The focus is on the processes by which China and ASEAN develop shared intersubjective understandings of the nature of the international system based on their respective norms and principles. There are areas of convergence in the worldviews of China and ASEAN, particularly their belief in a hierarchical world order and the need for a moral or ethical basis for inter-state relations. Both aspire for a more democratic world order, and are suspicious of great powers' proclivities to interfere in their internal affairs. On the other hand, there is divergence in the way they view inter-state relations, with China the more realist of the two, traditionally relying on self-help and military means in promoting its own security while being distrustful of international institutions. While the study tries to highlight the role of norms and identities in foreign policy behavior, it also found constructivism to have many weaknesses as a framework for analysis. Among these are the difficulties of understanding where norms come from, how to determine their impact on behavior, and how the processes of norm socialization take place. Ultimately, constructivist analysis may not be able to demonstrate superiority over other more traditional frameworks for studying international relations (IR). However, it enriches the field of IR by deepening our understanding of the agency-structure relationship, and by helping analysts struggle free of the neorealist endless power-balancing games. 2) China s International Image - A View from Europe By Axel Berkofsky (Belgium)

3 Abstracts: China s (international) image in Europe is manifold ranging from admiration for Chinese economic growth rates, China s efforts to catch up with the industrialized West to mistrust over China s global foreign and security policies and fear of an economically too powerful and influential China. China for its part has over the last years undertaken enormous efforts to create the image of itself as a responsible and peacefully emerging power that is playing by the rules and is not seeking economic, political or even military hegemony in Asia and beyond. However, it has become clear in this context that China s actual policies, its global economic policies as well as its global foreign and security policies do at times differ in style, substance and output from the policies propagated by the Chinese leadership in Beijing. This gap between political and political reality is likely to continue to influence China s international image although it must also be pointed out that China is far from being the only country or major power being criticized for replacing idealistic political rhetoric with real politic seeking to secure national security and national economic interests. Indeed, altruism is usually not relevant in international politics and China has the disadvantage of currently being observed more closely than the other main international power (apart from the US whose international policies are even under more intense international scrutiny given the current US administration disastrous foreign and security policies from 2001-present). China, a relative newcomer on the stage of international politics, will continue to find its international policies misunderstood and will continue to be confronted with the criticism of pursuing its global foreign economic policies and goals regardless of the domestic political situation, the political system and the human rights record of economic and political partners (a case in point are e.g. China s international energy supply and energy security policies in Africa, Central Asia and South America as well as it policies towards North Korea). The so-called principle of non-interference will continue to guide China s foreign and security policies which however for its part will continue to negatively influence China s international image and standing (for details see below) This short analysis is far from exhaustive and the author realizes that many of the points mentioned below are debatable and/or are being seen differently in China. However, they are aimed to serve as a basis for discussions between Chinese and non-chinese scholars and analysts on China s international image. This short analysis represents a listing of a few areas relevant to China s international image. All of the issues mentioned below have been discussed in numerous workshops, conference and seminars on Chinese affairs, EU-China relations over the last three years. The author was part of these discussions on numerous occasions in Europe and China and found this exchange with of opinions with Chinese colleagues very useful and constructive. The views expressed here do neither represent the views of the Brussels-based European Policy Centre (EPC) nor those of the University of Milan. A. China s Economic Growth-The Envy of the World China s economic growth rates of up to 10% are the envy of the world. China s enormous achievements over the last 20 years such as China s spectacular economic growth and the lifting hundreds of million of people out of poverty are a source of admiration for China in Europe. There is a

4 consensus amongst scholars and policymakers that China will turn into an economic superpower rather sooner than later overtaking Germany, France and even Japan in the next 20 years in terms of GDP (although not in terms in GDP-per-capita which is still that of a developing country and will continue to be for decades). China s economic successes are being reported on a daily basis in the international press and in 2005 China attracted close to $60 billion in global FDI. China has become a very important trading partner for the US and many countries in Europe and European consumers are more enjoying the benefits of relatively cheap Chinese labour and Chinese imports. Economic benefits for European consumers aside, rapidly rising Chinese exports to Europe are being perceived as threatening Europe s economic well-being. Supported by at times populist and inaccurate reporting in some European (and American) newspapers, Chinese exports and goods made in China are being portrayed as part of a Chinese threat responsible for growing European unemployment. Nonetheless, Chinese subsidies for the textile and shoe sector (the EU calls these subsidies as non-compliant with WTO rules) strengthen the image that China s is not yet a market economy distorting competition employing unfair trade practices through government interference and subsidies. Voluntary Chinese export restrictions for exports to Europe implemented last year helped to ease the trade friction (at least temporarily) and presented Chinas as a responsible stakeholder in international trade. China is still being perceived as the sweatshop of the world in the view of many Europeans lacking the will to become more innovative and creative and invest more resources into its own R&D promoting its own brands and technologies. In fact, few Europeans are yet able to name any Chinese brand and the Made in China still stands above all for cheap and inferior in quality products for the majority of Europeans. Developing and promoting Chinese brands in the IT or automobile sectors (like Korea did in the 1980s and 1990s) should be one of the issues on top of Chinese business. However, it must also be noted that China is without a doubt aware of the above mentioned problems and is more and more willing to increase investments in R&D and has realized (like India) that it needs to increase the number of highly qualified engineers and IT engineers to become competitive in the global high-tech sector. No doubt that China is catching up in these areas too and the world takes note. Perceived negatively is also the interference of the Communist Party in China s private business tainting the image that the political leadership in Beijing has over recent years developed a hands-off approach towards the emerging private business sector. Very recent reporting (in the Financial Times and elsewhere) that the Communist leadership is planning to increase its control over Chinese private business is not encouraging news for foreign investors and non-chinese companies seeking to establish joint ventures with Chinese companies. Government interference in business (as it happens also elsewhere, including in Europe) does usually harm the reputation of a country as attractive destination for FDI and should hence be kept to a minimum. However, that is still a problem in China in view of its political system and the role and influence of the Communist Party in the country. The Party s influence on Chinese business and its strategy to hold on to and financially support an enormous number of non-profitable State-owned enterprises is in Europe (and elsewhere) being

5 perceived as counterproductive to the development of the Chinese economy. B. International Concerns about China s Growing International Political and Economic Influence Envy and admiration for China s economic performance and growth aside, China s economic rise also raises concerns that an economically growing China will inevitably turn into a political and military superpower with hegemonic ambitions in Asia and beyond. The Chinese leadership in Beijing countered such fears with the so-called peaceful rise concept implying that China s economic rise will not be threatening to anyone and is not aimed at creating the basis for Chinese global hegemony. While Beijing s public relations campaign to sell China s rise as peaceful was indeed re-assuring to its Asian neighbours (apart from probably Japan for a number of reasons), it ironically also raised suspicions in analysts circles and the question why Beijing is investing so much energy and resources to portray China s rise as peaceful. A number of scholar suspected (and still suspect) Beijing of having a hidden agenda as Beijing s political leaders point out too often that China s rise will be peaceful. In a way, the government s peaceful rise campaign has produced unintended results. Even if there are realistically no indications that Beijing is interested in anything else but economic development and prosperity, China s rapidly growing defence budget is proof to those in the West (including those in Europe) who argue that an economically rapidly growing China will inevitably seek to turn into a military superpower ready to defend economic interests with military force. Chinese officials and scholar typically address these fears with the argument that China s military is simply modernizing itself and spends more than 30% of its defence on rising personnel costs. Furthermore, Chinese policymakers and diplomats are currently investing significant resources in explaining China s regional and global security and defence policies to the outside world, but realistically there remain concerns in Europe (sometimes expressed on the record but often only off the record) about China s regional and global security policies practices and goals. There is on the other hand a consensus amongst analysts that China s role in seeking to solve the nuclear crisis is productive and welcome even if North Korea s recent missile tests have seriously jeopardized joint efforts to de-nuclearize the Korean Peninsular. Even if some analysts and observers maintain that China could have put more pressure on North Korea convincing Pyongyang not to go ahead with the missile tests, China s role in the so-called 6-Nation Talks were widely considered to be proof that Beijing policymakers understand the rules of international politics and have implemented its own policies cleverly and effectively. China s engagement was appreciated by all parties involved (including Japan with whom current relations are to be described as problematic at best) and led the international community to conclude that Beijing s diplomacy and diplomatic skills are of those of a power actively engaged in securing regional peace and stability. Beijing s policies towards Taiwan on the other hand-including the implementation of the so-called Anti-Secession Law, are from a European perspective not helpful in promoting China s image as a so-called responsible stakeholder (admittedly a vague and also controversial term as it has been coined by US policymakers, including US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld) even if it must be pointed that Taiwan s current administration s cross strait

6 policies must be described as counterproductive not serving the purpose of peaceful engagement and constructive dialogue. It is acknowledged (and respected) that the so-called Taiwan question is a very sensitive and central issue to the political leadership in Beijing. Nonetheless, Europeans (scholars and policymakers likewise) are concerned about China s assertiveness when it comes to dealing with the Taiwan question. Expanding business relations with non-democracies and countries with very questionable human rights records in Central Asia and Africa for the sake of securing the supply of energy also does reflect negatively on China s image. These Chinese policies have been subject to extensive newspaper coverage over recent months and will continue to do as Beijing has made it clear to the outside world that securing China s energy supplies is one of its economic priorities. Then again (and that does not get reported in the press that often), China is by far not the only country expanding relations with non-democracies for political and economic purposes. Close US ties to Saudi-Arabia (admittedly subject of massive domestic criticism since 9/11) and Pakistan e.g. are a case in point. More cynical commentators might add in this context that none of the oil-producing countries in the Middle East have democratic structures and China is only doing what the West has done before China: putting economic and business interest of idealism. C. China, it s Media and the Internet Concern raises also Beijing s policies to control its media, censure the internet and limit political opposition. Newspaper stories on Beijing jailing journalists for critical reporting on the government and its policies do their share to shape the image in Europe (and elsewhere) that the Communist Party s leadership does not tolerate the principle of free speech in China. Whereas only a few years ago, there were indications that Beijing is beginning to allow freer speech, the outside world is now getting the impression that Beijing s policymakers are now increasing efforts to censure the internet (sometimes with the help of Yahoo, Google and Microsoft) even if it is widely acknowledged that Beijing is fighting a loosing battle in view of the rapidly growing number of Chinese Internet users. The policies of seeking to censor the internet in China will continue to damage China s international image even if Chinese scholars point out that the level of freedom of speech in China today is much higher than only a few years. There is no reason to doubt the correctness of such a statement, but the efforts of China s so-called Internet police to identify and stop internet users and bloggers who are critical of government policies will continue to create negative headlines in the international press. D. China s Diplomacy/Chinese Diplomats Chinese diplomats in Brussels and elsewhere are by now very familiar with the Western international diplomatic talk, are very eager to learn and usually represent Beijing as very well-informed and self-confident diplomats. This new Chinese self-confidence on the international scene, however, does at times get perceived as being too developed and is being interpreted in Brussels as part of a Chinese strategy to impose the official Chinese government opinion onto their European counterparts. This was especially the case during the controversy surrounding the discussion on the lifting or non-lifting of the EU weapons embargo imposed on China in In fact, Chinese insistence to urge the EU to lift the weapons embargo was considered to be Chinese interference in European affairs and was not helpful improving China s

7 image in European policymaking circles. However, it must also noted in this context that Brussels was not always sending a coherent message to Beijing with regards to the embargo issue. In fact, the EU s strategy on how to handle the embargo issue was widely perceived to be incoherent and ambiguous. Nonetheless, China s approach towards the weapons embargo was being perceived as pushy seeking to put EU policymakers under pressure to lift the embargo for the sake of implementing the so-called envisioned EU-China strategic partnership. China s policymakers at the time seemed unwilling to take outside advice not to put the embargo issue on top of all official and non-official encounters between Europeans and Chinese. What is on the other being perceived as positive, is the straightforwardness with which China s leaders and diplomats likewise admit that China is a developing country with numerous problems ranging from unemployment, environmental, social unrest, geographically unbalanced economic degradation. This realistic assessment on the state of China s economic and social is being perceived as very positive in Europe and has triggered increased EU efforts to support China in tackling a number of the country s problem, including environmental degradation. In fact, China s willingness to accept outside advice and technical assistance from the EU is without a doubt one of the reasons why the EU-China partnership flourished over the last three years. People-to-People Exchanges China has over recent years become a source of fascination for many young Europeans who become eager to learn the language, travel the country and get to know the people. Speaking Chinese and having a semester at a Chinese university on one s curricular has become an important qualification and given China s economic growth and might, China experts will be demand for years and decades to come (similar to Japan experts in the 1970s and 1980s). The increasing preparedness of Chinese scholars to discuss sensitive and controversial issues with their Europeans colleagues and counterparts does do its share to improve the knowledge about each other s political cultures, culture and work (this author can confirm this through various encounters with Chinese colleagues over the last three years). Through intensive people-to-people exchanges China (represented by scholars) presents itself as an open and interested interlocutor even if there are still fundamental disagreements on a number of issues between European and Chinese scholars (as there are admittedly also between European and American scholars e.g.). 3) China s Trade Linkages with EU, US and Japan: Could They Be Deepened? By Jean Berthelemy (France) Abstracts: Although China and the EU have significant trade linkages, the size of China-EU trade flows is relatively modest compared to the size of China and EU economies. In particular, China exports more goods to Japan and to the US than to the EU, despite the largest size of the EU import market, and China imports more goods from Japan.

8 In this paper we examine whether the China-EU trade relation could be further deepened. To answer this question, a first step is to compare trade flows of EU, US and Japan with China in a systematic manner, taking into account the relative size of the different partners (section 2). Then we consider natural factors that may explain differences in trade intensity of EU, US and Japan with China: geographical distance (section 3) and cultural factors (section 4). Such natural factors contribute to explain to a large extent the observed trade intensity differences. There are however other factors to consider, which are more related to economic policies. We discuss in turn trade policies (section 5) and foreign direct investment (section 6). Section 7 concludes. 4) Constructing Visions of China: Theories and Purposes By Shaun Breslin (United Kingdom) Abstracts: Despite many epistemological differences, a key strand that links critical and postmodern thinkers is the understanding that theory and knowledge are never politically neutral. In the oft cited words of Robert Cox echoed in the title of this paper, theory is always for someone and for some purpose. In this paper, I argue that dominant conceptions of China in the West exaggerate China s wealth and power. This constructed image of China partly results from the actions of key actors in the West who attempts to create an understanding of China to persuade policy makers to adopt favoured policies an argument that will be supported with evidence primarily from the specific case of UK relations with China. But these images also result from the dominance of theoretical approaches in analysis of China s global role that focuses on the nation state as the unit of analysis in international relations. In particular, those approaches that separate the domestic from the international as separate spheres of enquiry fail to consider the domestic context of China s international relations whilst those studies that focus on international economic relations between states both and the reality of globalised production that spans (or perhaps even transcends) national political boundaries. Whilst China is clearly important and likely to become ever more so, a different knowledge of China s power and position in the global order is generated by deploying different theoretical approaches; approaches that (re)connect the domestic with the international, that acknowledge the fragmentation of production (and trade) in a post-fordist globalised economy; and move away from an understanding of states as the sole repositories of power in the global political economy. 5) On the Principles of Keeping a Low Profile and Doing Something By Zhiying Cui (China)

9 Abstracts: Keeping a low profile and doing something were part of the international strategy put forward by the late leader Deng Xiaoping to guide China s diplomacy. This paper, analyzing on the dialectic relationship between the two apparently conflicting principles, argues that they are still of high relevance to the Chinese diplomacy in the 21st century. Key Words: keeping a low profile, doing something. 6) China s Policy and National Image Building in Central Asia: A Perspective on Cultural Communication By Jianping Ni (China) Abstracts: While China s relations with the great powers remaining a cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy, the launch of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June 2001 marked a new era in relations between China and the countries of the Central Asia. In this paper, the author uses the definition of culture by Geertz (1973) to describe the strategic implications of culture and cultural communication in a changing regional context and its implications for current and future Sino-US relations. The author then applies the concept to analyze the limitations for China s cultural communication in Central Asia. Through this analysis, the author reveals important differences in cultural communication between China, Russia and the U.S., and argues, although the relationships among the 10 states are not well developed, the concept of cultural communication is a useful analytical device that throws light on emerging patterns of international politics in the unpredictable region and a firm strengthening of China-Central Asia relations will have to be attributed to China's successful cultural cultivation of Central Asia, as well as a complimentary national image building. Avid Shambaugh Comparing American, Asia, and European Scholarship on Contemporary China How do American, Asian, and European specialists on contemporary China see China differently in their research? What subjects do they emphasize in their research particularly in the areas of China s economy, Chinese politics, and Chinese foreign policy?? Do they utilize different research methods and, if so, what impact does it have on their research findings? How well developed are contemporary China studies in these three regions? What are the strengths and weaknesses? Is there an international China studies community or are there simply different national communities and traditions? To what extent do foreign China specialists collaborate with their Chinese counterparts in research? What is the future of international China studies? Source: 11/2006