STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF STATE ADMINISTRATION IN UZBEKISTAN

Transcription

1 STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF STATE ADMINISTRATION IN UZBEKISTAN Dmitry Pashkun Budapest Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative Open Society Institute, 2003

2 Discussion Papers, No. 27 Published in 2003 by the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative Open Society Institute Nádor utca Budapest Hungary tel: (36-1) fax: (36-1) listserve: INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES The development of democratic and effective government at subnational levels remains one of the central tasks of transition in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The sharing of expertise between countries can contribute significantly to the reform process in the region. Pursuing this goal, the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI) has launched a series of discussion papers, ISSN which are distributed widely throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The series reports the findings of projects supported by LGI and OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE and Copyright 2003 Open Society Institute All rights reserved includes papers written by authors who are not LGI grant recipients. LGI offers assistance for the translation of the papers into the national languages of the region. The opinions presented in the papers are those of the authors and do not necessary represent the views of the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative. Produced by Arktisz Studio Budapest iii

3 Dmitry Pashkun is an expert for the local NGO C-Monitor in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. His research interests include: public administration in the Central Asian countries, area studies and international relations. He was a visiting scholar at the University of Oxford (in 1998), University of Washington (in 2001) and University of Dundee (in 2002). He can be reached by at: santdima@pochta.ru v

4 Contents Contents... vii Abstract Introduction The History of Nation-State Formation in Uzbekistan and Central Asia... 5 The Legacy of Ancient Times... 5 Muslim Heritage... 7 The Soviet System... 9 Regionalism and Clan Influence in Modern Times Development Since Independence and the Formation of the State Administration in Uzbekistan The Structure of State Administrative Institutions According to the Constitution and the Practice of their Workings...17 The Executive Branch The Legislative Branch The Judicial Branch Military and Police Local government Corruption Issues Democratization of the State Administration and the Role of Civil Society Conclusion Glossary of Uzbek Terms References Notes vii

5 Appendix 1. Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 1 June Appendix 2. Explanation of Research Methodology:...54 Population of Study Data Collection Respondents Profiles Appendix 3. Questionnaire Abstract This volume is the result of one year of research under the Central Asian Research Initiative (CARI) Scheme supported by the Higher Education Support Program (HESP) of the Open Society Institute. The main objective of this study is to concentrate on the analysis of the structure and practice of state administration in the Republic of Uzbekistan. Given the recent establishment of the independent state of Uzbekistan, there is a vital need to explore the constitutional underpinnings of the system of state administration and the way that system operates in practice. The analysis is informed by a series of questions with reference to the relationship between constitutional choices and the workings of the state administration in the Republic of Uzbekistan. Reference is made to the roots of nationstate formation, the role of Islam in the formation of the state administration and the legacy of the Soviet Union. Developments after the unexpected break-up of the Soviet Union and current issues of building a modern state administration in Uzbekistan are considered as well. The methodology of the project was based on archival research and survey study. The development of this project required the use of archival materials from government organizations, stenographic reports, statistical information, presidential decrees and legislative acts of the Cabinet of Ministers. viii 1

6 1. Introduction The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 is perhaps the most significant political event of the second half of the twentieth century, one that among other things offered the promise of greater freedom and democracy through radical structural transformation of its component republics. 1 Radical transformations, which, taking place in all former Soviet societies, not only destroy but also shape new systems and patterns of social and economic life as well as political and administrative relations in many states of the former Communist block. The main aim of this study is to concentrate on the analysis of the structure and practice of state administration in the Republic of Uzbekistan (see Figure 1), one of the countries that emerged as the result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Given the recent establishment of the independent state in Uzbekistan, there is a vital need to focus on the constitutional underpinnings of the system of state administration and the way that system operates in practice. Figure 1. Map of Uzbekistan 2 3

7 General Information on the Republic of Uzbekistan: The Republic of Uzbekistan has been a sovereign state since September It is situated in the middle of Central Asia and occupies most of the area between the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya rivers, a total of 448,900 square kilometers. The Republic of Uzbekistan consists of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, 12 oblasts, or regions, 120 cities, 113 towns, 164 raions and 11,844 rural settlements. The population of Uzbekistan, estimated at about 25 million people, is the largest of the Central Asian republics, compromising more than 40 percent of their total population. The ethnic composition of Uzbekistan consists of Uzbeks (77%), the remainder includes several minorities: Russians (6%), Tajiks (5.1%), Kazakhs (4.2%), Crimea Tartars (2%), Karakalpaks (2%), Koreans (1%), Kyrgyzs (1%), others (1.7%). 2 Recently, Uzbekistan has begun to witness a net migration of its European population. This is especially true of Russians, who have faced increased discrimination and uncertainty since 1991 and seek a more secure environment in Russia. Uzbekistan is still largely rural: roughly 60 percent of Uzbekistan s population lives in rural areas. The country is rich in various natural resources (oil, gas, gold, etc.). It also has a very large non-competitive agricultural sector. The analysis will be informed by a series of questions with reference to the relationship between constitutional choices and the workings of the state administration in the Republic of Uzbekistan. Until the Soviet era none of the five states comprising Central Asia, 3 including Uzbekistan, had any experience with written constitutions. In the summer of 1992 the first draft of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan was published. Following publication there were some public discussions in the press, albeit constrained by ongoing censorship restrictions. Finally at the beginning of December (December 8, 1992) the Constitution was adopted by the Parliament. It set the framework within which public power is exercised. It also defined the terri- torial distribution of power within a state, set out a more or less detailed framework of governmental institutions, and defined the relationship between these institutions and the citizenry. Before outlining the main structure of state administration in Uzbekistan, and illustrating the way it works in practice, it is worth going back to the roots of nation-state formation in the Central Asian region. These roots are still viable and visible today, due to the distinctive emphasis that countries of Central Asia place on tradition. 2. The History of Nation-State Formation in Uzbekistan and Central Asia The Legacy of Ancient Times During the first millennium C.E., 4 the Great Steppe 5 was an area where various tribes built up their huge but unstructured empires, and people were moving primarily from East to West. In the third to fifth centuries C.E. (possibly even earlier) Turkic tribes emerged in Central Asia. Progressively, they increased their presence and united in the vast steppeland near sedentary oases and the city-states of Maverannahr. 6 The Turks brought in their language, some features of their nomadic life and tribal relations. Several times, the Turkic tribes consolidated in various military confederations and established vast but shaky empires. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the region experienced devastating Mongol incursions, which almost destroyed its economy and culture. In due course, the Mongols were assimilated, however, and for many centuries onwards the descendants of the Ghengiz Khan dynasty (real and false) remained the ruling forces in all states of the region. The Mongols also initiated some peculiarities of tribal democracy to the region s political tradition, a unique model of kinship, patronage and complicated tribal structures of social relations which, to a certain extent, have survived until now. 4 5

8 In the primary form, the state (in the modern sense), the administrative system, and territorial borders of Central Asia began to be formed in the period from the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries. 7 At that time, Kazakh Zhuses 8 became consolidated as more or less permanent social and territorial entities, and such Khanates as Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand established their boundaries, borders that remained mainly unchanged until the Russians arrival. In the middle of the nineteenth century, during Russia s advance in the region, the Russian Empire regularly collided with the Zhuses and later with the Central Asian Khanates, and Russia competed there with the advance of the British Empire into the region. The great powers competition in the region came to be known as the Great Game. After the annexation of a considerable part of the region to Russia, the Tsarist government conducted its first territorial and administrative reform in Central Asia in A substantial part of the newly annexed land became a part of the Turkistan Governor-Generalship which existed until In the meantime, Khiva and Bukhara became part vassals of the Russian Emperor and preserved a formal independence. The Turkistanese were granted some political rights in the late Russian imperial era and even obtained seats in the Russian parliament, i.e., III and IV State Dumas in The year 1917 manifested the end of the Great Russian Empire. Yet, the full establishment of a Communist regime in the region became possible only several years later, after the end of the devastating civil war in Stalin, by his directive, significantly redrew the map of Central Asia during the period from 1924 to 1926: the region was subdivided into the Union Republics. The territorial borders were corrected somewhat in 1929 and 1936, and the areas occupied by each of the five Central Asian republics remained untouched until the dissolution of the USSR. Although the division of the region into nation-states was based on the traditional system of tribal and communal relations it was artificial to a significant degree. As a result, the Central Asian republics did not have firm national political institutions or strong political organi- zations that might have become a basis for independent development after the disintegration of the USSR. Muslim Heritage Muslim Arabs first appeared in Central Asia in the middle of the seventh century. However, only in the ninth century were they able to push out the Persian dynasties and to establish Islam as one of the major religions in the region. Regardless of gradual penetration by the pagan Turkic tribes in the ninth and tenth centuries, and a devastating Shaminist Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century, Islam retained and fortified its position in the region. Eventually the Turks and Mongols, who remained in Central Asia, absorbed some features of the Arabian and Persian culture and embraced Islam. In the southern settled territories of the region, Islam has a deep historical tradition of more than a thousand years. However, the process of establishing Islam among the nomadic tribes of the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Karakalpaks continued until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and Sufi Sheiks and Orders (Tarikats) played an important role in converting to Islam. A remarkable feature of the activities of the Sufi sheiks was a tolerance to some animistic nomadic traditions and a flexible approach to dealing with the nomads in their everyday life. These factors helped to make the nomads quite heterogeneous in their system of belief. The Muslim clergy (Ulama) played a significant role in the political affairs of Central Asian Khaganates along with the representatives of very influential Sufi orders (Yasavya, Nakshbadya, Qudravya, etc.) and their leaders (sheiks). Both the clergy and the Sufis significantly contributed to the balance among competing groups within the ruling elite in Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand Khaganates. By the eighteenth century, the Central Asian clergy and some representatives of the Sufi Tarikats (orders) were incorporated into the state system and they became a part of the state bureaucratic establishment. 6 7

9 The situation changed with the advance of the Russian Empire into Central Asia and the annexation of most of the region to the Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century. During the initial period of the Empire ( ) the imperial government faced multiple riots in the region. Changes in the ruling policy in the following period included the liberalization of relations with the religious and intellectual elite of Central Asia. This policy was the government s attempt to integrate the most liberal representatives of the Islamic clergy into the state administrative system of Russia through a system of special privileges. The new Soviet regime did not have a consistent policy towards Islam and Islamic civilization throughout the Soviet era. After the civil war of 1918 to 1922, the Commissars, who had to fight and suppress the Basmachi movement often led by the Muslim authorities, considered integration of the Muslim clergy and the most influential part of a local group of liberal intellectual reformers (Jadidists) into the state political and administrative structures. However, during the great leap in 1928 and 1937 the political pendulum swung towards rejection of this policy. The Soviet government intensified the anti-religious campaign, which was accompanied by severe state terror. However, the next stage brought the reconstruction of the institute of official clergy in 1943 as SADUM. 9 The prominent and authoritative Muslim Ulama, Sheikh Abdulmajid Babakhan ( ), was appointed as the Mufti (a spiritual leader) symbolizing the legalization of the official clergy. So, finally, the Soviet government returned to the long-lasting tradition of using the clergy as a part of the state bureaucratic establishment. Although the former Soviet leaders claimed that the USSR was an atheist state, they silently tolerated the efforts of local Central Asian authorities to maintain their Islamic cultural heritage as a part of everyday life in Central Asia. A significant development occurred after the Iranian Islamic Revolution of Officials in Moscow and the Central Asian Republics feared a similar Islamic resurgence in Central Asia. Thus, on the eve of independence, Islamic resurgence or Islamic fundamentalism, as some preferred to call it, became one of the important issues for the Central Asian policy-makers. Debates on this issue intensified in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan after the beginning of the civil war in Tajikistan, and again after the unprecedented success of the Taliban Islamic movement in Afghanistan. 10 The Soviet System The Soviet rule, and the creation of the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republics in Central Asia in ultimately created and solidified a new kind of identity. At the same time, the Soviet policy of cutting across existing tribal, regional, ethnic, cultural and linguistic lines in the region to create the new republics sowed tension and strife among the Central Asian groups that inhabited the region. For example, the boundaries of Uzbekistan included the two main Tajik cultural centers, Bukhara and Samarkand, as well as parts of the Ferghana Valley to which other ethnic groups could lay claim. This readjustment of ethnic politics caused animosity and territorial claims among Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, and others through much of the Soviet era, but conflicts grew especially sharp after the collapse of central Soviet rule. Soviet legacy in the contemporary state administration system in Uzbekistan: high degree of centralisation and state involvement in nearly all aspects of society; accumulation and concentration of power in the hands of the president and state bureaucracy; limited parliament and weak judiciary system; underdeveloped local government; command and top-to-bottom style of management; absence of professional civil service system based on internationally recognised standards. 8 9

10 The Soviet leaders believed that they could not implement their policy of development in the region unless the natives of the Central Asian republics were involved in the Soviet political administration. Therefore, the most important features of the Soviet social formation in this region were rapid urbanization, industrialization, the development of mass education, and the creation of a new westernized (Russified), secular national intelligentsia. One of the main Soviet achievements in the Central Asian republics was a very rapid positive change in the literacy rate that rose to 96 percent by the 1970s and 1980s. There was a well-developed network of universities and research institutions, which existed under the umbrella of the National Academies of Science of the Republics, although these institutions could not always provide qualitative expertise in certain fields such as international relations, market economy, law, finance, management, etc. Under the Soviet system of education, there was a special quota for Central Asian natives within the universities in the Central Asian republics and the USSR, which promoted the training of highly professional westernized (Russified) nomenclature. 11 The Kremlin tried to undermine the power of the clan and tribal structures by intervening in cadre policy, and by regular injections of non-indigenous Party and state bureaucrats into the Central Asian state institutions. Nevertheless, the political configuration in the region largely remained an odd mixture of the consequences of Soviet social engineering and the traditional clientele network, even during the last years of Soviet rule. However, it seems that the change in the identity of the ruling elite was one of the most important legacies of the Soviet era. The Central Asian ruling elite was well educated even according to Western standards, technocratically oriented in its approach to politics and economics, fluent in Russian (and also, after independence, in English) and has shown little affinity to pan-nationalist or Pan-Islamic ideological emotions. By and large, Central Asia had a very rich history before the arrival of the Russians and a very complicated development during the 130 years of Moscow s domination. The Soviet program of nation-state building created formal national institutions, shaped the boundaries of the Republics, and created an altered national identity for the people. However, these institutions were not created to last as independent entities, since the collapse of the USSR was never anticipated or assumed. To a certain extent, Central Asians succeeded in preserving their cultural heritage, but at the same time the turmoil of the twentieth century and Soviet modernization radically changed everyone s life in the region. It was a peculiar mix of traditionalism and modernity complicated by social and cultural polarization in which the ruling elite became quite westernized (Russified), and a large portion of society (especially the rural people who amounted to almost 60 percent of the population) has preserved its devotion to traditional values. Regionalism and Clan Influence in Modern Times Historically, Central Asia has no tradition of statehood based on local ethnic nationality. All the states that existed in the region before Russian colonization had been established mainly on the basis of dynastic or territorial principles (Khanates of Bukhara, Kokand and Khiva). The latter khanates distributed numerous settled and nomadic tribes living in the area by themselves, separating members of the same tribe or nationality and causing ruinous wars creating arbitrary social divisions that persisted down to the Soviet period. The establishment of Soviet power in the region, its efforts to internationalize and standardize all local features paradoxically led not to the disappearance of differences between and within ethnic nationalities but to those differences acquiring new importance. State socialism, with its typically rigid, planned economy, state-owned property and centralized distribution of benefits, created a fertile ground for the full-scale expansion of the regionalism and clan influence within the Soviet system

11 This happened because, while Soviet managers and administrators at various levels distributed material and other kinds of benefits, the local authorities and heads of economic sectors, enterprises, and trading establishments pursued Soviet patronage and shared it among their own kind. A personal recommendation by the acquaintance of an official a relative, a friend and a countryman was the magic word that opened the doors of his office. In turn, that official needed reliable and loyal supporters in order to maintain and reinforce his own position. The principle of personal loyalty thus became one of the chief criteria for selecting his staff. This policy served to widen the influence of cliques and local powers, helping clans to advance their members in the state apparatus. This system of relations in government and society, allowing the interests of certain groups or residents of certain areas to transcend the common interests, was extremely corrupt and politically harmful. Any such system results in social tensions and poses a severe threat to the state to its ability, integrity and capacity for progress. During the Soviet period, when all sorts of unrealistic ideas held sway, various conflicts resulted from the rival interests of opposing clans. These were traditionally settled by using powerful repressive state machinery, while official propaganda screened everything behind a thick veil of silence. Eliminating this legacy of corruption, regionalism and clan influence is one of the primary strategic tasks of Uzbekistan. But still in Uzbekistan, as well as in other Central Asian countries, regional and clan affiliation not national affiliation is the most important source of a person s identity. In Uzbekistan, the following regions can be identified: the Tashkent region, the Fergana Valley, Samarqand and Bukhara, the northwest territories of the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan, and the southern region that has played the role of a power base for individuals who rose to the position of first secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. Often clan-based, these regional allegiances remain important in both the politics and the social structure of post-soviet Uzbekistan. In the struggle for political control or access to economic resources, for example, regional alliances often prevail over all-uzbek ethnic identity. 3. Development Since Independence and the Formation of the State Administration in Uzbekistan After becoming an independent state in 1991, Uzbekistan s government began to pay considerable attention to solving primarily economic, political and social problems. One of the most immediate issues was the stabilization of the political environment, especially the neutralization of extremist political groups, and the resolution of inter-ethnic tensions. The bloody ethnic clashes of pre-independence years in the Ferghana Valley ( ) had destabilized life in some parts of Uzbekistan and in the region. The continuous escalation of inter-ethnic conflicts after independence threatened to slip out of control. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan and other Central Asian republics state institutions (which had been almost paralyzed by Gorbachev s inconsistent reforms and by a power struggle between the central and peripheral republics in the late 1980s), vitally needed reinforcement. Maintenance of stability in the rapidly changing political environment was impossible without a strong government policy. The status of the ruling elites, and the very existence of entire political systems, was challenged by the rising strength of numerous opposition groups which embraced a wide spectrum of views from extreme nationalism to Islamic radicalism. Last but not least, there was a desperate need for the creation of national economic systems and the transformation of the former Soviet administrative-command management mechanism into a balanced and stable system of sound market-driven institutions. Islam Karimov became the leader of Uzbekistan in 1989 and President in He had been the Finance Minister from 1983 to

12 President Karimov was the first among Central Asia s leaders to give wide application to the idea of political stability at any cost and represented the conservative technocratic elite. 12 He rejected any radical political or economic reforms and declared his own way of renovation and progress, targeted at the establishment of a socially oriented market economy through gradual changes. 13 He called for a study and apply approach for a successful transition of his country to prosperity and strong development. In terms of international relations, he promoted the idea of Uzbekistan as a strong regional power 14 and he promised that under his leadership the country would become a new economic tiger. In the post-soviet era, the only way for Karimov to get credibility was to halt the social unrest and to preserve the standard of living among the rapidly growing population. During the first stage of independence, Uzbekistan leaders focused their efforts on maintaining economic stability and slowing down economic decline, without implementing any radical economic or political transformation. They preferred to keep everything under control in accordance with the old order and to move very slowly, rather than to make radical reforms and to face unpredictable consequences. Their old fashioned conservative policy and the authoritarian style of Party rule evoked sharp criticism from democratically oriented local intellectuals, and especially from Russian democratic circles. However, even the critics gave credit to the Uzbek leadership for maintaining stability in this potentially explosive environment. In general, Uzbekistan confronted a complex of seemingly intractable environmental, ethnic, and political problems, which appeared and intensified after its unexpected independence. However quickly the ruling elite of Uzbekistan consolidated its political power, the creation of a sustainable economic system proved to be a challenging task, which could not be resolved overnight. Since achieving independence, Uzbekistan has also started the formation of its state administrative institutions. The development of the state administrative institutions in Uzbekistan has not only been influ- enced by internal factors, such as circumstances of the Soviet disintegration and the political orientation of the elites, it has also been affected by some cultural and political traditions of the pre-soviet and Soviet era. Historically, Uzbekistan, as well as other Central Asian countries, never had the independent state institutions in the modern sense. While Western European countries have developed their state and public institutions for many centuries, Central Asian states, including Uzbekistan, experienced stagnation. Immediately after independence, Uzbekistan did not have any clear picture in the way of organizing its state administration. Moreover, Uzbekistan, like all other Central Asian states, faced difficulties in obtaining expertise in developing its state administration. The government of Uzbekistan did not have enough specialists in state administration. The cadre problem has been solved primarily in two ways. The first was the recruitment of representatives who had worked in public administration during the Soviet times. The second was the recruitment of locals from various academic and research institutions. The academic circle plays a very important role in the formation of Uzbek state and public administrative institutions by providing both important guidelines for public administration and public policy, and professionals for governmental institutions. This practice is quite unique and different from the Soviet and Russian experience. From the very beginning, the leaders of Uzbekistan, who did not possess any experience in modern state and public administration, made extensive use of local academic expertise, although they sometimes recruited foreign experts as well. In general, Uzbekistan was able to mobilize all its human resources and existing expertise and create working state and other public institutions within a short period of time. The formation of state and public administration is a complex process, which involves a number of political institutions and individual or group actors. As a part of this study, a survey was conducted in different regions of Uzbekistan on the 14 15

13 formation and functioning of state institutions in Uzbekistan. The first question of the survey attempted to evaluate the experts 15 opinion on how successfully the state institutions in Uzbekistan had been developed. The experts were asked: In your opinion how successfully have state institutions been developed in Uzbekistan? There were four choices: 1-excellent; 2-good; 3-moderate; 4-poor. The survey found that the majority of respondents (67%) believe that the state institutions in Uzbekistan were formed excellently. Twelve percent of all respondents gave a good mark, 10% of all respondents considered it a moderate success. And finally, 11% of respondents were of the opinion that they were developed poorly. (Figure 2). Figure 2. Experts Opinions on the Success of Formation of State Institutions in Uzbekistan 67% 11% 10% 12% excellent good moderate The survey results show that in spite of different opinions on this question, one can conclude that the majority of local experts believe that Uzbekistan succeeded in the formation of its state institutions. The next question of the survey study intended to elucidate how Uzbekistan s experts evaluated the input of different institutions and actors in the formation of state administration. The experts were asked: In your opinion, which of the following groups have the greatest influ- bad ence on the formation of state institutions in the Republic of Uzbekistan? There were several choices, with marks ranging from one to four (1-does not influence; 2- influences insignificantly; 3- influences significantly; 4- influences greatly). The survey found that the experts believed that the President of Uzbekistan had the greatest influence on the formation of state institutions (66.7%). He was followed by Parliament (15.1%); in third place was the Ministry of Justice (9.9%). The experts perceived that the mass media also had a significant influence (8.3%). The academicians were in fifth place (6.5%). Public opinion was put in last place (3.5%) (Table 1). Table 1. Perception of Influence of Different Groups on the Formation of State Institutions in Uzbekistan (%) Source of Influence Influences Influences Influences Does not Missing Total Greatly Signif- Insignif- Influence icantly icantly at All President Parliament Ministry of Justice Mass Media Academicians Public Opinion The Structure and Practice of State Administration The Constitution of Uzbekistan contains many well-known features of a democratic state, i.e., separation of state power into legislative, executive and judicial branches, creation of a local-self government system, etc. (Table 2) 16 17

14 Table 2. Constitutional Model of Democracy in Uzbekistan and Common Criteria of Democracy Criteria of Democracy from General Criteria of Democracy Constitution affirming their commitment to the ideals of democracy and social justice (from the Preamble) The people are the sole source of state power. State power in the Republic of Uzbekistan shall be exercised in the Rule by people. interest of the people and solely by the bodies empowered therefore by the Constitutions (written or unwritten). Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the laws passed on its basis. (Article 7) The principle of the separation of power between the legislative, executive and Separation of power. judicial authorities shall underlie the system of state authority in the Republic of Uzbekistan. (Article 11) Democracy in the Republic of Uzbekistan shall rest on the principles common to all Guarantee of liberties and freedoms. mankind, according to which the ultimate Protection of rights. value is the human being, his life, freedom, honor, dignity and other inalienable rights. (Article 13) Part Two Guarantee of liberties and freedoms. Guarantees basic human and civil rights, Protection of rights. freedoms, and defined duties. Guarantee of freedom of association. Guarantee for the liberties and freedoms. (Chapter 13) Protection of rights. The mass media shall be free and act in Free media without censorship as accordance with the law. It shall bear realization of the freedom of speech. responsibility for trustworthiness of information in a prescribed manner. (Article 67) Electoral system with equal, universal Electoral system with universal suffrage and direct secret ballot. (Chapter 23) by secret ballots. Constitutions of four other Central Asian countries all have similar provisions, and in none of them were statements made that their democracies are specific and incomparable to Western democracies. The model of democracy presented in the constitutions is quite westernized. But in reality, the system of state and public administration in Uzbekistan, as well as in other Central Asian countries, has been keeping many features of the previous Communist (Soviet) regime. As a result, the administrative structure of Uzbekistan is still centralized and highly politicized. The constitution of Uzbekistan characterizes its political system as secular and democratic in which sovereignty resides only in the people. It also emphasizes the separation between church and state to avoid giving the state an Islamic flavor and provides a legal basis for banning rival political parties with religious orientation. The governmental system in Uzbekistan is republican and closer to a presidential rather than parliamentary system. Although the constitution limits the period of presidential rule, it has been twice extended. Thus, Uzbekistan s president resembles Third World authoritarian presidents-for-life. A concrete example of this trend was the prolongation of the presidential term from five years to seven years at the recent popular referendum, which was conducted in January 2002 and considered by many international observers unfair and unnecessary. 16 In this chapter we will look at the structure of state administration institutions according to the constitution and discuss the practice of their functioning. The Executive Branch The office of the president of the Republic, first established in 1990, is the central position in state administration and the keystone in the national political system. Presidential authority in Uzbekistan is considered a key element in the development of the new Uzbek State, a kind of warrant for stabili

15 ty in society and for the successful advance of Uzbekistan along the path of reforms. 17 According to article 89 of the Constitution, the president unites the powers of head of state and head of the executive branch. The president is therefore also chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, the highest executive body (see Appendix 1 for detailed structure of the Cabinet of Ministers). The president is elected for seven years, formerly five years, through universal suffrage. His executive powers are extensive. Included among them are the right to form a government, direct the government and appoint and dismiss the prime minister and cabinet ministers; to appoint and recall diplomats; to establish and dissolve ministries; to appoint and dismiss the procurator-general and his deputies; to nominate appointees to the constitutional court, supreme court and board of the central bank; to appoint and dismiss judges of regional, district, city and arbitration courts; to appoint and dismiss hokims for violations of the law; to suspend or repeal acts of hokims; to sign all laws of the Oliy Majlis or return them for reconsideration; to declare a state of emergency; to serve as commander-in-chief of the armed forces; to declare war; to rule on matters of citizenship; to issue amnesties and pardons; and to appoint and dismiss heads of the national security service. The president also enjoys personal immunity. Parliamentary deputies also enjoy immunity from prosecution, but are subject to the sanction of the parliament. No such restriction is placed on the immunity of the president. After his state service, the president becomes a lifetime member of the constitutional court. Beneath the president, executive agencies no longer exercise the dominant power of their predecessors in planning and distribution functions, but instead play more the role of coordinator and regulator of economic policy. Numerous ministries have been replaced by more flexible and market oriented economic amalgamations, associations, corporations and holding companies, while responsibility for regulating external relations is shared by such bodies as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for External Economic Relations, the National Bank for External Economic Activity and other specialized institutions. In practice, the current system of government in Uzbekistan can be described as a presidentialship, mixing the elements of both republicanism and autocracy, with a strong presidential administration and a distinguishing leadership, institutionalized by the President s post and embodied by President Karimov. The most important matters in the Republic of Uzbekistan are determined not in Parliament or even in the government but by the president. Presidentialship explains why state and public administration changes are so slowly initiated and put into practice. The authority of carrying out important reforms rests in the presidential bureaucratic structure, almost unchecked, where the legislative and judiciary branches exercise a very weak control over their executive counterpart. As a consequence, there are no incentives or pressure to change, beneficial for the presidential people, public administration structure. There have been only two presidential elections in Uzbekistan. The first took place on December 29, Karimov, the first secretary (and only president) of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, defeated Muhammed Solih of the opposition party Erk ( Will ) by a margin of 86 percent to 14 percent. The election was not considered free by international observers, although domestic analysts claimed that it was a contested race and therefore free and fair. On March 26, 1995, a referendum was held to extend President Karimov s term in office until the year It easily passed with 99.6 percent voter turnout and yes votes. The Oliy Majlis (parliament) rejected Karimov s suggestion that this extension be considered his second term, allowing him to compete in the next election in In 2000, two candidates took part in presidential elections. NDPU (National Democratic Party of Uzbekistan) nominated its first secretary Abdulhafiz Djalalov. Other political parties nominated Karimov, however, officially he was registered as a candidate of the recently estab

16 lished party called Fidokorlar. According to the data of the Election Committee, 95.1% of the electorate participated in the election on January 9. Results showed that 91.9% voted for Islam Karimov and 4.17% for Abdulhafiz Djalalov. A further 3.93% of the ballots were considered not valid. The international observers considered this election neither free nor fair and offered Uzbekistan s voters no true choice. 18 Under the Uzbek Constitution, the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan is elected by the Uzbek citizens in general, equal and direct elections by secret ballot, for a five year-term. However, following the enactment of a new Law on Referendum of the Republic of Uzbekistan that took effect on October 13, 2001, the Oliy Majlis initiated a referendum in January 2002 on the prolongation of the presidential term. According to the opinions of some international human rights organizations, the referendum was not aimed at deciding most important questions of public and national interests as stipulated in article 9 of the new law, but rather at using new methods for giving extended powers to the current president by extending his term for an additional two years, contrary to the constitution. 19 An interesting legal situation could arise in that technically a victory in the January 2000 election can be considered Karimov s first using the argument that his 1991 election was under a previous constitution (prior to the passage of the December 1992 constitution), therefore allowing him to run for the second term again, noting that the 1995 referendum was a continuation of the pre-constitutional presidency. To sum up, the state administration in Uzbekistan is still concentrated in the hand of the president. All important decisions in the state are made by the president. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Office of the President is becoming the fourth and the most powerful branch of state power in Uzbekistan. This is evident not only in Uzbekistan but also in other republics of Central Asia. (Table 3). Table 3. Comparison of the Power of Presidents in the Five Republics of Central Asia. President Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Head Of State and Of State, Of State and Of State and Of State and Executive, comman- Executive, Executive, Executive, Comman- der-in-chief Comman- Comman- Commander-in-Chief der-in-chief der-in-chief der-in-chief Age of eligibility for office Term in the Life-time 5 (to be 7) office (originally 5) Participation in appointment Participates Participates Participates Appoints Participates of Judicial officials Power to dismiss the Yes Yes No Yes Yes Parliament The decisions made by the president are implemented from top to bottom at the central level by government and his ministries and agencies; at the local level by heads of the local state administrations and their offices which represent the state power in the oblasts, rayons, cities and ayls. The Legislative Branch The highest representative body is the Oliy Majlis (The Supreme Assembly of the Republic of Uzbekistan). This body exercises legislative powers. The Oliy Majlis consists of deputies elected by territorial constituencies on a multi-party basis for a five-year term. (Table 4) 22 23

17 Table 4. Seats by Party (Four Party Factions and Two Blocks) in the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan Immediately after election At present 21 of December 19, People s Democratic Party 48 People s Democratic Party 49 Self-Sacrifice Party 34 Selfless National Democratic Fatherland Progress Party 20 Party of Uzbekistan 54 Adolat Social Democratic Party 11 Adolat Social Democratic Party 11 National Renaissance Party 10 National Renaissance Party 10 Citizens groups 16 Citizens groups 16 Local government 110 Local government 107 Vacant 1 Vacant 3 The number of seats in parliament by the parties shows that coalition of any two parties will not overcome the group of representatives of the executive. As the republic is a presidential one, parties do not form the government. In discussing the nominees for the offices in the government the party factions in Parliament do not form coalitions. Political programs of all the four current political parties essentially says the same: 1. Creation of market economy. 2. Establishment of a democratic state with rule of law (civil society). 3. Creation of class of property. All the parties are concerned about environmental problems; they seem to take care equally of white-collar and blue-collar workers, businessmen and farmers. There is no class or group within a class specific to a party what classically a party is supposed to be. Also, party programs do not differ essentially, parties do not form cabinets; they do not form opposition to the faction that consists of representatives of the executive. As a result, the executive branch controls the legislature. The Uzbek constitution outlines the powers of the Oliy Majlis (Chapter 17). It is charged with initiating and passing legislation, as well as executing policies through committee work. It meets twice a year plus special sessions, and holds both public and closed sessions. The constitution grants similar legislative authority to the president, thus throwing into question the actual powers of the legislature. In fact, the legislature spends most of its time in session discussing and passing presidential proposals and decrees, which suggests that it is not the effective rule-making body of Uzbekistan. Oliy Majlis adopts and amends the Constitution and laws of Republic of Uzbekistan; legislatively regulates customs, currency and credit systems, problems of the administrative-territorial structure, and alteration of frontiers of the Republic of Uzbekistan; and approves the state s budget. Oliy Majlis nominates elections to Oliy Majlis of Uzbekistan and local representative bodies; elects the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, Higher Arbitration Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan, ratifies the decrees of the president on the appointment and removal of the higher officials of the country; ratifies modifications of organs of state management; ratifies international treaties and agreements; and realizes other activity. The right to initiate legislation in the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan is vested in the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Republic of Karakalpakstan through the highest body of state authority, the deputies of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the Higher Arbitration Court and the Procurator General of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall pass laws, decisions and other acts. Any law shall be adopted when it is passed by a majority of the total voting power of the deputies of the Oliy Majlis. The Parliament in Uzbekistan is considered by the constitution as the supreme legislative and representative body. Recently it was decided that Uzbekistan will have a bicameral parliament, with competences 24 25

18 more or less clearly divided between the two chambers. The lower chamber is supposed to work out drafts and assemble in sessions, and the permanent upper chamber is to be made up of professional politicians. Two main reasons were presented to have a bicameral parliament: to have professional politicians in parliament and to protect interests of the regions (viloyats). It is proposed that the Lower Chamber be elected by popular vote and develop draft legislation, while the Upper Chamber is to be elected by local government bodies. The Central Government is supposed to report to the Upper Chamber. Given the strict control of the executive over local representatives bodies, these regulations means that the Government will report to itself and is not accountable. The Lower Chamber is supposed to submit drafts to the Upper one to pass. That means that the executive branch strictly controls the legislature. The figures for the size of the Chambers were not given prior to the referendum, neither have they been provided until now. The Chambers will be slightly larger than the current parliament because the size of parliament has budgetary limitations. It is assumed that an elected member on the Upper Chamber will not hold offices, as a sign of their independence from the executive, and each of them will tend to his/her professional (business) responsibilities after the expiration of their parliamentary mandates. There are no essential differences in Uzbekistan, with the exception of Karakalpakstan, to justify the proposed structure for bicameralism. Besides, permanent efforts are being made to overcome regionalism. Bicameralism may only be justified if the second chamber is not an upper one but both are equal, and the second chamber is formed of an equal number of representatives of Karakalpakstan and the rest of the territory of Uzbekistan, with likely representation of other ethnic, linguistic, and cultural minorities. That would mean the formation of a federation, or confederation. However, Uzbekistan is not a federal state, and the bicameral structure may slow down the 26 legislative process and does not necessarily improve the quality of legislation being passed. In reality, the supremacy of legislative power of the Uzbek parliament is restricted by extra-legislative procedures, such as presidential decrees that have the force of law, and the delegation of legislative rights of parliament to the President. The majority of draft bills in Uzbekistan are thus initiated by the President and his Cabinet of Ministers. In reality, the legislature spends most of its time in session discussing and passing presidential proposals and decrees, which suggests that it is not the effective rule-making body of Uzbekistan. The survey conducted in the framework of this study confirms such a conclusion. The respondents were asked: In your opinion, is the legislature (Oliy Majlis) the effective rule-making institution in Uzbekistan? There were four options: (1) very effective, (2) significantly effective, (3) moderately effective, and finally (4) not effective. Only 10% of respondents responded that it is the very effective rule-making institution. Twenty percent of respondents believe that the Oliy Majlis is the significantly effective rule-making institutions; another 20% of respondents think that it is the moderately effective, and 50% of respondents are of the opinion that the legislature is not an effective rule-making institution. (Figure 3). Figure 3. Effectiveness of Legislature (Oliy Majlis) as a Rule-making Institution 50% 10% 20% 20% 27 very effective significantly effective moderately effective not effective