Island of Opportunity?

Transcription

1 Island of Opportunity? A historical study on the recent change in Sri Lanka s foreign policy Master Thesis Robert Oudraad Student Number: International Relations in Historical Perspective Thesis Supervisor: Laurien Crump Number of words: 24769

2 The image on the first page shows former President Mahinda Rajapaksa congratulating President Sirisena with his victory at the Sri Lankan Presidential Elections of January The image originated from the Sangai Express and can be found at the following link: 2 j Island of Opportunity?

3 Table of Contents LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 4 INTRODUCTION 6 CHAPTER FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EARLY UNP GOVERNMENTS FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE BANDARANAIKES UNTIL SRI LANKAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SEVENTIES AND EIGHTIES SRI LANKA S POST-COLD WAR FOREIGN POLICY UNTIL AN OVERVIEW OF THE SRI LANKA S FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE FIRST 60 YEARS 25 CHAPTER RAJAPAKSA AS A WARTIME PRESIDENT EXCLUDING THE WEST AND ENDING THE PEACE PROCESS PLAYING INDIA AND CHINA OFF FOR HELP AGAINST THE LTTE POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INDIAN IRRITATIONS AND SINHALA NATIONALISM CONSOLIDATING RELATIONS WITH THE CHINESE RAJAPAKSA S FOREIGN POLICY 44 CHAPTER THE MAITHRI FACTOR SIRISENA S BACKGROUND RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE WEST REVIVING OLD INDIAN TIES TAMING THE CHINESE DRAGON SIRISENA S FOREIGN POLICY 60 CONCLUSION 62 BIBLIOGRAPHY 67 PRIMARY SOURCES 67 SECONDARY SOURCES 72 3 Island of Opportunity? 3

4 List of abbreviations ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations CEPA: Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement ETCA: Economic and Technology Cooperation Agreement. FTA: Free Trade Agreement GSP+: Generalized Scheme of Preferences Plus IPKF: Indian Peace Keeping Force LLRC: Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam MoU: Memorandum of Understanding SAARC: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SLFP: Sri Lanka Freedom Party UNHRC: United Nations Human Rights Committee UNP: United National Party 4 j Island of Opportunity?

5 5 Island of Opportunity? 5

6 Introduction On 4 February 2016, President Sirisena conducted a speech at the 68 th Independence Parade in Colombo, stating that Sri Lanka has made considerable steps in reconciliation and that the new national government would promote economic growth. 1 However, during the past year there have been doubts among the international community about the commitment of the Sri Lankan government to reconciliation. For decades, Sri Lanka had been a place of much turmoil. Until 2009, the successive Sri Lankan governments fought a bloody war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). These insurgents fought for an independent nation in the north and east of Sri Lanka, where most of the biggest minority group, the Tamil, live. Many of the Tamil population felt (partially) excluded from the Sri Lankan nation. Originally, the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka came from the southern part of the Indian subcontinent, where today still a large Tamil-speaking population lives. Because of this, the interests of India in Sri Lanka have always been high since the independence of the two nations. India s interference in Sri Lanka s protracted civil war has greatly influenced the course of the struggle. 2 While India sees Sri Lanka has an important part of its backyard, any interference by other major powers in Sri Lankan affairs is met with suspicious eyes from New Delhi. The last few decades, China has tried to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean. With its strategic location, Sri Lanka is a country which the Chinese have much interest in. 3 The island nation itself, however, has always claimed to follow a foreign policy of non-alignment and has, in this way, tried to stay neutral in the geopolitical battle that is taking place in Southern Asia. 4 However, Sri Lanka seemed with each succeeding presidency to have a different preference for interacting with one of the major powers. For example, former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, seemed to have developed a preference for Chinese investments after India s government became increasingly more 1 Maithripala Sirisena, Full Speech : President Sirisena's address at 68th Independence parade, Sunday Times (4 February 2016), 68th-independence-parade. (2 March 2016) 2 Sandra Destradi, India and Civil War in Sri Lanka War: The Failure of Regional Conflict Management in South Asia, Asian Survey 52 (3) (2012), Thilini Kahandawaarachchi, Politics of ports: China s investments in Pakistan, Sri Lanka & Bangladesh. Master Thesis. University of Washington (2005), Ambika Satkunanathan, "The Executive and the Shadow State in Sri Lanka." in Reforming Sri Lankan Presidentialism: Provenance, Problems and Prospects, A. Welikala (ed.). (2015) Colombo: Centre for Policy Alternative, j Island of Opportunity?

7 anti-colombo. 5 During Rajapaksa s presidency, China became Sri Lanka s biggest investor, with China being responsible for 24% of all investments in the country in China has mainly invested in the development of infrastructure, with the port of Hambantota, the first Sri Lankan highways and the proposed harbour city, Colombo Port City, being the biggest investment projects. With the victory of the other presidential candidate, Maitripala Sirisena, in the last Presidential Elections of January 2015, the foreign policy of Sri Lanka seems to have been directed into another lane. After his inauguration, President Sirisena promised great change and to tackle corruption and improve reconciliation after the civil war. 7 There seems also have been a change in the interaction with the major regional and world powers. Sirisena has changed Sri Lanka s focus on China and claims to really follow the policy of non-alignment. After January 2015, the Sri Lankan government has revised the Colombo Port City contract and started investigation into financial corruption and Chinese influence that came with the deal. 8 It seems that the tone of the government has changed and that it is willing to open up to other major powers, like India and the West, more than the previous government did. However, it has to be seen to what extent Sirisena s foreign policy is different from the previous governments. It is argued that the foreign policy of a country is a reflection of the dominant identity of that country. 9 Foreign policy is merely a reflection of domestic polices, directed outwards onto the international stage. The change of government and foreign policy in January 2015, seem to reflect a change of opinion within Sri Lankan society. What that change is and how to place it in a historical context, are two questions that still need more examination. By historically comparing the factors that influenced and the motives that drove the different governments of Sri Lanka to conduct a certain foreign policy, this thesis tries to identify which factors were the most important forming the foreign policy of the current government of Sri Lanka. From this a research question can be derived: What distinguishes the foreign policy laid out by the government of Maithripala Sirisena after the presidential elections of January 2015 from previous Sri Lankan governments and why is it different? This thesis is going to try to put this change 5 Asit Biswas and Cecilia Tortajada, Sri Lanka, China and India - A Tangled tale. Business Times, 19 March 2015, 2. 6 Kahandawaarachchi, Politics of ports, 3. 7 Daily Mirror Sri Lanka, Lanka anticipating new governing system : PM (14 March 2015) 8 Daily Mirror Sri Lanka, Port City project work carried out unlawfully Public Tribunal, (10 April 2015) 9 L. Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War. (New York 2006), Island of Opportunity? 7

8 in a historical perspective, by tracing the foreign policy of Sri Lanka from the country s independence and onwards. With foreign policy, I mean the relations with the major powers of the world and the preference of the Sri Lankan governments for one of these powers. Sri Lanka has changed its focus within its foreign relations frequently since its independence. While claiming to follow a policy of non-alignment for years, in different periods, different preferences for the major powers can be detected. For example, right after independence there was a preference for the West, Sri Lanka s foreign policy during the first eight years of her independence was marked by close collaboration with the West. 10. This historical examination will give a deeper explanation of the change of government and foreign policy of January This thesis tries to accomplish this by a textual examination of the available literature on Sri Lanka s foreign policy throughout the years and by the use of primary sources in the form of journalistic articles, speeches made by Sri Lankan leaders and personal memoranda. The historical examination of the change of government and foreign policy of late January is relevant because it is a very recent development, which is still on-going and has not been examined much yet. Also, to date, this has not really been done in relation to Sri Lanka s foreign policy in the post-cold War era. There have been some recent analyses of Sri Lanka s regime change in January 2015, but these have mainly been done in relation to internal developments. An example is the work of Prema-chandra Athukorala and Sisira Jayasuriya, professors at the Arndt-Corden Department of Economics Crawford School of Public Policy, who studies this dramatic shift in the political regime in Sri Lanka against the backdrop of longer term socio-political development in the post-independence era, placing emphasis on the determinants of the regime shift, and its implications for development prospects of the country and the resolution of the ethnic conflict. 11 Others have examined recent developments in the relations between Sri Lanka and major global and regional powers, like China, India and the West. Zhu, MA, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, USA and Kahandawaarachchi, Master of Arts in International Studies: South Asia University of Washington, for example, examine the relations between Sri Lanka and the major regional powers, but mainly from a perspective of these powers. Not much attention is 10 Shelton U. Kodikara, Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka: A Third World Perspective. (New Delhi 1982), Prema-chandra Athukorala, and Sisira Jayasuriya, Victory in War and Defeat in Peace: Politics and Economics of Post-Conflict Sri Lanka, Asian Economic Papers, 14 (2015), 1-36, 3. 8 j Island of Opportunity?

9 given to how the Sri Lankan government formulated their policy towards these major powers. There already has been done some research on the history of the earlier foreign policy of Sri Lanka. In those works, patterns within the development of Sri Lanka s foreign policy since the country s independence are examined and pointed out. Shelton U. Kodikara, Professor of Political Science at the University of Peradeniya, examines these patterns in the period between independence in 1948 and the end of the Cold War. In his work he observes a distinct difference between the foreign policies of succeeding Sri Lankan governments, this despite the fact that Sri Lanka officially declared itself nonaligned. He concludes that there actually was a preference for the West or communist countries. D.M. Prasad, Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Bhagalpur, further researches the start of the non-aligned movement in Sri Lankan foreign politics and observes the same conflicting relation between non-alignment and the actual conduction of foreign relations. 12 The pursuit of this non-alignment by Sri Lanka is seen by him and several other scholars as a way for Sri Lankan politicians to cope with the bipolar world and find the rightful place for Sri Lanka within the international system. Urmila Phadnis and Sivananda Patnaik, Associate Professor and research scholar at the South Asian Studies Centre, add to this that the economic dimension within the foreign policy of Sri Lanka is of great influence and conclude that trade has been one of the driving forces for the country to maintain foreign relations. 13 As for the literature on Sri Lanka s foreign policy of after the Cold War, it mainly focuses on foreign policy in relation with the civil war with the LTTE. Besides, these articles analyse the foreign policy of Sri Lanka with one other country or a few neighbouring ones. The discussion never reaches an overall view of Sri Lankan foreign policy after the Cold War, it keeps its focus on a specific period of time and/or a specific government. For example, Ashok K. Behuria and Gulbin Sultana, Research Fellows at IDSA, New Delhi, give an in-depth analysis of the foreign policy of Mahinda Rajapaksa towards India during his first term as a president. 14 This thesis tries to fill this gap within the academic literature on Sri Lanka s foreign policy. On the one hand, because a 12 D.M. Prasad, Ceylon s Foreign Policy Under the Bandaranaikes : A study in the Emergence and Role of Non-Alignment, Indian Political Science Association, 33 (3) (1972) , Phadnis, Urmila and Patnaik Sivananda, Non Alignment as a Foreign-Policy Strategy A Case Study of Sri Lanka, International Studies, 20 (1980) 1-2, , Ashok K. Behuria, and Gulbin Sultana, Mahinda Rajapaksa's India Policy: Engage and Countervail, Strategic Analysis, 37 (2013), Island of Opportunity? 9

10 overall analysis of Sri Lankan foreign policy after the Cold War is missing, on the other hand because most of the analysis of post-cold War foreign policy is not linked to any broad historic analysis of trends in foreign policy. By placing Maithripala Sirisena s foreign within the right context of long-term trends in Sri Lankan foreign policy, a deeper explanation for the recent change in foreign policy will be reached. Several factors, which determine the trends within foreign policy, will be identified, of which one is the above-mentioned economic dimension. The other groups of factors that will be examined are: internal, geopolitical and personal factors. By identifying these factors in different periods since the independence of Sri Lanka, several trends in change and continuity in Sri Lankan foreign policy will be determined. The incorporation of these long-term trends into an explanation for the change in Sri Lankan foreign policy during the past year will give new insights in why this has happened. This thesis will comprise of three chapters. In each chapter, the focus will be on a different era of Sri Lanka s foreign policy. For every era, it will determined how the above-mentioned factors have influenced foreign policy. In the first chapter this thesis will put the foreign policy of Sri Lanka in a historic context and analyse the development the foreign policy on a broader historic scale. By doing this, this thesis wants to identify certain recurring factors that have influenced Sri Lanka s foreign policy and determine certain trends in foreign policy during the first 60 years of Sri Lanka s independence. An overview of the relations with the major powers from independence until the elections of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2005 will be given. The second chapter will focus more deeply on the foreign policy that was conducted by the government of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, who headed the presidency from 2005 until January This analysis will be a combination of the examination of secondary resources and of primary sources in the form of speeches and news articles. In the last chapter the foreign policy conducted by the government of Maitripala Sirisena during the last year will explored. Through the examination of journalistic articles and statements made by government officials the foreign policy of Sirisena s government will be compared to that of his predecessors. With the structure of this thesis laid out, this thesis will now commence with analysing the earlier foreign policy of Sri Lanka, beginning at independence in 1948 until the election of Mahinda Rajapaksa as president of Sri Lanka in j Island of Opportunity?

11 Chapter 1 Throughout the decades, Sri Lanka has changed its foreign policy towards the major powers with each successive government. While the island nation has claimed to follow a foreign policy of non-alignment for a long time, it seems that in practice each government had its own inclination towards the support of foreign powers. An historical overview will be made in this chapter, which will give an indication of the comprehensive trends within Sri Lanka s foreign policy up until In this chapter, the names Ceylon and Sri Lanka will be used interchangeable, as it refers to the same country. The change of the country s name from Ceylon to Sri Lanka in 1972 is considered as not relevant for this thesis. 1.1 Foreign policy of the early UNP governments At its independence in 1948, Sri Lanka s fate was still closely tied with that of its former colonial overlord, Great-Britain. The newly formed government was led by the United National Party (UNP), which followed a foreign policy that was oriented mainly on the West. Sri Lanka s foreign policy during the first eight years of her independence was marked by close collaboration with the West, a policy strictly adhered to by all three UNP Prime Ministers who held office during this period. 15 Before 1977, when the executive presidency was installed, the government was led by the Prime Minister, who was the most influential person. As Shelton U. Kodikara, Professor of Political Science at the University of Peradeniya, argues: For thirty years, from 1948 to 1978, the Prime Minister stood at the apex of the foreign policy decision-making process in Sri Lanka. Section 46(4) of the independence constitution required that the Prime Minister should also hold the portfolios of Defence and External Affairs. 16 So while analysing the foreign policy of Sri Lanka before 1977, it is important to look at the decision-making of the Prime Minister. However, the first two Prime Ministers of Ceylon, D.S. Senanayake and his son Dudley Senanayake did not concerned themselves much with foreign relations. 17 Dudley s career as a Prime Minister was so short that it hardly could influence Sri Lanka s foreign policy in a significant way and his father s foreign policy was confined 15 Shelton U. Kodikara, Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka: A Third World Perspective. (New Delhi 1982), Ibidem D.M. Prasad, Ceylon s Foreign Policy Under the Bandaranaikes : A study in the Emergence and Role of Non-Alignment, Indian Political Science Association, 33 (3) (1972) , Island of Opportunity? 11

12 mainly to Ceylon s relationship with the UK and the Commonwealth. 18 According to Kodikara, the most important elements within UNP foreign policy in the early years of independence were an aversion to communism and the fear of a communist threat to the newly established parliamentary institutions in Sri Lanka. 19 He further argues: The policy laid down by D.S. Senanayake, that friendship with Britain was Sri Lanka s greatest security, was closely adhered to by both his UNP successors during the period, all of whom tended to regard the Commonwealth as a kind of third force in a world of power blocs headed by the United States and the USSR. 20 Sri Lanka s foreign policy, like that of most countries at that time, was formulated in the context of the emerging Cold War between the West and the Soviet Union. The aversion of the Sri Lankan government towards communism in the early days of independence was the strongest during the government of John Kotelawala, the third Prime Minister of Ceylon. He had a strong anti-communism opinion and was a fierce proponent of the Western point of view. 21 He went so far as that he annoyed the other Asian countries at the Bandung Conference who wanted to follow an independent course in foreign affairs and not to be caught up within the Power blocs. The attitude of the UNP governments to the communist countries was influenced by three factors: the intimacy of the association with the British, the Soviet veto of Ceylon s application for membership in the United Nations and the domestic political situation. 22 All relations with the communist countries were seen within the context of the stance of the relations with the British. There was a strong feeling within the Sri Lankan government that Ceylon s commercial and security interest were best served by a close association with Great-Britain. For example, after the independence of Ceylon, the Ceylon-UK Defence Agreement was established, which maintained the permission for Britain to use an airbase at Katunayake and the naval base at Trincomalee. 23 This prompted the Soviet Union to veto the application of Ceylon for membership of the United Nations, as the Russians saw the military presence of the British on the island as 18 Ibidem 19 Kodikara, Foreign Policy, Ibidem 21 Prasad, Ceylon s Foreign Policy, Kodikara, Foreign Policy, Ibidem 12 j Island of Opportunity?

13 an indication that Ceylon was still a colony of the United Kingdom. The aversion of the UNP governments towards communism originated from the fact that the first UNP government had come into power at the 1947 elections after a long contest with Marxist parties and these parties made up the main opposition in parliament until Another important factor in Kotelawala s rejection of non-alignment and preference for the West were his differences and rivalry with the Indian Prime Minister Nehru. 25 The foreign policy of Sri Lanka towards India has been different under each government. During the first years of independence, relations with India were also mainly conducted under influence of the British. Sri Lankan politicians were weary of Indian influence and interference in local politics. There was a perception of a threat from India that was a very real element in Sri Lankan politics, especially during the period This attitude of Sri Lankan politicians was not very strange, as many Indian politicians expressed the desire to incorporate Sri Lanka within a federal state with India. As one Indian writer stated: The first and primary consideration is that both Burma and Ceylon must form with India the basic federation for mutual defence whether they will it or not. It is necessary for their own security. 27 But the origin of this mistrust and suspicion between Indian and Sri Lankan politicians must be sought more internationally. It is suggested that the anti-indian attitude within Sri Lankan politics could not have gained ground in Ceylon if its independence was not circumscribed and conditioned by British diplomacy based on the Defence Agreement, which represents British military might in the Indian Ocean area. 28 It seems that Sri Lankan foreign policy under the first UNP governments was dictated by an orientation on the West. Most of all, the Ceylonese government tried to maintain a good relationship with their former colonizer, the United Kingdom, which was being fuelled by the perception of the Sri Lankan politicians that communism and the Indians were adversaries of the Ceylonese state. Through binding the Sri Lankans to British presence on the island by signing the Defence Agreement and by aiding an anticommunist government to come to power, the British were able to maintain their influence in the southern tip of the Indian subcontinent. 24 Ibidem R.M. Harney, The foreign policy of Ceylon under two premiers, Australian Outlook 14(1) (1960) 69-81, Kodikara, Foreign Policy, Ibidem K.P. Mukerji, Indo-Ceylon Relations, Indian Political Science Association, 18 (1) (1957) 41-54, Island of Opportunity? 13

14 1.2 Foreign policy under the Bandaranaikes until 1965 The election of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in 1956 as the Prime Minister of Ceylon, meant a shift away in foreign policy from a orientation on the West and the United Kingdom. While the successive UNP governments had claimed right after independence to follow a foreign policy of non-alignment, it was during the reign of the Bandaranaikes that this neutrality was articulated in practice. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike believed that the proper position for a country like Sri Lanka was that of following a neutral policy and being non-aligned with any power blocs. According to Kodikara, Bandaranaike s approach to foreign policy was determined by two main factors: First, by the belief that given a period of peace the extremes of Communism and democratic capitalism would disappear and the rest of the world start moving towards the Centre and will form a type of democratic Socialism. Secondly, he believed that Sri Lanka, like other Asian countries recently emerged from colonial status, was faced with the problem of converting a colonial society into a free society. 29 With this in mind, he tried to establish relationships with all the power blocs in the world, including China and the Soviet Union. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike was against the high amount of dependence of Sri Lanka on its former colonizer, Great Britain. One of his first acts as a Prime Minister was the removal of the remaining British air and navel bases in Sri Lanka. This was done during the last half of 1957, the British military bases were removed and it gave Ceylon the appearance of an independent state. 30 This outward image of the Sri Lankan state was crucial for Bandaranaike s ambition to follow a foreign policy of non-alignment. He also tried to maintain this image of neutrality by saying that his non-alignment policy was not anti-western or hostile to the United States. On the contrary, we are closer to the United States than the others because we too believe in a democratic way of life. 31 It was during the Suez-crisis of 1956 that the newly adopted non-alignment foreign policy of Sri Lanka became very apparent. When France and Great Britain invaded the land surrounding the canal following the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt, Sri Lanka 29 Kodikara, Foreign Policy, Prasad, Ceylon s Foreign Policy, Kodikara, Foreign Policy, j Island of Opportunity?

15 denounced the actions of the Western powers. 32 It became clear that Sri Lanka had broken the strong ties with its former colonial master. Another change of Sri Lanka s foreign policy that became apparent during the Suez crisis, was that it had moved closer to India s foreign policy. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike already had rejected the exaggerated notion of fear from India. He was convinced that India was a peace-loving country and the role that India had played to bring peace in Korea and Indo-China led him to believe that India was making a positive contribution to world peace. 33 But even in the relation with India, did the Bandaranaike governments try to stay non-aligned. When Communist China invaded non-aligned India in 1962, it was difficult for the non-aligned African and Asian countries to stay neutral without abandoning India. It was Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who succeeded her father S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in 1960, who took the initiative to summon the Colombo conference of six non-aligned countries to explore ways and means of bringing India and China together and settle the dispute. 34 This resulted in an improvement of the relations with both India and China. It further led to the signing of the Indo-Ceylon agreement in 1964, which provided a solution to the citizenship question of Indian migrants in Sri Lanka, and the increase of generous aid provided by China. 35 Sri Lanka s diplomatic relations with the communist countries during the UNP governments were mainly determined by British foreign policy, which was almost blindly followed by the Sri Lankan government. Because of this, Ceylon did recognize communist China the same time as the British did but, like the British, kept relations restricted to trade alone. In December 1952, Ceylon signed a trade agreement with China to fill up its rice shortage, which was one of the few trade relations the island nation made during the early UNP era. For the Bandaranaikes, this trade agreement became a starting point from which a more friendly relationship would be established. 36 The Chinese greatly appreciated the independent policy of peaceful neutrality and anticolonialism and the two countries implemented a policy of economic cooperation. Sri Lanka and China entered into a Maritime Agreement in July 1963, which gave most favoured nation treatment to the contracting parties in respect of commercial vessels engaged in cargo and passenger services to and from the two countries or a third 32 Ibidem 33 Prasad, Ceylon s Foreign Policy, Kodikara, Foreign Policy, Prasad, Ceylon s Foreign Policy, Kodikara, Foreign Policy, Island of Opportunity? 15

16 country. 37 A similar treaty had been signed with the Soviet Union in Under the Bandaranaikes, the economic co-operation grew from almost non-existent to substantial, up to the extent that the impression was created in some corners of Sri Lanka and the rest of the world that the SLFP s non-alignment policy was procommunist. Besides closer cooperation, Sri Lanka also received more economic and technical assistance from communist countries. For example, Sri Lanka already received economic aid from several Eastern European countries in the 1950 s. The biggest contributor to foreign aid in Sri Lanka was, however, China. The country has provided tens of millions of rupees in aid to Sri Lanka during the reign of the Bandaranaikes. 38 Overall, the reign of the Bandaranaikes as Prime Ministers of Sri Lanka until 1965 meant a huge change in foreign policy for the island nation. Officially a foreign policy of non-alignment was adopted and the Bandaranaike governments tried to follow a neutral course in the increasingly bipolar world of capitalism versus communism. However, a slight tilt towards favouring the communist powers can be observed up until the change of government in In that year, the UNP regained control within Sri Lankan government and relations with China entered a rough period. 1.3 Sri Lankan foreign policy in the seventies and eighties During the seventies and eighties, the different UNP and SLFP governments had the same alignment as their predecessors, with the UNP having a preference for working with the West and the SLFP government trying to uphold the non-alignment stance in a stricter manner by having more close ties with the communist countries. After the defeat of the Sirimavo Bandaranaike government, the newly elected UNP government under Dudley Senanayake enacted a different attitude towards communism and communist countries than its predecessor. It tried to maintain the non-alignment foreign policy, but the good relations with the communist world, especially China, deteriorated steadily and the government was more inclined to the West. 39 Senanayake s government even considered joining the newly formed Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was seen as a tool against China s expansionism in Southeast Asia. But eventually Sri Lanka did not join the organisation 37 Ibidem Ibidem Kodikara, Foreign Policy, j Island of Opportunity?

17 because it did not want to bring the trade agreements with China in danger. 40 Also, for this reason did Dudley Senanayake s government maintained the 1952 rice and rubber Agreement with China by not joining ASEAN. While relations with China deteriorated, Dudley Senanayake visited several Western countries and tried to normalize the relations with the United States. Moreover, in February 1966 Sri Lanka signed a treaty with the US that gave Sri Lanka a 7.5 million dollar economic assistance for the import of essential commodities for industrial and agricultural development. 41 In the five years of Dudley s UNP government, Sri Lanka received much economic assistance from the West. However, despite foreign policy veering towards the West, Sri Lanka tried to remain neutral on many international issues. On international crises like the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968, the Senanayake government tried to venture in an uncommitted manner. For example, the government refused to identify the aggressor in the Pakistan-India war of 1965 and sent messages to the Pakistani President and Indian Prime Minister to defer from the use of military means. 42 The neutral stance of the Senanayake government also represented the isolated stance that Sri Lanka held within international affairs during that time. Generally, a low profile was adopted by Dudley Senanayake in foreign affairs and the personality factor was played down. 43 The Vietnam War was the only international matter that Senanayake s administration dealt with in a more intensive manner. This because it had domestic implications, as it was a mainly Buddhist country that was being attacked by a foreign country. 44 In the eyes of many Sri Lankan Buddhist pressure groups and student organisations, the United States was the aggressor attacking Buddhist brothers and sisters. From the beginning, Sri Lanka tried to mediate a peaceful solution between the warring parties in Vietnam. Together with 17 other non-aligned countries, it signed a joint appeal for peace in Vietnam. 45 S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike was the first who saw the importance in Sri Lanka s role as a mediator on the global stage. As a small player in global affairs, Sri Lanka had to adapt to its underdog position. While recognizing the existence of ideological schisms, 40 V. Suryanarayan, Sri Lanka s Policy Towards China: Legacy of the Past and Prospects for the Future, China Report, 30 (2) (1994) , Kodikara Geeta Balakrishnan, Foreign policy-making in South Asia: a study of Pakistan, Nepal and Ceylon, (Proquest 1986), Ibidem 44 Kodikara, Foreign Policy, Ibidem 17 Island of Opportunity? 17

18 S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike refused to accept ideology as the sole criterion for determining the island s relations with other countries. Instead he believed in borrowing some ideas and principles from this side and some from the other until a coherent form of society suited to the genius of Sri Lanka was evolved. 46 This philosophy fits perfectly in the ideology of non-alignment in foreign policy. The role that Sri Lanka could play was that of an arbitrator and mediator to bridge the gulf between the opposing factions, to reduce world tensions, and, in the process, to safeguard its own security. 47 When Sirimavo Bandaranaike regained power after the 1970 elections, she kept the ideology of her former husband alive. Again there was a difference in her foreign policy with that of the previous UNP government, as she improved the relations with China and the rest of the communist world quickly. As Kodikara argues: it was in the seventies that the Non-Aligned Movement gathered momentum, and began to play a role as a factor to reckon with in global politics. 48 It was Sirimavo Bandaranaike who began to play a leading role in this movement, as Colombo hosted the fifth non-aligned summit in A major Sri Lankan initiative during this period was the proposal to convert the Indian Ocean into a peace zone so that the littoral states could be insulated from the adverse affects of the Cold War and super power rivalry. 49 During her second term, Sirimavo Bandaranaike redefined the concept of non-alignment, in the wake of a changing Cold War. It became apparent to the non-aligned countries that the two major world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, had lost interest in getting nonaligned countries within their respective ideological spheres and showed only interest in areas of global strategic importance. It became accepted for a non-aligned country to have a mutual defence agreement with one of the major powers without losing their non-alignment. 50 For example, it was permitted that India signed a mutual defence agreement with the Soviet Union in While the scale of the Chinese economic assistance to the island nation increased significantly, it also kept the relations with India on good terms. Traditionally the Bandaranaikes kept good relations with the Nehrus. However the relations between Sri Lanka and India were briefly stained during 46 Phadnis, Urmila and Patnaik Sivananda, Non Alignment as a Foreign-Policy Strategy: A Case Study of Sri Lanka, International Studies, 20 (1980) 1-2, , Ibidem 48 Kodikara, Foreign Policy, Suryanarayan, Sri Lanka s Foreign Policy, H.S.S. Nissanka, Sri Lanka s Foreign Policy: A Study in Non-Alignment. (New Delhi 1984) Ibidem 18 j Island of Opportunity?

19 the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, when Sri Lanka permitted Pakistani aircraft to stopover in Colombo on their way to East Pakistan. 52 The non-aligned group s new chairman became J.R. Jayewardene after the change of government in Sri Lanka in July Kodikara argues that the commitment to nonalignment generally remained basically unchanged though it acquired a new orientation following upon changes in personal style and the economic philosophy of the new UNP government. 53 Jayewardene s support for the Indian Ocean Peace Zone during his presidency was in contrast with statements made by him when he was in the opposition under Sirimavo Bandaranaike s Prime Minstership, when he stated that the Indian Ocean Peace Zone was impractical and idealistic. He only had a slightly different focus than the Bandaranaikes, he concentrated on disarmament and arms limitation within the Indian Ocean. 54 However, it has been suggested that Jayewardene has been quite inarticulate on the Indian Ocean Peace Zone and focused mainly on overall disarmament in the world. 55 Nevertheless, there was a definite pro-american tilt in Sri Lankan foreign policy. For example, Sri Lanka voted just like Britain in the United Nations on the issue of Grenada, it toned down the issue of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, and it also did not condemn the naval presence of the United States in Diego Garcia. 56 This is also apparent in J.R. Jayewardene economic policies. His new government came to power with a new economic policy, which comprised of a system of public and private sector competition. Consumer subsidises were scaled down and attempts to create a more free market economy were undertaken. His government tried to westernize the Sri Lankan economy by making it more capitalist and by getting rid of state welfarist approaches of the previous governments which pertained to an ideology which was basically anticapitalist and therefore anti-western. 57 Sri Lanka became more dependent on Western economic assistance, even more than previous UNP governments during Jayewardene s time as a president. After J.R. Jayewardene became the first president of Sri Lanka in 1977, he kept, despite his pro-western orientation, relations with China on the same positive level as the Bandaranaikes did. This was a huge difference with previous UNP governments, 52 Kodikara, Foreign Policy, Ibidem Nissanka, Sri Lanka s Foreign Policy, Kodikara, Foreign Policy, Suryanarayan, Sri Lanka s Foreign Policy, Kodikara, Foreign Policy, Island of Opportunity? 19

20 especially with the one of Dudley Senanayake, under which the relations with China sharply deteriorated. He succeeded to maintain good relations with both the West and China. Foreign Minister Shahul Hameed even stated during Vice-Premier Geng Biao s visit to Sri Lanka in June 1978 that the Sino-Sri Lankan friendship was as old as the hills. 58 Jayewardene also tried to uphold Sri Lanka s foreign policy of non-alignment by letting his country play the role as a mediator, like his predecessors did. In 1979, Sri Lanka had a crucial role in mediating the crisis of Americans being held hostage in the US embassy in Tehran. President Jayawardene sent his Foreign Minister, A.C.S. Hameed, twice to Tehran to explore the possibilities of preventing a total deadlock between Iran and the United States. 59 Also in issues where the country had no mediating role, Jayawardene tried to maintain the country s non-alignment. Sri Lanka was also one of the non-aligned countries that condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, but did not sign the letter requesting the Security Council to deal with the Afghan situation. Also it did not recognize the Heng Samrin government in Kampuchea as it was set up by the intervention of foreign forces, which was against nonalignment principles. 60 During the eighties, the relations between India and Sri Lanka began to deteriorate. At first, Jayewardene continued the policy towards India that was laid down by the Bandaranaikes, namely the idea that Sri Lanka s security could be maintained by developing good relations with India. This was possible because he and his Indian counterpart, Moraji Desai, where on good terms. However, after elections Indira Gandhi regained power, who had been a target of attack during the UNP elections campaigns in Moreover, ethnic tensions within Sri Lanka between the Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic groups made good relations with India much more difficult to maintain. Sri Lanka repeatedly accused India of harbouring Tamil terrorists in their own country by letting them set up training camps in their country. The outbreak of civil war in 1983 and the insurgency of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) brought Indian-Sri Lankan relations to a low. India has been the most important external actor in the Sri Lankan civil war, it was caught in a dilemma of finding a solution that answered the cry of the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu and to help their brethren without affecting the 58 Surayanarayan, Sri Lanka s Foreign Policy, Phadnis and Patnaik, Non-Alignement, Nissanka, Sri Lanka s Foreign Policy, Ibidem j Island of Opportunity?

21 unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. This led India to host talks between the Sri Lankan government and the leading militant groups in August 1985, while providing military training to some important Tamil militant groups during the 1980 s to shore up their bargaining power against the Sri Lankan government. 62 The pangs of proximity led India to become more involved in Sri Lanka s domestic conflict and eventually led to the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987 that should bring peace back to the island. 63 The main reason for the Indians to sign the agreement was to prevent any power outside the region that was a threat for Indian interests in Sri Lanka gaining a foothold in the country. 64 This is illustrated by the fact that an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was sent to the northern part of Sri Lanka. Eventually the election of a new president in 1988, Ranasinghe Premadasa, who was critical of the IPKF and a regime change in India let to the withdrawal of the IPKF in While Sri Lanka was caught up in a domestic ethnic war, relations with the other major powers other than India, moved to the background during the latter half of the 1980 s. This happened despite an attempt made by Sri Lanka to internationalise the ethnic conflict and encourage the involvement of external powers. During the conflict, China s support to Sri Lanka was on a low key. 65 China preferred to minimize its involvement in the Sri Lankan affairs not to affect the normalization of Sino-Indian affairs that was happening at that time. 66 When Chinese President Li visited Sri Lanka in March 1986 he advised the Sri Lankans to search a political solution to the ethnic problem. The same was said when Sri Lanka asked the Chinese for support when the confrontation between India and Sri Lanka escalated in the summer of However, China continued to be the largest arms supplier for Sri Lanka during the ethnic conflict and a ton Guided Missle Destroyer and supply ship paid a friendly visit to Colombo in 1985 to show China s support for Sri Lanka in its efforts to safeguard its sovereignty. 67 It seems that China, despite not wanting to provoke its neighbour India, kept on protecting and expanding its influence in the island nation. 62 N. Manoharan, Brothers, Not Friends: India-Sri Lanka Relations, South Asian Survey, 18 (2011) (2) , Suryanarayan, Sri Lanka s Foreign Policy, Monaharan, Brothers, Not Friends, Suryanarayan, Sri Lanka s Foreign Policy, Ibidem 67 Ibidem 21 Island of Opportunity? 21

22 Sri Lanka s foreign policy of non-alignment evolved into a mature state during the seventies and was consolidated in the first half of the eighties. Both the UNP and SLFP governments tried to maintain Sri Lanka s non-alignment, which was first introduced by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in the 1950 s. However, despite the official foreign policy of nonalignment, the UNP and SLFP governments had different preferences while interacting with the major powers. The UNP governments tended to align itself with the West, while the SLFP governments were more drawn to the communist countries, which is a trend that can be observed since the nation s independence. Relations with Sri Lanka s nearest neighbour, India, were until the end of the seventies quite cordial. Yet with the inauguration of J.R. Jayewardene as Sri Lanka s president in 1977, these trends began to change. He deviated from the earlier UNP governments anti-communism, and managed to maintain good relationships with both the capitalist and communist world. He also expanded the mediating role of Sri Lanka within global affairs. The choice of the role of a mediator is one that is taken often by Sri Lanka during the heydays of the Cold War. This was an important part in the strategy for the non-alignment foreign policy that the country tried to follow. He continued Sirimavo Bandaranaike s newly transformed nonalignment policy in his first years as a president. But when ethnic conflict broke out in the country, J.R. Jayewardene s focus was mainly on domestic issues and any foreign policy was heavily influenced by this new struggle. The policy of non-alignment became less important within the formulation of Sri Lanka s foreign policy, a tendency that was maintained during the whole 25-year long civil war. The start of the civil war also marked the beginning of a period of stained relations with India. 1.4 Sri Lanka s post-cold War foreign policy until 2005 When the Cold War ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, the structure of South Asian politics changed dramatically. The strategic environment in the Indian Ocean changed with the United States and Russia having fewer interests in the region. At the same time, China and India stepped in as the new major regional powers in South Asia. While the United States closed many of its military bases in the region, China stepped up its military presence. China emerged as a major arms supplier in India s neighbourhood and increased its naval presence near Sri Lanka. 68 Meanwhile, Sri Lanka s foreign policy became increasingly focussed on domestic 68 Surayanarayan, Sri Lanka s Foreign Policy, j Island of Opportunity?

23 economic preoccupations, as well to the security threat confronting the state due to armed insurgency. 69 Under President Ranasinghe Premadasa, relations with neighbour India became the most important factor in Sri Lanka s foreign policy. Indo-Sri Lankan relations experienced a sharp improvement under the Narasimha Rao-Premadasa governments, as was evident in the closer cooperation between the two countries in countering the LTTE insurgency, as well as in matters relating to trade and economics, cultural exchange, and the foreign policy world-view in general. 70 After the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in may 1991 by the LTTE, India followed a hands off approach towards Sri Lanka s internal ethnic struggle, while cooperating with the Sri Lankan government to counter their newfound common enemy. 71 So it seems that Premadasa improved relations with India. Yet a Sri Lankan politician who worked closely with him at that time noted that he gave priority to domestic affairs and took refuge in an inward and reactive foreign policy strategy rather than following more outreaching and innovative one. 72 With the election of Chandrika Kumaratunga Bandaranaike, daughter of S.W.R.D. and Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the SLFP returned to power in Chandrika enacted a more active foreign policy during her presidency than her predecessor Premadasa. Her government attached the greatest importance to strengthening relations with Sri Lanka s neighbours and to playing a leading role in fostering greater regional cooperation through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). 73 During her first term, she tried to re-establish neglected relationships with the West and China. The SLFP government tried to convince the Western governments, with some success, to stop the flow of funds and arms to the LTTE insurgents and was able to establish a more productive relationship with the new Deve Goda government in India. 74 The government of Chandrika initiated a peace process with the LTTE during the turn of the millennium. This had also influence on the foreign policy of Sri Lanka. Before the initiation of the peace process and the signing of the Cease-Fire Agreement of 2002, 69 Shelton U. Kodikara, International Change and Regional Compulsions: Sri Lanka s Foreign Policy, South Asian Survey, 2 (1995) 1, , Ibidem Manoharan, Brothers not Friends, A. Sivarajah, Sri Lanka s Foreign Policy since 1994, 9th International Conference on Sri Lanka Studies 57 (2003), 1-22, Sivarajah, Sri Lanka s Foreign Policy, Howard B. Schaffer, Sri Lanka in 1996: Promise and Disappointment. Asian Survey 37 (1997) 2, , Island of Opportunity? 23