THE DYNAMIC OF NEGOTIATION IN THE FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT 1996 Study Case: The Mindanao Conflict UNDERGRADUATE THESIS

Transcription

1 THE DYNAMIC OF NEGOTIATION IN THE FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT 1996 Study Case: The Mindanao Conflict As complement of condition of bachelor degree in Sarjana Ilmu Politik (S.IP) in the International Relations Department, Social Political Science Faculty, Muhammadiyah University Yogyakarta UNDERGRADUATE THESIS By: Diana Fatmawati Advisor: Surwandono, S.Sos, M.Si INTERNATIONAL CLASS of SOCIAL POLITICAL SCIENCE FACULTY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT UNIVERSITY MUHAMMADIYAH YOGYAKARTA

2 AUTHENTICATION PAGE The Dynamic of Negotiation in the Final Peace Agreement 1996 Study Case: The Mindanao Conflict By: Diana Fatmawati This undergraduate thesis has been examined and endorsed by the Board of Examiners from the International Relations Department, Social Political Science Faculty, Muhammadiyah University Yogyakarta On Day/Date: Thursday, July 10 th, 2008 Time: am Place: The Laboratory of International Relations A Acknowledged by, Adviser / Chief of Examiner Surwandono, S.Sos, M.Si Examiner I Examiner II Dr. Bambang Cipto, MA Sugeng Riyanto, S.IP,M.Si 2

3 PAGE OF DEVOTE For the Greatest parents in the world, Papito Zainal Abidin, Mimi Mir Atul Khoiriyah There is no enough word to represent my grateful to you, for all of your struggle and love I do hope that I can realize your dream to be someone who can be proud of, to make you happy Dunya wal Akhirah ameen. You mean the world to me My sweet ones, Oni Zakkia and Firda Sonia And for everyone who loves me 3

4 MOTTO "Be nice and smile to everyone you meet. You don't know what they are going through, and they may need that smile. And treasure it." - Christine M. Huppert 4

5 PREFACE This undergraduate thesis tried to discuss about the Dynamic of negotiation in the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) 1996, between the Government Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Where actually, the FPA 1996 was not yet ripe or ready to be signed, but on the contrary, it was signed. The question was how. Based on the theory used, why then the GRP and the MNLF agreed to conduct negotiation was because both the main actors of the conflict, Nur Misuari (MNLF) and President Ramos (the GRP) at that time, were experiencing declines and degradations politically and economically. So by that, beside beneficial, it seems that there is no other way out to save their each other condition and position except for having negotiations. Other than that, this undergraduate thesis is also written in order to fulfill one of the requirements of bachelor degree program in International Relations Department, Social Political Science Faculty of Muhammadyah University Yogyakarta. 5

6 THANKS TO Alhamdulillah hirabbil alamin, highest praise and thanks to Illahirobbi, because of Him I can pass all these and finish the final duty which entitles The Dynamic of Negotiation in the Final Peace Agreement 1996 well. My deepest appreciation goes to Ir. H. Dasron Hamid, M.Sc (The Head of Muhammadyah University Yogyakarta), DR. Tulus Warsito (The Dean of Social Political Science Faculty of UMY), Grace Lestariana W., S.IP, M.Si (The Head of International Relations of UMY), Siti Muslikhati, S.IP, M.Si (The Secretary of International Relations Department of UMY), Surwandono, S.Sos, M.Si (The Advisor), Dr. Bambang Cipto, MA (The Examiner II), Sugeng Riyanto, S.IP, M.Si (The Examiner III), and Mr. Djumari (The Student Service of International Relations Department of UMY). The grateful thanks to my family. My beloved parents who have been wholeheartedly love me and totally struggle for my living and future, so that I can reach to this level. There is no enough word to describe my thankful to you, and I pray to Allah to love you both and make you happy till the end, amin. For my sweet sisters, Oni Zakkia and Firda Sonia, my life have been colored by your laughs, tears, jokes, and indulges, I love you forever and we ll never be apart. Huge thanks to my friends and community. The big family of International Class Community especially all classmates in IC 2004, bu Dian, Mbak Ati, mbak Atin, and mas Jati, thank you for the wonderful days, precious experiences and 6

7 lessons, the laugh and sad that we ve share together for almost 4 years, the support, and motivation to improve myself. Thanks also to my girl, Susan, who have been with me through the hard times and hard road to Pak Surwandono s house, its worth enough. May Allah always bless us in every way we take, amiin, keep the spirit. For people in my boarding house, Ibu Kos, Nani, Dewi, Arum, sometimes Lalang and Mbak Ketut, and my lovely sister Oni, thank you for the support and motivation, and sorry for the noise I made during I type or scream or printing in the middle of the night, hehe. For all my friends as well as partner in World Eyes, Mas Angga, Iput, Mbak Tri, Rendy, Mas putra, Mas Reza, Mas Murry, Pak Ipung, and Pak Tegar, Thank you for the support and understanding, you are rock, guys! And then for all the Indonesia Islam friends in Mig33, Teh Fa, Arini, Ernis, Aini, mbak Endang, Puspita, Jiunk, Imam, Kid, teh Yo, mbak Pis, Umar, thank you for the support especially to teh Fa and arin, thanks for the sincere companion, motivation, and advices. And all friends who intentionally or not, got involve with the process of this thesis. Thank you for the support, assistance, and the prayer. Last but not least, I want to thank my past, because of it I can reach to this level and be thankful, and thank to my future, here I go, and I am coming for you. Finally, it is highly expected that this thesis would bring benefit and advantages to the reader especially to the International Relations students. Diana Fatmawati July, 28,

8 TABLE OF CON TENT PAGE AUTHENTICATION PAGE. PAGE OF DEVOTE. MOTTO PREFACE. THANKS TO TABLE OF CONTENT LIST OF CHART.. LIST OF PICTURE... ii iii iv v vi viii xi xi CHAPTER I PREFACE 1 A. Background B. Research Question C. Theoretical Framework.. 7 D. Hypotheses E. Method to Collect Data F. Scope of the Research G. Systematical Writing. 11 8

9 CHAPTER II GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF MINDANAO. 13 A. The Geographic Situation of Mindanao Island.. 13 B. The History of Mindanao Conflict 15 C. The Dynamic of Negotiation in the Mindanao Conflict Resolution.. 22 CHAPTER III THE OBSTACLES TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATION. 34 A. Experiences of Negotiation as a Trap. 34 B. The Complexity of Conflict 37 C. The Stronger The Hawkish Group.. 45 CHAPTER IV FACTORS THAT CAUSED THE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE MNLF TOOK PLACE Mutually Hurting Stalemate Mutually Enticing Opportunity. 60 CHAPTER V CONCLUSION 67 REFERENCES 71 9

10 ATTACHMENT 1. Map of the Philippines and Mindanao Island 3. The Tripoli Agreement Jeddah Accord 5. Republic Act The Final Peace Agreement Division of Region in the Mindanao Island 10

11 LIST OF CHART Graphic 1: The comparison of the Hawkish than the Dove in the Mindanao Conflict... 4 Graphic 2: Matrix of Research about Conflict and Negotiation: Conflict Perspective in the South East Asia and the Philippines Table 1: Financial Resources of the Bangsa Moro liberation Groups Table 2: Basis Region of the MILF Table 3: Basis Region of the Abu Sayyaf 55 Table 4: Net Satisfaction Ratings of Presidents Philippines May 1986 to June LIST OF PICTURE Picture 1: The Map of the Philippines Picture 2: The Map of the Mindanao Island 11

12 CHAPTER I PREFACE In the world history, there have been many stories about separatism, such as the Soviet Union (which after its collapsed in 1985 split into 15 States), Pakistan ( in 1971 spilt into Bangladesh and The Islamic Republic of Pakistan), Czechoslovakia (into Czech Republic and Slovakia, Indonesia with East Timor, and Thailand with its Pattani movement. Separatism emerged for several reasons; among others are different ideology, disappointment, provocation, and rejection. What were been so interested in a case of separatism were the dynamics of the conflict and the politics circled it. Mindanao conflict was one of a unique separatism conflicts that ever happened. It was a combination of a religious-sentiment (primordial) conflict and politics-interest (constructivist) conflict. 1 One of the things that were very interesting in this case was the fact that the Final Peace Agreement 1996 was finally signed, when there were too many conflicts happened, when both conflicting parties simultaneously defending their each others ego and refused peace so that couldn t possible to find opportunity to ran any negotiation. The question was why? 1 Surwandono, Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao) Research Report. Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October (unpublished) 12

13 A. Background Mindanao conflict, is a unique conflict which firstly caused by the unwillingness of its society to be integrated into the Philippines exclusive territory, which then developed to be an armed conflict that spent enormous victims, and then to be a conflict of political interest among the elites actors. The conflict was started in the time of Spain colonization in The Spain was use military forces in order to conquer the Mindanao Island, but the Spain was never gain anything there except the foot stand. The Mindanao society rebel the colonization of Spain time by time for more than 350 years. In 1898, the Spain colonization was ended by the United States through the Paris Agreement. But it was not better the condition of the Mindanao society; on the contrary, the second wave of colonization in the Mindanao was taken over by the United State. Different from the previous Spain colonization, the US regime was not use military forces in order to conquer the Mindanao Island, but it used softer way through political concessions and political penetrations. The colonization of the US took place for 47 years which then ended by the establishment of the Philippines commonwealth in The policy of the new Philippines government which would include the Mindanao Island to be one of the Philippines exclusive territories and the betrayal of the US toward the Mindanao society, emerging the case fire coming from the Mindanaoan youths and combatants. Rebellion and the demand for self- separation / independence were continued to run. The bloodiest era of the conflict was in the time of Marcos administration, 13

14 where there were many killing and torturing. These phenomena then led the elites Sultanate, combatants, and youths of the Mindanao to create a legal political Organization in order to increase the level of rebellion and to gain attention as well as support from the International Community. Several political Organization were then established, but along with the development, the MNLF was the one that known as the official representative of the Mindanao society especially the Muslims. The MNLF then increased the struggle to realize the independence of Mindanao by armed conflict with the Philippines army, and conflict Internationalization. The result of the Internationalization was the attention coming from the International Islamic of Conference (OIC) and several Muslim States like Libya, Malaysia, and Indonesia. These International actors then proposed peace way to the both conflicting parties (the Philippines government / GRP and the MNLF as the representative of Muslim Mindanao). As the result, in 1976, the Tripoli Agreement was signed by the GRP and the MNLF agreeing two points, which are; the establishment of autonomous government in the Southern part of Mindanao under the authority of the Philippines, and the agreement pertained to the 13 Muslim autonomous regions in the southern Philippines. Conflict between the government of the Philippines and the MNLF was reduced after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement. In theory, after a signing of an Agreement, the condition exist should be better for the two parties conflicting. But seem unlike that way to this time case. The signing of the Tripoli Agreement was on 14

15 the contrary emerging many disappointments and protests from various parties. In fact, in this Mindanao conflict, there were more the parties that reject the peace and negotiation, known as the Hawkish groups than the parties that wanted peace and negotiation, known as the Dove groups. The groups that wanted peace and negotiation to be conducted were only for example the MNLF, the Philippines government, the OIC, and several Muslim countries that were being the mediator. While at that time, the groups that being disappointed by and rejected the Tripoli Agreement were, the Philippines military, the Christian Pilipino society, the MILF, and Abu Sayyaf group. What happened in Mindanao conflict was a situation as follows. Accords, peace talks, and negotiation were carried out when there were still many parties refused the peace. Hardly possible situation. Graphic 1 Resource: processed from various resources The Philippines Military were disappointed by and the rejected the Tripoli 15

16 Agreement because according to them, conducting negotiation with a separatist movement was meaning a legitimating toward its existence. What have been done by the GRP these time (settle the conflict by armed forces) were what should be did by a State, for a state have right-to-force toward such kind of separatist movement in its exclusive territory. So it would be better to just eliminate (militarily) the separatist groups and slaughter its entire member. The Christian Philippino society were disappointed by the signing of the Tripoli Agreement because first, the agreement toward the establishment of Mindanao autonomous region would transfer the existence of Christian society which was at that time already dominate the Mindanao population. Second, they considered that Bangsa Moro were abject and inferior which inadvisability to be struggled but should be just finished. While the MILF and Abu Sayyaf groups were separated themselves from the membership of MNLF because once again, they disappointed by the results of the Tripoli Agreement which was not even closer to what they have demanded that was to create an Independent State. Moreover, there were plebiscite ran by President Marcos to re-determined which of the 13 areas mentioned in the Tripoli Agreement would be joined the Mindanao autonomous region. The 10 over 13 regions agreed to join the Mindanao autonomous region made the armed conflict came back on fire, for the Bangsa Moro considered that the government of the Philippines has betrayed the content of the Tripoli Agreement 1976 that has been agreed. There were too many resistance and objections after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement 1976, armed conflict even remain occurred, so that seemed mostly 16

17 impossible to have any negotiation in the front. But then suddenly, there were accords and informal meetings ran by the GRP and the MNLF with the OIC and the Muslim countries as the mediator. First were the Jeddah accord in 1987, and then the 20 th ICFM meeting in Istanbul, and the OIC Summit meeting in December 1991 in Senegal. Re-asking to self-separation by Nur Misuari even carried out during the several times meeting such as the 3 rd State Conference in Thaif, Saudi Arabia 1981 and the OIC meeting 1991, but it were refused by the forum. After those meetings, in September 2 nd 1996 the Final Peace Agreement was signed by President Ramos and Nur Misuari in Manila, witnessed by the Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and the OIC Secretary General Hamid Algabid. But what would be the question is, how come the Final Peace Agreement 1996 was finally signed in the middle of un-conducive situation, when there were more hawkish than the doves, when the two parties conflicting were not ready yet to have any negotiation because they were enjoying the armed conflicts and struggling their interests, when the unripe time forced to be ripe? B. Research Question Based on the background explained above, then the research question would be why the Government of Republic of the Philippines and the MNLF took negotiation process in the Final Peace Agreement 1996? C. Theoretical Framework Based on the research question, the writer will explain the problem using the 17

18 theory of ripeness by William Zartman. According to this Theory, there are essentially two approaches to the study and practice of negotiation (and its facilitated form, mediation).one, of longest standing, holds that the key to a successful resolution of conflict lies in the substance of the proposals for a solution. Parties resolve their conflict by finding an acceptable agreement more or less a midpoint between their positions, either along a flat front through compromise or, as more recent studies have highlighted, along a front made convex through the search for positive-sum solutions or encompassing formulas. 2 The other holds that the key to successful conflict resolution lies in the timing of efforts for resolution. Parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so when alternative, usually unilateral, means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties find themselves in an uncomfortable and costly predicament. At that point they grab on to proposals that usually have been in the air for a long time and that only now appears attractive. 3 Referring to the first school, the conflicting parties (the GRP and the MNLF) were tried to look for a resolution in the form of an agreement to negotiate their position and interest. The focus of the resolution was lie on the substance of the Agreement proposal. This negotiation process could be through compromises effort like the giving of political concession to the MNLF or other positive-sum solutions effort. They tried to find the mid-point material which could be accepted by the both 2 (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:49) 3 Ibid., 18

19 parties, since it is impossible to find such very-right solution to fulfill the both parties interests. Referring to the second school, the final decision to conduct negotiation was then caused by inconvenient and declines experienced by each of the conflicting parties. AS quoted in Zartman s book, the declines of the both conflicting parties were described in a situation of a mutually hurting stalemate, and the beneficial situation resulted by both main actors after the willing of negotiation was described in a mutually enticing opportunity. a ripe moment is depicted as a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS), which is characterized by a deadlock. The parties are locked into a situation because of an impeding catastrophe. In this situation, the disputing parties come to recognize, through a cost-benefit calculation, the sharp increase in costs of further escalation, which limits the use of unilateral strategies and enhances the prospect of a negotiated settlement as the only way out of an escalating situation. 4 Another way to conceptualize a ripe moment is as a mutually enticing opportunity (MEO), which is distinguished from an MHS by its emphasis on future gains rather than on costs. During a ripe moment, the parties begin to negotiate because they expect to achieve certain goals using alternative strategies instead of conflict. 5 The both conflicting parties were experiencing very difficult situations where they could not reach their interest, usually unilaterally, if they did not run the negotiation process. So, they then choose to conduct negotiation for it is the most attractive way out to gain back their interests and possibly gain other additional benefits. 4 Zartman,William., & Faure, Guy Oliver. (2005). Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts. Cambridge University Press ( page 272) 5 Ibid., 19

20 Actually, according to the type of the conflict (separatism conflict), condition happened in Mindanao, and the contrast interests of the each parties (integration and independency); it is impossible to find a perfect solution where each of the parties could satisfy their whole interests, because in this conflict, the goals of one party were blocked by the goals of other party. So then at this point, they take the alternative that actually have been in the air suggested and effort by the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) and other Muslim countries in order to conduct peace agreement and negotiation. Moreover, 20 years (after the Tripoli Agreement 1976) were a long and enough time to prepare a suitable drafts and substance for a Final Peace Agreement. In addition, the both parties would gain benefits from the signing of the agreement. D. Hypotheses The Final Peace Agreement was finally signed by the government of the Philippines and the MNLF because there were mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS), and the mutually Enticing Opportunity (MEO). The MHS was a condition where the actor of the each conflicting parties, President Ramos and Nur Misuari, were experiencing difficult situation, decline position, and International pressure, which finally lead them to the option of negotiation. While the MEO were a consequences situation if the both conflicting parties were engage to conduct negotiation. It is a situation where the each party, Ramos and Misuari, would regain their position and support, as well as financial and 20

21 political assistance from the International community after they sign the peace Agreement. E. Method to Collect Data In this writing, the writer uses several ways to collect the data in order to discuss the problem, they are as follows: Media research, collecting the data from media likes the internet in order to find references and sources to accomplish the explanation of the problem. Library research, this method used to study the relevant sources in order to discuss the problem (secondary data). Data analysis, the data gained from the internet and the library (books), were checked for the relevancy in order to be used as the sources in the final paper arrangement. Proving hypothesis, derived from the meaning of the title, the discussion of the problem, and the data analysis. F. Scope of the Research In this writing, also according to the theme that would be discussed, the writer will limit the scope of the discussion started from the beginning of the Mindanao conflict until the signing of the Final Peace Agreement This time limitation 21

22 used in order to ease the observation of the problem as well as to avoid the complexity of the further analysis. G. Systematical Writing The systematical writing was meant to answer the research question and hypotheses that were explained, these would be as follows: In the first chapter, the writer would discuss about the preface of the topic. It would consist of background of the Mindanao conflict, the research question, theoretical framework, hypotheses, method to collect data, the scope of the research, and the systematical writing. The second chapter would discuss about the general description of Mindanao Island. Including its geographical situation, it history of conflict, and the dynamic of the conflict resolution. In chapter three, the writer would go deeper by discussing about the obstacles to conduct negotiation. Where the worst of the conflict situation, made the going of a new further negotiation to be impossible. Started with the experiences of the both conflicting parties on finding that the negotiation which have been conducted was only resulted a trap, the complexity of the conflict, and the fact that there were more the hawkish than the dove group. Chapter four would be the answer of the research question. It would consist of the discussion of a mutually hurting stalemate and a mutually enticing opportunity, which caused the negotiation process to be conducted. 22

23 The last chapter, chapter five, would be the conclusion of the entire topic. 23

24 CHAPTER II GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF MINDANAO A. Geographic Situation of Mindanao Island Mindanao Island is located in the most Southern part of the Philippines archipelagos. It is the second largest Islands in the Philippines after the Luzon Island. Mindanao Island land reaches to 102,043 square kilometers, it occupies one-third of the Philippines' total land area. 6 Mindanao is surrounded by seas and near to Borneo Island, Indonesia. This key geographic location underscores its potential to be a major transshipment point and center of trade in the region. 7 Mindanao Island is prone to earthquakes and a mountainous island; it is the home to Mount Apo, the highest mountain in the country. 8 The Mindanao Island located outside the Typhoon belt. It have fair tropical climate spread to all over the area which potential to the growing of various tropical plants, fruits, and other mineral resources. An article reported: Its rich soil accounts for bountiful harvests of a variety of farm products. It grows most of the Philippines' major crops such as rubber (100% of national production), pineapple (91%), and cacao (90%) as well as banana, coffee, corn and coconut (over 50%). The island also produces exotic fruits like pomelo, mangosteen and durian. Mindanao is likewise endowed with rich mineral resources. Its metallic deposits include lead, zinc, ore, iron, copper, chromite, magnetite and gold. Gold mined in Mindanao accounts for nearly half of the national gold reserves. Its non-metallic mineral resources 6 (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:50) 7 ibid., 8 (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:53) 24

25 include marble, salt, sand, gravel, silica, clay, and limestone. 9 The population of Mindanao reaches to 18.1 million people or a quarter of the Philippines' total population, based on the 2000 census. 10 This island has the most varied populations as a result of the previous colonization and the huge migration coming from Luzon and Visayas. Among the residents of Mindanao there are tribal indigenous known as Lumad, the Muslim Mindanao, and the Christian Filipino. Religiously, Mindanao share three major religions embraced by its society. Roman Catholic 83%, Protestant 9%, Muslim 5%, Buddhist 3%, and others. 11 Islam was the first religion to enter Mindanao Island (in the 13 th century) and embraced by the Mindanao society. Then in the 16 th century, Christianization was started to spread along with the colonization of the Spain, continued by the American, and the migration of the Christian Filipinos into Mindanao. As a coastal island that have tropical climate evenly, most of the Mindanao society have living as fishermen, farmer, and work in forestry sector. About species of fish 12 are available in the coasts of Mindanao. Tropical climate that spread evenly to the entire region makes it very potential to the production of crops, rice, and other tropical plains and fruits that can contributes enormous income to the country. One of articles about Mindanao s economy said that: If wisely harnessed, Mindanao's rich agricultural resources can serve as the Philippines' foundation for sustainable growth. Mindanao's 9 ibid., 10 ibid., 11 (accessed on: May, / 18:23) 12 (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:55) 25

26 economy grew at an average of 3% in This dipped to 0.5 % in 1998 due to the Asian financial crisis but improved to nearly 2% in Its Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) in 2000 grew a noteworthy 4.95%, higher than the national growth rate of 4.01%. This was due to the bullish performance of its agriculture sector (5.84%) and industry sector (5.09%). 13 In order to ease the control, the country of the Philippines is divided into 15 regions. These 15 regions will then be divided into provinces, cities, and finally the Barangays (the smallest political unit). 14 In the Mindanao Island itself, the political division is divided into six administrative regions, which then subdivided into 25 provinces. These regions are Zamboanga Peninsula (Region IX) formerly Western Mindanao, Northern Mindanao (Region X), Davao Region (Region XI) formerly Southern Mindanao, SOCCSKSARGEN (Region XII) formerly Central Mindanao, Caraga (Region XIII) located in the northwestern part of Mindanao, and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) a special region which covers the territories predominantly populated by Muslims. 15 B. The History of Mindanao Conflict Mindanao conflict was started in the time of Spain colonization in Its objectives were to conquer and spread Christianization in the Mindanao Island which was already Muslim in Majority. In the effort to achieve those goals, the Spain regime often to used military oppressions and cruelty. There were torturing and killings in everyday lives. During its colonization era, the Spain were actually 13 (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:54) 14 (accessed on: May, / 18:24) 15 (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:53) 26

27 achieved nothing except the foot stand. Spain were never won the trust moreover the heart of Mindanao society. For those cruelties and violence, the Mindanao society, also known as the Bangsa Moro, conducted rebellion. The colonization of Spain took place for more than 350 years, and for that long as well, the Mindanao society rebelled it. In the 1898, the Spain colonization was ended by the United States through the Paris Agreement. The agreement was the result of the Spain s defeat over the United States in the Perang Pantai Manila (also in 1898) which was asked for the Spain to cede all of its colonial territories, including the Mindanao Island, to the United States. But then the end of the Spain colonization did not better the condition in the Mindanao for the next colonization was taken over by the United States. Then there was occurred the second wave of colonization which was took place for 47 years. The United States colonization was seemed different from the previous Spain colonization, but obviously same in the objectives. The US did not use military power and violations, or perhaps less use it, to won the heart and sympathy of the Mindanao society, but rather used softer and peaceful way in achieved the objectives. Its strategies to won the attention and trust of the Mindanao society were in the form of political penetration in the Mindanao sultanates. The US political lobby was succeeding proven by a signed agreement between the US and the Mindanao Sultanates called Kiram Bates in The agreement contented statement that the US would not intervening matters in the Sultans governance. But on the 2nd of 27

28 March 1904, the agreement was canceled by the President Franklin Roosevelt, unilaterally. The second US strategy to gain attention from the Mindanao society was in the form of education. The US to be successful to convinced the Sultans and elites of Mindanao to sent their children to the schools in the US and Manila, in objective to changed the point of view and life style of the Mindanaoan young generations which was hoped later to be the counterpart for the Mindanao rebellion itself. In 1935 the Philippines commonwealth was established with Molina as the chosen President. Molina then declared that the Sultans in Mindanao were no longer having any position in the new governance, and the International law would be implemented for the entire society without an exception to any religion. Heard to this, the Mindanao society were angry and refused to be joined in to the Philippines territory. Conflict came back to happen when the Muslim Mindanao found out that in fact the US were unilaterally support the integration of the Mindanao Island to be part of the Philippines territory. Since that time, the rebellion coming from the Mindanao society especially the Muslim toward the new policy and the new Philippines government were took place. Sets of resistances were conducted started from the requestioning the reason of why the Philippines included the Mindanao Island in to its exclusive territory, until the extreme actions to separatism. During the Marcos era around , there were enormous numbers of ruinations and victim so that known to be the most repressive era in the Mindanao conflict. His Martial Law resulted the killing of over people, imprisonments, and the disappearance of 759 reported, thousands of tortured and 28

29 lived under the poverty line. 16 There was also mass slaughter of Mindanao society done by Illagas ethnic under the order of the President Marcos himself. And the most traumatic incident for the Mindanao society were the jabiddah massacre, where the Philippines government massacring around 60 Muslims that considered betraying for they refuse to infiltrate Sabah in the operasi merdeka in During that time, the government of the Philippines also sent huge numbers of Christian citizens from the Luzon, visayas, as well as Manila in to the Mindanao Island in order to took over the population domination so that the Mindanao society being in minority. Along with the huge migration that kept ran, the GRP kept on its actions to progressively marginalized the Mindanao society so that the Mindanao society lived in the oppressive misery and social stress. But then this matter in turn motivates the young Muslim Moros to launched rebellion toward the Government of the Philippines. In 1968, MIM (Mindanao Independent Movement) was established by Datu Udtog matalam, as the first political organization that demand for separation over the control of the Philippines. But in the development, the MNLF( Moro National Liberation Front) led by Nur Misuari, a Muslim activist and professor in the University of Philippines, was the one that finally known as the official representative of the Bangsa Moro / Muslim Mindanao. The MNLF then not only became a political organization but also an organization with military power. Longer, this organization developed to be a strong unit that gains military and financial support from several Muslim countries in the world. Countries that played a role in the development of the 16 (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:53) 29

30 MNLF were such as Libya (for its top 90 and top 300 military assistances in 1971), Malaysia, Syria, and Pakistan. The conflict between the GRP and the MNLF then changed to be an armed conflict that devoured enormous numbers victims. Reported that the GRP spent 40% of its annual budget (more than 73 million pesos) per year to handle the separatist movement in Mindanao. 17 At the same time, Nur Misuari kept his effort to progressively internationalize the conflict in order to gain attention and support from the International community. As the result, in 1972 the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) gave attention to the Muslim minority problem in the Southern Philippines by the creation of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission which was then changed to be the Ministerial Committee of Six in the join of Indonesia and Bangladesh. This commission was tasked to investigate the issue and violence done by the GRP toward the Muslim Mindanao. After having several times of meeting between the GRP and the MNLF with the OIC and several Muslim, then in December 23rd 1976, the Tripoli Agreement was signed in Tripoli, Libya. This agreement result two essentials: First, the establishment of autonomous government in the Southern part of Mindanao under the authority of the Philippines. Second, the agreement pertained to the 13 areas of Muslim autonomous regions in the southern Philippines, these areas were; Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Manguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Dovao del Sur, 17 (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:59) 30

31 South Cotabato, Palawan, and all of the cities and villages around the areas. 18 The conflict was reduced after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement. But in 1970, internal conflict inside the MNLF body on the contrary increased so that result fraction. It was because there were two congress members and also elites of Mindanao Sultanate at the same time, Rashid Lucman and Salipada K. Pendatun, cooperate and declared the the establishment of BMLO (Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization), which in fact in the development couldn t compete the fame and the position of the MNLF as the leader of the Bangsa Moro. Then internal conflict came to occure again, signed by the establishment of the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) led by Salamat Hashim. The MILF was established for its dissapointment toward the MNLF which tend to be over obeyed to the Philippines policy and less represented the Bangsa Moro aspiration. Previously, the BMLO was conspirated with Salamat Hashim in order to took over the MNLF chairman position from Misuari. It was succeed anyway, but then the election in 1977 resulted the second winning of Misuari for he gained the maximum voices from the internal members of the organization. Salamat Hashim was fired for then established the MILF. Fractionalization in the MNLF body was increased by the emergence of Abu Sayyaf group led by Abdurrazzak Jailani, which prefer to use violation and kidnapping in the effort to achieve its objective. The more fierce armed conflict returned, and this time it was between the 18 Surwandono, Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao) Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October (Unpublished) 31

32 GRP and the Bangsa Moro rebel groups such as the MNLF, MILF, also the Abu Sayyaf group. The armed conflict happened after President Marcos conducted plebicite in order to re-determined of which of the 13 areas menationed in the Tripoli Agreement would be joined the Mindanao autonomous region. And the result was unfortunatable for it was only 10 from 13 areas, agreed to joined the Mindanao autonomous region. This matter reappeared the sentiment and increased the blood preasure of the Bangsamoro combatant. The GRP considered to betrayed the content of the Tripoli Agreement that has been agreed. Hence, the military fight and rebelion coming from the Bangsa Moro rebel groups were re-occured. Viewing to that condition, then a more comprehensive agreement was arranged. This agreement later called the Final Peace Agreement. The OIC together with Muslim countries such as Indonesia and Libya brought the GRP and the MNLF in to the negotiation table once again. In the process, this final agreement was prepared longer and riper whether by the Philippines government, the OIC, as well as the Ministerial Committee of Six. The range time to prepare the more comprehensive drafts for the agreement was 20 years after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement 1976, so that hoped to minimize the mistakes and deviations happen in the Tripoli Agreement implementation in order not to be repeated. After through several preparations steps, several accords then carried out. The first accord called the Jeddah accord; it was carried out on January in Jeddah. This accord produced the giving of full autonomy to the five big provinces which were Sulu, Basilan, Manguindanao, Tawi-tawi, and Palawan. By that, then the 32

33 peaceful way reopened. Afterwards, another accord that played significant role called the 20 th ICFM meeting in Istanbul and the OIC Summit meeting in December 1991 in Senegal which asked for the Philippines Government and the MNLF to continue their peace. In the meeting, Nur Misuari once again proposed to self-separation from the Philippines exclusive territory, but it was refused by the forum for the Philippines government after President Marcos considered to having more appreciative and serious intention in settling the Mindanao conflict. On April 1993 and December 1995 President Ramos and Nur Misuari met in Jakarta. After that meeting, the Final Peace Agreement was seemed to get closer to the realization, signed by the giving of political consessions to the Mindanao Autonomous Region and the integration of Bangsa Moro combatants in to the Philippines armed forces by the government of the Philippines. And finally, on Monday, September 2nd 1996, the Final Peace Agreement was signed by President Fidel Ramos and the chairman of the MNLF, Nur Misuari. The singing took place in Manila witnessed by the Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and the OIC Secretary General Hamid Algabid. C. The Dynamic of Negotiation in the Mindanao Conflict Resolution The Mindanao conflict remains happened; it killed more people and causing enormous lost day by day. On the other hand, various kinds of peace way have been proposed by the International Communities in order to resolve the conflict. The first action to get closer to the peace negotiation was the establishment of Quadripartite 33

34 Ministerial Commission initiated by the OIC in 1973 which member by Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and Somalia. 19 The Commission then changes its name to be the Ministerial Committee of Six after the joining of Indonesia and Bangladesh. This Committee was tasked to investigate the case of Mindanao conflict and the violations done by the GRP toward the Mindanao society. In 1975, the first domestic formal meeting between the GRP and the MNLF were occurred in Jeddah in the mediator of the OIC. The talks discussed about the Mindanao conflict resolution, but it was failed because there were many complexities and disproportionate demands coming from Nur Misuari. Nur Misuari wanted a creation of Mindanao Autonomous Region that will have a separate government and army to be the result of the talks, while according to the Indonesian Foreign Minister at that time, Dr. Adam Malik, it would not be acceptable by any reputable sovereign government. 20 In other words, the demands of the both conflicting parties (the GRP and the MNLF) would not be meeting. On July 1975, the 6 th Islamic Conference was held in Jeddah which decided to maximize the use of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission toward the issue of negotiation between the GRP and the MNLF until reached to the final decision. This Committee then tasked to prepare the negotiation as well as lobbying the GRP and the MNLF. 21 In December 21, 1976, The Tripoli Agreement was signed by Nur Misuari 19 Ibid., page (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:53) 21 Surwandono, Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao) Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October (page 50) (unpublished) 34

35 and the Philippines representative Zamello Z Barbero, witnessed by the OIC representative and several Muslim Countries. The Agreement was signed in Libya, a place that actually far away from word neutral, because Libya was one the central supports of the Mindanao rebellion to the Philippines. In the lobbying process previously, the GRP was more tend to be passive compare to the MNLF and the mediator (the OIC and several Muslim Countries) because at that time the GRP was facing significant economic contraction after the booming of the oil. 22 After the signing of the Tripoli Agreement, the conflict was reduced, but it rose again when President Marcos conducted plebiscite over the 13 regions which were already mentioned in the Tripoli Agreement. Marcos was considered to betray the content of the Tripoli Agreement that has been agreed by both parties. Nur Misuari then expressed this disappointment to the OIC in the 8 th Islamic Conference in May In 1979, Nur Misuari flew to Iran with his several delegations asked for assistant to tighter monitoring and takes an action toward the inconsistency of the GRP in implementing the content of the Tripoli Agreement Knowing the GRP deviation, Iran and Saudi Arabia then aggressively take an action to embargo their oil export to the Philippines. On the other hand, internal conflict in the MNLF body came to arise. The result of the Tripoli Agreement that disappointed many sides of the Bangsa Moro and the plebiscite done by Marcos caused the decreasing of popularity of the MNLF, 22 Ibid., 35

36 while increasing the popularity of the MILF which was more religious and more struggling for an Islamic Independent State. The decline of the MNLF popularity proven by the declined of Nur Misuari s chairmanship in the provisional government that created to serve the Regional Assembly and Executive Council for the Autonomous Region 9 and 12, and the absent of the MNLF supporters in the regional election assembly. Nur Misuari then continued to bring out the resolution of a Mindanao independent State to the OIC along with the 3 rd Summit Conference in Thaif, Saudi Arabia in January, and to the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission in Jeddah, in May The Misuari s proposal was rejected by the forum in the both meetings, the OIC then insists the MNLF to stay in its position to continue the peace process and stop the armed rebellion. Being pressed Internationally, Misuari then agreed to continue the diplomatic and politics process. During 1981 until around 1986, the situation in Mindanao was colored by several things. President Marcos launched strategy to compete the conflict Internationalization by Misuari: May (1988, 60) and Madale (1984, 184) argue that Marcos adopted a two-fold strategy: 1) provision of regional economic programs and concessions on selected religious and social matters (as the government believes the root causes are relative economic and social deprivation); 2) use of conventional military force to quell the insurgency. 23 The strategy was ran side by side, if the level of Mindanao s rebellion was 23 ( accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:53) 36

37 increased, then the economic betterment coming to that area will go slow, but if the level of the rebellion was decreased, then the economic betterment will come faster. But then in the real, the Muslim Mindanao only experienced little of the economic betterment; most of the benefits were enjoyed by the Christian society. Other than that, Marcos also did tricks in order to weaken the position of the MNLF and to break down the unity of Bangsa Moro. Marcos declared that the MNLF was an ally of communist party; this was aimed to discrediting the image of the MNLF among the Islamic world and also ASEAN. Unfortunately, this was worked, supported by the action of Marcos which always proposing peace choices for the Muslim issue by the establishment of peace panel, member by Muslim people. 24 In 1986, Presidential election chooses Corazon Aquino as the new President replacing the Marcos administration. In her reconciliation campaign, Aquino used softer and more peaceful way to resolve the Mindanao conflict. She promised to pay more attention to the development of Mindanao Autonomous region. She proved it by holding meeting and negotiation with Nur Misuari. After several times of contact, Aquino met Misuari who just came back from self-exile in the Middle East In September 5 th But the meeting was seemed unsmooth: However, even before talks begin, the MILF and MNLF-RG state they will not participate or honor any deal made. They launch armed attacks against military and civilian installations and army personnel and clashes are reported between the MNLF and the MILF. Talks between the government and the MNLF in Jolo in September result in a ceasefire and an amnesty program. Attempts to unite the various 24 Surwandono, Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao) Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October (page 55) (unpublished) 37

38 Moro factions fail. By late 1986, it is clear that elements in the military and the government do not support the negotiations. 25 In January 3 rd 1987, the GRP sent a team to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to convince the MNLF that the new Aquino administration was willing to conduct any kinds of negotiation except for self-independence. The MNLF then agreed, and in January 4 th 1987, the Jeddah accord was signed by the GRP and the MNLF. This accord discussed about the giving of full autonomy to all of Mindanao areas including Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Palawan. At that time, Misuari proposed another 24 demands to the GRP, but the GRP refused it and make another opposition proposal. On the other hand, a division inside the MLNF body reoccurred by the establishment of a radical movement (which later called Abu Sayyaf) by one of the member of MNLF, Abdul Razaq Jaljalani, that disappointed by Nur misuari s leadership. Many members of the MNLF also changed their support away from the MNLF to the other groups such as the MILF and Abu Sayyaf. They were disappointed for the demand of Misuari in the Jeddah accord was once again, minimized, from the demand to Independent State to the only autonomous region. The weak of the MNLF support and fame, made the GRP less response the demands of the MNLF in Jeddah accord because it considered being too much. Knowing the ignorance of the GRP, the MNLF was threat to conduct armed attack to the GRP. The OIC then insist the both parties to re-conducting negotiation. And after several times of intensive approaches, the Jeddah accord was resigned in January 4 th 25 (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:53) 38

39 1987 that proposed the giving of autonomy to all of Mindanao areas including Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Palawan under the authority of the Philippines State. On August 1 st 1989, President Aquino signed Republic Act 6734 about the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Many parties rejected this act. Meanwhile, the implementation of the ARMM should first through a plebiscite again just like the previsions President Marcos era. Founding out that plebiscite would be conducted again, the MNLF take an action in the form of boycotting it. They declared to remain consistent on the contents of the Tripoli Agreement But on the contrary, action of boycotting by the MNLF caused the worst plebiscite result to the MNLF itself. If the previous plebiscite done by Marcos resulting 10 over 13 regions, this time plebiscite only result 4 over 13 regions. It is submitted to a plebiscite on November 9. The MNLF and right-wing Christian groups oppose the act while the OIC first condemns and then supports the act. The surrounding confusion and dispute leads to low voter turnout and only 4 of the 13 provinces and 9 cities support the Organic Act (May 1992, 401). Estimates indicate that the voting area is 28% Muslim and 66% Christian. The four non-contiguous provinces, Lanao del Sur, Magindanao, Tawi-tawi, and Sulu, comprise the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The ARMM remains in place until the 1996 accord. 26 Twice of the conduction of plebiscite by the GRP caused the reoccurrence of greater rebellions done by the MNLF toward the government of the Philippines. Sets of armed attacks, killings, bombings, raids, gun battles, and other kinds of violations were happened very often and victim thousands of civilians as well as army forces of the GRP and also the MNLF. 26 Ibid., 39

40 In March 1991, 13 Moro combatants were murdered by the GRP s army for destroying the electricity tower. Not so long after that, 30 Moro combatants were found in death. These incidents were called the International amnesty to release that there have been extreme human right violations in the Philippines done by the GRP and the Bangsa Moro combatants. Knowing the worsened situation, the OIC then replayed its role to mediate the peace negotiation between the GRP and the MNLF in the OIC Summit in Senegal. But on the other hand, Nur Misuari on the contrary got another agenda in this time OIC meeting. Misuari was proposed the MNLF to the member of the OIC. By that, then the MNLF could indirectly be considered as an independent State. But this proposal was denied by the OIC, and the OIC warns the MNLF not to worsen the situation. In 1992, the Philippines Presidential election result Fidel V. Ramos as the new chosen President. He was the Minister of Defense under the Aquino administration which was considered to be the more proactive side, compared to Aquino itself, in settling the Mindanao conflict in the peace way. He proved it by establishing the NUC (National Unification Commission) in September 1992, headed by Haydee Yorac, a professor of University of the Philippines in order to task a political negotiating for the Mindanao Conflict resolution. While armed attacks and violations remain happened among the Mindanao rebellion groups and the Philippines armed forces along the country, the new Ramos government continued their intention to peace negotiation. In 1993, a meeting that led to an agreement to resume peace talk between the 40

41 GRP and the MNLF was held in Jakarta on April Then, a disturbance was reoccurred in the form of church bombing done by the Muslims and the Christian societies. In December 1993, mosque-bombing in Mindanao was happened after the church bombing that cause the killing of 7 people and injured 151. Sets of attacks and bank-raids in the Ipil Island that caused the die of 45 people and wounded 40 among them also done mostly by the Abu Sayyaf group. This incident considered to be the worst, so that in consequences, the government of the Philippines alleged those bombings and armed attacks were done not only by the Abu Sayyaf group but also by the MNLF and the MILF. The MNLF denied that claim and surprisingly declared that the MNLF would promise to together with the GRP to fight against the MILF and other what so called the lawless elements in Mindanao. 27 Considered to be a threat - group that grow bigger time to time, In January 4 th 1996, the leader of Abu Sayyaf, Abdul Razaq Djaljalani, was reported to be the most wanted criminal in the Philippines, the founder of the him (live or dead) would be given huge amount of cash by the GRP. January 7 th 1996, the 4 th round of peace talks between the GRP and the MNLF will resume in Jakarta next month, while they still resolving the five major issue that would be contented in Final Peace Agreement, these are; the timing of a plebiscite to set up the autonomous government; the geographic scope of autonomy; the number of MNLF forces to be integrated in the army and the national police; revenue-sharing in the autonomous area; and the establishment of a regional security 27 Surwandono, Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao) Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October (page 60) (unpublished) 41

42 force. 28 On January 11 th 1996, Nur Misuari opposed the resolution of ARRM and asked for the more meaningful autonomy. 29 Means that he wanted a special autonomy for Southern Mindanao that gives wider and bigger authority to rule and run the autonomous region. In March 5 th, 1996, the talks between the GRP and the MNLF in the mediation of the OIC were break down. The meeting was discussed about the setting of Muslim provisional government. The government in Manila wanted that the plebiscite have to run before the establishment of Provisional Government, while the MNLF wanted that the establishment of the Provisional Government has to set up under the Presidential edict avoiding the rejection over the Christian society toward the Muslim Autonomous Region. After sets of meeting and drafts - making were done by the OIC, the GRP, and the MNLF, In June 23rd 1995, the OIC spokesmen stated that the agreement regarding to the resolution of Mindanao conflict has reached to the 75-80%. 30 At the same time, the GRP has invited several investors to invest $80 million. 31 This step was aimed to rebuild the infrastructures that have been destroyed in the previous conflict. Public hearings and consultations with the Mindanao society were held monthly by the GRP. At the same month, there was a meeting between the GRP and the MNLF facilitated by the OIC, its result to the establishment of Southern 28 Xinhua News Agency, 01/07/ (accessed on: July, 12, 2008 / 15:53) 30 Reuters, 06/23/95 31 ibid., 07/02/95 42

43 Philippines Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD). 32 On August 1996, the GRP and the MNLF agreed to integrate 7500 MNLF combatant in to the GRP s military forces. 33 Finally in September 2nd 1996, the Final Peace Agreement was signed between the GRP and the MNLF witnessed by the OIC Secretary General, Hamid algabid, and the Indonesian Prime Minister, Ali Alatas. But the thing is, many controversies and rejections have come since the very beginning of negotiations and agreements conducted. For example, two months after the establishment of the SZOPAD, in August 1996, the Members of Congress of the GRP were expressed their opposition toward the content of the agreement. They were then asked for the Supreme Court to invalidate several particular contents and proposed for editing, which was then supported by the Christian bishop. The other example was the rejection of the MILF toward the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) The MILF was committing not to stand in the way of peace and keep the struggle for Independence; it was proved by the establishment of a huge assembly around Cotabato as the accommodation and base of the movement. 34 There were still many other examples and proves regarding to the rejections and disappointments that would be discussed in the next chapter (accessed on: May 29, 2008 / 20:57) 33 Xinhua News Agency, 08/02/ (accessed on: May, / 20:57) 43

44 CHAPTER III THE OBSTACLES TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATION As mentioned previously, the interesting points to study and analyzed the issue of separatism was relied on the dynamic of the conflict and the politics circled it. In this time case, there are three points that difficult to the happening of negotiation in the objective of peace situation in the Mindanao. First, the experiences of negotiation as a trap, means that every effort of negotiation that have been conducted were then on the contrary, only result to a worse problem and cause new opposition. Second, the complexity of the conflict. And third, the stronger the Hawkish group. A. Experiences of Negotiation as a Trap The signing of the Tripoli Agreement 1976 was essentially aimed for the betterment of the conflict situation in Mindanao. At one side, the conflict between the GRP and the MNLF was calming down after the signing of the Agreement. But on the other side, the Agreement was on the contrary being a trap for the MNLF itself. And it was being a trap too at last, however, toward the government Republic of the Philippines. In the MNLF bodies, divisions were then happened after the signing of the Agreement. The MNLF then split up to several factions, among them are the MILF and the more radical group which was then called the Abu Sayyaf group. These groups were separated themselves from the MNLF because they were disappointed 44

45 by Nur Misuari s leadership and the result of the Tripoli Agreement. The content of the Agreement was about the establishment of Mindanao autonomous region, which was away from the struggle of those time movement. The Moros were demanded for an Islamic Independent State, but Misuari were agreed to sign a resolution which was not even closer to the Moros aspiration. The Moros was wanted to be, at least, a Federal State that has their own jurisdiction, but the result of a common autonomous region by the Tripoli Agreement sad them. By this, Nur Misuari considered to be too obeyed to what the GRP s wanted and less represented the Moro aspiration. The plebiscite which was then ran by President Marcos was led to the re - launching of sets of armed attacks by the MNLF and the other Muslim Moro groups, because of their disappointment. Moreover, there was an economic policy proposed by President Marcos as his strategy to handle the separatism movement in Mindanao. The economic policy was described approximately as follows; if the level of rebellion was decreased then the economic betterment in Mindanao would run faster, but if the level of rebellion was increased then the economic betterment in Mindanao would run slower. 35 These thing was then increased the division among the Bangsa Moro, for some groups wanted the economic improvement and some group remain wanted to separate and establish Islamic Independent State. However, these phenomena then led to the distrust over the two sides toward each other. The MNLF was then could not any longer trust the GRP for its betrayal 35 Surwandono, Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao) Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October (page 54) (unpublished) 45

46 toward the content of the Tripoli Agreement 1976 that has been agreed together. While, the GRP was then decreased its trust toward the MNLF for the reoccurrence of armed forces attacks after the GRP gave political concession (autonomous region) to them. Meanwhile, trap was also experienced by the government of the Philippines after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement. These traps were in the form of the break of the Philippines military / political elites view of the Mindanao. According to the military elites, the peace negotiation with the Moro liberation groups was meaning useless. At that time (Marcos era), the Philippines military was having expand function in the development of the country and became the partner of the Martial Law and the authoritarian rule of Marcos. 36 For them, serve the separatist movement was mean legitimating to its existence. The military was regretting the President s decision to conduct peace and Agreement with the MNLF because according to them, a State have right-to-force toward such kind of separatist movement in its territory, and what have been done by the state these times (settle it militarily) was what a State suppose to do. And that was why the military was massively launching its fights against the threatening groups and organization in the country including the Moro separatist movements. While according the Philippines elite politics, what makes the President s decision pertaining to the Tripoli Agreement was useless was because the choice to Mindanao autonomous region would cost the National budget enormously, and the 36 Noel M. Morada & Teresa S. Tadem. (2007) Philippines Politics and Governance: An Introduction. Quezon. University of Philippines ( Page 395) 46

47 decision to establish a Mindanao autonomous region was worried to emerge such sense of jealousy toward another regions. Just like the case of Aceh, where it was also drawn controversies and worries from various parties, including the political elites in the government, before the decision to a special autonomous region of Aceh, which is now known as the Nangroe Atceh Darussalam was given. B. The Complexity of Conflict The complexity of the conflict in Mindanao also became the factors that difficult to the running of negotiations. Actually, after the signing of Tripoli Agreement 1976, the conflict was on the contrary got more acute, where it was started from the religious-sentiment conflict (primordial conflict); then rose to the instrumental conflict, even reached to the constructivist conflict. Firstly, Mindanao conflict in the was tending to caused by primordial issues. For the Muslim Mindanao, the Marcos repressive policy for them often to be considered as the representative of the Christian political power that intentionally wanted to marginalize Islam, also, the Manila was often to identified as Visayas that has the meaning and representing the Catholic. Joined with the republic of the Philippines was mean a form of capitulation (surrendering) toward the catholic community. 37 While for the government of the Philippines and the Filipinos, the Muslim 37 Surwandono, Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao) Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October (page 40) (unpublished) 47

48 Mindanao society was identified as a harsh, un-brained, and uncivilized nation. The existence of Bangsa Moro in Mindanao was also often to be identified as the Moors, a nation in Africa that ever irritated the Catholic community in Spain. This negative point of view toward the moors was then be transformed to the Muslim Mindanao. The genocide incident conducted by the Ilagas and the GRP toward the Muslim community in the 1970s was also triggered that the Mindanao conflict was meant a primordial conflict. 38 In the relation with the International actors, the protests and interferences from the OIC, Libya, Malaysia, and the other Muslim Countries could not be separated from the information stated by Nur Misuari in the effort of internationalizing the Mindanao conflict as the conflict of Islam versus the Catholiccharacterized Philippines. In his several speeches, Misuari described that the suffering of Bangsa Moro by the repressive policy of the GRP was similar to the suffering of the Palestinian by the repressive policy of Israel. 39 Primordial issue was also became the factor toward the division inside the MNLF bodies after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement. The action of Salamat Hashim as the vice chairman of Misuari, to separate and establish new rebellion organization (the MILF) was also because of primordial principle. In the point of view of Hashim, the MNLF and Misuari were no longer expressed an Islamicliberation movement, because it has obeyed the Tripoli Agreement that obviously 38 Ibid., 39 Ibid., 48

49 reduce the spirit to struggling the establishment of Islamic Independent State. 40 The Mindanao conflict was raise to the instrumentalist conflict after the signing of Tripoli Agreement. There was a big tendency that the actors of the conflict tend to use the issue to gain support whether from the domestic as well as the International community. The MNLF as one of the rebellion movements gained wide legitimacy from the International community especially the Muslim Countries, it even defeat the authority of the traditional Mindanao sultanates. In the view of Salamat Hashim, the conflict within the GRP was finally placed the Misuari to be one of important elites in the ARMM. In the certain point, the separation of Hashim from the MNLF and establish the MILF was also to increased the bargaining position, in order to reach its goal. The Abu Sayyaf group was an actor that uses the conflict more uniquely. Different from another rebellion movement, Abu Sayyaf tend to use kidnapping to get some ransom. There were, indeed, significant differences among the MNLF, MILF, and Abu Sayyaf group. The MNLF gain financial support from Libya, while the MILF struggle the International network such as Al-Qaeda. Even though this matter was always be rejected, especially after the MILF sign the Final Peace Agreement with the GRP Ibid., 41 Ibid., 49

50 Table 1 Financial Resource: No Mindanao Liberation Movement Financial Aid 1 Moro National Liberation Front Libya, Malaysia, and the OIC 2 Moro Islamic Liberation Front The Middle East, Pakistan, Al-Qaeda 3 Abu Sayyaf Group Ransoms / Al-Qaeda Resource: Surwandono, Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao) Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October (Page 42) (Unpublished) quoted from Asep Chaerudin s thesis So did with the GRP side especially in the Marcos era, conflict with the Muslim Mindanao community was used as one of the instruments to prospering the Luzon Island by exploiting the Mindanao natural resources, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Mindanao Island possesses huge numbers of natural resources and potentiality. It is the second largest Island in the Philippines archipelagos, which can accommodate huge numbers of populations for further years. Mindanao is also rich in natural resources, it has fertile soil and tropical weather that spread evenly along the Island which is very potential to the growing of tropical plants and agricultural products, it has enormous stock of mining materials that would take long to be finished, and it has skilled and trained human resources that use to process the whole of it. So it was also became one of the factors for the GRP to defend its authorization over the Mindanao Island. Also, by continuously conducting conflict, Marcos was hoping to gain the domestic support especially from the Luzon Island society. Other than that, by conflicting with the Muslim Mindanao, the GRP also gain aids and support from ally countries such as the Unite States. Constructivist conflict emerged when there is a primordial conflict added / 50

51 joined with an instrumentalist conflict. In this case, the constructivism was begin to appear when the conflicting parties then could not seceded themselves from primordial interests trade-offs and use the conflict for the economic and politics profit for the elites. The option to continue the conflict or having peace was very depend on the national and International construction. The MNLF options to settle the Mindanao conflict in the way of negotiation could not be separated from the big construction of International community that developed the peace principle. So did from the side of the GRP, the Ramos options to negotiation could not be separated from the big construction that the Mindanao conflict has spent enormous social, economic, and time costs. 42 So that the signing of Final Peace Agreement 1996 was happen. There were also researchers that have conducted study on separatism conflict with the view of primordial, instrumentalist, and constructivist point of view in their thesis. Researchers that used primordial point of view in their separatism conflict research were Anhar Gonggong, and Karl D. Jackson. Anhar Gonggong is a researcher that analyzed the separatism done by Kahar Muzakkar in the northern Celebes. On his research, he tend to analyze of relations between the role of the sirri passé custom embraced by the political elites as the precipating factors for the conflict of relations between the center military and district military. Political clash from the elites became the main factor to the emergence of political choice to separation Ibid., 43 Ibid., page 11 While, Karl D. Jackson researched the separatism movement which was done 51

52 by Kartosuwiryo. According to him, separatism appeared as the part of mobilization of an elite to the mass toward the political, economy, or cultural issues. He was tending to trace the fundamental factors of why Kartosuwiryo was rebelling. 44 Researchers that analyzed the separatism conflict from the instrumentalist point of view were Einer Wigen, Abu Syed Lingga, and Surwandono. These three people were analyzing the same separatism conflict in their thesis, the Mindanao conflict. Wigen saw the Mindanao conflict from the political point of view, that the Mindanao conflict could not be separated from the efforts of the actors to use the conflict in order to maximize the reach of their each other s interests. Conflict in the certain limit could be mobilized and reduced according to the most beneficial interest. 45 While Lingga tend to analyzed the conflict from the view of negotiation implementation to settlement. According to him, negotiation could not settle the Mindanao conflict because there were defects / imperfections dealing with the issues which would be negotiated, as the impact of the worry of the each conflicting parties toward the negotiation and the prospect after the negotiation. 46 In his dissertation, Surwandono analyzed the relations between the negotiation conducted with the continuing of conflict that remains happen between the Moro groups and the GRP. He develops the concept of politization of negotiation by Harold Nicholson. This concept was a crucial matter which caused the failure of a 44 Ibid., page Ibid., page Ibid., page14 52

53 negotiation. In this research, he analyzed why the negotiation that conducted in the aim of conflict resolution where the actors having fractionalization was often fail. 47 While researchers that saw the separatism conflict from the constructivist point of view in their research were Majul, Ferrer, Asep Chaerudin, Zulkipli Wadi,, and Prescillano D. Campodo and Saleem Adam. Cesar Adib Majul conducted analysis about factors that base the Bangsa Moro revolution in the decade 1970s. The thesis of Majul stated that the rebellion of Bangsa Moro in the Mindanao toward the GRP was based in the GRP s policy the tried to eliminate the Moro identity with the Philippines identity. So that the decrease of the conflict was very depend on the political will of the Philippines then the demand or action of the Moro society. 48 Julkipli Wadi, and Prescillano D. Campodo and Saleem Adam were researching the success of the FPA in reducing the conflict tension. They discussed about the success of the OIC mediation and effort in the negotiation between the GRP and the MNLF so that alleviate the conflict. 49 Mirriam Coronel Ferrer more to focused on the unresolved conflict that has been lasted long and has been treated in various way whether mediation, and negotiation to resolution. According to Ferrer, the unresolved conflict was caused by multi factorial reasons such as the disappointment of result of the development, the failure of the State to provide cohesive response, and the easy of choice to war. The thesis of Asep Chaerudin was approximately same with Ferer s. Chaerudin stated that 47 Ibid., 48 Ibid., page Ibid., 53

54 the entering of terrorist issue in the Mindanao conflict was also complicating the conflict and the settlement process. 50 Graphic 2 Matrix of Research about Conflict and Negotiation Conflict Perspective in the South East Asia and the Philippines Anhar Gonggong, Karl D. Jackson Primordially Abu Syed Lingga, Einer Wigen, Surwandono Instrumentalist Majul, Ferrer, Asep Chaerudin Zulkipli Wadi, dan Prescillano, Saleem Adam Constructivist Resource: Surwandono, Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao) Research Report. Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October 2007.(unpublished) C. The Stronger the Hawkish Group Another reason why, actually, it was very difficult to conduct negotiation was because there were stronger the hawkish groups than the dove groups. Hawkish group is a term in the political study for the group that tends to wanted to the continuation of the conflict until reached to a particular goal. While the dove group is a term that 50 Ibid., 54

55 represents the peaceful group that wanted to the resumed of the conflict and got peace. In fact, in this Mindanao conflict, there were more the hawkish groups then the dove groups. So however, it minimizes the possibility to the running of negotiations as well as peace Agreements. During the Mindanao conflict with the Government Republic of the Philippines until the signing of the Final Peace Agreement 1996, the dove group (the group that wanted peace) was lesser, actually, compared to the hawkish group (the group that wanted conflict). At that time, the groups that wanted peace and negotiation to be conducted were only the MNLF, the Philippines government, the OIC, and several Muslim countries that were being the mediator. While the groups that being disappointed by and rejected the Tripoli Agreement were, the Philippines military, the Church and Christian Filipino society, the MILF, and the Abu Sayyaf group. The Philippines military was considered the hawkish for, once again, according to this group, service the separatist movement means legitimating to its existence. What have been done by the GRP these time (settle the conflict by armed forces) were what should be did by a State, for a state have right-to-force toward such kind of separatist movement in its exclusive territory. So it would be better to just eliminate (militarily) the separatist groups and slaughter its entire member. This is proven by a report: The military s role as the partner in Martial Law and authoritarian rule was enhanced further by its key role in combating the twin armed conflicts that surged following regime change in 1972, 55

56 namely, a Maoist communist insurgency under the newly established Community Party of the Philippines, its armed wing (the New People Army) and its National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF); and ethnic separation led by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The use of coercion in governance was palpable in these conflicts, highlighting the military's function as the holder of the monopoly of the use of legitimate force in society, and exposing it to the dangers of committing human rights violations during internal security operations (ISO). 51 Several Minister in the Philippines government also disappointed by the Tripoli Agreement 1976, as reported as follows: May to December 1977 the 8th ICFM (in Tripoli) allow Misuari, for the first time, to address the conference. Ministers express disappointment over the outcome of negotiation. By this time, however, the improved image of the Philippines is working in its favour and the ICFM simply recommends that negotiations continue 52 In February 29, 1996, several government functionaries were rejected the meeting with Misuari for the discussion of new autonomous region. Several mayors and provincial governors in the south refuse to participate in a meeting with MNLF leader Nur Misuari to help prepare the region for autonomy. 53 The Church and Christian Philippino society also considered the hawkish, for them also rejected the Tripoli Agreement and wanted that the GRP remain fight against the Muslim Mindanao rebellion groups, perhaps until it is surrenders or defeated. These are proven by reports as follows: 51 Noel M. Morada & Teresa S. Tadem. (2007) Philippines Politics and Governance: An Introduction. Quezon. University of Philippines ( Page 395) 52 (accessed on: May, / 20:57) 53 UPI, 02/29/96 56

57 In the President Aquino administration, the Christian society was rejected the act for the Autonomous Registration of Muslim Mindanao (RA 6734). On August 1, an Organic Act for the Autonomous Registration of Muslim Mindanao (RA 6734) is signed as a bill by President Aquino. It is submitted to a plebiscite on November 9. The MNLF and right-wing Christian groups oppose the act while the OIC first condemns and then supports the act 54 In the era of President Ramos, the establishment of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development in 1996 was gained extreme response from churches and the Zamboanga Christian Congresswoman by holding mass demonstration. A Christian Congresswoman from Zamboanga is threatening to lead mass demonstrations to protest the establishment of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development. Church officials have also expressed concern over the role Muslim rebels will play in governing the region 55 As he arrives in Zamboanga, President Fidel Ramos is greeted by around 20,000 Christians protesting the peace agreement with the MNLF. Ramos is traveling in the region to garner support for the accord. 56 The Church also warn the President that the peace agreement with the Muslim Mindanao rebellion movements will led to a war by the Christian community. The Roman Catholic Church urges President Ramos to defer a peace agreement with the Moros, warning that its implementation could lead to war by the Christian majority in the area. 57 There were extreme gun battles and armed attacks done by Christian society / 54 (accessed on: July, / 15:53) 55 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 06/25/96 56 Reuters, 07/02/96 57 Ibid., 07/08/96 57

58 organization to express their disappointment and rejection. Several Christian gunmen were bombing a mosque after before there was a church bombing that left on 151 injured. Christian gunmen bomb a mosque in the south shortly after explosions in a Roman Catholic Church result in seven deaths and 151 injuries. Abu Sayyaf, also referred to as the MNLF Lost Command, is believed to be responsible. It opposes talks with the government. 58 These actions could be analyzed that, first, the establishment of the act and agreement toward the establishment of Mindanao autonomous region would transfer the Christian society existence that has been the major population in the Mindanao Island these times. Second, they considered that Bangsa Moro were abject and inferior which inadvisability to be struggled but should be just finished. While the MILF was considered the Hawkish for they also rejected the peace process and negotiation between the GRP and the MNLF. The establishment of the MILF was caused by the disappointment of the MNLF members such as Salamat Hashim and his friends, toward the Misuari s leadership and the result of the Tripoli Agreement 1976 which was not even closer to what they have expected these times. Since the first time, Bangsa Moro were struggling to separate themselves from the control over the Republic of the Philippines and intent to establish an Islamic Independent State. But negotiation conducted by Misuari and the GRP was result to the disappointing status of the Mindanao Island for the Muslim Mindanao society. 58 UPI, 12/27/93 58

59 This shakes the MNLF leadership, and a split emerges. In Jeddah on 26 December, Salamat Hashim announces an Instrument of Takeover of the MNLF leadership, a move supported by traditional leaders Rashid Lucman, Domacao Alonto and Salipada Pendatun. Misuari counters by expelling Hashim and charging him with treason. Arab supporters are equally divided: Egypt supports Hashim while Libya leans towards Misuari. Mediation by the OIC and Muslim World League fails. Not wishing to be used by the traditional politicians, Hashim transfers to Cairo and goes on to form the new MNLF, eventually the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 59 Armed contact with the GRP armed forces also happen several times. A clash between the MILF and Ituman, a Christian militia organization, results in the deaths of five Ituman members. 60 Battles between the MILF and government forces in North Cotabato result in 11 deaths. 61 For further, the MILF then continue its struggle to independent by its own, by strengthen the organization militarily, financially, and politically, to increase the bargaining position domestically and internationally. The Abu Sayyaf group was having the same intention with the MILF in its separation from the MNLF membership. It was started by group of people (Abdul Razaq Djaljalani which was then be the leader, was one of them) that also disappointed by the Misuari s leadership and the result of the Tripoli Agreement But Abu Sayyaf was a more unique in its movement. It was different from the MNLF and the MILF for it prefers to run its movement more radically and tend to be underground. This group s style of rebellion was in the form of foreign civilian 59 (accessed on: May, / 20:57) 60 Reuters, 12/13/95 61 UPI, 04/10/96 59

60 kidnapping, bank-raid, and church bombing, and it is believed to have relation with the Al-Qaeda. Around 200 Muslim rebels, reportedly members of Abu Sayyaf, raid three banks and attacks buildings and civilians in the town of Ipil on Mindanao Island. Authorities state that over 45 people are killed and another 40 injured 62 Gun battles between security forces and Abu Sayyaf rebels on Basilan Island result in the deaths of 15 rebels and 7 soldiers. Officials state that Abu Sayyaf has links with Ramzi Ahmed Yousef who is on trial in New York in connection with the bombing of the World Trade Center building Reuters, 04/05/95 63 ibid., 06/07/95 60

61 CHAPTER IV FACTORS THAT CAUSED THE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE MNLF TOOK PLACE One of the interesting points to study conflict and negotiation was lie on the politics circled it. As explained in the previous chapter, there are factors and reasons that difficult the running of negotiation and peace process between the GRP and the MNLF. These difficulties (experience of negotiation as a trap, the complexity of conflict, and the stronger the hawkish group) were actually enough to prove that the negotiation and peace process in the Mindanao was not yet ripe / ready to be effort. But in this case, in fact, the process of the FPA was actually being monopolized by the main actors of the both conflicting parties, Nur Misuari and President Ramos, for their own political interests. As an article said: Participation of a critical mass of constituent, from various sectors that have a stake in the conflict, was also absent in the process. Inputs from civil society groups have largely been ignored in the 1996 peace process. This showed that the parties to the signing of the agreement were oblivious of a critical factor in the success of a peace process: wide public participation. For a peace process to succeed, it must be a public peace process. 64 This was also agreed at least by Amina Rasul, by stating it in her presentation: 64 Surwandono, Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao) Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October 2007.(unpublished) 61

62 The Politics of Disagreement: Philippine Congress had minimal involvement in the negotiations, but had a central role in its implementation. Congressmen opposed the Interim Agreement. The Senate agreed to support the agreement only if amendments would be introduced, which dilute the powers and autonomy of institutions to be set up under Phase I of the agreement. Politicians, led by Senators, even filed a 54-page petition asking the Supreme Court to nullify the Agreement. 65 So at this point, we will go to discuss about what was actually happen between these two actors so that they finally sign the Final Peace Agreement In this chapter, the writer will try to answer the question using the ripeness theory by William Zartman, which has been explained in the first chapter. Based on the theory, the signing of the Final Peace Agreement was finally took place because there were Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) and the Mutually Enticing Opportunity (MEO). A. Mutually Hurting Stalemate According to the theory, MHS is a situation where the both conflicting parties were already stuck and could not find another way to betterment except for having negotiation. In this case, why then the FPA was finally singed were, actually, because the main actors of the both conflicting parties, Nur Misuari (from the MNLF) and President Ramos (from the GRP) were experiencing various declines. If they rejected the proposal to negotiation from the third parties (the OIC and several Muslim Countries), they will got collapsed and will no longer have any position as well as support in the domestic and International world. The facts were as follows: 65 Amina Rasul Presentasion_pdf 62

63 Why then Misuari agreed to sign the FPA was because his position and support were in danger, he was experiencing various declines and pressures from various parties. If he did not do the negotiation, he would get collapse and lose what he has got these times. Misuari s popularity started to decrease after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement Many of its members were then withdraw their support from the MNLF caused by the disappointment over the Misuari s leadership and the result of the Tripoli Agreement. Many of the MNLF supporters were then on the contrary transferred their support from the MNLF to the MILF and other Moro liberation groups such as Abu Sayyaf. Sources indicate that the MNLF now has a force of 14,000 compared to around 21,000 in 1977 (Madale 1984, 185). The drop is likely due to the creation of other Moro groups. 66 Table 2 Basis Region of the MILF Resorce: Commo Carlos L Agustin, Report on The State of Radicalization in Muslim Communities in the Philippines, Regional Conference on The Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Southeast Asia, 1 December (accessed on: July, / 15:53) 63

64 Table 3 The Basis Region of Abu Sayyaf Province/City % Affected Identified Identified Firearms Barangays Members Sulu 46% Basilan 24% Zamboanga City 18% Tawi-Tawi Average 33% Resorce: Commo Carlos L Agustin, Report on The State of Radicalization in Muslim Communities in the Philippines, Regional Conference on The Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Southeast Asia, 1 December 2005 These tables also indicate that the position of the MNLF was even more decreasing, while the other Moro Groups (Abu Sayyaf and the MILF) increased in term of basis region and, automatically, influence. During the implementation of Marcos economic strategy toward the Mindanao Island, Marcos also promotes and exploits the division happen among the Bangsa Moro by stated that the MNLF was also the representation of Communist Party just like the NPA, the aim was to discredit the MNLF image in the Islamic and International world. This thing was then also played a role in the declining of MNLF and Misuari image as the leader. Marcos also tries to promote and exploit divisions among the Moros. In the early and mid-1970s, for example, the government tries to discredit the MNLF by focusing on Misuari s Maoist tendencies'. There were minimal links between the MNLF and the communist New Peoples Army and the MNLF generally distanced itself from the NPA. 67 Misuari s position over his governorship was also criticized. He led the MNLF with the hope of an independent Muslim state, 67 May 1988, 56 64

65 but with the influence of the OIC, he was left with a shaky autonomy. He was hailed as an instrumental figure in bringing an end to 24 years of war in Although considered a great leader by many Muslims, his term as Governor of the autonomous region was heavily criticized and conditions in Mindanao did not significantly improve. 68 Pressures to conduct negotiation also came from the third parties which have being the main back up of the MNLF. The OIC, Libya, and Malaysia, were insist Misuari to run peace talks and negotiation with the GRP, if he was rejected it, the OIC and those Muslim Countries would withdraw their financial and military assistance from the MNLF and would allocated it for another liberation Group. MNLF also gain serious pressure if it s remained to choose to confrontation. Very serious pressure came from the OIC, Libya, and Malaysia, these three actors was the strongest back up from the MNLD side in the Internationalization of Mindanao conflict. The three of them asked Misuari to start to run peace and diplomatic option in resolving the Mindanao conflict. If Misuari remained to choose to conflict then the probability to International support toward the MNLF struggle would be decrease or even lose or overflowed to another organization such as the BMLO. 69 The GRP also insist Misuari to conduct negotiation by persuasive approach. That the willing of Misuari to conducts negotiation would give him a governor position in the ARMM. Misuari would be joined in the candidacy of regional election for the ARMM by using the President s political party. MNLF leader Nur Misuari states that he will seek the governorship of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao in elections this 68 Surwandono, Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao) Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October (unpublished) 69 Ibid., page 48 65

66 September. He will run under a coalition with President Ramos Lakas Party. The MNLF leader says his decision signals the return of the entire MNLF to the constitutional fold. 70 and in the final phase, no less than the MNLF Chairman took the radical step of accepting the GRP offer to run as candidate for ARMM Governor in the 1996 regional elections, paving the way for a political compromise that led to the signing of the Agreement. 71 In 1986, Misuari was reported to gives up the demand for independence after popular pressures. This was analyzed as the pressures given by the third Parties and also the GRP. Pressure from the OIC and others does lead Marcos to try to negotiate a deal. But a lack of commitment from Marcos and the idealistic demands of the MNLF lead to the breakdown of talks. 72 The second Bangsa Moro Congress is held. Reports reveal that Misuari concedes to popular pressure and gives up the demand for independence. 73 The pressure from the mediators which strongly gave an option to the MNLF as the only representation of the Muslim Mindanao in the middle of numbers of Mindanao liberation groups was narrowing the MNLF choice. If the MNLF remain in conflict with the GRP, there was tendency that the International support toward the MNLF would be transferred to another actor Reuters, 07/12/96 71 Iribani, Abraham: (2006) Give Peace a Chance: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Talks. Magbassa Kita Foundation / The Philippines Council for Islam and Democracy. The Philippines Press ( page 337) 72 May 1988, Ibid., 1988, Surwandono, Dinamika Konflik dan Negosiasi (studi: Ketidakefektifan Implemetasi Final Peace Agreement Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik di mindanao) Research Report, Social Political Science Faculty, University Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, October (page 48) (unpublished) 66

67 While from the President Ramos side, the declines were in the form of his position as a President, where has was considered to be fail, or done little, in his job to making improvements in the Country. If Ramos was rejected the negotiation, he would get collapsed and threaten his legitimacy as a President. Ramos jargon in the Presidency election was the economic betterment and development, but an article in the reviewing Ramos presidency by International Woman s Right stated; Despite the promise of "Philippines 2000" and four years of macroeconomics growth, a greater percentage of Filipinos live in poverty than in the other countries of Southeast Asia. President Ramos' liberalizing and deregulating measures have been attacked by many groups as "anti-poor." The struggle between social welfare and wealth-creation pervades every political and economic debate in the Philippines. 75 Corruption and nepotism were also remaining in the Ramos administration. Faced with the task of solving the problems Aquino had failed to solve, Ramos had little success. In economic policy he attacked the monopolies and cartels, especially in telecommunications, yet allegations of corruption and nepotism were leveled at his own government. 76 The Estrada s assassination effort linked by Ramos s Anti-Crime Commission activities in the aim to alleviate corruption, to realize order and stating law, was then on the contrary; invite the International attention toward the acute law and order problems in the Country. The President s new law-enforcement in combating crime as the prior focused was even rejected by the Congress for it was feared to be the 75 (accessed on: June, 14, :04) Ramos was implementing an IMF - World Bank prescribed reform program, called "Philippines 2000," which aims to convert the country's agrarian-based economy into an industrial, market-driven one. The government is attempting to attract foreign investment through legal and fiscal reforms, keeping wages and union activity low, and expanding export processing zones, with garments and electronics constituting fifty percent of Philippine exports (accessed on: June, 14, 2008 / 21:19) 67

68 degeneration of Marcos authoritarian. Such initiatives, however, were not successful. In Apr an assassination attempt on Vice-Pres. Estrada, linked to his anti-crime activities, focused international attention on the country s acute law and order problems. Kidnappings for ransom had become a regular occurrence, with the security forces themselves believed to be involved. Aware that the law and order problem could imperil foreign investment, Pres. Ramos made the fight against crime a priority. However, Congress rejected a tough new law-enforcement bill in early 1996 as too draconian and a regression to the authoritarian days of Marcos. 77 In 1997, Ramos decided to amend the constitution arranging about the onlyone-time presidency position in the Country. This statement drew controversies from various parties even before it was run, because Ramos was worried to be an authoritarian, just like Marcos. This action was automatically declined Ramos position and support from the Philippines political life. Ramos Popularity fell somewhat in 1997 when it appeared he would seek a second term by amending the country s constitution, which expressly forbids a presidential incumbent from serving more than a single term of office. This was a sensitive issue for most Filipinos, since Marcos suspended the constitution for the same reason in After opposition from the Supreme Court, the Catholic Church and many others, Ramos backed down and ruled out seeking an extension of his term. 78 Opponents of charter change say the amendments threaten the Philippines' young democracy by setting a bad precedent, opening the democratic constitution to other changes, and distracting the government at a time when it needs to respond to an Asia-wide currency crisis Ibid., 78 Ibid., 79 (accessed on: June, / 22:03) 68

69 The declines of Ramos position was even worsened by a media report which discover that actually, several bombings were launched in order to threaten the protesters of the amendment. However, the amendment was undone. Businesses, media outlets and Sin's office have received dozens of bomb threats in recent weeks in what is widely believed to be attempts to frighten people from attending the protest. 80 At the first time elected, Ramos was trusted to be able to resolve the issues in the Country, including the Mindanao conflict, for he was manner more proactively in resolving the Mindanao conflict during the Aquino s government. But years further, the popularity of Ramos was decline sharply and significantly even reached to the zero level. A national survey was showing it as follows: Table 4 Resource: Philippines.ppt 80 Ibid., 69