Britta Busse, Alexandra Hashem-Wangler, Jochen Tholen University of Bremen, Institute Labour and Economy (Germany)

Transcription

1 Two Worlds of Participation Young People and Politics in Germany Draft for consideration in the Sociological Review, Monograph series, issue: Pilkington, Hilary & Pollock, Gary (Eds.): Radical Futures? Youth, Politics and Activism in Contemporary Europe, Sociological Review, Wiley Blackwell, Chichester/UK, , July 2015 Britta Busse, Alexandra Hashem-Wangler, Jochen Tholen University of Bremen, Institute Labour and Economy (Germany) Dr. Britta Busse and Dr. Alexandra Hashem-Wangler are researchers at the University of Bremen Institute Labour and Economy, Universitaetsallee 21-23, Bremen (Germany). Dr. JochenTholen is the chair of the Department for Economy and Finance in the same institute. Please direct all correspondence to Dr. JochenTholen Support by the 7 th Framework Programme by the European Union (project: MYPLACE) is gratefully acknowledged.

2 Introduction Declining electoral participation and declining membership of political parties, especially among young people, together with the growing complexity of politics, point to the fact that citizens involvement in political processes is changing. This seems far away from the optimal shape of a representative democracy, which aims at involving people in policy-forming processes and promoting civic competencies (Mill 2008/1861).The acceleration of economic development as a result of globalization and the digital revolution, as well as an increasing lack of democratic legitimization of major political decision-making institutions (European Central Bank etc.) have led to doubts about a sustainable future for democracy. As a result, a continuous discussion ranging from a crisis of democracy to promising new forms of democracy in a third stage of modernity is packing libraries worldwide with pertinent literature. Starting with those who express a pessimistic view on the fate of democracy, Croizier, Huntington and Watanuki (1975) argue that democratic governments in the industrial world have lost their ability to operate, overwhelmed by the problems they confront. Nearly 40 years later this pessimistic view has been reiterated by Zakaria (2013), who states that the last four decades have been lost to the challenge of adapting western democracies to the demands of reflexive modernity. In this regard, the danger to western democracies would not be sudden death but sclerosis. Crouch (2004) sharpens Habermas discussion on problems of legitimation in the era of late capitalism (1973) and focuses his argument on the growing power of global business. He sees post-democracy as characterised by disinterest in widespread citizen involvement in politics. Streek (2013) strengthens this line of argument by pointing to the failure of democracy in the global financial crisis from 2008, which he sees as an outcome of economic neo-liberalism, accompanied by a growing gap between rich and poor. Coming from this, the emergence of political authority beyond the nation state lead to a shift within the set of established justifications of legitimate authority (Zürn 2013: 10). In other words, more and more democracies empower political institutions which are not truly democratic (like, for instance, the European Central Bank). Another argument within this strand of discussion highlights a democratic paradox (Blühdorn 2013). On the one hand, the process of modernity promotes the individualization and emancipation of subjects and in this respect satisfies citizens demands for freedom, self-determination and selfrealization. On the other hand, reflexive modernity (Beck, Giddens & Lash 1996) is undermining the principles of democracy: international integration and complex procedures increasingly render democratic procedures ineffective and even counter-productive. According to Embacher (2009) all 1

3 these trends lead not only to annoyance with politics but have far-reaching consequences for general perceptions of democratic systems and public policy. Contrary to his observation, however, a rather idealized understanding of democracy prevails in much public and academic discussion. Throughout history, democracy has always been considered an ideal, uniting those who govern with those who are governed (Rosanvallon 2008). Here, the natural distance between the two has often been overlooked. This leads to misunderstandings and disappointments. Considering the history of democracy, Nolte (2011: 8) argues that democracy has always questioned itself, reinvented itself and creatively extended itself. Therefore, a more realistic discussion about the opportunities and limits of liberal democracy is necessary. In order to prevent wholesale adoption of the crisis-thesis, a growing number of scholars emphasize the fact that today s democracy offers many more tools and possible forms of intervention than traditional representative democracy. During the last decades, for a limited number of politically active citizens, opportunities to be politically engaged beyond political parties have widened. This is a product of a network society (Castells 1997) and is deepened by the digital revolution. The sociology of modernization (Smith, Thomas & Holmwood 2013), which is picking up Bakhtin s concept of dialogism (1981) and Habermas theory of communicative action (1981), describes more options for political participation by non-elites. This bottom-up approach also includes the concept of liberal democracy as driven and organized by social movements (Hardt & Negri 2013). Considering these two strands of opinion, it can be assumed that decreasing engagement in traditional political organizations and young people s indifference towards political parties do not necessarily indicate a freezing of the system of parliamentary democracy, but, more likely, activate its dynamics and its further development beyond the area of institutional participation, resulting in a multiple democracy (Nolte 2011). This would include all so-called alternative forms of engagement, voluntary work in social and political matters and citizens action groups, that is, organisations and groups operating outside the area of direct political institutions. However, within these two strands of post-democracy discourse a third scenario of political (dis)engagement becomes apparent. The constitution of a parliamentary democracy fosters two worlds of participation. There are tendencies towards favouring professionalized participation by citizens. In this context, the existing political system, the authorities and the state, face the challenge of involving young people with all their diverse forms of engagement into decision-making processes. This task is difficult as the characteristics of a functioning parliamentary governmental system the 2

4 relatively well-organized parties, qualified political representatives and disciplined party fractions within the parliament differ considerably from (not only young) people s understandings of politics and political engagement as practised in alternative and less hierarchical forms. Examining these trends is important as it allows us to estimate whether the parliamentary governmental system can strengthen its existing (weak) ties to the second world of alternative political participation or whether the current system of political participation will develop entirely towards an elite project. But here a limitation of our arguments comes up: Only a minority of young people is politically active, and an even smaller part of young people are involved in new social movements (della Porta & Rucht 2013). Even during the zenith of spectacular political activities, e.g. the Außerparlamentarische Opposition-APO (= extra-parliamentary opposition) from 1968 and the then successive waves of social movements in West Germany, only 10 percent and less of all students in West Germany participated in the demonstrations (Rucht 2008). Generally, only 10 to 15 percent of a cohort of young people develop a political group identity, which shapes the identity of another 40 to 50 percent of this cohort. The remaining 40 percent are not influenced by this, they live in their own world or struggle to survive for social reasons (Hurrelmann & Albrecht 2014). But especially for this reason it is essential to integrate at least these 60 percent of young people into political participation processes. In Germany s history, liberal democracy has now lasted not more than two generations. Introduced by the Western allies after 1945 in the Western part of the country and enlarged after 1990 to the Eastern part, democracy has become a major foundation of German policy and society. This paper shows that the existing German political culture fosters parallel worlds where, on the one side, there are state regulated, traditional forms of engagement with its qualified members, and, on the other side, there are young people (at least a considerable part of the age cohort) who prefer to engage in projects and institutions that display a form of self-organization that is distant from conventional political engagement. Moreover, even though there are plenty of state-sponsored service points in Germany that offer information, advice and qualification for young people s alternative project ideas 1, our results show that there is a discrepancy between the reach and thus the effect in political matters of alternative forms of participation and forms of engagement undertaken by qualified members in Germany. Traditional vs. Alternative Forms: Are They Integrated into Decision-Making Processes? Recent debate among German political scientists and sociologists focuses on the concern that young people tend more and more to distance themselves from politics. Surveys show that their interest in 3

5 politics has decreased. For instance, the longitudinal Shell Youth Study (Shell Deutschland Holding 2010) has continuously gathered data on political interest among young people and displays changes during the last 30 years. Table 1 shows that the relatively high interest in politics during the 1980s declined until the first years of the new century. The decline amounts to more than one third of the starting figure. Table 1 about here Although in the last decade (since 2002) interest in politics has slightly increased and seems to stabilize, the fact that not even half of young people are interested in politics obliges both politicians and political scientists to explain this. Is it symptomatic of a generation of young people who maintain little engagement with politics? While Table 2 indicates that both gender and parental social status have an impact on young people developing an interest in political issues, it is primarily the age factor that has to be put forward in the context of our topic: the higher the age group, the more interest in politics is discernible. Table 2 about here Similarly, research on the voting behaviour of young people in Germany proves that voter turnout increases with age (Schäfer2013).Young people vote less frequently than older people. Typically, voting behaviour appears as an S-shaped profile in the life cycle. First-time voters use the newly gained right to vote relatively often. But during the second and third election, thus in their mid-20s, the participation rate decreases (Schäfer 2013). The reasons for this are often explained by family situations and increased geographical mobility during the education and training life-phase (Eilfort 1994). German general elections in 2009 confirmed this trend. Young persons aged 21 to24 had the lowest turnout (59 per cent). Similarly, for young people between25 and 29 (61 per cent), voter turnout was significantly below the average. 2 The notion of youth apathy and disengagement is strengthened by recent research on forms of popular engagement. The EUYOUPART youth survey 2004 shows that alternative forms of participation are more attractive for young people than traditional formal political engagement in a youth section of a party or in a trade union group organizations that are characterized by clear hierarchical structures and exclusive membership. Almost half of all young people interviewed (49 per cent) had been or were members of a sports club, followed by cultural associations (25 per cent) 4

6 and religious/church related organisations (17 per cent). Only nine per cent were members of the youth organisation of a political party or trade union. In line with this turning away from formal membership in traditional organisations, participation in protest events as an alternative has gained increasing popularity among young people (Rucht 2011). In Germany this form of engagement is transferred to children already in school, where classes are regularly encouraged by their teachers to take part in protests against cutbacks in education or in protests relating to other local matters. The Shell Youth Study 2010 endorses this trend: 44 per cent of all young people (12-25 years) were at least probably willing to take part in a protest meeting and 45 per cent of these respondents said that they had already taken part in such meetings (Shell Deutschland Holding 2010). However, the discourse of youth apathy and disengagement from politics typically relies on quantitative methodologies and orthodox hegemonic notions of politics (Manning 2010: 2). This conceptualization that privileges institutionalised politics has been described by Henn, Weinstein and Wring (2002: 170) as conventional political science that equates interest in electoral politics with knowledge and interest in politics in general. In other words, this model takes institutions as its focus and implies that engagement in traditional political organisations is the real politics. There is a vivid scientific discourse dealing with these hegemonic notions of politics and analysing alternative forms of engagement. Gaiser, de Rijke and Spannring (2010), for instance, refer to data from the DJI Youth Survey 2003 and distinguish three forms of participation: 1) Traditional clubs, associations, and organisations, 2) Other formal groups (NGOs), 3) Activities that are temporary and/or situational. These more detailed classifications contribute to a broadening of the term political activity, so that even sporadic or situational youth engagement can be assigned to a political context. Harris, Wyn and Younes (2010) also address the changing nature of participation for young people and stress that growing engagement in alternative forms is the result of barriers (perceiving politicians as reluctant to listen to youth, inappropriate political language, political structures that marginalize young people) that hinder young people from taking part in formal politics. Similarly, Riley, Morey and Griffin (2010) criticize top-down models of political participation that fail to reflect the diverse ways that young people act upon social and political issues and include partying as a form of political consumerism. Yet, these studies even though aimed at disclosing emerging forms of public and private engagement and stressing the political character of alternative forms of engagement do not discuss 5

7 the inter-dependencies between these two forms of engagement. The mere fact of knowing that there are informal or alternative forms of political engagement does not tell us about their actual integration into democratic processes, or whether they are political. Furthermore, there is little research on the exchange or cooperation between young people who are active in an alternative group and those engaged in a more traditional formal organisation. These shortcomings lead us to two questions. What is political engagement? Can any form of social participation be considered as political? The next section, referring to our new empirical data, offers some answers. 1 For instance the Servicestelle Jugendbeteiligung ( or the Zentrum für Eigenständige Jugendpolitik ( Deutschland/461d10/), last access on The trend is not limited to Germany, as research in other countries like the UK and Australia has demonstrated that compared to older people young people tend to be less interested in formal politics, to vote, to be a political party member or to display high political knowledge (Furlong & Cartmel 2007; Harris, Wyn & Younes 2010). Read the full article in: Pilkington, Hilary & Pollock, Gary (Eds.): Radical Futures? Youth, Politics and Activism in Contemporary Europe, Sociological Review, Wiley Blackwell, Chichester/UK, , July