Draft please do not cite without the authors permission. Political Parties in South Korea: The Role of Linkage and Local Party Staff

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1 Heike Hermanns & Cho Young-hee Dept of Politics and International Relations, Inha University, Incheon Korean Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Seoul Paper prepared for the 21 IPSA World Congress of Political Science in Santiago, Chile, July 12-16, Draft please do not cite without the authors permission Political Parties in South Korea: The Role of Linkage and Local Party Staff Introduction Political parties in South Korea have a relatively short history. Although first proto-parties were formed towards the end of the 19 th century, their development was cut short by Japanese colonisation in After liberation in 1945, a myriad of parties were formed but the party spectrum consolidated soon into a dichotomous system: a ruling party supporting a dictator and opposition forces. Under the presidencies of Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, the ruling party served as a support group for the leader, while the opposition formed an often uneasy alliance against the ruling party. This system prevailed until democratisation in the 1980s. Political parties could only begin to work without state interference after the inauguration of the 6 th Republic in However, parties do not develop in a vacuum but are deeply influenced by historical and cultural factors. This affects their ability to function in contemporary Korea. Indeed, political parties have been identified as one of the problems of Korean democratic consolidation (Park 2006; Steinberg and Shin 2006). The nature of Korean political parties is subject to intense theoretical debate, as Korean parties do not easily fit the typologies identified in the literature on political parties (e.g. Kim 2001; Kim 2003; Kwak 2001). These studies generally focus on parties at the national level. By using an empirical, qualitative approach, this research project chooses a different concept to explore the nature of Korean parties. We aim to place linkage - the connections of parties with citizen at the centre of the research and focus on local level politics, where linkage is experienced most directly. Following Janda and Colman (1998) the study looks at party organisation to assess its effect on party performance. In the context of Korean parties, this is a neglected area of research and should provide further insights into the nature of political parties. The analysis of political parties is often based on parties in established democracies in Europe and Northern America. Nevertheless, these theoretical models have been applied to other regions (e.g. Dix 1992; Mainwaring 1999). In the mass parties prevailing in Europe in the 20 th century parties provided linkage though membership. In Korea, mass parties have not (yet?) developed for a number of reasons that are explored below in detail. Instead, electoral or cadre parties are a more suitable description. Parties have formed around prominent leaders and their regional home area, rather than around programmatic or ideological bases. Being highly personalised, corruption cases are frequent and local grassroot organisations remain underdeveloped. This was aggravated when in 2004 local party offices were declared illegal to avoid further corruption. This ban further weakened the developed of linkages and party bases across the country. Party activities are currently Page 1

2 focuses on national and regional offices, while at the grass-root level supporters gather around prominent party officials. Does this lead to further personalisation and weaker linkages? We aim to shed light on this by conducting in-depth interviews with local party staff, who are continuing their work despite the closure of local offices. This should inform the discussion on linkage and the development trajectory of Korean parties. The first section of the paper looks at the literature on types of political parties and the role of identifying linkage in this context. This is followed by a brief review of the literature on South Korean political parties as well as local politics. The final section in lieu of a conclusion introduces our plans for research and the contribution we are hoping to make. As the research project is still in the preparatory stages at the time of writing, we can only present our outline without any results yet but we hope to gather fruitful comments and suggestions on our methodology. Types of political parties The role of political parties in a democracy is undisputed (Schattschneider 1942: 1). Regularised and institutionalised political parties are considered to be a vital part of the political process as they provide a framework for stable patterns of inter-party competition (Diamond 1999; Duverger 1954; Dix 1992; Mainwaring 1999). Party structures are understood and assessed primarily in term of modes of internal representation and accountability. A competitive party system connects citizens to the democratic process by providing points of identification and shared values. Parties aggregate and articulate citizens interests and provide citizens with opportunities for democratic participation. Parties identify and integrate political actors (recruitment function), ultimately aiming at placing party members in government and then to retain power. Parties play dual role as state actors and societal organisations, acting as intermediaries between government and citizens (Satori 1976). Kirchheimer (1966) described political parties as transmission belts : they connect citizens with government officials. Party members serve as sensors in society and provide feedback on citizens opinions and grievances. Local party offices select and aggregate citizens interest and beliefs and incorporate them into the internal negotiation and decisionmaking process, leading to the preparation of party policies (Epstein 1967: ). National party offices in turn can use their party networks to transmit government policies and influence public opinion by conveying their reaction and interpretation of policies. Parties are also an essential instrument to hold politicians accountable outside election periods. These connections are referred to as linkage, which is explored in detail below. A stable party system clarifies programmatic representation and the range of governing options, thus providing considerable structure to democratic politics (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). The emergence of institutionalised parties is therefore seen as a key development in democratic politics (Satori 1976). Party institutionalisation refers to the process by which a party acquires stability and values, and becomes established in organisational terms as well as in patterns of behaviour and attitudes. 1 Janda (1980: 19-27) develops a number of indicators for institutionalisation, namely the age of parties, organisational continuity, leadership competition, and the stability of parties in legislative and elections. Panebianco (1988) also stresses organisational elaboration as a key marker of party institutionalisation, including a stable and formalised internal structure, leadership succession, and mass membership. This includes a tangible presence amongst voters in the form of branch offices. Mass membership and partisanship are another indicator for party system institutionalisation (Dalton and Weldon 2007). The stability and routinisation of intraorganisational patterns as well as organisational independence, both from the initial leaders as well as financial backers, are thus indicators of institutionalisation (Levitzky 1998). An institutionalised party develops strong roots in society and its own distinct culture or value system beyond its initial leader and their personal charisma. The more a party is based purely on charisma, the more transient it will prove, as charisma is antithetical to party 1 Many studies are informed by Huntington s characterisation of institutionalisation as the process by which organisations and procedures acquire value and stability (Huntington 1968: 12). Page 2

3 institutionalisation (Janda 1980; Panebianco 1988). Organisationally underdeveloped parties play only a minor role in the political process while the role of individual politicians increases. This trend is also evident in mature democracies, due to technological developments: politicians can reach voters through the mass media, without the need of party structures and organisations, leading to the increased personalisation of politics and changes in party organisation. The theoretical work on political parties largely focuses on Europe where parties display greater organisational strength and political salience (Katz 1997; Mair 1994). 2 Duverger (1954) and others think of parties in terms of the European mass party of integration, as prevalent in the mid-20 th century. The mass-party model describes a party with a large fee-paying membership and organisational hierarchy, often based on a particular ideology that appeals to a section of the electorate (in particular class). Class-based parties ideally have representatives from the class they are representing (although not in all countries). Social- and value based parties tend to develop stronger relationships with their supporters as party members and leaders share similar opinions and values. These connections are not only indicators of stronger linkage but also of overall party system development, and the strength and stability of party systems. Mass parties develop large mass-membership bases, as well as a bureaucratic apparatus and inner-party hierarchies in order to deal with their members. In addition, mass parties often form subsidiary units with special appeal to groups such as women and youth, to extend its reach and appeal to socially diverse constituencies. Mass parties also maintain close relations (organisational linkage) with allied or ancillary institutions engaged in distinct but related spheres of social life (such as trade unions and religious organisations). In the mid-20 th century, not all parties follow the characteristics of the mass party model. Duverger distinguishes between modern mass parties and 'old' cadre parties, which are based on informal groupings of a few political notables. Cadre parties survive in some countries (most notably the LDP in Japan). Gunther and Diamond (2003) describe this type of party as a confederation of notables who gather support based on their personality, a geographic area or certain functions, such as being a prominent local leader. They lack a distinctive party programme or ideology and are thinly organised, as notables tend to campaign individually with the overall goal of securing power at national level. Grossly simplifying, programmatic parties want to win an election to implement programme while electoral parties offer a programme to win an election (to paraphrase Downs [1957: 137]). Programmatic parties seek benefits for the collective good whereas vote-and-office-seeking parties aim at securing personal benefits, or in simpler terms: parties of principle versus parties of patronage (Neumann 1956: 400). Once in power, programmatic parties often soften their plans in order to appeal to a greater share of voters and thus win re-election. Party behaviour thus changes: they focus more at gaining and retaining office than pursuing their specific programmes. The party organisation concentrates on election campaigns, based on hierarchical chains of interpersonal relationships of a quasi-feudal variety, in which relatively durable patterns of loyalty are linked with the exchange of services and obligations. (Gunther and Diamond 2003: 176). While mass parties are characterised by large membership bases, cadre parties are generally organisationally thin. In the years since the publication of Duverger s seminal work, the heyday of the mass party has passed (Kirchheimer signalled the demise of the mass party as early as 1966). Ideological differences have declined and the difference between party programmes have become less pronounced. Focusing on electoral gain, parties increasingly become catch-all parties (Kirchheimer 1966). The emergence of electoral parties is detrimental to both ideological principles and inner-party democracy. It also weakens their appeal to core constituencies and thus affects party affiliation and identification. Parties with weak 2 Furthermore, the conclusions are largely drawn from parliamentarian systems while the effects of a presidential system on party development are often overlooked (Samuels 2002). In the latter system, parties are driven by different behavioural and organisational incentives, as they aim first and foremost at winning the executive branch and not legislative seats. Page 3

4 programmatic foundations fail to offer clear policy choices. Voters thus often do not form an affiliation with political parties, resulting in electoral volatility and instability. Partisanship is found to be directly related to the commitment to democracy, as it leads to greater support of democracy (Shin and Tusalem 2008). The strength of partisanship also affects electoral and non-electoral participation: citizens who are feeling closer to a party are also more likely to participate in elections and politics in general (Chu and Huang 2008). Party organisation is affected by the changes in political behaviour and attitudes. With the growth of bureaucratic hierarchies and the rise of professional politicians, the role of individual members is downgraded (Panebianco 1988). As they have fewer members, the newer party types are less representative in terms of social and opinion representation. Once parties enjoy longer periods in office, their internal organisational structure and focus also change. Elected representatives and central offices gain in importance while party members lose influence. Incorporating these changes, Katz and Mair (1994) suggest disaggregating party organisations into three elements to accommodate for the changes in importance and influence of different aspects of party organisation (Figure 1). The first is the party in public office, the party organisation in government and parliament. Here, one can find political entrepreneurs, politicians involved in legislative politics. The second is the party on the ground, the membership organisation while the third refers to the party in central office, which is organisationally different from the party in public office. Mass parties in particular have developed party hierarchies that are distinct from the party in government. The latter are dominated by party bureaucrats who often favour different policies than politicians. Mair (1994) notes that in many countries, parties on the ground are weakening while the other two components are gaining influence. With the growing importance of (national) office, party structures at the local level fall in decline. In addition, central offices are more likely to communicate directly with members, rather than through local offices. This development is incorporated in the model of inner-party relationships below, representing the relationships between the party in central office, the party in public office and the party at ground level. To Katz and Mair s model, we have added an additional distinction, separating the party at ground level into party staff and members to account for the increasing marginalisation of party staff at the lowest level. The thickness of the lines is intended to represent the strength of the connections. Figure 1: Inner-party relationships (adapted from Katz and Mair [1994]) Party in central office Party in public office staff members Thicker lines indicate greater influence Party on the ground The decline of the mass parties has prompted the identification of new models of competitive elite democracy. This is a central theme in the discourse of party models mostly focusing on parties in office and the central organisations. As parties increasingly concentrate on gaining office and staying in power, they focus shifts from representing specific interests and Page 4

5 ideologies to winning elections. These electoralist parties come in a number of forms, but they share their focus on elections and thin organisational structure. These parties largely exist only for elections when they spring to life. They utilise modern campaign techniques, especially the mass media and rely on professionals to carry out these campaigns (Gunther and Diamond 2003). Mass parties have moved in this direction in recent years, too, becoming catch-all parties (Kirchheimer 1966). In the effort to appeal to as many voters as possible, party programmes become weaker and more generalised, while personalities are stressed more. In extreme cases, the party leader s personality can become the main selling point of the party (e.g. Berluscioni s Forza Italia). Organisationally, the party in public office generally professionals - dominates central office and marginalises the party on the ground. Parties can survive with minimal links with voters, as they represent rather than activate citizens. Citizens in turn have deserted parties in increasing numbers of the last decades, leading to further debate about the end of political parties (e.g. Dalton and Wattenberg 2001). In the perspective of party elites who need to connect to voters, their own membership organisation is just one of several ways which they can use to establish linkage to relevant sections of the electorate. Politicians can reach out to their voters directly, without the need of party organisations as intermediaries, by using the mass media, in particular television. As public opinion polls have become much easier to conduct, media and the political class both pay more attention to the results, while the value of input from party members declines, another indicator for increase in direct linkage (Poguntke 2002). Politics in many countries have come under criticism for becoming more populist as leaders worry about public opinion poll results and their personal popularity rather than pursuing long-term policies. This, in turn, increases electoral volatility. Parties tend to achieve better and more regular election results if they strengthen their organisational anchorage in society and create lasting connections with voters. Parties in newly democratising countries are thus welladvised to create such anchorage. However, many newer democracies are unlikely to develop mass parties as the internal socio-economic and political conditions are not conducive. Traditional models of party organisation fail to capture developments in these countries. Over the last twenty years, a number of models have been suggested to incorporate these changes. New models include cartel (Katz and Mair 1995), electoral-professional (Panebianco 1988), and business-firm parties (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999). Based on their analysis of established party systems in European countries, Katz and Mair (1995) introduce a new type, cartel party, to describe the changes state funding has brought to party activities. Cartel parties are evolving from mass parties when they begin to seek to perpetuate themselves to gain access to public finance as their main source of income, leading to the interpenetration of party and state. In order to restrict access to these limited resources, parties aim at the limitation of party competition. Cartel parties focus on the national office and neglect party organisations. The central party s relationship with other party organisations changes as members become less important as a source of income and support. Local offices are likely to be marginalised but individual members are still valued and included in party decision-making albeit mostly through depersonalised methods such as postal ballots and mailing lists. Panebianco (1988) contrasts mass-bureaucratic parties with electoral-professional parties. Many of the attributes of electoral and catch-all parties mentioned above apply to this model, but Panebianco also adds the professional moniker. This refers to political activists who have become full-time politicians but it also indicates that parties are relying more on outsiders with technical expertise to run campaigns for them. This is a response to the increasing importance of mass media, in particular television, on the electoral contest. Parties try to mobilise support a through carefully arranged image, prepared by political consultants and media specialists. Election messages as well as governmental policies thus become a product that is sold using the same marketing and advertising strategies used for commercial products. Creating and maintaining a membership base among voters is of lesser importance, the focus is firmly on vote maximisation and electoral success. Candidates are nominated first and foremost in terms of personal attractiveness to voters, Page 5

6 rather than formal position within the party or length of service in the party. Other features of internal democracy like members consultation on policy making are also neglected. Hopkin and Paolucci (1999) build on Panebianco s model and apply it to newer democracies in southern Europe. Here, they identify business-firm parties, which are more likely to form in newer democracies and among parties without a long organisational history. This is a type of political party where the spotlight is even more on the leadership. Politicians turn into political entrepreneurs, who use their resources and those of the party they are leading for their personal advantage. 3 Party programmes and messages are of secondary importance. Selling the product the party leader - to gain access to political office and power is the ultimate goal. Parties are no longer organisations with broader aspiration for society but are similar to business firms (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999: 311). Party organisations are far less important and often not even encouraged to form. 4 A common feature of these later models of party types is the dominating position of the party in public office as chief decision-maker and organisation, while the role of party members is restricted. This comes closer to the parties in existence in the United States, which are decentralised and candidate-oriented. 5 Media such as television and the internet also contribute to this development. Parties can use increasing sophisticated methods to directly contact their voters, through direct mailings, representative surveys and political marketing. Direct linkages thus increase while linkage through party organisation is in decline. In extreme cases, parties become heads without bodies. In light of these changes, it is necessary to reassess the role of linkage for political parties. Linkage In the context of political parties, linkage implies a chain of relationships and enduring connections between parties and voters. This paper follows Lawson s concept of linkage (1980), taking linkage to describe in the broadest terms the ties which bind parties to their voters. These ties are open to input from both ends, citizens use parties to transmit their views to the government while parties aim at influencing their supporters and thus stabilise electoral support. Lawson (1980: 13-14) introduces a more detailed typology of linkage that has been discussed and expanded by other scholars since its publication (e.g. Pogunkte 2002; Roemmele et al 2005). Linkage categories include participatory, policy responsive, linkage by reward, directive, and organisational linkage. All these are ascribed to party functions that have been introduced earlier in this paper. Parties provide participatory linkage as agencies through which citizens can participate in government. In most parties with formal memberships, party members have traditionally been the main source of parties candidates for local and national offices, attracting members and supporters and encourage their involvement (even in cadre parties, Katz and Mair 1995: 21). Party members have their uses for parties, not only financially in terms of their membership fees. Active members can be used as agents of persuasion, propaganda and mobilisation, in particular during election campaigns (Scarrow 1996). In informal settings, members can share party messages with their family, friends and co-workers by talking about politics and their party. Despite the growing use of media, including internet facilities, personal canvassing still wins votes, as shown in the campaigns of Roh Moo-hyun in South Korea and Barack Obama in the USA. In 2002, supporters of one candidate in the presidential election created an online support group (nosamo) that became important means to collect funds and attract supporters both in the virtual and real world (Kang 2004). The Obama-campaign recruited and coordinated supporters online to become active in the real world (See for 3 The description of politicians as political entrepreneurs refers to earlier work by Schumpeter (1942) and Dahl (1961). 4 For example: in the initial years of the Italian party Forza Italia, its leader Silvio Berlusconi deliberately created political clubs in support of the party which had little influence in party affairs. 5 American parties follow a different development trajectory for historical and institutional reasons that are beyond the scope of this paper to explore. Page 6

7 information). They also encourage other to become involved in politics (or at least, cast a vote on election day) by their example and outreach activities. The mobilisation of active community-based support is thus a main part of local branch activities. How this plays out in a newly democratising country with weak party bases is part of our research project. However, members do not only bring benefits to party organisations, there are also costs (Schlesinger 1984). Members - although by no means all - expect certain services and benefits. This includes the regular provision of information through meetings, newsletters or websites, with more information than available to the wider electorate. Party members also want to be included in the party decision-making processes, not only in their local branch but also at higher level, through party congresses and so on. Regular contact with party representatives at all levels is expected. There may also be non-political advantages, such as consumer discounts, travel activities and so on (Scarrow 2007). There is also the danger that the greater involvement of members undermines party cohesion, as members may offer different interpretations of party policies (Janda and Colman 1998). For these reasons, parties may be less interesting in recruiting. As mentioned above, the introduction of state funding and the use of media in election campaigns reduce the need for a large number of members. Furthermore, media campaigns often bypass party offices and thus weaken participatory linkage between party office and party members. The focus of our research will be on participatory linkage, so the other linkage types are introduced here only in passing. Policy responsive linkage refers to parties role as agencies for ensuring that government officials will be responsive to the views of rank and file voters (Lawson 1980: 14). Outside election time this is an important way to hold officials accountable. Linkage by reward refers to a clientelistic bond where parties are used as channels for the exchange of votes for favours. Parties abandon efforts to provide an intermediary function and instead offer party members rewards for their services, such as government offices or services. Lastly, directive linkage is the most outright top-down linkage, used by parties to control their subjects, more often used in one-party states. In addition to Lawson s typology, Poguntke adds organisational linkage, referring to connections between parties and organisations such as trade unions which can mobilise or withdraw support of their organisation for the party (2002: 46). As noted above, in established democracies, linkage of parties and voters is affected by the changes in party organisation over the last decades. In new democracies, the formation of linkage is a substantial problem. Parties in a newly democratising country In the last decades of the 20 th century, many more countries have gone through processes of democratisation as part of the third wave of democratisation (Huntington 1991). This has led to the emergence of a new body of literature on democratisation and consolidation, and also challenged political scientists understanding of parties. As has been pointed out above, the various models of party organisation are generally based on mature democracies, mainly located in Europe. The development of democratic institutions, including political parties, has proved to be a challenge in many new democracies. Countries with a previous history of democracy are in a more advantageous position, as they can refer to older institutions. In Eastern European states such as Hungary and Poland, politicians were able to invoke parties and ideologies that existed in pre-communist days. The example and support of Western European parties also encouraged the process of party building. In other newly democratising countries, parties have to be built without these legacies. When parties lack a long organisational history internal pressure and organisational inertia do not affect party development. Parties in new democracies facing the same pressures of socio-economic and technological development as established parties are thus less likely to develop mass parties. It is far more likely to find electoral parties with few links to the grassroots level (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999). When democracy returned to South Korea with the inauguration of the 6 th Republic in 1988, political parties were severely underdeveloped. During the long years of authoritarian rule ( ), the government party served as a support group for the president while the Page 7

8 opposition party was a loose association of individuals rather than a coherent organisation. The development of mass-based party organisations was prohibited and, due to the threat from North Korea, the ideological spectrum severely restricted. While political rights were limited under President Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, the country has undergone a rapid modernisation process. Out of the ruins of the Korean War, South Korea transformed from an agricultural, rural society to an industrialised, urban economy in little more than 30 years. For this reason, politics in South Korea has to accommodate and adapt to the tensions between modern and post-modern values and the rise of individualism, in a way similar to many older democracies. Politically, the changes had to be even faster in the 1980s. The development and institutionalisation of political parties has not kept up with the rapid changes (e.g. Kim 2000; Kim 2002; Kim 2003; Steinberg and Shin 2006). The party system remains fluid, with many mergers, dissolutions and new creations. The majority of the over twenty Korean parties formed since 1987 have been charismatic parties with an average lifespan of only 35 months. 6 Voters thus have little opportunity to form a lasting attachment with a party beyond one round of elections. As a result of these conditions, electoral volatility is high and party identification low (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Sheng 2008). There is a lively discussion on the reasons for the weaknesses in the Korean party system and the models Korean parties adhere to (e.g. Kim 2001; Kim 2003; Kwak 2001). The literature on political parties has identified a number of cleavages that influenced party development in Europe, namely centre-periphery, state-church, owner-worker (class) and land-industry (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). These are of little relevance in modern Korea, so politicians had to identify other cleavages to gather support (Kim et al 2008; McAllister 2008). Personal charisma and primordial attachments, especially regional ties, have become prime identifiers for political parties, especially in the earlier years of the 6 th Republic. The personalisation of power has a long tradition in Korean politics, going back centuries and attitudes are changing slower than political systems (see also Shin 1999). In the Korean presidential system, the president is at the apex of power, further perpetuating the personalisation of power. The personalised nature of the major Korean parties indicates that these parties can be classified as electoral parties. Other features also point in that direction. Parties have undertaken only half-hearted attempts to recruit members, if any at all. Party organisations remain underdeveloped as many supporters have personal connections with politicians, mainly representatives in the National Assembly and regional councils. The lack of mass membership in turn increases the dominance of the leadership. All of this indicates that the institutionalisation of Korean parties is far from completed. After the transition to democracy, political leaders were mostly concerned with state power, not building up political parties and organisations. Korean politicians saw little use of local organisations for their work. In terms of party organisation, parties are mainly understood as national support bases and thus first and foremost parties in public office. South Korean party organisations are dominated by the party in government and parliament (or more precisely at the apex of power, the presidency). The other two components are much weaker and, in the case of the party on the ground, even more undermined by legislation that prohibits party representation at the lowest level. Parties are driven by a logic that focuses on electoral success rather than constituency representation. Combined with regionalism, parties have not achieved territorial penetration but remain focused on their regional centres. 7 Linkages between local citizens and politicians are thus hindered in their development. A huge gap remains between politicians and voters. This is reflected in survey results regarding trust in political parties and politicians that show consistently low levels (e.g. Park and Lee 2007: 277). 6 Between February 1988 and May 2008, there have been 27 parties that participated in at least one election and won more than 5% of the votes (author s calculations). 7 In order to register as political organisation, parties are required to have branches around the country and a minimum of members but the regional differences remain. Page 8

9 The lack of a broad membership base affects party finance negatively: parties often rely on wealthy individuals or companies to provide finance, frequently skirting legality. Scandals are numerous in Korean politics, reaching the highest level (every president has been accused of corruption once they stepped down). Until the early 2000s, the nomination processes were dominated by the central office, often directly by the party leader. Although illegal, nominations and constituencies are sold by the party leadership or local support associations to the highest bidder. Seats on the proportional lists become available after donations have been made. 8 In more recent years, efforts have been made to democratise the nomination process, especially prior to the presidential elections. In 2007, for instance, the main parties held open primaries where any Korean voter could register to participate. This reduced the benefits for party supporters to join the party formally to be involved in candidate selection for important offices. At the lower level elections, candidates are still decided either in backroom deals and/or at the central office while inner-party democracy remains underdeveloped (Cho 2005; So 1997; Kang 2008). Role of local parties The discourse on political parties in South Korea focuses on the national level, as local politics remains underdeveloped. This oversight is not unique to South Korea. The discourse on intergovernmental central-local relations dwells on the administrative, legal and financial rather than the party-political aspects of the relationship. Generally, the literature highlights national party organisations while the local level is ignored or taken for granted. The relative decline of party organisations at the local level has been noted, and these changes in importance are reflected in the literature (such as Katz and Mair 1994). In light of this discussion, is it really necessary to look at local parties in South Korea? This paper posits that it is. Local party offices are important links in the participatory chain. It is at the local level that parties are the closest to citizens. Local party organisations are vital for political socialisation and integration, as well as interest articulation and aggregation (participatory linkage). Without local representation, parties find it difficult to recruit new activists and supporters. Despite the advance of new technologies and campaigning techniques, volunteers remain an important part of elections campaigns. These are mostly recruited and retained by local party activists, not the central office. For these reasons, an assessment of how political parties - and democracy are working needs to consider the role of parties at local level. Local party activities also provide further insights in the nature of a political party. Programmatic and ideological parties attract members by their programmes. Members often come from similar social backgrounds and societal sub-groups. Connections with other social groups related to the same clientele bring in more supporters (e.g. trade unions for socialdemocratic parties, religious groups for conservative parties), creating organisational linkage. Electoral parties attract members with specific interests who expect paybacks from backing a specific politicians or political clique. They may build on other organisations such a business associations or family ties. Two other factors point towards electoral parties: firstly, if a local office deals mostly with party members, and in particular the needs of the party representative (in the locality or their constituency). Secondly, in electoral parties, party member loyalties lie with the leaders not a mass base. Activities such as inviting broad participation and activities to recruit new members and voters on the other hand, point towards a mass party. Inviting the input from a larger number of citizens indicates a greater commitment to democratic values among party leaders. Open and accessible branch party organisations also serve as school of democracy, where political novices can experience politics at first hand and hone their skills. In German politics, for instance, most politicians are 8 In the 2008 parliamentary elections, for instance, one candidate was placed on the list of the Pro- Park Alliance after her mother made a big donation to the party. An informant told the author that in late 2007, 500,000,000 won (about US$500,000 at the time) bought the backing of network of supporters in a parliamentary constituency that was (practically) secure for this particular party and its candidate. Page 9

10 expected to begin their political career in local offices and work their way to national positions (the so-called Ochsentour, literally bulls-tour, e.g. Wessels 1997). Lastly, the territorial penetration of a party through many local branch offices increases its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Having members and branches in many parts of a country allows parties to claim that they are not just representing a certain region (and its inhabitants) but the electorate as a whole. These features need to be carefully analysed to allow for a more detailed classification of electoral parties. As has been described above, parties in South Korea mainly focus on the national level, and in particular on the party in public office. Party organisations are weakly institutionalised. Although local and regional elections are held in regular intervals, local politics has low priority for voters and politicians alike (e.g. Kang 1999). The energies of local political activists are harnessed to serve the national interests of the parties rather than local community interests. They often rely on particularistic networks of personal interaction or exchange. Since the 1990s, regular elections are held for provincial and local councils and their respective head of administration (governor, mayor and county and ward head). Local politics are, however, overshadowed by national politics and have failed to develop a separate profile (Hwang 2006; Kang 2008). Local election results tend to reflect the popular standing of the parties nationally rather than the reputations of the parties and their councillors locally. As the local elections are held two years after national parliamentary elections they are seen as a verdict on national politics rather than on merit of local results (Kang 1999). Rather than using their party membership as a recruitment ground, many parties approach local notables with a long history of local power and strong social ties. Often, they have been active for a longer period of time already, so that they can rely on a robust organisation outside the party framework and build up connections with other local notables and the bureaucracy. Membership development is of much lower priority. In times of economic hardship, maintaining a network of local branch offices is seen as a waste of resources. Local offices are often the first to be closed, as events during the economic crisis in 1997/98 showed. Local party offices also seem more likely to attract corruption scandals, so parties fear local offices as a liability. In consequence, the Political Party Act was changed in 2004 to outlaw party organisations at the lowest level. Smaller offices were ordered to close, so that currently, there are only city and county party offices, that are often closely connected to the representative in the National Assembly. Some of the staff at the closed offices continues to work for the party, but from difference premises (or their homes). After smaller branch offices were closed in 2004, rules for local elections were changed, lifting the restrictions of parties to nominate and support candidates at the lowest level. This sends contradictory messages about the role of local party offices and politicians. The closure of the local offices also shows a lack of respect for local politics and the role of local staff. The closures have not been universally welcomed. Studies find that party elites as well as party members regret the abolition of local branch offices (Kim 2008; Lee 2005; Jung 2005). A large majority of party members (90%) favour the re-introduction of local branch offices (Report by 고선규 ), especially among those who have been a party member for a longer period of time. The research project The focus of the studies noted above has been on party members and party elites (e.g. Jung 2005; Lee 2004; Park 2004). However, the voices of the affected party staff have so far not been analysed. For this reason, little is known about the role and attitudes of party staff in general and in particular of the effects of the Political Party Act. This paper aims to close this gap by analysing the efforts and experiences of local party staff, focusing on the changes in the status, their work and their evaluation of the changes in their role in the party organisation as well as the anchorage of parties in the local area. While assessing the impact of the abolition of local party branches, this research aims at shedding light on the role of party staff as well as the importance of linkage in the Korean political process. With these results in Page 10

11 mind, we aim to situate South Korean parties in the typologies of parties suggested in the literature. We propose to begin with an empirical, qualitative approach and focus on local staff in Incheon. This will serve as a pilot study to allow us to identify areas of particular interest that we need to explore in more detail. 9 The chief subjects of our study are those who are active as party officials and who work for local party branches. It is these actors who form the various coalitions or sub-coalitions within parties. Their goals, resources and appreciative systems may differ one from another. These political interactions are likely to be a result of interplay between three sets of factors: broad social and cultural characteristics; institutional and constitutional factors; and the norms and attitudes, goals and perspectives of local staff and activists. These need to be identified in interviews and informal encounters. An important area of interest are obviously the changes since 2004 and the demands and problems with which party staff is now faced. This should provide us with a much greater understanding of the relations between party organisations and their members, fleshing out our picture of the motives of party activists and their impact on party policies and party development. Their focus will inform also the inner workings of party offices on the ground: if they focus on local members and recruitment, we could see the foundations for a mass party, evolving; if they focus on elections and their local representatives, this would not be the case. If party staff interacts frequently with the general public, they are more likely to work as intermediaries between citizens and government. If they are more focused on selling policies or candidates, parties are more clientelistic. Political parties and linkage are an under-researched topic in South Korean contemporary politics. Interestingly, in Lawson s edited volume on linkage, Kihl Young-Whan (1980) contributes a chapter on Korean politicians in the 1970s and their disposition to citizens participation. He concludes that many politicians in government and in opposition follow subserviently their leader rather than taking citizens wishes into account. One has to wonder how much these values have changed in the last forty years. In a survey conducted in 1999, for instance, only a quarter of participants thought that their interests and opinions were taken into account by government leaders (Shin and Rose 2000). This impression underscores the lack of linkage provided by political parties and the need to study this further. It also addresses the categorisation of South Korean parties in the prevailing theoretical models of party organisation. References Cho Young-jin 조용진 지구당당직자의정치행위에관한사례연구 : 광주지역한나라당 A' 지구당을중심으로, 전남대학교대학원학위논문. Chu, Yun-Han and Min-Hua Huang (2008) 'Partisanship and Citizen Politics', in Russell J. Dalton, Doh Chull Shin and Yun-Han Chu (eds) Party Politics in East Asia: Citizens, Elections, and Democratic Development, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner: Dahl, Robert (1961) Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Dalton, Russell J., and Martin P. Wattenberg (2001) Parties without Partisans: Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 9 This approach is also chosen for time and financial constraints, as access will be easier to negotiate. Once more funding is available, a nation-wide study is planned. Page 11

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