An Ethnic or (Geo)Political Conflict? The Case of the Republic of Moldova

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1 An Ethnic or (Geo)Political Conflict? The Case of the Republic of Moldova Author: Dr. Bartłomiej Zdaniuk, Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Journalism and Political Science, University of Warsaw Co-Authors: Dr. Adam Burakowski, Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences Since its independence in 1991, the Republic of Moldova has been dealing with a kind of multi-level conflict. The most obvious, and the most visible one, but maybe not the most important, is the conflict around the existence and future of the Pridniestrovian Moldovan Republic (Transnistria), as the authorities of that quasi-state call it, but no state recognizes it. The nature of this conflict is unclear and hard to define: is it an ethnic conflict (for ex. Moldovans vs. Russians), a political one (political leaders of Chişinău vs. these from Tiraspol) or a geopolitical one (Europe and NATO vs. Russia)? A different conflict, but still not the most important one, is the case of the autonomous region of Gagauzia. Here we face the question about the origins of tensions between local and central authorities: is it an ethnic conflict (Moldovans vs. Gagauzians)? A political struggle? Is it caused by international influence (Russia, Turkey, EU)? In fact, the most important piece of the puzzle seems to be the essence of Moldovan statehood, its stateness and the national identity of its inhabitants. The debate concerning Moldovan identity is still not finished and even political cleavages in the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova look to follow rather geopolitical or ethnic criteria (integration with EU vs. integration with Russia; Moldova is a part of historic Romania vs. Moldova is a part of historic Russia) than ideological ones (liberalism vs. socialism). Not to be forgotten is also the linguistic issue: there is no consensus about the name of the majority s language ( Romanian vs. Moldovan ), while even in the Republic of Moldova s mainland, an important part of the population speaks Russian. 1

2 The aim of this paper is to highlight different levels of the Moldovan conflict and to analyse possible consequences of the Republic of Moldova s EU integration, as well as the possible impact of the EU integration on the Republic of Moldova s statehood. These issues are being constantly discussed by politicians and analysts. The Transnistrian issue, probably the most important one, is on the agenda especially these days, after Russian annexation of Crimea (which is not recognized by any state and Ukraine claims it back) and turbulences in Eastern districts of Ukraine. In April 2014 the Supreme Soviet of the Pridniestrovian Moldovan Republic formulated a motion of declaring independence from the Republic of Moldova, asking Moscow to recognize it and making it possible of being incorporated into Russian Federation. Despite this, there is still no official recognition from Russia. But this is nothing really new. It is a fact that Transnistria was never fully integrated with the rest of Moldova. Not speaking of older times, but even during Soviet rule the distinction between right and left bank of the Dniester River was clear and obvious. While the core Moldovan SSR kept the predominantly Latin character, Transnistria was more Slavonic, profoundly Sovietized and politically oriented rather towards Moscow than towards Chișinău. It was not a surprise that Tiraspol already in late Eighties showed clear tendencies of separatism from Moldova and loyalty to the Kremlin. In 1989 was proclaimed the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, never recognized by anyone, nevertheless de facto existing. In December 1991, a couple of days before the final dissolution of the USSR, in Transnistria was held a referendum for the independence of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, which led to a war between pro-tiraspol and pro-chișinău forces. The ceasefire was reached in July 1992 and then there was a long period of modus vivendi which guaranteed the relative stability of the region, but on a price of loose the control over Transnistria by Chișinău. In 1995 the Transitrian administration held another referendum, this time sanctioning the permanent stationing of Russian troops in the territory. 2

3 This status, on more or less the same conditions, remains till nowadays, however, there was a couple of attempts to change it. In 1997 the Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov came with a plan of "normalization" the relations between Chișinău and Tiraspol on a basis that the most important decisions should be taken together by the authorities of Moldova and Transnistria. The plan was rejected by Chișinău. In 2003 Dmitry Kozak, close collaborator of Vladimir Putin, proposed another plan, this time suggesting federalization of the Republic of Moldova and broad autonomy to Transnistria and Gagauzia. This plan, treated more seriously than the previous one, was also rejected by Chișinău. In 2006 Tiraspol organized another referendum of independence but, despite the fact that the results were in favour of it, it was once again not recognized by anybody. During Russian-Ukrainian crisis, in March 2014, Tiraspol authorities asked to be incorporated to Russia (on similar conditions as Crimea), but no official high-level answer came from Moscow. The Transnistrian problem seems to be permanent. It is inhabited only by around 30% of Latin population, the rest are mainly Russians and Ukrainians. The results of every referendum, even if nobody recognized them, reflect more or less the real opinion of the people. Even among Latin inhabitants the dominant type of national identity is not Romanian and not even Moldova - it is so-called homo sovieticus or pro-russian. The will for EU integration or even more profound ties with Western countries is almost inexistent in Transnistria. Moscow is a strong protector of Tiraspol, even though it is reluctant to support its independence. However, every serious and long-lasting solution of the whole Moldova's existence should contain also a proposal for Transnistria. Another predominantly non-latin province of Moldova is Gagauzia. The Gagauz are Turkic nation coming from the territory of Bulgaria and settled in Southern Bessarabia by Tsarist government after They are Orthodox Christian and are strongly pro-russian to this extent that they use rather Russian language than the language of their own. They live mainly in Southern part of the Republic of Moldova and in Bugeac, the Ukrainian region at the North-West shore of the Black Sea. In 1994 Chișinău authorities gave an autonomy to the region of Gagauzia, with a name of Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri in Gagauz language) and with the capital in Comrat. Gagauzia has its own parliament and its own governor, called 3

4 "Bashkan". Gagauzia is highly underdeveloped region, even according to Moldovan standards. Gagauz are against the EU integration and in February 2014 they held a referendum on the current geopolitical issues. Overwhelming majority chose closer ties with Russia and complete independence in case of EU accession of the Republic of Moldova. We could expect, however, that if Chișinău comes with really serious proposal, the opinion of Comrat could change. At the end of the day, the Gagauz are not Russians and their choice is based on geopolitical interest and not on any national or ethnic basis. The ethnic pattern of the "core" Republic of Moldova is definitely more homogenous. Its population is over 80% Latin, the rest are Ukrainians and Russians, but the distinction between those two national identities is not very visible. They are massively supporting the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) and are not so eager for EU integration. However, the Slavonic population of Moldova should not be considered as purely "Fifth Column" of Kremlin. Not all of them vote PCRM and the PCRM itself tries to promote rather a "Moldovanism", a kind of inter-ethnic and proindependence alliance of all nations living in Moldova, than incorporating to Russia or even joining the Euroasian Economic Union. There was a time when PCRM openly promoted EU integration of Moldova. But it should be stated that a part of Ukrainians and Russians vote Igor Dodon's Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), which is more radically pro-moscow. And, last but not least, there is the Latin population, which is a majority when we look at the Republic of Moldova in whole (including Transnitria and Gagauzia) and in the "core" Moldova they have overwhelming majority. This population is however also divided in terms of national identity. The most popular identity among them is "Moldovan", but some people consider themselves "Romanians". Nevertheless, even among Romanians of the Republic of Moldova the idea of unionism (with Romania) is not as popular as one could think. Despite the fact that a couple of hundreds thousands people have also Romanian citizenship, only one big party supports the idea of unionism (Liberal Party - PL) and it scores up to 16% in parliamentary elections. Other parties (of course without PCRM and PSRM) are united in the Pro-European coalition which promotes EU integration, and not the union with Romania. There is also a significant number of Latin people that vote PCRM. 4

5 It seems that the common denominator of the whole mentioned above is "Moldovanism" that could unite majority of Slavonic population and large part of Latin population. This is probably the key to the ethnic identity of inhabitants of the Republic of Moldova. In geopolitical context it could mean maintaining the country's independence and moving slowly towards integration with the EU, but also not breaking totally with Moscow. It is not a surprise that Republic of Moldova makes such a policy, because it derives from the national pattern of the country. Strong pressure either from Moscow, either from Brussels could change temporarily this drift towards one direction or another, and then we could speak about geopolitics prevailing over domestic politics. *** Among most important works on the topic we could name the volume coordinated by Monica Heintz (Stat slab, cetățenie încertă. Studii despre Republica Moldova, București 2007), the books by Charles King (e.g. The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture, Hoover Institution Press, 2000) and from two different perspectives the works by Dmitryi Furman (Молдавские молдаване и молдавские румыны. Влияние особенностей национального сознания молдаван на политическое развитие Республики Молдова, Москва 2007) and Dan Dungaciu (Basarabia e România?, Chişinău, 2011). 5