THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ECONOMICS OF TRIBAL RESISTANCE

Transcription

1 Matthew L.M. Fletcher (Michigan State Univ. College of Law) March 26, 2010 University of Idaho College of Law THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ECONOMICS OF TRIBAL RESISTANCE

2 Tribal Economies Wealthy Gaming and Resource Tribes and the Dilemma of Schumpeterian Economics Middle of the Road Tribes and the Dilemma of Institutional Economics Poor Tribes and the Dilemma of Market Share

3 Tribal Economies and Resistance Resistance to federal and state law has created only sustainable tribal economic development 1. Gaming 2. Smokeshops 3. Natural Resources (e.g., minerals, fishing)

4 Fallacy of Regulatory Immunity Typical business development projects in Indian Country promise regulatory and taxation immunities or advantages E.g., manufacturing, defense contracts, microbusinesses Exception (?): SBA set asides (tribal corporations)

5 Part 1 Grand River Enterprises (Six Nations) Six Nations Grand River Enterprises v. United States (NAFTA Arbitration 2010)

6 Schumpeterian Growth Major shocks and investment creating wealth E.g., invention of the cotton gin or discovery of massive natural resources

7 Schumpeterian Zero-Sum Game Wealth redistribution/windfalls do not improve economic pie, merely redistribute wealth at expense of others E.g., regulatory changes or legal loopholes

8 Schumpeter and Indian Economies Does Indian gaming create Schumpeterian growth? Does other Indian business create Schumpeterian growth? Wealth and market redistribution or genuine investment-based growth?

9 Schumpeterian Growth! Tribal treaty fishing rights: tribal investment includes fish hatcheries, conservation, and environmental protection initiatives Tribal gaming: tribal investment results include job creation (welfare roll reduction), local business development, and so on

10 Modern Congressional Regime Indian Self-Determination Acts: contracts and self-governance contracts 2. IHS 3. Housing 4. Natural Resources Gaming Recovery Act?

11 Supreme Court Utilitarianism (Schumpeterism?) SCT impliedly asks whether the tribal activity benefits community Community means United States SCT has been asking this question since Johnson v. M Intosh

12 Recent Supreme Court Decisions Inyo County v. Bishop Paiute (2003): questions tribal immunity from state process in economic context Washington v. Colville (1980): marketing the exemption versus on-reservation value added Wagnon v. Prairie Band (2005): affirms state taxes on tribal, on-reservation business with nonmembers (on-reservation value added irrelevant)

13 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Grand River-based enterprise, selling tobacco products wholesale to on- and off-reservation American retailers and wholesalers GRE employs hundreds on reserve American Indian tobacco sales revenues are significant, perhaps employing hundreds more GRE manufactures in Indian Country (onreservation value) Schumpeterian growth!

14 GRE Resistance GRE (and Native Wholesale Supply) establish reservation-to-reservation tobacco trade 46 States adopt MSA (tobacco settlement) GRE becomes NPM (non participating manufacturer); limits business to 5 states in accordance with MSA loophole State AGs and PMs agree to close loophole without input of NPMs Gives rise to NAFTA claim; GRE & NWS under state pressure, even indictment

15 Part 2 Little River Band Little River Band of Ottawa Indians v. National Labor Relations Board (W.D. Mich.)

16 Institutional Economics Douglass North: organizations will trend in an institutional direction most familiar to the organization, even if it is to their detriment

17 Rise of Labor Unions in Indian Country NLRA generally inapplicable to Indian nations Calif. gaming compacts forced Calif. tribes to negotiate with one union, favoring NLRB jurisdiction in San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino Labor charges filed at Foxwoods, Soaring Eagle, and elsewhere (2007 present)

18 Progressive Institutional Response Tribal Labor Relations Ordinance and grievance structure Foxwoods and Little River Band, examples Cf. Soaring Eagle (ban on unions); San Juan Pueblo (right to work ordinance)

19 Little River Band Signatory to 1836 and 1855 treaties Owns Indian gaming enterprise in Manistee, Michigan

20 LRB Resistance LRB adopts labor relations ordinance (quicker response time, non-politicized dispute resolution board) Sues NLRB to foreclose federal jurisdiction: both union and NLRB wants to use NLRA (despite institutional infirmities disadvantageous to both LRB and union)

21 Conclusions? Tribal Resistance often a source of sustainable economic growth Tribal Resistance inspires investment and creativity Regulatory and/or tax immunities are short term boosts, but require long-term investment to generate sustained growth

22 Resources FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW (FORTHCOMING 2010) GETCHES, WILKINSON, & WILLIAMS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (5TH ED.) SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1934) Fletcher, Indian Tribal Businesses and the Off Reservation Market, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV (2008) Fletcher, The Power to Tax, the Power to Destroy, and the Michigan Tribal-State Tax Agreements, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1 (2004) Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal Economic Development as a Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REV. 759 (2004) Galbraith & Stiles, Expectations of Indian Reservation Gaming: Entrepreneurial Activity Within a Context of Traditional Land Tenure and Wealth Acquisition, 8 J. DEV. ENTREPRENEURSHIP 93 (2003) Singel, The Institutional Economics of Tribal Labor Relations, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 487