Tactical voting. A study of voters tactical considerations in the 2010 Swedish general election. Annika Fredén

Transcription

1 Tactical voting A study of voters tactical considerations in the 2010 Swedish general election Annika Fredén Master thesis in Political Science 15 hp Spring semester 2011 Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg Supervisor: Henrik Ekengren Oscarsson Words:

2 Abstract Most studies on tactical voting in proportional representation system focus on voting to help a party pass the threshold to the parliament. This study extends and develops the theory of tactical voting. The theoretical starting point is the rational choice theory of Anthony Downs (1957), who discusses voters strategic considerations in elections. From Downs s perspective the rational voter considers the governmental consequences of voting. Downs distinguishes general rational voting, oriented towards the next-coming formation of government, from future oriented rational voting. This distinction is developed in the study, and tested on a contemporary electoral context. Tactical voting is defined as voting where party tactical considerations have been crucial for vote choice. The specific case investigated is the 2010 Swedish general election free text panel data answers have been read and analyzed by the author. Seven variants of tactical voting were identified. Five of these are short term: impact-voting, majority-voting, relationship-voting, big party-voting and pass-the-thresholdvoting, whereas two types are future oriented: signaling-voting and diversity-voting. In an explanatory analysis tactical voting is found to be related to hesitation about what party to choose and to young age. Keywords: tactical, strategic, voting, rational choice, elections, Downs 2

3 Contents 1. Intro: The electoral arena 5 2. Theoretical perspective Rational voting Future oriented rationality Voting under coalition governments Summary: Rational voting in theory Overarching theoretical expectations 9 3. Previous empirical results Definitions of tactical voting Tactical considerations Explaining tactical voting Contribution of the study Research questions Empirical investigation Case: Sweden Data Dependent variable: tactical considerations Presence of tactical considerations Short-term tactical considerations Future oriented tactical considerations General tactical considerations Summary: tactical considerations Non-tactical reasons Presence of tactical voting Presence of tactical categories Presence of strict tactical voting Explaining the presence of tactical voting Theoretical expectations Logistic regression method Independent variables Hesitation Center-position 29 3

4 6.3.3 Political sophistication Age and gender Results Bivariate analyses Multivariate analyses Summary of results Conclusions Discussion References 38 Appendix 41 4

5 1. Intro: The electoral arena Some voters vote for another party than the one they like most. One reason could be the specific party context. What are the relationships between parties? Does the favorite party have a chance to become influential? Which other parties are entering the election? Such tactical considerations may make the voter switch vote intentions. This thesis will investigate tactical aspects of voting. The theoretical starting point is the rational choice theory of Anthony Downs (1957). From this perspective, voting is seen as a rational decision process. The voter is furthermore assumed to take the governmental consequences into account when voting. From this view it is the outcome of voting that is important, rather than expressing one s first political preference. Therefore some voters may choose another party than the favorite one. Downs also discusses why some voters vote rational, whereas others stay loyal with first party preference. Downs s theory will be tested on a contemporary electoral context. First of all, the thesis will theoretically define what voting motives should be considered as tactical. The motives will be related to the specific party-system and expected governmental outcome. Furthermore, short-term tactical considerations will be distinguished from future oriented tactical motives. The former are related to the next-coming formation of government, whereas future oriented motives are related to expressing a wished direction. Moreover a distinction between tactical considerations and strict tactical voting will be developed. Tactical considerations may influence even those who stay with first party preference, whereas for others tactical factors lead to switching parties. The latter will be defined as strict tactical voting. The specific case that will be examined is the 2010 Swedish general election. This election provided many alternatives; there were larger parties, smaller parties and a couple of outsiders. Furthermore, the parliamentary parties entered the election as two main government coalitions. This made the election resemble plurality rule system, and enhanced the possibility to use different sorts of tactical reasoning. Most previous research on tactical voting in proportional representation system focuses on voting to help a party pass the threshold to the parliament. This thesis will extend and develop the theory of tactical voting. In an explanatory part of the study, the relationship between in previous research found different individual characteristics and tactical voting will also be tested. 5

6 In sum this will generate knowledge on voters motives and behavior in a contemporary electoral context. This is a relevant subject to study not at least because voters are becoming more volatile (van der Eijk & Franklin 2009). For some of these tactical aspects may play an important role. 2. Theoretical perspective 2.1 Rational voting Most research on tactical voting starts from a rational choice perspective (Ordeshook & Zeng 1997; Alvarez & Nagler 2000; Kselman & Niou 2010:2). From this view, it is the outcome of the election that is voters focus, rather than expressing a first political preference. The pioneer Anthony Downs (1957) develops a theory of voting from this perspective. He sees strategic considerations as a logical part of a rational voter s decision process. To consider strategic aspects there has to be more than two alternatives: then it might be a reason to support the second party preference. The base for voting is ideological, according to Downs: the voter assesses the benefits each party will provide. Sometimes this score is combined with a judgment of the party s performance in recent term in office (Downs 1957:41). Then, strategic aspects will be taken into account (ibid. p 47). If the favorite party has no chances to get elected the rational voter will tend to choose the second preference, given it is more competitive. For some voters, the two most preferred parties are seen as almost as good. These voters will tend to switch parties to a larger extent than those whose party preferences are clearer, Downs argues (ibid. p 49). The tendency to switch will also depend on whether there is a party the voter dislikes very much. Then there is an extra incentive to choose a more competitive party, to hinder the disliked alternative from getting influence. The tendency to shift parties will according to Downs also depend on the temperament of the voter (ibid. p 48). There has been considerably consensus on the basics of voters strategic considerations Downs discusses (Heath & Evans 1994; Ordeshook & Zeng 1997; Alvarez & Nagler 2000). However, there are some aspects of rational voting that are less investigated. This thesis will develop and discuss these. 2.2 Future oriented rationality Downs also discusses that the rational voter may be future oriented. For these voters, it could be a reason to vote for an overall less preferred party if the voter dislikes the development of 6

7 the favorite party, and wants to send a warning to it (Downs 1957:49). There could also be a reason to vote for a small, uncompetitive party if the voter wants a more diverse selection of government later on, Downs argues (ibid.). Downs is very brief in the description of future oriented rational voting, and few have picked up the arguments on this kind of voting. When similar voting is discussed, it is often under the more general label protest voting (Heath & Evans 1994; Kang 2004; van der Eijk & Franklin 2009:131). Protest-voting is often argued to be related to general disaffection and indifference. Thus protest-voting should not be regarded as the same phenomenon as the future oriented rational voting Downs describes. The important distinction between future oriented rational voting and general protest voting should be that the former is targeted and takes the long term consequences of voting into account, whereas the latter is a more diffuse sign of disaffection. Some scholars though discuss protest-voting resembling of Downs s view of future oriented rational voting (Kang 2004; Kselman & Niou 2010:1). Kselman and Niou (2010:1) defines protest-voting as choosing a party other than one s most preferred one to send that most preferred party a signal of dissatisfaction. In line with Downs, Kselman and Niou develop an analysis from a rational choice perspective. They analyze this sort of signaling voting in cost-benefit-terms, i.e. as voting related to a rational decision calculus. The value of signaling-voting depends, according to these authors, on the improvement the favorite party is supposed to make if the voter sends a signal to it. Another aspect taken into account is the weight the voter gives to influencing the long term development of the favorite party, versus affecting the next-coming formation of government. If the benefits of signaling-voting are considered higher than the benefits of voting for first party preference, targeted protest voting is rational according to these authors. Another contemporary scholar, Kang (2004), develops a similar rational choice influenced reasoning. Kang compares targeted protest-voting with abstention. As Kselman and Niou, Kang argues that the value of a signal of disaffection could be calculated in a cost-benefitanalysis. Targeted protest voting requires an alternative attractive enough to signal vote for, 7

8 according to Kang. There is thus supposed to be some kind of appeal in signaling-voting. 1 If there is no alternative attractive enough in the election, it might on the other hand, from Kang s perspective, be rational to abstain. However, it is questionable that the value of signaling-voting could be calculated the way Kselman and Niou and Kang suggest. First of all, it should be very difficult to assess what improvement the most preferred party will make if sending a message to it. Kselman and Niou briefly discuss the importance of the degree of information parties have on voters motives. Reasonably the parties lack information on voters motives, why signals of disaffection should be difficult for parties to interpret. It is also doubtful that voters consider parties coming improvement when thinking about whether to signaling-vote or not. Rather, future oriented rational voting should be the result of a mental rationality. The voter wishes that the favorite party will improve if sending a message to it therefore the action becomes rational for the specific voter. Still, in the aggregate such signals of disaffection may have an impact on the electoral outcome; the effect of a warning-message to a party should be more forceful if many voters articulate it. Therefore future oriented signaling voting could still be rational from a more pure rational choice perspective, if the voter co-ordinate the signaling-behavior with other voters Voting under coalition governments The base for Downs s analysis on rational voting is plurality systems, where only one party takes the seat (winner takes all). These electoral systems often results in one-party government. In systems with coalition governments, rational voting becomes more complicated. Here rational voters should take the favorite party s coalition partners into account when voting, Downs argues (1957:146). If the favorite party co-operates with a disliked party, it may be rational to choose another one. Since governmental alternatives are often blurred it is though difficult to take strategic aspects into account, Downs puts forward. Therefore voters in coalition government systems tend to behave irrationally from Downs s point of view, i.e. not consider strategic aspects at all (Downs 1957:154). Downs though admits that for a specific voter this behavior could still be rational (ibid.). 1 Returning a blank ballot paper should be seen as general protest voting rather than signaling-voting. The blank vote shows no clear wished direction, whereas signaling-voting expresses a wished direction in regard to present political alternatives. 2 The view of aggregate rationality holds true for short term rational voting as well. The chances that a single vote will affect the outcome are exceptionally small. Though, in the aggregate tactical votes could have a real impact. 8

9 There is thus a reservation with the view of rationality used in the rational voting theory. Downs s view of rational voting is first of all related to systemic aspects, not to the individual voter. For many voters in unclear systems it should, as Downs also admits, be rational and cost-saving not to take strategic aspects into account. If it is too complicated and impossible to assess the outcome, such considerations could be seen as pointless and confusing. However, if governmental alternatives are clear, it is easier for voters to consider strategic aspects, Downs argues (1957:147). If the rules of the game are clear, it becomes less costly to consider governmental outcome, and might be rational to do so for even from the individual s point of view. 2.4 Summary: rational voting in theory In Downs s view, rational voting is to take the governmental consequences into account when voting. The voter therefore has to consider the specific party context. Strategic considerations could be short-term, focusing on the next-coming formation of government, or long term, related to a wished development of a favorite party or diversity in the party system. The prerequisites for rational voting are clearer in plurality systems, where only one party gets the seat. Under coalition governments strategic thinking could also be related to close interrelationships between parties. If the governmental alternatives are clear, it is easier to vote rationally in these systems, according to Downs. 2.5 Overarching theoretical expectations From a Rational choice perspective, rational voters are supposed to act instrumentally. What is important is to get a specific outcome of voting. Since electoral outcomes are the result of many people s acting, the rational voter has to have information on how other people are going to act. A certain wait-and-see-mentality should therefore be related to rational voting. A) tactical considerations late voting decision Rational voting should also be related to uncertainty about what party to choose. If preferences for the two most preferred parties are tied, strategic aspects might make the voter choose one of these. B) tied political preferences tactical voting These are the overarching theoretical expectations of the study. 9

10 3. Previous empirical results 3.1 Definitions of tactical voting Most research on tactical voting is influenced by Downs s view of rational voting, where the composition of political preferences is central. Most scholars furthermore start from the view that tactical voting is to vote for another party than the first party preference (Holmberg 1984, Gilljam & Holmberg 1990; 1993; Ordeshook & Zeng 1997; Alvarez & Nagler 2000; Alvarez et al. 2006). Holmberg (1984:41) defines tactical voting as consciously voting for another party than one s most preferred one to attain a specific political goal. 3 The most well-known example of tactical voting in proportional representation system is voting to help a party pass the threshold to the parliament (see sect. 3.2). Within Holmberg s definition, several political motives could however be included. Some voters might for example vote for another party than the most preferred one due to disliked candidates in the favorite party. From Downs s point of view, it is though the party context and the governmental consequences that is central in rational voting. A specific candidate could hardly influence the composition of government. Therefore candidate-voting should not be included in a more restrictive definition of tactical voting. A refined definition of Holmberg s, more in line with Downs s perspective, could be consciously voting for another party than the most preferred one to attain a specific governmental outcome. The view of tactical voting as voting for another party than the most preferred one could also be confronted. For example van der Brug et al. (2007:51) argue that tactical thinking is incorporated in voters thinking of parties, and the propensity to support them. From this point of view it could be argued that some voters support a party partly because it is big. Alternatively, some voters might like a small party because it is small. Tactical considerations could thus reinforce the ideological preference and make the voter more convinced of party choice. Therefore it is not evident that voters who consider tactical aspects choose another party than the first preference. 3 Medvetet rösta på ett annat parti än sitt bästa för att därmed nå ett visst politiskt syfte. (Holmberg 1984:41) 10

11 This makes it relevant to talk about degrees of tactical voting (figure 1): non-tactical tactical considerations strict tactical (figure 1) First, there is voting that is not influenced by tactical considerations at all (non-tactical voting). Then there is voting influenced by tactical aspects, such as the size of the party, to some extent; tactical aspects have reinforced the preference for a party (tactical considerations). At the far right is the most exclusive definition of tactical voting: that is voting for another preference than the first one, due to tactical considerations (strict tactical voting). It is though reasonable to define tactical voting in a somewhat broader sense. If the voter s preferences for two most preferred parties are tied, and tactical aspects make the voter chose one of these parties, the voting should be seen as tactical. In tactical voting, tactical considerations have been crucial for vote choice. To conclude, an elaborated definition of tactical voting could be consciously voting for another party than the most preferred one (or an equally preferred one), to attain a specific governmental outcome. This definition will be the theoretical starting-point for the forthcoming empirical investigation. Central features are the specific party system and the expected governmental consequences of voting. 3.2 Tactical considerations Many scholars have applied Downs s reasoning on strategic considerations in voting on contemporary electoral contexts. Most studies investigate voters tendency to abandon the 11

12 most preferred party for a more competitive one (Niemi et al. 1992; Ordeshook & Zeng 1997; Alvarez & Nagler 2000; Kselman & Niou 2010:2). Fewer discuss future oriented rational voting and voting under coalition governments. Some studies have discovered future oriented tactical motives inductively. In a study of the British plurality system, Franklin et al. (1994) find out that some voters who refer to tactical motives have voted for small uncompetitive parties. They interpret this as voters wish to signal a direction, and label the voting expressive tactical. In a proportional representation context, Gilljam and Holmberg (1990; 1993) find similar tendencies. They discover that a part of the supporters of some minor parties, for example the Green Party, in Swedish elections in the late 1980s and early 1990s were not sincere supporters of these parties, but declared another party as their favorite (ibid.). Gilljam and Holmberg interpret this as voters wish to see another direction in a certain issue, and label the voting issue oriented tactical (saktaktisk) (Gilljam & Holmberg 1990:291). There has also been some research on tactical voting specific for proportional representation system and coalition governments. A characteristic of PR-systems is the threshold to the parliament, which generates motives to vote for small parties near the threshold. For example small parties may function as coalition partners to larger parties, why it could be a reason for supporters of the larger one to vote for the minor party. In line with this reasoning, Gilljam and Holmberg label voting to help a party pass the threshold to the parliament party tactical (partitaktisk) (ibid.). They mean that pass-the-threshold voting could be a tool to strengthen (the politics of) the larger party. On the other hand, voting for a small party within a governmental coalition could also be a sign of a wished direction to the larger party. It could furthermore be a reason to support a party near the threshold to get a more diverse selection of government later on. In these cases the tactical pass-the threshold voting is thus more future oriented. It is pass the threshold voting most research on tactical voting in PR-systems refers to (Holmberg 1984; Tsbelis 1986; Holmberg 2000; Oscarsson & Holmberg 2008). In Sweden it is sometimes labeled comrade four per cent (kamrat fyra procent), referring to the threshold to the parliament (and historically to Social Democratic supporters voting for the considerably smaller Left Party (see Holmberg 1984:45)). Many studies have also looked at how widespread tactical voting is. In plurality systems, the percentage varies considerably. If all voters are included around 6 8 per cent are estimated to vote tactically (Heath et al. 1994; Alvarez & Nagler 2000). If future oriented tactical voting in a broad sense is included in the analysis the percentage is about twice as high, according to Franklin et al. (1994). In the Swedish proportional representation system, the percentage 12

13 tactical pass-the-threshold voters is about 1 per cent, according to self-reported answers (Holmberg 2000:112). Pass-the-threshold-voting is however a very narrow definition of tactical voting. 3.3 Explaining tactical voting Some studies also try to explain the presence of tactical voting. Most studies confirm Downs s arguments on the importance of the composition of party preferences. In plurality system, tactical voting is related to small chances for the favorite party to be elected, indifference between the two most preferred parties and low party identification (Niemi et al. 1992; Franklin et al. 1994; Heath & Evans 1994; Alvarez & Nagler 2000). Some studies from the Swedish proportional system show that tactical voting is more common among voters who have switched parties from one election to the other, i.e. volatile voters (Holmberg 2000:112). In Sweden tactical voting is also found to be slightly related to education, political interest and knowledge (Gilljam & Holmberg 1990:292). 3.4 Contribution of the study Previous research on tactical voting in the Swedish system in general focuses on pass-thethreshold voting. On the other hand, there is no systematic investigation of what different kinds of tactical considerations voters use. This thesis will fill this gap. The study will test Downs s (1957) theory of rational voting on a contemporary PR-context. It will see if the tactical considerations Downs discusses are present among voters. Furthermore, the study will test individual characteristics related to tactical voting. 3.5 Research questions What kinds of party tactical considerations are present among voters in a contemporary PRsystem? Are there both short term and future oriented tactical considerations? Which individual characteristics are related to tactical voting? 13

14 4 Empirical investigation 4.1 Case: Sweden A clear example of a complicated and changing party strategic situation in proportional representation electoral systems is Sweden. Here the Social Democratic party was for long the dominant government party, but the last decade the bourgeois parties have challenged this position. At the prospect of the 2006 election, the four bourgeois parties for the first time outspokenly and closely co-operated in the Alliance, aiming at getting into office. This was successful: the Alliance succeeded in winning the election. Approaching the 2010 election the bourgeoisie parties stayed with the Alliance, whereas the Social Democrats for the first time co-operated with the Green Party and the Left Party in another government alternative, the Red-Greens. In a Swedish perspective, this was an extraordinary clear government alternative situation. From Downs s perspective, this could be argued to encourage strategic considerations. It could lead to 1) voting for any of the parties within the main government alternatives, to make the vote count (short-term tactical voting) 4 2) signal oriented voting, if the voter disliked the favorite party s recent development (future oriented tactical voting) Therefore the Swedish general election 2010 is an interesting case to investigate in regard to tactical voting. There are three main reasons to choose this election as the specific case. The main reason is that it provided many different opportunities to vote tactically: there were larger and smaller parliamentary parties, as well as a couple of outsiders, and proposed government coalitions. It should therefore be possible to study different sorts of tactical considerations. The second reason is that this election is a recent example. This could reveal trends. The third reason is pragmatic: there was available, relevant individual level data from the 2010 election. 4.2 Data The data for the study comes from the 2010 Internet Campaign panel (E-panelen) in the 2010 Swedish general election, conducted within the Multidisciplinary research on Opinion and 4 This was in fact encouraged by Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt and minister of finance Anders Borg, who late in the election campaign encouraged the Swedes to vote for a stable Alliance government, to keep the xenophobic party Sweden Democrats out of influence (DN ). This is not a unique Swedish phenomenon: parties tend to emphasize strategic factors in election campaigns (van der Eijk & Franklin 2009:106). 14

15 Democracy institute (MOD), University of Gothenburg. This election study is an Internet based citizen-panel with five sequential questionnaires, four pre-election and one postelection. They were conducted the four weeks before and the week directly after the general election in 19 September 2010 (weeks 34 38). About respondents were recruited, of which 4300 participated in all surveys (Dahlberg et al. 2011). The questionnaires for each week of the panel contained several questions on political attitudes and thoughts about the general election. At each stage, the respondent got a part of the questions. That means that some respondents got one question one week, while others got the same question the week before or after. 5 The panel is self-recruited 6 and males 7, relatively young people with high education and high political interest in urban areas are over-represented (Nilsson et al. 2007; Dahlberg et al. 2011). In the 2010 panel, supporters for the largest parties, the Social Democrats and the Moderate Party, were underrepresented (Dahlberg et al. 2011). This is beneficiary for this study in the sense that supporters for smaller parties are represented. Future oriented tactical voting should therefore have a chance to be revealed. Furthermore, in a complicated PR-context, tactical voting is supposed to be somewhat more widespread among politically sophisticated voters. Therefore different kinds of tactical considerations should have a chance to be present in this sample. Moreover the sample is large: 1746 respondents answered the question relevant for the dependent variable. This increases the generalizability of the study. Of course there could be ways of tactical reasoning that have not been covered, but the size and character of the sample should strengthen the generalizability. The explanatory part of the study should be somewhat less representative, since individual characteristics are more influential. Still, important background factors such as age and education vary in the panel. The explanatory part will make it possible to reveal tendencies, which could be tested in future research. 4.3 Dependent variable: tactical considerations Many studies on tactical voting use voters self-reported answers on reasons to vote for a party as a measurement of tactical voting (see e.g. Niemi et al. 1992). This thesis will start from this perspective, as it aims at discovering different kinds of tactical reasoning. As a second step, this method will be complemented with elements from another tradition in tactical voting research, which compares voters party preference with vote or vote intention 5 Some questions were only given to a part of the respondents. Therefore the sample varies in the forthcoming explanatory analyses. 6 via for example Internet sites and local morning papers 7 In the 2010 panel 61 per cent of the respondents were men (Dahlberg et al. 2011). 15

16 (Gilljam and Holmberg 1990; 1993; Alvarez & Nagler 2000). If the voter votes (or intend to vote) for another party than the first party preference, the vote is considered as tactical. A critique against using this method uniquely is that there are other reasons than party tactical ones to vote for another party than the first preference, for example certain candidates, random or trends. In this thesis the comparison between party preference and vote is on the other hand combined with self-reported voting motivations, which strengthens the coding of a vote as tactical. The open-ended question that was analyzed to reveal tactical considerations in the first step is the following question in the post-election stage of the panel: Why did you vote the way you did in the 2010 Swedish general election? 8 This question makes is possible to mention different kinds of reasons, such as tactical aspects respondents answered the question. The participants answered it the week immediately after the general election, which is very beneficiary for the study: responses on open-ended questions related to voting decision tend to be more valid the closer to the election they are given (Alvarez & Nagler 2000). I read and analyzed the answers repeatedly and developed and refined the sub-categories of tactical voting until all answers could be categorized (see sect. 4.4). The first coding of an answer as tactical was rather inclusive: if tactical considerations were mentioned to have influenced the final vote to some extent, the answer was coded as tactical (tactical considerations). A reason for this inclusive categorization is that tactical voting according to previous studies is very rare in PR-systems (Holmberg 2000:112). This implies that some kinds of tactical reasoning among voters may have been uncovered. The second step was to reveal strict tactical voting, i.e. voting for another party than one s first party preference. In line with the reasoning on when to define a vote as tactical or not (sect. 3.1), voting for one of equally preferred parties was also included. Since tactical voting is supposed to be something conscious, a subjective measurement of party preference was considered relevant. 9 Most previous studies on the Swedish system compare the voter s response on a question on what is his or her best party with the actual vote. 10 Unfortunately, there was no best party -question in the 2010 Internet campaign panel. Instead there was a 8 Varför röstade du som du gjorde i riksdagsvalet? Q2W38 9 An alternative would have been to measure the voter s objective party preference through for example his or her attitudes in certain ideological and/or performance-oriented issues. 10 See Gilljam and Holmberg (1993). 16

17 question on how much the voter likes a party on an 11 point feeling thermometer scale from ( 5) to +5. The rating on the feeling thermometer was therefore used to reveal strict tactical voting. 11 For all responses that were coded as tactical in the first step, party scores on the feeling thermometer were compared with the final vote. 12 If the respondent voted for another party than the first party preference, or if preferences for the most preferred parties were tied (had been given the same score), the voting was coded as strict tactical. 13 To conclude, the first coding of an answer as tactical is rather inclusive, in line with the definition of tactical considerations. The second coding is on the other hand more exclusive, in line with the definition of strict tactical voting. Both codings are based on voters own motivations. What is investigated is whether the respondent said he or she let tactical considerations guide voting decision, and, for strict tactical voting, whether these considerations made the voter chose another party than the most or an equally preferred one. A reservation with this measurement is that motivations are not the same thing as real motives. The answers might for example have been influenced by what was seen as appropriate to express for the moment. In this specific election, it could for example have been seen as politically correct to express tactical motives. At the same time, if tactical voting was seen as appropriate, this could also have influenced voters actual behavior. It is also possible that some voters who did not mention tactical considerations in fact had tactical motives. If so, some tactical voters may have been included in the non-tactical category. It is however very difficult to reveal voters real motives, since they may even be unconscious. At least the self-reported answers reveal what the voters themselves consider being important factors for vote choice. 11 The feeling-thermometer could be argued to be more emotionally oriented than the best party -question. It is not certain that liking a party the most is the same thing as preferring it from an ideological or competenceoriented point of view. The feeling thermometer is therefore a somewhat imprecise measurement of party preference. Still it was the best indicator of (subjective) party preference in this investigation. 12 Here final vote was considered a better measurement than vote intention a couple of days before the election (although some research shows that voters tend to over-report having voted for the winning party (Alvarez & Nagler 2000)). It is possible that the voter changes vote intentions during the last couple of days, especially if tactically oriented. Furthermore the response on actual vote was given the week directly after the election, which strengthens validity. 13 The feeling-thermometer question was only asked in the pre-elections stages of the Internet campaign panel. That means that the score on the sympathy-scale and vote were not measured simultaneously. The attitudes vis-à-vis parties (and the score on the feeling thermometer) might, for some voters, continue changing until the Election Day. However the voter s general attitude towards the main parties during the election period should have been covered. 17

18 The answers on the reason to vote for a party-question were coded into four broad categories: short-term tactical, future oriented tactical, general tactical and non-tactical. The two broad tactical categories have been composed with Downs (1957) as the theoretical reference. 4.4 Presence of tactical considerations Previous studies on the Swedish system have identified a couple of different sorts of tactical reasoning. Holmberg (1984:41) identifies three sorts of tactical voting: pass-the-thresholdvoting, voting for a party represented in the parliament (not to waste one s vote) and voting for a large and strong party. In a precedent study Gilljam and Holmberg also discuss some future oriented tactical motives, related to sending an ideological direction. They label this kind of voting issue oriented tactical (saktaktisk) (Gilljam & Holmberg 1990:291). All these tactical considerations are present in the Internet campaign panel material as well. Furthermore, there are tactical considerations related to outspoken party co-operation: some voters argue to have voted for another party than the most preferred one, due to proposed government coalitions. There are also tactical motives related to increasing diversity of the party system. Both short-term and future oriented tactical thinking are thus present. The tactical answers are presented in these two broad categories, in line with Downs s view of voters different time perspectives Short-term tactical considerations The answers in this category have in common that they relate to the short term outcome of the election and the expected impact of certain parties. Within this category, five main types of answers were identified: voting for a party that is represented in the parliament (not to waste one s vote ), voting to support a strong governmental alternative, voting adjusted to present or probable government coalitions, voting for a large and strong party and voting to help a party pass the threshold to the parliament. This category tactical voting could be seen as an extended version of Holmberg (1984); Holmberg does not discuss motives related to government coalitions. The first type of short term tactical considerations is related to voting for a party within the parliament, to make the vote count. This kind of voting is similar to tactical voting for big parties in plurality systems, not to waste one s vote, and could be labeled impact-voting. If there is a party that is very much disliked, there might be an extra incentive to do this. The following statement is an example: 18

19 I intended to vote for the Feminist Party 14, but since the Sweden Democrats were so successful I wanted to give my vote to a party that is represented in the parliament. The second type of short term tactical considerations is also related to the impact of the vote, but more outspokenly to government alternatives. These kinds of considerations are related to supporting a governmental alternative that is considered to be strong enough to gain the majority of seats, to hinder a disliked alternative from getting influence. It could therefore be labeled majority-voting. The following answer expresses this: I planned to vote for the Green Party, but I wanted the Bourgeois alliance to get the majority of seats, so that the Sweden Democrats would not come to hold the balance of parliamentary power 15. In the cases mentioned above, the voters thus adjusted their votes according to a disliked alternative. The third variant of short term tactical considerations is also related to adjusting the vote according to present or expected political coalitions, and even more directly. If the voter does not like the favorite party s coalition partners, he or she might choose another alternative. Since it has to do with ties between parties, it is labeled relationship-voting. The following statement exemplifies this: [ ] I would rather have voted for the Green Party, but not when a vote there is a vote for the Social Democrats and the Left Party. The fourth type of short term tactical considerations is related to voting for a large party with good chances to become influential big party-voting. In these motivations the party s main opponent is sometimes mentioned: there are several voters who express they would like the Moderate Party to become larger than the Social Democrats, and vice versa. This voting thus has a strategic aspect related to main competitors. The following statements are examples of big-party voting: I wanted the Moderate Party to outperform the Social Democrats. Otherwise I would have voted for the Liberal Party Feministiskt Initiativ (FI) 15 vågmästarroll 19

20 First of all: I concluded I wanted to vote for the big left party In the latter case, it is not evident that the tactical considerations made the voter switch vote intentions, but the answer indicates they may have functioned as a tie-breaker. 17 The fifth type of short term tactical considerations is voting to help a party pass the threshold, pass-the-threshold-voting. This kind of voting could both be related to supporting a governmental alternative, and a wish to see a certain ideological direction or greater diversity. In the latter cases, this kind of voting has future oriented elements (see below). The following answer is an example of general pass-the-threshold-voting. I support-voted. To make them pass the 4 per cent threshold Future oriented tactical considerations This category includes answers related to sending a signal to a favorite party. Answers related to wanting a more diverse selection of parties are also included, in line with Downs s theory on future oriented rational voting. The first variant of future oriented tactical motives is related to expressing a wished direction to a favorite party, a type of signaling-voting. The signaling-voting was sometimes difficult to distinguish from more general protest motives (with the society as a whole as the target, for example). This refined a criterion for signaling-voting to be related to the recent development of a favorite party, as well as a wished direction. The following answer was coded as tactical: I wanted to punish the Liberal Party. I am dissatisfied with their proposals on burqua restrictions as well as language tests for immigrants. The Center Party is fair enough, with decent immigration politics. 16 Folkpartiet 17 It is not obvious to include big-party voting within the definition of tactical considerations. Big party-voting could for example be related to prestige-thinking, rather than governmental outcome. The example above indicates that. Still it is clearly related to the party context and the relationships between parties, which constitute the prerequisites of government formation. Therefore big-party voting was seen as a tactical consideration. 20

21 The voter cited above is apparently dissatisfied with a favorite party s handling of some integration related issues, and therefore choses another party with fair enough politics. This could be seen as a tactical, targeted signal of disaffection and an expression of wished direction. On the other hand, answers which express dissatisfaction more generally, without references to any party voted for previously, were coded as non-tactical. The following statement exemplifies this: Because of failed integration. The distinction between future oriented tactical considerations and general protest motives does thus depend on how specific the voter has been in his or her motivations and whether there are references to parties, both backwards (past development) and forward (wished direction). It is possible that some voters with unspecified protest motives in fact had tactical arguments. However, if the voter gives a more nuanced motivation, he or she should reasonably have more tactically oriented motives for party choice. The second variant of future oriented tactical considerations is voting to increase diversity in the party system, and could therefore be labeled diversity-voting. This type of answers includes those who explicitly say they want to vote for a smaller party, to have more alternatives in coming elections or to balance the party system. The following statement is an example: I wanted to support a bourgeois government, but I think several parties enrich politics. So that the Moderate Party does not become too strong. This is related to a more diverse selection of parties, and a more balanced governmental outcome. Therefore these kinds of considerations are seen as tactical. The categorization of future oriented tactical considerations could be seen as a refined version of the issue oriented tactical voting (saktaktik) discussed by Gilljam and Holmberg (1990; 1993). Gilljam and Holmberg define issue oriented tactical voters as voters who want to see another political direction in a certain issue. In this thesis, to be coded as tactical it furthermore takes a negative reference to the development of a specific party or to diversity-oriented motives. 21

22 If both short-term and future-oriented motives were mentioned, the answer was coded according to the most emphasized factor General tactical considerations This category includes answers that mention tactical or strategic with no further explanation, for example: strategy Summary: tactical considerations The main kinds of tactical considerations related to tactical voting are summarized in the table below. Table 1 Variants of tactical voting Short term Future oriented 1. impact-voting 1. signaling-voting 2. majority-voting 2. diversity-voting 3. relationship-voting 4. big party-voting 5. pass-the-threshold-voting Non-tactical reasons The remaining answers, which expressed no party tactical motives, were categorized as nontactical. Two examples of non-tactical motives are the following answers: For ideological reasons. The best choice for me. 18 If a respondent with general tactical considerations had also answered question 7 in the same post-election stage (Do you remember your way of reasoning when you finally decided what party to vote for?) ( Kommer du ihåg hur du resonerade i det ögonblick då du fattade det slutgiltiga beslutet om hur du skulle rösta i riksdagsvalet?) and that answer clarified the tactical considerations, the answer was coded according to that motivation. 22

23 In sum, there are thus four main voting reason categories: short-term tactical considerations, future oriented tactical considerations, general tactical considerations and non-tactical reasons. 19 For detailed coding of tactical answers, see Appendix. 5. Presence of tactical voting 5.1 Presence of tactical categories 1746 respondents answered the relevant open-ended question on reasons to vote for certain party. 20 I read all answers repeatedly, and coded them into any of the broad voting reasons categories outlined above. 173 of the answers were identified as tactical, of which most were short-term tactical (Table 2). Table 2 Presence of tactical categories Category Short-term tactical 134 Future oriented tactical 28 General tactical 11 Non-tactical 1556 Missing 17 Total 1746 Data: Q2W38, 2010 Internet campaign panel, MOD N The frequencies should be seen in relation to the material, and not as representative for the Swedish electorate. In the Internet campaign panel people with high education and high political interest are overrepresented, why tactical voting should be somewhat more widespread here (Gilljam & Holmberg 1990:292). Therefore the percentage tactical responses is probably higher here than in the electorate as a whole. 19 There is also a missing category, which includes respondents who answered they did not vote in the general election or whose answers did not relate to voting decision. 20 Why did you vote the way you did in the general election? ( Varför röstade du som du gjorde i riksdagsvalet? ) Q2 W38. The response rate was about 60 per cent if including all participants (14434) in the panel (2887 of these got the open-ended question Q2W38 on vote reason). The response rate would be higher if including only the active participants (Dahlberg et al. 2011). 23

24 5.2 Presence of strict tactical voting As a second step voters scores on the party feeling thermometer were used to reveal strict tactical voting respondents had complete values on the feeling thermometer and final vote choice. Of these 106 respondents were coded as tactical at the first stage. Of the shortterm tactical answers, 85 per cent were coded as strict tactical, whereas 76 per cent of the future oriented tactical answers were coded as strict. 22 All general tactical answers were coded as strict (Table 3). Table 3 Tactical considerations or strict tactical voting Tactical category N Short-term strict 66 Short-term considerations 12 Future oriented strict 16 Future oriented considerations 5 General strict 7 General considerations 0 Total 106 Data: Q2W38 and feeling thermometer ratings weeks 34 37, 2010 Internet campaign panel, MOD This implies that some tactical reasoning, especially future oriented, is incorporated in voters general attitudes towards parties, as van der Brug et al. (2007) suggest; some voters who have 21 The feeling thermometer is based on the question: This question concerns how much one like or dislikes a party. Where would you personally place the different parties on the following scale? (Q28W34, Q33W35, Q33W36; Q80W37) Scale from (-5 ) (+5), where (-5) stands for strongly dislike, (0) for indifferent and (+5) for like very much. (Den här frågan gäller hur mycket man gillar respektive ogillar de politiska partierna. Var skulle du personligen vilja placera de olika partierna på nedanstående skala?) (-5) ogillar starkt, (0) varken ogillar eller gillar, (+5) gillar starkt.) All seven parliamentary parties were evaluated, as well as the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna), the Pirate Party (Piratpartiet) and the Feminist Party (Feministiskt initiativ). If the respondent answered the question at several stages, the rating closest to the election was used. None of the respondents who reported having voted for other parties than the ones rated on the feeling thermometer scale were coded as tactical in the first step, and were consequently included in the non-tactical category. Those who reported having returned blank ballot-papers were coded as non-tactical in the strict coding, since blank votes show no wished direction. 22 To be coded as strict tactical, the voter must have mentioned tactical motives in the open-ended question on reasons to vote for a party and have voted for another party than the one given the highest score on the feeling thermometer, or have had tied first political preferences (two or more most preferred parties were given the same score) (se footnote 21). 24