Amitav Acharya Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Nanyang Technological University

Transcription

1 Amitav Acharya Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Nanyang Technological University Terrorism and Security in Asia: Redefining Regional Order?i Working Paper No. 113 October 2004 The views presented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia Research Centre or Murdoch University. Copyright is held by the author(s) of each working paper: No part of this publication may be republished, reprinted or reproduced in any form without the permission of the paper s author(s). National Library of Australia. ISBN: ISSN:

2 We fear flying, we fear travelling, we fear certain countries, we fear certain religions, we fear certain people, we fear the shoes they wear, we fear cargo ships, imported goods, letters and parcels in fact we fear everything around us we are going to feel this fear and the consequences for a very long time. Mahathir Mohammad, speaking at the 11 th Annual Meeting of the Asia Pacific Parliamentary Forum. September 11, 2001 ushered in the post-post-cold War era in Asian security. The pre- September 11 regional security environment had been shaped by four factors: regional concerns about the changing regional balance of power due to the rise of China and the prospects for Sino-US power rivalry; the danger of war in persisting regional flashpoints such as Korea, Taiwan, Kashmir and the Spratly Islands dispute; the political and strategic fallout of the Asian economic crisis, including domestic strife in democratizing Indonesia; and the emergence of regional multilateral cooperation, with the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). While the above sources of regional instability have not disappeared, they have been overshadowed by the impact of the terrorist attacks of September 11, This paper analyses the major implications of terrorism and counter-terrorism post-september 11 for Asian security order, with a particular focus on Southeast Asia, which has been dubbed by the Bush administration as the second front in the war on terror. While a good deal has been written and said about the threat posed by terrorism in Southeast Asia 2, there has been little work analyzing the impact of terrorism and the war on terror on Asian regional order as a whole. The paper focuses on four areas which would be relevant to such an assessment: (1) The growing place of terrorism in the national threat perceptions and the security strategies of states; (2) the US strategic re-engagement in Southeast Asia as part of its war on terror and its impact on the regional balance of power; (3) the impact of the war on terror on domestic politics and state-society relations; and (4) the state of regional cooperation against terrorism and its impact on regional stability. The New Terrorism as a Security Threat Two events underscored Southeast Asia s place in the global war on terror launched by the United States following the September 11 attacks. First, in conjunction with the deployment of US troops to the Southern Philippines in January 2002 to participate in counterinsurgency operations, the United States has labeled the region as the second front in the global war on terror. Southeast Asia earned this labeling for two ostensible reasons the existence of a terrorist network (Jemaah Islamiah or JI) and the perceived links between this and Al-Qaeda

3 and the insurgency carried out by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Southern Philippines (Gershman 2002). The Bali bombings that killed more than 200 people on 12 October 2002 were a second important turning point in drawing international attention to Southeast Asia s vulnerability to terror. Prior to Bali, Al-Qaeda had generally shied away from easy soft targets in favor of attacks on hard targets that represent US power, such as the USS Cole, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. After Bali, as a New York Times report put it, the targets of attacks by Al-Qaeda took a 180 degree turn from embassies, which were becoming better protected, to so called soft targets like resorts and schools (Bonner and Perlez 2002). Even before the Bali bombings, an ASEAN spokesman, M.C. Abad, had claimed that today s international terrorism is probably the most serious security threat in the region since the Indochina conflict (Parameswaran 2002). Within Southeast Asia, however, perspectives differ as to the extent of danger posed by terrorism to the region. Singapore s perspective is largely in tune with the US in so far as both see Islamic terrorism as the main danger to national and regional security. Singapore s Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for Security and Defence, Tony Tan, described terrorism as the most immediate security threat facing the region (Agence France Presse 2002). In his view, the new terrorism is a networked, multinational enterprise with a global reach which aims to inflict death and destruction on a catastrophic scale (Agence France Presse 2002). The Indonesian perspective (at least under the Megawati government) has diverged from the overly strategic view of terror held by Singapore and the US. Neither Malaysia nor Indonesia has acknowledged terrorism as an existential threat in the manner of Singapore, Australia or the United States. For Indonesia, terrorism is a political issue, closely tied to domestic political dynamics. Counter-terrorism and electoral politics made uneasy bedfellows in a majority Muslim nation. Not surprisingly therefore, there exists considerable divergence among Asian countries over the definition of the sources of terrorism. Malaysia and Indonesia are wary of what they see as the US attempt to associate terrorism with Islam. For Singapore, the detention of several members of Jemaah Islamiah in 2002 with suspected links to Osama bin Laden s Al Qaeda network was reason enough to identify terrorism with radical Islam. Singapore sees the terrorist threat at home and in the immediate neighbourhood as the result of a combination of local muslim radicals and the global terrorist network Al-Qaeda. Eddie Teo, from Singapore s Prime Minister s Office, notes that: It may not be politically correct to focus on the relationship between Islam and terrorism. However, the common thread that

4 seemed to united JI members was their desire for spiritual revival What they were taught was that to be a good, genuine Muslim, you would have to hate the West, bring down secular, pro-western governments in the region and pave the way for an Islamic regional government (Teo 2002). By contrast, former Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, angrily refuted reports linking Malaysian political and religious organizations to the global Al-Qaeda network (BBC World Edition 2002). Thailand conveniently prefers to associate terrorist incidents as the work of the thugs and gangsters (Perrin 2002). The Thaksin government denied the possibility of Thailand s southern provinces being used as training bases and staging sites for terrorist attacks, a denial that included its madrasahs [being] used by the Muslim radicals or that the JI had even come into the country (Perrin 2002). In other parts of Asia, perceptions of terrorist threat and national responses to it are shaped by domestic concerns as well as alliance compulsions. India views terrorism as a longstanding problem that has only since September 11 begun to receive the recognition it deserved from the international community. India sees itself as the original setting or even a testing ground for terrorist tactics, citing examples of the 1993 bombing of the Mumbai Stock Exchange and the December 1999 hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight by Pakistani nationals forced to land in Afghanistan, as precursors to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon using hijacked airliners (Central Bureau of Investigation 2004; HindustanTimes.com 2000). China also sees terrorism in terms of its own preexisting domestic security challenges. Its policy framework equates terrorism with separatism and extremist activities in its Western provinces. Neither Japan nor South Korea face threats from Islamic terrorist organizations, indeed, Japan s main brush with terrorism came from an indigenous group, Aum Shinrikyo. Both continue to be preoccupied chiefly with the North Korean challenge. Beyond this, it is the compulsion to join the US-led war on terror in order to maintain their alliance relationships with the US, rather than an existential threat of terrorism, which shapes the security policies of the two states, leading to their support for the US attack on Iraq (although only Korea provided combat troops, Japan s support being limited to logistics). Given the differing understanding of terrorism as a security threat, it should be hardly surprising that differences exist over counter-terrorism strategies and the resources channeled towards them even among states where terrorism is perceived as a direct security threat. At one extreme is the Philippines, where terrorism is treated mainly, if not exclusively, as a form of heightened insurgency carried out by the MILF in Southern Philippines which must be

5 defeated through military means. For India, given the close links between terrorism and the Kashmir issue, counter-terrorism has included a strong, or even dominant, military aspect. Singapore, which sees itself as a tempting target of Islamic terrorists because of its wealth, the heavy concentration of its national infrastructure within a limited geographic space, and its close security links with the US (which had become closer since September 11), focuses heavily on the hybrid politico-security approach of homeland security, which stressed infrastructure protection and heightened surveillance (Agence France Presse 2003). As the chief theatre of the perceived terrorist threat in Asia, Southeast Asia has seen a debate over the global versus local roots and dimensions of terrorism. 3 In general, terrorism experts see Southeast Asia as a veritable shelter for global terrorist networks, including local militants who cut their teeth in Afghanistan, and the Al-Qaeda group in constant search for porous borders, lax security laws and governmental incapacity. In this view, without Al- Qaeda s ideological and financial support and training, local extremist groups could not have carried out attacks such as those that happened in Bali or in Jakarta. Critics of this view argue that terrorism in Southeast Asia is chiefly a local phenomenon and that focusing on the Al- Qaeda aspect constitutes a serious misrepresentation of the root causes of regional instability, which lie in poverty, injustice and authoritarianism. There is little question, however, that even the most local of terrorist groups have some regional and international inspiration and connection, riled as they are by a common dislike for America s pro-israeli policies and drawing inspiration from the pan-regional aspirations for statehood of Jemaah Islamiah and the pan-islamic ideology of Al-Qaeda. The fusing of local objectives directed against incumbent regimes and the perceived system of neglect and repression, with the regional aspiration for an Islamic superstate (which is a goal of Jemaah Islamiah) and the international ideological campaigns of Al-Qaeda makes it imperative that terrorism in Southeast Asia or Asia be understood as being at once a local and a global phenomenon. The principal regional terrorist organization in Southeast Asia is the Jemaah Islamiah (JI). JI s organizational structure cuts across existing national boundaries its four mantiqs (regions) are: Singapore and Malaysia; Indonesia; Sabah, Sulawesi and Southern Philippines; and Australia. There is evidence of networking among terrorist groups across national frontiers in Southeast Asia, links forged out of strategic and tactical calculations. The JI maintains links with MILF, which allows it to maintain training camps within its own training facility in Camp Abu Bakar. To further its regional networking, the JI set up the Rabitatul Mujahidin, a regional caucus of leaders of various Southeast Asian terror organizations

6 sponsored by JI s Abu Bakar Bashir in 1999 so that the groups could co-operate and share resources for training, procurement of arms, financial assistance and terrorist operations (Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs 2003). Comprising JI and representatives from MILF, groups in Aceh, Rohingyas of Myanmar and Sulawesi, as well as an unnamed group from Southern Thailand, this group held 3 meetings in Malaysia between 1999 and late The Philippines MILF Camp Abu Bakar provides training for GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) recruits in Aceh. The Indonesian Islamic Liberation Front (IILF) provided funding support for rebel groups in Southern Philippines. Singapore s JI sought support from transnational networks, especially from the training camps in the Southern Philippines. Apart from intra-regional links, extremist groups in Southeast Asia also maintain trans-regional ties. The JI is the group which enjoys the closest relationship with the Al- Qaeda organization in the region (Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs 2003). From its recruitment in Afghanistan in the 1990s to the support it enjoyed from Al-Qaeda when it planned to attack US targets in Singapore, JI s links to Al-Qaeda have been clear as evidenced by the personal rapport between JI s Hambali and Al-Qaeda s Mohamed Atef. Solidarity against prosecution and the possibility of diffusing radical ideologies from the Middle East make for excellent grounds for regional terrorist groups to band together. Weathering formative experiences such as the war in Afghanistan have also tightened the bonds between members of the scattered alumni of the Al-Qaeda (estimated to number some 200) network. Al-Qaeda s need for safe havens to conduct their operations, recruitment, and training, after being expelled from Afghanistan and unable to penetrate the closed and heavily policed homelands of the repressive Gulf states, have brought them to the more friendly and open grounds of Southeast Asia. Despite these regional and extra-regional linkages, terrorism in Asia is not the single overarching and all-encompassing threat it is often made out to be. These groups differ in terms of motivations, targets and tactics. Some groups seek to punish rival ethnic groups in a situation of ethnic hatred and conflict an example being the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) in Ambon, Indonesia. Others are challenging governments which they view as corrupt, undemocratic, inefficient and in many cases, subservient to the West (or some combination of these factors). These types of movements are more common in the Middle East (Egypt and Saudi Arabia for example) than in Asia, but the goal of replacing existing regimes with ones based on Islamic principles is an important underlying factor driving Southeast Asian extremist groups as well. There are also those that seek independence or autonomy from

7 existing nation states. These are classical separatist movements who are now branded as terrorist by governments and analysts partly with a view to de-legitimize them examples include the MILF and Abu Sayaaf in the Southern Philippines and the Uighurs in China. Neither has the concern with terrorism led to the disappearance of other sources of regional conflict. While terrorism is touted as a major threat to Asian stability, in reality, the potential for conflict in the Taiwan Straits and in the Korean Peninsula are more important regional dangers with global ramifications. While the war on terror might have dampened the Indo-Pakistan and Sino-US rivalries, as will be discussed in the following section, it has not necessarily engendered greater stability in the regional balance of power. The US Reengagement and the Regional Balance of Power The second major impact of September 11 on Asian security order is the increased strategic involvement and role of the US in regional security affairs. Rising US power and influence predates September 11, but its engagement in extending that hegemony is part of the post- September 11 era. Increased levels of military engagement and security assistance to states in the region testify to this trend. Assistance ranges from operations in the Philippines to cooperation with Indonesia and Malaysia. Operations in the Philippines kicked off in January 2002 with a deployment of 660 US troops to Southern Philippines to participate in what was termed as hostage rescue and counterinsurgency operations. A direct combat role was opposed by domestic Filipino forces. The United States also has an agreement with Malaysia to set up a counter-terrorism center. The post September 11 regional order in Asia appears to be a quasi-hegemonic order, founded upon US military preponderance but without the conditions to ensure its legitimation. In this context, the strategic gains made by the US could be offset by the declining legitimacy of its strategic role. A strategic preponderance will not produce stable regional order unless it also acquires legitimacy. But rising US power and growing strategic engagement has been accompanied by what might be called a widening legitimacy-deficit of US hegemony. Anti-Americanism is on the rise in the region, egged on by a combination of fear and dislike. While most regional governments condemned the September 11 attacks on the US and sympathised with its citizenry, this did not translate into support for the response to the attacks. There were significant gaps between governmental responses and popular ones. Though it can hardly be

8 labeled as a clash of civilizations, resentment of the US remains visibly widespread among regional populaces. In Malaysia and Indonesia, national leaders spoke out against the US military strikes in Iraq. Throughout Southeast Asia popular perceptions of the US response to September 11 is seen as focusing too much on military and too little on addressing the root causes, notwithstanding the increase in US aid budget and assistance to governments such as that in Pakistan, Philippines and Indonesia. The US is also seen as doing little to address the Palestinian cause, a root cause of global Islamic extremism and terrorism. Hence, in taking a cautious stance on the US role, governments of Muslim-majority states are very much constrained by their own concern for regime legitimacy and survival. Supporting US invites danger to regimes in the absence of concessions by the US on Palestine. The US attack on Iraq has added substantially to such perceptions. Attacks on a Muslim nation were openly opposed by Malaysia on the basis of American double standards. The Bush administration s obsession with Iraq was seen as detracting from the war on terror and producing the neglect of the crisis in the Korean peninsula over North Korea s nuclear programme. While the US is engaged in the war on terror, relations among the major powers in Asia have shifted. Conventional wisdom has it that these benefit the US. Most notable of them are the US relations with China, which have improved markedly. International Relations experts Wang Jisi and Yuan Jian concur that China has been taken off the list of America s enemies post-september 11, and that there is a new willingness to address and resolve problems in the US-China relationship. Richard Solomon, a former Bush Sr official, speaks of improved US-China relations, pointing to a convergence over a number of issues including North Korea and Taiwan. The isolationist and inward-looking note that the Bush administration started on strained Sino-US relations. A different picture emerges now, with the US as an informal member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). US has made in-roads into Central Asia, at China s expense. Yet, the geopolitical gains made by the US in purely strategic terms may be shortlived and offset by countervailing forces. Russia s strategic reassertion in Central Asia may challenge US interests. Other strategic considerations are the emerging uncertainties and challenges to US alliances with its Asian partners mainly Japan s new security role (and China s reaction to that) and the loss of legitimacy Australia holds in the region.

9 The war on terror is supposed to have led to a significant improvement in great power relations. For example, America s preoccupation with terrorism might have led the Bush administration to ease its hardline stance on China, thereby altering the climate of tension and conflict created by the 2001 spy-plane incident off Hainan Island. This has created better prospects for cooperative regional conflict management, one result of which is the six party talks on the Korean peninsula nuclear crisis. Moreover, the war on terror has led to improved relations between the US and India, which in turn creates a better climate for India and Pakistan managing their conflict over Kashmir. But India and China disagreed over the US attack on Iraq and have not supported US appeals for troops to help restore order in post-saddam Iraq. The security ties that the US enjoys with the Philippines could be a setback in the US-China relationship if and when Manila invokes its new ties with the US to back its claims in the Spratly Islands vis-a-vis China. The warmth in Sino-US relations does not ease Sino-US tensions over Taiwan, which has worsened in the past year. The war on terror has a mixed impact on China s geostrategic position. On the one hand, under the pretext of supporting the US-led war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq, Japan has increased its security role, which creates nervousness on the part of the Chinese. The war has also drawn international attention to the status of minorities in China s Xinjiang. The growing US presence in Central Asia diminishes China s clout over the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). On the other hand, China has been expanding its influence in the region through a charm offensive while US remains preoccupied in the war on terror. Terrorism and Domestic Politics: Challenge to Democratization? The war on terror appears to have brought about at least a partial closure of Southeast Asia s democratic moment (Acharya 1999). Prior to September 11, debates about democratization in Asia featured the following questions: Is democracy good for development? Are democratic transitions, such as the one unfurling in Indonesia, a catalyst for regional disorder? However, the regional debate over democratization has undergone a marked shift to focus on two questions: Is the lack of democracy a root cause of terrorism? and Does democracy limit the ability of states to effectively respond to it? 4

10 Before his surprise release from prison in September 2004, Anwar Ibrahim, the deposed and jailed Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia observed: Osama bin-laden and his protégés are the children of desperation; they come from countries where political struggle through peaceful means is futile. In many Muslim countries, political dissent is simply illegal (Anwar Ibrahim 2001). Farish Noor, a Malaysian scholar of Islam, makes a direct link between terrorism and authoritarian politics in Malaysia. It is the absence of democratic culture and practices in the Muslim world in general writes Noor, that leads to the rise of self-proclaimed leaders like the Mullahs of Taliban, Osama bin Laden and our own Mullahs and Osama-wannabes here in Malaysia. And as long as a sense of political awareness and understanding of democracy is not instilled in the hearts and minds of ordinary Muslims the world over we will all remain hostage to a bunch of bigoted fanatics who claim to speak, act and think on our behalf without us knowing so (Noor 2001). But democratization has also been seen as the part of the problem, rather than solution, especially by the region s authoritarian elite. They blame democratization for the rise of terrorist activity in Indonesia. Without comprehensive security regulations such as the internal security acts of Malaysia and Singapore (which can be used to arrest terrorists as much as political opponents; Anwar Ibrahim, arrested under the ISA for charges of sodomy and corruption, vowed to fight for its repeal as one of the first statements he made upon his surprise release in September), Indonesia is seen as lagging in its efforts to tame terror. In the meantime, the war on terror had produced support for the internal security acts feared by prodemocracy forces in the region. The most significant source of this new found support is the US. Rais Yatim, Malaysia s legal affairs minister was able to explain the ISA s importance to a receptive John Ashcroft, the US Attorney General. After today s talks, there is no basis to criticise each other s systems. If they do that, they could jeopardise the credibility of the Patriot Act, Yatim pointedly declared. Ashcroft had endorsed the significance of the ISA (Roberts 2002). Indonesia has faced international pressure to adopt ISA-style security measures which may be out of tune with its new democratic constitution. Terrorism and Regional Security Cooperation: Much Ado? Asia s response to terrorism has been primarily at national and bilateral levels, the latter especially involving the US and to a lesser extent Australia. Bilateral and sub-regional (sub- ASEAN) frameworks seem to have been preferred over purely multilateral ones. Thus, one of

11 the more important initiatives undertaken in the region after September 11 was the signing of a trilateral agreement between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. The Agreement provides for: anti-terrorism exercises as well as combined operations to hunt suspected terrorists, the setting up of hotlines and sharing of airline passenger lists, aimed at speeding intelligence exchanges between the three neighbors. However, all governments realize that to combat terrorism, regional multilateral cooperation is necessary given the transnational nature of the perceived threat. The objective of regional and international cooperation against terrorism has not been so much to develop regional collective mechanisms, but to shore up national capabilities. The UN remains the key multilateral framework in the response of Southeast Asian states to terrorism. An ASEAN Declaration dated 5 November 2001 called upon members to ratify all anti-terrorist conventions, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. It urged compliance with UN instruments and resolutions. In addition, the Convention aims to curb terrorist activity by severing financial sources through the creation of new offences under international law. Countries are required to criminalize the provision or collection of funds used or intended for the use of committing terrorist acts. There are also provisions for the extradition or prosecution of those who raise or provide funds to terrorists. 5 Among Asian regional organizations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has pursued the most ambitious form of security measures against terrorism. This role predates September 11, and is driven by China s efforts to suppress Uighur separatists. The SCO s target is the threat of terrorism, separatism and extremism, a conflation of enemies (since it could conceivably include Tibet and Taiwan) that has become a characteristic of the war on terror waged by Asian countries, and which allows governments to delegitimise demands for self-determination or regional autonomy both domestically and internationally. Among the other Asian regional groupings, 6 ASEAN has also brought terrorism to the centre-stage of its security agenda. One of the first acts of ASEAN after September 11 was to issue, on 5 November 2001, a Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism. The Declaration condemned acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed wherever, whenever and by whomsoever as a profound threat to international peace and security (ASEAN Secretariat 2001). Measures taken by ASEAN to combat terrorism include cooperation amongst law agencies; exchange of information and intelligence on terrorist organizations, their movement and funding; regional capacity building programmes for

12 investigating, detecting, monitoring and reporting of terrorist acts. The Workplan adopted by the Senior officials of the ASEAN Ministers Meeting for Transnational Crime (AMMTC) in Malaysia in May 2002 envisaged establishment of national focal points for information exchange and sharing of technical expertise and best practices through training workshops. Developing a common front against terrorism has been one of the objectives of the idea of ASEAN Security Community pursued by Indonesia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Indonesia 2003). Regional organizations such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) have undertaken a number of initiatives. These include: (1) Promoting common adherence to international conventions on terrorism and integrating them with ASEAN mechanisms; (2) calling for the early signing/ratification of or accession to anti-terrorist conventions; (3) designating principal contact points in all ASEAN member countries on counter-terrorism (CT); (4) holding meetings of ASEAN Police Chiefs to discuss practical measures and explore avenues of cooperation against terrorism; (5) increasing cooperation among front-line law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism and sharing best practices ; (6) providing for greater exchange of information/intelligence on terrorists and terrorist organizations, their movement and funding, and other information needed to protect lives, property and the security of all modes of travel; (7) development of regional capacity building programmes to enhance the existing capabilities of ASEAN member countries to investigate, detect, monitor and report on terrorist acts; and (8) measures against terrorist financing such as that undertaken by the ARF. The last measure has been particularly important for the ARF which, in a 30 July 2002 declaration, called for freezing terrorist assets; international cooperation on the exchange of information and outreach; compliance and reporting. It has formed an Inter-Sessional Group (ISG) on counter- Terrorism and Translational Crime (co-chaired by Malaysia and US). In dealing with terrorism, regional groupings have been better at issuing declarations and identifying principles than developing concrete operational counter-terrorism mechanisms. Cooperation undertaken by regional organizations focuses on intelligence and information exchanges and regional capacity building. Several factors militate against closer counter-terrorism cooperation in Southeast Asia. These include different national priorities and interests, domestic political consideration and sensitivities, inter-state suspicions, and a lack of capacity to implement counter-terrorism measures, which in turn, leads to a dependence on outside powers. This explains the high level of cooperation with Western countries, chiefly the US. Hence, a key security framework to emerge after September 11 is

13 the ASEAN-United States of America Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism, which seeks to create a framework for cooperation to prevent, disrupt and combat international terrorism through the exchange and flow of information, intelligence and capacity-building (ASEAN Secretariat 2002). US security policies aimed at drawing Asian countries into its war on terror have also proved a source of intra-regional tension. A prime example of this is the Regional Maritime Security Initiative, proposed in early 2004, under which the US would have carried out military interdiction of vessels suspected of carrying terrorists. This unilateral declaration of intent received support from Singapore, but was opposed by Indonesia and Malaysia, who argued that the primary responsibility for such intrusive maritime counter-terrorism should belong to the littoral countries of the Malacca Straits. Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia have since agreed to coordinated patrols (rather than having more integrated joint patrols) in the straits, backed by intelligence and training cooperation with the US. But this episode shows the reactive nature of regional security cooperation, which reflects disagreements over the threat posed by terrorism and the desired extent of security relationship with the US in the context of the Bush administration s Iraq policy. CONCLUSION Terrorism and the war on terror have paradoxical implications for Asian regional stability. The results of the war on terror in the region remain uncertain. It is difficult to estimate precisely how many terrorists are still out there. A US State Department study estimates that 37 per cent of the total number of major terrorist incidents in 2003 (190 incidents) occurred in Asia. These figures do not include incidents involving domestic terrorist groups. Including the latter, the Singapore-based International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research puts the number of terrorist incidents in the Asia-Pacific at over 400. This high estimate of terrorist strength is notwithstanding the fact that about 200 of the Jemaah Islamiah extremists are now in custody in various Southeast Asian countries. While terrorism remains and will remain for some time a challenge for regional countries, the nature and extent of this challenge will differ from country to country, thereby posing an obstacle to regional consensus and cooperation, including the role of regional groups such as ASEAN and the ARF. The gains of the war on terror have also to be seen against the persistence of regional conflicts and rivalries and its potential costs, including the renewed justification of security measures that can impede democratization. Moreover, the growing unpopularity of the US

14 and the declining credibility of the US strategic umbrella in the region due to its preoccupation with Iraq are likely to introduce new uncertainties in the regional balance of power. It is these uncertainties created by the war on terror, rather than terrorism per se, which in the final analysis may pose the most serious long-term challenge to Asian regional order. NOTES 1 This paper is based on notes for a lecture delivered as part of the Murdoch University Asia Research Centre s Public Seminar Series on Conflict, Security and Political Regimes in Asia, 17 June A more developed and detailed version of the key arguments in this paper can be found in the author s Age of Fear: Power Versus Principle in the War on Terror (New Delhi: Rupa & Co. and Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2004) 2 See, for example, Abuza, Zachary (2003), International Crisis Group (2002), Tan, Andrew and Kumar Ramakrishna (eds) (2002), Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs (2003) and Ramakrishna Kumar and See Seng Tan (2004). 3 For opposing views, see: Gunaratna, Rohan (2002); Noor, Farish A. (2002) 4 The remainder of this section draws upon: Acharya, A. (2002a) and Acharya, A. (2002b). 5 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Adopted by the United Nations in resolution 54/109 of 9 December Available at < 6 For more details of the initiatives undertaken by of ASEAN, ARF, and APEC to deal with terrorism, see: Acharya, A. (2004).

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