Multinationalism and Accommodation: Analysis of a Canadian Success. André Lecours School of Political Studies University of Ottawa

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1 Multinationalism and Accommodation: Analysis of a Canadian Success André Lecours School of Political Studies University of Ottawa July 2014

2 Introduction 3 1 Strategies for accommodating nationalism 4 2 Strategies for accommodation of nationalism and the Canadian approach 6 3 Canada compared in perspective 16

3 Introduction Canada is a traditional case study of political dynamics in multinational societies (Keating, 2001; Gagnon and Tully, 2001; Burgess and Pinder, 2007). Québec nationalism is evidently the major force behind the literature examining the intergovernmental tensions that have marked Canadian political life since the Quiet Revolution. In the literature produced by Québec Francophone intellectuals, the accent is invariably placed on Canadian resistance to Québec government demands for constitutional and political reform (Seymour 2001; Gagnon, 2008). In other words, the goal is to explain how and why Canada does not work, with the failure of constitutional negotiations and the holding of two referendums on sovereignty as clear indications of failure. The work of English-Canadian political scientists on Québec-Canada relations, as part of a larger body of literature on Canadian federalism, is evidently less negative but does not typically set out to explain Canada s success (Stevenson, 2009). Such a proposition is not so far-fetched, however. On the eve of the referendum in Scotland, the idea that a popular consultation on independence necessarily represents the failure of a State and its methods of accommodation appears less valid than it seemed to be in the context of the Québec referendums. Canada is not going through the political blockage of Belgium or the conflict of communities that is making it hard to form a government. It also seems in much better condition than Spain, which is confronting a resurgence of Catalonian nationalism and its shift towards secessionism with the refusal to accept a referendum on the political future of Catalonia. The question of the causes of Canada s success therefore deserves to be addressed. It has a great theoretical importance since the recipe for the survival of liberal and democratic multinational States is not clear. This question is also vital in terms of public policies since most of the States in the process of democratic transition are composed of complex societies and must therefore find forms of practices and arrangements that enable different populations to live together. This text is divided into three sections. In the first section, I survey the literature on diverse strategies used by liberal democratic States for managing multinationalism. In the second section, I look at how Canada has used these different strategies in order to accommodate Québec since the Quiet Revolution. In the conclusion, I take a comparative perspective on the case of Canada. 3

4 1Strategies for accommodating nationalism A quick analysis of the literature on the accommodation of nationalism shows several different strategies that can help to reduce the strength of secessionist intentions in liberal democracies. (McGarry and O Leary, 1993; Coakley, 2003). These strategies are often used in combination. A first strategy consists of promoting the national identity of the State. This is a matter of gaining (or regaining) the loyalty of the citizens of the distinct community by developing a positive image of the State and the national community it projects. States all deploy their own nationalisms, but in multinational societies this nationalism emerges more clearly in a political project that is offered as an alternative to that proposed by nationalist leaders (Gagnon, Lecours and Nootens, 2007). The State s national identity can incorporate the particularities of different historical communities to various degrees: some state nationalisms are in fact cultural and historical representations of the majority group (as in the case of Spain) while others are more plural in nature (for example British nationalism) (Keating, 2001). Another strategy is to increase the representation and political power of the community within central institutions. Nationalist sentiments can sometimes emerge due to alienation in the face of a State perceived as being remote and not representative. One way to remedy and possibly minimize nationalist action is to ensure that the minority community is represented proportionately to its demographic weight, if not better, and that its representatives have considerable political power. This goal can be achieved through formal mechanisms for power sharing such as consociative arrangements (Lijphart, 1977) or more generally by facilitating access to power by the politicians of the minority community. A third strategy is decentralization. Nationalist movements usually seek to obtain a distinct political destiny for the community that they claim to represent (Derriennic, 1995), up to independence but often limited to territorial political autonomy. Decentralizing political power in certain fields of public policy, whether for a specific community or through a federalizing process that restructures the territorial division of powers, often represents a direct answer to nationalist demands. Implementing this strategy typically requires the beginning of intergovernmental relations where the exact division of responsibilities will be negotiated continually. A fourth strategy is to offer the minority community recognition as distinct from the rest of the country. Nationalist movements are not just interest groups; a part of their demands are symbolic in nature. Nationalist leaders see their community as being a nation, and they often seek for this to be politically or constitutionally recognized. Even though the concrete effects of symbolic recognition may be slight, States often are very reluctant to use the term nation to qualify any community other than that defined by its own citizenship and territory. Consequently, negotiations about recognition are often more difficult than those about power sharing. 4

5 Material issues can also have a major impact on support for nationalist positions. For example, citizens who believe that independence would have major costs, or in other words, that remaining part of the State presents substantial economic and financial advantages, are little inclined to support strong nationalist positions. Consequently, the State can ensure, through fiscal transfers and redistributive programs, that citizens see the material advantages of the existing arrangements. Not only does redistribution of financial resources to communities in which there are nationalist movements encourage citizens to oppose independence for fear of becoming poorer, but these programs can evoke the typically abstract notions of citizenship and territorial solidarity (Béland and Lecours, forthcoming). 5

6 2Strategies for accommodation of nationalism and the Canadian approach This brief survey of the literature offers a basis for analysis of the Canadian methods for managing Québec nationalism. This section will look at how each of the points raised above play out in an approach to the accommodation of Québec. The Canadian identity and Québec nationalism One argument currently used by sovereignist advocates is that the Canadian and Québec identities are contradictory, and that the development of Canada s must be at the exclusion of Québec s. However, an examination of the changes in the Canadian identity over the past 50 years easily offers a very different interpretation. While the Québec identity was fundamentally transformed during the 1960s and 1970s, the Canadian identity also went through major changes during the same period. First, this identity was nationalized, in the sense that it lost its British character. The flag debate is a good illustration of the pressures that Québec nationalism was exerting on the Canadian identity already in In fact, the government of Lester B. Pearson decided to give the country a flag that was free of the colonial overtones of the Red Ensign. This decision, strongly opposed by the Conservative John Diefenbaker, and which displeased a large part of the Canadian electorate, was taken by English-Canadian politicians (mainly from Ontario) with the specific goal of making this important symbol of the country acceptable to Francophone Quebecers. (Champion, 2010). Canadian nationalism thus began to undergo significant transformations in the 1960s and the first change was to lose its British character. Then, still under the leadership of the Liberal Party of Canada, but this time the Trudeau government, Canadian nationalism restructured itself on the bases of bilingualism and biculturalism. The Official Languages Act of 1968 made Canada a bilingual State and gave its citizens linguistic rights. It also brought a transformation of the Canadian identity which henceforth would incorporate the Francophone reality in a clearer and more systematic way. A wish to distinguish itself from the United States (another important goal of the Trudeau governments) was also served by the incorporation of linguistic duality into Canadian nationalism. In contrast to a country like Spain, for example, State nationalism in Canada was not based exclusively on the linguistic and cultural features of a majority group; in fact the minority community represents an important part of its modern existence. 6

7 Official bilingualism is clearly not the only policy that nourishes contemporary Canadian nationalism. Other public policies have also built the Canadian national identity. Consider, for example, the Canada Health Act, which frames the provincial health systems and gives major symbolic value to something which is seen as a pan-canadian approach. The health system is often presented by federal politicians as embodying the values of compassion and equality associated with Canadian society. Federal social policies such as employment insurance are also tied to the social safety net which nourishes the idea of a progressive Canadian political culture. The nature of this national identity as nourished by these programs and the values associated with them provide some congruence with Québec nationalism, which also advocated egalitarianism and social justice. Québec nationalists have certainly argued that that Québec differs from the rest of Canada because of its progressive political climate, pointing to programs such as the $7 daycare and prescription drug insurance (Béland and Lecours, 2012). In reality, the difference between federal public policies, from the Quiet Revolution up to the formation of the Harper Conservative government in 2006, and the preferences of Quebecers (as extrapolated by Québec public policies) seem minimal. As well as social and health policy, other major fields such as foreign policy (with its traditional emphasis on diplomacy and multilateralism), environmental and industrial policy have not, at least until 2006, clashed with the Québec identity. Since 2006, the definition of the Canadian identity by its government has changed. In fact, the Conservative government which has run the country since that time has adopted public policy positions and an identity narrative which has shifted away from what has prevailed since the 1960s. This transformation makes the contemporary manifestations of Canadian nationalism less coherent with the Québec identity. Rather than emphasizing the Canada Health Act to perpetuate the idea that it frames a system which represents values of the Canadian identity, the Conservatives have encouraged the provinces to experiment in the health field. Far from talking of a Canadian value of compassion in social policy, they insist on individual responsibility. Contrary to the notion that Canada is a peaceful country that prefers multilateral diplomacy, the Conservative government s narrative is more military and talks about Arctic sovereignty. This attempt to re-articulate the Canadian identity though public policies that break with the past could over the long term negatively affect Canada s ability to accommodate Québec. 7

8 Power and representation in central institutions The transformation of Canadian nationalism since the 1960s has been accompanied by important sociolinguistic changes to the federal political power. Up to that time, the Prime Ministers of Canada tended to be Anglophones whose French was at best rudimentary. The French-speaking presence in the federal public service was also lower than its demographic weight in Canada. For Pierre Trudeau, this reality resulted in the alienation of many Francophone Quebecers from the federal government and growing support for independence. The Official Languages policy of the Trudeau government had in large part the intention of reversing this tendency. In the House of Commons, he declared: In all parts of the country, within both language groups, there are those who call for uniformity. It will be simpler and cheaper, they argue. In the case of the French minority, isolation is prescribed as necessary for survival. We must never underestimate the strength or the durability of these appeals to profound human emotions. Surely these arguments are based on fear, on a narrow view of human nature, and on a defeatist appraisal of our capacity to adapt our society and its institutions to the demands of its citizens. Those who argue for separation, in whatever form, are prisoners of past injustice, blind to the possibilities of the future. (1968). A key mechanism for promoting the Canadian identity through new legislation was the reinforcement of the Francophone presence with the federal government institutions. Pierre Trudeau was convinced that if Quebecers saw themselves better reflected in Ottawa, and believed that their representatives have real power there, they would be more willing to remain Canadian. The whole idea of French power in Ottawa has often been declared a great mistake. What Quebecers really wanted, by this view, was only more autonomy for their province. Clearly it is difficult to say exactly which of the Canadian accommodations of Québec have most contributed to keeping Québec within the country. However, the importance of Québec representation in Ottawa and the exercise of power on the federal scene by Quebecers should not be underestimated. One of the concrete impacts of the Official Languages Act is that Canada has since that time often been led by Prime Ministers representing Québec ridings. In fact, since the establishment of official bilingualism, it has become critical for the federal government to be able to communicate with Quebecers in French, which has brought opportunity for men and women politicians from the province. Quebecers have become not only Prime Ministers but have also frequently held important Cabinet posts. In these conditions, it has been more difficult to convince a majority of 8

9 Quebecers that Canada is a foreign country that cannot understand Québec. The Canadian regime of bilingualism has also meant that any serious candidate for the post of Prime Minister must be able to speak French. Thus, even in the absence of Quebecers in the highest Cabinet positions, the federal government typically includes a number of politicians who speak French. The representation of Quebecers in the federal public service also makes it harder to sell the PQ notion that Canada is a foreign country. Figures on the linguistic communities and the public service show Francophones are slightly over-represented. This has three impacts regarding the accommodation of Québec. First, this Francophone presence facilitates communication between federal public servants and Quebecers. Second, it means that many Quebecers are employed by the federal government; in concrete terms, tens of thousands of people living in Québec work for federal departments or organizations. 1 Finally, the presence of Quebecers in the highest ranks of the federal public service means that ministers have access to Québec analysis and perspectives. Even before the transformation of the Québec presence in central institutions that followed the Official Languages Act, the Canadian political system already had elements that favoured the accommodation of Québec through representation practices. For example, the convention of alternating the appointment of Governors General between Anglophones and Francophones has possibly contributed to making the Crown less negative for Quebecers. The legal requirement for three Supreme Court judges to be from Québec likely explains part of the credibility and legitimacy of that institution in the province. The status of the Supreme Court in Québec is important because the highest court in the country often rules on conflicts involving the federal and Québec governments. It has also ruled on procedures to guide a referendum on the independence of Québec, delivering a judgement that was widely considered by Québec intellectuals to be balanced. Unlike a country like Spain where minority communities see constitutional courts as being manipulated by the central government, Canada has a constitutional arbiter with a reputation for impartiality and an understanding of the complexities of the Canadian political culture. Canadian federalism and Québec political autonomy Federalism is the keystone of the Canadian architecture for accommodating Québec. The existence of federal structures in Canada is clearly a result of a French-Canadian community whose elites sought political autonomy in 1867 in order to protect the distinct character of a Catholic and French-speaking society. Until the 1960s, provincial autonomy allowed Québec s conservative political elite to limit the influence of external forces, above all the federal government, on a society which they wanted to keep united by religion, language and a traditional way of life

10 Federalism was a key structure when the new Québec political elite of the Quiet Revolution became major agents of social, cultural and economic change. Without the political autonomy of federal structures of governance, it would have been more difficult to perform the major transformations that have occurred in Québec society since the 1960s. For example, in a unitary State or a federation that gives fewer responsibilities to its constituent parts, a wave of change such as that of the Quiet Revolution would have depended far more on the cooperation of the central State. Canada s federal structures have both drawn the contours of the new Québec identity and enabled its development and expression. Without an autonomous province, the re-territorialisation of the French-Canadian identity would likely have followed a different course, since it is the Québec government which has led this process and rebuilt an identity that would be congruent with the territory of Québec. The federal structures thus enabled the development of a modern Québec political community with a robust identity. In this context, the political autonomy of Québec has enabled Quebecers to display and express their identity. In a federal system, Quebecers can combine the Québec and Canadian identities or consider themselves simply Quebecers (or Canadians). The political and institutional representation of the two territorial identities is a key element of Canada s accommodation of Québec through federalism. Part of the logic of federalism as an approach to the accommodation of minority communities is that it enables the governments of these communities to formulate public policies for them in vital domains (for example, language, culture, education, economic development) (Elazara, 1994; Burgess, 2006). In this way, by not having the central government responsible for legislating in all domains of public policy (including several that are quite sensitive in a multinational situation), federalism is able to avoid intercommunal conflicts. In Canada, there are certainly constraints on the autonomy of the Québec government in the formulation of public policy and legislation. Québec laws, for example, must be situated in the provincial jurisdictions as stipulated in the Constitution or Court judgements, and they must conform to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Nevertheless, Canadian federalism leaves Québec free to establish policies in many fields of State intervention: language, culture, education (Canada being one of the rare federations without a national education department), civil protection, the environment, economic development and many others. Canadian federalism is often described as dominating and centralizing by its detractors. This view is justified only if Canadian federalism is compared to a very specific ideal where the federal authority is limited to defence and monetary policy. However, from a comparative perspective there is no doubt that Québec enjoys much greater political autonomy than any other constituent entity of a federation. 10

11 The accommodation of Québec within Canada by federalism is also a matter of its flexibility. From a certain angle, Canadian federalism may appear more rigid than flexible. There is no doubt that reform of the federation through constitutional means has not succeeded and that this avenue does not appear promising for the foreseeable future. A demanding constitutional amendment formula combined with divergent provincial preferences makes constitutional change difficult in Canada. The flexibility of Canadian federalism comes from the fact that unlike Belgium, for example, change can come without constitutional reform. In fact, the nature of Canadian constitutionalism means that the details of the operations and processes of Canadian federalism are not codified. Therefore it is possible to bring evolution to federalism in Canada without changing the constitution. In this regard, the nature of Canadian intergovernmental relations encourages flexibility. Canadian federalism is the executive type: it involves relations between the governments of Canada and the provinces. Québec can thus call on the federal government to negotiate the respective places of the two governments in a domain of public policy. This has been the case since beginning of the Quiet Revolution, as many responsibilities have been transferred by the federal government to the Québec government, notably that of managing Quebecers pension plans through the Régie des rentes du Québec (RRQ), which is a rarity in federal systems. Later, in 1979, the Cullen-Couture accord, (later replaced by the Canada-Québec accord of 1991) enabled Québec to choose most of its immigrants. In these types of bilateral relations, the Québec government can try to mobilize public opinion in the province in order to put pressure on the federal government to accept certain changes, as was the case following 1995 referendum when powers in workforce training were transferred to Québec. In some situations, the change can occur without formal accords. For example, over the past 50 years Québec has developed a multidimensional foreign policy supported by an infrastructure headed by a cabinet minister and constituted in delegations and offices abroad. The development of this para-diplomacy by Québec has occurred largely without the negotiation of particular accords with the Government of Canada (some notable exceptions were the agreements for Québec s representation at the Francophonie and at UNESCO). In fact, Québec profited from a certain ambiguity regarding the division of powers on the conduct of international relations to develop a degree of international activity that is unparalleled among entities that are constituent parts of federations. 11

12 There are also some elements of multilateralism in the operation of Canadian federalism that Québec has been able to use. Often, Québec will seek to rally the provinces to oppose a federal initiative (for example, the creation of a federal securities regulator, which eventually went to the Supreme Court) or to pressure the Government of Canada to do more (for example, to increase federal transfers for health). This is why Québec took a leading role in the creation of an institution of intergovernmental collaboration, the Council of the Federation. Multilateralism in Canadian intergovernmental relations, even when it is led by the federal government, is less constraining, and in this sense Québec can typically withdraw from the agreements that result (for example, the Social Union Framework). In short, federalism is a key element in Canada s accommodation of Québec. It gives Québec a scope for development of its political community and the expression of its identity that is unequalled in any other State. Canada s constitutional blockage hides a decentralization and flexibility of federalism that enables it to adjust to, while evidently not meeting, the demands of Québec governments. The issue of recognition The absence of constitutional recognition of Québec as a nation or at least as a distinct society is typically seen as the main weakness of the Canadian accommodation of Québec. It is incontestable that such recognition, as proposed in the Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords, raised great opposition in Canadian political society during the 1980s and 1990s. This absence of constitutional recognition is often interpreted as showing a non-accommodation of Québec, since Canada does not explicitly recognize its multinational character (Gagnon and Iacovino, 2007). In fact, not only are there other dimensions of the Canadian system of accommodation of Québec (addressed in this text), but the Québec identity is explicitly or implicitly recognized in a great range of decisions by the Government of Canada. As we mentioned above, the federal government has transferred powers in a number of domains of public policy to Québec since the Quiet Revolution: pensions, immigration, workforce training, etc. It is true that often the possibility of exercising these powers is also offered to all provinces. However, the political goal of these exercises of decentralization has been to meet specific demands from the Québec government and by this fact to recognize the distinct character of the province. In fact, the result of the decentralization of several powers to Québec is an asymmetry in the formulation and implementation of public policy in the country. This asymmetry in public policy is 12

13 an identity accommodation. For example, the First Ministers Agreement on Health Care of 2004 with its dimension that allowed Québec to withdraw from certain pan-canadian common planning and accountability mechanisms, was said to rest on asymetrical federalism, that is, flexible federalism that notably allows for the existence of specific agreements and arrangements adapted to Quebec s specificity 2. Given that Québec s health system is not fundamentally very different from that of the other provinces, the specificity mentioned above is all about identity. The legitimacy of the Québec identity and its expression are clearly recognized by the Government of Canada. This recognition extends even to its international expression. In fact, despite a rivalry and some tension between the federal government and the Québec government in international relations, Canada has not sought to delegitimize the efforts of the Québec government to project the Québec identity beyond the borders of Canada. The most convincing illustration that Québec has been granted national qualities by the federal government is that the latter has twice accepted the idea that Québec could secede from Canada. Unlike Spain, where the central government insists that there is only one nation, and therefore only one demos, Canada has accepted the notion that Québec constitutes a political community whose right to self-determination extends in principle to secession. The effort to specify the parameters of a process leading to the independence of Québec by Canadian political institutions (the government, the House of Commons, the Supreme Court) suggests an implicit recognition of the particular nature of the Québec political community. The House of Commons has for its part explicitly recognized the national character of this community by a resolution in The effect of this resolution on the attachment of Quebecers to Canada seems to have been minimal. Many speculated that this was because the initiative made no concrete commitments; that it was purely symbolic. However, such a symbolic recognition had been sought by Québec politicians since the Quiet Revolution, while the more practical aspects of accommodation were being achieved by the mechanisms of federalism. It is possible that the resolution on the nation would have been more significant if it had taken place 20 years earlier, because the Canadian practice of accommodation of Québec has provided an implicit recognition of Québec s different identity. In summary, it is true that the Canadian political narrative does not resort to frequent references to the Québec nation or characterizations of the country as multinational. However, the differentiated treatment of Québec by the Canadian government in intergovernmental relations and certain issues particular to the province such as the quest for selfdetermination suggest the recognition of an identity and political community that is more than provincial

14 Equalization and profitable federalism The Canadian accommodation of Québec is not limited to identity, representation and institutions. There are also economic and material aspects to this accommodation. The keystone of this dimension of accommodation is the federal equalization program. The equalization program is intended to ensure that all Canadians, whatever province they may live in, have access to public services of comparable quality at a comparable level of taxation. The program establishes the fiscal capacity of each province (their capacity to generate revenues). Then, through unconditional transfers it brings up to the norm (approximating the average fiscal capacity of the 10 provinces) those provinces that fall below it. The responsibility of the federal government to make equalization payments was embedded in the Constitution Act of Equalization was the first chapter in a program intended to achieve a degree of equality in Canadian political society, since it is intended to ensure, for example, that citizens who reside in in Québec, New Brunswick and Manitoba have access to public services of comparable quality to those living in British Columbia (Lecours and Béland, 2011). There is another, less visible dimension of equalization: it helps the accommodation of Québec. The very creation of the equalization program had a Québec angle. Two contextual elements related to Québec and its relation to Canadian federalism encouraged the establishment of a horizontal wealth redistribution program. The first was the Tremblay Report of Québec s Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems, whose mandate was to examine federal-provincial relations from a fiscal perspective. The post-war period had brought an increase of political and fiscal centralization to Canada. The Tremblay Report, which adopted a strongly autonomist perspective (judged at the time by Premier Maurice Duplessis to be too radical), calling for a restructuring of fiscal federalism that would give the provinces more control over their financial resources. The second was the 1954 law that would allow Québec to levy personal income tax. This initiative, combined with Québec s distrust of the system of tax-rentals (under which the provincial governments would rent their constitutional taxation power to the federal government) seemed to increase the isolation of Québec in Canadian fiscal federalism (Stevenson, 2009: ). A program of territorial redistribution of wealth might, according to several key decision-makers of that era, reduce Québec s isolation. 14

15 Equalization has undoubtedly contributed to the integration of Québec into Canadian fiscal federalism. It is evidently impossible to determine the degree to which it has contributed to Quebecers feeling of attachment to Canada. However, it is clear that it aligns perfectly with the federalist narrative of the Liberal Party of Québec (PLQ) and presents a problem for sovereignist politicians. For the PLQ, the equalization payments represent simply a benefit, if not a right, that flows from Canadian citizenship. This narrative may resonate because the equalization program is popular in Québec. 3 Sovereignists, for their part, tend to avoid debates on equalization. When pressed to talk about it, the sovereignist argument is that this is just the money of Quebecers coming back to them. Despite this argument, equalization remains very probably a strong point for Canada among Quebecers. Independent of the effect of the program on the attachment of Quebecers to Canada, equalization payments to Québec represent a strong sign that Canadian federalism is profitable for the province. Québec has received equalization payments since the beginning of the program in In this context, any argument for the financial benefits of Québec independence has to follow a complex line of reasoning. It consists mainly of saying that federal industrial policy favours the other provinces and that it is mainly responsible for the relative economic weakness of Québec. 4 The importance of the equalization payments going to Québec ($9.2 billion, about 55% of the total envelope for ) represents a more direct argument for the benefits of Canadian federalism to Québec. The structure of the equalization program is generally favourable to Québec, particularly regarding energy and natural resources. In fact, part of the revenues from the hydro-electric operation can be excluded from the calculation of the fiscal capacity of Québec since the government sells this energy to Quebecers at a lower than market price. The result is a lower fiscal capacity (and larger equalization payments) than if this hydro-electricity was sold at market prices, a situation that has been called unjust by observers from other provinces (Flanagan and Christensen, 2014). Equalization gives major visibility to the advantages of fiscal federalism for Québec. This visibility comes partly from the fact that equalization is a federal program entirely administered by the Government of Canada (unlike Australia, for example, where it is administered by an independent commission, the Commonwealth Grants Commission). Thus, equalization can become part of the political debate. In 2007, for example, the announcement of a major reform that would result in higher payments to Québec was made during an election campaign in which the PLQ was in a tight race with the PQ and the ADQ. More generally, the annual announcement of equalization payments enables the federal government to remind Quebecers of the material benefits of having Canadian citizenship. 3. In a Pollara poll for the Mowat Center for Policy Innovation in 2010, 88% of Quebecers polled supported (strongly or moderately) the equalization program. See Canadian Opinion Research Archive, 4. This was the response of Québec International Relations Minister Jean-François Lisée to comments by federal minister Denis Lebel who worried about the impoverishment of Québec and its growing dependence on Ottawa, following the announcement of equalization payments for in January

16 3Canada compared in perspective The Canadian configuration of accommodation of Québec is certainly unique. It is the product of a particular institutional heritage (federalism) as well as political decisions (re-articulation of Canadian nationalism, creation of the equalization program) that represent turning points in Canadian political society. Other liberal democratic States have developed their own approaches to the political minority communities. 5 The conclusion of this text examines how Canada compares with the United Kingdom, Spain and Belgium in the five dimensions of accommodation presented above. Modern Canadian nationalism has the particular feature of being built on a bilingual and bicultural basis, in a manner that incorporates the particularities of Québec (and the Francophone minority elsewhere in Canada). This form of nationalism contrasts starkly with that of Spain, where the language, culture and history to which nationalism is attached are exclusively those of the majority community. This configuration contributes to explaining why many Basques and Catalonians feel alienated by Spain. Belgium is also very different from Canada. Belgian nationalism was fractured by intercommunal conflicts and schisms in political parties during the 1960s and 1970s and it continues to dwindle as problems in forming a government accentuate the political divisions between Flemish and Francophones. The weakness of Belgian nationalism, resulting from a great social and political polarization between the two communities, makes the potential for its unification very limited. The British national concept presents similarities with Canadian nationalism in the sense that it does not exclude the minority communities in its articulation. In fact, the United Kingdom defines itself as a community of communities which has, it is true, England at its core. Thus it is possible to be British through a sense of belonging to the Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish communities. Another important (but not often emphasized) dimension of Canadian accommodation that has few parallels elsewhere is the representation of Quebecers in the federal institutions and the power they exercise there. In Spain, Basque and Catalonian politicians are less present in the central institutions than Quebecers are in Canada: there are no political practices to assure that Basque and Catalonian people have representation in Madrid; the makeup of the Constitutional Court that rules on the disagreements between the State and the Autonomous Communities does not take into account the diversity of the country and it is not seen (in the Basque country and in Catalonia) as being impartial. By contrast, in the United Kingdom, Scotland has benefited since the end of the 19th Century from a minister in UK Cabinet whose role is to articulate the Scottish perspective and if necessary adjust the details of public policy to the situation in Scotland. Also Scottish politicians are able to take part in the exercise of political power in 5. The term minority community is used to refer to the Flemish in the Belgian context even though they are a demographic majority since several Flemish political parties present the idea of a Flemish nation. 16

17 Westminster. In Belgium, the mechanisms of representation and the exercise of power in the central institutions (particularly the Executive Branch) are well developed and constitutionalized. Through regulations based on consociative democracy, there must be an equal number of Flemish and Francophone ministers in the Belgian government. These mechanisms, which have allowed Belgium to manage the issues caused by a dichotomisation of its majority and minority groups, following community crises are now leading to major political blockages in the formation of governments. Today they represent as much a problem as a solution for the political unity of Belgium (Sinardet, 2001). Federalism is the keystone of the Canadian system of accommodation. Federal structures also serve in the accommodation of the Basque country and Catalonia in Spain, but the autonomy of these Autonomous Communities (especially Catalonia, which does not have the fiscal autonomy of the Basque country) is much more limited than that of Québec. The Spanish government intervenes in several domains of public policy (for example, elementary and secondary education) in a way that would be unthinkable in Canada. Also changing the division of powers is difficult: the Constitutional Court interprets the constitution very literally, as shown by its judgement in 2010 on the reform of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, which limits the possibilities of constitutional change; furthermore, the central government habitually refuses to transfer responsibilities to the Autonomous Communities through intergovernmental agreements. The United Kingdom accommodated Scotland without offering it territorial autonomy until the (re-) establishment of the Scottish Parliament in The autonomy of Scotland, especially in fiscal terms, remains somewhat modest, but this way remains open for the British accommodation of Scotland. Ironically, 15 years after the development of this territorial autonomy, the Scottish SNP government is preparing to hold a referendum on independence. Belgian federalism, for its part, is very decentralized despite the fact that virtually all of the social security programs remain in the hands of the federal government. While it offers great autonomy to its constituent entities, the structure of Belgian federalism does little to encourage bridge-building between the two communities or the promotion of loyalty to Belgium (Swenden and Theo Jans, 2006). 17

18 In Canada, recognition has very likely been the most delicate question in relation to Québec. This type of question has never arisen in the United Kingdom or in Belgium. In the British situation, the frequent use of the word nation in the political narrative to designate the communities of the United Kingdom makes more formal recognition redundant. In Belgium, the fact that the nationalist movement is found in the demographic majority has not slowed the Flemish from demanding recognition as a nation from the Belgian State. In Spain, the Basque and Catalonian parties demand this type of recognition, and they have collided into the firm refusal of the Spanish State, whose argument is that only one nation can exist in the country: the Spanish nation. Even an oblique reference to the national character of Catalonia (a recognition by the Spanish State that the Catalonian Parliament considers that Catalonia forms a nation) included in the reform of the Statute of Autonomy in 2006 was judged unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. In the Spanish situation, there is not even implicit recognition of nations other than Spain. For example, the wish of the Catalonian Parliament to hold a referendum on the future of Catalonia has been denied by Madrid, which insists on the mono-national nature of the country. Canadian equalization gives Quebecers concrete reasons to remain Canadian. More broadly, the fiscal dimensions and the institutional arrangements can influence the attractiveness of secession and of State citizenship respectively. In Belgium, despite the absence of a specific equalization program, the greater wealth of Flanders compared to Wallonia translates into implicit transfers, through social security mechanisms, from the North to the South, a situation decried by most of the Flemish parties. In fact the Flemish nationalist narrative feeds heavily on these transfers, seeing them exaggerated and unjustified (Béland and Lecours, 2012). In Spain, Catalonia has demanded for some time a fiscal autonomy comparable to that of the Basque Country. The severe economic fiscal and economic crisis that began in 2008 led Catalonian politicians to examine the Spanish fiscal arrangements, with some of them suggesting that Catalonia would be richer if it left Spain. In the United Kingdom, the territorial financing formula (known as the Barnett formula), created at the end of the 1970s, is advantageous for Scotland. This advantage has not, however, prevented the Scottish SNP government from preparing a referendum on independence. In fact, it must be acknowledged that there is no magic formula for the accommodation of national minority communities. The United Kingdom is facing a referendum on the independence of Scotland despite a flexible State nationalism, Scottish representation in Cabinet, territorial autonomy (recent, it is true), recognition practices and the Barnett formula. Canada has also gone through referendums on the sovereignty of Québec even though its nationalism has been built on a bicultural basis, its federalism is flexible and decentralized, its federal government is often led by Quebecers and its equalization program brings financial resources to Québec. 18

19 Spain and Belgium have not had to face such referendums. Nevertheless, these two cases should not be seen as success stories. There will probably not be a referendum on the political future of Catalonia (as there has never been one about the future of the Basque country despite calls for one) (Lecours, 2007) because the Spanish State does not permit it. The rigidity of Spanish nationalism and federalism, the economic crisis, and the decision of the Constitutional Court to invalidate several clauses of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia in 2010 have led to a great rise in support for Catalonian independence and a deep malaise in relations between Catalonia and Spain (Petithomme and Fernandez Garcia, 2013). In Belgium, continual decentralization of federalism and consociative mechanisms have contributed heavily to the mutual isolation of the two communities and political blockages in the formation of governments, leaving the future of the federation uncertain (Deschouwer and Reuchamps, 2013). In the accommodation of multinationalism, success is always relative. This comparative perspective suggests, however, that contrary to the writings of many Québec intellectuals, Canada represents more of a success than a failure. The Canadian recipe may be difficult to copy: it is anchored in the deep and unique federal condition (Smiley, 1987) of the Canadian political culture and an access to political power by politicians of the minority community that, in most other States, would be difficult to accept. 19

20 Références Béland, Daniel and André Lecours Nationalisme et protection sociale. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press Béland, Daniel and André Lecours (forthcoming), Accommodation and the Politics of Fiscal Equalization in Multinational States: The Case of Canada, Nations & Nationalism. Burgess, Michael Comparative Federalism. Theory and Practice (London: Routledge). Burgess, Michael and John Pinder (dir) Multinational Federations (London: Routledge). Champion, Christian P The Strange Demise of British Canada. The Liberals and Canadian Nationalism, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen s University Press. Coakley, John (dir) The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict. London: Frank Cass. Derriennic, Jean-Pierre Nationalisme et démocratie. Réflexion sur les illusions des indépendantistes Québécois. Québec: Boréal. Deschouwer, Kris and Min Reuchamps The Belgian Federation at a Crossroad, Regional and Federal Studies, 23, Elazar, Daniel Federalism and the Way to Peace. Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. Flanagan, Tom and Naomi Christensen. Equalization gone wrong, The Globe and Mail, January 28, Gagnon, Alain-G La raison du plus fort : plaidoyer pour un fédéralisme multinational. Montreal: Québec/Amérique. Gagnon, Alain-G and Raffaele Iacovino De la nation à la multination. Les rapports Québec-Canada. Montreal: Boréal. Gagnon, Alain-G. and James Tully (dir) Multinational Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gagnon, Alain-G., André Lecours and Geneviève Nootens Les nationalismes majoritaires contemporains: identité, mémoire, pouvoir. Montreal: Québec Amérique. Keating, Michael Plurinational Democracy. Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereign Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lecours, André Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State. Reno: University of Nevada Press. Lecours André and Daniel Béland Federalism and Fiscal Policy: The Politics of Equalization in Canada, Publius. The Journal of Federalism, 40, Lijphart, Arendt Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press. McGarry, John and Brendan O Leary (dir) The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation. London: Routledge. Petithomme, Mathieu and Alicia Fernandez Garcia Le nationalisme catalan dans une Espagne en crise : du fédéralisme asymétrique à l indépendantisme. Montreal: The Federal Idea. Seymour, Michel Le pari de la démesure. L intransigeance canadien face au Québec. Québec: Éditions de l Hexagone. Sinardet, David Le federalism consociatif belge : vecteur d instabilité? Pouvoir, 36, 2011, Smiley, Donald V The federal condition in Canada. Toronto: McGraw-Hill. Stevenson, Garth Unfulfilled Union. Canadian Federalism and National Unity. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen s University Press. Trudeau, Pierre Elliott Statement of the Prime Minister on the introduction of the Official Languages Bill, October 17, Ottawa: Office of the Prime Minister. Swenden, Wilfried and Martin Theo Jans Will it stay or will it go? Federalism and the sustainability of Belgium, West European Politics, 36,