Political Accommodation of National Minorities in Multi-ethnic\national Countries in Comparative Perspective: The Case of Cyprus Introduction

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1 Political Accommodation of National Minorities in Multi-ethnic\national Countries in Comparative Perspective: The Case of Cyprus This article focuses on autonomy and secessionist movements inherited in the shared models of federal sovereignty. Spain, Canada and Belgium have been selected to inform the claims for new forms of self-determination, tolerance, rights and freedoms that have emerged in Cyprus among Turkish Cypriots who have been formally calling for recognition and accommodation in the state. Comparing conditions in Catalonia, Quebec and Flanders, the paper examines the process of accommodating demands for autonomy and self-determination within democratic settings. The goals here are to discuss possible preconditions that encourage and discourage secessionist movements, and to develop a model more likely to accommodate the ethnic/national minority group and eventually plurinational diversity in Cyprus. One neglected area is analysing whether members of an ethno-nation feel that power sharing institutions of federalism can accommodate their aspirations, or if secession should be their ultimate goal. For this reason, the politics of Cyprus offer an interesting case to study the tension between internal self-determination and secession, and to test the utility of federalism. The paper argues that the answer to accommodation lies in the normative character of the federal idea embedded in asymmetrical federalism. Introduction The paper examines the link between federalism and secession, as well as its implications for managing ethnic conflicts. Here the questions of when, why and how federalism lead to secessionism become important. The attractiveness of federalism comes from its capacity to accommodate diversity within the boundaries of a single polity while preventing secession. However, the tensions that arise from adopting federalism as a second-best alternative among actors whose first choice is either a more centralized or a more decentralized state detract from its attractiveness (Anderson 2014). These preferences continue over time and instability emerges when federal partners aim to change the separation of powers through pushing in opposite directions at the same time, which may result in secessionist tendencies. This dynamic should be considered a peculiarity of federalism rather than a problem requiring resolution. However, the prospect of designing stable, federal institutions is complicated by contradictory findings indicating that while federalism seems to reduce or prevent secessionism, it also has been found to contribute to secession and secessionist mobilization (Erk and Anderson 2009). While the Soviet Union, Pakistan, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia collapsed (some violently), Canada, Spain and Belgium have not. For this reason, democratic, multinational federal systems will be used to analyse secessionist and autonomy movements and the ways in which these states are responding to requests for greater independence will be used to develop a model for dealing with secessionism. The conclusions presented here are not entirely positive about being able to predict with absolute certainty the institutional features that will generate stable and unstable federations. But, even though these institutional features are context-dependent, it is possible to specify in advance where fault lines are likely to occur or develop, and whether specific institutional features will be secession-calming, secession-inducing, or both. The cases of Catalonia, Flanders and Quebec have been examined as a framework for wider analysis of cultural, political and economic factors and forces that contribute to autonomy

2 movements and their desired outcomes. Some normative and institutional questions addressed in these democracies, including the constitutional recognition and regulation of national pluralism and minority rights as well as the self-government of national minorities and the institutional charter of the polity, have been analysed. The main challenge in multinational societies is that territorially-based institutions of autonomy need to reflect a principle of non-domination by both state-wide and regional majorities. Territorial pluralism can prevent excesses of majority rule by turning state-wide minorities into regional majorities. Minorities often advocate institutional protections (a requirement for supermajorities and mutual vetoes) against marginalisation. Gagnon (2009) and Requejo (2005) emphasise the need for recognition of minority groups in addition to, and apart from, territorial autonomy. However, these consociational practices are often no substitute for territorially-based autonomy. For politically mobilised, territoriallyconcentrated groups, it constitutes an important pathway to self-government. Here, the question is how to design new means of establishing and rules for full-fledged multinational federalism in order to prevent secessionism. In light of the fact that federations are established by pacts among constituent members, federal systems for multinational societies need to be redesigned to recognise and accommodate their member nations. All members subject to and affected by the compact should have an effective say in its negotiation a basic condition that will ensure the pact s legitimacy (Gagnon 2014). However, a problem arises in traditional liberal and federal political theories/models that rest on monist assumptions. Notions of justice and fairness embedded in these theories are applied neutrally to all individuals equally, which can overlook deeply imbalanced power relations between communities, territories and nations within multinational societies (Tierney 2013). And while there are some attempts towards multinational federalism in practice and towards an appreciation of multinational federalism as a just and stable form of political system in political theory and public discourse (Gagnon 2014), there is still a need to establish new models reflecting plurality in federalism. The aim of this article is to propose new rules by which the Turkish Cypriot community may work to coexist with the Greek Cypriot community under a multinational federal system. Both theoretical and comparative case study findings are used to inform political discussions on federalism in Cyprus. Unilaterally declared the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) by the Turkish Cypriot community, the TRNC represents a case of a separatist group searching for a solution within the boundaries of the established sovereign order. Since federalism has been the only proposed solution to the frozen conflict of Cyprus, the question is how to construct a model that would discourage secession by Turkish Cypriots and encourage unity with Greek Cypriots in the same polity. Multinational federalism and secession The main goal of this paper is to examine conditions under which multinational federalism in Cyprus would be an effective response to diminish the risk of secession and centralization, and to achieve peace and territorial integrity. This section is divided into two parts. In the first part, multinational federalism will be discussed, and in the second part the paradox of federalism will be analysed. The characteristic feature of multinational federalism is drawing internal borders to ensure that a national minority constitutes a majority in a region, thereby allowing each national group to preserve itself as a distinct and self-governing societal culture (Kymlicka 2000, 269). National

3 minorities are usually regionally-concentrated ethnic groups who once enjoyed political autonomy and have become part of states in which they constitute an ethnic minority through conquest, colonization or voluntary incorporation (Dixon, Ginsburg and Elgar 2014, 174). They mobilize politically around claims for national identity and self-determination to recover the extensive self-government they claim to have enjoyed historically. The degree of selfgovernment they pursue varies from autonomy to secession. National minorities claim that the state they live in involves more than one nation, each holding an inherent and identical right to self-determination and each entitled to their own separate state. The allocation of jurisdiction between levels of government ensures that the national minority is not outvoted by the majority and has sufficient powers to protect itself from economic and political disadvantages. The minority identity is not merely a subnational identity, so it must develop a means of asserting its sense of itself to protect, preserve and promote its own interests if it is to expand its identity within the multinational state. Multinational federalism allows an asymmetrical power distribution for the reason that a province or a state might require different powers, rights and options than its counterparts to achieve equality with other federal units. The paper argues that multinational federalism recognizes the state as containing more than one constituent nation and structures its institutions to recognize and empower each of them. That is why it is expected that this particular model is capable of dealing with secession demands while preserving the territorial integrity of an existing polity because it satisfies the demand for selfdetermination with powers of self-government that fall short of independent statehood. To achieve this, multinational democracies need to abandon the more traditional Jacobin vision that values the centralising power of the state and aims to integrate national minorities in a singular national project as classical democratic and federal theories have not normally been pluralistic. The uniform treatment of distinct and different realities often associated with traditional normative universalism does not promote the equality that constitutes one foundation of liberal democracy. Rather, this so called cultural neutrality has promoted standardizing versions of state nation building. That is why today asymmetrical federalism is considered a basic feature for a multicultural federation, because it offers a flexible framework for accommodating the different needs of communities in terms of institutional recognition of political autonomy or self-government. In the classical approach to federalism, based on the American model, asymmetries had to be melted in the pot of legal individual equality, while today they are considered as important elements of the constitutional framework of multicultural states. Gagnon (2012) argues that minority nations need to be empowered in majority minority relations within the federation by using asymmetrical federalism and creating, protecting and preserving constitutional, legal and political spaces for them to determine themselves within the framework of a single state. It is asymmetrical federalism that constitutes the formal politics of recognition and that is rooted in respect for, and toleration of, difference. This is a deep federal culture that must be promoted to maintain multinational federalism. Moreover, from the normative point of view asymmetry protects and supports an image of multinationalism. Thus, it is able to preserve certain cultural groups rights, and to accommodate national minorities needs for recognition of their distinctiveness. In Canada and Spain, however, political elites are entirely reluctant to propose constitutional reforms that resonate with the demands of their respective state s founding nations. This demonstrates that the political cultures of these countries are fragile and inherently insecure (Gagnon 2014). In Canada, the entrenchment of individual rights has been adopted to maintain power and authority over minority groups. As Gagnon (2014, 13) states, there is a need to go beyond the mere recognition or accommodation

4 of difference to the idea of empowerment to enable both minority and majority nations to acquire the tools needed for their full flourishing as communities. Moreover, there is a need to be aware of the potential problem inherited in federal systems: secession. Federalism has secession inducing or preventing features, but the important thing is to find out the incentives that give way to secession in multinational federal systems. Whether federalism calms secessionism or facilitates it depends on internal and external factors. While it may not be possible to predict in advance which federations are likely to lead to secessionist movements and which are not, it is possible to identify the way institutions will be used and the lines along which secessionism is likely to develop. The paradox of federalism has led scholars to fall into one of two opposed schools. One school holds that federalism can be a solution for territorial-based political conflict and thus, prevent secessionist movements (Bermeo 2002; Brubaker 1994; Ghai 2000; Gurr 2000; Lijphart 1977; McGarry and O Leary 2009; Stepan 1999). In multinational federalism, secession is a selfprotective response to policies of the central government. To be able to deal with secession, federalism must remedy the disadvantages these policies cause by providing a constitutional selfdefence mechanism for the discontent minority nation (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004; Bermeo 2002). Nancy Bermeo (2002, 18) states that federalism is a successful method for managing ethnic conflict. She argues that no violent separatist movement has ever succeeded in a federal democracy. For John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (1993, 30), ethnic differences can be managed through federalism with liberal democratic norms. Ghai (2000, 525) argues that selfrule is an instrument to reduce conflict through providing a basis for collaboration between the centre and the province that is satisfactory to both, thus promoting integration. For him, autonomy should be chosen not because of some notion of preserving sovereignty but in order to enable different groups to live together, to define a common public space. This is the spirit of the shared rule as well. Ian Lustick, Dan Miodownik and Roy Eidelson (2004, 223) state that the possibility of secession decreases once power-sharing institutions like federalism are adopted. The other school of thought, (i.e., those who criticise federalism as secession inducing) stresses the failed nondemocratic federal countries like Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia to justify their arguments. They believe that federalism contributes to secessionism (Brancati 2006). The link between federalism and secessionism seems to be strong and persistent here: institutions intended to prevent secession can fuel it. Firstly, the pursuit of autonomy at the base of independence movements is considered an effective tool in accommodating separatist groups. However, some scholars argue that providing autonomous institutions to groups that are, or could be, in conflict with the center might increase the chances of secessionism (Bunce 1999; Cornell 2002; Gorenburg 2003; Roeder 1991; Treisman 1997). These existing institutions help smooth the transition to independence, thus diminishing the substantial costs of secession (Erk and Anderson 2009). Secondly, both symmetry and asymmetry can also play a role in the development of secessionism. When federations are symmetric, national minorities who believe they need more rights and powers may be annoyed by being equal to mere provinces or states. When federations are asymmetric, increased institutional resources are granted to groups that might otherwise seek to secede or engage in conflict with the center. The institutions of asymmetrical federalism might satisfy the ambitions of national minorities, but dissatisfy a subset of the national majority to the point where this group seeks independence. It is often said that asymmetric arrangements would give province(s) more power. However, constitutional

5 asymmetry means letting provinces have a say over the same kinds of political decisions and exercise in a provincial rather than a federal forum (Weber 1994, 229). This arrangement does not give that particular province neither more power at the centre nor at the other provinces. Thirdly, the origin of a state affects secessionist movements as well. Two justifications for the pursuit of secession emerge as a state's right or as a right consistent with the right to national self-determination (Meadwell 1999). The justification made in the latter implies that a group that calls itself a nation does not have the ability to rule itself and its exercise does not necessarily mean independence. National self-determination may be enjoyed through various autonomy arrangements like federalism. By contrast, a state's right justification for secession appeals that a union of formerly independent states was created through a treaty\compact between states (i.e., coming-together federations). In case the terms of the bargain are broken, for instance through over-stepping constitutional authority by the central state, the member-units consider this action a violation of the terms of the compact and withdrawal from the bargain. The state's right justification is not only a justification for secession, but a historical claim about the nature and terms of the polity. As time has gone on, the language of compact theory has given way to a justification grounded in the right of national self-determination. 1 To resolve the paradox of federalism, Henry Hale emphasises the impact of core regions, which may consist of a single ethnic federal region that enjoys dramatic superiority in population or a group of provinces (or states) acting in concert might operate as a core region. Hale (2004, 166) argues that states with core regions are more at risk to secessionist forces than states with no core regions. Federalism seems likely to be more stable with multiple units instead of two or three large units or a single dominant one (Erk and Anderson 2009, 7) because that design will be likely to generate more room for shifting alliances and reduce an us vs them mentality. Moreover, when only a few or one of the subunits is ethno-culturally distinct like in Spain and Canada, subunits of the minority culture(s) might feel overwhelmed by the subunits representing the majority culture (Erk and Anderson 2009, 7). Dawn Brancati (2006), in order to solve the paradox, analysed regional political parties. Brancati suggests that rules governing political parties and electoral competition can accommodate secessionist demands. For example, he suggests requiring parties running in national elections to field candidates in more than one region in order to win seats. Moreover, social factors, in particular the social cleavage structure plays an important role in explaining secessionist tendencies. Ethnic conflict can be moderated by the existence of some cross-cutting cleavages. For Lijphart, Belgium could be stable if the Flemish/Walloon division were supplemented by other cleavages (i.e., spiritual families and Bruxellesois) (Bieber 1999). Unfortunately, the mutually exclusive split between the main parties has effectively diminished the existence of overlapping group memberships (Schneckener 2002). This is problematic because the existence of cross-cutting pressures through multiple associations can provide a possible solution to ethnic tensions in multinational societies (i.e., Social Capital). The lack of cross-cutting ethnic, social or political bonds, however, prevents the development of a common political culture and overarching loyalties among different groups (Duba 2013), which may generate secessionism. Alternately, asymmetrical federalism as a normative solution can deal with that paradox as well as by establishing viable and acute recognition of national diversity. In multinational federations, political representation and self- 1 There is a disjuncture in the origin of grievance in the Canadian case and the language of justification used to defend the pursuit of secession. One is firmly grounded in compact theory and states' rights; the other is closely linked to the more contemporary language of national self-determination.

6 government for national minorities are no guarantee to meet their needs because, at crucial points, the other members may act like a majority or the central government may threaten their fiscal and political autonomy. So, recognising specific peoples, granting special status, instituting asymmetric federalism and guaranteeing a right to opt out of federal programmes in exclusive provincial jurisdictions with financial compensation would all reflect a real politics of difference and politics of empowerment, which could eventually escape the majority-minority syndrome (Seymour 2012). In a multinational federation, the majority group often tends to identify itself with the country as a whole, while the national minority tends to identify itself with the federated state. So, it is as though the former has its own sovereign state, the central federal state, while the latter only has a federated state. This could be seen as preferential treatment for the former. To compensate for this, a similar treatment should be provided for the latter. So, granting a special status is just a way of achieving a more equal treatment between all the citizens (Seymour 2012). Multinational states in comparative perspectives The emergence of autonomist or secessionist nationalist parties in Spain and Canada and the split along linguistic lines of the traditional Belgian parties have transformed the political landscape of these societies. Therefore, the specific constitutional and institutional arrangements that demonstrate formal recognition/rejection of the national diversity that characterizes these countries will be analysed. Their differences suggest many questions concerning the meaning given to the dual principles of integration and respect for diversity, questions relating to the nature and degree of political autonomy given to the different communities, to the unavoidable tension between the central state and the larger collective identity, and the presence of regional/community/provincial governments and their own collective identity. Quebec and Catalonia seek to acquire a new status that would obligate majority-based nations to restructure state institutions to create space for building multinational grounds as the basis for those states legitimacy. In the case of Belgium, it is the Flemish movement's concerns for the linguistic and cultural future of the Flemish community that led to claims for political autonomy. These concerns were brought to Parliament by the Volksunie, a Flemish nationalist political party that attained considerable electoral success in the late 1960s and the 1970s. The Volksunie gave birth to another Flemish nationalist party, the Vlaams Blok. The split of the three traditional parties the Christian Social Party, the Socialist Party and the Liberal Party is a direct consequence of the emergence of nationalist/regionalist parties. The absence of a national party in Belgium limits the opportunities for a dialogue between communities and lowers the level of mutual understanding (Rocher, Rouillard and Lecours 2001, 180). There are no national politicians in a traditional sense. Rather, there are only those who are accountable to members of their own linguistic communities. This genre of political representation has generated a series of institutional reforms aimed at acknowledging the existence of Belgium's linguistic communities and providing them with the autonomy necessary to fulfill their specific needs. These reforms of constitutional division of power not only promoted both regional and communal identities but also acknowledged the multinational character of the Belgian state symbolically as well as formally. This recognition came, however, at the expense of the larger Belgian national identity. In this way the dynamics of the party system have created instability in the political system by

7 reinforcing ongoing claims for more autonomy and pointing towards further constitutional change. More than three decades after the transition to democracy and the recognition of the state s autonomous regions in 1978, Spain still has not been able to fully implement its multinational model. The institutional features reflect consecration of a national identity: the Spanish one. Other identities are defined as nationalities or regions constituting socio-political characteristics of the former. Formal political recognition of the multinational nature of the state has been limited to the allocation of regional language and culture to the exclusive jurisdiction of regional governments (excluding international relations), while the true nature of the relationship between the central and regional governments has been illustrated by the small fiscal autonomy of the regional governments that rely, for the most part, on the many transfers coming from the centre. Moreover, in 2010, the Constitutional Tribunal invalidated many of the new powers accorded to the Catalan government by the popular referendum in These decisions suggest to Catalans that they may be in a better position to push for national independence than to continue negotiations with the central state (Gagnon 2014, 8). Canada is trying to accommodate its diversity through asymmetric federalism, rearticulation of Canadian nationalism, and the creation of fiscal equalization programs. Modern Canadian nationalism has been built on a bilingual and bicultural foundation for the purpose of incorporating the particularities of Quebec, which contrasts sharply with Spain where the culture, language and history with which nationalism is associated are completely those of the majority community. The Official Languages Act of the (first) Trudeau government mainly aimed at mitigating secessionist tendencies and promoting Canadian identity, including the elimination of Quebec nationalism and asymmetrical devolution, led the Parti Quebecois (1976) to be elected. In order to accommodate Quebec s demand for recognition of its distinct society, the Meech Lake Accord and Charlottetown Agreement were introduced in the late 1980s and 1990s. However, the so-called Canada Clause treated Quebec as a province just like the others, thus, asserting the equality of provinces, which led to the revival of pervasive grievance among Quebeckers. The failure of these accords in a referendum actually served to strengthen Quebec separatists. The Belgian case is quite different as well. During 1960s and 1970s, intercommunal conflicts and splits in political parties fractured its nationalism creating an obstacle to forming a government. Moreover, the possibility of unification has been diluted by the weakness of Belgian nationalism as the two communities have become polarized socially and politically. In this way party politics and the governmental institutions present obstacles to creating more integrative political rules in Belgium. Canadian accommodation of Québec through federalism lies in the political and institutional representation of the two territorial identities. Official bilingualism is obviously not the only policy that fosters modern Canadian nationalism/canadian national identity. Public policies that give major symbolic value to something seen as a pan-canadian approach, repeatedly offered by federal politicians as expressing the values of compassion and equality associated with Canadian society, also promote the idea of a progressive Canadian political culture (Lecours 2014). Spain s semi-federal structure plays an important role in the accommodation of Catalonia. However, the autonomy of Catalonia is much more limited than that of Québec. The central government has intervened in several spheres of public policy in a way that would be impossible

8 to see in Canada. Moreover, Catalonian politicians are not adequately represented in the central institutions compared to Quebecers. The Constitutional Court of Spain that governs disagreements between the State and the Autonomous Communities does not consider diversity of the country unlike in Canada, and it is not accepted as impartial. In Spain, plurilingualism is an essential character of state plurinationality that needs to be reflected in state institutions. Neither Spanish symbols nor their use represents the plurinational character of that state (Karmis and Norman 2005). The upper chamber s composition and its competences also need to reflect this reality, and should be strictly associated with Autonomous Communities rather than to the mere administrative provinces. Belgium has well-established and constitutionalised mechanisms of representation and the exercise of power in the central institutions, especially the executive branch. The mechanisms of consociational democracy -composition of the Belgian government by an equal number of Flemish and Francophone ministers have contributed to dealing with issues caused by a polarisation although they are now a major political obstacle in forming governments. While Québec aims to strengthen its institutions and autonomy, other provinces feel the necessity of pushing back. For Québec the struggle to centralize puts them in a defensive mode, further reinforcing the aspiration to decentralize. For Québec, centralizing turns provinces into ordinary administrative units of the center, but also gives them an opportunity to create policy, which helps capacity-building in Québec (Beland and Lecours 2007). Québec has been given a chance to opt-out of many centralizing programs (e.g., the Canada Pension Plan) and create its own plan. In Canada, although the autonomy of Québec in formulating public policy and legislation has been restricted, the flexible system does enable Québec to form policies in other areas of state intervention. Québec has been given greater political autonomy than any other constituent state for the purpose of meeting specific demands from the Québec government and recognizing the distinct character of the province. Quebeckers interpret this accommodation as a means of achieving tacit recognition of Quebec as one of the two founding peoples of Canada (Guibernau 2006). Therefore, decentralizing several domains of state intervention to give Québec more autonomous control has generated an asymmetry in the formulation and implementation of public policy for the purpose of identity accommodation. Unlike Belgium and Spain, change can come without constitutional reform through intergovernmental relations whereby policies and tasks have been transferred to Quebec by the central government. Informally, central government authorities show a willingness to compromise with Québec (Murphy 2008). Belgium s decentralization has been driven by the desire of Flemish-speakers to proclaim their language rights and to attain more autonomy. And although the regions and communities have increased spending and regulatory powers though their taxation powers have not. Belgian federalism is highly decentralized even though nearly all of the social security programs are vested with the federal government. As Swenden and Theo Jans (2006) state, the system assigns great autonomy to its constituent entities but the federal structure does not sufficiently encourage bridge-building between the two communities or the promotion of loyalty to Belgium. Due to the lack of a national party system, it is difficult for two separate systems in Wallonia and Flanders to work to hold the federation together. In Canada, although its multinational character has not been explicitly recognized, the Québec identity and political community are recognized either explicitly or implicitly in a wide range of decisions by the Government of Canada, which demonstrates that it is more than provincial. The

9 Canadian government has different treatment of Quebec in intergovernmental relations and certain issues particular to the province, such as the quest for self-determination. Recognition is the most sensitive question in relation to Québec, which has never come out in Belgium. Here, the nationalist movement emerged in the demographic majority but this has not stopped the Flemish demand for recognition as a nation from the Belgian State. This type of recognition has been called for by Catalonia but rejected by the Spanish State. The Canadian way to accommodate Québec has not been restricted to identity, representation and institutions but has also included economic and material aspects. The federal equalization program, which is generally favourable to Quebec, aims to achieve a degree of equality and accommodation of Québec (Lecours 2014). Belgium has no such specific equalization program although the greater wealth of Flanders compared to Wallonia translates from the North to the South through social security mechanisms about which there have been complaints from most Flemish parties. Catalonia has asked for fiscal autonomy similar to that of the Basque Country, but until now it has not benefited from this type of arrangement. However, in spite of the problems that have emerged within these countries, territorial decentralization has strengthened common as well as regional identity which are important to prevent secession. The shared political identity is an essential source that keeps groups together in those societies. Canadians present very strong dual identities, provincial and federal (Guibernau 2007, 51). Provincial attachments are very strong: 85% in Quebec (including both anglophone as well as francophone and allophone Quebeckers). 79% in Quebec feel also attached to Canada (Opinion Canada 2003), although Quebecers are much less apt to identify with the country (36%) than are those living elsewhere (64%) (Focus Canada 2010). It can be argued that territorial autonomy has not lead to the weakening of Canadian and Spanish identity but has promoted a dual identity among large sections of the population. Although national identity achieves much higher scores in Canada than identification with Spain, 37 % of the population in Catalonia indicate an equal, dual identification 69 per cent of the population in Catalonia declaring some kind of dual identity (Guibernau 2006, 66). Despite considerable support for Flemish, Quebecois and Catalan nationalism, these movements appear to be in some way accommodated through devolution/self-rule structures which, in return, have dealt with secession and undermined pro-independence claims. The main nationalist political parties call for greater devolution or qualified independence such as the sovereignty and partnership model advocated by some Quebeckers rather than complete independence (see Gagnon et al. 2003; Guibernau 1999; Keating 1999). However, since 2010, things have changed in Spain. While until 2010 a minority of around 12-15% Catalans backed secession, after 2010 the support for independence increased to around 45%. The majority of its citizens, political parties and civil society organizations have recently demanded pro-independence (Requejo 2015) unlike in either Canada or Belgium, mainly due to inadequacies concerning constitutional recognition and political and economic accommodation. The reform process of Catalonia s 2006 Constitutional Law the Statute of Autonomy and the decision of the Constitutional Court in 2010 regarding this Law also led to tension between legality and democratic legitimacy (Requejo 2015). A secessionist movement has been active in Québec since The pro-secessionist Parti Québécois was elected to power in Québec and held two referenda on secession. In the first referendum (1980) the vote was 60% against; in the second in 1995, 51% against. Moreover, since 1993, the Bloc Québécois has represented the secessionist movement in the federal parliament. At the provincial level, Parti Québécois, has not dropped to under 30% of votes cast

10 since In national elections the most extreme Flemish political party, the Vlaams Blok, has slowly but progressively increased over time, from only 2% in 1978 to 12% in Successive attempts to meet Flemish demands by increasing their autonomy first over spending and over revenue seem to have resulted in more demands (Bird, Vaillancourt and Roy-Cesar 2010). These case studies propose various formulas for the accommodation of national communities/minorities. Canada has undergone referendums on the sovereignty of Québec in spite of its bicultural basis of nationalism, its flexible and decentralized structure, its federal government often led by Quebecers and its equalization program providing financial resources to Quebec. Still, Quebec tends to find itself isolated. A reformed constitution imposed in 1982 by the central government without the support of Quebec contained no recognition of the Quebec people and restricted Quebec s powers. Furthermore, a Social Union Framework Agreement has been imposed upon Quebeckers in 1999 with the explicit approval of all other provinces except Quebec. This agreement accepts the constant intrusion of the central government in exclusive jurisdictions of the provinces through federal spending, allowing the central government to create programmes and spend money in provincial jurisdictions. So although Quebec may enjoy self-government, political autonomy is far from guaranteed ( ). The inflexibility and strictness of Spanish federalism and nationalism, the economic crisis and the judgment of the Constitutional Court to nullify Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia have increased support for Catalonian independence and deteriorated relations between Catalonia and Spain (Lecours 2014). In Belgium, consociational mechanisms and constant decentralization of federalism have generated mutual isolation of the two communities making the future of the federation uncertain (Deschouwer and Reuchamps, 2013). Unitary Belgium relied on party-dominated elite compromises, transformations toward federalism resulted from such compromises, and federal Belgium now rests on party-dominated elite compromises. Despite the long process of federalisation that relied on political flexibility delivered by party politics and giving the Regions and Communities the right of self-rule, the constitution still holds a nationwide understanding of democracy upon which popular legitimacy rests (Erk 2013). Yet the constitution seems to have partially preserved a new understanding of Belgium (i.e., residual powers vested within constituent units) as a federal compact between the constituent units of the union. Whether democratic legitimacy comes from the Nation that Article 33 of the amended constitution mentions, or the compact between the demoi that brought about the changes in the Belgian state, is not clear. The reforms giving the Communities and Regions self-rule have often centred on the intricacies of devolving power from the centre to the subunits and the complexities of institutional solutions that are acceptable to the various constituent entities, especially to political parties, without precision regarding what the underlying demos is and how the constitution can guide division of prerogatives between legislatures. So, these are the problems that must be considered while discussing future federal union in Cyprus. Historical background of the Cyprus problem The Cyprus conflict is an intractable ethnic dispute that has frustrated many third-party attempts to resolve it. Since 1974, the island has been de facto divided between two communities, the Greek Cypriots, who comprise 76% of the population and live in the southern two-thirds of the island, and the Turkish Cypriots, who make up 19% of the population and live in the north. Both

11 communities experienced a short-lived power-sharing constitution ( ) under the Republic of Cyprus, which ended with violent ethnic conflict, prompting a Greek-inspired coup d état, Turkish military intervention, forced population transfers and the de facto partition of Cyprus. Problems that emerged in this power-sharing regime were linked to conflict over different visions of self-determination. Greek Cypriots objected to power-sharing with Turkish Cypriots not just because this infringed upon principles of majority rule or because the constitution overrepresented Turkish Cypriots, but also because Turkish Cypriots fundamentally opposed the core aspiration of the majority of Greek Cypriots Enosis (i.e., union with Greece). In response Turkish Cypriots called for Taksim (i.e., the partition of Cyprus along ethnonational lines), which would have extended Ankara s control. Attempts by Greek Cypriots to weaken Turkish Cypriots constitutional rights were seen by Turkish Cypriots as steps toward union with Greece or uncontrolled majority rule. The 1960 power sharing arrangement ended in 1963 when, after debilitating deadlock, Greek Cypriot President Makarios proposed amendments to the constitution that would remove Turkish Cypriots veto rights as well as their overrepresentation in civil service and governmental institutions (Moore 2011). This provoked many of the Turkish Cypriot minority fears of domination, generating inter-communal violence and increased segregation as the Turkish Cypriots were forced into enclaves. Within their armed enclaves the Turkish Cypriots set up their own State, leaving the official State, the one that enjoyed recognition, in the hands of the Greeks. 2 The Turkish Cypriots established a state, the TRNC, in the northern third of the island in 1983, although this state is recognized only by Turkey. 3 The TRNC represents a case of a separatist group searching for a settlement within the boundaries of the established sovereign order. Constitutional proposals for a reunited Cyprus have generally recognized the de facto division of the island and have envisaged some form of federation based upon territorial autonomy. The issue that emerged as most polarizing during the consociational regime and the main reason for the regime s failure was one of territorial pluralism. The 1960 Constitution provided a limited form of self-government for Turkish Cypriots only by way of separate Turkish Cypriotcontrolled municipalities where they were able to make their own decisions. They were seen as important for physical security, for opposing union with Greece and as a platform for a more extensive version of partition (McGarry 2015). For Greek Cypriots, separate municipalities were seen as facilitating partition and being inconsistent with their vision of a majoritarian democracy in a unitary state. The period of 1963 to 1974 were characterized by intercommunal violence. From 1968 to 1974 the issue of territorial autonomy for Turkish Cypriots emerged as the most crucial issue in intercommunal negotiations (McGarry 2015; Polyviou 1980). The Turkish Cypriot proposal for federated autonomy had been rejected by the Greek Cypriot leadership: any form of federalism was seen as unacceptable and all local government reforms had to be consistent with unitarism. In 1974 the Turkish military intervened after a coup by Greek Cypriot hardliners with the support of the Greek junta ousted Makarios. The result was the subsequent partition of the island 2 In 1965, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 186, which recognized Makarios s government as the sole legitimate force on the island. 3 As a result of failed mediation attempts to unify the island, Turkish Cypriot leaders unilaterally declared independent statehood of the TRNC in Security Council Resolution 541 condemned it and called it invalid. So, no country other than Turkey recognizes the independence of the TRNC, which has led the TRNC to suffer political and economic isolation.

12 and eventual existence of two ethnically homogenous zones with Turkish Cypriots controlling 37% of the island in the north. By agreeing to a bicommunal, bizonal federation as a basis for a settlement since the 1970s, the Greek Cypriot leadership has accepted that relations between the two territorial communities necessitate some form of partnership in a federation. This agreement has both institutionalized and safeguarded the territorially-rooted Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Although the most recent comprehensive UN Plan in 2004 (i.e., the Annan Plan) with its proposed federal solution was rejected by 76 per cent of Greek Cypriots despite being accepted by 65 per cent of the Turkish Cypriots, both sides remain committed to the principle of federalism as a second best solution. The Cyprus conflict has been frozen for decades and various federal models have not brought tangible results. Cyprus demonstrates that, in self-determination disputes, institutions that emphasise territorial pluralism (i.e., the division of power between central and regional governments) are often as important as, or in many cases, more important than, power-sharing at the center (McGarry 2015, 265). A self-governing territorial unit is the most important demand for the Turkish Cypriot leaders. The failure to agree on territorial autonomy for Turkish Cypriots after 1964 was a major obstacle to the re-establishment of consociation. For Turkish Cypriots, their vision of self-determination involves a viable territorial zone securely dominated by their community. In practice, this means pursuing a settlement that approaches the current postpartition status quo. For the Greek Cypriot community, Bicommunal Bizonal Federation (BBF) is only acceptable either if it is socially, politically and economically integrated, or from the perspective of norms of corrective justice and human rights, under which Greek Cypriots see the 1974 partition and ethnic expulsions as injustices that need to be remedied. For Greek Cypriot leaders, a self-governing territorial unit for the Turkish Cypriots will undermine the unity of the polity and facilitate formal partition of the island. Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, fear that Greek Cypriots would integrate Turkish Cypriots into a state in which their status is downgraded from an equal national partner to that of minority and into an entity from which there is no prospect of secession (McGarry 2015, ). Since partition, the fundamental Greek Cypriot strategy in negotiations has been to reunite the territory of Cyprus within a united federal state. Greek Cypriots worry that Turkish Cypriots want to negotiate an autonomy settlement that gives legitimacy to the TRNC, facilitates the breakup of a united Cyprus, and will be followed by international recognition of the TRNC. These fears about what would follow a federal settlement have produced fundamental disagreements on many issues. Greek Cypriot negotiators have consistently insisted that negotiations should be aimed at achieving a state that has a single sovereignty, single international personality, and single citizenship, a position shared by the United Nations Security Council and the EU. That means establishing a holding together federation, which would convert Cyprus from a unitary state into a federation to preserve the legal continuity of the Republic of Cyprus and avoid giving legitimacy to partition and the TRNC. During negotiations on the Annan Plan (2001-4), Greek Cypriots argued that the state should be clearly named as a federation not confederation, and that it should have a federal government and federated entities, cantons or provinces rather than states. These stipulations were meant to ensure federal authorities the resources necessary to preserve unity. The Greek Cypriot negotiators agreed to a distribution of competencies that gave the bulk of the powers for most matters affecting the day-to-day life of citizens or requiring major budgetary expenditure to the constituent states though the Greek Cypriot position is usually described as

13 fundamentally centralist. Their concerns about breakdown followed by breakup also shaped their views on consociation within federal institutions, and they called for workable and functional institutions partly because this is what majorities normally call for, but also because they worry that the federal authorities might fail. They have sought to minimise vetoes, especially those that can be activated by one side alone, and to emphasise the necessity of a dispute resolution mechanism : rules that come into play if a veto is applied to a vital policy of the federal government. This reflects Greek Cypriots memories of how use of the Turkish Cypriot veto in the early 1960s destabilised the Republic. While Turkish Cypriot negotiators have formally aimed at achieving a federation with a single sovereignty, single citizenship, and single international personality, they have usually avoided endorsing these concepts. Despite his participation in talks between , the long-term Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, consistently called for a confederation (UNSC 2003, 18) with dual/multiple sovereign states, each with its own citizenship, an international personality and the right to secede. Denktash s successors have not called for confederation but clearly advocate a coming together federation, which indicates a union between two sovereign entities, each of which retaining whatever sovereignty is not explicitly ceded to the federal authorities in the constitution. This demand was reflected in the negotiations of by designing federal regions that enjoyed residual authority and by providing some explicit constitutional recognition of the regions sovereignty. Turkish Cypriots argued that the regions needed to be called constituent states rather than province\federated entities, and should enjoy some competence in matters generally reserved elsewhere for federal authorities. Denktash s successor, Mehmet Ali Talat ( ), who is more of a moderate, soft-liner on some of these issues than his predecessor, agreed with the Greek Cypriot leader Christofias in 2008 accepting a single sovereignty and citizenship, albeit in principle, and with the details of their implementation to be worked out in negotiations. His successor Dervis Eroglu, who is more nationalistic and strongly critical of Talat s ideas, generally refused this agreement and consistently uses the language of a settlement involving two states living side by side (Morelli 2012), which has led GCs to believe that he is seeking confederation. Regarding consociational arrangements at the federal level, the general preference of Turkish Cypriot politicians is for significant veto rights that can be activated by them alone, though Turkish Cypriots, with their own fears of what might follow breakdown, are not adverse to what they see as equitable sorts of dispute resolution mechanisms. In the executive branch, Turkish Cypriots have traditionally endorsed a co-presidency since it indicates a partnership of equal and distinct peoples, though they approved the Annan Plan, which provided an indirectly elected presidential council in which they had one-third of the membership, as well as one-third share of a rotating presidency. In negotiations between 2001 and 2003, the traditional Turkish Cypriot position insisted on separate rather than integrated direct elections for the presidency even if their share of total votes was weighted at 50 per cent (UNSC 2003, 81). However, Talat deviated from this position in early 2010 when he conditionally accepted the offer from Christofias of a rotating presidency in exchange for an integrated election. Eroglu s preference was the traditional Turkish Cypriot position on separate elections, which would reflect the existence of two distinct peoples and make it more likely that the elected Turkish Cypriot leader would be radical on the national question because she or he would not have to be concerned about Greek Cypriot voters. Just as between 1960 and 1963, the reluctance of many Greek Cypriots to accept consociation is related not just to the fact that they are a majority who believe in majority rule, but also to their