The Honorable Maurice F. Strong. North Korea at the Crossroads Prospects for a Comprehensive Settlement

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1 Notes for Remarks Delivered at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C. by The Honorable Maurice F. Strong Special Advisor to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Undersecretary-General of the United Nations, and Personal Envoy of U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Korean Peninsula June 17, 2003 North Korea at the Crossroads Prospects for a Comprehensive Settlement Delivered in Abbreviated Form I want first to thank Dr. Jessica Mathews and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for providing this opportunity to discuss with such an impressive group, prospects for peace on the Korean Peninsula. And I must also express my appreciation for the important and influential work that the endowment has done on this increasingly acute issue. Indeed, the issue has now forced its way to the top of the international agenda with the recent confirmation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) more generally referred to as North Korea that it indeed has nuclear weapons and is proceeding with the development of its nuclear weapons program. This has lent new impetus and importance to the need for a peaceful resolution of the deeply imbedded differences and mutually hostility which have divided the Korean Peninsula for the past 50 years and cast an ominous cloud over the security of both Koreas. Although the armed conflict - the most bloody and destructive since World War II ended with the Armistice Agreement signed 50 years ago next month, it left a legacy of a Korea divided, not only in geographical, political and ideological terms but by the entrenchment of deep-seated mutual distrust and hostility Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC

2 Negotiations for a peace treaty to bring the war formally to an end, as envisaged in the Armistice Agreement, have never taken place and the world s largest and most long-standing concentrations of military might are deployed on each side of the Demilitarized Zone which divides the two Koreas, each on constant alert and combat ready. A number of confrontations and incidents have occurred which came close to unleashing a renewal of conflict and this risk will continue to imperil the security of both Koreas until a peaceful resolution of the issues which give rise to them has been achieved. As you know, several attempts to begin negotiations of a peaceful resolution that initially showed promise, and did indeed produce some positive results, nevertheless faltered. Now the prospect of North Korea continuing on the pathway to developing an arsenal of nuclear weapons have made it imperative that this piece of unfinished business remaining from the Cold War be resolved. As all parties concerned are well aware of the horrendous consequences of a resumption of warfare on the Peninsula the absolute necessity of a peaceful settlement could provide the opportunity for a comprehensive and permanent peace, which has proved so elusive in the 50 years. My own experience, most recently as the Personal Envoy of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, has convinced me that a peaceful settlement may in fact be within reach. As my official responsibilities with Secretary-General Annan continue, you will understand that they impose some constraints on what I can say. And I am sure you will also realize that my role requires me to be entirely objective in presenting the position of each of the parties without serving as an advocate for any of them or distorting them with my personal views. I serve the Secretary-General in his good offices capacity in which he seeks to facilitate and support the processes through which a peaceful settlement may be achieved by the parties most directly concerned. In my work on behalf of the Secretary-General I have consulted closely with the DPRK, United States, South Korea (ROK), China, Japan, Russia and other interested parties including the European Union. I have been impressed that despite some differences in approach all have a deep interest in seeking and contributing to a peaceful resolution of the crisis. And all have in various ways been working towards such a solution. Most are prepared to make significant long-term commitments of support as part of a peaceful solution. It is important that the interest of the international community in achieving and supporting a peaceful solution be known to the DPRK and initiatives by interested parties to demonstrate this are very useful. The most recent examples are the visits to Pyongyang of Swiss Foreign Minister Ms. Calmy-Rey and a US bi-partisan congressional delegation headed by Republican Congressman Curt Weldon, which have served a valuable and timely purpose in this respect. Despite their deep differences and mutual hostility, both Koreas continue to affirm that their ultimate goal is unification and share a pride in their long and rich history and their identity as Koreans. While there have been periodic initiatives that have portended progress towards reconciliation and greater cooperation between the two Koreas, notably the historic meeting between the ROK President Kim Dae-jung and North Korea s Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang on June 2000, progress has been slow and sporadic because of the periodic intensification of the political controversies that have long characterized their relationship. Nevertheless it is important to note that despite the current nuclear crisis the two Koreas have agreed to restore 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC

3 their rail and road links which have been severed since the end of the Korean War in 1953, and consultations on a growing range of other practical issues continue at the technical level including the ambitious prospect of a natural gas pipeline from Siberia through the DPRK to the ROK which could provide a promising, but still distant and uncertain, possible answer to the DPRK s long term energy needs. Of particular importance to people on both sides of the border are the arrangements for family reunions, which have thus far involved only small numbers of people but have invoked an intense positive emotional response on the part of Koreans. I am impressed at the deep emotional ties and the sense of the common history, cultural, language and shared destiny despite which unite all Koreans the trauma and conflict that has divided them for so many years. This will continue to drive the political movement for cooperation and ultimate unification. My most immediate task when I went to Pyongyang in January of this year was to consult with the North Koreans and our United Nations country team there on the humanitarian situation and the need for continuing assistance from the international community. We concluded that indeed urgent action was necessary to ensure continuity of support for the most vulnerable of North Korea s population which are dependent on it children, the elderly and the ill. Supplies already committed or in the pipeline at that time would only last until April and unless new supplies could be mobilized immediately the risk to these people would rapidly reach crisis proportions. At the very time when attempts to launch negotiations for a peaceful solution to a nuclear issue this would be at an especially sensitive stage. To avert this impending crisis Secretary-General Annan launched a special appeal for exceptional and expeditious assistance. The response was encouraging. The United States, I am pleased to say, led the way agreeing to provide immediately 40,000 tons of food aid as the initial installment of a 100,000-ton commitment for the year. And despite the impasse in negotiations on the nuclear issue the US maintained its policy of not tying humanitarian assistance to political conditions. The new administration of President Roh Moo-hyun, in the ROK as one of its first acts, made a generous contribution of 400,000 tons of food as well as medical and nutritional supplement supplies. A timely contribution by the European Union and support of Australia, Canada and a number of other countries has assured the continuity of humanitarian supplies during this critical period. While this is certainly a source of relief and satisfaction, there is no cause for complacency. My latest discussions with the principal donors make it clear that future prospects are clouded by their frustration with North Korea s escalation of the nuclear issue, lack of significant progress in meeting donor requirements for accountability, monitoring and satisfactory operating conditions for field personnel, as well as competing demands for assistance to Afghanistan, Iraq, Africa and other areas of need. Japan, which has been one of the main sources of aid and a major potential future source, has announced suspension of all assistance until there has been a resolution of both the abductee and the nuclear issues. And China, which over time has been the principal source of support for North Korea, all provided bilaterally, has not stated what its position would be on continuing support, but indications are that it too will be influenced by progress on the nuclear issue Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC

4 Of course, the extent of North Korea s need for humanitarian aid will also depend on this year s harvest, although even under the best foreseeable conditions, it will still require substantial international assistance. The state of North Korea s humanitarian needs and prospects for international support in meeting them are closely related to progress in resolving the nuclear controversy and on the longer term improving the performance of North Korea s severely weakened economy. In the final analysis it is only through economic development that North Korea will achieve the level of self-reliance, which is the basic theme of its distinctive JUCHE ideology. But this will require substantial and sustained international assistance and investment and in the meantime there will be a continuing need for humanitarian assistance, hopefully on a diminishing scale. This will require major policy decisions on the part of the North Koreans themselves. It is encouraging to note that they have already begun the process of initiating such changes. I was especially impressed in my recent discussions with North Korean officials on the priority they are clearly according to economic development. Of course, the most acute needs are in the fields of agriculture and energy although the need for revitalization and development extends across the entire economy including the urgent need to effect large scale improvements in transport and industrial infrastructure. After all, the North was the industrial heartland of Korea and it has this legacy to build on. Energy is at the heart of North Korea s economic and security dilemma. It was, they contend, the basic reason for undertaking the construction of the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and the original reason they gave for re-activating Yongbyon. When KEDO suspended work on the two light-water reactors that were designed to replace them and stopped shipments of the fuel oil it was providing to meet the DPRK s energy needs while the new reactors were being constructed that produced an acute energy crisis. While the Yongbyon will produce some much needed electric power it will only go a small distance towards meeting the country s overall energy needs, which remain one of its most urgent problems. Interruptions and blackouts of electric power in the capital city Pyongyang and indeed throughout the country inflict severe hardship and inconvenience on the entire population and exacerbate deterioration and disruption of industrial activity and the provision of medical and other social services. While the rehabilitation of its coal mines and further development of its electric power potential offer the prospect of filling some of the energy gap they will require substantial external technical and financial assistance as will the major task of restoring and developing the country s transmission system. If construction by KEDO of the two lightwater reactors were to proceed it would constitute an important contribution to the energy supply. In the meantime, the DPRK will continue to need supplies of fuel oil which, it cannot afford to purchase and there remains the daunting challenge of ensuring the long term energy supplies that will be needed by their expanding economy. This, too, will require substantial international support. I might say that I have taken special interest in the energy and agricultural sectors and had the privilege of co-chairing the meeting in Geneva in 1998 at which the DPRK presented to the international community its Agricultural Recovery and Environment Program now referred to as the Agriculture Rehabilitation and Environment Protection Program. To be sure the economic development challenge now confronting North Korea is a monumental one. But I have no doubt that its resourceful and talented people will rise to the challenge given a 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC

5 combination of supportive government policies, incentives and access to a substantial amounts of development support and investment from the international community. I am confident that such support will be forthcoming but only following a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue and establishment by the DPRK of the conditions conducive to such support. At the same time the international community will need to remove resisting impediments to trade with and investment in North Korea and facilitate its full participation in international cooperation, with its responsibilities and benefits, notably through membership in the Asian Development Bank and ultimately the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The United Nations principally through the World Food Program, UNICEF and the World Health Organization has since 1995 had the main role in mobilizing and deploying humanitarian assistance to North Korea. And the UNDP is virtually the sole source of multilateral development support and is therefore well positioned to help prepare the way for longer-term development cooperation between the DPRK and the international community following resolution of the nuclear and security issue. This is the crunch issue on which all else depends. What are the prospects of resolving this peacefully? Let me briefly cite the positions of the main parties as I see them. First, there is broad international agreement on the need to keep the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons and, as evidenced by the recent statement of the G-8 leaders, to ensure that the DPRK abandon and dismantle its nuclear weapons program. This would be accompanied by DPRK agreement to verification and inspection measures acceptable to the other parties and its re-joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The DPRK says it is prepared to do this but only if the United States enters into a nonaggression pact, normalizes its relations with the DPRK and ends the hostile measures it has adopted towards their country, particularly in inhibiting trade, investment and development cooperation with South Korea, Japan, and others. This, I understand, was the essence of the bold proposal made by the North Korean s at the recent meeting in Beijing convened by the Chinese. While the US has described this as unacceptable it is still under consideration and subject to consultations with other key parties. Paradoxically, although there remain important differences on particulars, the positions of both the US and DPRK contain the basic elements on which an agreed settlement should be achievable. Why, then, is it so elusive? And why has this proven so difficult for the parties to begin serious negotiations? The underlying reason is the legacy of continuing hostility, mutual distrust and almost total lack of mutual confidence and understanding, which divides the parties as deeply as the DMZ divides Korea. The apparent reason for the current impasse between the insistence of DPRK that negotiation of the nuclear and security issues must be with the US on a bilateral basis and the equally strong insistence by the United States that the negotiations be multilateral involving the other principal parties concerned. There is a rationale behind both of these positions, which I have to believe, are reconcilable. This indeed was the basis for the proposal I made on behalf of Secretary-General that a meeting that was multilateral in nature be convened involving the principal parties concerned within which direct discussions could take place between the DPRK and the US. Others made similar 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC

6 proposals and both the United States and DPRK moved a step in this direction by agreeing to the tri-party meeting convened by the Chinese in Beijing. However, the DPRK was disappointed that no provision was made for direct discussions with the United States and they had to make their bold proposal to the US representative informally during a break in the meeting. The US was disappointed that it did not include other key parties, notably Japan and South Korea, which were equally disappointed that they had been excluded. Lack of agreement on the format of future meetings and on who should participate in them continues to cloud their prospects, although we are hopeful that the talks are resumed soon. North Koreans contend that as the 1994 agreement was bilateral between the US and the DPRK, and the United States is the only country that threatens their security only the US can give the DPRK the kind of non-aggression commitment that will ensure its security. They cite the designation of their country as part of an axis of evil, the hostile statements made by President Bush and other members of his administration concerning their country and its leadership, the assertion by the US in its National Security Strategy of its right to take preemptive military action against those who threaten its interests. The war on Iraq reinforced their conviction that their security is threatened and that only the United States can give them the clear assurance against that threat which would justify their abandoning their nuclear program. They state that this is their only means of ensuring their security in the absence of such a guarantee. They also add now that it would enable them to reduce the cost of their military which would make a much needed contribution to their economy. DPRK officials have made it clear to me that they accept the fact that there is a multilateral dimension to the issue but that multilateral negotiations should follow bilateral discussions with the United States. They understand that having other key countries participate would have certain advantages for them in broadening the basis of the security guarantee they are seeking from the US and that the substantial amounts of economic assistance that would need to accompany any agreement which would come more from these other countries than the United States. At the same time the DPRK officials are convinced that the real purpose of the United States is to effect a regime change in their country and that it wants to avoid for as long as possible the negotiations that could lead to their further acceptance of the legitimacy and continuity of the current regime. One does not have to agree with this premise to concede that it is understandable that the North Koreans read some of signals emanating from the United States as pointed in this direction. In the meantime, the claim by the DPRK that it has nuclear weapons and is proceeding with their further development together with the aggressive nature of some of its statements have resulted in a hardening of the positions of other key parties and of international opinion. While there is unanimity at the international level as to the need to keep the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons there have been major differences as to the measures each of the main parties would be prepared to take vis-a-vis North Korea to achieve this. The United States has been and continues to be the single most important ally of South Korea and arbiter of prospects for the future of the two Koreas. The relationship between the US and its South Korean ally has been a turbulent one. It has degenerated seriously at several points along the way but remained intact as a result of their common interests and the realization by South Koreans of how much their democracy, security and remarkable economic progress has depended on their alliance with the US. New strains in the 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC

7 relationship emerged during the administration of President Kim Dae-jung, particularly over his sunshine policy of reconciliation and greater cooperation with the North. These differences deepened when President Roh Moo-hyun unexpectedly won election as President in 2002 on a platform of reducing South Korea s dependence on the US and establishing a more mature relationship of equals. Since assuming office the relationship has begun to mend, as a result of the positive results of President Roh s visit with President Bush in Washington and his support for the Iraqi war. But important differences remain and the relationship is still in the process of being re-constituted on a basis that would maintain their partnership as close friends and allies while accommodating to South Koreas desire to play a leading role in inter-korean affairs. The United States, while continuing to assert that it has no intention of attacking North Korea, has not totally foreclosed this as a possible option in extremis. [Only Japan amongst the other countries concerned has shown some degree of receptivity to this prospect recently.] China, North Korea s principal traditional ally and source of support, has strongly opposed military action, sanctions or other punitive measures but will undoubtedly be reviewing its position in light of the fact that the DPRK is now actively pursuing its nuclear weapons program. This has led, also, to a further hardening of Japan s position, which had already hardened due to the lack of progress in resolving the abductee issue. It has now signaled that it will provide no further assistance and may join in sanctions and punitive measures while holding out the prospect that it would become a primary source of investment and assistance to the DPRK once these issues are resolved. South Korea under its new President Roh Moohyun is committed to a policy of peace and prosperity in Korea and has been very forthcoming in providing humanitarian aid and extending its economic ties with the North. It has at the same time become more responsive to US concerns since President Roh s visit to Washington and confirmation of North Korea s commitment to its nuclear program. But though South Korea may rein in its policy of reconciliation with the North it has strongly ruled out support for military action and is unlikely to support punitive sanctions. In my discussions with people in both Koreas they asserted strongly their insistence that their future must ultimately be resolved by the Koreans themselves and this aspiration I am sure will remain as an important underlying factor in the evolution of their relations with each other and the international community. Russia, with its strong political ties to North Korea has been influential in helping to set the stage for negotiations while opposing both military action and sanctions although there are some signs that its position, too, has hardened. Recently, following an incident in which the Australian navy boarded a North Korean vessel, which was said to carry drugs, the DPRK has been accused of engaging in the illegal drug trade. Moves are now underway to interdict shipments by DPRK of those as well as military materials In summary the recent hardening of positions by key actors has not produced a consensus on military action although it may yet lead to agreement on, or acquiescence in, measures of a more limited nature. These would most likely take the form of interdiction of suspected exports by North Korea of nuclear materials, weapons of mass destruction and drugs which 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC

8 would add to the pressures on the already weakened North Korean economy and deprive it of the economic benefits it might otherwise derive from its nuclear program. Thus, as North Korea escalates its commitment to nuclear weapons, pressures on it from the international community are escalating in tandem. This increases the risk that even an unplanned incident could spark a major eruption of conflict. It also deepens the urgency of pursuing the negotiations for a peaceful settlement. One school of thought postulates that increasing the pressure on North Korea could lead to a collapse of its economy with attendant social unrest and political upheaval. But the North Koreans have shown a remarkable resilience to such pressures in the past and even those who might prefer to seek a regime change as a result of such internal difficulties are apprehensive as to the ultimate consequences of it, fearing that it may produce more instability in the region than allowing the process of change to be undertaken by the North Koreans themselves. They must soon make tough decisions as to the extent to which they can allow their people to continue to bear the deprivation and hardships imposed by the weakness of their economy and their international isolation. The international community, led by the United States, must in turn decide how far it is prepared to go in meeting North Korea s requirements for a peaceful settlement and whether to resort to punitive measures that may affect the prospects for such negotiations. It is now widely acknowledged that any real solution to the current crisis must be comprehensive in nature it if is to meet on a permanent basis the needs of the DPRK for both military and economic security and the needs of it neighbors and others for peace, security and conditions conducive to continued economic growth. The DPRK insists that security from attack is its principal concern but it wants also to have the US remove the impediments that exists to its access to international trade and capital and membership in institutions like the Asian Development Bank. Although the North Koreans have told me that they do not seek to exact an economic advantage from their nuclear program they do want to recover their costs in abandoning it. And, of course, there must be a major economic component to any comprehensive settlement of the nuclear and security issues. The United Nations is the only multilateral organization with a team of experts in North Korea and a very effective team it is. Managing the deployment of humanitarian assistance is one of its principal tasks. Most of the team members, including its head, are World Food Program personnel and there are experts from UNICEF, the World Health Organization with the supporting and coordinating role of the UN s Humanitarian Coordinator. The United Nations Development Program in addition to supporting the humanitarian activity is carrying out on modest scale development programs with the DPRK. In short, it is the United Nations which is uniquely qualified to mobilize the international assistance to help the DPRK fully meet its humanitarian and longer term economic needs when the nuclear crisis is resolved Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC

9 The following, then, would seem to be the main elements of a comprehensive settlement: i.a non-aggression agreement in form acceptable to both the United States and the DPRK which may be joined by other main parties; ii.verifiable and irreversible elimination by the DPRK of its nuclear weapons and related programs, and acceptance by the DPRK of international inspection and verification procedures required to ensure this, and resumption of its membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; iii.commitment to the conventional force reduction called for by the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North of 1992 to include limitations on the development and testing of long range missiles; iv.establishment of full diplomatic relations between the United States and the DPRK accompanied by elimination of the existing economic sanctions and impediments to the normalization of trade, access to international financial institutions, continued humanitarian and development assistance. A comprehensive agreement would need to include, or be accompanied by, agreed measures establishing a conducive framework for international trade, investment, institutional development and humanitarian assistance to include the necessary policy and essential reforms on the part of DPRK and its access to membership in multilateral financial institutions. It would also be important to include provision for the DPRK s movement towards international standards of human rights, especially for some of the countries, which would be potentially significant sources of development support and investment. Of course the devil is always in the details and the process of reaching such a comprehensive agreement would clearly be a time consuming and difficult one which should not be allowed to delay negotiations on the nuclear and security issues. Accordingly, the first aim of the continuation of the Beijing negotiations might best be to reach an interim agreement, the main elements of which would be an immediate freeze on the DPRK s nuclear program, resumption of fuel oil shipments by KEDO, establishment for this interim period of diplomatic links between the DPRK and the United State, suspension of existing impediments to trade and investment with the DPRK, continuation of humanitarian and selective development support. This interim agreement could also hopefully be accompanied by a bilateral agreement between the DPRK and Japan resolving the abductee issue, which is such an acute thorn in their relations. The parties to this interim agreement could also commit themselves to a continuing process of negotiations designed to produce a permanent and comprehensive agreement to remove the ominous cloud of tension, conflict and uncertainty that has hung over the Korean Peninsula for more than half a century. Indeed, such a comprehensive agreement would need to encompass roughly the same issues that would be required to complete the peace treaty contemplated in the Armistice Agreement signed 50 years ago next month. For while the armistice brought the military dimensions of the conflict to an end it left Korea divided by a narrow and virtually impenetrable Demilitarized Zone with massive military forces deployed on each side, each with their fingers on the triggers that could resume a state of war that has 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC

10 never been formally terminated to an end on any perceived infraction or provocation by the other. Anniversaries are not in themselves a reason to do things that would not otherwise be done, but the fact that this anniversary coincides with the most ominous of the intermittent risks of resumption of conflict on the Peninsula that have occurred during the 50 years since the armistice was signed is as a timely reminder that the peace treaty it envisaged in the armistice agreement has never been signed or even been the subject of serious negotiations. It surely points up, too, the risks of recurring conflict that will continue as long there is no end to the state of war and to the requirement for such maintaining such major military forces on either side of the Demilitarized Zone. Although first priority must be accorded to meet the immediate security and economic concerns of the DPRK and the requirements of the international community that it abandon its nuclear weapons program this, I hope would be seen as the first step in a negotiating process designed to produce a peace treaty that would bring this especially important piece of unfinished business to a peaceful conclusion. Only this will ensure the long-term security and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and contribute to the stability and economic progress of the entire region. The recent report on A Comprehensive Resolution of the Korean War done under the auspices of the United States Institute of Peace makes a compelling case for which I hope will be seriously considered by the main parties concerned - those most directly involved in the Korean War North and South Korea, United Sates and China through the People s Volunteer Force. The other 19 nations, which participated in the UN-mandated war under the leadership of the United States, could also be parties and full international support would be conferred by endorsement of the Security Council. While it is not for me to state my position on the particulars of this proposal I regard it as en extremely and relevant contribution to current attempts to resolve the Korean issue peacefully. However, I am sure you can deduce from the analysis of the prospects for a peaceful settlement that I have shared with you that this is the most promising pathway to permanent peace in Korea. To conclude, the situation on the Korean Peninsula is probably the most complicated and dangerous one in the world. At the same time, all the ingredients required for its peaceful resolution seem to be in place. What is needed is the will to put them together. I remain hopeful that the work of peace is already underway Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC