Indigenous Nationalism in Fiji: Rethinking the Politics of Ethnicity 1. Stephanie Lawson 2

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1 Indigenous Nationalism in Fiji: Rethinking the Politics of Ethnicity 1 Stephanie Lawson 2 Abstract The Republic of the Fiji Islands has been plagued by coups d etat since 1987 following elections at that time which had seen the first change of government since independence seventeen years earlier. These elections had resulted in the defeat of an indigenous chiefly elite by a broader coalition dominated numerically by Indo-Fijians. A military coup less than six weeks later was justified almost exclusively in terms of the alleged threat to indigenous rights posed by the new government. Further coups have followed, with the rhetoric of justification again centering on indigenous rights vis-à-vis perceived encroachment by Indo-Fijians. Images of politics in Fiji have therefore been dominated largely by ethnically based struggles for dominance with indigenous Fijians generally winning out by virtue of their control of the military. The most recent coup in December 2006, however, has revealed some significant contradictions and confounded explanations of Fiji s politics based on a simple dichotomy of interests between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians. In this instance, the commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces led a coup against a government dominated by Fijian nationalists claiming, among other things, that their government was based on racist principles and that Fiji needed a new way forward. The paper provides an analysis of this most recent episode in Fiji s politics, focusing in particular on rival factions among indigenous Fijians, and assessing prospects for the future of constitutional rule. More generally, it considers the principles of indigenous political privilege vis-à-vis the rights of immigrant communities and how these have played out in practice. Introduction The Republic of the Fiji Islands consists of around 520 islands scattered over an area of roughly 650,000 square kilometers of the Southwest Pacific. Most people occupy the two largest islands, Viti Levu and Vanua Levu. As of 2007 when the last census was conducted, the total population stood at 837,271. The specific census data for Fiji are always a matter of great interest given the extent to which the ethnic or racial composition of the population holds implications for politics, society and the economy. Indeed, political discourse in Fiji has long revolved around the notion of indigenous rights vis-à-vis immigrants, and this is linked to constitutional issues as well. Although the 1997 constitution used the term Fiji Islander to designate all citizens, its provisions nonetheless required that each and every one be classified according to race, viz. Fijian (the term reserved for indigenous Fijians); Indian (i.e. Indo-Fijian); European, part-european, Chinese, other Pacific Islanders and so on usually making up the remainder. The 2007 census showed that those classified as indigenous Fijians numbered 1 Paper prepared for presentation at the xxx Convention of the International Political Science Association, Santiago, Chile 12 th -16 th July Professor of Politics and International Relations, Macquarie University, stephanie.lawson@mq.edu.au 1

2 475,739 Indo-Fijians 313,798 and others 47, In percentage terms this translates into indigenous Fijians 56.8%; Indo-Fijians 37.5% and others 5.7%, making indigenous Fijians a substantial majority populations, although that has not always been the case. Since Fiji became an independent state almost forty years ago, it has experienced more changes of government through coups than through constitutional processes, thereby attracting the epithet coup-coup land from media and other commentators in nearby Australia and New Zealand. The first three coups were executed in the name of indigenous rights but the leader of the fourth in December 2006, Commander Voreqe (Frank) Bainimarama, in a complete turnaround, pledged to put an end to the divisive tactics of indigenous nationalists with his coup to end all coups. In his speech to the United Nations (UN) in September 2007 he stated that he would put an end to Fiji s coup culture and the country s history of civilian or military coups executed in the interests of a few and based on nationalism, racism and greed. In order to remove this coup culture and entrench democracy and the rule of law, Bainimarama stated further that policies which promote racial supremacy, and further the interests of economic and social elites, must be removed once and for all. 4 In short, Bainimarama appears to have rejected the tenets of indigenous nationalism in favour of a broader, more inclusive set of political structures based on liberal constitutional principles. But, almost perversely, he seems intent on achieving this through compulsion backed up military power. As noted above, indigenous Fijians have not always been the majority population, but they have been politically dominant since independence. Even under colonial rule, their concerns and well-being were regarded as paramount over other communities, making the colonial regime an exception to much colonial history elsewhere. In addition, the population against which indigenous rights in Fiji are generally asserted are descended mainly from the helots of empire people transported from India under slave-like conditions to provide cheap labour for the plantation economy. 5 It is the latter group whose political rights have been most compromised over the last hundred years rather than the indigenous population. This does not mean that sectors within the indigenous population have do not have legitimate grievances but, by and large, these cannot be attributed either to colonial dispossession or, in the final analysis, to the presence of a large non-indigenous population. Rather, many of the problems almost certainly lie within indigenous Fijian society and with its leaders, both those with traditional status as well as many among a newer generation of non-traditional leaders. The foregoing suggests that the situation in Fiji does not fit the assumptions underpinning the approach of the UN to indigenous rights, nor even, strictly speaking, its definition of indigenous. In UN terms, indigenous refers to communities which not only have a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories and which continue to consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those territories and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their 3 Fiji Islands, Bureau of Statistics, Fiji Facts and Figures as at 1 July 2008, accessed 7/5/09. Note that officially, 4 PM Bainimarama - Statement at the 62nd Session of the UN General Assembly, 29 September 2007, Fiji Government On-Line Portal at accessed 23/05/ See Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery: The Export of Inidan Labour Overseas , London, Oxford University Press, 1974., 2

3 ethnic identity but also form non-dominant sectors of society. 6 It is the latter qualification which effectively excludes Fiji from the ambit of the normative assumptions underpinning UN approaches to indigenous rights. A principle purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of Fiji s coup culture in terms of the politics of indigenous nationalism. An important focus will be on rivalries among indigenous Fijians themselves rather than the familiar Fijian vs Indian theme, although this certainly plays a key role in nationalist rhetoric. The first section below provides a brief outline of Fiji s colonial and pre-colonial past in which the problematic nature of a singular Fijian nation is highlighted. We then turn to an account of key developments in post-independence politics, including the circumstances surrounding the first two coups in 1987 and the two new constitutions promulgated in the 1990s and the 2000 coup. The final part considers the circumstances leading to the 2006 coup and the Qarase government s downfall at the hands of Bainamarama and the RFMF, the current state of play in Fiji politics, and prospects for the future. Colonialism and the Creation of the Fijian Nation One scholar of Fiji notes the belief among indigenous Fijians that they have occupied the islands e na dua na gauna makawa sara since time immemorial. 7 Certainly, the archeological evidence supports settlement by ancestral Fijians from around 3,000 years ago, although later waves of immigration continued into the nineteenth century, with the latest in the precolonial period coming from Tonga. 8 The variety of migrations brought people with varying characteristics although they almost all belonged to one or other of the anthropological categories Polynesian and Melanesian. The broad differences between these two groups or categories have been taken to underscore the physical, cultural and linguistic diversity of indigenous Fijians evident throughout the islands to this day. 9 Diversity was evident in pre-colonial political practices as well. Of the political entities extant in the islands before colonization, the largest and most powerful were located in the east where relatively large-scale confederacies called matanitu were established. Headed by paramount chiefs, these were characterized by hierarchical sociopolitical structures usually with Polynesian forms. 10 These contrasted with arrangements in the central and western regions where smaller scale and less stratified units, generally designated as Melanesian in character, were found. 11 Diversity rather than uniformity is 6 accessed 13/5/09. 7 Alumita L. Durutalo, Fiji: Party Politics in the Post Independence Period in Roland Rich, Luke Hambly and Michael G. Morgan (eds), Political Parties in the Pacific Islands, Canberra, ANU E-Press, 2008, p The migration from Tonga actually constituted a form of colonialism. 9 An interesting account of anthropological debates over these categories may be found in Nicholas Thomas, The Force of Ethnology: Origins and Significance of the Melanesia/Polynesia Division, Current Anthropology, 30 (1), 1989: David Routledge, Matanitu; The Struggle for Power in Early Fiji, Suva, Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Robert Norton, Race and Politics in Fiji, St Lucia, University of Queensland Press 1977, p

4 thus a hallmark of Fiji s indigenous people, 12 leading some to suggest that the main problem with Fijian nationalism is that there has never been a Fijian nation as such. 13 In the period leading up to colonization, the most important chiefly figure in the east was Ratu Seru Cakobau who controlled an important region around the south-east of Viti Levu. Another important paramount chief was Ma afu, a Tongan who had colonized the Lau region of eastern Fiji which in turn formed the basis of the Tovata confederacy. Cakobau s stronghold of Bau dominated the Kubuna confederacy and a third confederacy, Burebasaga, controlled the south-western region. There were (and are) various other centres of provincial power within these confederacies, as well as in the central and west areas, and the pre-colonial history of Fiji is replete with struggles for dominance within and between the various groups. While these struggles subsided to a large extent under colonial rule, independent Fiji soon has seen the re-emergence of power plays along the lines of long-standing provincial and confederacy allegiances. 14 The story of how the Fiji islands came under British colonial control is an unusual one. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Cakobau found himself mired in difficulties exacerbated by the presence of assorted Europeans (including Americans) in the islands as well as by his arch rival Ma afu. Cakobau eventually found himself persuaded that his difficulties might best be resolved by ceding the whole of the island group to the British Crown, although his authority to do so did not actually exist. The first offer of cession was, in any case, turned down. Germany and the US were subsequently approached but they too declined. In the face of increasing problems with law and order engendered largely by the impact of European activity in the region, a second offer of cession to the British was accepted. On 10 October 1974, Cakobau and eleven other high chiefs including Ma afu but excluding all but one western chief signed an unconditional deed of cession to the British Crown. Thus it was through colonization by a foreign power that the various people of the Fiji islands were formally brought together under a single sovereign power, although it took several more years before the western regions were pacified, a task carried out largely by native troops from the east. Fiji s first substantive governor, Sir Arthur Gordon, arrived in the islands intent on preserving the Fijian way of life and instituted several key structures for this purpose. These included a system of native provincial government alongside which operated a system of deliberative bodies, the highest of which was the Bose Vaka Turanga known also as the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) which served as the national apex of the new native system. This body arose in an ad hoc manner on the occasion of Gordon s installation as supreme chief representing Queen Victoria when chiefs gathered from different parts of the island. The gathering became an annual event and, when vested with certain authority, came to represent a new national element. 15 It was to become the foremost institution claiming to embody a singular Fijian tradition and, on independence, was constitutionally entrenched as a symbol of indigenous Fijian identity and political pre-eminence alongside Westminster style parliamentary 12 For a detailed analysis see The Myth of Cultural Homogeneity and its Implications for Chiefly Power and Politics in Fiji, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 32 (4), 1990: Teresia Teaiwa, An Analysis of the Current Political Crisis in Fiji in Brij Lal and Michael Pretes (eds), Coup: Reflections on the Political Crisis in Fiji, Canberra, ANU E Press, 2008, p See Routledge, Matanitu.. 15 J.D. Legge, Britain in Fiji , London, Macmillan, 1958, p

5 institutions. It has remained a key indigenous institution in all three of Fiji s constitutions since independence although its fate under Bainimarama s regime is far from certain, as we shall see later. The creation of a Fiji nation was part of a project of constructing and rigidifying indigenous Fijian society as a totality to be acted upon. 16 The institutions described above were part of this, but standardization of language, land tenure and kinship systems was also required. The Bauan dialect presented itself as the obvious choice for a common Fijian language as it had been adopted by missionaries in the east as the language for biblical translation and therefore for initial literacy. With respect to land, the system that was eventually adopted vested ownership of native land in kinship groups known as mataqali, although this particular unit was not recognized throughout the islands. It was further decreed that native land was inalienable. 17 More generally, land became linked inextricably with a doctrine of Fijian paramountcy. Initially, it developed as part of Gordon s plan to preserve the Fijian way of life against incursions by Europeans. But it came to acquire its strongest political salience in the presence of another immigrant population, the people now known as Indo-Fijians (or Fiji Indians). Colonies like Fiji were not acquired because of the economic benefits they might bring to the British government. On the contrary, such colonies were more of a financial liability and one of Gordon s prime responsibilities was to establish a sound local economy to support the colony. Fiji was ideal for the development of sugar plantations and native ownership of land by no means precluded leases for economic purposes. There was also some Crown land (which had no official mataqali owners) available. Some of the best agricultural land had been acquired by Europeans before colonization. About half of this was returned to native ownership under Gordon s paternalistic regime but tracts amounting to 17 per cent of land in the islands remained in private ownership. Land was therefore available for plantations, but who was to work it? Preserving the Fijian way of life required that commoner Fijians remain in their villages under the control of chiefs, maintaining traditional activities (excluding warfare). They were thus unavailable for plantation labour. The problem was soon resolved via means employed elsewhere in the empire, namely, the importation of indentured coolies from India. Over a period of almost 40 years some 60,000 labourers were transported to the islands, about two thirds of whom remained as free settlers. Many of these simply could not afford their return passage. This suited the colonial administration as it assured the continuing availability of cheap labour for an industry that was to remain the backbone of the colonial economy, and indeed, the backbone of independent Fiji until very recently. 18 With respect to identity, the presence of a large and growing immigrant population was probably the single most important factor contributing to a sense of 16 Nicholas Thomas, Material Culture and Colonial Power: Ethnological Collecting and the Establishment of Colonial Rule in Fiji, Man (NS), 24 (1), 1989: For detailed studies of the land issue see Peter France, The Charter of the Land, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1969 and R. Gerard Ward, Land, Law and Custom: Diverging Realities in Fiji in R. Gerard Wardand Elizabeth Kingdon (eds), Land, Custom and Practice in the South Pacific, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, See Paresh Kumar Narayan and Biman Chand Prasad, Economic Importance of the Sugar Industry for Fiji, Review of Urban and Regional Studies, 17 (2), 2009: The authors point out that the industry is now in very dire straights not only due to lower sugar prices on global markets but because of the failure of indigenous owners to renew leases on sugar plantations for Indo-Fijian farmers. 5

6 Fijianess and, as the population of Indo-Fijians grew, engendered a sense of threat to what indigenous Fijian leaders regarded as their paramount rights and interests. Like Fijians, Indo-Fijians did not constitute a homogeneous social/cultural entity. Most were Hindu, but subscribed to different schools of practice, while Muslims and Christian Indians retained a distinctive identity. Place of origin in India was another differentiating factor. In later years many Indo-Fijians remained on the land, mostly growing sugar on leased smallholdings. Others moved to urban areas and engaged in trades, professions and small businesses. The relative success of Indo-Fijians in these latter activities, in particular, led to a perception that they had become an advantaged group and this has helped to fuel anti-indian rhetoric. This is despite the fact that poverty afflicts many Indo-Fijians as well as ordinary Fijians in both urban and rural areas. Indeed, recent figures show that Indo-Fijians now suffer greater levels of poverty than their indigenous counterparts, especially in rural areas. 19 A crucial feature of colonial rule which has had a significant and continuing influence on inter-community relations were rules and institutions which kept Indo- Fijians strictly segregated from indigenous Fijians. It was an offence for an Indo-Fijian to enter a native village or for villagers to harbour an Indo-Fijian. This gave rise to an apartheid-like system with separate schools and other social facilities catering for the different races in the colony. All this was reinforced by racially based representation in the colonial legislature. Communal representation has remained enshrined in all postindependence constitutions to date, although these were supplemented by some national electorates based on cross-voting. The doctrine of indigenous Fijian paramountcy logically required the political subordination of Indo-Fijians. And although many of the early paternalistic policies were well-intentioned as far as native Fijians were concerned, one cannot say the same about policy towards Indo-Fijians. Although the latter were brought in to work the land, and encouraged to stay in Fiji after indenture to support the economy with their labour and skills, little thought was given to how future generations might be accommodated. Today, any notion that Indo-Fijians may have rights with respect to land is completely anathema to nationalists. Indeed, land the vanua is regarded as virtually sacred and is often said to embody the very essence of Fijianess. The word taukei has been used in relation to various Fijian nationalist movements and parties and means, literally owners (of the land). Much of the evidence suggests that pre-colonial tenure was more flexible.and did not carry such sacred connotations Nor did every square inch of Fiji have native owners. The rigid doctrine of the inalienability of land as well as the notion that it was a sacred symbol of identity were essentially products of the processes of colonial state formation. 20 In an earlier study, I noted that little attention has been paid to how Indo-Fijian farmers and rural communities might relate to land in cultural terms. 21 I have also taken issue with another researcher s suggestion that the concern of Indo-Fijians with the land 19 See Fiji Islands, Bureau of Statistics, Fiji Facts and Figures as at 1 July 2008, accessed 7/5/ France, Charter of the Land; Ward, Land, Law and Custom, and Lawson, Failure of Democratic Politics. 21 Stephanie Lawson, NationalismVersus Constitutionalism in Fiji, Nations and Nationalism, 10 (4), 2004:

7 is economic rather than cultural. 22 This supposition tends to undermine the normative status of their connection as it assumes that Indo-Fijian interests are coldly instrumental while indigenous Fijian interests have primordial and spiritual dimensions, and are thus more deserving of sympathy and support. Apart from the fact that both indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians have an important economic relationship with the land, after five or so generations on the land one would be hard put to argue that Indo-Fijian farmers have no cultural attachments to it. Furthermore, an emphasis on the cultural rights that go with indigenousness should not automatically negate the claims that groups such as Indo- Fijians might make in terms of their own culture. But no equitable accommodation was ever likely under colonial rule, and the institutions established during that period have persisted into the present era with unfortunate consequences for all concerned. Indigenous Nationalism and Challenges to Constitutionalism in Independent Fiji 23 If Fiji s path to British colonial rule was an unusual one, so was its route to independence. In contrast with many other places in the former colonial world, there was no heroic struggle for self-determination by native people against a colonizing power intent on clinging to the remnants of empire. Indeed, indigenous Fijian leaders resisted moves instigated by Britain itself to push Fiji towards independence. This was at least partly because paternalistic colonial rule was seen as assuring the paramountcy of Fijian interests over those of the Indo-Fijian population an approach which also assumed that there interests were mutually exclusive. To overcome Fijian objections, certain guarantees relating to indigenous rights and representation were entrenched firmly in the 1970 constitution of independent Fiji. In the interests of assuring a smooth path to independence, those representing Indo-Fijian interests accepted the entrenchment of these rights, as well as the fact that a significant level of communal representation in the new parliament would continue, at least for the time being, alongside a number of national cross-voting seats. 24 There were expectations, however, that a common electoral roll would be introduced at some stage, thereby eliminating formal race-based representation altogether and affording Indo- Fijians equality of status. Indo-Fijian leaders also accepted that the country could proceed to independence without elections for the first two years, meaning that the country s preeminent indigenous chiefly leader, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, would assume the office of Prime Minister unopposed. The Alliance went on to win the first general elections of 1982 in a low key contest, but the next couple of years saw the emergence of the Fijian Nationalist Party 22 Joseph Carens, Democracy and Respect for Difference: The Case of Fiji, published as 25 (3&4), University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, This section is a summary of events covered in more detail in Lawson, Failure of Democratic Politics and Lawson, Nationalism Versus Constitutionalism. 24 The new House of Representatives comprised reserved communal seats: 12 each for Fijians and Indo- Fijians and 3 for General Electors (those from other racial groups which included mostly Europeans and part-europeans). Both candidates and electors for these seats were stipulated according to race. The system of cross-voting allowed electors from all three racially defined electoral groups to vote together to produce the successful candidate, although candidacy itself remained racially determined. Of these national seats, 10 were designated Fijian, 10 Indo-Fijian and 5 as General Electors seats. This meant that the racial composition of the legislature was fixed. 7

8 (FNP) with its catch-cry of Fiji for the Fijians (and Indians out ) and which garnered around 25% of the indigenous Fijian vote in the next elections in This slogan, however, masked an undercurrent of strong dissatisfaction with the eastern chiefly establishment s dominance of Fijian politics, as later political developments were to demonstrate more clearly. Ethnic outbidding by the nationalists became an important factor in pushing the Alliance itself to adopt a more nationalistic stand, and this helped to alienate its Indo-Fijian support base. In the meantime, smaller Fijian parties also developed in opposition to the Alliance which was seen as a vehicle for eastern chiefly interests, and while the 1982 elections were also won by the Alliance, Fijian political unity under the guidance of the old chiefly elite was showing strains. In 1987 Mara s conservative Alliance was defeated by a newly formed, left-leaning Fiji Labour Party (FLP) in coalition with the largely Indo-Fijian National Federation Party (NFP). The new government was headed by an indigenous Fijian of non-chiefly status from the west of Fiji. Although receiving some backing from among indigenous Fijians for its explicit multiracial policies, the new government drew the majority of its support from Indo-Fijians and was thus depicted as an Indian government, at least by Fijian nationalists who soon mobilized against it. A loose grouping of dissenters formed the Taukei movement whose declared purpose was the overthrow of the new government. Within six weeks of the election a military coup led by the third-ranking officer of what was then the Royal Fiji Military Forces, Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, saw their ambition realized. A second coup just a few months later, again led by Rabuka, deposed an interim civilian administration which he regarded as insufficiently attuned to a nationalist agenda. In the name of maintaining indigenous supremacy, Rabuka then abrogated the constitution, declared Fiji a republic and embarked on a project of thoroughly marginalizing Indo-Fijians politically. Three years later a new constitution was promulgated. Representation in the new House of Representatives was to be strictly communal, with Fijians occupying 37 seats, Indo-Fijians 27 and others 6. Such an arrangement could only guarantee the consolidation of race-based electioneering and voting. Furthermore, governments could be formed without the support of a single non- Fijian voter. Many Indo-Fijians who had the means and the opportunity found emigration to Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the US and other destinations an attractive prospect under such circumstances, taking their skills and experience i.e. human capital with them. Not surprisingly, Fiji and most indigenous Fijians for that matter failed to prosper under this regime. Equally unsurprisingly, indigenous Fijians found that in the absence of serious political rivalry from an Other, rivalries among themselves multiplied and escalated. Although a few Fijians gained materially and in other ways under the new dispensation, the political pre-eminence sought by indigenous nationalists did not deliver on its supposed promise a better life for the majority of ordinary indigenous Fijians. International condemnation, suspension from the Commonwealth and limited aid flows added to pressures for change. Former coup leader Rabuka, now turned civilian politician, Prime Minster and reformed nationalist, soon backed a review of the 1990 constitution which in 1997 produced a constitution for the Republic of the Fiji Islands allowing Indo-Fijians a much more equitable role in politics while safeguarding 8

9 traditional indigenous rights. But it retained provisions for communal voting, thus ensuring that racial or ethnic identity would remain highly salient in any electoral contest. Generally, however, the tenor of the constitution was much more in tune with principles of multiculturalism, an idea whose time had come for more liberal-minded Fijians, now apparently including Rabuka himself. But he was perhaps as surprised as anyone else that the first elections under the new constitution in 1999 not only failed to return him as head of government, but brought to power a new coalition headed by Labour leader Mahendra Chaudry who duly became Fiji s first (and so far only) Indo- Fijian Prime Minister. Labour leader Chaudhry quickly formed a government styled the People s Coalition with a Fijian coalition party leader as Deputy Prime Minister and eleven other Fijians from both Labour and other coalition members holding cabinet positions. But it was again portrayed as a largely Indo-Fijian government, with the FAP being used simply as an ornament to give the government a Fijian face. 25 Divisions within the party emerged, reflecting the fact that the coalition government had been electorally united less in its positive platform for the future than in its electoral purpose of defeating the SVTled alliance. While achieving results in investment, employment and economic growth, the coalition s first year in office was marked by disunity within its ranks, no doubt exacerbated by Chaudhry s abrasive style. A particularly difficult and sensitive issue at this time was the renewal of agricultural leases for Indo-Fijian farmers. The ascendancy of nationalist rhetoric exacerbated by the election of an Indo-Fijian Prime Minster created an atmosphere within which Fijian landowners took an increasingly hard line against the renewal of leases. It was a simple matter to portray the entire land issue as a straightforward matter of Fijian versus Indian interests, with Chaudhry accused of favouring Indo-Fijians. 26 This was the political climate in which Speight s coup of 19 May 2000 took place. The Speight Coup of 2000 It took Speight and just seven other men, all soldiers from the RFMF s Counter- Revolutionary Warfare Unit (CRW) to take the government hostage at gunpoint in the parliamentary compound and hold them there for 56 days. The only plausible justification Speight could offer, as Rabuka had before him, was the need to protect indigenous Fijians from dangers posed by an Indian government. Speight s record, however, hardly supported a heroic image. He was wanted in Australia for fraud, and was due to face extortion charges in a Fijian court. 27 Other personal interests had been adversely affected by the change of government Chaudhry s unexpected election had evidently blocked him from managing a multi-million dollar timber deal. 28 These issues aside, Speight had a major problem in that he did not have the support of the military leadership or the GCC as a whole, although he did have support from factions within both. At a populist level things appeared very different. Scenes of indigenous Fijians demonstrating vigorously in support of the coup, as well as others rioting and looting Indo-Fijian businesses, seemed to indicate widespread backing. Assaults on Indo-Fijians reached proportions unheard of 25 Pacific Magazine, April 2000: See Sandra Tarte, Fiji in Review 2000, The Contemporary Pacific, 14 (1), 2001: Daily Telegraph, 22 May 2000: Robert Keith-Reid, How Speight Pushed Too Far, Islands Business, August 2000: 30. 9

10 in previous episodes of political unrest, with many thoroughly terrorized and driven from their homes by gangs inspired by the nationalist upsurge. 29 It should be emphasized that the participation of CRW soldiers did not make this a military coup. Speight himself was a civilian opportunist with a grudge against the government and an ability to tap a strong vein of indigenous nationalist prejudice, including elements within the military. Nor was the coup simply a Fijian versus Indian affair. Despite the usual nationalist rhetoric about the Indian threat this coup was, as with the 1987 coups, more complex. For one thing, indigenous nationalism in the form of anti-indianism has over the years become a medium through which rivalries among Fijians have been played out, and the coup and its aftermath require analysis in this light as well. Speight s animosity towards certain chiefly leaders became evident when, as he continued to hold the government hostage at gunpoint, he demanded the resignation of Mara as president. At one stage Speight depicted his coup as a rising of Kubuna (his own confederacy) against Mara s Tovata confederacy. 30 Norton also notes that the failure of the GCC to unite in condemnation of the coup was due in part to a long-standing resentment of some Bauan chiefs of the continued pre-eminence of Mara and the Tovata confederacy. Further, while Mara s daughter was one of Speight s hostages, the daughter of another prominent Fijian leader the late Ratu Sir George Cakobau, a former Governor-General was strongly supporting the coup from her position as Deputy Chair of the GCC. 31 Along with the abrogation of the new constitution, complete Fijian political control, and permanent immunity from prosecution, Speight demanded an interim administration headed by himself. 32 With no agreement on these conditions forthcoming and law and order problems becoming increasingly serious, Bainimarama stepped in and imposed martial law. He then purported to abrogate the constitution and confirm the elected government s dismissal, while agreeing to Speight s demand for immunity from prosecution. Mara, under considerable pressure, stepped aside as President and Ratu Josefa Iloilo, formerly Vice-President under Mara, was appointed in his place. He remains in post to this day, having become a loyal supporter of Bainimarama. A pro- Speight chief, Ratu Jope Senilolo, was appointed Vice-President, almost certainly as a concession to Speight. Speight agreed in the end to an interim civil administration which was subsequently formed under military supervision and with the support of the GCC, but without including Speight as a member. 33 Rather, Laisenia Qarase was plucked from relative obscurity and given the job of interim Prime Minister. After nearly two months of incarceration, the hostages were finally released. Shortly afterwards, Speight broke the terms of his amnesty and was arrested and charged with treason. He subsequently pleaded guilty and is currently serving a life term while 29 See Goodbye Democracy: Fiji is Set on a Course it Will Come to Regret posted 19 July 200 at accessed 24/05/ Jon Fraenkel, The Clash of Dynasties and Rise of Demogogues: Fiji s Tauri Vakaukauwa of May 2000, Journal of Pacific History, 35 (3), 2000: Robert Norton, The Changing Role of the Great Council of Chiefs in Jon Fraenkel, Stewart Firth and Brij V. Lal (eds), The 2006 Military Takeover in Fiji: A Coup to End all Coups?, Canberra, ANU E Press, 2009, pp Daily Telegraph 26 May 2000: Australian 31 May 2000: 6-7; Pacific News Bulletin August 2000: 7. 10

11 others involved received sentences for lesser offences. His possible pardon and release under the Qarase government was to become a factor in later developments. In the meantime, Qarase s appointment seemed to confirm that the nationalist agenda had once again won the day and that even though Speight was sidelined, much of what he had demanded would be implemented, for on nationalist issues there was little to distinguish Qarase rhetoric from Speight s. Qarase had had a successful career as a banker, and in 1999 had been appointed to the Senate by the GCC from where he had become a critic of Chaudhry s government, although not the most prominent. In any event, Bainimarama and others may not have expected a moderate banker to immediately pursue an aggressively nationalist agenda. 34 But on assuming office, Qarase announced another widespread program of affirmative action for Fijians. Policies supporting this program required the displacement of Indo-Fijian farmers with little in the way of compensation. This was despite much talk of reconciliation and understanding between communities. For Qarase, this meant that Indo-Fijians must reconcile themselves to a subordinate political status. He also moved quickly to establish a new constitutional commission headed by academic and nationalist, Asesela Ravuvu, 35 with the intention of returning Fiji to a semi-apartheid state, one in which the national culture would be based uncompromisingly on indigenous Fijian culture. At the same he declared that the fundamental rights of all citizens irrespective of race, culture, gender or economic or social status were to be preserved. 36 How the latter could be maintained in the face of the former was an interesting question. Qarase s commission, however, never got off the ground, for although the coup had ousted the elected government, the rule of law was to prevail in another respect. A Temporary Victory for Constitutionalism Although Bainimarama had reinstated civilian rule he made no attempt to reinstate the constitution that he had purported to abrogate. This was left to a civil action by an Indo- Fijian farmer, filed in July 2000, which effectively sought a declaration that the 1997 constitution remained the law of the land and that Chaudhry s coalition remained the legitimate government of Fiji. The personal experiences of Prasad and his family highlighted the consequences of Speight s appeal to indigenous nationalism and the lawless void that opened up in the wake of his coup. Prasad, an Indo-Fijian farmer, was displaced when he and his family were forced off their land in the wake of the Speight coup attempt. His home had been robbed and badly damaged, his livestock butchered, and his crops destroyed. He was threatened with death. Rebuffed by the police, he turned to the courts. 37 In a surprise ruling the High Court found in Prasad s favour. The interim government went immediately to the Fiji Court of Appeal but again, the 1997 constitution 34 See Vijay Naidu, Coups in Fiji: Seesawing Democratic Multiracialism and Ethnonationalist Extremism, unpublished paper, 2008, p See Asesela Ravuvu, The Façade of Democracy: Fijian Struggles for Political Control , Suva, Reader Publishing House, 1991 for a statement of his nationalist views.. 36 Fiji, Ministry of Information Press Release, Laisene Qarase, Address at First Meeting of the Constitution Commission, 6 October George Williams, Republic of Fiji V Prasad, Melbourne Journal of International Law, 5, 2001 at accessed 24/05/

12 was upheld and the government declared illegitimate. 38 With an eye to the economy, aid donors and international opinion, the interim government and its backers (including the GCC) reluctantly accepted that fresh elections would have to be held under the existing constitution. They did not, however, respect the ruling that Chaudhry s government remained the legitimate government and instead reconstituted themselves as a caretaker government. 39 Fresh elections in August 2001 saw a further proliferation of indigenous Fijian factions amid calls for unity and populist/nationalist rhetoric. Qarase himself formed a new party, the Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) otherwise known as the Fijian United Party. His tone during the campaign was described as belligerently nationalist. 40 The SDL was no doubt assisted by divisions in other Fijian parties, especially in the SVT. Election day saw a relatively poor turnout and a high informal vote. Rather than being galvanized by the various appeals to nationalist interests, many Fijian voters seemed disillusioned. Several media commentaries held that indigenous Fijians had been served poorly by their leaders over the years, with some robbing them blind. 41 Qarase s SDL, with the advantage of incumbency, won 32 seats. Another new party sponsored by hard-line coup supporters, the Alliance Matanitu Vanua Party (MV), won six of the Fijian communal seats (with Speight successfully contesting a seat from his prison cell, although he was subsequently expelled as an MP for failure to attend). Labour under Chaudhry won 27, taking all Indian communal seats and 8 open seats. 42 But neither the People s Coalition nor the Labour Party itself had remained united. More generally, the proliferation of Fijian parties, their rise and fall between elections, and the fractured nature of indigenous Fijian voting demonstrated the extent of rivalry and shifting alliances among indigenous Fijians, a factor once again attributed to the persistence of traditional political patterns from pre-colonial times. 43 Given the extent to which the Fijian vote was split, the SDL was unable to form government in its own right and therefore entered into negotiations with a number of smaller parties and independents, including the MV George Speight s party. Although constitutionally obliged to form a multi-party cabinet which also included the biggest parties in proportion to their parliamentary strength, Qarase refused to have Chaudhry in the cabinet, this despite a court ruling that he allow Labour up to eight Cabinet positions. In the meantime, there had been trouble within the military which was to have wider implications for the relationship between Bainimarama and Qarase. One attempt at mutiny had occurred at the time of the Speight s coup when pro-coup military personnel stationed at Labasa on Vanua Levu took over key installations there. The mutiny was quickly put down and charges were subsequently brought. Fifty six CRW soldiers pleaded guilty to mutiny and the leaders received life sentences. 44 Another attempted mutiny led by officers of the CRW occurred in December 2000 which aimed to assassinate Bainimarama and free Speight. The rebels came close to achieving their goal as far as Bainimarama s assassination was concerned, but were defeated by loyalists. The 38 For details and commentary see ibid. 39 Sydney Morning Herald, 13 April 2001: ibid: Fiji Times 7 April 2001: For election results see accessed 14/5/ See Durutalo, Fiji Party Politics, p See accessed 15/05/

13 incident resulted resulted in the death of eight soldiers three killed by the mutineers while five of the mutineers were themselves killed four apparently beaten to death by loyalists. Since then there have been no further overt disturbances within the RFMF. It is interesting to note that a number of CRW men who completed gaol sentences for their involvement in the mutinies were subsequently employed as personal security guards to a prominent Indo-Fijian businessman, thus illustrating the superficialty of purely ethnic interpretations of politics. 45 Bainimarama was clearly never a supporter of Speight or of his agenda. If he had been, there would not have been a 56 day period of negotiations nor a mutiny against him from pro-speight elements in the military. Further, his reputation at the time was as someone who believed that the military must stay out of politics. But the events of 2000, and especially the attempt on his own life drew the RFMF leader further into the political arena. Most importantly, he came increasingly into conflict with Qarase who he saw as a supporter of those involved in the coup and the mutinies. Certainly, Qarase seemed halfhearted in supporting prosecutions of those involved in the coup/mutiny attempts. Nevertheless, prosecutions did proceed, including that of Vice-President Seniloli in 2004 together with the Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives, Ratu Rakuita Vakalalabure, and three other defendants on charges of treason in connection with the coup, and on which they were found guilty. The Attorney-General later ordered the release of Senilolo on grounds of ill health after serving just a few months of his sentence. This drew harsh criticism not only from the FLP but from the RFMF leadership as well, a military spokesmen saying that it undermined the rule of law. 46 Bainimarama soon showed that he was unwilling to stand by while the government attempted to reduce the sentences of the mutineers who had conspired to assassinate him and had some release orders reversed. A further highly contentious act by the Qarase government was the formulation of a Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity (RTU) Bill in 2005 which had the potential to provide an amnesty for all those involved in the 2000 coup and mutinies while couched in terms that purported to bring Fiji s communities together. 47 Qarase s defence of the Bill referred to the long-term consequences of decisions taken by the early colonial government to bring labourers from India, and implied that responsibility for the coups of 1987 and 2000 actually rested with the British: The bill is an approach to justice adopted in other nations that have been driven and damaged by internal strife. It is undeniable that large numbers of active sympathizers of that upheaval felt they were standing for indigenous rights. But their actions were against the law. What they did was related to the grievances, insecurities and fears of the Fijian people, born out of a colonial decision to bring to Fiji settlers from India. Two distinct ethnic groups, with quite different cultures and religious beliefs were thus living in our islands. Colonial policy largely kept them apart....this 45 See accessed 15/05/ Mosmi Bhin, The Impact of the Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill in Jon Fraenkel and Stewart Firth (eds), From Election to Coup in Fiji: The 2006 Campaign and its Aftermath, Canberra, Australian National University E Press, 2007, esp. pp The full text of the Bill may be found at accessed 15/05/

14 polarization brought us to the coups of 1987 and 2000 and to the legal initiative we have launched to spur and complement efforts for accomplishing justice and reconciliation. 48 A second Bill the Qoliqoli Bill, was intended to make native reserve out of all of Fiji s marine foreshores. 49 This had the potential to create significant problems for all other users, including tourist operators, and was seen as a further sop to nationalist demands. Nationalist support for these bills notwithstanding, Bainimarama s opposition to both bills received considerable backing from other quarters concerned with the rule of law implications in relation to the first bill and the wider exclusionary and economic implications of the second. Bolstered perhaps by a feeling that he enjoyed reasonably wide public support, and certainly convinced of the rightness of his position, Bainimarama adopted an increasingly belligerent attitude to the Qarase government, especially in the lead-up to the 2006 elections. Charges of corruption and mismanagement were common themes and at one stage he sent military personnel out to Fijian villages to educate them about what he said was the real intention of those in government to use the public purse to feather their own nests. Bainimarama made it clear that he favoured a change of government and that if this occurred, he would ensure its security. A display of military force, when 500 soldiers in full battle gear marched through the streets of Suva on the same day that parliament was dissolved, backed up Bainimarama s rhetoric. An attempt by the Vice President, Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, 50 to broker a truce between Qarase and Bainimarama in succeeded only for a few months with Bainiamarama continuing to accuse the government of trying to get rid of him so that it would have a free hand to pursue their corrupt practices. 51 From Elections to Coup in 2006 The elections of May 2006 saw Qarase s SDL, which had by now absorbed the hypernationalist MV, returned with an outright majority of seats 36 out of 71. Although there were the usual challengers from smaller groupings and independents, the Fiji communal vote was much more united behind Qarase than in the previous contest and the SDL won all Fijian communal seats. Labor won all Indian communal seats. Only two seats in the entire House went to independents and none to minor parties. 52 This result indicated a much stronger alignment of Fijian voters behind the SDL while Indo-Fijian support for Labor remained solid. The political party system had therefore returned to a dominant two-party format with indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians voters separating into distinct blocs and backing parties seen to reflect their communal interests. With respect to indigenous Fijians, one commentator notes that Qarase s assiduous courting of the Fijian voters through special assistance programs and grants and an open appeal to 48 Quoted in Alumita Durutalo, Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 200: Fiji, Contemporary Pacific, 18 (2) 2006: See for speech introducing the Bill, accessed 17/05/ A widely respected, highly educated and liberal minded indigenous Fijian who Bainimarama dismissed as Vice-President at the time of the 2006 coup. 51 Brij V. Lal, Anxiety, Uncertainty and Fear in OurLand: Fiji s Road to Military Coup, 2006 in Fraenkel et al (eds), The 2006 Military Takeover in Fiji, p For detailed results see 14