Security Sector Reform and non-state policing in Africa

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1 Security Sector Reform and non-state policing in Africa Speaker: Professor Bruce Baker, Professor of African Security, Coventry University Chair: Thomas Cargill, Africa Programme Manager, Chatham House Chatham House 22 January 2008 This summary is issued on the understanding that if any of the information is used, the speaker and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the event. Speaker The state police in Africa are generally small in number, urban based and lacking in skills and resources. Understandably most Africans look elsewhere for their everyday policing needs. Who are these non-state policing actors? Professor Baker, author of new book Multi-choice Policing in Africa, offers an overview some of the multiplicity of actors who have a policing role in Africa, and suggest ways governments, developmental partners and others might better engage with them. I would like to begin by telling you the story of a woman who lives in a village in Africa and her sources of defence and protection. For the most part she relies on her extended family at home to be her eyes and ears and to protect her from theft. If she is alone and there is any danger she will rattle her saucepans or blow her whistle and her neighbours will come to her aid. Night patrols in villages are often conducted by local youths or selected by committees. Where issues of domestic violence are concerned, a local chief or Imam will often be approached for help. If disputes arise over land settlement the paramount chief will often mediate. Another cheap and increasingly common avenue that is being used is to ask NGOs for help with restoring justice. When our woman goes into town to carry out her errands, we find that the majority of policing is not being carried out by the state, but by the town s workers. She visits the bank, and passes by an armed security guard; one who is no doubt being paid by a foreign company. In the market, the traders keep their eye out for thieves. When she s on her way home, the taxi drivers association are self-policing and looking after their customers at the heaving taxi rank. Then when she has finally made it back to her village, her family and neighbours will have kept an eye out for her while she was gone. The only time when she will need to contact the state police is if blood is spilt. For her everyday needs she won t even think of them, and largely speaking, they won t think of her.

2 The world of non-state policing is a complex one made up of many characters and collectives who act as volunteers, based in the local community, offering a range of alternative services beyond the public. How important would you rate non-state policing? Non-state policing is the dominant provider in the security sector in every African country. Simply put, it is the answer for most people, in most circumstances, most of the time. State police tend to be urban based. They hold themselves to the tarmac and are rarely present elsewhere, including the majority of rural areas. Non-state policing does not fill a vacuum that has been left by a lack of state policing. Having interviewed approximately 10,000 people over the last six years, in the majority of cases they are the preferred actors of policing. They are accessible, affordable and they understand the locality. Most importantly they are effective not only do the catch the thief, but they return stolen possessions. This is a key factor in areas where there is no insurance on goods. People centred policing ensures local ownership over security and these actors are on the ground delivering the goods for most Africans. Can we do business with non-state policing organisations? Doing business with non-state policing organisations would be a hazardous business. These actors are not the answer to all of our problems. The constantly changing world of non-state policing makes developing a common strategy very problematic. There simply is no pattern from place to place. Anything that is run by volunteers can be seen as unsustainable, even in the most enthusiastic of places, such as Rwanda. Actors are susceptible to corruption, abuses of power and manipulation by local elites. However, most are driven by a level of civic mindedness that is no longer visible in this country. They are not fully compliant with international human rights standards, but neither are many state police across the world today. With a lack of forensic science at their disposal, it is not easy to make someone talk. There is also the issue of irregular record keeping, although in some cases I have observed accounts being kept in order to produce case studies on how to deal with future incidents. For foreign organisations, forging links with non-state policing organisations is often difficult. The state police see them as unofficial rivals and are unwilling to share power with them. These actors would more than likely be deemed untrustworthy by the police. Positive aspects of non-state policing There are informal police organisations operating in every aspect of town, city and village life in Africa. In fact, advocates of decentralisation might argue that for this reason, a strong police force is already in place. Non-state policing organisations can be highly effective, operating with local knowledge and more importantly legitimacy. While the majority would applaud South Africa s constitution, in the townships it is seen as threatening. Legitimacy must be locally owned. Chiefs are very conscious of change in a way that state officials are not. They cannot afford to be stuck in their ways because their legitimacy relies on them catering for their people s needs. By being able to change they remain resilient, ensuring that local policing continues to exist even in places where there are weak state structures. Also, they are

3 horizontally accountable: if they did not meet the expectations of elders and clients, they simply would not survive. Non-state policing organisations are cost-effective. When I ask what these actors need most I am mostly given practical answers: a bicycle to ride to the courts each day, or pencils, paper and rucksacks. These actors want legitimacy and support, not money. Non state police organisations are linked, often informally with the sate police. Relationships between them are important because they rely on working together and a lot of overlap exists. Four assumptions to think about I would like to end with four assumptions about which you should not make judgement without evidence: 1. The state has the capacity/willingness to provide efficient and equitable policing to all citizens. 2. That non-state policing (not including protection rackets) has greater problems than state policing. State police have the same concerns, for example conflicting attitudes to women and corporal punishment. 3. Non-state policing s failures somehow cannot be reformed and is intrinsically different to policing in the formal sector. 4. Accountability and the protection of human rights is best achieved through state systems. It is not enough to have regulations passed through parliament. If you know about police complaints departments in Africa, such as in Monrovia, then you know that they don t exist. The police are involved in stealing and bribing people. Yet very few of them are removed from office for such crimes. However, you do find chiefs being removed for not serving their people. Policing for the poor in Africa will not be done without the help of non-state policing. We need their partnership; they need our support. Question & Answer Q. Non-state police organisations are seen as a threat to state legitimacy and development partners find in necessary to conduct their affairs through the state. Accepting these two obstacles, what methods can we use to overcome them? A. The fact that the state needs to work with non-state police organisations is critical for development partners being able to gain access. Rwanda is case in point, where the government admitted they could not provide a police force. They started at rock bottom, delegating police resources to household leaders. The state had to trust in non-state policing because they had no other choice. They were relieved to shift some power out of their own hands. The taxi drivers association in Uganda is another impressive example of non-state policing. They are contracted by the government to run school patrols and crossings; they even have their own investigations branch. Q. The African continent has fifty three countries with numerous tribes and subcultures, each distinctive in terms of their peoples and politics. How then, can you generalise so much in your discussion when using the words Africa and policing?

4 A. I have not been generalising. I have been using specific examples of the eleven countries I have been to. We need to audit non-state policing in every country to find out who you can do business with. We don t make assumptions: it is necessary for policy makers to stay in one place until they find out who is doing the policing on the ground. Some people we will not be able to work with; then there will be some iffy groups who we can support and work with. C. I would like to pick up on the question that was asked about how you support security sector reform in the right way. The sector is only visible from above, but I would argue that we need to think from the bottom up. It is not the door that keeps people out, it is the concept of the door. We need to go beyond actors and examine what are the rules of security and how do those rules get changed in society. You started your talk with the story of a woman and the concept of how security is provided. Let us work backwards from that. A. Taking on your argument, I believe that the state plays an important political and symbolic role in policing. However, let us not pretend that they will be the solution to the woman whose story I began with. It is important to understand security from the viewpoint of Africans, in local contexts, rather than taking a prescriptive programme development approach. C. I like the informal approach, getting a handle on civil society as an entry point into non-state policing. However, I get very concerned with the concept of security when the state and justice sectors are merged. Also with the business of human security, the concept of security seems to embrace absolutely everything. The conceptual difficulties of security make it very difficult for programme donors to know where they should put their money. A. I draw the line at the point where human security becomes development. My definition talks about security from a violence and crime perspective, retaining that narrowness of concept. Q. Who is the typical non-state policeman and what is their motivation? A. I will use the example of Monrovia to answer your question. The Minister of Justice told one community that they would have to look after themselves. Residents were relieved as they believed that they could sort out the problem of armed bandits in their area for themselves. They organised a vigilante group, who carrying only rubber catapults went after men armed with AK47s. In a few weeks, the group was very pleased to report that they had more or less removed the bandits. They had no doubt only displaced the bandits to another area, but it had worked. After several complaints by the police the Minister of Justice had the non-state policing group disbanded. The organisation was very unhappy because the government prevented them from carrying out what they saw as their civic duty. As a result of the patrols stopping, violence in the community increased again. Q. Have you come across instances where non-state policing organisations are part of organised crime? A. In the UK, as with most places in the world, most crime is not reported. Also, the biggest actors in organised crime in Africa are the police. Anyone who gets involved in crime busting can be tempted into organised crime. Q. There seems to be an issue with legitimacy and the state being unwilling to share power with non-state police organisations. Is that always the case, or can governments feels safe sharing power with informal collectives?

5 A. Why did Rwanda and Uganda delegate beyond the formal system to local communities? It may have something to do with ideology and the fact that both Kigame and Museveni s power came from socialist backgrounds. Both leaders believed strongly in power sharing, delegation and the need for support from local people to survive, although Museveni has since back tracked on those convictions. I think that in Rwanda it has been possible to delegate, whereas ideology was rolled back by the centre in Uganda. In southern Sudan, the SPLM is encouraging power sharing by handing out policing responsibilities to community leaders who supported them during their war with the North. Q. I feel uncomfortable tapping into informal networks. If we interfere with non-state policing organisations, will they remain informal? A. This is a fascinating question. The wrong kind of support could definitely lead to the corruption of some of these organisations, by introducing a different social order than one which is locally defined. Criticisms of western hijacking of non-state police organisations are clearly relevant. My argument would be that if these groups are already providing the service, then too much involvement would be a negative thing. Unfortunately I can only see the problem, not the answer. Q. You left out quite an important actor in your discussion, namely non-state security companies and their problem of accountability. Could you say something about them? A. Apart from South Africa, I don t think there are any other countries with rules pertaining to non-state security firms. The ignorance and lack of regulation is at once diverse and desperate. The presence of these security firms continues to grow, but I don t think that they are taking over from non-state policing organisations. Take for example Liberia, where there are three to four thousand commercial security guards, but hardly any outside of Monrovia. These firms will not help the woman I talked about with her security. Q. How do you assess the belief that insecurity at a civil level in post-conflict Africa is getting worse and the state is a failing to contain criminality? A. I have not seen evidence of rising criminality in rural areas; it is mainly contained to sprawling urban centres. I would say that I am dubious about the idea of a post-conflict rise in armed crime and that any such claim might be based on equally dubious statistics about African countries.