Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update 1 st June 31 st July 2006 World Bank/DSF

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1 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update 1 st June 31 st July 2006 World Bank/DSF As part of an analytical support program to the peace process, the Conflict and Community Development Program, within the World Bank Office Indonesia, is using a newspaper conflict mapping methodology to record and categorize all incidents of conflict in Aceh as reported in two provincial newspapers (Serambi and Aceh Kita). The Program publishes monthly updates and analysis of the data, complemented by fieldwork where possible, in both English and Indonesian. 1 In the past two months, only one GAM-GoI related incident was reported in local newspapers. This incident in Aceh Utara was serious, however, and resulted in one death, two injuries and damage to an AMM vehicle. GAM, military and civil society representatives opted to depart from BRA, the reintegration agency. This development was not totally unexpected and has effectively transformed BRA into a less politicized agency focused on implementation of reintegration programming. The passing of the LoGA on the 11 th July was greeted with a mixed response. AMM and its GAM and Government representatives agreed that the law was broadly in line with the contents of the MoU, although GAM felt some articles were unsatisfactory. In contrast, civil society demonstrations were prominent throughout July. Although these are continuing as this Update is being written, they do not seem to be motivated by serious misgivings with the LoGA. Rather, they appear to indicate that all Acehnese, not just GAM and political elite, have high expectations for the peace agreement and the benefits it will bring them in the future. This Update also highlights some preliminary findings from two Decentralization Support Facility (DSF) studies. An evaluation of early BRA assistance to former GAM indicates a number of positives as well as future challenges. Overall, it suggests that donors and support organizations should work closely with BRA to develop a comprehensive and coordinated livelihoods strategy. A workshop at UNSYIAH began a dialogue on how best to manage conflict and disputes surrounding the upcoming pilkada (local) elections, although to date pilkada-related incidents have been few. Local level conflict continued to remain high throughout June and July. More positively, the number of tsunami-related incidents declined in July to the lowest number since tsunami-related disputes began to increase in October of last year. Only one GAM-GoI-related conflict incident reported in June and July In the past two months, only one GAM-GoI related incident was reported in local newspapers (see Figure 1). This incident was serious, Figure 1: GAM-GoI incidents by month however, and resulted in one death and two injuries. On 3 rd July, a GAM-GoI incident in Paya Bakong, Aceh Utara, resulted in the death of one former GAM member and injuries to a police officer and another GAM member. Reportedly, the incident began when TNI soldiers inexplicably beat-up a 1 This Update covers two months (June and July). Apologies to readers who were waiting on last month s Update. There are limitations to using newspapers to map conflict: newspapers, for more information see: Patrick Barron and Joanne Sharpe (2005). Counting Conflict: Using Newspaper Reports to Understand Violence in Indonesia, Indonesian Social Development Paper No. 7. Jakarta: World Bank. This report, as well as the monthly monitoring updates, are available online at: The dataset is available for those interested, please contact Samuel Clark at: sclark@wboj.or.id

2 local villager for riding a noisy motorbike past their newly established military post. In response, a group of approximately one hundred villagers descended on the military post in protest at the young man s beating and detention. Some hours later, after being informed of mounting tensions, AMM arrived with district GAM and military representatives at the TNI military post. The shootings were reported to have taken place upon their arrival, with a number of shots fired at GAM members as they scrambled to seek shelter in the AMM vehicle. A senior GAM representative was quoted as saying that warning shots had already been fired prior to AMM s arrival at the post. The following day, AMM called for an investigation and two days later (5 th July) the police and military announced a joint investigation team. The investigations are due to be discussed at the 40 th CoSA meeting. As with previous one-off incidents that have taken place since the beginning of year, 2 newspaper and AMM reports indicate that this incident is not indicative of a widespread deterioration in security or in GAM-GoI relations. Rather, this type of incident is the result of low military discipline and weak community-military relations. GAM, military and civil society representatives exit BRA After much behind the scenes negotiation, on 11 th June, GAM, the military and civil society representatives opted to exit from the Steering Committee of the Aceh Reintegration Agency (BRA). Their departure was not sudden but the result of a political compromise after ongoing negotiations. Tensions amongst members of this highly political committee had increased after some members insisted on the participation of anti-separatist groups. The exit of GAM and military representatives has effectively transformed BRA into a less politicized agency focused on the implementation of reintegration assistance. Instead of direct participation, GAM and civil society are feeding their perspectives and opinions on reintegration assistance through the Forum Bersama mechanism. The passing of the LoGA draws mixed reaction On the 11 th July, the national parliament in Jakarta passed the law that effectively implements the peace agreement. The new law, commonly called the LoGA (Law on the Governing of Aceh) contains 273 articles and runs to 88 pages (Box 1 summarises some of the key features). In the lead up to its passage, both GAM and civil society groups expressed their dissatisfaction with the draft s contents and the drafting process. GAM stated their intention to report the matter to AMM, expressing their dissatisfaction with sections on the central government s authority to make laws that affect Aceh (articles 7 and 11), the functions of the Aceh People s Council (article 8), the role of the TNI in Aceh (article 192), and the status quo approach to human rights Box 1: Key Features of LoGA General Government (pemerintahan) of Aceh to regulate all public sectors except those that are the authority of central government, which includes foreign affairs, defense, security, justice, monetary affairs, national fiscal affairs and certain functions in the field of religion (article 7) Economic Aceh to receive 70% of oil and gas revenues; 80% of forestry, fishery, mining and geothermal energy revenues (article 181) Additional 2% of DAU (General Allocation Funds) for 15 years and 1% for following 5 years Mining enterprises must establish Community Development Funds (article 159) Political Local political parties (article 257) Independent candidates for first elections only (article 256) Law Human rights court established in Aceh (article 228) Truth and Reconciliation Commission based on existing regulations (article 229) Right to implement shariah law (article 125) Security TNI to protect state unity and sovereignty (article 202) Socio-cultural Wali Nanggroe established as non-political non-government institution (article 96) Subsequent required regulations At least four national government regulations Three presidential decrees At least 58 provincial qanun and 35 district qanun 2 See, for example, the May Conflict Monitoring Update, available at 2

3 (article 215). 3 Meanwhile, civil society groups, including SIRA, organized demonstrations in most major cities. Generally, the demonstrations were peaceful, at most causing traffic disruptions in Bireuen and Aceh Utara. The law s actual passing was greeted with mixed reactions. Some civil society groups continued to organize demonstrations, whereas other elements of society expressed their general satisfaction with the new law. AMM devoted the 39 th CoSA meeting on 22 nd July with GAM and government representatives to discuss the LoGA. The parties to this meeting, including GAM, agreed that the law was broadly in-line with the contents of the MoU, but requested that the government clarify two apparent changes from the MoU: one, the use of consultation in article 8 instead of agreement in clause of the MoU; and, two, the role of the TNI as outlined in article 202 compared to clause 4.11 of the MoU. The demonstrations and public dissent, although continuing as this Update is written, seem buoyed more by a new sense of political freedom brought about by the MoU than by serious misgivings with the LoGA s interpretation of the agreement. Overall, these developments can be seen as a reminder that all of Aceh, not just GAM and political elites, have high expectations for the peace agreement and the benefits it will bring them in the future. Evaluation of BRA s current livelihood assistance to former GAM indicates a number of challenges As technical support to BRA, the World Bank in June conducted a field assessment of the agency s support to former GAM members through a system of soliciting, approving and funding livelihood proposals. To date BRA has approved 29 proposals involving 965 former GAM. Figure 2 indicates that combatants have opted for a wide range of mostly rural activities. Not all former combatants, are satisfied with this program, because not everyone has been accommodated to work in the program. Former Combatant, Pidie Figure 2: Number of GAM proposals by sector Although most proposals are in the early stages of implementation, the research indicated a number of issues and challenges relevant to both this method of delivering livelihood assistance and to any future livelihood programs. One, the low capacity and skill-base of many non-combatants groups means that they need additional support to assist them in realizing their proposals. Two, the proposal system is not covering a sufficient number of former GAM members suggesting a significant expansion in livelihood assistance is required. Three, the current proposal system, by focusing on former GAM only, has limited impact in facilitating reintegration between GAM returnees and receiving communities. Four, the regulations and procedures of eligibility, verification and reporting are unclear to beneficiaries (and communities) leading to serious misunderstandings. Finally, the current lack of assistance to conflict-affected communities compounds jealousies and 3 These pre-loga complaints of GAM were reported in GAM akan Laporkan ke AMM Aceh Kita, 8 July

4 community-level tensions suggesting individual livelihood programs should be implemented in tandem with community-wide assistance. Overall, these findings suggest that donors and other support organizations should work closely with BRA in order to develop a large-scale and coordinated livelihoods support strategy. KIP Workshop focuses on management of election-related disputes In order to assist KIP (the Independent Elections Committee) in developing mechanisms for managing election-related conflict, in late June the Faculty of Law at UNSYIAH organised a workshop to highlight lessons learned from previous Indonesian elections. Drawing on research from the 2004 legislative elections, the Decentralization Support Facility presentation made four recommendations for managing conflict during the upcoming elections: 4 One, empower the Election Supervisory Body (KPP the Panwaslu equivalent) to monitor and actually resolve election administration disputes when they occur; Two, establish, in cooperation with parties and candidates, campaign and mobilization guidelines in order to prevent clashes between parties and party supporters; Three, ensure cross-institutional cooperation by establishing Election Crisis or Coordination Centres that bring together KIP, KPP, police and party leaders in order to facilitate rapid and coordinated responses to election-related conflict; Four, engage community leaders and civil society, including GAM, in order to tap these local actors significant conflict management capacity. To date the number of election-related disputes has been low. Unsurprisingly, those minor disputes that have occurred are mostly intra-party and concern the manoeuvring of potential candidates within their parties. These monthly conflict updates will continue to monitor pilkada developments. Local level conflict remains high Local level conflict continued to remain high throughout June and July (see Figure 3). Violent incidents were, however, stable at relatively low levels (Figure 4). Figure 3: GAM-GoI and local level conflict by month Figure 4: Non-violent and violent local level conflict by month Tsunami-related incidents decline to lowest number since October Positively, the number of tsunami-related incidents declined in July to the lowest number since tsunami-related disputes began to increase in October of last year. However, this only came after a significant increase in June. Only nine incidents were recorded in July, compared to 25 incidents in June (see Figure 5). 4 A policy note will be available shortly; check the website over the coming weeks. 4

5 Figure 5: Tsunami-related local conflict incidents by month The sharp decline in July is perhaps the result of a number of bigger aid organizations taking action to resolve conflicts with communities that have arisen in the past six to eight months and, in addition, more proactively managing problems and complaints before they result in conflict. However, with the increase in June, another explanation might be that July s decrease is part of a three to four month cycle of rises and falls in tsunami incidents (see the trend in Figure 5 above). Future months will indicate whether this month s positive decline is indeed the result of improvements in the delivery and management of aid resources or part of a cycle that would warrant further investigation. Conflict incidents resulting in demonstrations and involving corruption decline Despite a number of demonstrations relating to the passage of the LoGA, in both June and July the number of local level conflict incidents that resulted in demonstrations or protests declined to 13 and 14 respectively (see Figure 6). Similarly, although largely unrelated, the number of reported corruption incidents has declined over the same two-month period. Again, it is difficult at present to tell whether these are one off developments or the result of substantive changes that are having a positive impact on local conflict levels. Figure 6: Local level conflict, demonstrations, and corruption by month Overall vigilante incidents decline but moral vigilantism on the rise Overall, the number of vigilante type incidents in June and July declined to six and eight respectively (see Figure 7). Analysis of these newspaper articles indicates two forms of vigilantism 5

6 are generally being reported: incidents involving orang tak kenal (unidentified assailants) and incidents that might be termed moral vigilantism. In June and July, the former took the form of extortion, kidnapping and shootings. In the most serious incident, unidentified assailants attacked five timber cutters in Mane, Pidie. Tragically, three died while two escaped with injuries. Until now the perpetrators of have not been identified. Related to the second form of vigilantism, in a number of incidents in Bireuen, Aceh Utara and Lhokseumawe groups of between 10 and 200 males disrupted and forcibly broke-up music concerts and beach gatherings because of their concern that such events would result in sinful activities. Although none of these incidents involved violence, it will be important to monitor whether community resistance to such moral policing leads to further radicalisation and more heavy-handed techniques. Figure 7: Local level conflict and vigilantism by month 6