Aceh Peace Process: Perspective of Human Rights Organizati ons1 Legend:

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1 1 9. Aceh Peace Process: Perspective of Human Rights Organizations 1 Leena Avonius (Post-doctoral Researcher at the Renvall Institute, University of Helsinki, Finland) Legend: 1 This paper is based on information collected through media reports, as well as interviews with human rights organisations in Aceh and Jakarta. The author worked for Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) as EUmonitor of the implementation of the peace accord in Aceh in Dokumentation der Tagung Civil Society and Civilian Crisis Management: Enhancing Cooperation and Coherence by Multi Level Dialogues vom 2. bis im Evangelischen Johannesstift Berlin, veranstaltet von der Evangelischen Akademie Iserlohn und der Plattform Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung.

2 2 In this paper I will examine the situation in post-conflict Aceh from a perspective of Acehnese and Indonesian human rights organizations. The organizations are currently making efforts to establish the mechanisms of transitional justice in Aceh, but there appears to be many hindrances on the way. It seems that one of the greatest problems is the reluctance of Indonesian state authorities to move away from the culture of impunity. I will first give some background information on Aceh s thirty years of conflict, and on the human rights abuses that have taken place during conflict years. I will take a look at the two human rights mechanisms that were agreed upon in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh-movement GAM in August The possibilities and challenges of human rights court and truth and reconciliation commission will be explored. Finally, I will bring up the views of Acehnese human rights organizations on the role of the European Union and other international actors in the peacebuilding process in Aceh. Aceh Conflict Aceh has had violent history ever since the 1870s when the Dutch attacked the most northern tip of Sumatra in order to enlarge their colonial power in the region. Acehnese fought against the Dutch for almost four decades, and continued the resistance throughout the colonial era. In the Indonesian independence struggle Aceh also played a remarkable role, and joined the newly-born nation in However, Acehnese position within the Indonesian Republic has never been peaceful, and conflicts have occurred throughout the decades. The latest conflict started in 1976 when a New York-based Acehnese Hasan di Tiro returned back to Aceh and proclaimed the province independent. His Free Acehmovement GAM only had a couple of hundred supporters in the early years, and some observers say that its political importance might have remained insignificant if the Indonesian state would have had the wisdom to seek for a negotiated solution to begin with. Unfortunately the militaristic New Order regime of President Suharto was ruling the country during that time, and chose to use military force to crush the Acehnese opposition. The Indonesian military launched a massive military operation in Aceh in The whole province remained a military operations zone (Daerah Operasi Militer, DOM) until the fall of Suharto regime in The post-suharto Indonesian leaders like President B.J. Habibie stated that people in Aceh would be able to live in peace and determine their position within the Indonesian Republic through political means. In 1999 the Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces General Wiranto publicly apologised for the atrocities that had taken place in Aceh during the years of military operation. Despite these statements the military operations in Aceh continued almost without a break. 2 The so-called Humanitarian Pauses announced by the reformist President Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001 did not ease the situation much, and the violence against Acehnese civilians continued. It was only in 2002 when a Swiss non-governmental organization Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 3 (HDC) started to mediate peace talks between GAM and the Indonesian government. Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) was signed by the two parties in December 2002, and 2 In January April 1999 there was military operation Operasi Wibawa, followed by Operasi Sadar Rencong I and II between May 1999 and May From June 2000 until February 2001 Operasi Cinta Meunasah was conducted. 3 Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue is also known by its previous name Henry Dunant Centre. Dokumentation der Tagung Civil Society and Civilian Crisis Management: Enhancing Cooperation and Coherence by Multi Level Dialogues vom 2. bis im Evangelischen Johannesstift Berlin, veranstaltet von der Evangelischen Akademie Iserlohn und der Plattform Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung.

3 3 international monitors were brought into Aceh to jointly monitor the situation in the field with local monitors representing GAM and the Indonesian government. Neither party seemed to be sufficiently committed to peace, and already during the early months of 2003 violent incidents started to occur. GAM used the opportunity to recruit new supporters, and local militia groups that were apparently supported by the military launched attacks against civilians and international monitors of the ceasefire. The peace process, known as CoHA, finally collapsed in May 2003 when Indonesian authorities arrested five GAM negotiators at the airport in Banda Aceh when they were about to leave for Tokyo where the next round of negotiations was to take place. In the early hours of the following day, on 19 May 2003, the Indonesian military organised a grandiose military entrance to the Aceh s capital city Banda Aceh, mimicking American military operations that have become well known to global audiences through the media. Indonesia s then president, ultra-nationalist Megawati Sukarnoputri announced Aceh again as a Military Operations Zone, and gave the military forces free hands to manoeuvre and full decisionmaking power in the province. Violence escalated once again between the conflicting parties, and just like before it was the civilians in Aceh that suffered most. It was only in October 2004 when Indonesia held presidential elections, and Megawati was replaced by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono that space was opened for a negotiated settlement in Aceh. Even though President Susilo is himself a retired military commander, he had a reputation to be a reformist both politically and within the military. During his presidential campaign he had promised to try to find a political solution for Aceh. His Vice President Yusuf Kalla had already made lowkey initial inquiries with the rebel leaders who stayed in exile in Sweden. GAM leaders accepted Indonesia s offer to start informal peace talks just one day before the devastating earthquake and tsunami hit Aceh in December 2004, killing some people in the province. The peace talks took place in Finland, and were mediated by Crisis Management Initiative, a non-governmental organization led by Finland s former president Martti Ahtisaari. Five intensive rounds of talks were needed to draft a comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding that was formally signed by the two parties in Helsinki on 15 August Soon after, international monitors from European and Asian countries entered the province to monitor the implementation of the Helsinki accord. AMM remained in Aceh until December Only very few violent incidents have occurred after the signing of the peace agreement, and the peace process has remained well on its track during the first eighteen months. But in order to guarantee sustainable peace in Aceh in the future the full implementation of Helsinki MoU is needed, including the fulfilment of promises made over the establishment of mechanisms of transitional justice to deal with the past atrocities and human rights violations. Human Rights Violations in Aceh Aceh s human rights history is dark. The conflict between GAM and the Indonesian government demanded at least lives, and left tens if not hundreds of thousands of people homeless. There have been no systematic efforts to put together all the data on the human rights abuses of the conflict years, though some local human rights organizations did their best to document the incidents that took place. 4 Aceh Monitoring Mission had monitors from EU, Norway, Switzerland, as well as five ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei and the Philippines). Dokumentation der Tagung Civil Society and Civilian Crisis Management: Enhancing Cooperation and Coherence by Multi Level Dialogues vom 2. bis im Evangelischen Johannesstift Berlin, veranstaltet von der Evangelischen Akademie Iserlohn und der Plattform Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung.

4 4 Here below is a table that gives some initial ideas of the widespread practices of human rights violations. This data is provided by the Human Rights NGO Coalition, which is a network of 27 human rights organizations and legal aid organizations across Aceh. One can conclude from the table that there indeed was not much difference in the number of atrocities taking place during various conflict periods. The data on the DOM I period, from , is most incomplete, since most data-collecting organizations were only established in the late 1990s after the political changes in Indonesia had made the work of human rights organizations possible. As mentioned before, after the fall of Suharto s regime the military operations in Aceh continued, and so did violations of human rights. This illustrates the role of the Indonesian military in human rights abuses. CASE Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Excecutions Enforced or Involuntary Dissappearances Arbitary Arrest and Defentions Torture and Other Cruel Rape and Sexual Assault DOM I ( ) PASC A- DOM I ( ) 2001 (Humanitarian pauses I & II) 2002 (CoHA ) 2003 (DOM II) 2004 (DO M II) 2005 (Mo U) 2006 (Mo U) Burning (unit) TOTAL (person) Mo U Source: Koalisi NGO HAM (Coalition of Human Rights NGOs in Aceh). The column of 2005 includes incidents that have taken place both before and after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 15 August The last, blue-coloured column shows the total number of human rights violations reported to Koalisi NGO HAM from 15 August 2005 until the end of Dokumentation der Tagung Civil Society and Civilian Crisis Management: Enhancing Cooperation and Coherence by Multi Level Dialogues vom 2. bis im Evangelischen Johannesstift Berlin, veranstaltet von der Evangelischen Akademie Iserlohn und der Plattform Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung.

5 Even though GAM guerrillas have also been responsible for human rights abuses in Aceh the majority of perpetrators of violations come from the military and special police units that were deployed to Aceh for the military operations. This table shows that only the efforts to look for a political solution to the conflict have improved the security situation in Aceh, while the military solutions have worsened it. It was only in 2002 when CoHA process was ongoing that the number of human rights abuses clearly dropped, only to rise again in 2003 when the DOM II began. Violations continued throughout the peace talks in Helsinki, but stopped almost completely in August 2005, and have remained at a very low level ever since. During the MoU period most reported human rights abuses have been police violence against civilians in custody. Currently there are several programs ongoing in Aceh, in which human rights training is given to police officers. The most common type of human rights violations in Aceh have been extrajudicial executions and torture or other type of cruel treatment. People who were arrested and suspected to have connections with GAM were often forced to confirm their connections and give information through torture and physical abuse. Organizations that offered legal aid for suspected GAM members or supporters have told that torture was a common practice particularly during the first days of arrest. But physical assaults and extrajudicial killings were commonplace also in the villages, as has been reported by both Indonesian and international human rights organizations throughout the years of conflict. 5 GAM s abuses have 5 Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have published several reports on human rights abuses in Aceh. In Indonesia, particularly Imparsial and KontraS have reported on Aceh conflict. been related to kidnappings, use of children in warfare, as well as destroying both state and private property. Burning down schools and houses was common in Aceh conflict particularly during the post-1998 period, as can be seen from the table above. Whole villages were burnt down by the conflicting parties, and until today very few of these houses have been rebuilt. 6 Rape and other type of sexual violence has also been part of the warfare in Aceh. The real numbers of this type of violence are much higher than indicated in the table above, since very few victims are willing to talk about their experiences. Typical to Muslim societies where family honour is symbolised through women s sexual purity, rape victims in Aceh are often isolated by the community and even by their own families. Suraiya Kamaruzzaman, one of the most prominent Acehnese women s rights activists has pointed out that amongst the sex workers in the provincial capital Banda Aceh there are many victims of conflict, and some of them are rape victims. Women who fell victims of the conflict, and had no longer family protection, had very few opportunities to earn living in any other means than prostitution during conflict years. 7 6 Rebuilding of houses that were burnt down during the conflict is one of the obligations of the Indonesian government mentioned in the Helsinki MoU. The government allocated funds for this under the reintegration budget funds during years Aceh Reintegration Body (BRA) was established in February 2006 to allocate the funds. BRA has started to hand over funds for the rebuilding of houses, but there have been many irregularities in the process and accusations of misuses of the funds by local government officials. This is not surprising, considering that Aceh is said to be the most corrupt province of Indonesia, which itself is the fifth most corrupt country in the world. 7 Suraiya Kamaruzzaman: Women and syariah in Aceh: Aceh s women find themselves between an armed conflict and Islamic law. In: Inside Indonesia 79, Jul-Sep 2004.

6 Past Efforts to Bring Justice Since the late 1990s growing domestic and international pressure made Indonesia to redirect its approach in Aceh, and few efforts were made to bring justice to the civilian victims of Aceh conflict. It must be pointed out, however, that all cases were handled either by military, civilian, or mixed military and civilian courts, rather than by any specialised human rights courts. Cases were also handled as ordinary criminal cases, and not as human rights violations, and the sentences given were very short or the defendants were released altogether. Generally speaking, court cases on conflict atrocities in Aceh have so far been totally unsatisfying. They have increased Acehnese mistrust towards the national justice system and failed to bring any justice to conflict victims. The case of Tengku Bantaqiah serves as a good example on this. 8 In July 1999 a mass killing took place in Beutong Ateuh that during the time belonged to the district of West Aceh. 9 Tengku Bantaqiah, a religious leader (ulama) known for his critical statements on the military operations in Aceh, together with 56 of his students were slaughtered by the Indonesian military at the yard of the Islamic boarding school. There were several eye-witnesses to this mass murder that was committed by the TNI soldiers led by Lieutenant-Colonel Sudjono. After the initial shooting at the school yard, many injured students were taken away in military trucks, and later on shot dead. In April 2000 twenty-four soldiers, all of lower military rank, and one civilian were tried at a koneksitas court (a joint 8 See for example KontraS: Aceg Damai Dengan Keadilan? Seri Aceh II, Since then West Aceh district has been divided into three districts. Beutong Ateuh is nowadays part of Nagan Raya district. military-civilian court) in relation to the incident in Beutong Ateuh. Sudjono, who had been the main suspect, had mysteriously disappeared after he was first interrogated in November His whereabouts is unknown until today. The fact that the case was taken to court was a remarkable improvement to the accountability situation in Aceh during that time. The court also sentenced all twenty-five respondents to imprisonment on the basis of Indonesian Criminal Code article on murder in conspiracy with others, which had never happened before. Nevertheless, there were several problems in the trial showing how lukewarm Indonesia s efforts were to stop impunity. Even though many of the soldiers who were charged testified that they were following orders that had been given from above, no reference was made to the chain of command or to the apparent conclusion that the mass murder was conducted as part of a military operation. Instead, all persons were charged as individuals, and the case was handled as if it was an ordinary crime. There were also several eye-witnesses who were willing to testify these included Tengku Bantaqiah s widow but were never summoned to testify by the court. Instead, many of them received threats and were forced to flee the province. While the sentences given in this case were remarkably higher than had been usual, and each person involved was sentenced to 8,5-10 years in prison, they were still much below the maximum punishment. Other cases involving military officers that have been taken to court in Aceh since the late 1990s have followed similar patterns. Mechanisms of Transitional Justice The Helsinki MoU determines that two mechanisms of transitional justice will be established in Aceh: a human rights

7 court and a truth and reconciliation commission. The Law on the Governance of Aceh (LoGA) confirmed that these two mechanisms should be at place within one year after the law was passed i.e. by July Despite this, in practice there appears to be many problems to be solved before the two mechanisms can be established. This section will take a look at some of the issues. The Human Rights Court There are two types of human rights courts in Indonesia, and both types will be needed to handle the human rights violations in Aceh. Added by the human rights court mentioned in the peace agreement, all in all Aceh will need three types of human rights courts in the future in order to cover past, present and future violations. This is because of a limitation that LoGA put to the human rights court demanded in the peace agreement. The LoGA determined that the human rights court in Aceh can only handle cases that have taken place after the law was passed leaving out any violations that had taken place before July Thus, the human rights court to be established in Aceh will only be meant for future human rights violations. However, Indonesian legal human rights framework allows human rights courts also to handle cases that have happened in the past. The law on Human Rights (Law 39/1999) and the law on Human Rights Court (Law 26/2000) determine that four permanent human rights courts need to be established in Indonesia, which will cover the whole country. These permanent courts were to be established by 2003, but until now only the one in Makassar in eastern Indonesia is functioning. The one that should handle cases that have taken place in Aceh should be placed in Medan in North Sumatra province. The permanent human rights courts will handle cases of gross human rights violations 10 from November 2000 onwards. It is also possible to establish ad hochuman rights courts in Indonesia to handle particular cases and events in the past. To establish such a court, a recommendation is needed from the national parliament, and an approval from the President. Two such ad hoccourts have already been established: one for East Timor 1999 violence, and another one for 1984 massacre in Tanjung Priok. As both of these previous ad hoc-courts were travesties of a court there is no much confidence amongst Acehnese human rights organizations to the possibility of getting justice for past atrocities through human rights courts mechanism. Current expectation is that before the parliamentary election in 2009 it will be unlikely that an ad hoc-court would be initiated. And even if it would, the fact that Indonesian judicial system is amongst the most corrupt institutions in the country discourages people to push the process forward. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Concerning the truth and reconciliation commission the Helsinki accord states that such a commission will be established for Aceh by the Indonesian Commission on Truth and Reconciliation with the task of formulating and determining reconciliation measures 10 According to Indonesian legislation gross human rights violations include genocide, and crimes against humanity. Suzannah Linton has examined more in detail Indonesian legal definitions of these crimes, and concludes that while in general the definitions appear to follow international legal standards there are some limitations that apparently protect the perpetrators and thus maintain impunity. Suzannah Linton: Accounting for Atrocities in Indonesia. In: Singapore Year Book of International Law 10/2006.

8 (MoU article 2.3.). LoGA confirms this linkage between the national truth and reconciliation system and the Acehnese one. This has turned out to form a serious problem to the establishment of the commission for Aceh, since in December 2006 the Indonesian Constitutional Court annulled the national law on Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. The court decision means that Indonesia no longer has a national legal framework that the commission in Aceh should be based on. Some in Aceh suspect that the Constitutional Court made its decision in order to prevent Aceh commission from happening. However, others in Indonesia say that while it was indeed political rather than judicial reasons behind the court ruling, it was not Aceh but the broader initiatives to review Indonesian history under the Suharto s New Order regime that triggered the annulling of the law. As the preparations for the national Truth and Reconciliation Commission were almost completed, and commission members already selected, the court decision was a last minute effort to prevent the commission to start its work. But there are also Indonesian human rights observers who are of the opinion that it is not that bad that the law is not there any more since it had many weaknesses. According to them it is better to spend a few more years to prepare an improved legislation rather than establish commissions that will only whitewash the crimes committed The Law on Truth and Reconciliation Commission (law 27/2004) was initially taken to the Constitutional Court by the leading Indonesian human rights organisations such as Elsham, Imparsial and Kontras that were concerned of some of its articles that were not in accordance with the Indonesian constitution or international human rights standards. One such article held for example that the compensations for victims were only to be given if the perpetrators were to be amnestied. The Constitutional Court had actually no right to abolish the whole law, but only to review the articles indicated to be problematic. In its decision, the Court stated that the articles in questions formed the core of the Despite the problems at the national level the people in Aceh are committed to establish a truth and reconciliation commission for Aceh. The newly elected Vice Governor, a former prisoner of conscience Mohamed Nazar pointed out in a recent press statement that Aceh will get its commission soon, possibly within year Members of provincial parliament in Aceh have also given similar statements. Civil society activists in Aceh are currently looking at various possibilities to establish a truth and reconciliation commission for Aceh outside the national system. It can be done, and for example the other Indonesian conflict area West Papua has such a mechanism included in its special autonomy legislation. Most probably LoGA will need to be amended in order to give legal power to the future commission in Aceh. The main argument for prioritising the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission over human rights courts to deal with the past is that the former will help to keep up the peace process in Aceh. Human rights organizations in Aceh say that the focus of the future truth and reconciliation commission should be in reconciling past disputes and violent events within Acehnese communities. They state, quite realistically, that the chances to get Indonesian non-organic 12 military or police officers to the hearings of the commission are almost non-existent. But the commission could be able to hear and rule on cases that have taken place amongst people in Aceh, acts of violence committed by GAM members and their supporters or by local militias. To be able to reconcile such cases would improve the sustainability of the law and as they had to be abolished the whole law lost its meaning. 12 Non-organic military and police refer to those troops that were deployed to Aceh for the military operations and have been withdrawn from the province by the end of 2005.

9 peace process by removing some latent tensions in the communities that can be utilised to provoke violence. Activists also stress the importance of rewriting the history of Aceh through the data collected by the commission. It is vital for rebuilding the future that the truth of past experiences will be established and shared openly. On the other hand, the activists think that economic compensations are less important, and may lead to jealousies and new tensions. This view becomes understandable when one takes into considerations the growing concern in Aceh over the inequalities created by the massive tsunami assistance to the province and the so-far unsuccessful distribution of reintegration assistance to the ex-combatants, amnestied political prisoners, and conflict victims. 13 Concluding Remarks: What is expected from the EU? Even though there are many hindrances on the way it is likely that Aceh will see the establishment of at least a Truth and Reconciliation Commission within few years. The role of the international community and European Union in particular is important to support the Acehnese efforts towards this goal. EU has permanent presence in Aceh, and there are some European experts who continue to follow closely the developments related to the peace process at the Europehouse in Banda Aceh now that the EUmonitors of AMM have left the province. The relative success of the European civilian crisis management mission in Aceh has made Acehnese people to trust EU, which is currently seen as the only international actor that has any credibility within the field of human rights as was stated to me several times during interviews in Aceh. Acehnese human rights organizations hope that EU will have real and not just symbolic presence in Aceh also in the future, and that it will strengthen its human rights expertise at its Banda Aceh office. Currently there is no human rights specialist working at the Europehouse. EU and European countries individually are also urged to continue to use their diplomatic channels to support the Indonesian government in its reform policies, including the military reform and the reform of judicial system. Acehnese organizations also point out that EU and European civil society organizations could offer technical assistance in the transitional justice processes. There is clearly a need to maintain and improve open discussions between European and Acehnese organizations within the field of human rights and peacebuilding. 13 Governmental bodies that manage the tsunami funds (BRR) and post-conflict reintegration budget funds (BRA) have been strongly criticised recently in Aceh. As the new Governor has now been installed many expect that some fundamental changes will happen to make the flow of assistance more equal and beneficial for wider population in Aceh.

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