AFGHANISTAN: PARLIAMENTARY AND PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS SEPTEMBER Report by Tone K. Sissener and Linda Kartawich

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1 AFGHANISTAN: PARLIAMENTARY AND PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS SEPTEMBER 2005 Report by Tone K. Sissener and Linda Kartawich NORDEM Report 14/2005

2 Copyright: the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights/NORDEM and (author(s)). NORDEM, the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights, is a programme of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR), and has as its main objective to actively promote international human rights. NORDEM is jointly administered by NCHR and the Norwegian Refugee Council. NORDEM works mainly in relation to multilateral institutions. The operative mandate of the programme is realised primarily through the recruitment and deployment of qualified Norwegian personnel to international assignments which promote democratisation and respect for human rights. The programme is responsible for the training of personnel before deployment, reporting on completed assignments, and plays a role in research related to areas of active involvement. The vast majority of assignments are channelled through the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. NORDEM Report is a series of reports documenting NORDEM activities and is published jointly by NORDEM and the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. Series editor: Siri Skåre Series consultants: Hege Mørk, Christian Boe Astrup The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher(s). ISSN: ISBN/13: ISBN/10: NORDEM Report is available online at:

3 Preface Upon the invitation of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the European Union established an Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) to Afghanistan in July 2005 to observe the parliamentary and provincial elections taking place on 18 September, The EU EOM was led by a Chief Observer, Ms Emma Bonino, Member of the European Parliament. The European Union, stated Bonino, considers these elections as a crucial passage in view of establishing a functioning institutional system based on the rule of law in Afghanistan. The EOM, with its observation activity, aims to increase confidence in the electoral process and contribute to a sustainable transition towards a democratic and pluralist society in Afghanistan. In addition to the Chief Observer, the EU EOM consisted of a core team of 13 experts based in Kabul, and 60 long-term observers (LTOs) and 24 short-term observers (STOs) deployed across the country observing in 29 of the 34 provinces. Locally recruited STOs from EU embassies and institutions in Afghanistan, and a delegation of seven members of the European parliament joined the mission on Election Day enabling the mission to draw on the findings of a total of 159 observers visiting nearly 900 polling stations in 26 provinces. The mission was to remain in the country until end of October. The Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM) recruited two STOs, Linda Kartawich and Tone K. Sissener, to the EU EOM. After two days of briefing in Kabul the two Norwegian observers were deployed to Jalalabad and Kunduz respectively. The report draws on STO observations in Jalalabad and Kunduz, EU EOM briefing material, and general findings of the mission. Additional sources are books, reports and articles published by NGOs and multilateral agencies, Joint Electoral Management Body s web site, net pages of United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and news web sites. Opinions expressed in the report are the responsibility of the authors. The Norwegian Centre for Human Rights / NORDEM University of Oslo September 2005

4 Contents Preface Contents Introduction...1 Political background...2 The Legislative Framework...6 The Electoral Administration...7 Voter and Civic Education Voter Registration Candidate registration The Election campaign The Media Observation on the Polling Day Kunduz Province, North Eastern Region Jalalabad in Nangarhar Province, Eastern Region The review of Complaints Process Concluding remarks Comments on the election observation mission Appendices Political parties in Afghanistan... Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions... Copy of observers reporting form...

5 Afghanistan: Parliamentary and provincial elections Introduction Following the collapse of the Taliban at the end of 2001, Afghan factional leaders came together at the UN-sponsored conference in Bonn, Germany to sign the Bonn Agreement. The Afghanistan Interim Administration (AIA) was appointed and an agreement to a timetable for re-establishing permanent government institutions in Afghanistan over the course of two-and-a-half years was reached. Per this timetable, the Emergency Loya Jirga (ELJ) of June 2002 replaced the AIA with the Afghanistan Transitional Authority (ATA) and elected Hamid Karzai as head of state. Broadly in line with the Bonn timetable, the new constitution was concluded in January 2004, which provides for an elected president and a national assembly comprising two houses the Wolesi Jirga (House of the People) and Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders). To prepare, manage, convene and oversee the elections, the President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan issued a decree (July 2003) creating the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB). The timeframe of forming a representative and elected government by June 2004 proved overly ambitious and it was finally decided to hold only presidential elections on 9 October 2004, delaying parliamentary, provincial, and district voting until The EU EOM was deployed in Afghanistan from July till end of October 2005 to observe elections for the Wolesi Jirga (lower house of the new National Assembly) and provincial councils. The mission, comprising of Chief Observer, a core team, and longterm and short-term observers, concluded in the preliminary statement presented at a press conference in Kabul on 19 September that Election Day had proceeded largely peacefully and that the election process had been generally well-managed, despite shortcomings and challenges ahead. Final assessment of the elections depends on the completion of counting and tabulation, the complaints and appeals process, and the certification of the results by JEMB. With reservations to the completion of the electoral process, elections were further found to mark a significant step forward for Afghanistan s democratic development, which is believed will help bringing peace to the country. Positive elements observed during the election process as expressed in the statement of preliminary findings and conclusions includes a legislative framework providing for the conduct of future elections, well-administered election process, pluralistic competition between candidates and participation of women both as candidates and voters, and the involvement of civil society through deployment of domestic observers. Shortcomings mentioned includes cases of election related intimidations and killings, security problems, a challenging election system, lack of voters list, limited electionrelated coverage in the mass media, less than universal civic education coverage, and insufficient complaints procedures. As the authors only engaged as STOs in the Afghanistan parliamentary and provincial elections, some aspects of the election process will necessarily be less than fully covered 1 International Crisis Group (ICG), Afghanistan: From Presidential to Parliamentary Elections, Asia Report No 88, November 2004, Kabul/Brussels.

6 Afghanistan: Parliamentary and provincial elections in this report. While the STOs support the EU EOMs recognition of the efforts and commitment demonstrated by the Afghan people, the JEMB and the thousands of officials administering the elections, in addition to the role played by domestic observers, effects of certain shortcomings are seen as more obscure than others, such as the implementation of voter registration and a census. Focus of this report is less on detailed descriptions of technical aspects of the election process and more on issues of general concern. Political background 2 The history of the Afghan state extends back a little more than a hundred years, to the reign of Abdur Rahman Khan ( ) who turned Afghanistan from a tribal confederacy into a centralized state. However, the tribal areas were never brought totally under central control and continued to retain a measure of independence. Abdur Rahman Khan was able to build a strong state only by dint of foreign financial backing enabling the British to take control of external affairs. After the First World War, resistance to this outside interference in the country s affairs grew and led to the assassination of Abdur Rahman Khan s son and successor, Habibullah, in His son, Amanullah, seized the throne, declared the country s independence which, after a brief war, the British conceded. Amanullah reversed the isolationist economic policies and opened up the country to trade. He undertook land reform, regularized taxes, improved roads, increased educational provision and, in 1921, gave the country its first constitution. Aminullah s attempts to shift power away from village elders and the religious establishment and his liberal stance on women s issues provoked opposition that led to his deposition in A tribal leader, Bacha-i Saqao, held Kabul for a few months until defeated by Amanullah's cousin, Nadir Khan, who became King Nadir Shah. The new king pursued cautious modernization efforts until he was assassinated in His son Zahir Shah succeeded him. Afghanistan continued to depend on foreign grants and loans, but remained neutral until the late 1970s receiving aid from both the United States and the Soviet Union. In the early 1970s the country was beset by serious economic problems, particularly a severe long-term drought in the centre and north. Maintaining that King Zahir Shah had mishandled the economic crisis and in addition was stifling political reform, a group of young military officers deposed the king and proclaimed a republic in Lt. Gen. Sardar Muhammad Daud Khan, the king's cousin and former prime minister, became president and prime minister. The principal communist organization in Afghanistan, the People s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) led by Noor Mohammed Taraki, overthrew Daoud in the Saur Revolution (occurred in the Afghan month of Saur) in April The year after, Taraki was killed and Hafizullah Amin took power. In December 1979, Soviet President Brezhnev sent troops across the border, Amin was executed, and the Soviet-supported Babrak Karmal became president. From 1979 until 2 Chris Johnson & Jolyon Leslie, Afghanistan. The Mirage of Peace, London New York: Zed Books, The Columbia Electronic Encyclopaedia, 6 th ed. Columbia University Press, ICG, Report No 88, ICG, Political Parties in Afghanistan, Asia Briefing No 39, June 2005, Kabul/Brussels. ICG, Afghanistan Elections: Endgame or New Beginning? Asia Report No 101, July 2005, Kabul/Brussels.

7 Afghanistan: Parliamentary and provincial elections the mid-1980s, the Soviets virtually controlled the Afghan state structure staffing all major offices with Soviet advisors and, in economic terms, government-controlled Afghanistan became a Soviet republic. In the late 1970s the government faced increasing popular opposition to its social policies. By 1979 guerrilla opposition forces, popularly called mujahideen (Islamic warriors), were active in much of the country, fighting both Soviet forces and the Sovietbacked Afghan government. In sacrificing Afghanistan s independence, the regime had lost its legitimacy and by introducing land reforms and coeducation they challenged religious and traditional values. In an attempt of redemption the old Soviet protégé, Karmal, was in 1986 replaced by Najibullah, but it was too late. The country was devastated by the Afghanistan War ( ) taking an enormous human and economic toll. After the Soviet withdrawal, the government steadily lost ground to the guerrilla forces. In early 1992, President Najibullah was about to resign as part of a UN negotiated peace agreement when Kabul was captured militarily, and the guerrilla alliance set up a new government consisting of a 50-member ruling council. Sebgahtullah Mujaddidi was named interim president, on a rotation system, followed by Burhanuddin Rabbani who then refused to give up the position. The victorious guerrillas proved unable to unite, however, and the forces of guerrilla leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar teamed up with Uzbek militia leader Rashid Dostum in the fight over control over Kabul. Fighting among various factions continued and ethnic cleansing of the hazara minority was organised by Ahmad Shah Masood and his closest leadership in Shura e-nezar, including his deputies Qanooni (Presidential candidate and standing for the parliament in Kabul) and Abdullah Abdullah (now Minister of Foreign Affairs) in collaboration with Abd al-rabb al-rasul Sayyaf, leader of the Islamist party Ittehad Islami (standing for parliament elections in Paghman) and the one to hold the closest ties to Islamist groups, including Al Qaeda. Afghanistan was in effect divided into several independent zones, each with its own ruler. Beginning in summer 1994, a militia of Pashtun Islamic fundamentalist students and former commanders from the struggle against the Soviet invasion, the Taliban, emerged as an increasingly powerful force. In early 1996, as the Taliban continued its attempt to gain control of Afghanistan, Rabbani and Hekmatyar signed a power-sharing accord making Hekmatyar premier. In September, however, the Taliban captured Kabul and declared themselves the legitimate government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan imposing a particularly strict form of Islamic law in the two thirds of the country they controlled. In 1998, as the Taliban appeared on the verge of taking over the whole country, U.S. missiles destroyed what was described by the Pentagon as an extensive terrorist training complex in southern Afghanistan funded by Osama bin Laden, a Saudi-born militant accused of masterminding the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In 1999, a UN-brokered peace agreement was reached between the Taliban and their major remaining foe, the forces of the Northern Alliance, under Ahmed Shah Massoud, an ethnic Tajik and former mujahideen leader, but fighting broke out again. The Taliban controlled some 90 per cent of the country by 2000, only three countries had recognized their government, while UN sanctions had been imposed on them since Continued warfare had caused over a million deaths, while more than five millions Afghans remained in Pakistan and Iran as refugees. In a severe blow to the Northern Alliance in 2001, Massoud died as a result of a suicide bomb attack by assassins posing as Arab journalists. Two days after that attack devastating terrorist assaults on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, which bin Laden was apparently involved in planning,

8 Afghanistan: Parliamentary and provincial elections prompted new demands by U.S. President Bush for his arrest, while a UN approval was provided for the military operation, as was NATO s self defence clause put into effect. When the Taliban, instead of immediately handing bin Laden over, called a national council to approved the transfer to a third country (Saudi Arabia) the United States, with a coalition of the willing, launched attacks against Taliban and Al Qaeda (bin Laden's organization) positions and forces. The United States had then for some time provided financial aid, military hardware, and other assistance to the Northern Alliance and other opposition groups. Assisted by U.S. air strikes, opposition forces ousted Taliban and Al Qaeda forces from Afghanistan's major urban areas by November, often aided by the defection of forces allied with the Taliban. Several thousand international troops under US leadership, termed Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), had by then entered the country, mainly to concentrate on the search for bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar and to deal with the remaining pockets of their forces. In early December 2001, the US and UN called a pan-afghan (excluding the Taliban) conference in Bonn, Germany, appointed Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun with ties to the former king, deputy minister of the first Taliban government, and consultant to a US oil company, as the nation's interim leader replacing President Rabbani. By this time, the Taliban and Al Qaeda were largely militarily defeated, although most of their leaders and unknown numbers of their forces remained at large. Fighting continued on a sporadic basis with occasional real battles. The country itself largely reverted to the control of the regional warlords who held power before the Taliban and who had secured themselves the positions of provincial governors or head of the new police force. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), on a UN approved mandate and later to become under NATO leadership, provided forces for various military, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations. Initially confined to Kabul as the US refused their expansion into areas under OEF command, they later moved into northern Afghanistan with Provincial Reconstruction Teams. At the Tokyo conference in January 2001 a number of nations agreed to contribute with humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance valued at 4,5 billion US dollars over a five year period; while the United Nations estimated that 15 billion US dollars would be needed over the next 10 years to rebuild Afghanistan. The former king, Zahir Shah, returned to the country from exile to convene (June 2002) a loya jirga (a traditional Afghan grand council) to establish a transitional government. Karzai was elected president for a two-year term, and the king was declared the father of the nation. That Karzai and his cabinet faced many challenges was confirmed violently in the following months when one of his Pashtun vice presidents was assassinated in Kabul, as was another minister of the first cabinet, and an attempt was made on Karzai's life. Nonetheless, by the end of 2002 Kabul had achieved a measure of stability, not least due to ISAF representation. Sporadic, generally small-scale fighting with various guerrillas continued, particularly in the southeast, with the Taliban regaining some strength and even control in certain districts. Fighting between rival factions in various parts of the country has also taken place. Reconstruction has proceeded slowly, and central governmental control outside Kabul remained almost nonexistent. A return to economic health also was hindered by a persistent drought that continued through A new constitution was approved in January 2004 by a loya jirga. It provides for a strong executive presidency and contains some concessions to minorities, but tensions between the dominant Pashtuns and other ethnic groups were evident during the loya jirga. Karzai was elected to the presidency in October 2004 in the country's first democratic election

9 Afghanistan: Parliamentary and provincial elections of a president. The vote was peaceful, but marred by some minor difficulties, as a registration process where a large number of voters obtained multiple registration cards and where many were allowed to cast votes several times as a non-sticking marking ink was used. There was no official election observation taking place, the EU was only observing the election to provide advice for later elections. Consequently, several losing candidates accused Karzai of fraud, but an international review panel said the irregularities that had occurred were not significant enough to have affected the outcome. Karzai's new cabinet consisted of a mix of technocrats (many returning from exile) and former warlords, and was more ethnically balanced than the first cabinet where Tajiks held most important ministerial positions, and as Pashtuns have entered more important posts, as Minister of Defence. 3 There are few strong, non-militarised parties in Afghanistan and voting was expected to primarily reflect patron-client relations along ethnic, regional and sectarian lines. Former mujahideen leaders, whose vote base is limited to their own ethnic groups and regions, lead many of the parties that are registered (see annex for presentation of major parties). The Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) election system adopted by Afghanistan is furthermore regarded as a hindrance to the development of well-organised political parties as candidates stand for elections as individuals and not as part of a party list. Under this system, each province is a constituency and more than one person represents each constituency. Each voter cast one vote for one candidate and candidates who win the most votes fill the available seats for each constituency. To be successful under the SNTV, a party must have sufficient control over its support base in each contested district to instruct it how to allocate votes among the party s candidates. Otherwise, the party risks having too many votes cast for one candidate, beyond the minimum need for election, and too few for others leaving it with majority of votes, but minority of seats. While the United Nations and international advisors went against the SNTV system, President Karzai, mujahideen groups with established power bases and resources, and Afghans associating parties with civil war, communist rule or years of factional fighting, appeared in favour of it. Total number of candidates running for the parliamentary and provincial elections was nearly six thousand, including some ten per cent women, who could either be independent, nominated or endorsed by a political party, although political party symbols were not to appear on the ballot. The participation of political parties in direct elections for parliament has been seen as a major turning point in Afghanistan s post-bonn political transition. 4 That most candidates competed as independent suggests that political parties were not allowed to play such an important role as envisaged by the constitution in these elections. A general fear before the elections was for commanders, as they are called, to use the elections to cement their power. According to election rules, Individuals who practically command or are members of unofficial military forces or armed groups shall not be qualified to candidate themselves for the elections (Electoral Law, Article 15). In July, the Electoral Complaint Commission (EEC) drew up a list of 208 blacklisted candidates for having ties to illegal armed groups. Since July, only 28 lower profile candidates were actually disqualified from running following complaints to the electoral 3 This historical review has benefited from insightful comments from Arne Strand, who has done extensive work on Afghanistan and who also worked in Kabul between 1993 and See ICG Asia Briefing No 39, 2005, which also includes a discussion on party formation in Afghan history.

10 Afghanistan: Parliamentary and provincial elections commission; 22 on grounds of having links to illegal armed groups and the rest for being in a public position. Meanwhile, warlords like Abdul Rabb al-rasul Sayyaf 5, whose criminal past has been documented by groups like Human Rights Watch, are openly running for seats in the Parliament. So are former Taliban officials, like the ex-deputy interior minister Mullah Khaksar. 6 For the elections, security remained a huge concern since some parts of the country are still under the sway of insurgents or drug lords. Besides the repression of more and less entrenched warlords, violence carried out by remnants of the Taliban, al-qaeda, or other Afghan formations, as well as US soldiers, contributed to an insecure environment. More than a thousand people, including civilians, has been estimated killed in Afghanistan this year alone. Anti-governmental groups have targeted moderate Islamic clerics, government officials, foreign aid workers, and people involved in the elections. Citizens have been killed for carrying voter registration cards, electoral workers have been attacked, and candidates, particularly women, have received death threats. A total of six candidates and four election workers have been killed. Afghan national army and afghan national police forces, with support from coalition and NATO/ISAF 7 forces, were responsible for security in general, while the security concept of EU EOM was based on the support of agencies such as JEMB, United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), and Kroll (international security service). The Legislative Framework The elections 18 September 2005 was part of a process initiated by the agreement in Bonn, The ultimate aim of the Bonn Agreement is to create a stable peaceful state, governed by institutions derived from and legitimised by a democratic process. The Constitution of Afghanistan, adopted by the Constitutional Loya Jirga in January 2004, envisages Afghanistan as an Islamic Republic with a directly elected president as head, and a bicameral national assembly as the highest legislative body. Elections are governed by the Constitution, the Electoral Law, Presidential Decrees, and regulations adopted by the JEMB. The constitution says little about the exact conduct of the polls, and its legal framework is found in the new Electoral Law of May The new Law endeavours to allocate seats proportionally to each province for Wolesi Jirga (House of the People) and Provincial Council elections on the basis of population size; although without any consensus to establish the actual number of inhabitants of the now 34 provinces, a number established as the new province of Panjsher with an estimated population of 128,000 to secure the influence of particular ethnic/militant groups. The Wolesi Jirga will have 249 members, 239 from the 34 provinces and ten from the pastoralist Kuchi community. 68 seats are reserved for women. The 34 Provincial Councils are local bodies of between nine and 29 members, a quarter of the seats reserved for women. The indirectly elected upper house of the National Assembly, the 102-seat Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders), will be formed after the polls. Each of 5 A Karzai ally whose forces are accused of having massacred hundreds of Hazaras in Kabul. 6 Sonali Kolhatkar and Jim Ingalls, Giving Democracy a Bad Name, ZNet 16 September, Eighteen countries are contributing to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan sanctioned by the UN Security Council (UNSCR 1386) in 2001.

11 Afghanistan: Parliamentary and provincial elections the 34 councils will select a member to sit in the Meshrano Jirga. Another third will be chosen by the President and a third by District Councils. As District Council elections have been postponed, these councils will not be able to elect their representatives to the Meshrano Jirga at this time. In order to maintain the balance between indirectly elected members and presidential appointees, it is anticipated that the President will only appoint half of the 34 representatives, which means that half of the Meshrano Jirga seats will be vacant until such time when the District Council elections have taken place. Little in the way of physical infrastructure or political space has been prepared for the new representative institutions. As of mid-july 2005, the Provincial Councils, for instance, still lacked a legislative framework. 8 Additionally, the SNTV system, providing for all candidates to compete against each other as independents, built a hostile environment for political parties. The disadvantages of this system in tandem with laws that favour the individual over political parties became clear when as many as candidates were competing for, in comparison, few seats in the National Assembly and Provincial Council. In its statement of preliminary findings and conclusions EU EOM noted that the SNTV system might lead to a fragmented parliament; powerful individuals competing against each other on the ground of self-interests. Although Afghans have mixed perceptions of the role that parties could play, given the association to violent histories of former leftist and Islamist parties, the undermining of nascent democratic groupings and new political parties, which the SNTV system works against, might lead to a lack of representational diversity. Moreover, the huge number of candidates competing for few seats in the new institutions might lead to disappointments and dissatisfactions at not being elected. The Electoral Administration The institution legally responsible for administering, regulating, and overseeing the elections is the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB). It was first established by Presidential Decree in July 2003 and has evolved over time. The current Electoral Law of 2005, Article 57, treats it as an institution in existence only for the Transitional Period and destined to be replaced by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). JEMB is the temporary merger of the IEC and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) Electoral Component (UEC). The Afghan commissioners who presided over the presidential elections, in what was then the Interim Election Commission, was widely perceived as weak and partisan. The current JEMB is composed of nine Afghan commissioners from the IEC appointed by President Karzai and four international commissioners appointed by the United Nations Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG). The Chief Electoral Officer, appointed by the SRSG to head the JEMB Secretariat, is also a member, but without voting rights. The Independent Electoral Commission, though established under the Constitution, currently has no independent function, its powers and responsibilities effectively being exercised within and by the JEMB. The Chairman of the IEC chairs the sessions of the JEMB. Chairman Bissmillah Bissmil s impartiality was also questioned 8 ICG Asia Report No 101, 2005.

12 Afghanistan: Parliamentary and provincial elections as a result of former ties with Ismail Khan (the powerful former Governor of Herat, now Minister of Energy and Water in Karzai's government) and, of late, his perceived alliance with President Karzai. The new Afghan commissioners were otherwise regarded as impartial, except for opposition leaders- and groups distrust of the body as a whole because of the appointment system (Afghan members appointed by the President). JEMB s responsibilities include appointing electoral officials, determining the electoral boundaries, conducting the registration process, determining candidates eligibility, determining complaints, and declaration of the date for each election. The responsibility of vetting candidates to ensure they meet the criteria and do not have- or are members of militias stresses the importance of JEMB to be seen as and be in practice non-partisan. The JEMB Secretariat (JEMBS) is the executive arm of the JEMB, responsible for the implementation of the electoral operation. A Deputy, a Chief of Operations, and a Chief of Staff, all internationals, assist the Chief Election Officer. Departments of External Relations, Legal Services, Public Outreach, Support, Program Management, Information Technology and Communications, Training and Capacity Building, Security and Field Operations are also headed by internationals. The JEMB and its Secretariat are located in the electoral headquarters in Kabul. Additionally, the JEMBS has approximately six thousand Afghan and some four hundred international core staff active in eight regional and thirty-four provincial offices. Regional election coordinators lead the regional offices, while provincial election officers lead the provincial offices. For the parliamentary and provincial elections, the JEMB established in addition to the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) a Provincial Electoral Commission (PEC) in each province. Among its functions, the PEC was to receive and process complaints; review candidate nominations; and advice the ECC on the eligibility and qualification of nominated candidates. The functions of the ECC are, among others, to consider and adjudicate on matters of complaints relating to electoral offences; and challenges to the list of candidates or to the eligibility or qualifications of a candidate raised during the electoral process. The decisions of the ECC are final and the body itself is wound up no later than thirty days after final certification of election results. The Supreme Court, however, holds a constitutional right to review decisions of lower bodies and this, in principle, must include adjudications of the ECC. A media commission was also formed in order to monitor the coverage of the candidates during the official campaign period and to assess complaints about media coverage and breaches of the media code of conduct issued by it.

13 Afghanistan: Parliamentary and provincial elections President -Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) 2 Afghans & 3 internationals Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) 9 Afghans & 4 internationals -Electoral Media Commission (EMC) 3 Afghans & 3 internationals JEMB Secretariat (JEMBS) Chief Electoral Officer, 6,000 Afghans & 425 internationals 8 Regional Offices Regional Election Coordinators -Provincial Electoral Commissions (PEC) 3 members (minimum 1 woman) 34 Provincial Offices Provincial Election Officer In the final report on the presidential election, the EU Democracy and Election Support Mission to Afghanistan noted the following: The hierarchical structure of the JEMB does not envisage devolved decision-making below a centralised level. However, the policy of Afghanisation, whereby the JEMB Secretariat sought to rely on national rather than international staff at provincial and district level, appeared to be generally successful in providing a pool of experienced election administrators for future elections On the other hand, there was less success in developing the capacity of national counterparts at a more senior level and most decision-making on major operational issues involved few national staff members. 9 Much of the same situation persisted for the parliamentary and provincial elections, only this time internationals dominated the process even more. As a result, little local knowhow will be left behind under what can be termed a further de-afghanisation of the election process. The EU EOMs assessment of JEMB after the parliamentary and provincial elections was generally positive acknowledging the ability to conduct its tasks in an efficient, independent and transparent manner. Compared to the 2004 presidential elections, an improvement in the overall performance of JEMB was noted. Around 160,000 polling staff for 26,250 polling stations were recruited and trained without major delays and the supply of election materials appeared generally unproblematic. Although much time and money was spent, the JEMB did not manage to produce a voter register. Procedures for registration will be discussed in more detail later, but the failure to produce a census and a voter register complicated the administration of the elections in a number of ways. 9 European Union Democracy and Election Support Mission (EU DESM), Afghanistan. Presidential Election 9 October 2004, Final Report.

14 Afghanistan: Parliamentary and provincial elections District Councils elections had to be postponed all together and, once constituted, it will be up to the National Assembly to resolve the district issue. As a result, District Councils will not be able to elect their representatives to the Meshrano Jirga at this time. Instead of being determined by JEMB, the allocation of parliamentary seats between provinces and the size of provincial councils was subjected to months of political discussions. The issue was finally resolved by a presidential decree telling JEMB the exact number of representatives to be elected from each province. The uncertainty as to how many voters would vote in each polling station required provisions to be made for every polling station to have a minimum number of ballot papers sufficient for the maximum number of potential voters using the polling stations. Considering the complexity of the elections involving three different ballot papers for three simultaneous elections parliamentary, provincial, and Kuchi forty million ballots were printed for the 12.3 million registered voters (one million printed for the half a million registered Kuchi voters). While there were no reports of shortages of ballot papers on Election Day, the extremely high excess figure created opportunities for ballot-box stuffing in polling stations with low turnout. Registration procedures relied entirely on the electorate to come forward for registration, and to do so only once, within the registration period. Only means to check a voter for eligibility on the day of elections was the voter card and the ink, where many voters would be in a possession of a number of cards. A major difference between the election for president and for parliament was that in the first Afghan refugees based in Pakistan and Iran was allowed to vote, while, on technical arguments several millions were excluded from the second election. Voter and Civic Education Civic education was sub-contracted by the JEMB to other organisations and groups. The EU EOM preliminary statement acknowledged the challenge of reaching all voters in time and concluded that women in particular remained generally less informed than male voters. When conducted, the focus was primarily on polling procedures and less on the role and functions of the institutions which are to emerge from the elections. In the northern province of Kunduz, Education Centre for Women was involved in civic education operating in a team of two, one man and one woman, visiting villages from morning till late afternoon and distributing material and explaining election procedures. In a training session for men, mostly underage boys were present taking the place of their working fathers. According to the trainer, fathers would learn the procedures from their sons. The women, on the other hand, gathered in large numbers to listen and lean about elections. Asking participants about what they learned, the most frequent answer was to select the right candidate and avoid those involved in criminal activities. The number of villages reached is difficult to say, but activities appeared to have intensified as Election Day approached.

15 Afghanistan: Parliamentary and provincial elections Voter Registration Under the Bonn Agreement, the UN was to carry out a census prior to any election. The UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and the Central Statistics Office (CSO) subsequently signed a project document, limiting the responsibility of the former to providing technical expertise. According to the International Crisis Group, a pre-election census may always have been overly ambitious in a country devastated by years of conflict and stripped of technical and human capacity. After three years, only the very beginnings of a census process were in place. A preliminary survey was almost complete, but final data of a full census is only expected in During the registration phase prior to the 2004 elections, more than nine thousand teams employing some thirty-six thousand personnel conducted registration in five thousand registration sites across Afghanistan. Registration began in December 2003 and by mid- August more than ten million voters had registered, representing over 100 per cent of the estimated electorate (UNAMA estimate was 9.8 million eligible voters). The registration figure for women, 41.3 per cent of the total, was equally striking given social strictures against their appearance in public. Registration facilities was re-opened prior to the parliamentary and provincial elections to enable more people to register: those who had attained the age of 18 or returned to the country since the last registration period; those who for other reasons did not participate in the previous registration exercise; those who had lost their voter card; and those living in areas where no sufficient registration facilities had been provided. In addition, voters were allowed to make changes to the information on their voter card if incorrect, particularly if the province was wrong since voting was meant to take place only in the province marked on the voter registration card. This voter Registration Update Period was conducted over the course of one month in June/July 2005 and took place in more than a thousand registration sites throughout the country. As a result of the voter registration update, a further 1.7 million voter registration cards were issued (56 per cent to men, and 44 per cent to women). Kuchis made up 8 per cent of the total number of registrants. For the presidential election, a number of problematic aspects with the voter registration procedures were commented on. Confidence in the accuracy of the voter register was in particular said to have been undermined by a high level of over-registration commonly acknowledged to have been cause by multiple registration. Absences of formal identification documentation and procedures to verify or check information allowed voters to register at any registration cite enabling them to collect voter registration cards merely upon oral confirmation of their identity and eligibility. Lack of safeguards against multiple registrations also meant problems in preventing minors from registering. 11 For the parliamentary and provincial elections, instead of addressing previous problems, the voter registration update was found to probably have exacerbated them. Like last year s presidential elections, the EU EOM statement noted, the elections for the Wolesi Jirga and provincial councils were not conducted on the basis of an adequate voter list 10 ICG Asia Report No 101, EU DESM Final Report, 2004.

16 Afghanistan: Parliamentary and provincial elections and, despite two elections, Afghanistan still has no accurate Final Voters List. While some people have registered more than once, others were left out of the registration process. Accurate voter registration being a fundamental element in the creation of a credible electoral system, negligence risked voters confidence in the electoral process. Candidate registration On 12 July, 5,800 candidates where certified, rejecting only 17 applicants. Potential candidates for the Wolesi Jirga has to be over 25 years and submit 300 signatures of registered voters and a deposit of Afghani. For provincial councils, requirements are eighteen years old, 200 signatures and Afghanis. The Electoral Law also requires candidates to step down from a number of specified government positions. In the candidate nomination process, nominees had to enter as individuals. Although candidates could choose to give a party affiliation as well, only few did when it became clear how little power parties would have under the new Electoral Law. For nearly a quarter of a century armed groups in Afghanistan have committed numerous atrocities. Article 85 (2) of the constitution specifies that a candidate should not have been convicted by a court of committing a crime against humanity Based on this, a formal process of vetting candidates for the September Elections was instituted. Due to a largely inactive judicial system, no one in Afghanistan has ever been convicted of a crime against humanity. 12 Furthermore, under the Electoral Law, membership of illegal armed groups is a barrier to being certified as a candidate and may be grounds for disqualification even after certification. Disqualification of candidates after ballot papers had been printed raised concerns of how to inform the voters about the changes. Despite disqualified candidates printed on the ballot papers in Nangarhar province, STOs in Jalalabad did not observe any confusion among voters due to this matter on Election Day. During the candidate nomination process, the ECC, based on the recommendations of the Joint Secretariat of the Commission for Disarmament and Reintegration 13, provisionally excluded 208 persons from the list of candidates. According to the EU EOM statement, by July, again on the recommendations of the Joint Secretariat the number of those who were finally excluded on grounds of being identified with illegal armed groups had been sharply reduced to 11. Subsequently, 22 more candidates were disqualified at a very late stage on the same ground. 12 ICG Asia Report No 101, See below; The review of Complaints Process.

17 Afghanistan: Parliamentary and provincial elections The Election campaign There was an immense challenge to campaigning in Afghanistan with its low literacy rate, differing levels of media penetration, large rural population and crumbling road network. With remote settlements, Kuchis faced especially challenges, so did women candidates, given financial and social constraints as well as local political tradition. The JEMB placed legal restrictions on campaigning expenditures by candidates, as well as limits on contributions given to candidates. According to EU EOM s statement, despite of legal restrictions there can be little doubt that campaigning expenditures of some candidates have greatly exceeded the statutory limits. The STO team in Jalalabad in Nangarhar province observed lot of campaigning, such as posters, boards and candidate rallies. Although male candidates were most active, female candidates were also visible, especially holding rallies. Given the new Electoral Law and the Single Non-Transferable Voting system, the election campaign was far more about the projection of powerful individuals than choices between manifestos and programs. The Media The new Electoral Law establishes a set of principles for the coverage of the election campaign by the mass media. Article 50 obliges the mass media to accept the views and opinions of the candidates in a fair and unbiased manner, in accordance with the code of conduct issued by the Media Commission. The Media Commission, composed of three Afghan nationals and two international members, was established in readiness for the official campaign period 20 July It has its own mandate and the capacity to make its own decisions and issue advisory notices. Its decisions are open to appeal to the JEMB. Article 38 (1) obliges a 30 days period for the official campaign period as well as an official moratorium of 48 hours before the polling starts. According to EU EOM there were clear violations in the media of the campaign silence period prior to opening of the polls, such as indirect campaigning of candidates. Additionally, the state media should provide free airtime on radio and television to ensure fair coverage of the candidates. The Media Commission concluded that approximately 53 per cent of candidates took up free slots. In general, according to EU EOM statement, access of candidates to the media was limited by the lack of election related coverage.

18 Afghanistan: Parliamentary and provincial elections Observation on the Polling Day Election Day was assessed as relatively calm and peaceful and no major incidents were reported from the nearly 900 polling stations in 26 provinces monitored by the EU EOM. In total, JEMB had established 26,250 polling stations in 34 provinces. Due to the security situation, it was not feasible for the EU EOM to observe in all the provinces. Kunduz Province, North Eastern Region The city of Kunduz was anciently known as Drapsaka. Under the governance of Sher Khan Nasher or Nashir, Kunduz became among the wealthiest Afghan provinces in the early twentieth century, mainly due to Narsher s founding of the still existing Spinzar Cotton Company. The province consists of seven districts (Markaz Kunduz, Ali Abad, Char Dara, Khana Bad, Qala-i-Zal, Imam Saheb and Dasth-i-Archi) and has a population of some 800,000 people, including 3 400,000 living in the city. Around 400,000 registered for the parliamentary and provincial elections entitling them to vote in any of the 792 polling stations. Kunduz occupies an especially important position in the northeast region as headquarter of the 6 th Army Corps, formerly led by the powerful General Daoud (Tajik) of the Jamiat/Shura-i Nazar faction. Although Daoud was transferred to become Deputy Minister of Interior, he still has considerable influence in the province. There are some commanders loyal to other parties or factions, but they are not very powerful. The local power structure is based on a somewhat uneasy alliance between the Uzbek and Turkmen commanders of the northern part of the province, who used to be loyal to Hizbe Islami, and the Tajik commanders of the south, loyal to Jamiat and Shura-i Nezar. Although there are Uzbek commanders loyal to Junbish, they have not been public about their alignment, generally pretended loyalty to Jamiat or Shura-i Nezar. The province also has the highest percentage of Pashtuns in the region (36 percent as opposed to 23 per cent Tajiks, 23 per cent Uzbeks, 8 per cent Hazaras and 8 per cent Turkmen), but the Pashtun component of the population remained sidelined after the fall of Taliban. The marginalisation of Pashtuns is a potential source of tensions, especially if other groups particularly Tajiks control of the population is reflected in the election results and the Pashtuns feels underrepresented. Out of a total of 182 candidates running for the elections in Kunduz, 37 candidates were nominated or endorsed by a partly, while the remaining 145 contested as independent. On Election Day, there were one LTO team observing in Markaz Kunduz (city), while the STO team visited polling stations in surrounding districts of Khana Bad, Char Dara, and Aliabad. Observation of the opening At first, JEMB announced polling to take place from seven in the morning, but this was changed to six only a few days ahead of Election Day. The EU EOM noted in the statement that many polling stations opened late, which was also true in the ones observed by the observer team (henceforth the team). When arriving at 5.15, the team split up to observe opening both in male and female polling stations simultaneously. In the female station, polling officials only arrived at five thirty not knowing that time of