The EU/CSDP on Libya in 2011

Transcription

1 The EU/CSDP on Libya in 2011 Dr Ludovica Marchi Balossi-Restelli (PhD) Department of Geography, University of Cambridge, UK On-going work Please do not quote Comments are welcome Key words: European Union, Common Security and Defence Policy, Libya 2011, crisis management Introduction As many observers have pointed out, the future development of the European Union s (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is marred by uncertainty. After a decade of comparatively rapid development in terms of structures, concepts and operations, the policy seems to have run into trouble. One of the most visible signs of these troubles was the EU s performance in the Libya crisis. This paper focuses on that case study and aims to contribute to the debate on the CSDP. It asks whether, to confront the surge of violence in Libya in 2011, there were prospects for convergence within the CSDP. To tackle this question, it uses ideas of strategic culture, as the literature cited here called the culture supporting military and civil interventions. Though we use these ideas, this paper is not included in a strategic culture-focused research, e.g. it has no concern with questions such as, what sort of strategic culture can be discerned in the EU, in the CSDP and in the practice of its operations. The paper neither deals specifically, with the question of pooling and sharing national defence capabilities (for which the present economic crisis may offer incentives), nor with the need for streamlining the civil-military crisis management procedures in Brussels, nor with the matter of sustainable budgetary instruments to allow missions to take place, all of which are of primary importance to intervention. The paper questions how strategic culture changes, whether we should expect it to be persistent and affected by history, how we explain it in the context of the EU/CSDP, and whether we think that it holds explanatory power in predicting certain types of policy option, such as the operation in Libya. Hints from the literature assist our exploration of this issue. The paper contends that there was no prospect of convergence within the framework of the EU s Common Security and Defence Policy in 2011, to challenge the Libya crisis. It claims that the comparative advantage of a EU operation was to demonstrate that, in spite of the Union s setbacks (the financial and Euro crisis) and, in particular, the defence budget crunch, the EU could still hold together, as a political actor. It highlights several missed opportunities. That the level of national politics offers evidence of these outcomes is neither puzzling nor surprising. However, national politics and the leadership s attitudes reveal the political nature of the decision that opted for a weak EU as far as crisis management in the neighbourhood was concerned. Emphasis is placed on France, Britain, Germany and Italy. The analytical framework consists of three main research questions: how the EU/member

2 states reacted to the external challenge of the Libyan crisis; how domestic politics have influenced the EU/member states response to the crisis; and whether the EU/member states actual management of that crisis has constrained or enhanced the EU s standing in the region. The paper employs official documents, the speeches of political leaders, newspapers and secondary sources, and interviews with public officials. It consists of five stages following this introduction: A promising CSDP?, The background to the Libya crisis, Missed opportunities, Subdued to national politics? Not that puzzling, nor surprising and Conclusions. A promising CSDP? Security culture and strategic culture According to this section s central question, as stated in the introduction, we are tempted to understand whether, to confront the surge of violence in Libya in 2011, there were prospects of convergence within the CSDP. One might have expected that the institutional advances of the end of the 1990s, and the following involvement of the EU and member states in activating operations on the ground (Meyer 2006, ; Kirchner 2010, , ; Biava 2011, 55-58) would be sufficient to assume that there were chances of convergence. 1 We are interested in this issue because it has long been taken for granted that there was an emerging security culture in the Union that backed several civil-military operations, both close and far from the European region. Its symptoms became apparent after the end of the Cold War, in the face of the obstacles existing in the Balkans. Such a culture developed at the Saint Malo summit held in France and Britain were its main carriers within the Union. Saint Malo marked the beginning of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and formed the basis of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). However, even before that time, during the European Political Cooperation of the 1970s and 80s, reactions to the conflicts and tensions in the international arena encouraged common positions and political declarations among the member states that were expression of a European security culture (see Nuttall 1992). Security culture takes shape in reaction to threats (terrorism, failed states, insecure borders, excessive or unwanted immigration, expansive state ambitions, as well as uncertainty about accessibility to trade routes, availability of fundamental sources, water, oil and gas for energy consumption and industrial development) and the tensions threatening the world s balance of power. Most political scientists and theoreticians do not use the term security culture to refer to that mix of narratives of EU states, their leaders and societies concerned with the above matters of insecurity, threats and also peace, and employ instead the term strategic culture. We would choose security culture to designate that combination of narratives, since it seems more neutral politically, and is also more suitable for defining any kind of collective solution that might emerge from the EU and its member states. Yet, in respect of the choice made by most of the literature that we cite in this section, we shall use the term strategic culture (see Howorth on the same issue, 2007, 178). Strategic culture can be considered that background of philosophy and attitude that an actor (a EU state and its society) holds towards security and defence. How does strategic culture change; how is it persistent; and how is it affected by history? Strategic culture changes and transforms under the pressure of external influences, and adapts to changed circumstances. The end of the Cold War affected in no minor way the EU states. The case of Italy suggests that it was no longer assured 2

3 of US protection. Those states which, during that period, had not taken responsibility for their national defence, were later forced to build a new culture. Italy, in fact, had to focus on its own safety and wellbeing. Another order of the drivers of change comprises the several groups and committees in the various international and regional forums, NATO, the UN and the EU framework, where the state representatives meet, share opinions, and inevitably influence each other. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is a cluster at the EU level, where socialisation has developed and boosted the transformations of political attitudes towards defence, at least as it occurred in Italy. This one felt the PSC s influence in terms of both concept formation and propelling operations (Interview September 2012). Strategic culture is not necessarily expected to be persistent; together with outside factors and external politics, the domestic realm also has an influence. The heads of state and government and political leaders tend to respond to external events and crises following their (and their society s) preferences and specific aims. Using the case of former prime ministers, in Italy, Prodi emphasised a culture that led the country to be as deeply involved in multilateralism as in the teamwork connected with Brussels. Berlusconi s subsequent governance highlighted a personalised culture, apparently detached from aspirations to establish multilateral links, and disconnected from the team players method, followed by the Italian representatives to the EU, of sharing problems and discussing solutions that are acceptable to the majority of member states. Also, for Spain, there was no persistency. Aznar waged war against Iraq, which Zapatero later called an error, and withdrew the Spanish forces. Several matters impact on strategic culture, not least the political leaders assessment of the choice that might allow them to remain in power, so its persistence might be unpredictable. History, predictably, continues to affect strategic culture in spite of the dynamics of the socialisation processes and of the increased common work among the EU states. Strong signs of its power are visible. The new born culture that sees Italy as having been transformed into a contributor that shares international security responsibility (taking part in more than 30 international missions up till January 2012) differs from the culture that backs its fellow European states, such as France or Britain. As background feeding their strategic culture, Italians still struggle with the need to preserve their national pride together with their nation (Ferrara 2003), a heritage from the Second World War. They do not hold ideas of grandeur as the French do, who remain vitally tied to the general grandeur objective of their culture (Interview 2011). Italian culture markedly differs from that of the UK, where the British find it essential to express a strong attachment to their own sovereignty, have a self-perception as being a great power, and habitually employ armed forces as a foreign policy instrument, along with civilian resources, and are less hesitant regarding this option than Italy. The French, too, traditionally engaged their armed forces in foreign policy making. By contrast, Italy s culture perceives the need for a UN (or an Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE) mandate, before embarking on an operation that utilises the military. Besides the particular influences of Prime Ministers, Italian strategic culture encourages cooperative security and, peculiarly, Italian public opinion has accepted only a specific Italian way of peacekeeping (Missiroli 2007, 165; Foradori and Rosa 2010), that removes any idea of combat, emphasises post-stabilisation aid, and reduces the function of the military to that of a Non-Governmental Organisation, not to mention the fact that Italy does not have a seat on the UN Security Council, as France and Britain do. This truth also contributes towards influencing Italian strategic culture (and creating a sense that 3

4 something is missing in order to embrace a strategic culture worthy of the name) (Interview 2010). By contrast, Italian strategic culture appears similar to that of Germany, where the Germans perceive the need to submerge their nation-state into the wider whole (Schmidt 2006), and have been uneasy about the combination of military and civilian tools, particularly with force projection, so their choice is for civilian means. Past traditions leave their mark and generate patterns of behaviour that are expressions of the strategic culture of the state and their society. Also with regard to the strategic culture in the context of the EU s aspiration to advance the Common Security and Defence Policy, history, external changes and politics, together with the creation of the European institutions, do have an influence. The embryonic European strategic culture which emerged following the Saint Malo revolution (Meyer 2004; Howorth 2004; Biscop 2005; Edwards 2006; et al) was not designed to provide a substitute for the strategic cultures of its components, the EU member states, but it came to exist on a parallel level. Strategic culture in the context of the EU/CSDP can be explained as the increased institutionalisation of the ideas, norms and patterns of behaviour concerning security and defence that are perceived in a common way by the member states. A vital contribution to the increased institutionalisation of the ideas, norms and patterns of behaviour was the European Security Strategy document (ESS, 2003) and its implementation report (European Council 2008). The ESS was a sign of a promised pro-active involvement in regional conflict resolution. The Lisbon Treaty (2010) in particular expanded the scope of the Petersberg tasks, through Art. 43, including joint disarmament operations and rescue missions. It introduced the post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission (HR-VP) that, on the basis of Art. 9, gave responsibility to the occupant to conduct the Union s Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy. The treaty also established, through Art. 13, the European External Action Service (EEAS), and gave it the task of assisting the HR in fulfilling his/her mandate. The literature How does the literature in this field define whether strategic culture enables us to foresee convergence within the CSDP, in the case of a military campaign such as that of Libya and, also, how does it contribute to a more comprehensive definition of strategic culture in the context of the EU/CSDP? In her recent work (2011), Biava applied a multilevel analytical framework to the CSDP, based on the operative level (for the analysis of the EU field operations), on the top-down institutional level (for the analysis of the official documents and CSDP practices), and on the bottom-up institutional level (focused on the socialisation among the political actors involved in the CSDP, in the framework of the Political and Security Committee taken as a case study). Biava found elements of an emergent strategic culture within the CSDP among those that were consistent across the above three levels of analysis. She defined the strategic culture in the EU/CSDP as being based on the principle of the projection of forces within a multilateral framework, which implies positive cooperation and the complementarity of efforts with the international community, and with the EU s long-term approach on the field, employing Communitarian instruments. Concerning our question of whether we were likely to expect policy convergence, within the CSDP, towards action in Libya, Biava was unable to qualify the EU emergent strategic culture in terms of reactivity in the framework of the temporality of the engagement, nor in terms of universality, vis-à-vis the 4

5 geographical areas of CSDP intervention (pp. 41, 57). The reactivity issue is influenced by the fact that the EU strategic culture regarding the military side is grounded on deployment based on a mandate, limited in time and space, and foreseeing an exit strategy. The whole is a long procedure of agreement and formalisation, which contrasts with the rapidity required for such military decisions to be made. The other factor characterising the reactivity is that, to the battlegroup concept, developed at the institutional level as a EU military means, corresponds no single battlegroup deployment at the operational level. Another work on the concepts underpinning the European Security and Defence Policy (Meyer 2004) sought a viable definition and operationalisation of the term European strategic culture. Meyer adapted the description of Martinsen (2003) (as the ideas, expectations and patterns of behaviour that are shared across the actors involved in the processes surrounding European security and defence politics ), and replaced expectations with norms to tie in with Katzenstein s idea of norms as social facts, which define standards of appropriate behaviour. A strategic culture, Meyer argued, needs to be engrained in mutually shared norms, societal values and beliefs, and should not narrowed to just the political actors directly involved in the CSDP decision-making. This logic lies in the public salience of security threats, and the high expense to which organizing and conducting military operations leads. Concerning the operationalisation of strategic culture, its definition as being the civil and military means employed in ranked order to reach particular ends defined as crisis management (Martinsen) was broadened and made more inclusive by Meyer into the deliberate application of all kind of instruments and forms of power, ranging from persuasion to force, by one actor or a group of actors to make other actors (usually states) change their behaviour in ways that are deemed important to enhance the formers security and defence interests (Hill 2003, 137). As far as the convergence issue regarding our question is concerned, Meyer claimed that pressure for the convergence of strategic cultures affected all countries, not just the more pacific, neutral or defensive cultures. However, the convergence was not an inevitable phenomenon, as states may respond differently to adaptation pressures and particular events (p. 3-4, 20). A further work (Giegerich 2006) also focused on the role of ideas and foreign and security policy traditions to address national realities attitudes towards common endeavours. Giegerich defined strategic culture as an ideational milieu that governs the decisions of states regarding the use of the military force, and embraces the issues of when, on what occasions, and in which situations military force is to be used as a political tool. This ideational milieu is rooted in a historically distinctive evolution of a society, from which originated constant inclinations that are only exposed to transformations through policy-making elites, principally at times of emergent crisis. With regard to the convergence matter within the CSDP, of member states policy visions vis-à-vis the Libya crisis, external pressure can be an accelerating driver to the progress of a common strategic culture, and can potentially change deeply rooted norms. However, as Giegerich emphasised, external pressure alone is insufficient to encourage the formation of a common strategic culture and the growth of CSDP. Leadership is also needed, both national and European (pp. 13, 27, 40). Regarding our focus on the definition of strategic culture in the framework of the CSDP, one among those cited above suggested an outward-looking view for its emphasis on multilateral framework, constructive cooperation and long-term approach via communitarian instruments (Biava). Another suggested a more inwardlooking interpretation, with an emphasis on military force as a political tool ; from 5

6 that perspective in particular, the questions of when, in which circumstances and in what contexts take on important meanings (Giegerich). We firstly characterised strategic culture in the context of the EU/CSDP as the institutionalisation of shared ideas, norms and patterns of behaviour, and we return to that explanation because it promises a more inclusive meaning. That description expands the idea of the political actor to comprise social actors (society), their understanding of a safe world, and the legal requirements regarding military intervention, and we explore that interpretation further. Ideas relate to the state s role in the world and vision of a safe global order. This understanding matters, because the state s vision of a safe global order forms the basis of its cooperation with other players, regimes, regional, or global organisations, and with the US. Norms define the conditions under which the employing force is lawful, and describe its purpose and the procedures by which to obtain consent, both in the national and international contexts. Established patterns of behaviour can be largely seen as the mode in which societies debate, the political actors take decisions, and the armed forces perform actions, all of which functions are related to security and defence affairs. Thus, we understand strategic culture in the context of the EU/CSDP as that combination of ideas, norms and patterns of behaviour that are sufficiently shared at the national level by political actors and society, and are related to processes concerning European security and defence politics (Martinsen s and Meyer s contributions). The above studies (Biava, Meyer and Giegerich) uncovered patterns and processes of growing overlap and convergence, at the same time sustaining that persistent divergence of preferences remains, often posing as an obstacle to the progress of the CSDP. There is agreement in those studies that, even in cases where certain degrees of convergence between national strategic cultures have been observed, these events do not lead to the conclusion that this convergence necessarily continues. There is therefore no suggestion that the institutional progress of the end of the 1990s and the subsequent engagement of the EU in civil-military operations imply the merging of the national security policies in the CSDP. Strategic culture has not appeared to hold explanatory power in predicting convergence, particularly concerning certain types of policy option such as the operation in Libya. Convergence is a process that has not been completed, remains on-going, and could theoretically stall, and even be reversed. For example, political opposition (from Berlin, London and Paris) was not overcome in the case of the convergence of pooling and sharing that was required for the merger of an integrated European aerospace construct, combining the leading commercial aircraft company with the main European defence group (EADS-BAE). The choice that has been preferred was for a collective military irrelevance and a militarily weak Europe. The main source of this outcome lay in the political nature of that decision (see: FT 15 Oct 2012). To confront the Libyan crisis with a EU military operation, the political decision to enhance the relevance of the EU in association with the CSDP would have been essential. The background to the Libya crisis The crisis in Libya exploded on 17 February 2011, when Gaddafi s use of force against civilians exacerbated. A few days later, on 21 February, the 27 EU foreign ministers requested an end to the violence and, shortly afterwards, France, Germany and The Netherlands proposed sanctions, whereas Malta, Cyprus and Italy, led by former Prime Minister Berlusconi, were unwilling to endorse the proposal. In late 6

7 February, Britain s Prime Minister Cameron declared that Britain was preparing to arrange a no fly zone, possibly under NATO s coordination. France expressly stated that it was keen to use NATO s military command to plan and execute air operations, but strongly believed that the North Atlantic Alliance should take no political control of the overall military operation. This would have alienated the Arab countries (Fr 2011a). At the European Council meeting of 11 March in Brussels, the EU states have been addressed by France to recognise the Benghazi-based Transitional National Council (TNC), a recognition that France s former President Sarkozy made unilaterally the previous day (EurActiv). 2 Shortly afterwards, on 17 March, the UN Security Council approved the no-fly zone over Libya, and authorised all of the necessary measures to protect civilians (Resolution 1973). Sarkozy called a summit on Libya, in the French capital on 19 March, tasked with organising the political guidance of the operation authorised by the UN. It was agreed with America s President Obama that the first offensive action would be conducted by the US, Operation Odyssey Dawn, under the arrangement that, after the US had nullified Libya s air defence system, NATO would replace the American leadership, making then clear that the direction was under non-usa authority (Howorth 2011, 18-19; Charlemagne 2011). On 20 March, French fighter jets fired at Gaddafi s troops (THP). The collective action, the Unified Protector Operation, was launched by NATO on 31 March 2011, according to Resolution The Italian leaders felt pressurised to make choices against Gaddafi that initially they wished to avoid. Once Resolution 1973 was approved, they accepted its substance, supported the engagement of NATO power, and later acknowledged the TNC (ItGov). No military operation was aired, as one to be taken under the initiative of the CSDP within the European framework. Not that a discussion on the matter was eluded by the EU states. However, there was no sign of the ambition in the field of military crisis management that some Swedish defence ministers had previously predicted for the EU (Engberg 2010, 408), nor any indication of the so-called tarzan narrative that the EU had constructed in the first decade of the twenty-first century (Flockhart 2011). As late as 12 April, at a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg, a debate on whether the CSDP should intervene with armed forces occupied the agenda of the EU states. The meeting was held after the European Council, on 1 st April, had agreed on the EUFOR Libya CSDP military mission that was anchored to the United Nation s request to intervene in support of humanitarian assistance operations (Council Decision 011/210/CFSP). 4 An operational plan was needed for the military humanitarian intervention, and the discussion on that matter, in Luxemburg, unveiled the contrasting positions of the foreign ministers, and particularly: the claim that the UN retained access to Misrata, which was under siege by Gaddafi s forces, and a EU military action would have jeopardised the UN endeavours; the contention advanced by the Italians that they could not understand the need for a military intervention to deliver humanitarian aid; the argument by others that the deployment of forces was driven by the pursuit of demonstrating that the EU had a military planning capacity distinct from that of NATO. The indication that a military intervention was the only possible choice to halt Gaddafi was, definitely, made. Reportedly, disagreement about the EU being divided among the do-gooders and the warriors was impossible to restrain, until a UN high level aid-and-relief official s letter to HR Ashton finally cleared the objections. The letter disclosed the reservations about providing military support for a humanitarian mission (Vogel 2011a). 7

8 By contrast, a few days after the EU foreign ministers met in Luxemburg, France s former President Sarkozy and Britain s Prime Minister Cameron underwrote a letter, signed also by the US President Obama, which was published in the New York Times, declaring that Gaddafi must go and go for good (NYT 14 April 2011). In spite of the tensions, no concrete refusal emerged from the member states to the regime change sequence that took place. The suggestion that regime change was the desired option was indicated by an opinion poll, conducted about 100 days after the start of the NATO operation, in Italy, Germany, France, Britain, Spain, the US and other European countries (22 June 2011). The sample revealed that the Germans (who chose to abstain from UNSC Resolution 1973, on 17 March) were only second to the primacy of France in advocating regime change (Menotti 2011). In April, Italy s former Foreign Minister Frattini declared that any solution for the future of Libya has a precondition: that Gadhafi s regime leaves [ and] himself and the family leave the country (Lucas and Rizzo 2011). These developments occurred within a relatively short period of time. What would have been the comparative advantage and value-added influence of a EU operation? Member states had several options available: UN, NATO, EU, and coalitions of the willing, to name the obvious ones. The comparative advantage of a EU operation would have been to demonstrate that, in spite of the Union s setbacks (financial and Euro crisis) and in particular the defence budget crunch, the EU could still hold together as a political actor. The value-added factor of a EU military initiative would have been the decision to employ the instruments mandated by the Union as a way of bringing forward its policies, specifically common security and defence. Missed opportunities Certainly the inadequacy of the military capabilities was a prior concern when the external circumstances pressed for action in Libya. However the problem found a temporary solution in the American support. The lack of keenness to promote the EU as political actor (and to avoid the European Union collective military insignificance) leads to see several missed opportunities that member states and the EU disregarded. It is sufficient to quote four instances. First, the defence of European interests in the region. In 2010, Libya was the sixth major energy provider to the EU, fulfilling 17 per cent of European energy requirements. The EU framed no common energy policy, and so the member states were compelled to make direct acquisitions on an individual basis. In 2010 also, France was a strong importer (205,000 oil barrels per day) and also Germany and Spain (respectively b/d and 136,000 b/d), and Italy was, by far, the biggest buyer (376,000 b/d). For Britain, the reduced availability of energy resources in the North Sea, in addition to the desire to lessen its reliance on Russian Gazprom, had served to strengthen its energy dealings with Libya (95,000 b/d in 2010) (The Economist 2011; Caspian Weekly 2011). Along with the strategic aim of fostering stability in the neighbourhood (Schroeder 2009, 501), the protection of a region key for European wellbeing concerning the security of energy sources, maritime security, and sea commercial lanes as well as migration control, was a logical task for the CSDP policy to undertake. Second, the promotion of a CSDP operation formed by those who were willing to take action. Officially, the choices made within this area conform to the norm of unanimity, namely the 27 Foreign Ministers need to agree within the Foreign Affairs 8

9 Council. In situations of particular importance, the Heads of State and Government united in the European Council have the right of decision, and individual member states hold a veto over any joint choice. On that occasion, the member states and the EU could make an effort, and bridge the gap between the willing to intervene in the crisis management and those less interested in doing so. They could give support to the shaping of a CSDP military operation formed by the keen to intervene states. Third, taking the political control and strategic direction of the NATO military operation if Berlin-Plus had been used. Not possessing the necessary military capabilities was watched with anxiety on the other side of the Atlantic and branded by some as the European culture of demilitarization (Gates 2010). This hurdle was nonetheless lowered by the US granting assistance and support in the light of the lack of aircraft carriers, smart munitions and enablers of modern warfare, surveillance and air tanking (Witney 2011, 2). The kind of setting of a Europe-led NATO command configuration was not new. It was defined, in the 1990s, as the European Security and Defence Identity, specifically a NATO mission, conducted by the Europeans operating through US military resources, and was surpassed, in 2002, by the Berlin Plus arrangement that allowed the CSDP to use NATO (i.e. US) assets to handle an operation without the involvement of US forces (Howorth 2011, 19; 2007, ). The Berlin Plus mechanisms were successfully used in Operation Concordia in Macedonia, in 2003 (Mace 2004; Abele 2003), and were indeed offering a more European option to mark the operation in Libya. Specifically, even though the military action was implemented under NATO command, the member states choice to resort to the Berlin-Plus procedures would have allowed the CSDP to take strategic control of the military action. There was also a stringent logic in support of this alternative. The EU was involved in making long-term policies in the region aimed at nurturing stability in its neighbouring belt. The EU was, by intention, well-disposed towards eventually developing a comprehensive relationship with Libya, and offering a framework agreement, finally including Libya s participation in the European Neighbourhood Policy (Biscop 2011, 2; Bosse 2011, 442). Fourth, the Union and the member states had estimated that they were willing, as a group or part of it, to perform disarmament operations and rescue missions through the CSDP (Lisbon Treaty Art. 43). By contrast, as a result of their choices, the Responsibility to Protect People (R2P) was also among the overlooked charges. This was a paradox because the member states made efforts and succeeded in having the R2P recognised as a responsibility of the international community at the 2005 World Summit, and because they incorporated it within the EU s own security strategy priority tasks. One would claim that, if the European Union is not to disintegrate, the member states are required to employ the instruments authorised by the Union as a way of furthering its policies, such as the CSDP. By achieving this, they would create the momentum that, perhaps, the other member states would be unable to resist. Assuming a leading function does not entail excluding others; somebody has to be the engine; and leaving the gate open, and having other EU states crossing it, would increase the positive pressure on those in the leading job to engage in more effective external action (see Habermas and Derrida 2005). The alternative decision of promoting the EU as a political actor would have seen, as an example for the Libya campaign: a EU military operation made up by the willing to intervene EU states, under the CSDP political control and strategic direction (thanks to Berlin-Plus), in defence of the R2P obligation and of the many 9

10 European security interests in the region instead of letting the protection of these responsibilities towards the coalition of the willing. Such an operation would have combated the idea of the EU s collective military insignificance. Evidence of the basis of these outcomes can be seen through a focus on the specific attitudes of the member states. Subdued to national politics? Not that puzzling, nor surprising There was the suggestion that external pressure alone was insufficient to encourage the growth of the common security and defence policy, and that strong leadership was needed. How did the main member states, and their leaders (and societies), France, Britain and Germany, and Italy too, respond to the crisis concerning the possibility of giving shape to a military operation within the framework of the CSDP, and how did the EU HR respond to this same issue? France showed promptness of reaction and initiative towards Libya, initially suggesting unilateral moves. It generally held the initiative within the CSDP, inspired by Europe puissance and Europe de la defence ideas (Haine 2011a, 14). Holding the initiative made it easier for the other member states to follow. On that occasion, however, France realised that it had already wasted time, and lost the opportunity for initiatives, as had occurred when it faced the previous challenge of the Tunisian unrest. It needed rapidity of action. Its failure to respond to that North African country had resulted in the dismissal of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs and in the appointment of a new Foreign Minister, Alain Juppe, exerting pressure on Sarkozy s assertive role in lobbying for a no-fly zone over Libya and a UN resolution (Fr 2011b). French political and public opinion was largely behind former President Sarkozy s military initiative and deployment of forces (Fr 2011a). France had already other times experienced the extent to which the CSDP lacked promptness of action. For Chad, it had to make efforts to convince the other member states to participate (Haine 2011b, 594). The project for an integrated Mediterranean area was the focus of French attention under Sarkozy, in 2008, reviving the idea of a Union of the Mediterranean. Former Prime Minister Francois Fillon made it clear to the French Parliament (24 March 2011) that France want[ed] to see a new era in the Mediterranean region (Fr 2011a). France may have wished to avoid repeating the experience of suppressing its own interests and influence in Africa in the pursuit of a minimal European consensus (Haine 2011a, 14). Britain was ready to intervene in Libya even without a UN resolution, as indicated by Prime Minister Cameron (see note 2). Yet, Britain could hardly be the promoter of a security operation in Libya within the CSDP. Its national security strategy document of 2010 never mentioned the then European Security and Defence Policy, and Prime Minister Cameron showed no passion for policies decided at the level of centralised decision-shaping agencies in Brussels. The British domestic audience would favour a national referendum on Europe (FT 21 May 2012), implying Britain s weakened link to the EU. Britain had previously signed, in November 2010, a defensive treaty with France, and the management of the Libyan crisis was an occasion for the joint operational and political leadership of these two states (Benitez 2011). At the time of that agreement, Cameron stated that, by working together, we increase our own individual sovereign capacity so that we can do more things alone as well as together (The Guardian 2010). The whole suggests no preference for Britain s choice of the CSDP framework. 10

11 Germany could not sponsor the CSDP to play a role in Libya, apparently because its ontological security problems could not promise the military connection. It made known its position at the beginning of the crisis, at the UNSC, and, paradoxically as a convinced human rights champion, it joined Russia and China, notably no great human rights supporters, in abstaining from imposing the no-fly zone (see Speck 2011). Former Foreign Minister Westerwelle has remained largely silent on the issue since the abstention from the UN vote. Chancellor Merkel was concentrated on a number of states elections that threatened to erode her party s power. She was also absorbed by the euro-zone s debt concerns, for which she was facing opposition among parliamentarians regarding her plans for the the European Financial Stability Facility (Spiegel 26 August 2011). The decision to abstain was badly received by the German people, including political personalities like former Chancellor Kohl, who questioned Germany s stance. It was criticised for the inappropriateness of refusing to side with its traditional allies (the US, France and Britain), not to mention the European Union that declared its support for the resolution (Spiegel 18 March 2011). A European diplomat confirmed that the European Union could, quite simply, have arranged and positioned naval patrols to supervise an arms embargo against Gaddafi, as NATO has then organised and for which it was responsible. Later, when at the White House, Merkel expressed her support for the NATO military mission (CNN 2011). Italy, which was normally regarded as being passionately pro-european, has made no efforts, in Parliament, to stream any discussion on how to tackle the Libyan crisis within the ranks of the CSDP. That is to say, it was expected that a member state would reinforce the institutional framework which had been constructed, and adhered to, to deal with disarmament and rescue missions jointly with the other EU states, as declared in the Lisbon Treaty. It was even more expected since Italy had ratified, with no doubts, the Treaty, with 551 favourable parliamentary votes, no abstentions and no contrary votes (Presidenza Consiglio 2009). Italy s efforts regarding the armed action in Libya were to re-conduct the military operation under the NATO umbrella, as former Foreign Minister Franco Frattini declared in the Lower House (27 April 2011). Neither the European Union nor the CSDP were mentioned as a framework that would house the on-going military operation. Among the causes pressing Frattini to stress that we could not imagine a coalition of the willing under bilateral or trilateral guide, there was perhaps the insinuation that France and Britain, tied in by the bilateral defensive treaty, might lead a joint operation (ItGov, p. 23). A stronger explanation was offered by La Stampa (31 March 2011) that seemed to challenge the notion, which had begun to circulate, that the Lisbon Treaty outlined the principle of decentralisation, which has suggested to some, that European policy in foreign affairs and defence should be subcontracted to Paris and London. Italy resisted the idea of bi/tri-lateral guidance on the Libyan operation. We should acknowledge that there were other influences distracting Italy from the CSDP as a military actor in the operation. Primarily, the government s response to the crisis was slowed by the friendship and cooperation treaty agreed by former Prime Minister Berlusconi with Tripoli, in 2008, which ensured that Italy would not consent to the use of its territory for any hostile act, or engage in direct or indirect military action against Libya. It was, then, diverted from a possible focus on a CSDP action by Berlusconi s fear of a negative impact on the profits of many Italian companies that were partly owned by the Libyan government (e.g. FIAT SpA, UniCredit SpA). Another critical feature was Italy s dependence for a quarter of its crude oil requirements on Libya, where the national energy company, Eni SpA, had been active 11

12 for more than fifty years (Limes 2011). An additional problem was the more than 1,300 Italian workers that had to be taken out from Libya prior to the commencement of any military action (ItGov2, p. 20). A further motive for delaying any reference to military CSDP was the desire to prevent the flow of Libyan migrants into Italy. These dynamics affected the government s tardiness in embracing the military notion, and eventually contemplating the CSDP to deal with the crisis. The EU HR showed no drive to convince the member countries about the prominence of the CSDP in responding to the Libyan authoritarian regime. She shunned any idea of EU military involvement while in Cairo, at the conference on Libya, on 14 April For example, the HR has not led the EU to expose the face of that regional organisation which warmed the incremental European security institutionalisation and build up of ideas, norms and values, which have been pooled together at Saint Malo, and developed further in the following security documents and in the European Security Strategy. As for the EU HR, cooperation and sovereignty, democracy and security were values that conflicted with each other, making it difficult for the EU, in terms of its role in the world and vision of a safe global order, to develop a firm and strategic outlook. The norms concerning the legal prescriptions that allow for civilian and military force to be used, and on which occasions, supported the High Representative to reinforce the position that the EU was not a traditional military power (Corvinus 2011). The soft power actor image for the EU was expressly criticised by NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, who commented, at the earlier 2011 Munich Security Conference, that without the hardware the EU credibility in upholding the principles and values that it holds dear would encounter problems (Rasmussen 2011). Not that Ashton disregarded the task of contributing to the development of the common security and defence policy, as for Art. 9.E of the Lisbon Treaty. The planning of EUFOR Libya took place under Ashton s jurisdiction, with officials working on an A-plan, on the operational instructions that would specify the size of the force, its equipment and makeup, and rules of engagement (The Guardian, 18 April 2011). As a EU official said, the EU armed forces, numbering no more than 1,000, were to secure sea and land corridors inside the country. But the European Union, as the Council had decided, needed the UN s request for EUFOR Libya to become operative, a clause that many considered as a slap in the face to those who created the ability of the Union to respond in military terms to regional crises. The HR s role in heading the External Action Service was expected to play an influential part in enhancing the Union s visibility and greater unity. However, the EEAS was conceivably too young to impact on the EU s crisis management, and encourage its effectiveness. It held the first managerial meeting at the end of January 2011, and until summer, the EEAS staff were going to remain at their desk in the Commission and Council buildings, thus making both accountability and corporate identity difficult (Duke, Pomorska and Vanhoonacker 2012). Ashton fared badly in a leadership survey conducted by the Financial Times (April 2012). The problem, as Ashton said, is the reality of 27 member states who are sovereign, who believe passionately in their own right to determine what they do, particularly in the area of defence (DCW 2011). It was reported that, at the European Council emergency meeting of 11 March 2011, the HR s views prevailed when the EU leaders signed a communiqué omitting any mention of the no-fly zone that was strongly sponsored by France and Britain. That communiqué caused a harsh debate. In London, should [Baroness Ashton] not serve the member states of the European Union rather than pretending to lead them was the prevalent question posed by MPs, 12

13 engaging Prime Minister Cameron in a defensive debate in the Commons (The Guardian, 15 March 2011). The EU was influenced, if not taken hostage, by the politics of Britain and France, with Cameron and Sarkozy covertly instructing HR Ashton for not interfering with the military decision-making (Interview November 2012). Ideas, norms and patterns of behaviour concerning security and defence politics in the CSDP framework seemed to have been insufficiently shared by societies. Society in Britain was more prone to repatriate their share of policy from Brussels than to tie in with the CSDP and its military. Society in France was largely behind Sarkozy s military initiative, with Parliament accepting the notion of the new era in the Mediterranean, and not rejecting Sarkozy s assertive role under the claim of further action in the CSDP. In Italy, society was above all concerned with Berlusconi s tardy reaction rather than with deserting the CSDP, while society in Germany questioned the government s non alignment with its traditional allies rather than its weak attachment to the CSDP civil-military actor. Also, the attitude of EU HR Ashton, of making no efforts to enhance the reputation of the CSDP to challenge authoritarian Libya, had not helped societies to generate support and make the EU/CSDP more influential. The idea that the EU and its CSDP were subdued to national politics was not new, nor original as a case to discuss. The above findings suggest that there was no plan in the leadership to encourage the progress of the EU s common security and defence policy. The implied causes, and those more openly disclosed by the leaders, were the usual excuses (for France, Sarkozy s want to compress time; for Britain, Cameron s bilateralisation of defence policies; for Germany, Merkel s need to avoid further political burdens; for Italy, Berlusconi s protection of mercantilist ties; and for the EU, Ashton s desire to avoid challenging Cameron and Sarkozy s right of choice regarding defence). There could be no EU/CSDP Libya campaign. These pretexts, however, do not conceal the deeply political nature of that decision; specifically, the choice of a weak European Union in terms of the CSDP s response to a regional crisis. Conclusions This paper focused on the European Union s performance in the 2011 Libya crisis as a case study to contribute to the debate on the EU s Common Security and Defence Policy. It claims that there was no prospect for convergence within the framework of the CSDP to challenge the violence in Libya. The evidence of this analysis brought to the fore three main points. First, to deal with the question of convergence (i.e. and whether the EU/CSDP institutional and operational advances were suggesting convergence), the paper used ideas of strategic culture, as the literature quoted here termed the culture behind military and civil operations. Beyond the indications that strategic culture continues to be influenced by history and is affected by global and domestic politics, also the suggestion emerged in the paper that the ideas, norms and patterns of behaviour regarding European security and defence politics were not adequately shared at the EU s and member states national levels when the crisis erupted. Beyond these indications, with the support of the literature, the present analysis has found no ground in the strategic culture approach for foreseeing convergence. Firstly, with regard to the European Union, the reactivity issue to the crises, as was held, was prejudiced by the fact that the EU strategic culture vis-à-vis the military is rooted in 13

14 deployment based on a mandate, limited in time and space, and foreseeing an exit strategy (Biava); agreeing and formalising all this contrasts the rapidity needed on these occasions. No battle-group has been deployed since its concept has been agreed. Secondly, with regard to the EU states, the situation of states responding differently to pressure for the convergence of strategic cultures does not encourage thinking that convergence might be certain (Meyer). Convergence on a EU Libya campaign was unlikely to be supported by France, Britain, Italy, or Germany, for reasons explained below. Thirdly, with regard to the requirement that the national and European leadership should press for the formation of a common strategic culture (Giegerich), this condition is a useful one, but by itself does not assure convergence. Sarkozy was interested in enhancing his personal standing in view of the incoming national presidential elections, and may have wanted to avoid suppressing France s interests in Libya in the pursuit of a minimal European consensus. Cameron was challenged by the British domestic reality, weakly connected to a common strategic culture in the European Union. Berlusconi was keen to avoid a lethal economic impact on the Italian companies, owned by the Libyan government, thus deferring any possible focus on the formation of a common strategic culture in the Union. Merkel was concerned with not jeopardising her party s position at the upcoming elections, in some states, through becoming involved in any process to back a common strategic culture formation considering deployment. HR Ashton revealed no ambition for a common strategic culture that could support the CSDP s action in Libya. This paper s observations found no basis in the strategic culture perspective to suggest convergence. Biava, Meyer and Giegerich also confirm that, though the convergence of national strategic cultures has been experimented on at times, these events do not indicate that convergence continues. Convergence is a process that has not been concluded, is still developing and could supposedly cease and reverse too. The strategic culture approach has shown no explanatory power in envisaging convergence, specifically regarding the possibility of intervening in Libya. Second, the paper suggested that the comparative advantage of a EU s Libya military campaign would have been to prove that, though the Union had been weakened by the setbacks in the form of the financial and Euro crises and the defence budget crunch, the EU could still respond as a political actor. It stressed that the value-added factor of a EU initiative would have been the decision to employ the instruments mandated by the Union as a way of bringing forward its policies, and specifically the common security and defence. It argued that the promotion of the EU as political actor would have seen, as an example for the Libya campaign, a EU military operation made up of the willing to intervene EU states, under the CSDP political control and strategic direction (thanks to Berlin-Plus), in defence of the R2P obligation and of the many European security interests in the region instead of leaving the defence of these charges to the coalition of the willing. Such an operation would have combated the idea of the collective military irrelevance of the Union. Third, of the research questions included in the framework of analysis, two have been already answered, i.e. the reactions to the external challenge of the crisis, and the domestic politics influencing the response to the crisis. The third question, and specifically the standing of the EU in the nearby region as a consequence of the actual management of the crisis, has yet to be answered. The findings have suggested that a crisis management operation over Libya led by the CSDP would have made a difference to the EU s position in its neighbourhood. The EU, as seen by others, i.e. the North African and Middle Eastern countries and the democratic forces there in particular (see Aliboni 2011), was an agent that could provide security. If Libya and 14