Afghanistan: What Kind of Peace? The Role of Rural Development in Peace-Building. Dr. Omar Zakhilwal and Jane Murphy Thomas Kabul, Afghanistan

Transcription

1 Afghanistan: What Kind of Peace? The Role of Rural Development in Peace-Building Dr. Omar Zakhilwal and Jane Murphy Thomas Kabul, Afghanistan Working paper, November 2005 What Kind of Peace is Possible? project Final version to be published in a book With other WKOP papers in mid-2006 Co-funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Ford Foundation Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) Dr. Omar Zakhilwal Omar Zakhilwal is an Afghan Canadian Economist. He is the founder of Afghanistan of Afghanistan Center for Policy and Development Studies (ACPDS). Prior to his current job as the President of Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA), Dr. Zakhilwal served as the Chief Policy Advisor at the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation & Development (MRRD). However, this paper reflects the independent research of the authors and is not an MRRD position paper. Over the course of his stay in Afghanistan, Dr. Zakhilwal has been part of the two Loya Jirgas that elected the president for the Afghanistan Transitional Government (June 2002) and ratified Afghanistan s Constitution (Dec 2003), served as an author of Afghanistan s First National Human Development Report (2004); and has been part of many other rural development iniatives. Jane Murphy Thomas Jane Murphy Thomas is a Canadian social anthropologist and independent consultant specializing in Afghanistan, community development and participatory development since Currently she is engaged by the Government of Afghanistan s Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development to conceptualize the Afghanistan Institute for Rural Development. [janethomas6@hotmail.com] 1

2 1. Introduction Afghanistan is often depicted as being in a post-conflict situation, but questions remain if this is an accurate description. While peace could be on the horizon, the distance to that horizon is unclear. Overall, conditions are considered to have improved since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, however, insecurity is widespread. What fragile peace exists is both determined and threatened by numerous complex factors. As this paper s title suggests, development in rural areas where most of Afghanistan s citizens live, could perhaps be the most critical issue in determining the future. In seeking to best understand the role of rural development in sustainable peace-building, we address several key questions throughout this paper: What is the background that led to the present situation and what implications does this have for today s policy makers? What factors or conditions will determine or threaten peace? What roles are foreign military playing in peace building? What efforts are underway to rebuild the state structures and create conditions that at least make peace feasible? What are the lessons learned elsewhere in participatory rural development that can now be applied in Afghanistan? What lessons can be drawn from Afghanistan s history and the National Solidarity Programme and applied to Afghanistan s rural development as a whole? This paper is set out in five sections. Following this introduction, Section Two gives a review and background to provide historical context, examining how past rural development policies, or lack of them, contributed to the cause of war and how drastically different rural policies are needed now. Section Three, focuses on today s state-building and peace-building process, its threats and determinants, with an emphasis on the links to rural development. Afghanistan where most citizens live in rural areas, rural development, especially participatory rural development, and peace building are largely dependent on each other. Section Four looks at the broad, international subject of participatory rural development and within that framework, examines the largest such programme underway in Afghanistan, the National Solidarity Programme (NSP). Section Five draws conclusions about rural development and peace, and what lessons from the history of Afghanistan and the NSP has for Afghanistan s rural development as a whole. For this paper, information was collected from primary and secondary sources. A thorough literature review was conducted, including both published and grey literature, along with field work. Twenty nine villages in five provinces of Afghanistan were visited. The five provinces, Ningahar, Logar, Wardak, Parwan and Herat. In each of the provinces, villages were randomly selected. On the first visit to each of the villages, surveyors conducted a survey using a questionnaire. One of the authors and his research assistants then re-visited the same villages, collecting qualitative data through participant observation, attending meetings, conducting interviews with key informants including facilitating partners; leaders, members and non-members of CDCs, in the villages and on CDC project sites, as well as with NSP officials. Although the five provinces represent a diversity of ethnic groups, topography, economic, security and other conditions, it was noted that the problems, weaknesses or strengths in 2

3 NSP activities across the 29 villages visited was relatively similar. Although no attempt was made to rigorously compare villages, four villages with NSP problems and strengths at least roughly representative of those observed in all the villages visited were chosen as case studies. As shown below, this range of strengths and weaknesses was similar to those identified in the national conference Community Development Councils in July See Endnotes for a list of all the villages visited. 2. Historical Background Afghanistan presents a striking example of the connections among rural development, war and peace. One constant in the country has been relations between Kabul and the rest of the country, relations that at best have hardly existed, and at worst have caused social unrest and war. While the majority of the population, roughly 70%, remains rural, development infrastructure and services historically have been concentrated in the cities, especially Kabul (ANHDR: 2004:168). This trend began in the 1950 s, strengthened through to the 1990 s with the politicization of aid from western countries and the USSR, and the decades of war. A major turning point in Kabul-rural relations came in 1978, with a coup d etat that placed Nur Mohammad Taraki in power. Taraki and his communist party government immediately began introducing and rapidly enforcing eight major reforms which were directed at rural populations. While all the reforms were unpopular to varying degrees, the land reform and literacy programmes are remembered as the most severe and unacceptable. In its attempt at land reform, Taraki s government sent representatives backed by government troops to the villages to confiscate land and re-distribute it. A nation-wide literacy programme was also imposed by Takaki s government. It was compulsory for everyone who could not read or write, and treated villagers and the rural way of life with contempt. Even old people, who are held in high respect by Afghans, where forced to attend. Literacy programme text books illustrated that being a farmer was a backward way of life, while working in a factory or office was superior. All these reforms, were enforced by the military and soon met with up-risings around the country, leading to the 1979 invasion by the USSR to prop-up the Afghan regime it had created. A full decade later, after millions were killed or fled as refugees and the country s education, health and infrastructure destroyed, the USSR withdrew its troops in For over another decade, the Mujahideen and Taliban added their own chapters of conflict and destruction. A new crossroads was reached in In response to the terrorist events in the USA on September 11, the US launched a military invasion into Afghanistan which resulted in the collapse of the ruling Taliban regime. This military intervention was coupled with a UNmediated political framework, the Bonn Agreement, signed on December 5, While re-building of the Afghan state has begun, the country s security remains unsettled. 3

4 In this paper we outline what has happened since the 2001 Bonn Agreement, pointing out the challenges and links among them for state building, peace building and rural development. In a country where rural development policies have meant either almost no government services, or the opposite extreme - unwanted reforms forced on the people leading to uprisings and war - drastically different rural policies are needed, ones that are sensitive, sustainable, and participatory. Out of the Bonn agreement and unprecedented pledges and involvement of many countries to help in the rebuilding of Afghanistan, many programmes and projects have emerged. One of those, the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), was designed for rapid build-up of rural development on a country-wide basis. In this paper we examine the NSP and what lessons can be extracted from it for Afghanistan s rural development as a whole. Throughout the paper, we explore what is needed in rural development for it to be a catalyst in peace-building and state-building? 3. Today s State Building and Peace Building Process The 2001 Bonn Agreement set into action a number of steps in state-building. Most significantly, it established an interim authority and transitional government. In January 2004, a new constitution was established. In October 2004, national presidential elections were held in which Hamid Karzai became the first elected president of Afghanistan. Parliamentary elections were held in September Other hopeful results in building and stabilizing the state include the voluntary return of over three million Afghan refugees from Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere; the return of at least four million children to school, one third of them girls; and the successful launch of several major development and reconstruction initiatives, among them the NSP. From the Bonn agreement, specific commissions were established either to directly facilitate the political processes, or to lay the foundations for specific tasks: legal reform and rule of law, the observance and protection of human rights and the future public administration and its needed reforms. The Bonn Agreement also addressed the need to fill the security vacuum by requesting the deployment of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and specified the role of the United Nations in supporting the state-building processes. Other critical elements in state building and peace building are: participation by Afghan civil society; improvements in Kabul-rural relations, the state s own capacities to govern, provide services and to have the financial resources to do so. Civil society, its integration, empowerment, buy-in and sense of ownership in building peace and sharing responsibility for a strong, accountable state is essential. Afghanistan does have various institutions (eg. shuras-village councils), traditional mechanisms, (eg. jirgas-dispute resolution bodies) and religious networks; more recently emerged indigenous NGOs; and a wide range of other institutions and groups with strong potential for playing roles. From 2001 to the present there are a number of indications of increased civil society involvement, not the least being a high voter turn-out in the first-ever presidential elections. 4

5 Great challenges continue and Kabul s relations with the rest of the country remain uncertain. While a careful balance is clearly articulated in the new constitution, translating this balance into reality represents a formidable challenge. The central government has established a basic presence in all the provinces and districts but the capacities are weak. In those locations, under the present conditions personnel s loyalty to government has taken higher precedence than competency. In some areas, powerful local leaders still dominate. They raise and keep revenues, handing over only a fraction, but growing, amount to central authorities. Due to the limited capacities, the central government s attempts to bring about the needed changes in both governance and development in the provinces have thus far had only limited success. Warlordism which has maintained divisiveness and insecurity throughout the country. The central government has attempted to rein in warlordism through a strategy to include some warlords in the interim government structures as a means of gaining their cooperation. The risk of this strategy may soon be tested however, as several of the warlords were recently elected into the parliament drawing sharp criticism of human rights groups and Afghan citizens alike. In their campaigns, they used the wealth and power they ve gained through intimidation and their frequent connections with the narcotics trade, and now have been legitimized as leaders by the democratic process of election. In the past they have ruled by the gun, in future the dangers could even be more, as the vote entrenches and legitimizes them long term, a scenario that could be even more divisive and add to any new parliament s vulnerability. The state s finances and capacity to carry out its roles are also a major issues. At the April 2005 donors conference in Kabul, President Karzai and his representatives expressed concern about the tenuous position they see themselves in. While the state must have the finances to build its own capacity and offer services, only about 23% of international assistance is being channeled through the central government. Accusations and counter-accusations by government, donor government representatives and NGOs regarding waste or poor use of existing funds by the Afghan government and NGOs have been rampant (New York Times: 2005:1). While some waste and misuse is undoubtedly occurring, what is clear is the lack of government s own administrative capacities. Many senior managers were killed by successive regimes during and since the 1978 coup d etat or fled abroad as refugees. The country now, as in the past, has very few people with higher education: probably significantly less than 10% of the population has university education. Complicating this scenario is the job placement of the most skilled Afghans. Most educated Afghans are highly sought after and are currently employed with the UN and other international agencies which can pay far higher than the Afghan government. To illustrate, government civil servants are paid an average of US$60 per month, while Afghans working in UN agencies, donors and NGOs earn and average of $1,000 per month (NHDR:2004:170). The extreme shortage of highly skilled Afghans in the civil service has resulted in the engagement of an increased number of foreign advisors to work in the ministries, primarily to increase the Afghan government s aid absorbency. However, the result is 5

6 that the Afghan government s capacities are being enhanced rather than being built. (Suhrke:2004:9). Probably exacerbating the problem is that by 2005, it is widely observed that the scale of capacity building needed within government, while apparently planned, has hardly begun. Why this is occurring should be questioned. As one analyst noted, the transition from humanitarian aid to national institution reconstruction has been conspicuous by its absence, not only in Afghanistan but across the gamut of humanitarian/security crises, in which the United Nations, military coalitions and small armies of non-government aid agencies of varied agenda have sought to intervene (Mills: DATE:01). 4. What Kind of Peace in Afghanistan? What is the status of peace in Afghanistan? One report calls it conflictual peace, possibly the most accurate way to describe the transitory and uncertain nature of the present situation. The authors explain that conflictual peace refers to gaps or built-in elements of conflict that were either ignored or deliberately set aside in the Bonn process (Suhre:2004:3). Among the most obvious of the missing elements, was that the UN did not bring together warring parties to make peace (Rubin: undated:3). Solutions to this problem however, have been initiated by the government of Afghanistan since the Bonn Agreement, with the introduction of an amnesty for former Taliban. However it is meeting with limited success, attributed to lack of suitable incentives. Another study considers the extreme complexities of the conflict and its root causes, and how this calls for going beyond simplistic formulations such as peace or ending war to conflict transformation : an emphasis on transforming institutions, regionally, nationally and locally. (ANHDR:2004:8). This transformation means addressing linkages among scarcity, inequality and institutional weaknesses. When the status of peace is already so unsettled, what kind of peace is possible is even more difficult to speculate. 5. Underlying Determinants and Threats Despite the early successes in state-building that have led to the drafting of a constitution, elections and the re-establishment of ministries and commissions, secured peace in Afghanistan is far from guaranteed. As indicated above, one of the main threats or determinants of peace is the dialogue and relations to be built between the state and rural areas: especially through rural development policies and programmes. As pointed out below, however, these developments are themselves complex and interdependent and include security arrangements; human security; inclusive balanced development; local values, social and cultural issues; a supportive international community, a co-operative regional agenda and other factors, all discussed below in more detail. 6

7 5.1 Security Arrangements As indicated earlier, the central government is beginning to show some presence in rural areas but security problems in Afghanistan can be seen as linked either directly or indirectly to the inability of government to extend its full authority outside Kabul. In the provinces, control has often been in the hands of warlords and the central government by itself lacks the means to control these destabilizing figures. This tense mix is the main context for rural development. To improve security, since late 2001, two sets of international military forces have been present in Afghanistan to carry out different roles: at mid-2005, roughly 20,000 personnel under the US-led coalition Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), whose main goal is still to route out Al Quaida and its Taliban base which are located mainly in the south and east. The second force, is the UN mandated, NATO led, International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), which number about 8,500 personnel from 29 countries, who are stationed mainly in Kabul and whose role is to secure the capital, main airports, train the Afghan National Army (ANA) and National Police Force and provide Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs in particular are controversial as they play contradictory roles: being soldiers or intelligence officers operating in rural communities as aid workers, rebuilding schools or carrying out other humanitarian-type works. While NGOs play the main roles in implementing rural development programmes throughout the country, they have made repeated calls to ISAF and the PRTs for increased security arrangements. At the same time, NGOs have taken a unified stance against the dual roles of the PRTs (ACBAR:2003:2) through the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), the main umbrella group of NGOs, pointing out that soldiers involved in development activities adds to the confusion, putting real humanitarian workers more at risk. As a result by mid-2005, some changes are occurring in the PRT roles, but controversy remains. Training the planned 70,000 member Afghan army to take over the security role is underway and seen by many as essential. Yet analysts have pointed out many problems being encountered with building up the army including the slow pace of training, failure to get the multi-ethnic mix needed, and a high rate of desertion by recruits. In particular, there is concern that the 70,000 member ANA could be outnumbered by the illegal militias anyway. Even three years after the toppling of the Taliban regime, and the completion of the UN-backed Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of excombattants programme, there is still an estimated 1,800 illegal armed bands of men comprised up to 100,000 individuals who pose a major security concern in many parts of the country (IRIN:2005: ). As one analyst noted, Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF forces are essentially buying time (Maloney: 2004:3) to see what happens. If the ISAF and OEF forces withdrew before needed resolutions and transformations occur, many fear that Afghanistan would revert to the post-soviet, pre-taliban internal conflict period of the 1990 s (Maloney: 2004:3). 7

8 5.2 Human Security What is most alarming is how the already poor conditions in Afghanistan deteriorated further over the last decades. As stated in Afghanistan s first ever National Human Development Report (UNDP: 2004), conditions in child and mother mortality rates, low literacy rates and lack of access to health care and safe drinking water have put Afghanistan in 169th position out of 174 countries. War damage to infrastructure, subsequent plunge in agricultural production and the country s main exports, all agriculture based (fruit, nuts, carpets, etc.), rendered further poverty. Often neglected in the dialogue on security in Afghanistan has been the human security needs of the people, but these may be the most crucial to national stabilisation. This is especially true as expectations of the people have grown over the years, starting at least 16 years ago with the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and now may be increased further with the formation of a government. 5.3 Inclusive, Balanced Development The rural areas of Afghanistan represent a diversity of cultures, topography, histories and accessibility from the capital city. Rural development strategies, therefore must be balanced and inclusive, based on addressing inequalities of gender, regions, religions, ethnicities and locations. Otherwise, the strategies are unlikely to work and could potentially be cause of renewed conflict. While rebuilding physical infrastructure is important, a kind of reconstruction of the social damage of war is perhaps an even bigger determinant of peace or conflict. This means institution re-building or building on what institutions already exist. In this case we mean institution in two senses: 1)an organization or administration; 2)an established practice, custom, law or rules that exist to govern or regulate the behavior of individuals (Pain:2004:1) at the national, regional, local and village levels. Other major subjects which are essential to address are imbalances of assistance to urbanrural areas and both stable and unstable areas. Another of the biggest threats and determinants of peace may be to overcome what the Bonn agreement did not attempt: how to include those who were excluded from the peace-building effort at that time, the Taliban. Since the Bonn agreement, an amnesty programme introduced by the Afghan government to draw-in former Taliban has met with limited success, at least partly due to no incentives (eg. jobs or material goods) being offered. Afghan women have historically been victims of imbalanced development, often excluded from decision-making that affects them and under-represented in education, health and in many other areas. While major constitutional steps have been taken to ensure inclusion and representation of women in decision-making in the political spheres, applying these changes successfully will depend on many factors, not the least of which is how the international community chooses to support the changes Afghans wish to 8

9 make. It is especially important in re-building the country s institutions at all levels, to ensure women as well as men are included in the capacity building and hiring. The fall of the Taliban finally brought to world attention the situation of Afghan women but the problems are long standing and made even more complex from at least the time of the Soviet invasion, 25 years ago. However, even by 2005, it is questionable if any conditions for women have dramatically improved. For example, one of the earliest reports on the mortality rates of Afghan mothers during the war, one published by the American Center for Disease Control in 1986, placed Afghanistan as having the highest birthing related mortality rate in the world (Thomas:1990:34). By 2004, the UNDP s Afghanistan National Human Development Report, shows Afghanistan still having the world s highest mortality rate of mothers, 1,600 per 100,000. Other conditions indicate many complex inter-connected challenges: life expectancy of both men and women is estimated at only 44.5 years, while the literacy rate of men is 16%, with women it is 12.7%. Such low conditions for both men and women, suggests that inclusive, balanced development needs several considerations especially to include both women and men. As well, there are other divides to be bridged: one between rural and urban women, and women with and without formal education. In a society where purdah is the norm, conditions for rural women are unlikely to change unless the educated women who tend to be in urban areas, are able, willing and supported to take the leadership for change. Essential, of course, are Afghan women doctors, health personnel, teachers, entrepreneurs, policy makers, planners, managers, social mobilisers, and women as legislators and other leadership positions. However, even with constitution guarantees for women, and numbers of seats reserved for women in the 2005 parliamentary elections, it is questionable how so many obvious needs can be addressed. The situation also raises many questions about the international community s actual commitment. As one report states, Twenty three years of conflict Soviet occupation, civil war, the Taliban, and finally the US-led bombing campaign-have taken a toll on women in Afghanistan. Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Afghan women have been the focus of much international attention and the cornerstone of the largest gender-focused aid intervention. Yet today, many people in Afghanistan believe that there is less funding for women and for gender programs that there was three years ago because we think we have solved the problems (Abirafeh:2005:3). The above report and its title, Lessons from Gender-focused International Aid in Post- Conflict Afghanistan Learned? is possibly the most comprehensive critical analysis on this subject and indicative of the challenges. It places many of the problems for Afghan women in the aid community s lack of understanding of Afghan culture; lack of recognition of indigenous capacities; how gender in Afghanistan has been treated as only women and not included men which further divides Afghan men and women; the need to match rhetoric with political will and funding, and several other shortcomings. 9

10 5.4 Local Values and Social and Cultural Issues The events of 1978, attempted to force reforms on the rural people, reforms that rejected Afghan social and cultural values. Yet is it within some of these local values that development and peace building could be strengthened. In particular, international assistance in Afghanistan has suffered from a lack of understanding and dialogue on the role of culture and religion (Maley: 1998). Yet to be developed are strategies to translate Afghan cultural or religious values into governance and assistance issues to avoid polarizing domestic and international actors (Karim: 2001:5). From now into the future, the success of rural development policies and programmes will heavily depend on respect for these foundations. 5.5 Supportive International Community, International Aid and Intervention Long term support by the international community is necessary to strengthen Afghanistan s development, rural development, peace and conflict prevention efforts and economic recovery. However, while Afghanistan needs large amounts of aid to rebuild, it is questionable whether the large amounts needed can bring lasting peace and stability. As Afghanistan s history has already shown in the lead-up to the Soviet invasion, inappropriate or ill-conceived aid can tilt the balance toward peace or war (Karim: 2001:2). Moreover, assistance strategies that bypass the central government, and its subnational levels, miss very important opportunities for state building. This paper emphasizes the need for more bottom-up government approaches, but these also require strengthening at the top. For many Afghans international commitments and assistance pledged now is a déjà vu from the 1989 era, when the Soviets withdrew their troops and the international community made large pledges for assistance, most of which were not realized. Despite what has been learned internationally since then about the risks of abandoning failed states, there still is Afghan anxiety and mis-trust over what is happening with the present international assistance promises, whether they will last or if they will disappear as they have done once before when the international community grows tired of unsettled situations. Within the international context, narcotics needs special mention, not only in relation to the usual issues of health, well-being and criminal activity, but in particular on how the narcotics trade helps sustain conflict and the vicious cycle of poverty in some rural areas. Opium growing in Afghanistan is a major issue of power. The growers, most of whom are the smallest farmers, get locked into indebtedness to the powerful traders whose quest to maintain control fuels conflict. This often makes legitimate rural development far more difficult. As part of peace-building, a multi-dimensional approach to the opium trade is needed: government policies; international controls and programmes to lessen demand of narcotics; and efforts to create better understanding of the power structures that trap these farmers, then offer realistic options at the farm level, both short term and long term. 10

11 5.6 Peaceful, Co-operative Regional Agenda The political environment of the region is also critical for progress in peace building. Although alignments have been considerably altered since September 11, most actors of the region maintain and cultivate their networks in Afghanistan. There has been partial progress towards converting harmful interference into constructive engagement for the rebuilding of the country. At present, the involvement of Afghanistan s neighbors seems to be aimed as much at maintaining options in case of renewed conflict as it does at contributing to peace-building and reconstruction. 6. Rural Development in Peace Building 6.1: Participatory Rural Development Not only is rural development essential to peace-building in Afghanistan, participatory rural development needs to be seen as a main vehicle for peace-building among the people and between the people and government. In many ways the war in Afghanistan can be attributed to past rural development policies, or lack thereof. What do we mean by rural development? Although an enormous body of literature exists on rural development, and different theories, trends and concepts of it have evolved, for the purpose of this paper we refer to it in two ways. First in the general way to meaning assistance being provided in efficient quantities to rural areas. In Afghanistan even this alone is a major change from the past. Second rural development can be defined as the process whereby rural communities progress from given situations to more desirable situations in terms of quality of life. It depends on the utilisation of local, physical and human resources, supplemented by investment, technology and services with full participation of the local people in decision making. (INASP: 2004: 1). Rural development services such as health, education, agriculture, and physical infrastructure seen to be provided by a government to its populations are, of course, extremely important both to poverty alleviation and in establishing and building government credibility in the eyes of the population. What do we mean by participation? One definition is that it is a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives, decisions and resources which affect them (Narayan: 1998: 4). During the years that Afghanistan has been at war the participation paradigm has come into existence in other countries. This paradigm evolved out of NGO work in Latin America, Africa and Asia, largely because of dissatisfaction with how top-down aid programmes were not achieving what they were meant to do. Theories and practices such as those of Paulo Friere, the Brazilian educationist, the liberation theology movement in Latin America, and the co-operative movement in India and Bangladesh provided poignant examples of more effectively addressing poverty by working directly with the people at the grass roots to design and implement policy and programs. By the 1980 s, specific attitudes and methodologies had 11

12 emerged for working with the poor to put them in charge of analysis and decision-making, with their empowerment as the intended goal. Robert Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the Last First, was a milestone in this movement and argued for putting those who are usually left out or the last ones to be considered in development the poor- directly into analysis and decision-making roles. This approach suggested that aid programmes adjust their own thinking and recognize the strengths and priorities of the aid recipient. Today, social mobilization for rural development is carried out by various NGOs and governments, using attitudes and methods such as Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA), Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) and Participatory Learning and Action (PLA). These tools are intended to help enable agencies to draw the target population, even the most vulnerable and voiceless, into a process to do their own analysis, prioritization, planning, organizing, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. In this time, there have been an increasing number of analyses of development projects showing that participation is one of the critical components of success in irrigation, livestock, health, water, sanitation and agriculture projects. All the evidence points towards long-term economic and environmental success coming about when people s ideas and knowledge are valued, and power is given to them to make decisions independently of external agencies (Pretty:1995:60). Donor agencies, including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, United Nations agencies, and donor governments have for the last decade placed new emphasis on reconstruction and development that, at least in rhetoric, required, beneficiary participation in virtually every project. The trouble is that while participation in theory has become accepted in the broad development field, there is far less common understanding about participation or empowerment in practice. Amongst specialists, many lessons have been learned and best practices developed but in many places applying these consistently is still enormously challenging. Looking internationally, some of the best practices include: the need for clear concepts, methodologies and tools for participation, motivation and empowerment; realistic time and resources; political will and the buy- in by all stakeholder groups to share power; instilling local ownership; the need to recognize local social contexts; the need for high levels of training, supervision and support of social mobilisers; capacity building and long-term follow-up in communities to help avoid the break-down of groups formed which often happens when groups are introduced from outside; tools for targeting the poor and empowering them while dealing with the elites; identifying and addressing root causes; avoiding dependence; setting up sustainability; managing expectations; creating and maintaining linkages among villages, government and other stakeholders. These best practices are more likely to be achieved when specifically targeted beneficiaries and/or the whole community is involved, not just the usual leaders and powerful people. In Afghanistan, clarity about best practices in participatory rural development and sharing of such information is very limited. Compared to many other conflict zones, Afghanistan has received limited attention from researchers and analysts (Atmar: 12

13 2001:12). This is especially true about the subject of development and aid. Publicly, there has been little written critical analysis of international aid policies or programmes, with almost no analysis of participatory programmes in Afghanistan. However, based on the authors direct observation over most of the last 20 years, aid programmes have virtually all involved different degrees of outside, top-down imposition. By default, having no recognized central authority for many years, aid programmes have been parachuted- in with little to no local consultation. The UN, donor governments and NGOs have decided what is needed and to the extent possible, tried to provide it, usually to targeted parts of the population, especially the most vulnerable. Thus community development, involving the whole community participating in the decisions that affect them, is very new. With few exceptions, such attempts have been made only in the last four years. Best practices in participatory development, which evolved in other countries during the years Afghanistan has been at war, should now be drawn on for Afghanistan. Genuine participation means dialogue among the people and between government and the people, as well as government being responsive to the needs and priorities as identified by the people. It is the basis for dialogue, transparency, accountability, building common understanding and trust that can substantially contribute to peace building, state building and community building. From lessons learned in other countries, participatory development needs to be multi-dimensional. It is not only community-led or only government-led, instead it means all levels working together and reflecting each other. Including rural Afghans in the development analysis, design and implementation is a way to counter the tensions between perceptions of a modern state with its modern, urban elite and a conservative, rural tribal people. Such dialogues and processes are especially important in rural Afghanistan as fast paced change is often understood by conservative rural Afghans as influence from the West, change they perceive as anti-islamic and are quick to reject (ANHRD:2004:194). Moreover, careful consideration should also be given to working with traditional bodies such as councils of elder and dispute resolution bodies (shuras and jirgas), even if these bodies are not themselves inclusive. While these bodies are not without problems, in some cases these institutions may have played an extremely important role in providing support networks to villages during the last 20 years, when state institutions have been severely weakened or damaged (Pain/AREU: 2004:1). When we look at how consultative or participatory practices have been neglected in Afghanistan to date, it is unsurprising that almost all the major state-building elements coming out of the Bonn Agreement have been seriously criticized for their lack of broadbased participation, as until now, broad participation in central governance was neither valued or practiced in Afghanistan. However, the new Afghan constitution takes a bold step in officially recognizing and requiring local level participation. Article 140 states, In order to organize activities and provide people the opportunity to actively participate in the local administration, a council shall be set up in districts and villages in accordance with the law. Members of these councils shall be elected by the local people through free, general, universal, secret and direct elections for a period of three years. 13

14 While there now is the constitutional basis for participation from the bottom-up, putting it into practice is another matter. As lessons learned elsewhere show and are confirmed below in our case studies, having elected leaders does not guarantee equal or just participation. Amongst the many needs in Afghanistan is the need to have a clearly defined vision of participation. It must be inclusive, to draw in those traditionally excluded, namely women and girls, the landless, marginalized ethnic minorities and the most poor. While this is challenging work anywhere, to be inclusive in Afghanistan requires being aware of and dealing with many complexities. With a central Afghan government at least partly in place, a newly elected leader and upcoming parliamentary elections, the central government has begun some work in rural areas. Most rural-focused programmes are financed by the international financial institutions including World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and many donor governments. Roughly $4.5 USD billion is targeted for several National Priority Programmes, including the National Rural Access Programme, the National Skills Development Priority Programme, National Agriculture Priority Programme, and other national programmes for drinking water, irrigation and power, transportation, education, health, and so on. One of these national priority programmes, the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), is particularly relevant to explore and critically analyze to consider what it might suggest for the country s rural development as a whole. 7. National Solidarity Programme At present, the most complicated and high stakes IFI-financed program in Afghanistan is the World Bank-financed National Solidarity Programme (NSP) (Carlin:2003:8). Introduced in 2003 by the Afghan government s Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), the NSP by the end of May 2005, had approximately $207 USD million from the World Bank and donor countries to cover what was originally estimated at 20,000 qualifying villages, but has since been revised to 15,000 villages (NSP: 2005:1) in three years. The NSP s main goal is for the government to introduce community-based development, a crucial step for the country s stability. As the first of its kind, the NSP may have major implications for the future of Afghanistan s rural development as a whole. This paper looks at the NSP and what lessons it might have for the country s rural development in the broadest sense. Government documents refer to the NSP as its flag ship programme. It is by far the largest government programme in the country in terms of finance, scale and geographic reach. NSP s mandate is to implement community-supported development programs in nearly every Afghan village in only three years, making the scale and speed of the project perhaps unprecedented in the world. As the NSP is many rural Afghan s first contact with and assistance from the new government, the importance of results of the NSP can not be over-stated. In particular, it has been envisioned that the NSP could play a role in helping to secure at least the existing central fledgling government and at the same time, reduce 14

15 or at least effectively deal with the influence of destabilizing, divisive figures in the provinces. However, its speed, scale, unsecured funding and other factors make it a high risk programme. At mid-2005, half way through the project, while there are some signs of success, some of these risks are already apparent, as our case studies below illustrate. Overall, many of NSP s pitfalls are directly linked to its rushed preparation. While best practices in widespread participatory development indicate that the most successful projects normally have gone through many months, if not years, of preliminary study, analysis and design phases, often involving pilot projects, the NSP for Afghanistan did not pass through any of these stages of preparation. Instead, it was adapted from the design of similar World Bank projects in East Timor and Indonesia and initiated at full scale on a very short timeline in Afghanistan. Introduced at its present scale in December 2002, NGOs held workshops in February and March 2003, to try to overcome the project design flaws, but the main in-built risks remained: the scale and speed. Adequate time was not allowed for many activities needed, most especially for the range of crucial capacity building needed by the FPs and government. Although a very new approach in Afghanistan, necessary skills in participation and broad community development were assumed to exist in each FP. Within only a few more months, by September 2003 NGOs were already implementing the programme on a large scale. The NSP rush was part of the run-up to the Afghan presidential elections to follow the next year. Careful programme preparation was given far less priority than the perceived need to make visible things happen quickly and on a very large and wide scale. Possible additional roles, such as peace-building and poverty alleviation were not clearly integrated into the NSP as planned strategies, rather these major roles may have been assumed only as possible consequences. Now in its second year of operation, the NSP is implemented for the government s MRRD by the UN Habitat and about 20 international and Afghan NGOs, all of whom are referred to as the facilitating partners (FPs). The FPs were selected based on their existing expertise in Afghanistan and capacities to expand operations, and include such international NGOs as: CARE, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, Aga Khan Foundation, Oxfam, and Actionaid. FPs are responsible for approaching communities and letting them know about the NSP, its eligibility requirements, what it has to offer and help the village through the whole NSP process. In September 2003, an Oversight Consultant was appointed: GTZ, an agency of the German government, along with DAI, an American consulting firm. NSP documents (NSP:1383:3) describe itself as consisting of four core elements: 1) a facilitated participatory planning process at the community level to assist with the establishment and strengthening of community institutions; 2)a system of direct block grant transfers to support the rehabilitation or development activities for such institutions; 3)capacity development to enhance the competence of communities for financial management, procurement, useful technical skills and transparency; 4) activities which facilitate links to other institutions and programmes with available services and resources. 15

16 The block grants are allocated to villages comprised of over 50 families at $200 USD per family up to a maximum of $60,000 USD (NSP:2003:6) per village. These block grants are to provide resources for public infrastructure, community assets, revolving funds, social services and training identified as priority needs through an inclusive, participatory village planning process. The village is to manage the block grants including preparation of project proposals with technical assistance from the MRRD. In the villages, the NSP is introduced and facilitated by a total of about 3,500 social mobilisers employed by the FPs. Many of the FP s social mobilisers who were field workers in other projects have been diverted to the NSP, while due to the scale of the project FPs also have had to hire many more people. As there is an extreme shortage of Afghans with community development experience, many of those hired had to be given basic training to act as social mobilisers. The FPs themselves have trained the social mobilisers with input from NSP, with training focusing mainly on NSP management and logistical matters. Thorough training on community development is largely missing. To be eligible for a development grant from the NSP, communities are required to elect a Community Development Council (CDC) which should be a representative, decisionmaking body with both women and men on the council, or out of cultural sensitivity, men and women could organise separate councils. The CDC is to hold a series of community meetings to make decisions on development priorities, final choice of projects, size and composition of community contributions, use of project funds, project implementation and management, transparency arrangements, and arrangements for the operation and maintenance of completed projects. Each FP was given minimal NSP guidance on how to guide villages to hold elections so each FP did it according to their own judgment. Under pressure to get the village projects identified and underway, elections were held but village constitutions or bylaws were not introduced. Without bylaws, there is no village agreement on matters such as who can run for office, the obligations of elected leaders, how they can be removed if they fail to meet the obligations, participation of women or minority sub-groups, or other normal subjects of agreements made through bylaws. In most cases such formalised selfregulation is yet to be introduced. 7.1 What has Happened? Under the NSP, Afghanistan s first CDCs were elected from August 2003 onwards and the first block grant disbursements began in December By the end of May 2005, about 9,000 villages had elected CDCs, and nearly 8,000 village project proposals had been approved and first installments disbursed. The projects are divided into those for drinking water, irrigation, reconstruction of schools, clinics, community centers; transport; and energy with a smaller number pertaining to livelihoods and income generation (MRRD:2005:4). Villages that are able to successfully implement projects during the first year are to receive additional small block grants during their second year and third years (NSP:2005/1). After this time, the CDCs and the villages are to sustain the projects themselves. 16