Thai Pragmatism in the Globalizing World. Chaiwat Khamchoo Faculty of Political Science Chulalongkorn University Bangkok, Thailand

Transcription

1 Thai Pragmatism in the Globalizing World Chaiwat Khamchoo Faculty of Political Science Chulalongkorn University Bangkok, Thailand Dr. Aaron Stern Government Accountability Office Washington, DC USA Prepared for: Panel JS01.356: Renaissance of Political Culture Research? Identity in Asia and Europe International Political Science Association (IPSA) 20th World Congress Fukuoka, Japan July 2006 DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT Please do not quote or circulate without the authors permission.

2 I. Introduction A. Background and objectives This paper discusses some key aspects of Thai society and politics, focusing on what some people call Thai political culture. Political culture generally refers to long-standing and unconsciously-held views about political institutions, processes, and personages. These views may reflect more short-term opinions about politics but political culture is characterized by its tendency to change slowly and over long periods of time. Our main objective is to provide a clear description of deep-seated Thai political attitudes as of 2006 and comment on some implications of these attitudes. We do not intend to address the origins of Thailand s political culture, preferring to leave that task to historians of politics. Thai politics has captured an unusual amount of attention recently. Thailand s Prime Minister since 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra, led his Thai Rak Thai ( Thais Love Thais ) Party to a major victory in the February 2005 elections for the crucial House of Representatives, the lower chamber of the National Assembly (Thailand s national parliament). Discontent with Thaksin s rule, particularly accusations of major corruption within his government and reservations about his authoritarian style of leadership, led to open demonstrations against him and his political allies. Faced with anti-thaksin protests led by the People s Alliance for Democracy that often comprised tens of thousands of people, he called snap House elections for early April After a boycott of the April elections by the main opposition parties, Thai Rak Thai (TRT) maintained its absolute majority in the House but a substantial number of House seats remained vacant because no candidate received the constitutionally-mandated minimum of 20 percent of the vote in those districts. Thus, Thai politics entered a state of great uncertainty. Thaksin took leave of absence from his duties as prime minister soon after the election but returned to resume his job in late May He continues to serve without a functioning House and under a cloud of doubt about the constitutionality of his rule. The uncertainty extends to the TRT and the Democrat Party (the largest opposition party). Thailand s Office of the Attorney General is putting the finishing touches on a report that recommends disbanding the TRT and Democrat parties (along with three small parties) for election law violations. We wish to highlight these events because they help explain how a better understanding of Thai political culture contributes to a clearer comprehension of why Thai politics has arrived at its current predicament and what Thailand s likely political future is. Decisions made by voters in elections and by protesters emerge in part from the deep-rooted political attitudes that define political culture. How Thais interpret their own constitution, how they develop generallyaccepted guidelines for addressing major political conflicts, and how much support Thaksin can muster in his efforts to hold onto power are shaped by political culture. The paper is based substantially on data from the AsiaBarometer survey of 2004, along with more current information from a variety of academic and news sources. Launched in early 2003, the AsiaBarometer survey in 2004 covers the following 13 countries: Japan, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar/Burma, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and China. 1 Designed to focus on the daily activities or ordinary people and their attitudes, it encompasses a series of questions covering general views towards political institutions, beliefs about problems facing society, satisfaction with living conditions, views 1 AsiaBarometer 2003 covered 10 countries: Japan, South Korea, China, Vietnam, Myanmar/Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Sri Lanka, and Uzbekistan 1

3 about family and social relations, attitudes towards foreign organizations and trends, and thoughts on how to handle future problems. Unless otherwise stated, the AsiaBarometer survey is the source of all data in the tables shown in the paper. The exchange rate used for all conversions between Thai baht (the Thai currency) and US dollars is 40 baht/dollar. B. Brief political background through the end of 2004 In 1932, a group of military officers and high-level bureaucrats led a coup d état which changed the system of government from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy, the system still used today in Thailand. After a complex power struggle between various elements bureaucrats, military officers, people closely associated with the monarchy, and civilian groups such as labor the military under the leadership of Phibun Songkram became the most dominant force in Thai politics. Except for a few brief periods of more open politics, the military s power (mainly the army) cast a shadow over every facet of the Thai government administration. Military coups nine successful coups (and various unsuccessful efforts) since 1932 were common political events in Thailand until the last coup in February Using the centralized government bureaucracy as a tool, military leaders pushed other political institutions such as the parliament into subservient positions and extended their grip over the economy through regulations, government controlled enterprises, and violence. Economic growth and other factors originating outside of Thailand created an increasingly active group of opponents to military s grip on power. Labor associations, university students, and the Mao-influenced Communist Party of Thailand all agitated separately and cooperatively against the military-led government. The government of General Thanom Kittikachorn fell in October 1973 and for a few years, Thai politics experienced a period of openness previously unknown. This ended in October 1976 with the violent suppression of student demonstrators at Thammasat University in Bangkok and the return of military rule under Thanin Kraivixien. Yet the events of 1973 and 1976 helped nourish the seeds of change in Thai politics and in April 1988, the business-oriented government of Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan took power. The Chatichai government focused on promoting business interests (often of its own members) and eventually began to encroach on areas viewed by the military as under its exclusive purview (e.g., arms purchases). A group of military officers launched a successful coup in February 1991 and in 1992 manipulated the parliament and constitution to have one member of the group, General Suchinda Kraprayoon, become prime minister. Anti-government demonstrations in various parts of the country, violently suppressed in Bangkok by army troops from outside the city, led to the military group s downfall. The post-1992 period expedited a number of long-term trends in Thai politics. The disgraced though still powerful Thai army withdrew considerably from its overt role in Thai politics. Interest groups lobbying the government, particularly business associations, became more active and influential in policy-making. Non-profit organizations performing various kinds of charitable and development work grew in number and energy. The mass media, especially the media not under direct government control, maintained close scrutiny of the government, a role it had enthusiastically pursued against the military leaders in The changes outlined in the preceding paragraph helped to bring about the formation of a mainly popularly-elected assembly charged with drafting a new constitution. The Constitutional Drafting Assembly submitted its draft to the parliament in September 1997 while Thailand and 2

4 much of Southeast Asia endured a major financial crisis. Given that the draft constitution contained some substantial changes not welcomed by many political leaders, the public pressure for reform provoked by the crisis probably contributed much to the parliament s passage of the constitution in October The detailed constitution (336 articles) contains many important changes to the political system, particularly a complete overhaul of the electoral system, the establishment of constraints on changing political party membership, and the formation of a Constitutional Court. The current government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra s Thai Rak Thai party (TRT or Thais Love Thais ) took power in 2001, the first Thai political party to gain direct control of more than half the seats (helped by mergers with other political parties) in a popular election to Thailand s lower house of parliament. An understanding of the consequences of the new constitutional provisions combined with a well-financed electoral campaign, a party platform with a set of popular policies, and strong support from the business community enabled Thaksin to sweep into power. His government has implemented a series of policies e.g., a low-cost national health care program, an often-violent crackdown on the illicit drug trade within the country, and pursuit of bilateral trade agreements that have earned it bitter criticism from some quarters but much popular support. A surging economy (GDP growth was an estimated 6.0% in the third quarter of 2004) a weakened political opposition both inside and outside of parliament, and polls showing strong support for the prime minister characterized There was little doubt the TRT would win the elections held for the key House of Representatives of the national parliament on 6 February 2005 and be selected as prime minister for another term. For some parts of 2004, the TRT and Thaksin looked under threat because of government mishandling of problems in the three southern provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani. However, the devastating tsunami in December 2004 shifted attention away from the southern unrest and the Thaksin government s effective management of the tsunami s impacts helped to compensate for the mistakes made earlier in the year. The TRT captured 376 of 500 House seats, strengthening Thaksin s control and giving him a clear mandate to continue with the TRT agenda. C. General Comments on the AsiaBarometer 2004 Data The AsiaBarometer 2004 data are skewed towards urban populations. Data from the Asian Development Bank indicate that the urban population was 29% in The AsiaBarometer data show 85.5% respondents from urban areas. Even excluding Bangkok, the percentage of urban respondents still high: 67.3% of the total sample. The high figure emerges in part from treating municipalities ( ket tessaban in Thai) as urban areas. This is a liberal interpretation of urban since many municipalities are small towns that would not qualify as particularly urban by most criteria. Consequently, the results involving measures of urban areas sometimes require careful interpretation. We suspect the data on household income are actually monthly figures, not annual as reported. As evidence of this, 62.9% of the respondents report an annual income of less than 10,000 baht (approximately US$250) and 6.2% report an annual income of US$1,000 or more. Thailand s annual per-capita income was approximately US$3200 in 2003 (World Development Indicators). If the AsiaBarometer data are correct, they imply that only a tiny percentage of the population earns the average level of income. In addition, figures from the National Statistical Office of Thailand indicate that even in Thailand s poorest region (the Northeast), average 3

5 income was 9,279 baht/month (US$232). The gap between the AsiaBarometer data and these other data sources does not make sense, unless we treat the data as monthly. A very small number of respondents stated that they are Muslim: 5 out of 800 (0.6%). This is lower than the estimated 4.6% of the population who are Muslim. 2 The reason for this low count is that the survey did not include any of the four provinces with the majority of the Muslim population in Thailand: Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, and Satun. The Thai data did not include results for a set of questions about types of political actions: whether respondents had signed (or would consider signing) a petition, joined a boycott, or attended a lawful demonstration. We assume the government did not permit the inclusion of these questions. II. General Analysis This section provides a broad sense of Thai attitudes towards a variety of issues and concerns. We assume that views about matters which are not overtly political e.g., families, foreigners, relationships with other people, etc. help to form the views underlying Thai political culture. A. Views towards foreign countries and organizations To gauge connections with foreign the world outside of Thailand, the AsiaBarometer asked if respondents had relatives or friends abroad, traveled abroad, watched foreign-produced television programs, and/or communicated with foreigners. Out of a total of 800 respondents, 603 answered none of the above. This implies that 75% of the population has essentially no contact with foreigners. This does not mean that Thailand has closed itself off from the outside world as much as it means Thais do not see foreign influences as having much impact on their daily lives. This perception of foreign influence is most prominent in Southern Thailand: 96.3% of respondents from southern Thai provinces answered none of the above. In non-southern areas, 8.1% 21.2% respondents said they had a relative living outside of Thailand but approximately 1% of southern respondents had a relative living abroad. The AsiaBarometer asked people what countries have a good or bad influence on Thailand with five possible responses: good influence, rather good influence, neither good nor bad influence, rather bad influence, bad influence. Taking the difference between the percentage who responded that a country had a good influence or rather good influence from the percentage who responded rather bad influence or bad influence gave the following results: China 57.7% Japan 51.6% USA 43.5% United Kingdom 41.7% India 7.7%. This indicates that there was still a strong reservoir of goodwill towards the USA, though changes in US policies and closer economic and political relations with China have affected Thai perceptions (see Mahbubani for an argument about the reasons for the decline in goodwill towards the US). The low figure for India is most likely a product of deep-rooted prejudice in Thai society against people from South Asia, despite the fact that Buddhism (the dominant religion in Thailand), the Thai language, and aspects of the Thai arts have strong roots in India. 2 This figure is from 2000 Thai census data ( 4

6 B. Satisfaction with life and own preferences about lifestyle When asked how happy they are ( All things considered, would you say that you are happy these days? ), Thais answered that they are happier than their fellow AsiaBarometer citizens, though only slightly above the average for the nine countries reporting results. The levels of general happiness do not substantially differ across geographic regions in Thailand. There are moderately higher levels of unhappiness among people from the Northeast and South (10.9% and 8.4% responded they were not too happy, respectively) vs. Bangkok, central Thailand, and northern Thailand (4.3%, 3.5%, and 0.8%, respectively). The AsiaBarometer had other questions to gauge happiness or satisfaction in more specific areas such as housing, marriage, household income, job, public safety, the environment, and others. Thai levels of satisfaction are generally high with at least 80% of respondents falling into the very satisfied or somewhat satisfied categories across the board. One exception is household income where 33.2% answered somewhat dissatisfied. This result is higher than the results in two less wealthy countries, Cambodia (27.8%) and Indonesia (19.8%), though Cambodia had a smaller proportion of respondents in the very satisfied or somewhat satisfied response categories. A second exception is job satisfaction where 19.2% answered somewhat dissatisfied and 67.7% answered either very satisfied or somewhat satisfied. Earning a high income was also viewed as substantially more important by rural respondents than respondents from urban areas and Bangkok (41.7% vs. 29.6%). Overall, the figures suggest that the fruits of recent economic growth have not penetrated some areas of Thai society. The wide income disparities, particularly between Bangkok and the rest of the country, are now a target of government policies to provide social welfare (e.g., a low-cost national health care program) and reduce the rich-poor gap. C. Domestic government institutions, politically active organizations, and government policies Levels of satisfaction with Thailand s democracy remain generally high, with 32.1% and 49.7% of respondents stating they are very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the democratic system, respectively. Compared with 2003, 19.3% said they were very happy with the democratic system and 55.3% said pretty happy. 3 This suggests a small increase in the level of satisfaction with Thai politics between 2003 and 2004, though not any indication of a trend. We calculated a broad, basic measure of satisfaction by subtracting the sum of the somewhat dissatisfied and very dissatisfied responses from the sum of the very satisfied and somewhat satisfied responses. In 2004, levels of satisfaction with democratic system lowest in Bangkok (48.7%) and South (57.6%) as compared with the central region (72.7%), North (85.8%), and Northeast (85.0%). By the same measures in 2003, the levels of satisfaction with the democratic system were also lowest in Bangkok (59.0%) and the South (55.8%). This indicates that Bangkok residents became less satisfied with the direction of Thai democracy; the south remained essentially unchanged. AsiaBarometer asked about the degree of trust Thais had in various political, governmental, and social institutions. As with our analysis from the 2003 AsiaBarometer, Thais have high levels of trust in the central and local governments, the legal system, the army, and the 3 For this question, the 2003 AsiaBarometer asked respondents if they were very happy, pretty happy, neither happy nor unhappy, not too happy, or very unhappy. 5

7 national parliament. These results fit with the generally high level of Thai satisfaction with the country s democratic system. In a similar vein, respondents answered questions about how well they believe the government is handling various issues. The responses ranged from very well to not well at all. The results in Table 1 briefly summarize the proportion of Thais who felt there were problems with the government s handling of certain issues. Table 1: Responses to the Question How well do you think the Thai government is dealing with the following issues? Combined percentage responding not so well or not well at all Economy 12.3% 14.7% Political corruption 37.6% 41.3% Human rights 32.4% 22.5% Unemployment 56.7% 35.7% Crime 47.5% 43.9% Quality of public services 24.5% 15.2% Immigration 55.9% 39.5% Ethnic conflict 39.7% 53.1% Religious conflict 39.0% 58.0% Environmental problems 41.1% 21.6% The difference between the views in 2003 and 2004 on the government s handling of ethnic and religious conflicts is striking and clearly a public opinion response to the government s difficulties and mistakes in addressing the unrest in parts of southern Thailand. What clouds the interpretation of the data is the greater number of Thais who favorably view the Thaksin government s handling of human rights concerns. Apparently, many Thais distinguish between the implications of handling ethnic/religious conflicts and the human rights issues many nongovernmental organizations and activists associate with the government s actions. To foreshadow our analysis of the situation in southern Thailand later in the paper, this kind of thinking may help account for the lack of a lasting solution to the problems in some southern provinces. Many Thais view the problems in the south through the lens of nationalism and patriotism, not broader considerations about civil and religious rights. Public views about unemployment improved substantially between 2003 and 2004, likely a product of the growing economy. Yet there was almost no movement in opinions on political corruption, despite many statements from the prime minister about combating corruption and campaigns to eliminate so-called dark influences from Thai society. Lastly, we have no convincing explanation of the improved view of people about the government s efforts to improve the natural environment, given that there have been no major policies announced or implemented in the areas of environmental protection and restoration. 6

8 Table 2: Levels of Satisfaction with Selected Rights and Freedoms in Thailand in 2004 Combined percentage responding very satisfied or somewhat satisfied The right to vote 98.8% The right to participate in any kind of 88.6% organization The right to gather and demonstrate 86.9% The right to be informed about the work 86.2% and functions of government Freedom of speech 87.0% The right to criticize the government 73.9% Table 2 summarizes some views about political and civil rights in The levels of satisfaction among Thais concerning their basic rights were quite high in 2004, both as standalone measurements and measurements in comparison to other AsiaBarometer countries. For example, among seven AsiaBarometer 2004 countries for which data are available (Japan, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), Thailand shows the highest level of satisfaction with the right to criticize the government, followed closely by the Philippines. Though we do not have comparable data from later years, we cannot say if levels of satisfaction have substantially changed in response to the unusual present political circumstances. We suspect that despite the increased attention devoted to claims that Thaksin limited political and civil rights, the levels of satisfaction in Table 2 have probably changed little if at all. Thaksin s critics often express their frustration with his leadership in terms of his government s efforts to limit the activities of certain grass-roots development organizations, to clamp down on the news media, and to paint his critics as both unpatriotic and misguided (and at times mentally unstable). The truth of these accusations aside, many Thais seem willing to give these criticisms modest weight, either because the protection of their basic rights is less important to them than obtaining material benefits, or because they believe government actions under Thaksin are not fundamental assaults on the rights enshrined in Thailand s current constitution. However, not all Thais are the same and the data reveal some important distinctions among respondents. People in higher income groups, particularly the highest earners, have less faith in the current government, or in the degree of basic rights in Thailand. Looking again at the 2004 data on the right to criticize the government, people in the lowest income group reported they were very satisfied (24.7%) and somewhat dissatisfied (18.5%). This compares to the highest income group which reported they were very satisfied (8.0%) and somewhat dissatisfied (42.0%). In addition, the 2004 data show a tendency for respondents in Bangkok and the South to have lower levels of satisfaction with rights than those in the North and Northeast. This tendency is more pronounced in Bangkok, most notably when asked about the right to criticize the government: 34.5% and 7.8% of Bangkok respondents claimed they were somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied, respectively. These results fit with current political conditions: the opposition Democrat Party has its strongest electoral support in Bangkok and the South. More educated Thais, particularly those with a university degree, also tended to have 7

9 lower levels of satisfaction than less educated Thais, though the differences between different educational levels were lower in magnitude than the regional differences. Even so, continuing with our example of the right to criticize the government, among those without a high school degree, 18.9% responded somewhat dissatisfied and 1.7% very dissatisfied ; compared to university graduates who responded somewhat dissatisfied (35.7%) and very dissatisfied (8.6%). D. Citizenship, language, and ethnic/racial identity Though the AsiaBarometer 2004 contained a number of questions concerning citizenship, language, and ethnic/racial identity, we will spend relatively little effort reporting the results. The 2003 and 2004 surveys had the same set of questions and very similar results for these questions. There is little we can add to our analysis of the 2003 data (see Khamchoo and Stern 2005 for details). Concerning national pride, among nine AsiaBarometer countries for which data are available in 2004, Thailand had the highest score: 95.2% of Thais responded they are very proud of being Thai. In 2003, 93.4% said they were very proud. Two serious recent national problems with the potential to adversely impact national pride a major outbreak of the avian flu in approximately one-third of Thailand s 76 provinces and violence in southern Thailand did not reduce national pride nor diminish public receptiveness to the Thaksin government s nationalist rhetoric in At least in the short-run, these sorts of crises tend to increase Thai resolve and often serve more as national rallying issues than events that create fundamental divisions in Thai society. Even among respondents in the South, 94.3% responded very proud, though these results need careful interpretation since the two southern provinces surveyed are not areas of unrest. III. Political Culture through the Lens of Thaksin s Administration Thailand s current Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is a useful figure for understanding the deep-rooted and seemingly incongruent attitudes that constitute much of Thai political culture. He is extremely wealthy but was not born into a wealthy (at least during his childhood) or aristocratic family. He makes himself out as a take-charge, get things done leader while peppering his political message with comments about listening to the people and building up the closest thing to a mass party ever seen in Thailand. He is cosmopolitan (educated abroad, made his fortune in telecommunications and information technology) but has his greatest political support among rural voters. In many ways, Thaksin s rule has brought many aspects of political culture closer to the surface, forcing people to confront their own political beliefs as they try to understand and address his legacy. Thaksin s Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) has used a variety of major national policies, often called populist, to foster his vision of Thailand s future and cultivate electoral support. These include debt relief for individual debtors to the government s Bank of Agriculture and Cooperatives, a program to provide low-cost loans to thousands of Thai villages, and a low-cost national health care scheme. As the party s name suggests, Thaksin s government has promoted a sense of Thai nationalism and policies ostensibly designed to reduce Thailand s reliance on foreign funds and resources. This is a clear response to the feeling that foreign investors unfairly contributed to the 1997 economic crisis and that strengthening local businesses and mitigating 8

10 the adverse effects of globalization are major responsibilities of the government. The government s efforts have appeared most prominently in the form of major new government spending (fiscal stimulus to the economy) and low interest rates which have helped spur a revival in the property market and consumer spending. Up until recent economic troubles due to political uncertainty and the increased cost of oil, the main result of TRT policies was impressive economic growth mainly driven by domestic consumer demand and exports: real GDP growth was 2.1% in 2001, 5.4% in 2002, and 6.7% in 2003 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 35). Before the substantial upsurge in anti-thaksin protests in 2005, the unrest in southern Thailand was seen by many as presenting the most significant challenge to the TRT government. Four provinces near Malaysia in which Islam is the predominant religion (Narathiwat, Yala, Pattani, and Satun) were the focus of much domestic and international attention in In January 2004, a series of attacks resulted in more than 100 deaths and the imposition of martial law in Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani provinces. In April 2004, Thai soldiers and police killed 108 Thai militants during failed raids on police posts and an armed confrontation at the Krue Sae mosque in Pattani. In October 2004, government security forces mishandling of a demonstration in Narathiwat resulted in the deaths of 85 Muslim protesters. While this region has had a low-level separatist movement for decades, the upsurge in violence in 2004 came as a surprise to the government and citizens of Thailand. Figure 1: Map of Southern Thailand Source: Perry Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection (accessed 12 February 2005) 9

11 The AsiaBarometer is helpful for understanding the situation in the South and the Thaksin administration s policies towards the region. We only note one caveat: the AsiaBarometer did not survey residents of Narathiwat, Pattani, or Yala. 4 Therefore, the data on the South must be treated with some caution because it only covers two of 14 provinces that constitute southern Thailand; and those two provinces (Surat Thani and Nakorn Sri Thammarat) have not experienced unrest. The majority of Muslims are concentrated in only four provinces: Narathiwat (82.0% of provincial population), Pattani (80.7%), Yala (68.9%), and Satun (67.8%). Consider these figures in comparison to Surat Thani (2.0%) and Nakorn Sri Thammarat (6.2%). 5 Compared to Thailand as a whole, the South is not poor. According to the AsiaBarometer, 53.8% of respondents in the South reported an income less than 10,000 baht/month (approximately US$250). 6 This is less than the 62.8% of all survey respondents who reported earning less than 10,000 baht/month. In addition, 17% of Southern respondents reported earning at least 40,000 baht/month, more than in Bangkok (15.5%), Thailand s capital and center of business and government. Figures from the Thai government s National Statistical Office generally corroborate the AsiaBarometer findings (see Table 3). However, Table 3 also shows that Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala are noticeably poorer than both Southern Thailand on average and Thailand nationally. While low income may contribute to the unrest in these provinces, low income is probably not at the heart of the unrest. The average monthly income of these three provinces was 9,108 baht in 2002, almost the same as the North and Northeastern areas of Thailand which have experienced nothing approaching the South s violence. Table 3: Average Per-Capita Monthly Income, by Region and Selected Provinces, 2002 Area Thailand (nationally) Bangkok and 3 neighboring provinces (Pathum Thani, Nontaburi, and Samut Prakan) Northeastern Thailand Northern Thailand Central Thailand Southern Thailand* Surat Thani Province Nakorn Sri Thammarat Province Pattani Province Narathiwat Province Yala Province Income 13,736 baht/month (US$343) 28,239 baht/month (US$706) 9,279 baht/month (US$232) 9,530 baht/month (US$238) 14,128 baht/month (US$303) 12,487 baht/month (US$312) 14,056 baht/month (US$351) 12,317 baht/month (US$308) 9,702 baht/month (US$242) 7,603 baht/month (US$190) 10,018 baht/month (US$250) Source: National Statistical Office of Thailand. accessed on 7 February * Southern Thailand has 14 provinces: Krabi, Chumpon, Trang, Nakorn Sri Thammarat, Narathiwat, Pattani, Pang-Nga, Pattalung, Phuket, Yala, Ranong, Songkla, Satun, and Surat Thani. 4 It is highly likely that the organization in charge of conducting the survey did not want to put anyone in danger. 5 These figures are from the Population and Housing Census 2000, conducted by the National Statistical Office Thailand. See (accessed on 13 February 2005) 6 Comparable figures were 24.1% Bangkok, 50.9% Central region, 72.7% North, and 85.1% Northeast. 10

12 Yet the AsiaBarometer data, along with data from recent elections, indicate that the southern unrest does not pose as significant a challenge to Thaksin s government as some believe. First, with regard to elections, it is true that the many seats left vacant after the 2006 elections were predominantly in Southern provinces where the Democrat Party has its strongest base. Even so, electoral power in the South is ultimately not enough to determine electoral strength on a national scale. The South has the smallest population of Thailand s four major regions (Central, North, Northeast, and South). Moreover, in the February 2005 election for 500 House seats, the Democrat party captured 52 of 54 seats in the South but only 44 seats in the rest of the country. This leaves the Democrats isolated in the South with no national power base. Second, as we reported earlier in the paper (see section II C), the AsiaBarometer data indicate that the levels of satisfaction with Thailand s democratic system are lowest in Bangkok and the South. This is due in part to the inconsistency and ineffectiveness of the Thaksin administration s efforts to end the unrest. Yet our analysis in section II C also showed that the way the Thaksin administration is handling the situation in the South may not perturb Thais outside of the South, with the partial exception of Bangkok. While some people in the South, particularly in Muslim communities, see the government s actions as oppressive and violations of civil rights, Thais elsewhere often view the problem areas in the South as a teenage child gone bad who needs to be brought back into the national family using a combination of strong discipline and financial outlays to meet his perceived needs. Even Bangkok residents reported being less satisfied with their rights (e.g., freedom of speech, the right to demonstrate) than residents of Surat Thani and Nakorn Sri Thammarat. In other words, people close to the unrest showed less concern about the Thaksin administration s pressure on areas of the South than residents of an urban city far removed from the South s difficulties. Moreover, looking at Thailand as a whole, the AsiaBarometer paints a picture of a nation confronting fundamental concerns about what democracy means; and how to balance traditions of non-democratic politics with a constitution that guarantees a wide variety of rights and promotes greater public participation in government policy making. In Table 4, the 2004 results present a confusing picture of a nation whose people strongly believe in the value of democratic politics but who are sometimes willing to accept the rule of non-elected public leaders. We call it Thailand s democratic contradiction. For example, though there is strong support for a democratic system, almost one-third of respondents see merit in having the military run the government. To put the contradiction more starkly, 14.1% of respondents answered that a democratic political system and a military government are both very good. Thaksin seems to understand the democratic contradiction. In 2003, he said: Democracy is a good and beautiful thing, but it's not the ultimate goal as far as administering the country is concerned. Democracy is just a tool, not our goal. The goal is to give people a good lifestyle, happiness and national progress (The Nation). His thinking suggests that his view (and the view of many others in his government) of the situation in the South focuses on providing people with tangible government-administered benefits such as better infrastructure, jobs, etc. and maintaining substantial government control over the residents of the troubled southern provinces. Promoting increased political participation and community involvement in government decisionmaking processes take a lower priority. Community leaders in the troubled southern provinces, particularly Muslim religious leaders, have consistently questioned the efficacy of the government s actions as a long-term approach for solving the South s problems. There are few 11

13 signs that the government s attitude, or the attitude of those engaged in violent acts of unrest, will change. And the violence in the South continues. Table 4: Preferences about Forms of National Governance, 2003 and 2004 Governance by a powerful leader without the restriction of parliament or elections A system whereby decisions affecting the country are made by experts (such as bureaucrats with expertise in a particular field) according to what they think is best for the country. Very Good Fairly Good Bad Don t Know % 4.8% 11.5% 23.5% 85.1% 70.4% 1.6% 1.3% 18.0% 20.8% 60.5% 41.5% 18.5% 35.3% 3.0% 2.4% Military government 3.0% 16.7% 30.6% 37.2% 62.9% 44.3% 3.5% 1.8% A democratic political system 50.0% 76.6% 46.8% 22.3% 2.0% 0.7% 1.3% 0.4% Continuing our exploration of Table 4, any analysis of differences in views between the 2003 and 2004 AsiaBarometer responses requires cautious interpretation. Even so, we note how the democratic contradiction appears again. In 2004, support for having a military government rose at the same time as support for a democratic political system. Perhaps as an indication of Thaksin s popularity, support for having a strong leader unhindered by two key elements of a democracy a legislature and elections increased significantly from 2003 to The increased support for an unhindered leader showed little difference across different income strata and educational levels, though residents in the South more strongly backed an unhindered form of governance. These sorts of findings correspond well with Thaksin s continued popularity after his internationally-criticized campaign against the drug trade in Thailand, heavy-handed use of the army and police to quell the unrest in the South, and ability to push through some controversial laws despite vocal opposition from various groups. Thais voted for a government that could lead them out of the unpleasant period following the economic crisis of 1997, where the line between a decisive and authoritarian leader was blurred for many voters. Our analysis and the 2005 House election results convince us that many Thais got what they wanted in a prime minister. At the risk of muddying our existing picture of Thaksin s rule, we refer to the results in Table 5. The importance Thais attach to having more input into government decision-making is substantially higher than the other AsiaBarometer countries in the table. We interpret this to mean that Thais would like to see their role in government decision-making increased from its current level. We do not believe it means Thais are content with the extent of this role and are simply stating that it is important to maintain the status quo. Therefore, the results indicate that a 12

14 key element of democracy accounting for public views explicitly in public policy choices may be deficient from the perspective of many Thais. Table 5: What Selected AsiaBarometer 2004 Respondents Feel is Most Important Maintaining order in the nation Giving people more say in important government decisions Fighting rising prices Protecting freedom of speech Don t know Japan 38.9% 33.6% 18.3% 6.4% 2.8% Indonesia 20.2% 24.0% 46.9% 8.5% 0.4% Malaysia 57.2% 14.0% 23.1% 4.4% 1.3% Philippines 39.8% 17.4% 38.4% 4.3% 0.1% Thailand 38.2% 46.0% 10.0% 5.8% 0.0% The Thaksin government has given a mixed response to this desire for citizen participation in government. On the one hand, the TRT party platform is a well-researched effort to provide government programs of direct interest to the general population; e.g., a national health-care system. Thaksin s government has also implemented policies such as providing more autonomy for governors of some provinces to address problems in their provinces without requiring the assent of government ministries in Bangkok (the CEO governor policy). On the other hand, the government has clearly established stronger control over Thailand s news media, either through government regulation or via ownership by Thaksin s political allies (including companies controlled by his immediate family members). A constitutionally-mandated policy to transfer central government control over some forms of fee/tax collection and some public services to local government organizations has made little progress. The CEO governor policy makes governors directly accountable to the prime minister who is known for his hands-on management style. Many people, particularly from the non-profit community, have criticized the Thaksin government for failing to effectively and fairly implement a recent law requiring public hearings before the initiation of major projects such as road and bridge construction. The Thaksin administration s conduct with regard to making itself accountable to Thai citizens has had mixed results as well. Comparing some of the AsiaBarometer data from 2003 and 2004 (see Table 6), on the one hand, people feel their vote counts more and that they may have increased influence over how the government makes decisions. On the other hand, more Thais claim that government officials fail to pay attention to what citizens desire. This is partially a question of how people respond to differently depending on how a question is worded (Converse and Presser, 41). It may also result from the different ways in which people interpret the government activities and the personality of the powerful prime minister. At times, the government presents what is often termed a populist image. This takes many forms: mobile cabinet meetings where government heads of ministries meet in various provinces far from Bangkok, numerous statements from the prime minister about working on behalf of the people and the interests of the nation, and government-funded policies designed to appeal directly to residents of rural areas such as a program to provide low-interest loans to Thai villages nationwide. Other people see a different side to Thaksin s rule: increased government interference in the news media, less willingness to consult with or listen to representatives of grass-roots non-governmental organizations, and what one Thai newspaper referred to as 13

15 Thaksin s arrogance (Phongpaichit and Baker, 153). Cross-tabulations of responses to these questions using factors such as the respondents education, income, and geographic region did not reveal any strong differences in views across these factors. The two noticeable differences were that Bangkok residents on average were mildly more cynical about politics and government institutions than residents of other regions; and that women felt government officials paid less attention to their views than men felt. Table 6: Miscellaneous Views on Political Participation and Political Institutions, 2003 and 2004 Combined percentage responding strongly agree or agree Citizens have a duty to vote in elections 98.8% 99.3% There is widespread corruption among those who govern the country 61.9% 66.4% Generally speaking, people like me don t have the power to influence government policy or actions Politics and government are so complicated that sometimes I don t understand what's happening Since so many people vote in elections, it really doesn t matter whether I vote or not Generally speaking, the people who are elected to the national parliament stop thinking about the public once they re elected Government officials pay little attention to what citizens like me think 67.1% 58.1% 74.4% 71.4% 18.8% 7.3% 61.6% 60.3% 55.5% 64.9% In the end, what Thaksin and his advisors understand is that they have a useful mechanism for building up yet regulating public participation: a national political party. The TRT s efforts to build a national party have been effective. A survey conducted in 2000 asked about Thais confidence in political parties: 43.0% said not much confidence and 28.2% said none at all. 7 The AsiaBarometer 2004 had very different results: 11.5% trust parties a lot, 65.9% trust parties to a degree, and 18.7% don t really trust parties. TRT, with its substantial financial resources and charismatic leader as prime minister, has made great strides in forming a national mass party with a high degree of organization and an identifiable party platform. This is a change from the typical Thai political party which was a mercurial organization with low levels of party loyalty (as measured by the high propensity of members of parliament to switch parties), a vague or non-existent party platform, and a high degree of reliance on the party leader or a very small group of party supporters to finance the party s activities. 7 These data are from the Asia-Europe Survey conducted in 2000, before Thaksin became prime minister. The Asia- Europe Survey was a predecessor to the Asia Barometer. For brief additional information, see 14

16 IV. Conclusion In conclusion, we wish to make some observations about Thailand s political culture, especially in light of recent political events there. First, Thaksin is sometimes called an authoritarian leader because of his party s near-total control of the government, his mostly successful efforts to increase control over the armed forces, and the weakening of independent government bodies designed to monitor and sometimes check the government s power (e.g., the National Counter-Corruption Commission). We do not dispute the power Thaksin and TRT possess but we would not call it authoritarian, at least not in the same way that past Thai military-controlled governments were authoritarian. Thais have chosen Thaksin s leadership twice in what most observers would call free and fair elections. The one region where his government s policies have had little success is the South and TRT will have to accept a resounding rejection of its policies from voters in that region. Thais appreciate the economic growth that the government has helped generate but they also understand that the benefits of this growth have disproportionately ended up in the hands of politically-connected companies. Thais want a leader who can handle crises like the avian flu, the devastating tsunami of December 2004, and more recently the burdens created by the rise oil prices. But decisive does not mean the government can jail or get rid of its most active opponents with relative impunity. Thais want strong leadership but not at the cost of giving up well-established elements of a strong democracy such as free and fair elections, the right to know what the government is doing, and the right to hold government officials accountable for their actions. In sum, Thaksin faces limitations on his power driven to some degree by the attitudes of Thai citizens, attitudes the AsiaBarometer has partly measured. Thaksin and his allies know this and must operate in a society where democracy has wide and deep support. This leads into our second point: the Thai pragmatism that allowed the authoritarian Thaksin to remain the head of a democratic country requires re-analysis. Thai pragmatism was always a fine balancing act under Thaksin s rule. As long as economic growth remained reasonably strong and corruption not too overt, he managed to fulfill the political preferences of both middle class voters and a mass of mostly rural voters. However, this pragmatic equilibrium became increasingly unstable as major corruption charges accumulated and economic growth slowed. 8 Unlike any other Thai politician in recent memory, Thaksin has made Thais confront their deep-rooted political attitudes and pushed them into making decisions about what is most important to them in the formation and implementation of public policies. In light of the democratic contradiction we discussed earlier in this paper, many Thais are weighing the perceived advantages of having Thaksin stay on as Prime Minister against the major disadvantages of his current efforts to maintain power; especially his lack of legitimacy among substantial swathes of the Thai population and the political divisiveness he fosters. Political culture has not necessarily changed noticeably under Thaksin s rule, though it has come to the surface more as people think about why Thaksin came into power and whether he is the best leader for Thailand. 8 One damaging corruption scandals has been the construction and management of the new Suvarnabhumi International Airport near Bangkok. Another equally problematic case is the recent sale of the Thaksin-founded Shin Corporation to the Singaporean government controlled Temasek Holdings. The sale involved one of Thailand s largest companies and was devised in such a way that the key shareholders (mainly Thaksin s family members) paid almost no taxes during the transaction. 15

17 Finally, in part due to the questions people are asking about their political priorities, Thailand s democracy has entered a difficult phase. We claim that Thailand s democracy is partially consolidated in the sense that Thais believe democratic institutions are the best option for running the country and government agencies operate in accordance with this popular belief in democracy. However, Thailand s young democracy is experiencing difficulties with its consolidation in two closely-connected areas: 1) the interpretation of the spirit of the constitution and willingness to abide by this constitutional spirit; and 2) the development of generally accepted non-violent processes for resolving major political conflicts. Thaksin s critics often accuse his government of ignoring the spirit of laws and stretching interpretations of the constitution in ways designed to benefit the TRT. Given that most Thai constitutions up until the current one (promulgated in 1997) have often been written by particular governments to suit their needs (or simply ignored), it is understandable why people are still examining the level of importance they attach to the constitution and the rule of law. These dilemmas of constitutionality and how to interpret the provisions of the constitution are presently the subject of much political confusion and wrangling. These disputes are far from trivial: for example, the interpretation of constitutional language regarding the Election Commission is critical to decisions about the date of Thailand s next election. And the lack of precedents and commonlyaccepted methods for settling debates about key institutions such as the Election Commission lead us to make the assertion we offered at the start of this paragraph. Into this murky zone of democracy step Thaksin and his close political allies who understand that their continued hold on power depends heavily on what people decide are the best ways to handle such debates. Political culture has become important at this juncture in Thailand democracy because deep-rooted views will help drive the resolution of these debates and consequently Thaksin s future. For example, one (somewhat heuristic) dichotomy in political culture is the tendency to desire a strong, take-charge leader vs. favoring a softer leader who will not take action until he has sought approval from a variety of people and organizations. Thaksin presents more of the former take charge image and Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva (arguably his main competitor for the premiership) tends to present a softer image. In a poll conducted during June 2006 by the Thailand s ABAC Poll Research Center ( a sample of 1,143 Bangkok residents was asked to choose which politician or former prime minister they believed was the most capable and competent of solving the country s problems. Thaksin topped the list with 46.9 percent. Abhisit was at the bottom with less than one percent. We are not claiming that such poll results depend solely on this aspect of political culture. And we do not wish to give the impression that Thaksin is only interested in taking charge and that Abhisit is impotent or gutless. However, we assert that some meaningful part of this poll result stems from an entrenched political attitude among most Thais that accepts an excess of authoritarianism more than an excess of accommodation. The fact that Thaksin is still a major political force and that he successfully resumed his duties as prime minister in May 2006 using the kind of take-charge mentality just described emerges from this attitude. The sort of situation is why we give some credit to political culture as driver of political outcomes. 16