Turning a Blind Eye?
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- Ferdinand Peters
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1 Turning a Blind Eye? On the Political Economy of Environmental Regulation in China Dalia Ghanem Shu Shen Junjie Zhang UC Davis UC Davis Duke/Duke Kunshan October 16, 2017
2 Motivation China has a unique system of promotion incentives to encourage local leaders (city party secretaries and mayors) to meet policy targets. Evidence on environmental data manipulation, arguably an unintended consequence of the system, was found in previous work around the cutoff for blue-sky days. The question that we ask here is what characteristics of local officials are most predictive of this manipulation.
3 Contributions of the Paper Propose a method to estimate the proportion of manipulation for each city-year ( ) - Tests for the presence of manipulation used in previous work do not provide statistics that are monotonic in the degree of manipulation. - Proposed method can be adapted to estimate the proportion of excess bunching. Collect city party secretary and mayor resumé-type characteristics for each city-year in our data set, including demographic characteristics, education and experience Use LASSO to select the best predictors of city-level manipulation from this large number of variables
4 Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation: API and Blue-sky Days Disclaimers What we present here is a very interesting correlation/predictive relationship, but this paper makes no causal claims. We will use the word manipulation in lieu of evidence consistent with manipulation around the blue-sky day cut-off. There are other types of manipulation that our approach cannot detect.
5 Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation: API and Blue-sky Days Disclaimers What we present here is a very interesting correlation/predictive relationship, but this paper makes no causal claims. We will use the word manipulation in lieu of evidence consistent with manipulation around the blue-sky day cut-off. There are other types of manipulation that our approach cannot detect. Source:
6 Preview of Results Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation Substantial heterogeneity in manipulation patterns across cities and across time Mean S.D. Proportion of Manipulation among Blue-sky Days (ˆµ) 3.1% 4.3% Manipulated Blue-sky Days ( m) Beijing: % of Blue-sky Days Beijing: % Manipulation Among Blue-sky Days Year Year Reported Estimated Estimated % 90% Familywise CI
7 Preview of Results Predicting City-Level Manipulation having an elite-educated party secretary is associated with a significant 1.1% increase in ˆµ and about 2.4 m in a year (α = 0.05) no mayor characteristics and no other party secretary are selected to be significant predictors of manipulation among elite-educated party secretaries, we find significantly less manipulation under the following: - females relative to male Han and non-han - those with previous research experience relative to others
8 Related Literature Evidence consistent with manipulation of Chinese air quality data Andrews (2008), Chen et al (2012), Ghanem and Zhang (2014), Fu et al (2014) Promotion incentives of local leaders in China Li and Zhou (2005), Xu (2011), Zheng et al (2013), Jia et al (2015), Jia (2017) Data Manipulation and Excess Bunching - High-stakes testing: Dee et al (2011), Figlio and Getzler (2002), Jacob (2005), Figlio (2006), Reback and Cullen (2006), Diamond and Persson (2016) - Behavioral responses to tax policy: Saez (2010), Chetty et al (2011)
9 Outline of the Talk Institutional Background Data Estimation of the Proportion of Manipulation Predicting City-level Manipulation Interpretation
10 Institutional Background Simplified Model of Dual-Head Leadership Party Secretary Mayor appoints supervises City Government Agencies
11 Institutional Background Simplified Model of Dual-Head Leadership Party Secretary In reality, the roles of party secretaries and mayors are often hard to disentangle from one another, and their relative political power is not as clear-cut. Mayor supervises City Government Agencies appoints - typical promotion from city mayor is to become party secretary in the same city - mayors recommendations are taken seriously in personnel appointments at the city level - rank of the cities affects political power of party secretaries
12 Institutional Background Administrative Ranking Province-level City (Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing and Tianjin) Sub-provincial-level City (15 cities, mostly provincial capitals) Prefecture-level City County Township Village Comments - Party secretaries of the province-level cities are typically members of the politburo. - Party secretaries of provincial capital cities or cities with economic importance are usually member of the provincial party committee (sub-provincial appointment). - Our data set only includes prefecture-level, sub-provincial and province-level cities.
13 Institutional Background Promotion Incentives Party secretaries and mayors are evaluated based on economic, social and environmental indicators. Promotion has been characterized in the literature as a promotion tournament. Previous literature (Zheng et al 2013, Jia 2017) suggests that mayors promotion is more correlated with environmental indicators than party secretaries.
14 Data Harbin Urumqi Shenyang Changchun Lhasa Huhehaote Beijing Tianjin Yinchuan Shijiazhuang Jinan Taiyuan Xi'ning Lanzhou Zhengzhou Xi'an Nanjing Hefei Wuhan Hangzhou Chengdu Chongqing Nanchang Changsha Shanghai Kunming Guiyang Nanning Guangzhou Fujian
15 Data Demographic, education and experience variables of party secretaries and mayors for 111 cities ( ) PM 10 concentration data (confidential) daily frequency for 111 cities ( ) produced by China National Environmental Monitoring Center GDP data for 111 cities ( ) annual frequency published by the China City Statistical Yearbooks
16 Data: Party Secretary and Mayor Characteristics Demographics and Education Sample Mean (S.D.) Secretary Mayor Demographic Characteristics Male Han Female Han Male non-han Education Full-time Completed College STEM Major Elite College Entered College Between Entered College Between Part-time College Graduate Degree # Observations Notes: Data collapsed by city and mayor name. Elite College variable includes all universities designated as key colleges by 1978, which include about 88 colleges. (In 2010, China had about 2,300 registered colleges.) Mayors and party secretaries have fairly similar demographic and education characteristics on average.
17 Data: Party Secretary and Mayor Characteristics Experience Sample Mean (S.D.) Secretary Mayor Experience Years in Current Post (1.41) (1.50) Years to Retirement (3.74) (4.40) Current Post in Birth Province Previous Experience Enterprise Research Administrator in Gov t or Party Organization County Mayor County Party Secretary City Mayor City Party Secretary Central Government Location of Previous Posts Current City Current Province Other Province # Observations Notes: Data collapsed by city and mayor name.
18 Data: Environmental and Economic Variables Mean S.D. Min Max PM 10 concentration GDP (100 million yuan) 1, , , GDP by Sector (100 million yuan) Primary Secondary , Tertiary , , # Observations 983 Notes: According to the current exchange rate, 1 million yuan are about 150 thousand USD.
19 Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation: API and Blue-sky Days Between , PM 10, SO 2 and NO 2 concentrations are collected by each city. Daily API is published on a daily basis using these concentrations. If API is less than 100, then a day is labeled a blue-sky day. If cities reach 80% or more blue-sky days in a year, they receive the National Environmental Protection Model City Award (Chen et al 2012). PM 10 is the primary pollutant for most cities, hence evidence consistent with manipulation of its data was found for a large portion of the cities in our data set (Ghanem and Zhang 2014). We seek to measure the proportion of manipulation of PM 10 concentration data around the cutoff for blue-sky days, 0.15 ppb.
20 Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation: Why not McCrary Statistic? McCrary (2008) proposes a test of a discontinuity in a density which was used to test for manipulation in Chinese air quality data (Chen et al 2012, Ghanem and Zhang 2014). The McCrary statistic is the difference in log of of the density from the left and the right of the cutoff. It is not monotonic in the proportion of manipulation as the two pictures above show (same proportion of manipulation, yet different McCrary statistics).
21 Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation: Why not McCrary Statistic? McCrary (2008) proposes a test of a discontinuity in a density which was used to test for manipulation in Chinese air quality data (Chen et al 2012, Ghanem and Zhang 2014). The McCrary statistic is the difference in log of of the density from the left and the right of the cutoff. It is not monotonic in the proportion of manipulation as the two pictures above show (same proportion of manipulation, yet different McCrary statistics).
22 Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation: Identification Problem Observe manipulated PM 10 Cannot observe unmanipulated PM 10 X X (0) cdf cdf c x c x Suppose we could observe unmanipulated PM 10 (X (0))... cdf F X (c) F X (0) (c) X F X (c): proportion of observed bluesky days (X c) F X (0) (c): proportion of true blue-sky days λ = F X (c) F X (0) (c) is the proportion of manipulation c x Goal: To propose sufficient conditions under which we can estimate the distribution of unmanipulated blue-sky days
23 Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation: Identifying Assumptions Let X denote the reported PM 10 concentration and Z be a binary for manipulation, then we can write X in terms of potential outcomes, X (0) and X (1). X = (1 Z)X (0) + ZX (1), where X (0) is potential realization of PM 10 if unmanipulated, X (1) is potential realization of PM 10 if manipulated.
24 Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation: Identifying Assumptions Let X denote the reported PM 10 concentration and Z be a binary for manipulation, then we can write X in terms of potential outcomes, X (0) and X (1). X = (1 Z)X (0) + ZX (1), where X (0) is potential realization of PM 10 if unmanipulated, X (1) is potential realization of PM 10 if manipulated. Our empirical context is consistent with the following assumptions: A1 No Manipulation if Blue-sky Day: Z = 0 if X (0) c A2 Manipulated PM 10 Has to Lead to a Blue-Sky Day: X (1) c A3 Known Manipulation Window: P(Z = 1 X = x) = 0 for all x / [x, x], where c [x, x] and P(x X x) < 1. A4 Known Parametric Distribution of Unmanipulated PM 10: The cdf of X (0) is G(.; θ), where G(.; θ) is a known function with density g(.; θ) and θ is an unknown finite-dimensional parameter. Identification of the CDF of unmanipulated PM 10, F X (0) (.) = G(.; θ)
25 Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation: Identifying Assumptions Intuition X (0) cdf A1: No Manipulation if X (0) c c x X cdf A2: Manipulation Leads to Blue-Sky Days c x Manipulation is uni-directional and leads to a blue-sky day.
26 Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation: Identifying Assumptions Intuition cdf x c x A3: Manipulation Window x
27 Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation: Identifying Assumptions Intuition X = X (0) cdf X X (0) x c x A3: Manipulation Window x X (0) cdf A4: F X (0) (x) = G(x; θ) c x an interval-censored version of X is an interval-censored version of X (0) Distribution of X (0) is known up to θ, so it can be estimated from censored data
28 Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation: Estimation Back to λ = F X (c) F X (0) (c) cdf F X (c) X (0) X F X (0) (c) = G(c; θ) c x Estimation: For each city i and year t, - ˆFXit (c) = T it d=1 1{x itd c}/t it (empirical CDF for each i and t) - ˆθ it is estimated using censored MLE: for each i in year t T it ˆθ it = arg max {1{x itd / [x, x]} log g(x itd ; θ it ) θ it Θ d=1 +1{x itd [x, x]} log(g( x; θ it ) G(x; θ it ))}, where T it is the total number of days observed for city i in year t, G is the generalized β distribution of the second kind (GB2), x = 0.135, x = Note: GB2 is a four-parameter distribution that nests many distributions such as the generalized gamma, Weibull, χ 2, lognormal...
29 Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation: Estimation Results Empirical vs. Censored MLE PM 10 CDFs Beijing: 2004 Beijing: ECDF Para-CDF ECDF Para-CDF Beijing: 2008 Beijing: ECDF Para-CDF ECDF Para-CDF Notes: ECDF denotes the empirical CDF of the reported PM 10, whereas Para-CDF denotes our parametric CDF estimate of the true PM 10.
30 Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation: Estimation Results Empirical vs. Censored MLE PM 10 CDFs Shanghai: 2004 Shanghai: ECDF Para-CDF ECDF Para-CDF Shanghai: 2008 Shanghai: ECDF Para-CDF ECDF Para-CDF Notes: ECDF denotes the empirical CDF of the reported PM 10, whereas Para-CDF denotes our parametric CDF estimate of the true PM 10.
31 Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation: Estimation Results Empirical vs. Censored MLE PM 10 CDFs by Year Chongqing: 2004 Chongqing: ECDF Para-CDF ECDF Para-CDF Chongqing: 2008 Chongqing: ECDF Para-CDF ECDF Para-CDF Notes: ECDF denotes the empirical CDF of the reported PM 10, whereas Para-CDF denotes our parametric CDF estimate of the true PM 10.
32 Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation: Estimation Results Empirical vs. Censored MLE PM 10 CDFs by Year Tianjin: 2004 Tianjin: ECDF Para-CDF ECDF Para-CDF Tianjin: 2008 Tianjin: ECDF Para-CDF ECDF Para-CDF Notes: ECDF denotes the empirical CDF of the reported PM 10, whereas Para-CDF denotes our parametric CDF estimate of the true PM 10.
33 Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation: Estimation Results For each year i and t, Proportion of Manipulation ˆλ it = ˆF Xit (c) G(c; ˆθ it ) Proportion of Manipulation among Blue-sky Days ˆµ it = ˆλ it ˆF Xit (c) Number of Manipulated Blue-sky Days ˆm it = ˆλ it T it Given the above, we can estimated the proportion of reported blue-sky days and the proportion of estimated blue-sky days.
34 Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation: Estimation Results Distribution of Manipulated Blue-Sky Days by Year Mean S.D. Proportion of Manipulation among Blue-sky Days (ˆµ) 3.1% 4.3% Manipulated Blue-sky Days ( m) Frequency # of Manipulated Blue-Sky Days Frequency # of Manipulated Blue-Sky Days Frequency # of Manipulated Blue-Sky Days Frequency # of Manipulated Blue-Sky Days Frequency # of Manipulated Blue-Sky Days Frequency # of Manipulated Blue-Sky Days Frequency # of Manipulated Blue-Sky Days Frequency # of Manipulated Blue-Sky Days Frequency # of Manipulated Blue-Sky Days
35 Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation: Estimation Results City-level Trends in Measures of Manipulation Beijing: % of Blue-sky Days Beijing: % Manipulation Among Blue-sky Days Year Year Reported Estimated Estimated % 90% Familywise CI Shanghai: % of Blue-sky Days Year Shanghai: % Manipulation Among Blue-sky Days Year Reported Estimated Estimated % 90% Familywise CI
36 Estimating the Proportion of Manipulation: Estimation Results City-level Trends in Measures of Manipulation Chongqing: % of Blue-sky Days Chongqing: % Manipulation Among Blue-sky Days Year Year Reported Estimated Estimated % 90% Familywise CI Tianjin: % of Blue-sky Days Tianjin: % Manipulation Among Blue-sky Days Year Year Reported Estimated Estimated % 90% Familywise CI
37 Predicting City-level Manipulation Introducing the Post-LASSO Estimator Belloni, Chen, Chernozhukov and Hansen (2012, Econometrica) ˆβ = arg min b ( ) 2 n T K K y i x i,j b j γ pr δ r λ t + λ ˆl j b j (1) i=1 t=1 j=1 where λ is a penalty level (λ = 2 2log(KnT )/nt ), ˆl j is a regressor-specific data-driven penalty loading. Implementation: Post-LASSO OLS Estimator Step 1: Select variables using LASSO Step 2: Perform OLS using selected variables in Step 1 j=1 Advantages uniform valid post-selection inference of post-lasso estimators (allowing for heteroskedasticity and non-normality) critical assumption: approximate sparsity
38 Predicting City-level Manipulation LASSO Selection Step Proportion of Manipulated Dependent Variable: Manipulation Blue-Sky Days Lasso Variant I II I II Selected Variables: Secretary Variables Elite Elite Elite College College College None Mayor Variables None None None None Secretary & Mayor Variables Included for Selection Demographic, Education Yes Yes Yes Yes and Experience Variables Interactions of Demographic X Education, Demographic X Experience, Education X Experience Variables No Yes No Yes Variables Included as Controls Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes City-rank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
39 Predicting City-level Manipulation Post-LASSO and Fixed Effects Results Dependent Variable: Proportion of Manipulation Manipulated Blue-Sky Days (1) (2) (3) (4) Party Secretary with Elite College Degree (PSEC) Post-Lasso Regression with Province, City- Rank and Year Fixed Effects Regression with City & Year Fixed Effects Sample Mean of Dependent Variable (2.47) (2.06) (2.41) (2.00) Yes Yes Yes Yes (S.D.) (0.043) (0.043) (10.553) (10.553) # Observations Notes: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Cluster-robust standard errors at the city level are used in (2) and (4). We will abbreviate the elite college variable for party secretaries as PSEC.
40 Predicting City-level Manipulation Overview of Results and Robustness Checks Summary Only one party secretary variable (PSEC) is selected. No mayor characteristics are selected. This is surprising given previous literature on the relationship between mayor s promotion and pollution (Zheng et al 2013, Jia 2017) Robustness Checks LASSO variants I and II are robustness checks for each other LASSO selection step without the PSEC variable Fixed effects regression using elite educated mayor variable instead of PSEC
41 Predicting City-level Manipulation Robustness Check I LASSO SELECTION STEP WITHOUT PSEC Proportion of Manipulated Dependent Variable: Manipulation Blue-Sky Days Lasso Variant I II I II Selected Variables: Party Secretary Variables None None None None Mayor Variables None None None None Party Secretary & Mayor Variables Included for Selection Demographic, Education All All All and Experience Variables Except Except Except PSEC PSEC PSEC All Except PSEC Interactions of Demographic X Education, Demographic X Experience, Education X Experience Variables No Yes No Yes Variables Included as Controls Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes City-rank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Note: PSEC abbreviates Party Secretary Elite College Variable.
42 Predicting City-level Manipulation Robustness Check II FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION WITH MAYOR ELITE COLLEGE VARIABLE (1) (2) Proportion of Manipulation Manipulated Blue-Sky Days Mayor with Elite College Degree (-0.13) (0.21) City & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Sample Mean of Dependent Variable (S.D.) (0.043) (10.553) # Observations Notes: t-statistics reported in parentheses are computed using standard errors clustered at the city level.
43 Predicting City-level Manipulation: Interpreting the PSEC Variable Questions 1. Can promotion incentives help explain the manipulation-psec relationship? 2. Which unobservable feature of party secretaries drives the manipulation-psec relationship? - Are elite-educated party secretaries more technically able? - Are elite-educated party secretaries more connected? - Are elite-educated party secretaries more ambitious?
44 Predicting City-level Manipulation: Interpreting the PSEC Variable PSEC and Promotion Incentives Question 1 Economic growth is a competing priority for party secretaries (arguably the only one). All of the unobservables that are captured by PSEC are likely to improve the odds of promotion. One potential story that explains the manipulation-psec relationship: - Elite-educated party secretaries are more likely to get promoted, hence their marginal benefit from prioritizing economic growth at the expense of costly abatement is higher. - They hence turn a blind eye when mayors try to clean up their environmental record. If this were true, we should see a positive correlation between economic growth and manipulation when PSEC = 1.
45 Predicting City-level Manipulation: Interpreting the PSEC Variable PSEC, Manipulation and the Economy With-Correlation: For two variables, Z 1 it = α 1 i + λ 1 t + u 1 it, Z 2 it = α 2 i + λ 2 t + u 2 it the within-correlation presented below is an estimate of Corr(u 1 it, u 2 it). Table: Within-City Proportion of Manipulation and GDP Party Secretary: PSEC = 1 PSEC = 0 GDP GDP by Sector Primary Secondary Tertiary # of Observations Notes: To compute the above correlations we first remove city-specific and time-specific unobservables from both the proportion of manipulation and the economic variable in question.
46 Predicting City-level Manipulation: Interpreting the PSEC Variable Question 2: Which unobservables are likely drivers of the manipulation-psec relationship? Comparison of Observables of Party Secretaries by the PSEC variable Observable differences might suggest unobservable differences. Heterogeneity in the Manipulation-PSEC Relationship Among elite-educated party secretaries, heterogeneity in manipulation may provide suggestive evidence for a story that is consistent with ability or connections.
47 Predicting City-level Manipulation: Interpreting the PSEC Variable Comparing Party Secretaries by PSEC Variable Elite College Elite Other t-stat Difference Demographic Characteristics Male Han Female Han Male non-han Education Full-Time Completed College STEM Major Entered College Between Entered College Between Part-time College Graduate Degree Notes: t-statistics are computed using standard errors clustered at the city level. This comparison is similar to the balance table from RCTs. Differences in education variables are largely determined by the nature of the variable.
48 Predicting City-level Manipulation: Interpreting the PSEC Variable Comparing Party Secretaries by PSEC Variable Elite College Elite Other t-stat Difference Experience Years in Current Post Years to Retirement Current Post in Birth Province Previous Experience Enterprise Research Administrator in Gov t or Party Organization County Mayor County Party Secretary City Mayor City Party Secretary Central Government Location of Previous Posts Current City Current Province Other Province # Observations 313 Notes: t-statistics are computed using standard errors clustered at the city level.
49 Predicting City-level Manipulation: Interpreting the PSEC Variable Comparing Party Secretaries by PSEC Variable Elite College Elite Other t-stat Difference Experience Years in Current Post Years to Retirement Current Post in Birth Province Previous Experience Enterprise Research Administrator in Gov t or Party Organization County Mayor County Party Secretary City Mayor City Party Secretary Central Government Location of Previous Posts Current City Current Province Other Province # Observations 313 Notes: t-statistics are computed using standard errors clustered at the city level.
50 Predicting City-level Manipulation: Interpreting the PSEC Variable Comparing Party Secretaries by PSEC Variable Elite College Elite Other t-stat Difference Experience Years in Current Post Years to Retirement Current Post in Birth Province Previous Experience Enterprise Research Administrator in Gov t or Party Organization County Mayor County Party Secretary City Mayor City Party Secretary Central Government Location of Previous Posts Current City Current Province Other Province # Observations 313 Notes: t-statistics are computed using standard errors clustered at the city level.
51 Predicting City-level Manipulation: Interpreting the PSEC Variable Comparing Party Secretaries by PSEC Variable Elite College Elite Other t-stat Difference Experience Years in Current Post Years to Retirement Current Post in Birth Province Previous Experience Enterprise Research Administrator in Gov t or Party Organization County Mayor County Party Secretary City Mayor City Party Secretary Central Government Location of Previous Posts Current City Current Province Other Province # Observations 313 Notes: t-statistics are computed using standard errors clustered at the city level.
52 Predicting City-level Manipulation: Interpreting the PSEC Variable Comparing Party Secretaries by PSEC Variable Elite College Elite Other t-stat Difference Experience Years in Current Post Years to Retirement Current Post in Birth Province Previous Experience Enterprise Research Administrator in Gov t or Party Organization County Mayor County Party Secretary City Mayor City Party Secretary Central Government Location of Previous Posts Current City Current Province Other Province # Observations 313 Notes: t-statistics are computed using standard errors clustered at the city level. Interpretation more mobile non-gov. experience less likely to climb the political ladder central government experience
53 Predicting City-level Manipulation: Interpreting the PSEC Variable Heterogeneity in the Manipulation-PSEC Relationship (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) PSEC (2.14) (1.86) (1.53) (1.49) (1.57) Interacted with Demographic Characteristics Male non-han (0.30) Female Han (-2.90) Education Entrance During (0.86) Entrance During (-1.30) STEM Major (-0.10) Experience Years in Current Post (-0.69) Years to Retirement (-0.76) Previous Experience Enterprise (0.13) Sample Mean of Dependent Variable (S.D.) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) # Observations Notes: All regressions include city and year fixed effects. t-statistics in parentheses are computed using standard errors clustered at the city level. ˆm
54 Predicting City-level Manipulation: Interpreting the PSEC Variable Heterogeneity in the Manipulation-PSEC Relationship (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) PSEC (2.61) (2.74) (1.21) (1.83) (2.05) Interacted with Previous Experience Research (-2.01) County Party Secretary Only (-0.94) County Mayor Only (-4.16) Both County Party Secretary & Mayor (1.04) City Party Secretary Only (1.37) City Mayor Only (-0.76) Both City Party Secretary & Mayor (-0.57) Central Government (0.01) Previous Location Current City Only (-1.56) Other Province Only (-1.61) Current City & Other Province (-1.21) Sample Mean of Dependent Variable (S.D.) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) # Observations Notes: All regressions include city and year fixed effects. t-statistics in parentheses are computed using standard errors clustered at the city level. ˆm
55 Predicting City-level Manipulation: Interpreting the PSEC Variable Recap 1. Increases in GDP associated with increases in manipulation when PSEC = 1, even after accounting for macroeconomic trends. 2. PSEC, observable differences and heterogeneity Key Observable differences between elite educated and other party secretaries - more likely to have non-governmental experience - less likely to have climbed the political ladder from county-level positions - more likely to have central-government experience Heterogeneity in the Manipulation-PSEC relationship Among elite-educated party secretaries... - females are associated with less manipulation - those with previous research experience are associated with less manipulation - those whose county-level experience was only as a mayor are associated with less manipulation
56 Predicting City-level Manipulation: Interpreting the PSEC Variable Technical Ability, Ambition or Connections? Suppose it were technical ability or ambition,... - why would females be less likely to manipulate? - why would those with prior research experience be less likely to manipulate? - why would those with only mayor experience at the county level be less likely to manipulate? Could it be connections?
57 Concluding Remarks This paper presents an interesting predictive relationship between air pollution manipulation and elite-educated party secretaries (PSEC) in Chinese cities. The interpretation of elite education in this context is more consistent with connections being the unobservable driver of the manipulation-psec relationship. A proper network analysis would be an important direction for future work.
58 Concluding Remarks This paper presents an interesting predictive relationship between air pollution manipulation and elite-educated party secretaries (PSEC) in Chinese cities. The interpretation of elite education in this context is more consistent with connections being the unobservable driver of the manipulation-psec relationship. A proper network analysis would be an important direction for future work. Thank you!
59 Predicting City-level Manipulation: Interpreting the PSEC Variable University Ranking and High-level Politicians Notes: The relationship between number of high-level politicians and university ranking presented. The high-level politicians include the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee members and candidates and the Central Disciplinary Committee members in the 14th-18th party congress. They also include national, sub-national, and minister-level politicians since The universities are ranked by China University Alumni Network. The ranked universities are also categorized into 6 grades, with 6 being the highest rank. The data source is
60 Supplementary Results: Heterogeneity in PSEC Variable - Manipulated Blue-Sky Days I (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) PSEC (1.99) (1.87) (1.36) (1.07) (1.21) Interacted with Demographic Characteristics Male non-han (0.24) Female Han (-0.99) Education College Entrance During (0.60) College Entrance During (-1.30) STEM Major (-0.06) Experience Years in Current Post (0.26) Years to Retirement (-0.29) Previous Experience Enterprise (0.43) # Observations Notes: All regressions include city and year fixed effects. t-statistics in parentheses are computed using standard errors clustered at the city level. Back
61 Supplementary Results: Heterogeneity in the PSEC Variable - Manipulated Blue-Sky Days II (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) PSEC (2.35) (2.49) (1.26) (1.82) (1.97) Interacted with Previous Experience Research (-1.74) County Party Secretary Only (-0.71) County Mayor Only (-4.34) Both County Party Secretary & Mayor (1.06) City Party Secretary Only (0.94) City Mayor Only (-1.05) Both City Party Secretary & Mayor (-0.42) Central Government (-0.05) Previous Locations Current City Only (-0.86) Other Province Only (-1.65) Current City & Other Province (-0.50) # Observations Notes: All regressions include city and year fixed effects. t-statistics in parentheses are computed using standard errors clustered at the city level. Back
62 List of Cities in Our Data Set 1 Anshan 38 Jiujiang 75 Suzhou 2 Anyang 39 Kaifeng 76 Taian 3 Baoding 40 Kelamayi 77 Taiyuan 4 Baoji 41 Kunming 78 Tangshan 5 Baotou 42 Lanzhou 79 Tianjin 6 Beihai 43 Lasa 80 Tongchuan 7 Beijing 44 Lianyungang 81 Weifang 8 Benxi 45 Linfen 82 Weinan 9 Changchun 46 Liuzhou 83 Wenzhou 10 Changde 47 Luoyang 84 Wuhan 11 Changsha 48 Luzhou 85 Wuhu 12 Changzhi 49 Maanshan 86 Wulumuqi 13 Changzhou 50 Mianyang 87 Wuxi 14 Chengdou 51 Mudanjiang 88 Xiamen 15 Chifeng 52 Nanchang 89 Xian 16 Chongqing 53 Nanchong 90 Xiangtan 17 Dalian 54 Nanjing 91 Xianyang 18 Datong 55 Nanning 92 Xining 19 Deyang 56 Nantong 93 Xuzhou 20 Fushun 57 Ningbo 94 Yanan 21 Fuzhou 58 Panzhihua 95 Yangquan 22 Guangzhou 59 Pingdingshan 96 Yangzhou 23 Guilin 60 Qingdao 97 Yantai 24 Guiyang 61 Qinhuangdao 98 Yibin 25 Haerbin 62 Qiqihaer 99 Yichang 26 Haikou 63 Quanzhou 100 Yinchuan 27 Handan 64 Qujing 101 Yueyang 28 Hangzhou 65 Rizhao 102 Yuxi 29 Hefei 66 Sanmenxia 103 Zaozhuang 30 Huhehaote 67 Shanghai 104 Zhanjiang 31 Huzhou 68 Shantou 105 Zhengzhou 32 Jiaozuo 69 Shaoguan 106 Zhenjiang 33 Jilin 70 Shaoxing 107 Zhuhai 34 Jinan 71 Shenyang 108 Zhuzhou 35 Jinchang 72 Shenzhen 109 Zibo 36 Jining 73 Shijiazhuang 110 Zigong 37 Jinzhou 74 Shizuishan 111 Zunyi
63 List of Variables in Raw Data Set 1 Province 29 Years Worked in This City 2 City 30 Highest degree/certificate 3 Administrative Ranking of the City 31 School Name 4 Year 32 Bachelor/Associate 5 Name 33 Campus Location (province) 6 Member of CPC Provincial Committee 34 Key Univ. (1st round) 7 Year/Month to Assume Duty 35 Key Univ. (2nd round) 8 Age when Assuming Duty 36 Year/Month of Entering College 9 Year/Month to Leave Office 37 Major in College 10 Year/Month to Leave Office 38 Graduate School Name 11 Birth of Date 39 Year/Month of Entering Graduate School 12 Male 40 Major in Graduate School 13 Province of Birth 41 Highest Degree/Certificate 14 City of Birth 42 Year/Month of Obtaining the Degree 15 County of Birth 43 Major 16 Ethnic Group 44 School/Institute 17 Year/Month of Joining the Party 45 Government Training Program 18 Year/Month of Starting Career 46 Year/Month of Starting Training 19 Been a Secretary in Party/Government Institutions 47 Party School Training 20 Been a Enterprise s Employee 48 Year/Month of Entering Party School 21 Been an Academic or Policy Researcher 49 Level of Training in Party School 22 Been a Party Secretary of City 50 Studied Abroad 23 Been a Mayor of City 51 Duration of Abroad Study 24 Been a Party Secretary of County 52 Worked in Functional Departments 25 Been a Mayor of County 53 Name of the Functional Departments 26 Years in Central Governmental Institutions 54 Worked in Communist League Central 27 Years Worked in Other Provinces 55 Actual Current Administrative Ranking 28 Years Worked in This Province Notes: For each party secretary and mayor for each city whose tenure overlapped with , we collected all of the above variables in our raw data set, which we then use to construct the variables listed.
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