1 Paper presented at the International Political Science Association (IPSA) Congress. Poznan, Poland July 2016.!1

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1 Looking for a Gender Lens in Party Formation and Dynamics: The Case of Bangsamoro Political Parties in Mindanao, Philippines 1 Rosalie Arcala Hall, Ph.D. University of the Philippines Visayas rahall@upv.edu.ph Introduction On March 2014, the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) between the national government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), an armed Muslim separatist group, was signed signalling a possible termination of the three-decade conflict in Mindanao. The CAB is the outcome of formal peace processes restarted under the Presidency of Benigno Aquino III after years of stalled negotiations and two interim wars (2000 Camp Abu Bakar and 2001 Buliok offensives) which resulted in the displacement of many local people. The CAB reframes the relationship between the national government and the proposed Bangsamoro Political Entity (BPE), which will supplant the problem-ridden Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) by providing more robust local autonomy and more defined power and resource sharing. With a ministerial form of government, proportional party representation system of its legislature, and definitive control over shared wealth, the BPE and the MILF s presumed control over the this governance apparatus are expected to reconfigure local politics in this area. The peace processes between the Philippine government and the MILF build upon the gains from the 1996 peace agreement between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), another Muslim separatist armed movement. Both produced tremendous yields in terms of spaces for political articulation of Bangsamoro women s agenda and their agency. Much of the gains in the public sphere has been in the realm of civil society where Bangsamoro women have made great strides in providing leadership to NGOs and community-based organisations pursuing 1 Paper presented at the International Political Science Association (IPSA) Congress. Poznan, Poland July 2016.!1

2 various peace and development projects (Hall and Hoare, 2015). In the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and local politics, there have also been Bangsamoro women running for and elected into office. Although fewer in numbers, mostly in legislative rather than executive positions, and more readily embedded in their respective clan dynasties, these women are forging paths and breaking gender barriers. As women sectoral parties are also gaining some ground in the national political arena, women leaders like Yasmin Busran-Lao and others are carving spaces within the national government and progressive movements for the nuancing of their gendered Muslim identity. The power-sharing component of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the projected new institutional design under the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) is set to fundamentally alter the political dynamics of the Bangsamoro region. With a ministerial/parliamentary form of government, a mixed set of representation and a reserved sectoral seat for women, new incentive structures are being created to regional party formation, which are also theorised to facilitate MILF s transition from an armed group to a democratic political player. The regional parties are envisioned to provide more substantive vehicles for political participation by MILF and MNLF women, particularly those outside of powerful clans that have dominated local politics in the area. Would these women follow the similar trajectory of Filipino women who have earlier found their political voices in the context of the anti-marcos dictatorship struggle, build strong civil society formations with a women s agenda, and shifting into the political arena during the 1988 elections and subsequently party list elections? This paper describes the involvement of MNLF and MILF women in party formation and party-building within the two regional parties, Bangsamoro Women United Party (BWUP) and the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP), in the contexts of the incentive structure provided by new electoral rules under the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law and the realities of clan domination in!2

3 ARMM and local elections. 2 The paper is based on a research project which involved key informant interviews and focus group discussions with key political party officers of BWUP and UBJP in Cotabato, Isabela and Zamboanga cities from August to October The interview and FGD instruments mapped the political parties activities along membership recruitment, chapter formation, nomination procedures, and constituency building, and their inclusiveness or cognisance of women s substantive participation. Select women party activists, male MNLF/MILF leaders, and incumbent Moro women officials were also interviewed about women s role in electoral politics and its compatibility/tensions with cultural interpretations of gender-based relations. The party list representatives of Abanse Pinay and Gabriela Women s Party, as well as multi-sectoral party list Akbayan were also interviewed for their insights on the strategies for enhancing women s political participation and for prospects of linkages between these national party formations and the regional parties. Election Rules as Institutional Givens The electoral rules in the Philippines has direct consequences on the way political parties are organized and mobilised to win votes. All national and local seats are filled in through a winnertake-all/first-past-the-post (FPTP) system where candidates with the most number of votes are declared winner. Because Presidential and Senatorial seats are decided on a nation-wide basis (i.e. national sum of votes), there is pressure for candidates to spread their machinery across Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. During the pre-martial law period where two parties (Liberal and Nacionalista Party) vied for power, great efforts are made to make sure the party ticket/line up draw from the three regions. In the era of multiple party system post-1986, political parties pay attention to vote-rich metropolitan areas and areas where command votes are guaranteed. As such, Philip- 2 The paper is derived from a commissioned study by the author for The Asia Foundation-Manila. The field research was conducted in Mindanao from May-November 2015.!3

4 pine political parties evolved not so much as interest-aggregating bodies in line with the Western template, but as pragmatic coalitions of key leaders with their respective clientelistic networks (Teehankee, 2006: 260). They are primarily vehicles for Presidential candidacy linked to local brokers able to deliver votes in exchange for access to resources and power post-election. Maguindanao during the ARMM governorship of Andal Ampatuan Sr. ( ) was infamous for delivering the crucial margin of victory for Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the 2004 elections, albeit in numbers that are suspect or statistically improbable. The national legislature (House of Representatives) go by single-member district representation. Beginning 1998, 20% (about 52 seats) of the House seats are filled in through a party list (PL) system which is supposed to balance representation from the marginalized sectors of Philippine society. Unlike the FPTP where voters choose individual candidates, in the PL system voters choose parties. The party that obtains at least 2% of the total votes cast gets one seat and may get additional seats (three seats maximum) with a vote share higher than 2%. Each party submits a list of five nominees to COMELEC prior, from which the representative from the winning party is selected. The ARMM created in 1988 has parallel rules (FPTP) in filling up seats for the governorship and the Regional Legislative Assembly (RLA). Although the ARMM Organic Law (Republic Act 6734) then has a similar proviso for sectoral representation, subsequent Assemblies have failed to pass an enabling law creating the mechanisms for this proviso. 3 As such no sectoral representation exists to date under the RLA; in place is single-member district representation parallel to that of the national House of Representatives (Co et al., 2013: 133). Because the ARMM is supervised by the Office of the President (technically part of the executive branch), the relationship between the national and ARMM government officials has always been nuanced. Before 2013, ARMM elections 3 In anticipation of the enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) and elections for the Bangsamoro Parliament, Maguindanao Governor Toto Mangudadatu established the Maguindanao Reform Party. Said party has already been COMELEC-accredited as a regional party. Maguindanao forms party for Bangsamoro polls, 21 December 2014, Manila Bulletin. com.ph/maguindanao-forms-party-for-bangsamoro-polls/!4

5 were de-synchronized from national and local elections (including local seats in constituent units of ARMM). Given this, the national government (and de facto, the party of the incumbent President or administration party) is able to interfere in ARMM elections by favouring administration party candidates and specifically by the President choosing party s candidate for the ARMM governorship (Co et al., 2013: 99). The synchronization of ARMM elections with national and local elections is supposed to reduce this effect by somewhat levelling-off the playing field between Presidential candidates. 4 The unique context of electoral politics in the ARMM, notably the predominance of political clans, colour the operationalisation of partisan politics in the area. Historically, this Muslim-dominant area had the datu system whereby followers owed allegiance to clan leader (datu) for their ability to mediate and reconcile disputes. The datu system has evolved as a way for the central government to coop clans that are then used to neutralise un-cooperative ones or to suppress a rebellion/insurgency (Lingao, 2013: 18; Brecht-Drouart, 2015: 90). The concomitant redefinition of datu into ones whose fortunes are beholden to the central government has also corrupted the presumably reciprocal and accountable relationship between the datu and his followers. Under democratic electoral rules, the clan leaders asset is their followers, the locked-in-electorate they are able to mobilise or de-mobilise by use of fraud, intimidation, and outright violence (Sidel, 2014: 18; Co, 2013: 69 citing Rivera 2011). The emergence of the regional Islamic party, OMPIA, in Lanao del Sur is a departure from the usual template whereby clan leaders are coopted into the national party mechanism as a local vote delivery vehicle. OMPIA led by Marawi City Mayor ( ) and 3-term Governor ( ) Muhid Mutilan, himself the leader of Ulama League of the Philippines and founder of the Bishop-Ulama Conference, is indicative of the re-traditionalization focus of Lanao s politics. While 4 Republic Act (2011) provided for the synchronization of ARMM elections with national and local elections beginning In the interim, the President appointed officers-in-charge for Governor, Vice-Governor and Regional Legislative Assembly.!5

6 Mutilan clearly had the support of President Estrada during his years of involvement in the national government s peace process with the MILF, Mutilan under OMPIA also sought to introduce aspects of Islam into the local government (Brecht-Drouart 2015, 90). OMPIA did not draw from the usual Maranao royalty families as client-supporters of Manila; it had a clear Islamization agenda. After Mutilan s controversial defeat to Andal Ampatuan Sr. for the ARMM governorship in 2001, the powers-that-be in Manila promptly shifted support back to members of the royal families, bringing OMPIA into a moribund existence. The clan leader also directly influences electoral outcomes in areas s/he controls by dictating who runs for office (i.e., pre-selecting candidates who invariably run unopposed) and by using his private army to pressure local COMELEC officials and election inspectors (school teachers) to fudge the results. Thus, whatever political party affiliation local candidates carry has neither meaningful nor symbolic importance to the voters; it is the family or clan that matters. In Maguindanao, for instance, the Ampatuans, Sangkis, Mangudadatus, Midtimbangs, Sinsuats, Dilangalens, Datumanongs, and Semas hold public office in the 36 municipalities comprising the province, with each clan maintaining their own bailiwick (e.g. Midtimbang political clan members holding office in the towns of Datu Hoffer Ampatuan, Datu Anggal Midtimbang, Guindulungan, and Talayan) (Ilagan, 2013: 3). Political Parties and the Participation of Women: Gains and Snares There are three types of political parties accredited by COMELEC: national, regional, and sectoral. The types of political parties determine which elections they could contest (national, local, party list). Regional political parties are those that can only field candidates for geographically contained areas (e.g. province or region-wide). COMELEC rules (Rule Number 32) do not proscribe how political parties choose their candidates, but require that they should not espouse any religious sect or denomination, pursue violent means, or receive support from foreign governments.!6

7 How do these electoral rules (FPTP, PL, scope of electoral contestation available) affect women s involvement as candidates and their winnability? Since the democratic transition in 1986, the proportion of women running for office has been steadily increasing. Veneracion-Rallonza (2008: 227) noted an upward trend from 9% to 16% in terms of legislative seats; and from 10% to 16% in terms of provincial and local seats from 1988 to Other studies also point to improvements in the proportion of women in elected positions over the years (Philippine Commission on Women, 2013: 1; Balili-Gener and Urbiztondo, 2002: 6). But while the number is increasing nationally, the record for ARMM remains well-below the average. Co (2013: 128 and 129) notes that very few women run for office (roughly 10% of total) in ARMM; elected female officials at the provincial level in ARMM are such rare species. The reasons cited for comparatively lower proportion of women (to men) running for office are: (1) socially-defined roles for women to be supportive of leader-husbands by entertaining constituencies and doing charity work (Valente and Moreno, 2014: 17); (2) multiple burden of women domestic, work, civic which make entry into politics unattractive; and (3) political parties not exerting effort to recruit women in their slates as candidates (COMELEC exec: Political parties should field more women candidates, 25 November 2015). Political parties are not the exclusive path to political power for women. Previous studies looking at the profile of elected female legislators and local officials point that a majority of them are drawn from the elite and from political families or clans that have an established following in their locality (Aguilar, 1993: 148 and 151; Report on the Status of Women in Urban Local Government, n.d., 10). Looking at the roster of successful female candidates in Mindanao during the 2013 election, Arguillas (2013) also notes that many women came from family dynasties. The usual trajectory for women s entry into politics are: (1) they take over in locales with an established patronage-base by male clan members (e.g. father, husband, brother, uncle); (2) they are substitute candidate (in case of untimely demise of the male clan member with patronage-base) or transition candidate (when male clan member is termed out) (Veneracion-Rallonza, 2008: 242; Co et al., 2013:!7

8 128). Party affiliation is seen as an add-on, not a substitute, to the money and other resources provided by the family (Veneracion-Rallonza, 2008: 245). In the context of ARMM, women exercise agency in running for office but within the ambit of their family affiliation and by the strong imperative for clans to keep political power within the family. Among Maguindanao clans, women members are chosen to run based on pragmatic considerations mentioned above; but very rarely for executive posts like mayor, unless under exigent circumstances (e.g. wives of Ampatuan male members on trial for involvement in the 2009 Maguindanao massacre ran for office in 2010). In what Lingao (2013: 13) mentions as fat dynasties where clans occupy multiple elective positions concurrently, there is more room for women members to be chosen as presumptive candidates. In the case of powerful Maranao clans, they are oblivious to Islamic interpretations opposing women in leadership positions as their main concern is power for the family (Brecht-Drouart, 2015: 102). The role of Maranao women in local politics is more nuanced given the presumably gendersymmetric (male and female) recognition in the Maranao royal family, the traditional basis for clan/family system in their society. Said traditional system recognises the role of sultan (male) and bai a labi (female), although the latter s role in decision-making is limited by cultural prescriptions (based on age, social standing, family background, education among others) as to the women s presence in the public sphere (Brecht-Drouart 2015, 92) Older women in their 50s are accorded more freedoms to join meetings, conferences, and rallies, but younger women in their 30s can only do so in groups or if escorted by a male relative. Even with this presumed entitlement as bai a labi, Maranao women have to be stubborn and insistent about this role before a male-dominated body whose natural inclination is to dismiss the women s claim (in the context of the sultanate system) as un-islamic. The political career of Maranao Yasmin Busran-Lao is emblematic of the new breed of Muslim secular feminism that is a counterpoise to the traditional and conservative views about the political role of women espoused by MILF and OMPIA. Busran-Lao was a nominee for Abanse!8

9 Pinay in 2004 and ran under the Liberal Party Senate ticket (in both cases, lost) and has deep roots in the Muslim NGO movement and with PILIPINA. Her brand of feminism seeks to empower Muslim women by using Islam as reference point and arguing against what is deemed patriarchic interpretations by male clerics. Where electoral rules have a bearing on party formation with a gender focus is more readily seen in the case of sectoral parties competing for the House PL seats. As women is a constitutionally-articulated sector, there was an incentive for women s groups to organize. This was the case of PILIPINA, a women s advocacy group that was also part of a left-leaning coalition against the Marcos dictatorship. In 1997, PILIPINA made a conscious decision to shift to electoral and parliamentary politics and adopted the following strategies accordingly: building a women s constituency through consultations; recruiting, training, and directly supporting candidates in barangay and House party-list elections; drafting a women s legislative and administrative agenda (Abao and Yang, 2001). In the 1995 elections, they (and another women s group KALAYAAN) succeeded in having AKSYON, the national political party they are affiliated with, adopt a 30% quota for women in its local and national chapters (Abao and Yang, 2001). In 1998, Abanse Pinay, a sectoral (women) political party competed in House elections and obtained a seat. However, after failing to gain seats in the 2004 and 2007 elections, Abanse Pinay was subsequently de-listed. GABRIELA, a group created in 1984 with the same anti-marcos credentials and more feminist in orientation similarly created a sectoral party, GABRIELA Women s Party which competed and won in the 2004 (one seat), 2007 (two seats), and 2010 (three seats) elections (Roces, 2010: 38). There had been a prior attempt to organise a national political party for women Kababaihan para sa Inang Bayan or KAIBA which posted one successful candidate, Rep. Nikki Coseteng, but the party folded once Coseteng joined a more mainstream national party. There were other women s sectoral political parties that fielded candidates (and lost) but did not have any concrete progressive women s agenda.!9

10 The elected women's impact on policy was a mixed bag. While concrete gains have been made in the realm of reproductive health and solo parent's rights, these have been made possible by way of networking across party lines rather than singular victories for the women's parties. While party list has become a way for women to enter formal political structures with a definitive agenda, the party list representatives could only link and bargain with numerically-superior representatives belonging to national parties (Veneracion-Rallonza, 2008: 231). Roces (2010: 39) sees electoral politics as a failed venue for women to advance a feminist agenda; the women party list have not been able to use campaigns as sites for feminist debates or propaganda. The de-listing of Abanse Pinay is also seen as an indicator of the women s movements as yet immature performance in building a robust woman s constituency. Bangsamoro political parties: organization, leadership and mass base in a period of uncertainty The electoral rules (FPTP, single-member district representation in the Regional Legislative Assembly) under the ARMM is the default rules-of-the-game for current party formations, but emerging political parties like the Bangsamoro Women United Party (BWUP) and the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP) has the Bangsamoro Parliament under the proposed (agreed!10

11 GPH-MILF version) Bangsamoro Basic Law in their horizon. 5 The Bangsamoro Parliament fea- tures a mixed system of representation; the 60 parliament seats is to be distributed 50%-40%-10% (party list, district-based and sectoral seats, respectively). 6 Unlike the PL system for the national House which comprise only 20% of the House seats, the projected Bangsamoro Parliament has more party list seats, which when combined with sectoral seats is intended to neutralise clan-dominance in district seats. It is also understood that only regional parties (parties whose base is geographically-confined to the Bangsamoro core territory) will be allowed to compete in the Bangsamoro election; thereby inhibiting national political parties from joining. In theory, these rules provide more incentives for regional parties to be organised, distinct from national parties. As a corollary, female candidates should have more opportunities to be recruited as a candidate under a regional party list system. There is already a proviso for one reserved seat for women as sectoral representative in the Bangsamoro Parliament and at least one woman cabinet minister. It is worth noting that the operational guidelines for the PL, district representative, and sectoral representative have yet to be formulated. The agreed GPH-MILF version of the BBL has a proviso for a Bangsamoro Electoral Office that presumably will craft these, but the Senate version of the BBL 5 Another regional political party, Moro National Solidarity Party (MNSP), is being formed, with the Bangsamoro Parliament elections in its horizon. MNSP was initiated by mostly male, middle ranking MNLF leaders from Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, including Teng Ambolodto and Benhur Usman. According to Abdul Hajid Habib Hussein (personal communications, 20 August 2015), they already have chapters in many districts, municipalities and barangays in BaSulTa area; and that they have as members some sitting politicians. They plan to apply for accreditation as a regional party once the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority is set up and the Bangsamoro Electoral Office is in place. In terms of organisational development, the incipient party has committees propaganda, communication, education, religious sector, women and youth but they have yet to convene an assembly where their nomination procedures will be decided, projecting a vetting process based on qualification and honesty. There are no women in municipal or district chapter members as yet but most of the women are involved in community organising/constituency-building. They project that their target candidates would be males, former MNLF commanders and those with positions in government (women, secondary). In terms of financing, Hussein says the consensus now is for party leaders to contribute 10,000 pesos as seed money for mobilisation, while piggy-backing party promotion in MNLF activities. Mr. Hussein says MNSP has had conversations with the Binay Movement for President. 6 The Senate version of the BBL (authored by Ferdinand Marcos Jr.) reduces PL seats from 30 to 8.!11

12 excludes this body, thus posing the question as to whether COMELEC or a Bangsamoro Electoral Office will come up with these crucial guidelines. This section describes the organisational capacity of the Bangsamoro Women United Party (BWUP) and the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP) using the following metrics for political parties: (1) membership recruitment; (2) financing and personnel resource mobilisation; (3) candidate nomination procedure; and (4) party activities along dimensions of civic education (voter s education; voter s registration); interest aggregation (building constituency for a gender agenda) and coalition-building (seeking connections and mutually beneficial relationships with civil society groups and with other political parties). In 07 December 2015, the Commission of Election (COM- ELEC) accredited UBJP as a regional political party. By contrast, the BWUP has not been able to file an application for accreditation by the May 2015 deadline set by COMELEC. The group focused their time registering with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in an erroneous assumption that such is needed as a requirement for the COMELEC registration. There are core members and associates of BWUP, all of whom are women and majority of whom belong to the Moro National Liberation Front Women s Committee including their de facto leader Bainon Karon. Bainon Karon, an ex-combatant and wife to former MNLF commander, and an esteemed MNLF stalwart who sat in the Central Committee (as representative for the Women s Committee). Many MNLF women joined BWUP because of loyalty to her and a shared strong belief on the worthiness of the MNLF and women s cause. Apart from the core members (who are by demographics older women), the group also has young female recruits who are the children and/or grandchildren of MNLF women pre This second liners are deliberately recruited because of the BWUP leaders emphasis on continuity; they wanted the next generation to be embedded with the same passion for the Bangsamoro cause and to identify with the MNLF as did their forebears (Bainon Karon, comments during focus group discussion, 02 June 2015). The BWUP is organisationally configured as an all-women party at this point, with membership re-!12

13 cruitment only available to women but inclusive in that they also try to invite MILF, indigenous and Christian women to join them. The core members of BWUP are also women leaders of the Federation of United Mindanawan Bangsamoro Women Multi-Purpose Cooperatives, a civil society network that grew out of the many development projects following the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the government and the MNLF (Teng Ambolodto, personal communications, 02 June 2015). Many MNLF women following this transition worked as community organisers, becoming grassroots leaders in their own right. This network comprises the BWUP s supposed constituency and volunteer backbone; they hope to tap these women leaders in populating the district chapters and doing precinct coordination work to identify at least 30% pro-party voters from within the precinct. According to Bainon Karon and Giobay Diocolano (remarks during validation presentation, 02 April 2016), some BWUP members (as Kadtabanga NGO network) has also been engaging local MNLF commanders involved in PAMANA projects, in line with their task as Joint Monitoring Team by the ARMM government. During these sorties, they have been quietly building support for BWUP. BWUP is also able to engage commanders through their de facto presence in the MNLF Central Committee meetings and in MNLF General Assembly meetings, during which commanders also attend. BWUP members attest that they have grassroots presence ( may tao sa baba ) given these multiple platforms and channels. BWUP operations to date are focused on building organisational capacity. In terms of structure, the party is working towards having 937 regional, provincial, municipal and barangay chapters. They also have a Central Committee, with membership from outside the region which as seen as critical in mobilising resources for their long-term goal to gain party-list seats. They have participated in trainings and workshops on political party building funded by The Asia Foundation. The party s operations are divided between Central Mindanao and island provinces (Sulu-Basilan-Tawi Tawi) members, the latter led by Nawira Rasdi. Admittedly, the BWUP women experience great difficulty in mobilising across this geographical dispersion, with many members from the island!13

14 provinces having to travel long distances to attend trainings/workshops/meetings held either in Davao City or Cotabato City. In the island provinces in particular, Nawira Rasdi (personal communications, 21 August 2015) confides that they do not have structured meetings per se but small group gatherings or socials whenever members come into town or visit. By contrast, the Central Mindanao chapter meets more regularly and is able to attract a larger number of women attendees at any given time. BWUP has no operational fund at this point; much of their expenses (for meeting meals, travel, communication etc.) are self-financed by member-volunteers. As a way to expand their pool, they also send different persons (with preference to those from the island provinces) to attend the training and workshops by The Asia Foundation. Having applied for accreditation as a regional party, UBJP has a more concrete organization with committees (planning, education, documentation and publication, finance, disciplinary) and chapters (province, municipality/town/district, precinct) throughout the Bangsamoro core territory and Palawan. There are identified area coordinators per chapter and, at least in the case of Basilan province and Isabela City, a complete set of officers paralleling the committees set up at the party s central office (Ahkmad Al-Hamid, personal communications, 22 August 2015). From the MILF Assembly at Camp Darapanan in 27 June 2015, UBJP claims at least 127,000 registered volunteers (with names, addresses, precinct number, and contact information) they hope to tap to meet the target COMELEC requirement of 100 members per municipality. 7 For members, the UBJP is more inclusive in that it targets both males and females; MILF and non-milf affiliated; Muslims, Christians, and indigenous people. Chapter officers are also tasked to secure a voters registration list from the local COMELEC office and write a letter/introduce themselves to local COMELEC officers. 7 In the Presentation of Research Findings before select UBJP members (01 April 2016), Mr. Sam Al Manor reports that they have just completed political party training for 60 women; the next group will be youth members; and then by area chapter.!14

15 The bulk of the women who do volunteer work for UBJP come from the MILF Social Welfare Committee. The MILF Social Welfare Committee is already active in MILF communities doing activities such as Brigada Eskwela, masjid and public bathroom clean-ups, etc. Having outstanding grassroots connection, UBJP sees MILF Social Welfare Committee members as important assets particularly in the voter registration drive. UBJP has a Deputy Vice President (1 of 4) for Women, who is Atty. Raisa Jajurie. Atty. Jajurie (comments during focus group discussion, 16 August 2015) is of the opinion that having women in elective positions through the political party mechanism is not a question of entitlement but capacity. She said the notion of a woman s quota in the UBJP slate has been brought up by external agents, but did not surface in their community consultations. She is doubtful that such quota system will work as UBJP will be hard pressed to find women who are capable and skilled in public speaking and planning. Rather than adopting a quota, she thinks that UBJP is better off adopting internal rules that will allow for more voluntary recruitment of women, as potential candidates gain capacity. Further, according to Sammy Al-Mansour, UBJP Chairman (comments during focus group discussion, 16 August 2015), the party is envisioned as a pathway to reintegration for demobilised Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) combatants. According to Mr. Mohagher Iqbal (remarks during the Presentation of Research Findings, 01 April 2016), the MILF Central Committee has already agreed that MILF-BIAF members are automatically UBJP members. Said directive also presumed that MILF members (combatant and civilian) require no further orientation about the logic of forming a political party (which by contrast, would be required for non-milf members). Given the critical role for the UBJP in the MILF s projected transformation from an armed movement into a democratic player contesting elections, UBJP is seen as a political extension of the armed struggle (i.e. bullets to ballots ) with the possibility to serve as vehicle for ex-commanders or their children to try their hand in local politics. It is for this reason that part of the activities organized for the chapter coordinators include engagement with colocated MILF-BIAF commanders. The researcher was not able to pose the question whether this!15

16 demobilisation thrust would also include the women BIAF auxiliary force, although the Annex on Normalization under the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro specifically identifies the BIAF women as a special group. The BWUP and UBJP are explicitly linked to the MNLF and MILF, respectively. BWUP claims that it has sought and received the green light from its principals (male leaders of the MNLF Executive Council led by Muslimin Sema; and also informally to the Nur Misuari faction) to establish the party. They argue that the formation of BWUP (an all-women party) did not elicit much contestation as such is a logical extension to the work of MNLF Women s Committee. The MNLF male leaders also expressed great confidence in the leadership of Bainon Karon and her organising capacity given her previous political roles as Regional Assembly Woman and Deputy ARMM Governor (Jan Jakilani, personal communications, 03 June 2015; Omar Sema, personal communications, 03 June 2015). Given the current factionalism of the MNLF leadership, BWUP functions autonomously from the movement. By contrast, the link between UBJP and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is on a more formal footing. The party was created through a directive by the MILF Central Committee. UBJP s central office committee memberships are also persons who concurrently occupy formal positions in the MILF (e.g. UBJP Chair Sammy Al-Mansour is also BIAF Chief of Staff; UBJP Deputy VP for Women and Youth Atty. Raisa Jajurie is also a member of the Bangsamoro Transition Commission). The MILF-CC retains veto power over UBJP rules, including nomination procedures which as it stands are subject to cultural limitations (i.e. women can be parliament members but could not hold executive positions including mayor and Chief Minister) and the determination of the party s list of nominees (criteria for slot and order distribution between geographic areas, ethnicity, and gender) (Sammy Al-Mansour, comments during focus group discussion, 16 August 2015).!16

17 Given the asymmetric stage in party formation of BWUP and UBJP, many of their activities are geared towards building a mass base or voter constituency, recruitment of informal candidate, and projection of participation in the Bangsamoro parliament and local electoral contests. The BWUP s expected mass-base are members of Federation of United Mindanawan Bangsamoro Women Multi-Purpose Cooperatives, MNLF members (men and women alike), and MNLF supporters. Towards this end, they are focusing on recruiting and grooming local women leaders; emphasizing education in party principles, social obligation as Muslim women, and women s agenda. Admittedly, they recognise that many local MNLF women leaders in their pool are still lacking in these party fundamentals, including skills such as public speaking and campaigning. As such, they are keen in providing capacity training along these lines for these identified women. They also plan to bring their platform/agenda to the mass base through voter s education. However, BWUP has yet to provide concrete examples of activities or strategies for candidate recruitment and voter mobilization, e.g. voters registration drive. Many activities cited by the BWUP respondents during the interviews point more to ad hoc initiatives and informal networking between the party stalwarts and this general pool. Previously, some BWUP members have done local election monitoring, guarding ballots in the precinct to make sure they're not seized by armed parties. From this experience, they have learned that women are safer in this environment as men usually do not oppose their presence and actions. Some members also had previous experience supporting a party list candidate (e.g., Kasangga Party List) but which linkage left them disappointed. After supposedly delivering votes for said party-list candidate, their advocacy was conveniently forgotten by the winning candidate. BWUP s projection for 2016 elections is to endorse women-friendly candidates in local elections and build alliances with male-led party-formations. BWUP s long-term plan is to get accredited as a regional party and field candidates for both the Bangsamoro parliament and local elections. They envision a nomination procedure whereby candidate-nominees are to be drawn from their own members; mounting a convention of members to scout and persuade potential candidates. They!17

18 have no concrete plans on how to raise campaign funds but they intimated that each core member donate 10,000 pesos to BWUP as part of the seed money to support initial mobilisation. BWUP members appear optimistic that even with little campaign funds on their own, they can win seats by being selective they will only field candidates in positions (e.g. local council) and localities where they will not run up against a clan-supported candidate ( malakas na kandidato ). By contrast, UBJP s mass base comes from MILF members and supporters. Because of the party s unofficial status at the time the study was conducted, its officers claim their point persons could not openly recruit members nor solicit/accept campaign donations. In Basilan, ground work is done through informal introductions to MILF communities, often piggy-backed to Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA)-supported community projects or to social outreach projects by the MILF Social Welfare Committee. The UBJP Basilan chapter President says he also befriends the principals or school administrators of colleges/universities so that he be allowed to make presentations about the BBL (and corollary, the UBJP) with students (Abduljamid Tanasak, personal communications, 22 August 2015). In these community presentations, UBJP officers have to explain about the nature and circumstances of UBJP s creation as a party in conjunction with the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law and its derivative structures of government (Bangsamoro Parliament, partylist, sectoral representation). For UBJP officers on the ground, this is a much more difficult undertaking as they also have to explain about UBJP as a continuation of MILF s struggle from political to democratic participation. For the Isabela City chapter officers, they admit facing greater challenges before Christian communities because of the oft-misguided notion that UBJP is an exclusive vehicle for MILF s path to power under the proposed Bangsamoro Political Entity (BPE) (Ahkmad Al-Hamid, personal communications, 22 August 2015). While their party platform point to non-exclusivity (i.e. they appeal to the broad segment of Muslims, Christians, indigenous/lumads), their close identification with MILF generates an opposite view. As previously mentioned, the UBJP is working with members of the MILF Social Welfare Committee in encouraging members of their!18

19 respective community to register as voters. Deputy Vice-President for Women and Youth Atty. Raisa Jajurie (comments during focus group discussion, 16 August 2015) also mentioned that UBJP is advocating for the COMELEC to extend a specials voters registration outside the Bangsamoro core area to capture the diaspora population. UBJP officers see that the party will continue to operate in-between elections conducting outreach programs geared towards voter s education. Both parties are cognisant that they face formidable challenges in running against clan-dominated electoral politics in the Bangsamoro area and national party influence on local electoral outcomes. UBJP s strategy against the first is three-fold: (1) change the rules of the game more seats should be allocated through the party-list system compared to district seats (which are naturally-controlled by clans); (2) a separate Bangsamoro Electoral Office and a Bangsamoro Election Code from which more neutral election guidelines (e.g. how are sectoral votes to be counted; sectoral vote conversion to seats and applicable thresholds) will emanate, and not subject to manipulation by Manila; (3) work against vote mobilization/demobilization by recruiting numerous poll watchers/monitors and pushing for voter re-registration. UBJP officers express confidence that their version of a locally-governed principled political party would resonate more with MILF supporters ( mga tao nila ) over family/clan obligations during election time. Unlike UBJP which has decided at this point not to field candidates for local elections, BWUP s strategy is the opposite they plan to field only candidates in competitive and least contested (i.e. where the dominant clan has no identified candidate) local elections, e.g. for barangay and municipal councilors. Like UBJP, BWUP is confident that the women in the NGO and community network would support these candidates. UBJP is more conscious of the imperative to break national party influence on regional outcomes, thus its emphasis on its independence. Thus far, it has no formal links with any of the national or sectoral parties, nor does it plan to support candidates from these parties in the upcoming 2016 elections. None of the national political parties have articulated interest in linking up with!19

20 UBJP. MILF Negotiating Panel Chair Mohagher Iqbal and Mr. Sam Al Mansoor (remarks during the Presentation of Research Findings, 01 April 2016) say this is because: (1) UBJP is still in its early organising stages, hence no projected block votes to deliver to national party candidates; (2) sensitivity of UBJP s direct link with the MILF Central Committee; and (3) UBJP s own misgivings about the transient, ad hoc (not principled) nature of national parties. UBJP s party formation efforts are also un-connected to those of BWUP and MNSP. It has no linkages with Anak Mindanao, but recognise that the latter has joined rallies in support of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB). By contrast, BWUP is open to building linkages with national party formations and supporting independent women candidates in the next local elections. Comparing the two, BWUP has a more clearly articulated gender agenda in its public education and interest aggregation activities, although much of the activities are as yet at a premature stage. Their target candidate-nominees and anticipated mass base are women; they wish to inculcate Muslim-culture convergent principles among their candidates-nominees and mass base (including social obligations and helping women achieve empowerment) through their voter s education. While their women s agenda is clear, their version of a voter s education preclude discussion about the structures for participation by women reserve seats, party-list representation in the Bangsamoro Parliament. By contrast, UBJP has no specific women s agenda in its platform and voter s education thrust. Given, however, that the party s fortunes are tied up with the new political structures for the Bangsamoro area under the BBL, they put more emphasis towards explaining about the big picture frameworks BBL, Bangsamoro Parliament, reserve seats, party-list system in their voter s education and interest aggregation strategies. Given the proposed BBL s non-passage, both groups remain optimistic and committed to their long-term political goal. For BWUP, their political struggle for Bangsamoro self-determination through their political party is a long-term project, for which they are confident, would be sustained by their second liners. They contend not to be affected by the fate of the BBL. UBJP members!20

21 meanwhile remain steadfast in their position that without the BBL, they must maintain their military capacity and be ready for whatever outcome. They remain positive that their organizing activities will continue, although admittedly, it s harder for them to recruit young people/second liners in the UBJP as committed and dedicated to the cause. They see the non-passage of the BBL as an electric shock that can perhaps energize the leadership and propel general angst towards more membership on their side. What Male Muslim Leaders Think: Women, Politics, and Party This section draws from the interviews of select male Muslims who are identified as MNLF and MILF leaders. As previously mentioned, MNLF male leaders comprise key positions in their Central Committee, but given the rift between the dominant Misuari and Sema factions, they do not formally comprise the BWUP s principals. Male members of the MILF, by contrast, hold formal positions within and have a direct say on the UBJP s organization. While the male MNLF leaders generally welcome the creation of BWUP, they are not confident that the gains made by MNLF women in their NGO work and community immersions would suffice for winning elections. Their pessimism rests with supposed BWUP s mass base the grassroots women whom they argue can t be relied upon when it comes to votes as their primary loyalty rests with their respective families/clans. Omar Sema (personal communications, 05 June 2015) and Jan Jakilani (personal communications, 05 June 2015) doubts BWUP candidates winnability given this predilection. Both male MNLF leaders recognise the importance of local parties linking up with national parties; Nur Misuari and Farouq Hussein won the ARMM governorship without having an MNLF party but their endorsement as administration Lakas party candidates were key. For them, it is more pragmatic for BWUP to align themselves with a mainstream national party if the goal is to win seats.!21

22 By contrast, Dr. Parido Rahman Pigkaulan (comments during focus group discussion, 16 August 2015) is more optimistic that the MILF mass base, while beholden to their clans, would ultimately choose principled rather than money politics in the upcoming Bangsamoro Parliament elections. They base this optimism on the relatively large amount of attendance/following they garner during MILF assemblies, indicative that they would also attract parallel amount of votes down the road. The large volunteer-turnout in June 2015 was also a positive indicator. The male MILF leaders are at this point keen on building their autonomous party capacities by focusing on voter mobilization, registration, and education, not on building linkages with other parties. The male leaders perspectives about the place of women in politics follow conservative lines. For Omar Sema (personal communications, 05 June 2015), Ustadz Faisal Esmael (personal communications, 06 June 2015) and Miskuddin Tupay (personal communications, 21 August 2015), it is acceptable for women to run for political office as it is part of their development as human beings. However, there are reservations to this participation: (1) that women only seek legislative, not executive posts (e.g. mayor or governor); (2) that women must be qualified, i.e. with comparable experience and education necessary for the position aspired for; and (3) all things being equal, men should be the first choice, i.e. women can run for the same position if no other men are qualified. These reservations are in place because a woman s priority is her family; running for office would run the risk of neglecting family over career. For married women in particular, a husband s approval for a political career path is necessary. Dr. Parido Rahman Pigkaulan (comments during focus group discussion, 16 August 2015) echoes the same concerns that women are not allowed for the Chief Ministry position in the projected Bangsamoro Parliament, but it is alright for women to run and be elected as parliament members. Like his MNLF counterpart, Dr. Parido Rahman Pigkaulan maintains that the main challenge for women participating in electoral contests are traditional expectations of the primacy of their domestic role. Moreover, many women (at least in the MILF roster) remain lacking in skills necessary to run for political office.!22

23 Gazing out: Insights on the Organisation and Activities of Women s Political Parties at the National Level There had been three political parties with overt women s agenda that have successfully fielded candidates and won seats under the national House of Representatives party-list system since 1998 Abanse Pinay (AP), Gabriela Women s Party (GWP), and Akbayan. 8 AP and GWP are women s sector party while Akbayan is multi-sectoral (including women). All three emerged out of the national women s movement, with a strong ethos towards regional representation in its nominee-list, particularly from Mindanao. Given this progeny, the parties were deliberately created as vehicles to advance the women s cause; with direct legislation as a complement to lobbying on key issues such as violence against women (VAW), reproductive/women s health, migration, and empowerment. The parties relationship with its civil society base is analysed along two dimensions: (1) how the movement affects the leadership and candidate recruitment for the party; and (2) how the movement supports the party through constituency-building and as a source of legislative agenda. With parallelisms in the electoral rules between party-list system and the proportional representation system stipulated in the proposed BBL, the experiences of women representatives from these parties are instructive in imagining what challenges may be in the offing for similarly situated Bangsamoro political parties. Links, if any, between the BWUP and UBJP on one hand, and Abanse 8 There have also been sectoral parties representing Muslims, which have fielded and (some) won seats in the national House. The most successful of which is Anak ng Mindanao (AMIN) which has won in the 2001 (1 seat); 2004 (1 seat); 2007 (2 seats) and 2013 (1 seat). Three-term AMIN Representative Mujiv Hataman (from Basilan) later was appointed in 2010 and elected ARMM Governor in His wife, Sitti DjaliaTurabin-Hataman, under highly controversial circumstances, became the party s representative in Suara Bangsamoro, an affiliate of Bayan Muna has competed in recent elections but failed to get seats; they had Muslim women nominees in their list (Zaynab Ampatuan and Amirah Ali Lidasan). AMIN s relative electoral success has been attributed to its ability to collect votes its bailiwick, the ARMM region specifically Basilan, Sulu and Maguindanao. AMIN s impressive showing in the 2013 elections is attributed to Mujiv Hataman s ARMM governorship, but the selection of his wife lead many to suspect a trend towards family dynasty-capture of the sectoral party. Sectoral Party list votes come from reg'l bailiwicks, 14 June Rappler News. Retrieved from