大 學. 8. Case Analysis 2 The Chantier de l économie Sociale

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1 8. Case Analysis 2 The Chantier de l économie Sociale The development of the Chantier de l économie sociale (CES) is a case that will thoroughly demonstrate how strong social capital within a community while keeping a certain trust / distrust relationship versus the authority (in this case the Québec Provincial Government) gave birth to a new institution that worked not only for the people of Québec but also for the government. We will first have a brief section on the recent history of Quebec. Not only will this 國 立 政 治 give the readers a general overview of the cultural, political and social condition of Quebec, but it will also show how Quebecers have had a tradition of distrusting the government (especially the Federal Government) and why. The recent history of Québec will also illustrate how being a French nation under English control brought the people together and how their identity as a distinct nation was forged. We will then proceed to a detailed description of the development of the Chantier de l économie sociale and the role of the Women s Federation of Québec (WFQ). We will National Chengch locate the various trust relations between the people and the governmental agencies and the various ways in which these relations worked for the different actors. We will be able to observe that the Women s Federation of Québec had a very high level of social capital, as seen through their large and effective mobilization capacities. We will also be able to observe 大 學 i University that their distrust towards the government led to a vibrant discussion to take place and the building of new institutions. Brief history of Québec since the 1960 s We believe the understanding of the case would not be complete without a brief introduction to Québec s recent history. The historical events can explain in some ways how and why the CES was born. It is important to keep in mind that the main cause for Canada Québec conflicts arise from the fact that the seven years war ended with Britain taking over France s colonies in Canada with the Treaty of Paris in At that time, Canada s main population was French; it was not until much later, in the mid 19 th century that the English speaking population was greater then the French population. Ninety percent of the French 55

2 speaking population resides in Québec (Chevrier, 2008). Also, since the 1960 s until the latest Canadian census of 2006, the French speaking population of Québec has always been around 80%, whereas the English speaking population has little by little decreased; from 13,8% in the 60 s to 8% in 2001, most of which live in Montréal city and its surroundings (Chevrier, 2008 and Statistics Canada, 2007). The French community had little power over their economic and social advancement, even though they accounted for the majority of the population. By the 1970 s, the situation of the English political and economic domination was still overwhelming. Eighty-three percent of administrative and managerial jobs were held by English speakers; French-Canadians salary was in average 35% lower then that of the English speakers, even bilingual Anglophones or Francophone did not do as well financially as unilingual Anglophones (Leclerc, 2008). With just this short overview of the makings of the population of Québec, we can already see how the French Quebeckers would have developed very deep feelings of discontent with the situation accompanied with high distrust towards the authoritative governments of Canada and to a certain extend, Québec. Needless to say, community ties increased accordingly to their anger towards the situation, as the following historical events will demonstrate. The year of 1960 marked a turning point in Canada-Québec relations: the period that follows 1960, until 1966, is called the Quiet Revolution. During this period, Québec s province undertook vast governmental reforms. It all started when Jean Lesage won the 1960 elections in Québec, thus ending the 16 yearlong rule by the conservative Union Nationale. This period is named the Quiet revolution because first, Jean Lesage s stance was for the most part traditional, and very much negotiation based, but it was a political and social revolution nonetheless. His election brought a new wave of hope in Quebeckers for self- assertion, economic growth, and full recognition by Canada. Under the slogan Masters in our own House, the new Québec government started reforms, most of which would not necessarily make the Canadian federal government or populaion happy, but Jean Lesage and his government were ready to negotiate and arrive to compromises. On the social side: The Quiet Revolution saw the rise of the labor movements, notably in the fastgrowing public sector (54% annual increase), the student movement advocating free tuition in universities and colleges, and of, course, the community development movement. (Raymond-Panet and Mayer, 1997: 54). 56

3 Some initiatives brought by Lesage, such as the creation of a provincial pension plan rather then a federal one (which still exists for all other provinces and territories of Canada) or the creation of a provincial Ministry of Education, were a success. Unfortunately, when it came to other federal-provincial relations, negotiations were not as easy. Québec wanted additional provincial powers, especially in cultural, educational and social security matters, but the federal government was less then willing to give these powers up, especially the fiscal powers. The other source of confrontation was in regards to the status of Québec; in the 1960 s, Québec province and their people were still seen as being a second-class population. Nevertheless, they wanted full and equal recognition in the Confederation. Frustration levels rose on both sides; Jean Lesage had been the first to go to the federal government to negotiate and accept some of Canada s demands, expectations of reciprocity were high. Requests were refused and negotiations stalled. Finally, after much frustration, Jean Lesage s own party was split into two fractions; one remained the Liberal Party and the other is now the strongest independence movement and party in Québec; the Party Québécois. In the end, Québec received very little from the Canadian government, while Canada was able to once again silence the Québec provincial government and population as well as isolate it just a little more. The impact these events had on the French Canadian population in Québec was deep. The population had lost the little hope (and trust) they had in the Federal government. Social movements, labor unions, and community organization started to build and organize (see Raymond-Panet, 1997: 32 or Ninacs, 2003: 8). Even if the Federal government had decided to launch special social services that had catered to the Québec public, the Québec people would have rather used other social services, and so they created their own. In addition, the provincial government had no economic or political power to build the necessary institutions that the population of the 60 s and 70 s needed. The programs, organizations, and movements, were almost all sponsored either by the Catholic Church (which until the late 70 s early 80 s still held a powerful position in community decisions), or United Ways (now Centreaid), or private donations (Raymond-Panet and Mayer, 1997:30 or Ninacs, 2003: 7). De Gaulle did not help the Federal cause in any way when he famously declared in a speech in July of 1967, in Montréal: Vive le Québec libre! (Long live free Québec). Anti- English protests and demonstrations were held in the entire province, for example, on April 24, 1968, 57

4 290 people were arrested during the St-Jean Baptist (the national patron saint of Québec day); on March 28, 1969, people marched in front of McGill University, an English university (Routhier, 2006). The dark side of social capital was slowly creeping into the lives and communities of Québec as increasingly extreme ideologies; mainly Marxist-Leninist and nationalistic organizations emerged (Raymond-Panet and Mayor, 1997: 30 or Ninacs, 2002). One of these newborn organizations, the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ), went as far as using terrorist methods to achieve their goals. The FLQ has been recognized to be the masterminds behind many bank robberies, bombings, and other violent crimes that have caused the deaths of at least five people. The now banned organization is most notorious for what is referred to as The October Crisis of The October Crisis started with the kidnappings on October 5, 1970 of James Richard Cross, a British diplomat and Pierre Laporte, the Québec Labor Minister. The War Measures Act was invoked shortly after the kidnappings, but even then, Mr. Laporte was found dead in a car trunk on the 17 th of the same month. The Crisis only ended in December with the expatriation of the FLQ leaders to Cuba, the release of the British diplomat and the disbanding of the FLQ organization and activities. Although the actions and methods of the Front de Libération du Québec were condemned by the vast majority of the French-Canadian population, the vast majority also thought that the Canadian government had reacted too strongly by imposing the War Measures Act (and affirming they would use it again, if necessary). The strong military intervention and arrest of more then 500 militants without warrants during the October Crisis in 1970 contributed to the perception of the state as a repressive class apparatus. (Raymond-Panet and Mayor, 1997: 36). The defeat of the Québec Provincial government to achieve its goals and its subsequent division into two fractions, as well as the October Crisis lead to a strong and steady growth of the independent movement. Many Quebeckers now felt there was no other way to attain cultural, social, and economic recognition than to form a sovereign nation. In 1976, the Parti Québecois (PQ) won the provincial elections. Their mandate was to give Québec back to the Quebeckers and thus started a number of reforms. In 1978, the 101 Law, making French not only the official language of Québec but also making it mandatory for all Quebeckers to learn and use in their work place was passed. In 1980, the first Québec referendum on Québec s possible independence was held. 59,56% of the people voted against the separation of 58

5 Québec from Canada (Le Directeur général des élections du Québec, 1980). The PQ (under René Levesque) nevertheless won the provincial election again in Starting in the 80 s Québec also saw a decrease in number of radical movements and organizations (Raymond- Panet and Mayer, 1997: 29). After so many years of extremist ideologies and social movements with so few results, the populations of Québec started to look for other ways of obtaining what they wanted. Neoliberalism ideology was also quickly taking over the minds of the Québec politicians, and businessmen (Raymond-Panet and Mayer, 1997: 46). On the federal side, the Canadian prime minister started proceedings in 1981 to bring a constitution to all Canadians. This had been a promise made to the Quebeckers who had voted for the no. In 1980, Trudeau had emphasized the fact that the new Constitution would unite all Canadians and that it would be based on dialogues and negotiations (Routhier, 2006). The mediating process thus started between the provincial and federal governments. Once a consensus was reached, Trudeau brought the draft before Parliament for the other provinces to have a say and ratify the new bill that would allow for a Canadian constitution to be put in place. Unfortunately, the bill was indeed ratified by all the other provinces, but the compromises Trudeau and Levesque had agreed upon were all removed. Québec looses its veto power; can choose not to take part in federal programs, but is not compensated for them; the transfers of executive powers over immigration, social programs, and communication to the provinces are all ignored. Once more, the provincial government and the citizens of Québec felt cheated and the Québec Party did not win the following elections of Talks for a new constitution, which Québec could agree to, have led to two failed Accords and many stalled negotiations. None of the constitutional reform proceedings has succeeded and to this day, Québec is still not fully recognized in the constitution in the same terms as the other provinces. The 1984 Constitution (available in English only) is still imposed on Québec and its population. In June of 1990, Québec formed a new political party: the Bloc Québecois, which represents the Quebeckers at the federal level. Two months later, a poll shows that 60% of the people in Québec would now vote for the nation s independence. At the provincial level, the National Assembly votes for a commission on the political and constitutional future of Québec to be held (called the Bélanger-Campeau Commission). A year later, the commission concludes that Québec has either of two options: first, the current constitutional status quo is 59

6 unacceptable and Québec necessitates a strongly decentralized federal government. Alternatively, Québec can decide to be a sovereign nation. Discontent with the Federal government is on the rise. In 1993, the Québec people show their dissatisfaction and distrust towards the Federal government, when the Bloc Québecois wins enough seats to be the official opposition party in the Canadian Parliament. A year later, it is the turn for the provincial elections to take place; the Parti Québecois wins the majority. They promise to hold a new referendum on Québec s independence. On October 30, 1995, Quebeckers go to the voting booth to decide if they want or not a sovereign nation. The outcome was closer then the first referendum, but the no wins once again, with a small majority of only 1,2%. As the history of the Chantier de l économie social starts about here, we will leave this section to focus on the events relating to our particular case. History of the Chantier de l économie social As Raymond-Panet and Mayer have observed, community development in Québec is clearly rooted in its social, economic, cultural and political fabric (1997: 52). Through various history lessons, the Québec community has learnt to have a certain cautious discontent towards their own provincial government and a high distrust towards the federal government of Canada, although they have always voted for cooperation with Canada rather then complete separation. Because the population was for so many decades on its own, and because of the prominent power of the Church on the community, Quebecers have had a tradition of strong community and social help: for example, Québec holds the highest rate of labor unions in North America (Mendell, 2003: 9). The average unionization rate in 2004 of the other provinces was of about 31,8%, the rate in the United States was of 13,8% but Québec s rate is at 40% (Kozhaya, 2005:1 and Ninacs, 2003: 11). This already goes to show how strong the networks are in Quebec compared to other North American regions. Putnam (2002) reserves an entire chapter on the study of unions in the United States. He uses them to measure in part social capital levels in the United States; unions is just one of the many other concrete representation of social and trust networks that have decreased in number in the last few years in the United States, and so has its social capital level. In the case of Quebec, this is not true. Workers of different fields seem to still have strong networks and trust relationships. 60

7 The 80 s were marked by a phase called the partnership model phase characterized by a three level consultation process between the businesses, the government, and the labor force (see for example Ninacs, 2002: 16 or Mendell, 2003: 6). What also appeared in the 1980 s is very particular to the province of Québec. Nationalistic sentiments grew very strong and with this, the population of Québec was trying to find substitute non-federal-government linked resources and solutions to their political, financial, social or health issues. Unfortunately, in 1982, a recession touched Québec; options for funding and support of organizations and networks would be limited. Many advocacy groups and social service organizations had a hard time surviving (Raymond-Panet and Mayer, 1997: 37, 43, or White: 1997: 62). A number of organizations that formerly worked separately started to unite in order to bring their strength and funding together, umbrella organizations started to form. The labor front and the living condition front started to make such alliances (Raymond-Panet and Mayer, 1997: 40). In the 80 s, political action through demonstrations and riots was no longer the only way to bring change: political lobbying also emerged as a new method of doing things (Raymond-Panet and Mayer, 1997: 43). Little by little, the organizations became increasingly specialized in order to meet strict funding criteria (in both the breadth of the actions, reach, and ideologies of the organization); in addition, voluntary action became more necessary then militant political action (Raymond- Panet and Mayer, 1997: 45). Finally as the economy was still lagging and both provincial and federal governments had a minimal budget for social services, all the organizations that helped either woman, workers, the youth or that promoted better housing and living conditions came to be seen as being the cheaper option of public services (Raymond-Panet and Mayer, 1997:46) Alternative resource centers in such areas as mental health, treatment for drugs and alcohol addiction, and homeless shelters also emerged, accompanying a wave of de-institutionalized approached to social and health issues. This period also saw the birth of community development organizations such as the Community Economic Development Corporations (CDECs), Community Futures, know under the name SADCs (Sociétés d aide au dévelopment des collectivités) in Québec; as well as social economy enterprises, health services users cooperatives, loan circles, homecare services, etc. Numerous civil and society initiatives, for example the Forum on Employment (Forum pour l emploi) 7 ( ) and Urgence Rurale, ( ), contributed to the recognition of these community groups. (Mendell, 2003: 6) 61

8 A feeling of discontent towards the government grew in the volunteer and social service organization as the government defined them as partners but treated them as subcontractors; the issues of recognition, funding, and respect for autonomy were all linked (Raymond-Panet and Mayer, 1997: 46). Another scholar says: the community groups inherit the problems the State it is not able to manage (Fournier, René, and Duval, 2001: 115). The 1990 s economy did not prove to be any better and many organizations continued to have the same problems as they had had in the 80 s. Volunteer work was even more valued and necessary and the selfhelp trend emerged (White: 1997: 62). The need for alliances and coalitions between various help networks and organizations was even more felt (Raymond-Panet and Mayer, 1997: 48). Organizations started taking profit of each other s networks and became increasingly apt at working in groups and bridging from one community or region to another. For example the Women s Federation of Québec, which was created in 1966, had about 30 member organization in the 80 s and this number went up to 60 by 1992: the total number of member associations went up to 160 by 2002 (Fédération des femmes website). In the summer of 1995, discontent with the provincial government reached its climax. The PQ s priority was to bring Québec s deficit to zero. The government proceeded to massive cuts, especially in the health system and other social service funds. In the minds of many Quebeckers, this was not a priority at all, for them it was more necessary to reduce poverty and invest more in social services: a zero deficit had to be accompanied by an impoverishment zero (Ninacs, Béliveau and Gareau, 2003: 4). In the eyes of many Quebeckers, the PQ seemed oblivious to certain alarming conditions of its citizens. In June of 1995, a report handed out by the National Council on Welfare showed that Québec had the highest poverty rate in Canada at 21% when the other provinces ranged around 17% (Bagnall, 1995; MacPherson, 1995 and Gagnon, 1995). Further on, the poverty level afflicted women more then it did men: in 1995, 15% of the men in Quebec lived in poverty compared to 21% of women (Bagnall, 1995; MacPherson, 1995 and Gagnon, 1995). In a different study, Statistics Canada also showed that 61% of Québec s minimum wage earners were women, and that the poorest of the poor were single mothers, (Bagnall, 1995; Gagnon, 1995). Finally, the unfairness of women s state was also due in part to the fact that 62

9 women who worked full-time were paid less then men, for the same work performed: in average, women were paid 73,9% of a men s salary. In June of the same year, a special event brought the need to invest more in social infrastructures to the attention of the provincial government 8. This event was the For Bread and Roses: Women s March Against Poverty organized by the Women s Federation of Québec. The Women s Federation of Québec started organizing about a year before the actual date of the March when they held a roundtable for about 60 women s organizations of Québec: as Nancy Neamtam, the president of the QFW, said: we can t wait upon the government to solve everything (Grégoire, 2004). The roundtable united a diverse set of organizations such as: the Québec Association of Native Women, the Community Center of South-Asian Women, the Immigrant s Women s Collective, the Tunisian Women s Circle of Canada, The Congress of Black Women of Canada and Maison D Haiti, people from different backgrounds were also invited to represent groups such as handicapped women, women living with AIDS, women farmers, students and many others (Bagnall, 1995). The purpose of the roundtable was to find a new approach to the problem of poverty many women faced in Québec. A few months later they came up with nine demands which they sent to Parizeau, the then Prime Minister of Québec. In their final requests the WFQ decided to not only focus on women, but to also include all the people affected by poverty, whether they be immigrants, students, welfare recipients or others. The demands included: 1. Social infrastructures and legislative measures to help parents combine work and family life (improved daycare service for example). 2. A pay equity law 3. Increase in the minimum wage from $6 an hour to $8, Minimum labor standards for people participating in government run employability programs. 5. Measures for the automatic collection of child-support payments to be put in place (This demand was accepted only two days after the Women s March began (McPherson, 1995). 6. Creation of a minimum of 1,500 social-housing units per year 7. Programs to help women obtain educational and professional training 63

10 8. The retroactive reduction of the time an immigrant woman must be sponsored by her husband from ten years to three years 9. A freeze on tuition fees and an increase in the number of financial aid programs available to students. (The demanded was accepted and since the student strike of winter 1996, there has not been any tuition fee increase) The March started at 8h30 a.m. of May 26, 1995 in Montréal, Longueil and Rivière-du- Loup and was going to end in front of the National Assembly in Québec city. It would be a 250 km walk for the women leaving from Montréal and Longueil and a 200 km march for the ones leaving from Rivière-du-Loup. 751 women were to march the whole way, whereas about 20, 000 to 25, 000 more would join them once they had reached the capital city 10 days later, to hear a speech given by Parizeau on the nine demands they had previously made (Bagnall, 1995 and Waller, Harper, Martin and Valiani, 2008: 4). The joiners, women and men, came from 150 different organizations across Québec (Guinan, 1995). The women had chosen the name after a strike held in Massachusetts in 1912 by mainly women and immigrant textile workers who demanded to put an end to child labor and their own near slavery-working conditions (Bagnall, 1995). Then and now, the bread represents the necessities of life whereas the roses represent the need for a decent quality of life (Bagnall, 1995 and Waller et al., 2008: 5). Originally, the WFQ expected to have about 150 marchers, but they were soon overwhelmed with the amount of people and help they were receiving. Solidarity brought all the women together. The oldest lady to join the entire 10-day walk was a 79 years old lady, Christine Sibillotte. Like other marchers, she was able to train at the YMCA who offered free memberships and training for the women participating in the march. Other enterprises and organizations gave various cash donations and others arranged for lodging and food during the trip. Help and support came from everywhere. Cafeterias opened their doors. People donated walking shoes. A well-known company offered fruit juices (Gagnon, 1995). The whole event brought all women of Quebec together and was an amazing show of solidarity amongst women. Some, like Mrs. Sibillotte joined for a specific cause, like pay equity, others like Carolle Poulin wanted to walk to bring attention to violence against women, but all joined for a same general purpose: bring governments attention to poverty and its particular impact 64

11 on women (Guinan, 1995). As Poulin stated, the march brought so many people together because it was a project where we [found] ourselves on a common front (Guinan, 1995). The Women s March Against Poverty was covered in all the major news outlets and even reached French newspapers in Europe such as Le Monde, or L Express, and it received attention from the population across Canada (see for example Grégoire 2004 and 2007). The Media co-operated to the fullest. The march made headlines on every TV newscast (Gagnon, 1995). It was such a success that in 2000, the WFQ was able to hold once again a World March Against Poverty, this time in 145 countries (Macan-Markar, 2000). The main goal of the march - to bring awareness to the poverty issue - was reached. As Favreau observes: Bread and Roses, the Women s March Against Poverty, was the primary catalyst for the arrival of the social economy in the public sphere throughout Québec (2006: 11). The march had many other positive results although it did take some time before all nine demands were dealt with. Most importantly, it brought attention to woman s exclusion from the labor market and the often unpaid and usually undervalued work that woman accomplish for society s benefit (Ninacs, 2002: 16). The WFQ has also built up its reputation as a major political player among state and non-state actors in ensuring women s rights and the rights of low-income people (Waller et al., 2008: 5). The economic and social economic development of Québec had traditionally ghettoized female employment sectors in low wage settings (Ninacs, 2003: 11), but there was a strong potential for woman to be raised out of poverty if their work in the social services and not-for-profit organization was recognized and paid for. The Pay Equity Act was passed in November 1996 and a Commission on equal pay was also formed (Gouvernement du Québec, 2007). Further on, there was a small minimum pay raise of 2.5% (up 45 cents). It was negotiated that the minimum pay would increase on a yearly basis; it is now at $8,50 an hour (Gouvernement du Québec, 2008). In addition, a $225 million fund was opened to be spread out over the course of 5 years and to be invested in the building of social infrastructures and the formation of two committees, both initially run by woman: the Comité d orientation et de concertation sur l économie social and the Regional Committees of the Social Economy (CRES). Another outcome that is worth mentioning is the crafting of the Bill 112 (finished in 2002): Act to Combat Poverty and Social Exclusion. Thanks to the hard work of the WFQ, fighting poverty is now a law in Québec. 65

12 In addition to all the previous gains the WFQ achieved, the Québec Government organized a Summit on the Economic and Social Future of Québec in March of 1996 because of the pressures of the WFQ (Mendell 2003: 7 and Waller et al., 2008: 7). It had not been enough to simply have a speech at the National Assembly; more had to be done, solutions had to be found. Many groups and organizations, ranging from woman s group to labor union groups, were all invited to join the discussion. This conference brought about two different chantier, or task forces in English: one on employment and the economy and the other on the reform of public services. The two task forces were then sub-divided into four different working groups that all later became task forces themselves, one of those was to become the Chantier de l économie sociale (Social Economy Task Force, but the Chantier has no official translated name thus we will continue to use the French designation). It was not always easy to build consensus between the various actors and the WFQ even decided to walk out during some of the negotiation to show their disagreement (Panet-Raymond, 1999: 342 and Waller et al., 2008: 7). The members of the task forces and organizations that took part in the consensus building process also worked in collaboration with lawyers and made sure all legislation processes were correct (Waller et al., 2008: 13). The task forces had to make reports for a summit to be held in the fall of the same year. The goal of the summit was to determine the criteria for a social contract between the governmental body and the civic society. The summit allowed for a large and diverse set of organizations and people to join, this type of discussion had never been done before, and probably would never be done again. The civil society had a chance to participate in the policy making process on an equal footing with the state and the private sector; many critical issues that had been raised repeatedly would finally be solved, at least in part. The Chantier de l économie sociale was composed of woman s groups, community organizations, the cooperative movement, the labor movement, the national movement, the youth groups and employer representatives all seeking common grounds: it is often referred to as the network of networks (Favreau, 2006:10, Mendell, 2003: 7). The mandate of the CES was to propose employment opportunity projects within the social economy and find alternatives to the deficient public services of the time. It was to represent the civil society when dealing with the government. After submitting the recommendations, it was decided that the CES continue to work for another two years. After the first two years were over in 66

13 December of 1998, it was found that the organization played an important role in Quebec s society and so it became an autonomous non-profit organization in the spring of It had to continue its original mission to serve as an intermediary on all matters relating to the social economy between the Quebec government and almost everyone else, [while playing] an organizational role, overseeing the development of new sector-based development programs, coordinating the work of regional and local social economy committees, exploring ways to increase training opportunities, and promoting research and development in the field. (Ninacs, 2002: 20) The Chantier de l économie sociale and the government agreed on various measures to develop the social economy of Quebec. First, it had to be recognized that social economy actors had an important role to play in the social and economic development of the state. The CES had to look for, counsel, and collaborate with these actors. Second came the criteria for funding. The CES not only needed funding to survive itself, but also to fund the social economy enterprises that would be under its umbrella. In order to support the financial needs of the organization, the government agreed upon a special fund to be established for the social economy. It also put in place a special comity (the Comité sectoriel de la main-d oeuvre de l économie social et de l action communautaire) to offer training and technical advice or project development analysis for the social economy sector. Finally, it allowed for risk capital funds to be available to not-for profit organization (Mendell, 1997: 8 and Ninacs, 2003: 14). There were of course other measures taken, but the two mentioned above were the main ones that brought the institutionalization of the social economy. Even though the institutionalization of the organization was necessary, it was important it remain autonomous and independent from governmental stronghold in order to effectively negotiate with government from the outside while making critical use of the structures within the state apparatus that represent the interests of the social economy (Mendell, 2003: 9). In its first phase alone the CES identified twenty-five projects with a potential to create jobs in the next three years within the social economy. The projects came from a variety of social services and fields such as homecare, daycare, peri-natal centers and housing, as well as training businesses, the environment, recycling, wildlife protection, social tourism, culture, and finally, information and communication. Even though politicians as well as people working for the CES have a hard time pinning down what exactly is meant by social 67

14 economy enterprises and projects, they can all agree on a general meaning: these enterprises do generate profit, but financial profit only comes in as a second goal behind helping other individuals and groups (Laidlaw, 2007). Further on, the CES has now developed a strict guideline on how to operate a business using environmentally friendly methods and materials (Dougherty, 2007). These various streams of activities are oriented towards social output rather then a maximization of profits: they prove there is another way of doing business (Grégoire, 2004). Ninacs observes that the Chantier s strategic approach has been to focus on developing social economy enterprises in key markets such as home care, child care, forestry, funeral services, and recycling while consolidating local financial and technical assistance for new social economy ventures (2002: 20). It seems like these enterprises are doing good business as they have kept on growing in number over the last few years. By 2001, the social economy sector in Quebec included 4,764 businesses (2,303 co-ops and 2,461 not-for-profits) with total revenues of 4,2 billion and offering 49, 450 jobs (Ninacs, 2002: 17-18). By that same year, the board of directors had 30 members: made up of representatives of umbrella organization of various social economy initiatives, networks of local development organizations, social economy regional committees, labor unions, social movements, research committees, and a few specific organizations supporting social economy initiatives. No other organization [played] as commanding a role as the Chantier in the development of the social economy in Quebec. (Ninacs, 2002: 19) By the end of 2004, there was a total of 6,000 social economy enterprises, employing people and generating 4,3 billion dollars in business. In 2007, the Chantier established its own trust of $52,8 million patient capital fund ( $52.8 million to develop the social economy, 2007 and Dougherty, 2007). Through the fund, loans ranging from $ to $1,5 million would go to start up various enterprises or social economy projects ( $2.6 M goes to eight Québec social economy enterprises, 2007). Over the course of five years, the Chantier de l économie social trust expected to invest about $49 million and hopes to generate $140 million in total investments ( $2.6 M goes to eight Québec social economy enterprises, 2007 and $52.8 million to develop the social economy, 2007). The new projects would lead to the creation of 5,000 additional jobs in the social economy sector (Dougherty, 2007). Almost half of the funds, $22.8 million, come 68

15 from the federal government, $12 million is invested by the Quebec Federation of Labour Solidarity Fund, another $10 million comes from the provincial government and the remaining $8 million comes from the investment fund of the Confederation des syndicats nationaux (the National Confederation of Unions) (Dougherty, 2007). Through their work and collective action, the people and especially the women working in the social economy sector finally gained more political representation in the government which contributed to economic and social development of the population (Grootaert and Van Bastelaer, 2002: 2) Discussion Since their beginnings, social movements in Québec do not only have very strong social and trust networks, but they also have been able to mobilize people and get media attention (Raymond-Panet and Mayer, 1997: 53). Grégoire observes that the community groups force resides in their formidable capability to constitute networks, and by so doing to mobilize the people (2004). Further on, Quebec ranks first for risk capital representing 40 per cent of funds available in Canada; it also has the greatest number of regional, local, and community development funds (Ninacs, 2002: 20). In addition, today s communities are strongly based on the strategies developed over the last years of community development experience. In many ways, community development programs have contributed to Quebec s specific social dynamic. Deena White says: Community action is now most likely to be kindled by the convergence of grassroots and government strategies in spite of their different objectives (1997: 62). In terms of democratic advancement, Québec s association s ability to mobilize people all across the region and challenge the government certainly leads to positive outcomes (Waller et al., 2008: 12). The Women Federation of Québec was not only able to bring together its own members and sister organizations together but it was also able to develop strong ties with outside networks and groups. They held a central role in setting a new agenda for the government as well as finding a new approach to the problems the community faced. It shows that social capital has been beneficial as it enabled people to get together and have power when facing the government: networking was key to getting the government to listen (Waller et al., 2008: 9). In terms of distrust, it enabled the people to request the 69

16 foundation of institutions, commissions, and laws in order to monitor the government s actions and in order to re-align their mutual interests. This approach to public policy building and reform allows for a more horizontal discussion, which according to the previous chapter on trust and power relations, we have seen tend to be more democratic. As Favreau explains: as a result of pressure from local communities and social movements horizontal public policy emerged. ( ) these policies were part of a greater regionalization movement in which all social actors were involved (enterprises, labour unions, co-operatives, community organizations, citizens). In short, these alternate policies called for a proactive state to work in partnership with local communities. (2006: 12) Before the appearance of the well-built mobilization and the Chantier de l économie social, the state acted passively and reacted to emergencies, further on, policies were in large part supported by business subsidies; there was no representation of the civil society (Favreau, 2006: 12). Founding the CES, as well as many of the other new institutions and laws that are now in place in Québec, has enabled the citizens of that nation to appreciate the democratic quality and capacities of the state rather then it s interventionist, authoritative or hierarchical qualities and capacities, (Favreau, 2006: 13 and Vaillancourt and Leclerc, 2008:22). It gave them a voice like no other time in history. Scholars (such as Bélanger and Lévesque, 1992 or Raymond-Panet and Mayer, 1997) have agreed that the search for a new social contract between the state and civil society has resulted in the current community movements in Québec. The civic society was able not only to access the services they needed through the various organizations, but also access political representation. What the present community development organizers must keep in mind is that: If community groups are to play the game, they have to make concessions while not relinquishing the basic values they stand for. ( ) The balance between critical viewpoint and concerted action is still necessary if community development is to influence policies and societal values. In any negotiation with the governments, it is important for the leaders involved to feel the pressure from their constituencies and to blend consensual and conflicting strategies. (Raymond-Panet and Mayer, 1997: 53) What social capital and democratic scholars must keep in mind, is that this case is a perfect example of distrust in the government guiding the people to organize and obtain what they need. The organizers had the support of the people through their networks and they were 70

17 able to negotiate with the governmental representatives with a cautious eye. The balance was found between trusting the available social institutions available (such as hiring lawyers) and networking skills with a constant distrust towards the government. Even once at the negotiation table, the balance was restored by having the civil society able to walk away from cooperation if necessary. Raymond-Panet and Mayer also states the radical movements of the 60 s and 70 s in a way kept the more institutionalized and service-oriented groups honest (1997: 53). Although we do not agree that radical movements really had any advantages other then push the populations to find a balance between inaction and terrorism, we do see that once these radical movements became more moderate, they indeed brought honesty or an aspect of heightened expressions of trustworthiness on the part of the more powerful political and social institutions. The strong social networks brought balance to the formerly power asymmetric relationship between the people of Québec and both the federal and provincial governments. According to the study of the case, we can confidently say that hypothesis one is correct. The government of Québec and Canada had great authority over the French- Canadian population of Québec. A trust relation, based on the definitions seen in chapter two would not have been possible. Further on, the relationship between the various governments in power with the population was one based on thin ties; there was almost no interaction between the two actors until a massive mobilization took place and enabled both parties to meet. According to the study of the case, we can confidently say that hypothesis two is also correct. The population s distrust towards the government did not create a barrier to cooperation. It was rather their distrust that led them to get together and take action. The population under study distrusted the government, in the sense that they did not believe their interests were aligned, they did not believe the government s intentions and motivations were embedded with their own. They nonetheless cooperated with the government, but remained suspicious. The organization approached the authorities with lawyers at their side and a large number of networks to show their own strength. They also took advantage of other trustworthy institutions such as the passing of bills and the establishment of specialized funds and commissions in order to monitor the actions of the government and make sure the trustworthiness as well as show of goodwill of the government would not be a short term deal. 71

18 In this case, the population s distrust in the government was important to the well-functioning democracy of Québec. 72