Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), Islamabad

Transcription

1 1 P a g e PAKISTAN S COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY By Gul Dad For Round Table with delegation of Centro Studi Internazionali (Ce.S.I) Musharraf & PPP s Eras During Mushraf and PPP s eras, Pakistan had been following a piecemeal 3-D policy to fight terrorism. This included Deterrence, Dialogue and Development as the government simultaneously engaged itself in dialogue with various militant outfits, worked on developmental work of the areas under influence of militancy while also used strong armed tactics against militant outfits in addition to banning some of them.1 Under Development strand, FATA Development Plan was initiated for Improving economic and social conditions of the people to mainstream them on sustainable basis through strategic development plan with a budget of US $2.06 billion which was to be partially funded by the GoP and the US. 2 The US also had a plan of setting up Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) with the view to provide duty free access to products developed in conflict zones into the US market but the plan was shelved due to lack of support from the US Congress. 3 Then the government announced the Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) project named Economic Revitalization of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) with the view to provide support to the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), attract Diaspora investment, and strengthen institutional capacities to foster investment and implement regulatory reforms. The project was conceived in response to the priority interventions 1 Zahid Ali Khan, "Military Operations in Fata and Pata: Implications for Pakistan," 31, no. 4 (2011). 2 Embassy of Pakistan, "Fata Development ( ),"(Economic Division, Embassy of Pakistan, 2008). 3 Kalbe Ali, "Us Withdraws Rozs Offer," The Dawn, 10 November 2012.

2 2 P a g e identified under the donor-supported Post Crisis Needs Assessment (PCNA) Report to be administered by the World Bank.4 With regards to dialogue, in June 2002, an agreement was made between Pakistan Army and local tribes of South Waziristan with the understanding that house and property of those who will shelter foreigners will be destroyed.5 In April 2004, government entered into a peace agreement named Shakai Peace Agreement with Nek Muhammad Wazir in which government agreed to withdraw forces from the area, pay compensation to those who lost their lives or property during military operation and ensure minimum interference in tribal affairs in addition to releasing all detainees. In return, local tribesmen pledged not to attack security forces and would not allow use of their soil for violent activities. It was also agreed that foreign militants will surrender before the forces in one month timeframe, which by the way they did not and thus this agreement failed to achieved desired outcome.6 In October 2004, an agreement was reached between the government and Ahmedzai tribes of South Waziristan. Through the agreement, it was decided that economic sanctions in the area would be lifted and all detainees would be released while militants/ tribesmen would not attack security forces in addition helping security forces to detain foreign fighters but this agreement could not lost for longer. However, in November 2004, another agreement was signed between the government and Ahmedzai tribes in which the latter agreed to hand wanted militants, cease attack on security forces and would not allow their territory to be used for attacks against foreign forces.7 In February 2005, an agreement Sararogha Peace Agreement was signed between Baitullah Mehsud (who later formed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and became its chief) and the government in South Waziristan. It was agreed that compensation will be paid to tribes for their losses due to military operations and the government will not target/attack Baitullah Mehsud while the latter will not attack security forces nor will give shelter to foreigners. 4 Post Crises Needs Assessment, FATA Development Authority, available: 5 Muhammad Amir Rana, Safdar Sial, and Abdul Basit, "Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in Fata," Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (2010). 6 Jones and Fair, "Counterinsurgency in Pakistan." 7 Hidayat Khan, "Pakistan s Contribution to Global War on Terror after 9/11 " IPRI Journal 13, no. 1 (2013).

3 3 P a g e But this agreement also proved to be a failure and could not continue for longer as both sides blamed each other for not abiding by the agreement.8 In September 2006, Miranshah Agreement was made that contemplated release of detainees, removing army check-posts and army s withdrawal, compensation for losses, etc in return for not attacking army and not giving shelter to foreigners. In February 2008, this agreement was extended to Wazir and Dawar sub-tribes with its application in whole of North Waziristan. However, the agreement was also a partial success and was actually meant to put the issues under the carpet.9 In February and March 2009, Bajaur Agreement was reached between the government and the militants deciding that security forces and government installations will not be targeted, militants will down their arms and surrender to tribal elders who will give surety of their conduct, compensation will be paid for losses due to military operation, parallel judicial system will disbanded, foreign elements would not be given shelter and no attack will be carried to any foreign country (read across the border in Afghanistan).10 In May 2008, a 16-point Swat Agreement was signed between the government and the militants in Swat with the objective to end militancy in the area whereby the militants headed by present TTP Chief Maualana Fazalullah agreed to enter into ceasefire, disband their militia, not attack security forces and government officials/ installations, eliminate all sources of militancy and stop training suicide bombers, etc. In return, the government agreed to enforce Sharia Law in Swat and agreed to withdraw forces in phased manner. However, the agreement could not last for longer as the differences on implementation of the agreement aroused. Militants did not surrender as was agreed and asked the government to first withdraw the forces.11 Under Deterrence, various operations were carried out including Operation Al-Mizan ( ) in FATA with specific focus on South Waziristan, Operation Zalzala (2008) in South Waziristan, Operations Sher Dil (in Bajaur Agency), Rah-e-Haq, and Rah-e-Rast ( ) in Swat, Operation Rah-e-Nijat ( ) in South Waziristan. The Deterrence aspect of the 8 Amir Mir, "War and Peace in Waziristan," Asia Times, 4 May Khan, "Pakistan s Contribution to Global War on Terror after 9/11 ". 10 Rana, Sial, and Basit, "Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in Fata." 11 Daud Khattak, "Reviewing Pakistan s Peace Deals with the Taliban," CTC Sentinel 5, no. 9 (2012).

4 4 P a g e policy was aimed at enhancing security measures that restrict terrorists from carrying out acts of terrorism. In addition, Deterrence aspect also included banning of various militant organizations.12 In August 2001, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sepah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP) were banned; in January 2002, Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Lakhar-e-Taeba (LeT), Sepah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Tehreek-e-Jaafria Pakistan (TJP), Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammad (TNSM), and Tehreek-e-Islami were banned; in March 2003, AI-Qaeda was banned; In November 2003, Millate-Islamia Pakistan (formerly SSP), Khuddam-ul-Islam (formerly JeM), Islami Tehreek Pakistan (formerly TJP), Jamiat-ul-Ansar, Jamiat-ul-Furqan, and Hizbut Tehrir were banned; in October 2014, Khair-un-Nas International Trust was banned; in April 2006, Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) was banned; in August 2006, Islamic Students Movement of Pakistan was banned; in June 2008, Lashkar-e-Islam, Ansar-ul-Islam, Haji Namdar Group were banned; in August 2008, Tehreek-e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was banned; in September 2010, Balochistan Republican Army (BRA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), Laskhar-e-Balochistan (LeB), Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF), Balochistan Muslla Defa Tanzeem (BMDT) were banned; in October 2011, Shia Tulaba Action Committee, Gilgit, Markaz Sabeel Organisation, Gilgit, Tanzeem Naujawanae-Ahle Sunnat (TNA), Gilgit, and Peoples Aman Committee (Lyari), Karachi were banned; in February 2012, Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) formerly SSP was banned; in March 2012, AI Harmain Foundation and Rabita Trust were banned; in April 2012, Anjuman-e- Imamia Gilgit- Baltistan and Muslim Students Organisation (MSO) Gilgit-Baltistan were banned; in August 2012, Balochistan Bunyad Parast Army, Tehreek Nafaz-e- Aman, Tahafuz Hadudullah, Balochisan Waja Liberation Army, Baloch Republican Party Azad, Balochistan United Army, Islam, Jaish-e- Islam, and Balochistan National Liberation Army were banned. In addition to these banned militant organizations, three militant outfits, in December 2005, were enlisted under UNSCR 1267 namely AI-Akhtar Trust, AI-Rashid Trust and Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) while Sunni Tehreek had been put under watch list in January Web Desk, "List of Banned Organisations in Pakistan," Express Tribune 24 October "List of Banned Organisations in Pakistan," Express Tribune 2012, Accessed on 20 October 2014.

5 5 P a g e Despite implying various ways and means, Pakistan failed to achieve desired objectives in its fight against terrorism and the militancy continued to expand. One of the reasons behind failure of these policies was lack of clarity on the part of various state institutions and lack of support from masses as people felt that Pakistan is fighting a US war and killing its own people. There was a strong opinion among some top political parties that instead of using force, Pakistan needs to initiate dialogue with various militant outfits and bring them to the mainstream. Counter-Terrorism Policy Post Elections In 2013 General Elections, pro-talks political parties came into power with Pakistan Muslim League- Nawaz (PML-N) forming the government in the Centre while Pakistan Tehreeke-Insaf (PTI), in coalition with Jamat-e-Islami, was given mandate to form the government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. All these parties were strong proponent of initiating dialogue with militant outfits as a means to end bloodshed in the country. Subsequently, efforts of peace talks were made by the end of 2013 and start of As a result of these peace efforts, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the amalgamate of various militant outfits, announced one month s ceasefire effective from 1 March 2014 which was later extended for another ten days.14 While there has been some notable reduction in violence in the country during the ceasefire period but some notable militant attacks including one in a district courts in Islamabad as well as attacks in Quetta and Peshawar did occur, as some factions within the TTP were against holding talks with the government but majority of TTP were in favour of talks. In the meanwhile, the federal government on 24 February 2014 announced first ever security policy called National Internal Security Policy (NISP), containing three major elements: dialogue with all stakeholders; isolating terrorists from their support bases; and enhancing deterrence through capacity-building to enable the security apparatus to neutralize threats to internal security.15 This suggested that the government was seriously pursuing a dialogue option 14 Halimullah Kousary, "Islamabad-Pakistan Taliban Peace Talks: Shifting Focus to Afghanistan,"(Singapore: Nanyang Technological University, 2014). 15 Muhammad Amir Rana, A review of National Internal Security Policy, available at

6 6 P a g e but had a plan to deal with irreconcilable elements with iron hand in addition to focusing capacity building of relevant security institutions. Despite some serious efforts, the talks could not enter into serious negotiation mode in the wake of a high profile Karachi Airport Attack on 8 June 2014, which was claimed by the TTP. After the attack, prospects of peace talks completely diminished and the military, in mid-june 2014, started Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan agency of FATA, where militants were having a stronghold and even had their offices in Miranshah and Mir Ali and they used to patrol the area as if they were legitimate force with policing powers. This operation was supported by almost all political parties as even the pro-talks parties also realized that militants were not serious in negotiations. With the view to restrict movement of militants into other settled areas, security forces also launched intelligence based operations across the country. Military also launched operations Khyber-I, Khyber-II and Khyber-III in October 2014, March 2015 and August 2015 in Khyber Agency, which is adjacent to Peshawar and the area was being used by militants to mount attack in adjoining settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Since Khyber Agency also connects with Afghanistan, militants and criminals were using this area for their to-and-fro movement into Afghanistan. Operation Zarb-e-Azb and Khyber-I in FATA during 2014 and intelligence based operations across the country brought about a substantial change in security situation across the country. However, militants were still able to carry out attacks in various parts of the country. In December 2014, militants launched devastating Army Public School attack in Peshawar that sent a shockwave across the country as at least 131 school children and 10 others including teachers and school s principal were killed and over 150 others injured. This unfortunate and brutal attack on school children brought the whole nation closer, diminished moral support of the militants among the masses, and the nation demanded taking serious action against the perpetrators of this heinous crime. Resultantly, political and military leadership of the country came up with a unanimous and comprehensive counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategy known as National Action Plan (NAP).

7 7 P a g e NAP included following16:- 1. Implementation of death sentence of those convicted in cases of terrorism. 2. Special trial courts under the supervision of Army. The duration of these courts would be two years. 3. Militant outfits and armed gangs will not be allowed to operate in the country. 4. NACTA, the anti-terrorism institution will be strengthened. 5. Strict action against the literature, newspapers and magazines promoting hatred, extremism, sectarianism and intolerance. 6. Choking financing for terrorist and terrorist organizations. 7. Ensuring against re-emergence of proscribed organizations. 8. Establishing and deploying a dedicated counter-terrorism force. 9. Taking effective steps against religious persecution. 10. Registration and regulation of religious seminaries. 11. Ban on glorification of terrorists and terrorist organizations through print and electronic media. 12. Administrative and development reforms in FATA with immediate focus on repatriation of IDPs. 13. Communication network of terrorists will be dismantled completely. 14. Measures against abuse of internet and social media for terrorism. 15. Zero tolerance for militancy in Punjab. 16. Ongoing operation in Karachi will be taken to its logical end. 17. Balochistan government to be fully empowered for political reconciliation with complete ownership by all stakeholders. 18. Dealing firmly with sectarian terrorists. 19. Formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, beginning with registration of all refugees. 20. Revamping and reforming the criminal justice system. 16

8 8 P a g e Since military operations in FATA and devising National Action Plan security situation in the country witnessed a substantial change, as shown below, although sporadic incident of violence including some notable ones continued. Source: PICSS Militancy Database After a comparative reduction in violence across the country, militants of various shades struck not only FATA but also in Punjab, KPK, Balochistan and Sindh in February This included some notable attacks including attack on a religious shrine in Sewan Sharif in Sindh, which was claimed by Daesh/Islamic State. In the wake of sudden increase in violence, Pakistan Army announced the initiation of a key countrywide urban counterterrorism operation, code-named Raddul Fasaad, to deal with the problem of resurgent terrorism. Another important development was related deployment of Rangers in Punjab to help provincial agencies to curb rising tide of militancy. Assessment of National Action Plan Brief assessment of NAP is as under:- Pakistan lifted the self-moratorium on capital punishment and hanged those already convicted.

9 9 P a g e To ensure conviction and quick disposal of terrorism-related cases, military courts were established for two years (till 7 January 2017) via the 21st Constitutional Amendment, and amending Pakistan Army Act, which were extended in March 2017 for another two years through 23 rd Constitutional Amendment and through amending Pakistan Army Act. Reportedly, a total of 275 cases of terrorism had been referred to the military courts in their first tenure of two years while the courts sentenced 161 militants to death, whereas another 116 were given jail terms, mostly life sentences. After extension, military courts resumed their work. To enhance the efficacy of the existing anti-terrorism courts and reduce the backlog of cases in Sindh, the apex committee decided to install 30 additional courts. No such development was seen in other provinces. One point reiterates armed militias won t be allowed to operate. It conforms to Article 256 of the Constitution. In FATA, the army dismantled the infrastructure and training facilities of such militias. In Karachi, the Rangers and police jointly reduced the operational space for such forces. Strengthening and activating NACTA lies in the federal government s domain. There is still a need to empower NACTA. Joint Intelligence Directorate has been established and a brigadier-level officer from Pakistan Army has been appointed its head. NACTA has initiated Countering Violent Extremism National Policy. Madrassah reforms being pursued by relevant ministries. Provinces claim that 100 work on geo-tagging of madrassahs have been completed. NACTA and ITMP (Itehand-e-Tanzeem-e-Madaris, a representative body of madrassahs) have agreed for audit of madrassah accounts in addition to agreeing for development of Madrassah registration form. Ministry of education is working on mainstreaming of madrassahs and negotiations between a committee of relevant government officials and ITMP are at the final stage for introducing contemporary education in madrassahs and settling issues related to their degrees. Ministry of Religious Affairs and ITMP are working for removing hate material from syllabi of madrassahs and negotiations are also in the final stage.

10 10 P a g e Countering hate speech and extremist material is the shared jurisdiction of the district administration, police, and special branches of the provincial police. Crackdown has been conducted against sectarian literature in the country but it is an unending struggle, which can be complimented through other soft interventions. Many books, magazines, and periodicals have been banned. However, social media is not under government s control. A PTA team tries to block blogs of militants in Pakistan but they are accessible through proxy. Reporting of social media accounts is also underway. Although hate speech could not be stopped and it may not be stopped forever but a consistent pressure keeps the message limited to fewer audience now. Choking financing for militant groups: On the orders of State Bank of Pakistan, banks froze accounts of at least 4000 individuals for suspicions of terror financing. State Bank s Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU) is operational since 2009 but FMU was considered ineffective to choke finances for terrorism. Resultantly, the government decided to establish the National Terrorists Financing Investigation Cell to track financial transactions meant to fund extremism and terrorism. It is also pertinent to note that kidnapping for ransom was one of the major sources of finance, which is significantly dropped due to IBOs in the country. Ensuring against re-emergence of proscribed organizations: In acting against the re-emergence of proscribed groups, ministry of interior has already notified such organizations. In the provinces, it s the responsibility of the Counter Terrorism Department, Special Branch, police and administration to reduce the room for such groups. It is also their joint responsibility to ensure they don t resurface with new names. However, government is blamed for not going hard on certain groups due to some political consideration. Surfacing of head of banned outfit Sipa-e- Sahaba Moulana Ludhyanvi in public rallies as well as meeting with interior minister Ch. Nisar stir sever criticism in the media. Raising and deploying a dedicated Counter Terrorism force is linked to the provinces. No independent force erected at national level so far though

11 11 P a g e recruitment process has lately been seen, however, counter terrorism departments of police have been reinforced and operationalized at the provincial levels. Taking effective steps against religious persecution: Constitutionally minorities are well protected however; government needs to give more attention to protect minorities. A bill has been passed by Sindh Assembly against forced conversions of minorities. Hindu Marriage Bill has been enacted at the national level. Ban on glorification of terrorism and militant groups through print and electronic media is the responsibility of PEMRA and media gatekeepers. The drafting of the Electronic Media Code of Conduct is a positive intervention. Now mainstream media does not give coverage to statements and claims of militants. Glorification of terrorism was already not allowed but militants do not seek permission from government for their actions. FATA Reforms: Federal cabinet has approved recommendations of the FATA reforms committee, which inter-alia includes the merger of the tribal areas with Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and repeal of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). 5-year transition period suggested. Socio-economic development in the area, rehabilitation of TDPs, and development of Infrastructure; establishing elected local bodies before end of 2017; extending jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court while retaining Jirga system; capacity building of Levies for policing; capacity building of FC for efficient border management; carrying out Land Settlement and preparing GIS based computerized land record. Constitutional amendment would be required to implement some of recommendations of the committee. Dismantling communication networks of terrorist organisations: Government made sure biometric verification of SIM Cards and in the process millions of unverified numbers have been blocked. Measures have been taken to stop Afghan SIMs in Pakistan s border areas. Govt suspends mobile phone networks on the eve

12 12 P a g e of important occasions which cause irritation for public but it saves many lives as well. Measures against internet and social media abuse for terrorism purposes is the domain of the FIA s cybercrime unit and PTA. Apart from legal intervention, the capacity-building of investigators is required, for which no worthwhile progress was witnessed. The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 for protection against cybercrimes was enacted in August 2016 though the act was criticised for being against the spirit of freedom of expression and freedom of speech. Zero tolerance for militancy in Punjab: Province-wise operation against LeJ has been seen since NAP announced. Malik Ishaq and Haroon Bhatti and many other top militants have been eliminated in Punjab which was blamed previously for having an unannounced alliance with LeJ militants. Punjab has lost its interior minister to a suicide bombing in the process. Also DAESH remained prime target of security forces in the province during the year. Now paramilitary Rangers has been deployed in Punjab to fight terrorism. Taking the ongoing operation in Karachi to its logical conclusion, the federal agencies FIA, NAB and Rangers are actively assisting the Sindh government. To make reconciliation a success in Balochistan is the responsibility of the center, the provincial government and the political parties. Progress has been made as hundreds of militants along with key commanders have laid their weapons with reconciliation efforts by the government. Last two years have seen unprecedented celebrations of Pakistan s national days in the province. Alienated public is merging back into national folds. Dealing firmly with sectarian militants pertains to home departments, police and special branches. Actions are being taken however, government is blamed by rival leaders of opposing sects. Emergence of DAESH, its collaboration with Lashkar-e- Jhanvi Al-Aalami, recruitment of Shia youth by Iranian backed organizations for Syria and Iraq have made things further complicated for the State.

13 13 P a g e The policy on Afghan refugees rests with the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, the Foreign Office and the provinces. Some progress was made. Prevailing security situation in Afghanistan is one of the main hindrances. Government has extended the deadline of repatriation of registered Afghan Refugees a number of times in 2016 and finally it is extended till the end of Some background efforts towards reforming the criminal justice system was made but its pace is too slow. Counter-terrorism Issues and Challenges Internally, although questions are being raised, sometime very rightly, about slow progress on NAP by the civilian government and the issue has been one of the contentious points affecting civil-military relations yet one needs to understand that most of the issues in which progress has been slow are in fact societal in nature and there is no quick fix solution for them. In addition, institutional weaknesses and capacity of relevant government officials is also an important factor that seriously affect NAP implementation. One such issue is reforming, empowering and capacity building of police as effective policing is pivotal for long term counterterrorism as engagement of military for internal security is neither viable nor feasible. Notwithstanding these factors, there are issues with NAP itself as the formulator of the plan, while being emotionally charged due to APS attack, did not provide mechanism for proper evaluation and monitoring of various segments. More than three years down the road since inception of NAP federal government is not able to devise such a mechanism. On external front, Indian and Afghan intelligence agencies in meddling into internal affairs of Pakistan and support to anti-pakistan elements are being slated as one of the main reasons for instability in Pakistan. In addition, instability in Afghanistan is also a major factors that is affecting Pakistan s fight against terrorism as almost all of the anti-pakistan militant outfits have their basis across the border in Afghanistan from where they plan attacks in mainland Pakistan, train their cadres and also mount attacks into Federally Administrated Tribal Areas. Mistrust and uneasy relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan are counter-productive for any meaningful

14 14 P a g e cooperation regarding handling these militant groups. Prevailing bilateral environment also does not bode well for cooperation at the border.